Post Cold War problems and prospects∗

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Post Cold War problemsand prospectsKennedy Graham aa Parliamentarians for Global Action , NewYorkPublished online: 08 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Kennedy Graham (1992) Post Cold War problemsand prospects , Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly PacificaReview: Peace, Security & Global Change, 4:1, 89-107, DOI:10.1080/14781159208412748

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COMMUNICATION PAGE 89

Post Cold War Problems and Prospects*Kennedy GrahamParliamentarians for Global Action, New York

We are entering a new era that will define the early part of the 21stcentury. The past year has been, as the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations puts it, "another year in a series marking a greatturning point in history" (Perez de Cuellar 1991b, p.3). There isno guarantee, yet a reasonable prospect, that the "new worldorder" proclaimed by our leading global figures will reflect a newlevel of enlightenment in international relations. But what are theproblems and prospects, in the early post-Cold War period, ofbuilding an alternative global security system to that which has pre-vailed during the 20th century?

Throughout the century, the political mechanism, the frame-work, for strengthening civilisation has continually grown. Thevehicles through which progress is made — the nation-state andinternational organisation — have continually changed with thedevelopment of international law and political custom. Nation-states are moving tectonically together, gradually sharing values,ceding sovereignty, and shifting the loci of decision-making tohigher levels of authority. Three abstractions of political life —values, power and sovereignty — best reflect the steady movementfrom the national to the global body politic in the present age.

In this paper, it is intended to consider peace — defined as themaintenance of international peace and security, including theprocess of disarmament — from the viewpoint of the above threeabstractions. To what extent is the goal of peace, as a value,shared? To what extent can we enforce the peace? Who, or whatinstitutions, are best suited to take the critical decisions relevant tothese requirements — and what changes in sovereignty arerequired for this?

The Legacy of the Cold WarThe steady strengthening of international law and organisation,taken in the broader view, has been little short of spectacular. Over* Paper originally delivered at the Xth Annual Asian Peace Research Association Congress, Christchurch, New Zealand,31 January - 4 February.

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four millennia from Sargon to Napoleon, empires and nations roseand fell under the free hand of the sword. Even in the 19th centuryfollowing the Congress of Vienna, peace was sought through a bal-ance of power that rested on the continuing right to warfare. Thefirst seminal step on the road to establishing peace as a value wasthe first attempt at collective security in 1919. Several novel mea-sures were introduced in the Covenant of the League. The conceptof aggression was introduced and its perpetration proscribed.Conflict was to be a matter of "continuing concern" to the centralorganisation which would take action to safeguard the peace. The"illegal" resort to war by a member state would be deemed to be anact of war against all.

Yet the proscription of war was not, under the Covenant, total.The right to initiate war was restricted but not eliminated: amember state could, if adjudication procedures had beenexhausted, resort to hostilities. And aggression was not defined,being left open to a subjective interpretation by the parties con-cerned. Third.the League's jurisdiction did not extend to non-members, including those states which exercised their right toleave the organisation, as some did, at the critical moment.

Succeeding years have seen steady progress in remedying theseshortcomings and strengthening the fabric of peace. In 1928, theParis Pact placed the final constraint on aggression. Warfare per sewas henceforth illegal: states could only resort to military combatin self-defence — an injunction reaffirmed in the UN Charter of1945.* Second, the concept of aggression was defined over fortyarduous years, being captured in a UN resolution of 1974 (UNGA3314[XXIX]). Third, the UN Charter — the second generation ofcollective security — extended its jurisdiction to all states of theworld, thereby proclaiming universal peace on the planet in inter-national law for the first time.

Both enforcement powers and centralised decision-making havesimilarly strengthened with the two generations of collective secu-rity. Under the Covenant, the League's powers of enforcementagainst aggression, and indeed the judgement of aggression itself,

* The operative part of the UN Charter does not use the term "war". That term is referred to only as an historical recol-lection in the preamble. Article 2(4) refers to the more precise terms: "aggression", "threats to peace", and "breach of thepeace" - the criteria since 1945 for triggering collective security through economic and military action. Strictly, there isno such thing as war today, the operation in the Gulf being an enforcement action to suppress aggression. In the realworld, however, the conflict was still described as a war, including by its chief prosecutor, the US President.

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were fatally weak, based as they were on the sovereign discretion ofeach member state. An act of aggression would trigger immediateand mandatory economic sanctions, but the military action thatmight, as necessary follow, could only be recommended by theLeague's Council and rest on the voluntary contribution of mem-bers' armed forces.

The UN Security Council was vested with far greater judgmentaland enforcement powers than its predecessor. The Council deter-mines, on behalf of the total membership, an act of aggression or athreat to, or breach of, the peace. It has the power of bindingenforcement action of both economic and military means.Member states have, for nearly half a century now, relinquished theessence of their national sovereignty through agreeing, under theCharter, to allow territorial access to UN-orchestrated forces and tocontribute their own armed forces, including air power, to the UNupon the Council's call.

