Possession of firearms by sport shooters

The Dutch Safety Board

telephone +31(0)70 333 70 00 • e-mail [email protected] • website www.safetyboard.nl

visiting address Anna van Saksenlaan 50 • 2593 HT The Hague

postal address PO Box 95404 • 2509 CK The Hague • The Netherlands

Possession of firearms by sport shooters

Investigation into the system governing the

legal possession of firearms following a shooting

incident in Alphen aan den Rijn, 9th of April 2011

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The Hague, September 2011

The reports published by the Dutch Safety Board are public.All reports are also available on the Dutch Safety Board’s website. www.safetyboard.nl

POSSESSION OF FIREARMS BY SPORT SHOOTERS,Investigation into the system governing the legal possession of firearms following a shooting incident in Alphen aan den Rijn, 9th of April 2011

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THE DUTCH SAFETY BOARD

The aim in the Netherlands is to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents as much as possible. If accidents or near-accidents nevertheless occur, a thorough investigation into the causes of the problem, irrespective of who is to blame for it, may help to prevent similar problems from occurring in the future. It is important to ensure that the investigation is carried out independently from the parties involved. This is why the Dutch Safety Board itself selects the issues it wishes to investigate, mindful of citizens’ position of dependence with respect to public authorities and businesses.

Dutch Safety Board Advisory CommitteeChairman: T.H.J. Joustra J.P. Visser

Annie Brouwer-Korf F.J.H. Mertens J.P. Visser

Annie Brouwer-KorfM.A. BeuvingM.A. DutréeM.W. HengeveldI. van OutheusdenH.J.B. SackersS. ZouridisP.J. van ZunderdG.N. Roes1

General secretary:

M. Visser

Project Manager:J.J.G. Bovens

Visiting address: Anna van Saksenlaan 502593 HT The Hague,The Netherlands

Correspondence address:

PO Box 954042509 CK The Hague

Telephone: +31 (0)70 333 7000 Fax: +31 (0)70 333 7077 Internet: www.safetyboard.nl

This report is published in Dutch and English. In the event of any difference in interpretation the Dutch text must be regarded as binding.

1 Mr Roes stepped down from the guidance committee at the beginning of July 2011, in connection with his appointment to the position of Director General with the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONSIDERATION ............................................................................................................. 5

ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ 11

1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 121.1 History ................................................................................................................121.2 Investigation by the Dutch Safety Board ..................................................................131.3 Incidents with legal firearms ...................................................................................131.4 Investigation questions ..........................................................................................141.5 Scope: What has and has not been studied? .............................................................151.6 Basic assumptions of the Dutch Safety Board ...........................................................161.7 Procedure ............................................................................................................161.8 Outline ................................................................................................................17

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM FOR GRANTING A FIREARMS PERMIT ...................... 182.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................182.2 Obtaining a legal firearm for sport shooting purposes ................................................192.3 Keeping a legal firearm for sport shooting purposes ..................................................302.4 Summary .............................................................................................................33

3. CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN GRANTING FIREARMS PERMIT TO TRISTAN VAN DER V. ................................................................................................. 343.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................343.2 2005: First permit application .................................................................................343.3 2006: Committed to a mental institution ..................................................................363.4 2007: Shooting club membership ............................................................................373.5 2008: Second permit application .............................................................................383.6 Annual renewal .....................................................................................................393.7 Information known to the surrounding areas ............................................................403.8 The purchase of firearms and ammunition ................................................................423.9 Conclusions ..........................................................................................................43

4. LESSONS ABOUT THE WORKINGS OF THE SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO GRANTING A FIREARMS PERMIT ................................................................................................... 464.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................464.2 Knowledge of the (future) firearms owner ................................................................474.3 Assessing the risk of abuse ....................................................................................534.4 Organisation and improvement of the system ...........................................................584.5 Conclusions ..........................................................................................................62

5. COMPARISON WITH OTHER SYSTEMS....................................................................... 645.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................645.2 Obtaining medical information in other systems ........................................................645.3 Recognising the risk of abuse .................................................................................695.4 Conclusions ..........................................................................................................72

6. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................... 736.1 Why information about (prospective) firearms owners is not included in

the risk assessment ..............................................................................................746.2 Why problems in the system have not been resolved .................................................756.3 Important points to consider ..................................................................................76

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7. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................. 79

APPENDIX 1: INVESTIGATION EXPLANATION ................................................................ 81

APPENDIX 2: COMMENTS TO PRELIMINARY REPORT ..................................................... 88

APPENDIX 3: FIREARMS AND PERMITS ACCORDING TO THE DUTCH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION ACT .................................................................................... 94

APPENDIX 4: STATISTICS .............................................................................................. 96

APPENDIX 5: MANAGING THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES ...... 109

APPENDIX 6: POLICE AND JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS ...................................... 118

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CONSIDERATION

IntroductionOn Saturday, 9 April 2011, just after 12:00 pm, a car drives into the car park at the Ridderhof shopping centre in Alphen aan den Rijn. A man gets out of the car and takes three guns out of the boot: a pistol, a revolver and a semi-automatic rifle. He shoots a passer-by. He then enters the shopping centre. Once inside, he starts shooting again. In total, he shoots twenty-two people. Five of them die at the scene and one of them passes away later in the hospital. Another sixteen people are injured, a number of them seriously. The man then fatally shoots himself.

The events in Alphen aan den Rijn left a deep impression on the people who were injured, the many witnesses, those who provided assistance and the family members. In the Netherlands and also internationally, this incident and its outcome raise feelings of anxiety, astonishment and outrage. These feelings escalate even more when the police and the Dutch Public Prosecutor’s Office announce the day after the incident that the shooter, Tristan van der V., had a firearms permit for the three guns that he used that day, and that he had been admitted to a mental health institution for compulsory treatment in 2006. Many people are wondering how it was possible for Tristan van der V. to legally own three guns and ammunition, while he was suffering from schizophrenia and being treated for his condition at a mental health institution.

Investigation by the Dutch Safety BoardThe possession of firearms forms a safety risk and society should be protected against this risk as much as possible. This is the reason behind the principle to prohibit the possession of firearms in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act that bans the possession of firearms provides for exceptions for certain groups, including sport shooters. Before a sport shooter can purchase a gun, he must apply for a firearms permit with the police. The chief of police is the person who is authorised to grant this permit. He has to carefully consider the information for each individual case. If there is any doubt as to whether someone can be entrusted with a firearm, the permit should be refused or withdrawn. The concept of “fear of abuse” is an important factor in the system. The police must evaluate the content of each application.

Tristan van der V. abused his privilege to own guns and, in retrospect, should not have been