The implementation in the real world of these theoretical inno-vations has been scant. The 1920s and '30s fell completely short ofthe standards of collective security, with member states seeking toweaken the Covenant, leaving the League, committing aggressionand failing to enforce sanctions. Over the following half-century,from the 1940s to the '80s, the stronger mechanism for peace thatis the United Nations was left under-utilised. Collective securitythrough enforcement action was rendered inoperable through aninstitutional paralysis occasioned by ideological antagonism andthe veto. Enforcement power was used only twice in fifty years — in1950 when the UN authorised a military coalition under UN com-mand to repel aggression in Korea,* and in 1965 when it authoriseda permanent member to impose a naval blockade in support ofeconomic sanctions against Rhodesia. The Congo peacekeepingoperation in the early 1960s resembled an enforcement operation,with ONUC forces fighting local rebels under a mandate to "restorelaw and order in the country"." But it is generally seen today assomething of an aberration that sheds no light on the way ahead inthe maintenance of peace.* The Security Council resolution of 25 June 1950 noted the "armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from NorthKorea" which constituted a "breach of the peace". North Korea was never identified as the aggressor, although a subsequent reso-lution did identify the PRC as an aggressor, after its forces were committed to combat. The resolution of 27 June recommendedthat member states lend "every assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restoreinternational peace and security in the area". A third resolution of 7 July established a unified UN command. All these resolu-tions were adopted in the absence of the USSR, whose subsequent return to the Council prompted the. Assembly to adopt itsUniting for Peace resolution, according itself the competency to handle the crisis.** Security Council resolution 143 of 14 July 1960 called upon Belgium to wididraw its troops from the Congo (but did not nameBelgium as an aggressor) and authorised the Secretary-General to provide die Congo with military assistance. The Council wasacting under chapter VII but did not explicitly refer to article 39 concerning any aggression, threat to the peace or breach thereof.


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During the past half-century, international security — the avoid-ance of a third world war — was underpinned by deterring aggres-sion, not through UN collective security, but through nuclear deter-rence between East and West with a global destructive capacity atthirty minutes' notice. While strategic stability was achieved betweencapitalism and communism in the developed world, conflict becameendemic in the Third World, inflamed rather than cooled by super-power behaviour. Under the strategic arch of nuclear deterrence,the innovative practice of UN peacekeeping helped in the termina-tion of hostilities once the belligerents had reached the point of mili-tary exhaustion. But it was decidedly ineffective in preventing orcontaining such hostilities. It was a dreadfully dangerous period, andits destructive capacity remains to haunt the planet today.

The Transition PeriodThe end of the Cold war following the Gorbachev reforms, symbol-ised in the Malta proclamation in 1989 of a "new era of co-opera-tion", has fundamentally reshaped the political-strategic face of theworld. Superpower co-operation in the late 1980s triggeredprogress in both disarmament and international security.

The INF and START agreements, followed by the reciprocal Bush-Gorbachev proposals of September 1991, comprise major first stepsin strategic nuclear arms reductions and world-wide tacticalnuclear arms withdrawals. With the down-grading in the alertstatus of the superpowers' strategic commands, these developmentsrender the planet safer from superpower conflict than it has beensince the 1950s. The independence of the fifteen Soviet republics,four of which retain strategic and tactical nuclear weapons on theirterritories, portends a new kind of nuclear instability for the world.But it also offers new opportunity for a qualitative break with thepast. The policies of Belarus and Ukraine to move expeditiouslytoward a nuclear-free status are tantamount to the first completeunilateral disarmament measures yet undertaken. The unknownfactor at present, and the main challenge, is whether Russia andKazakhstan can agree on the status of the nuclear weapons on thelatter's territory: whether they will genuinely remain under a uni-fied command, or whether Kazakhstan will seek to assert politicalcontrol over them as a counter-balance to Russia's nuclear arsenal.*• The Declaration of the Commonwealth of Independent States, signed by 11 former Soviet republics on 21 December andreaffirmed in Minsk on 30 December, states: "In order to ensure international strategic stability* and security, allied com-mand of the military-strategic forces and a single control over nuclear weapons will be preserved. The sides respect eachothers' desires to attain the status of a non-nuclear or neutral state." Recent disputes between Russia and Kazakhstan overnuclear weapon transfer have effectively been resolved, with Kazakhstan (and Belarus and Ukraine) agreeing to sign theNPT.


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Despite progress in bilateral arms control, enforcement powersfor multilateral disarmament remain weak. START and INF brokenew ground in verification, but the mechanism for compliancewith the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains shabbily ineffective, asthe Iraqi and Korean experiences demonstrate. And the sovereignauthority that decides non-compliance remains disassembled, thestates parties having no guiding provision under the Treaty forcomplaint or redress.

In maintaining peace and security, the UN has been re-oxygenated by the co-operation between the superpowers, symbol-ised in resolution 44/21 of 1989 and the commitment of the G-7nations in July 1991 to a "revitalised United Nations [which] willhave a central role in strengthening the internationalorder...[and]...fulfil completely the promise of its founders" (UNGA44/21; 'Strengthening the International Order'). Its new-foundeffectiveness was manifest initially in the recent peacekeepingoperations in Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Angola and Namibia in thelate 1980s and Nicaragua, Western Sahara, Cambodia and ElSalvador in the early 1990s. To date, peacekeeping has been con-fined to conflict between sovereign member states. In November1991, however, the Security Council, focusing on the Yugoslavcrisis, raised the prospect for the first time of a UN peacekeepingforce intervening in an internal conflict of a member state (UNSC721). Given that the overwhelming majority of conflicts today con-cern internal disputes within states, this development could havefar-reaching repercussions for the maintenance of internationalpeace and security in a new world order.

The potency of the UN to date, however, has been most vividlyportrayed in the enforcement action it undertook under chapterVII in the Gulf in early 1991. The binding decisions by the SecurityCouncil in response to Iraqi aggression — twenty-three resolutionsover fifteen months — have taken the power of the United Nationsto unprecedented lengths, indeed into new and uncharted consti-tutional terrain.

Enforcing the peace under chapter VII through twelve resolu-tions between August and November 1990, the Council, inter alia,determined a breach of the peace, condemned Iraq's invasion andcalled for a withdrawal; imposed economic, maritime and aircraftsanctions; declared the annexation of Kuwait invalid; and autho-rised members states to use all necessary means to effect an Iraqiwithdrawal and restore international peace and security to the area


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(UNSC 600, 661, 662, 664, 670, 678; see also UNSC 665, 666, 667, 669,674 and 677). Resolution 678 is the first time that a militaryenforcement operation has been conducted by the UN with theconsent of all major powers acting through the Security Council.The first time, thus, that collective security has been effectivelyprosecuted in the seventy years since the system was introduced asthe stated means of maintaining the peace. Yet while the decision-making procedure in the Gulf operation was an improvement overKorea in terms of great power consent, its execution was some-thing of a regression. The Gulf enforcement action was "sub-con-tracted" to a multinational coalition and, unlike the Korean opera-tion, it was not under UN command. And the decision itself toresort to force was seen by some as premature or overbearing,although such concerns address the political wisdom of the action,not its constitutionality.

The ferocity of the action to expel Iraq, moreover, described as"near apocalyptic" by the UN assessment team (UN SecurityCouncil S/22366), prompted the Secretary-General to issue asolemn note of caution. The enforcement action, he believed, wasnot carried out exactly in the form foreseen by article 42 et sequen-tia of chapter VII. In the circumstances, he said, and given the costsimposed and capabilities demanded by "modern warfare", thecoalition arrangement seemed unavoidable. But the experiencesuggested the need for a "collective reflection" on questions relat-ing to the future use of the powers vested in the Security Councilunder chapter VII. These concerned, inter alia, application of therules of proportionality and humanitarian law, reporting responsi-bilities of member states to the Security Council, and whetherenforcement action under chapter VII should be seen as subject toany limitation. Enforcement, concluded the Secretary-General in asubtle rebuke of coalition conduct, was "a collective engagement,which requires a discipline all its own" (Perez de Cuellar 1991a;and de Cuellar 1991b, p.8).

Subsequent to the hostilities and in eleven resolutions betweenMarch and October 1991, the UN moved beyond military enforce-ment into several new areas of "political enforcement". Explicitlyinvoking chapter VII and thus imposing mandatory decisions onmember states, the Council has, inter alia, determined full liabilityby Iraq for its actions, including the environmental damage itcaused; reaffirmed the 1963 boundaries between the disputantcountries; "decided" that Iraq shall "unconditionally accept" the

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destruction of all its chemical and biological weapons and missileswith a range of over 150 km; and "decided" that Iraq "shall uncon-ditionally agree" not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons (UNSC686, 687; see also UNSC 692, 699, 700).

In implementation of these decisions, the Council deployed UNobserver units to monitor the demilitarised zone; formed a SpecialCommission on Iraq's weapons and missile capability, granting itimmediate on-site inspection rights in Iraq; created a CompensationFund for all liability claims; established a Governing Council inGeneva to oversee the work of the Commission and the Fund;authorised the IAEA and the Commission to "conduct activities" nec-essary to carry out their mandate, the costs to be borne by Iraq;established a mechanism for determining the appropriate level ofIraq's contribution to the Fund, deciding upon 30% of its annualoil exports; allowed Iraqi oil exports up to a limit of $1.6 billion, theproceeds to be paid into a separate escrow account; and assignedone-third of the proceeds to humanitarian needs in the country(UNSC 687, 705, 706). So far, however, Iraq has refused to recom-mence its oil sales for such humanitarian purposes.

Upon discovering that it had concealed equipment and informa-tion from its inspection teams, the UN "demanded" that Iraq pro-vide full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its pro-grams for developing weapons of mass destruction, and allow unre-stricted overflight access to the inspection teams (UNSC 707). Thesedecisions of the UN have given rise to tension with Iraq, whichheld a UN team briefly in detention and is still not complying fullywith the UN demands.

These new measures of political enforcement by the UN on amember state, following the repelling of aggression and a ceasefire,are without precedent. The UN, in short, has Iraq in a vice-like gripof contrition, liability and transparency which no other memberstate has been subjected to before. It is one thing to roll backaggression through military action under chapter VII, and indeedto restore the status quo ante and impose full liability upon theaggressor. It is quite another to divest a member state of its remain-ing rights under international law to acquire certain ballistic mis-siles and weaponry of mass destruction.

The UN's inspection activities raise difficult questions ofenforcement authority. On what basis of rights and powers is theSecurity Council deciding that Iraq must surrender its right to


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weapons of mass destruction? The Council has decided that Iraqhas violated the NPT, not for having manufactured a nuclearweapon which it had not yet done, but for failing its obligationsunder its IAEA safeguards agreement — in short, pursuing a nuclearweapons program and receiving assistance to that end (UNSC 707).Does this give the Council the authority to forcibly inspect Iraq andensure that it is not producing nuclear weapons? The NPT does notspecify any complaint and enforcement measures. Is the Councilderiving its nuclear inspection powers from the silence of theTreaty? Or are such powers derived from its enforcement mandateunder chapter VII? Iraq has the right to withdraw from the Treatyon three months' notice and become a nuclear power. Would theCouncil override Iraq's exercise of that treaty right? In the case ofchemical weapons and ballistic missiles, no treaty was violated andthe Council thus has no treaty-derivative power of inspection andenforcement. Its authority here can derive only from its enforce-ment mandate under resolution 678 to "restore peace and securityto the area". Does the responsibility to restore peace and securityextend to divesting an aggressor state of the right to certainweaponry? If a state commits aggression, does it forfeit all rightsbefore the Council? Did the Council have the right to authorisethe coalition to reach Baghdad and remove the aggressor regime,as a military coalition did in Tokyo and Berlin in 1945? If so, whatis the limit, if any, of the Council's authority under chapter Vll? Ifnot, how can the Council effectively maintain the peace if it mustallow an aggressor regime to retain power? North Korea isregarded as having violated its obligations under the NPT, havingfailed to conclude a safeguards agreement within the time speci-fied.* But it has not committed aggression lately. Does the Councilhave the right to inspect that UN member state, or is an act ofaggression the necessary trigger?

These questions are divorced from the political wisdom ofenforcing stringent peace terms upon Iraq. Rather they address theconstitutionality of recent action by the United Nations. If the UNis developing a more assertive role in a new world order, this is tothe good. But it is in the interest of all that such innovative actionsrest upon an acceptable juridical base.

* The two Koreas have now resolved their differences over the nuclear question. Under the two treaties on non-aggres-sion (II December) and nuclear co-operation (30 December), they have both undertaken to ban nuclear weapons fromthe peninsular and accept IAEA inspections. In earlier unilateral moves, the DPRK had renounced nuclear weapon pro-duction and possession and the ROK had declared that all US nuclear weapons have been removed from the peninsula.


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In addition to political enforcement, the UN has taken unprece-dented steps of humanitarian intervention in Iraq. Unlike the mili-tary and political enforcement decisions, the humanitarian man-date the UN gave itself does not explicitly invoke chapter VII. Intwo delphic preambular paragraphs, the Security Council remem-bers its duties and responsibilities for the maintenance of interna-tional peace and security, and recalls the charter provision ondomestic jurisdiction. It then condemns Iraqi repression of its citi-zens, including most recently the Kurds; demands the terminationthereof; "insists" that Iraq allow immediate access by humanitarianagencies; requests the Secretary-General to use all the resources athis disposal to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees;and appeals to all member states and humanitarian agencies tocontribute to the relief efforts (UNSC 688). It was on the strength ofthis resolution that four member states immediately redeployedarmed forces already in southern Iraq under the ceasefire arrange-ment to set up a "security zone" in Kurdistan to protect Iraqi citi-zens from their own government. The coalition troops, ultimatelysome 23,000 soldiers from thirteen countries, were only temporar-ily deployed in Kurdistan for a few months until the UN could takeover. A hastily-recruited team of 500 UN "guards" replaced them inmid-1991 — the first time the UN has stationed a unit on memberstate's territory for a purely humanitarian purpose.

Thus, a UN-authorised coalition of armed forces, already posi-tioned on a member state's territory under a military enforcementmandate of chapter VII (resolution 678), was partially redeployedelsewhere within the same state to undertake humanitarian workunder a separate, non-enforcement mandate. It is unlikely that directintervention from an external force would have occurred without aprior enforcement mandate and an existing military presence. Yetthe Kurdistan case may well act as a precedent for future cases.Unlike the relief operations in the Sudan in 1989 or Bangladesh in1991, the action in Iraq was undertaken against the wishes of the hoststate. The humanitarian intervention in Iraq may signify one aspectof a new world order in which humanitarian imperatives will, in cer-tain extreme situations, override domestic jurisdiction. "Militaryhumanitarianism in Iraq" as one authority observes, "has providedone bridge between Cold War military capabilities and the vision ofnew world order proponents" (Weiss in Minear et al 1991, p.68).

Thus it is that, in the area of peace and security, the interna-tional community, after a long history of obstruction, weakness and


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failure through the 20th century, is finally starting to move pur-posefully toward a system of shared values, enforcement capabilityand centralised decision-making. It is a painstaking and hazardousbusiness, and the UN is in new territory. Some query whether acombination of great power interest and blatant aggression willrecur, and suspect that the Gulf crisis will prove an aberration.Certainly it is the extreme case that makes a precedent. But onceestablished, the precedent leaves its mark, like the leading wave onan incoming tide, setting the standard for future years. The UNaction in the Gulf will act as a powerful deterrent to middle-poweraggression and will set a new yardstick of behaviour for the majorpowers themselves. The progress through the century, and notleast in the most recent of times, is discernible, and encouraging.

Problems of, Opportunities for, A New World OrderThe world stands on the threshold of major opportunities, a defin-ing point in history of a kind not seen since San Francisco, andVersailles and Vienna before it. The emerging new world orderoffers unprecedented opportunity for the maintenance of peaceand security, including the reduction of weaponry to a level belowthat which threatens the planet. Unlike earlier times, however, theinstitutional framework for world order does not lie in pieces,requiring leaders to start from a clean slate. Governments todaymust blend a vision of what might be with what exists. Political con-cepts are in a state of great fluidity, but the institutional realities ofour time remain intact. As Mr Boutros-Ghali has put it on accept-ing his new appointment: "I do not claim to elevate the vision ofthe Utopian city, called for by the Islamic thinker Al-Farabi, to thatof a Utopian world, for I cannot promise to go beyond what is feasi-ble and what is possible. Despite the close ties that bind me to opti-mism, my ties to realism are even closer" (UN Press ReleaseGA/8275).

What opportunities are there, in a new world order, for buildingan alternative global security system? How can peace, as a value, bestrengthened further, beyond the seminal steps taken in 1919, 1928and 1945? Can peace be enforced with more authority, impartialityand competence? Who, which institutions, what improvements indecision-making, would facilitate this?

In the present age, the problematique in the preservation ofpeace, in developing peace as a common value for nation-statebehaviour, is the doctrine of self-defence. Currently, the inherent


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right of individual or collective self-defence remains consolidatedin article 51 of the Charter. It is held to be valid in customary inter-national law on several counts: inter alia, in response to aggression,by way of pre-emptive attack,* and for the protection of nationals.Article 51 has masked a number of abuses in recent decades. Theright of collective self-defence through regional military alliancestructures needs to be reassessed in a new light. Strategic thinkingduring the Cold War dismissed the intended thrust of article 51,which stipulates that the right of self-defence is circumscribed invarious ways. First, it obtains only until the Security Council hastaken over responsibility for the crisis. Second, a self-defenceaction is to be immediately reported to the Council. Third, suchaction is not to affect in any way the Council's authority to act. Yetduring the Cold War, much discretionary action, either unilaterallyor through regional alliances, was undertaken at the expense ofSecurity Council authority. Now that regional alliance diplomacy isundergoing fundamental change, attention must be given to theor-etical ways of pinning back the right of self-defence in article 51,and according that responsibility back to the Security Councilwhere it rightfully belongs.

Secondly, the right to protect nationals also requires examina-tion. Major powers often justify their unilateral intervention inanother state on the grounds that that country is experiencing tur-bulence and its own nationals are in danger. The rationale oftenmasks other, less politically pure, reasons for intervention, invitessuspicion as to the motives of the intervening state, and increasestension further. A new world order would be a more stable one ifnation-states had less automatic and extensive a right of interven-tion for the protection of nationals, and the UN Security Councilcarried a clearer responsibility for this on humanitarian grounds.

A third consideration — a need rather than an opportunity —concerns some novel conceptual developments extraneous to theCharter. It is widely understood that most conflict situations in thefuture will involve internal situations within nation-states rather

* The right to resort to pre-emptive strike in advance of, and in self-defence against, an imminent attack is subject to dis-pute, vide. ...if the action of the United Nations is obstructed, delayed or inadequate and the armed attack becomes mani-festly imminent, then it would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending state to allow itsassailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow. If an armed attack is imminent within the strict doctrine Caroline,then it would seem to bring the case within article 51. To read article 51 otherwise is to protect the aggressor's right tothe first stroke" (Waldock 1952, p.498); and "...this term [armed attack] means something that has taken place. Article 51prohibits 'preventive war'. The 'threat of aggression' does not justify self-defence under article 51" (Kunz 1947, p.878;and see also Kelsen 1954, pp.798-799).


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than trans-border aggression between them. As noted, the UN isbreaking new ground in its recent Security Council resolution onYugoslavia. But in strengthening the fabric of peace, states coulddevelop a consensual understanding, enshrined in due course ininternational law, that they will not resort to armed force withintheir own national territory as a means of settling internal conflictsituations. At present, the use of force in internal disputes is notexplicitly proscribed in the UN Charter or elsewhere in interna-tional law. It could be understood by UN member states that theinjunction against the threat or use of force, in article 2(4) of theCharter, shall apply, not only to their international relations butalso to the internal affairs of member states. The jurisprudentialbasis for this can be found within the same article, which stipulatesthat members shall refrain from the threat or use of force in anymanner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Thiscan reasonably be taken today to include peace and stability withinmember states themselves.

The new decade of the 1990s is also likely to see developments inthe doctrine of humanitarian intervention. French ForeignMinister Dumas has claimed that the international community hasthe "right to intervene" in humanitarian cases, and should be pre-pared to violate national boundaries to alleviate human sufferingresulting from repression, civil disorder, interstate conflict, or natu-ral disasters (Dumas in Minear et al 1991, p.51). And the formerUN Secretary-General has observed that "we are clearly witnessingwhat is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward thebelief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of moralityshould prevail over frontiers and legal documents" ('S.G. Perez deCuellar Sees Changes' 1991, p.l). He has queried whether certainnorms subsequent to the UN Charter, such as the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, do not call into question the notionof sovereignty as set out in article 2(7). Recent developments, suchas General Assembly resolution 43/131 and the Secretary-General'sproposal for temporary "relief corridors" for the distribution ofemergency medical and food aid ('Report of the Secretary-General', UNGA document A/45/587), are likely to be acted upon.Other possible innovations might be the use of article 99 as a trig-ger to ensure Security Council review of humanitarian crises, and anew Under-Secretary-General for Special Humanitarian Affairs toensure better co-ordination and planning of UN systems of relief(Minear et al 1991. p.17). Many states have called for improved pro-cedures in this regard, and the UN has recently been criticised for


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its apparent inaction in Somalia (New York Times 11 December1991). At its London summit this year, the G-7 nations urged organ-isational changes within the UN's disaster response machinery sothat "early action that has sometimes been missing in the past"would be automatically undertaken (Minear et al 1991, p.36).

How might peace be enforced more effectively in a new worldorder? First, the art of conflict-prevention needs to be developedfurther. As Sir Brian Urquhart has observed, peace requires "morethan reacting, however forcefully, to a crisis that has already hap-pened. It requires both the creation of conditions in which peacecan be maintained, and the capacity to anticipate and preventbreaches of the peace" (Urquhart 1991, p.9). Among other innova-tive practices, the Secretary-General should be authorised underarticle 96, as the Council and Assembly are, to request theInternational Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on anylegal question. Secondly, the concept of preventive peacekeeping isattracting attention in the wake of the Gulf conflict. Preventivepeacekeeping is the stationing of a UN peacekeeping force on oneside of a member state's border, at the request of that state, inadvance of any aggression. This differs profoundly from the exist-ing peacekeeping operations, which essentially police a ceasefireafter the conflict. Preventive peacekeeping would probably nothave been undertaken on behalf of Kuwait in 1990, had Iraq madeits opposition clear. But there is a developing view that such arequest by a member state might well be received more favourablyhenceforth. The problem of preventive peacekeeping, however, isthat it signals to the world that, in the opinion of the SecurityCouncil, one of its member states is an imminent aggressor.Further experience and reflection is required before this concepttakes substantive form.

In addition to improving conflict-prevention techniques, themechanism of traditional peacekeeping itself should be strength-ened further. Training centres in each region, includingAsia/Pacific, should be established, modelled on the lines of theNordic Centres.

Apart from peacekeeping, the capacity for enforcement actionby the UN under chapter VII of the Charter needs also to bestrengthened. It is regrettable that, nearly half a century after UNcollective security was introduced, the Organisation still lacks thecapacity of a unified command structure for military enforcement


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action. The international community deserves something betterthan farming out its enforcement responsibilities to the strongestpower around. There are clear opportunities in strengthening theinstitutional fabric of enforcement capability of the UN. It wouldrequire the conclusion of article 43 agreements for the provision ofarmed forces, which has never been attempted but for which thetime has surely arrived. Similarly, the reactivation of the MilitaryStaff Committee for co-ordination among the major powers wouldfacilitate the development of a unified UN command in the future.

Finally, greater use needs to be made of the regional mechanismfor peace under chapter VIII of the Charter. Greater co-operationbetween the regional political bodies, such as the OAU and the OAS,with the Security Council would legitimise, and perhaps more pur-posefully direct, regional peacekeeping operations such as thatundertaken by ECOWAS in Liberia.

What improvements in decision-making for peace, what institu-tional changes, are possible in a new world order?

If the fabric of peace is to be woven together more tightly,member states will need to mesh power and principle more finelythan has been the case to date. If its decision-making is to be credi-ble, the UN must balance the principles in its Charter, such as thesovereign equality of member states, with the power realities in achanging world. So long as Tuvalu and China have the same votingpower in the General Assembly, the expression of world opinionthrough the United Nations will be greatly distorted. The time hascome when the question of weighted voting in the Assembly shouldbe given serious study.

Since the end of the Cold War, a closer correlation betweenpower and principle has been developing, through a greater use ofthe United Nations by the major powers. With the collapse of com-munism and the demise of the USSR, some concern is held, espe-cially in the Third World, over the likely dominance of the remain-ing superpower on global politics. So long as the conduct of thatnation remains within constitutional and legal limitations, its influ-ence can scarcely be resented. The world needs leadership in bothpolitical thought and action, and leadership will go naturally to themost vigorous societies. Provided such vigour remains lawful, this isto the common good. But there is a need to ensure that the powerof our leading states, even if it were to be prosecuted lawfullythrough the United Nations, remains subject to appropriate checksand balances.


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Redefining power relationships with a view to legitimising futureUN activity, and especially any future enforcement action, is a com-plex and delicate business. How might power be more closelyrelated to principle? The question of Security Council membershipbrings to the surface underlying political issues of some philosophi-cal depth. What, essentially, is the meaning of power in the worldcommunity at the close of the 20th century? Does military powerremain dominant, with nuclear weapon status the key to perma-nent membership? Such an atavistic premise invites nuclear prolif-eration, fostering tension with the goals of disarmament and theNPT. Should economic power and "capacity to pay" be accordedequivalent status, such that Germany and Japan be given perma-nent membership? Should the weight of human numbers be afactor, such that India, and perhaps Indonesia — the largestMuslim country in the world — could advance a claim to Councilmembership? Should regional representation be considered, suchthat Brazil and Nigeria could advance claims?* If so, why shouldEurope (including the former USSR) have six out of fifteen seats?Should the ratio of Council members to assembly members remainat 1:11 in the 1990s, compared with 1:8 in 1963 and 1:5 in 1945? Inthe real world, what is the relationship between military power,economic power, human numbers and regionality; and how can itbe captured in a formula for Security Council membership andGeneral Assembly voting?

These issues are more than academic; they are of compelling rel-evance and imminence to the world of 1992. The fragmentation ofthe USSR raises penetrating questions for the United Nations. TheCommonwealth of Independent States supported Russia "in takingover" the permanent membership of the Security Council. Thepermanent five were keen to ensure this to constrain the momen-tum for change, and the UN as a whole acquiesced. But the ques-tion of Soviet succession brings into scrutiny the question ofCouncil membership at a particularly sensitive time, when othermajor nations are asserting new claims for Council recognition.

Conversely, the movement towards a European union posesother issues. Should France and the United Kingdom maintainpermanent membership of the Council? Might their seats, at some

* The Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers, meeting in Accra in September 1991 declared: T h e current effort at reform of theUnited Nations should include measures designed to make the decision-making process at the UN, particularly theSecurity Council, more democratic and transparent. In that context, the present membership of the Security Councilshould be reviewed...." See also statements at the 46 th General Assembly by Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela;UN doc. CA/8289 of 11 December.


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future stage, be merged into one European seat? The MaastrichtTreaties, if implemented in their current form, portend a singleEuropean currency and will move the Community towardscommon defence, foreign and economic policies. A commonEuropean defence system is to be set up, separate from but "linkedto" and in conformity with NATO. The likely outcome, therefore, isthat, at the UN Security Council, France and the UK will acttogether in a single voting pattern for the European union, afterextensive consultations within its own framework. This in itselfwould be an advance: at present, British and French voting pat-terns, especially in the General Assembly, are not identical.

There are various ways in which the diminution of powerthrough the Security Council veto might be attained short of aCharter amendment. The permanent five, for example, might be"invited" to diminish their veto power in the Security Council.Neither Britain nor France have not cast vetos for some time now,and China uses it sparingly. Only the United States, and to a lesserextent the USSR, have used the veto in recent years. The perma-nent members could be invited to exercise their veto only in theevent that "supreme national interests" were in jeopardy. Thiswould not be a great departure from the present, but wouldenshrine such circumscription of the veto in more formal status.Alternatively, a practice could develop of "overriding" a single per-manent member's veto through an appropriate voting formula inthe General Assembly.

In addition to the maintenance of peace, the new world orderoffers a vast new area of opportunity for further disarmament ini-tiatives. The fragmentation of the USSR and the emergence of thefour "nuclear" sovereign republics of the former Union, with freshleadership reflecting modern security thinking without the inheri-tance of Cold War policies, present new opportunities for nucleardisarmament. The ethnic unrest and political turbulence therepose serious potential dangers for the command and control of the28,000 Soviet nuclear weapons spread across the four republics.Reflecting its deep concern over this, the US Congress inNovember voted $400 million for technical assistance to therepublics for the dismantling of their nuclear weapons, and inDecember Senator Nunn called for the Western nuclear powers torespond to the proposal for a joint register of nuclear arms.

If political sanity prevails and stability is retained, the opportuni-ties for progress in nuclear disarmament are without precedent.


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The calls for nuclear weapons registers and reductions under col-lective management co-ordinated through a centralised commandraise the ante of nuclear disarmament initiated in the SeptemberBush-Gorbachev proposals, and invite Britain, France and China toformulate a response. Russia has raised the question of NATO mem-bership, and its officials speak of reducing its strategic arsenal tosome 1,000 nuclear weapons. Further reductions in strategic armsare therefore a distinct possibility as the US determines there is nosuperpower threat as in the past, and that Third World threats, tothe extent they are real, do not warrant strategic overkill of ColdWar magnitudes. But the problem for the US will be in knowinghow to proceed. The days of traditional strategic arms controlnegotiations, in which two adversarial superpowers undertake"equal and balanced force reductions" with "undiminished securityto both sides", are a thing of the past. Nuclear reductions in theUnited States itself is likely to be driven by domestic economicpressures within that country, and orchestrated by congressionalresponse to popular concerns.

In the new world order, the question of non-proliferation is alsorecast in a qualitatively new light. The Bush-Gorbachev proposalsof September 1991 represent the first significant steps to meetingtheir article VI obligations under the NPT, increasing the likelihoodof its indefinite extension in 1995. What, if any, conditions mightthe threshold states require of the existing nuclear powers beforeacceding to the Treaty? The threshold states are in danger ofbecoming increasingly isolated as adherence to the Treaty climbswith the recent accession policies of France, China and SouthAfrica. They are giving thought to an appropriate trade-off. Mightit be a nuclear test ban? Might it be an undertaking from thenuclear powers to end nuclear weapons production? A "non-acqui-sition" regime could be pursued as a complement to the finalstrengthening of the non-proliferation regime. While there is nodoubt that the NPT will be extended in 1995, some existing treatystates, and some of the threshold states, are more likely to see suchextension as legitimised if the nuclear powers have in place a non-acquisition regime before that date. There are, moreover, practicalas well as normative reasons for a non-acquisition regime. For theUS, it would mean abandoning plans to restart its crippledweapons production complex, at a cost savings of over $100 billion.For Russia, the closure of its highly secret production complex,which may still be engaged in weapon production, would meaneven more urgently needed financial relief.


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In a new world order, a nuclear test ban, possibly allowing forsafety testing under international inspection, should not be beyondthe reach of the nuclear powers. Within the United States, not onlyis there a congressional majority for a test ban, but there is anincreasing debate within the Administration over the merits of con-cluding a ban of some kind. The recent Kidder Report for the USCongress concludes that the need exists for only ten to twelve testsin the future to maintain the safety requirements of the US strategicarsenal. This could be factored in, under international observationand verification, for a comprehensive nuclear test ban before 1995.

It is clear, the opportunities for progress in international peaceand security and in disarmament are, in the early 1990s, virtuallyunprecedented. The likely trends in strategic politics and disarma-ment in the 1990s will open up new areas of inquiry, at a leveldeeper than the Cold War allowed. With Russia a member or asso-ciate of NATO, what is the future of nuclear deterrence? Instead ofmaintaining nuclear forces to deter superpower aggression, howmight nuclear power he brought into relationship with the gover-nance of the planet in a new world order? If nuclear weapons areto be "truly weapons of last resort" as NATO strategy currentlydeclares, what are they to be weapons of last resort against? What isto be their role in the 1990s, against whom, and what numbers areto be required?

Further into the 21st century, can the world maintain self-gover-nance through UN Security Council management with no nuclearweapons, or are some nuclear weapons permanently required?Might the UN develop a collective international ownership andmanagement of nuclear weapons through the UN? Is it desirable,and is it feasible, that the United Nations, in the context of collec-tive security, comes to terms with the existence of nuclear weapons?

The Charter, being silent on the subject of nuclear weapons,offers no insight on these questions, and it therefore falls to politi-cal judgement to provide the answers — requiring standards ofvision and competence of the kind we have seen in recent years.The new decade requires statesmanship of the highest order. If it isattained, a new world order will in fact be realised in the 1990s,and the next century will see a new level of enlightenment in thehuman story.


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REFERENCESKelsen, H. 1954 The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems, F.A.Praeger,London.

Kunz, J.L. 1947, 'Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the UnitedNations', American Journal of International Law, vol.41, pp.872-879.

Minear, L., T.G.Weiss, and K.M.Campbell 1991, 'Humanitarianism and War: Learning the Lessons fromRecent Armed Conflicts', Occasional Paper no.8, Thomas J.Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies,Brown University.

New York Times 11 December 1991.

Perez de Cuellar, Javier 1991a, Address to University of Bordeaux, 22 April 1991.'

Perez de Cuellar, Javier 1991b, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization',UNDPI/1168/40923-Septemberl991-15M.

Report of the Secretary-General 1990, 'New International Humanitarian Order: Humanitarian Assistanceto Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar Emergency Situations', UNGA document A/45/587, 24October 1990.

'S.G.Perez de Cuellar Sees Changes in Basic Noninterference Doctrine' 1990, Diplomatic World Bulletin 22,no.6 (6-13 May 1991).

'Strengthening the International Order' 1991, Political Declaration of the London Economic Summit ofthe Leaders of the G-7 Countries and Representatives of the European Community, 16 July 1991.

United Nations General Assembly resolutions: 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974; 44/21, 15 November1989.

UN document: GA/8289, 11 December 1991.

UN Press Release: GA/8275, 3 December 1991.

United Nations Security Council resolutions: 660, 2 August 1990; 661, 6 August 1990; 662, 9 August 1990;664, 18 August 1990; 665, 25 August 1990; 666, 13 September 1990; 667, 16 September 1990; 669, 24September 1990; 670, 25 September 1990; 674, 29 October 1990; 677, 28 November 1990; 678, 29November 1990; 686, 2 March 1991; 687, 8 April 1991; 688, 5 April 1991; 692, 20 May 1991; 699 and 700,17 June 1991; 705 and 706, 15 August 1991; 707, 15 August 1991; 712, 19 September 1991; 715, 11October 1991; 721, 27 November 1991;.

Urquhart, Sir Brian 1991, in 'The Role of the United Nations in the New World Order', UNITAR.

Waldock, C.H.M. 1952, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, Academy ofInternational Law, The Hague.


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Post Cold War problems and prospects∗

Documents

Transcript of Post Cold War problems and prospects∗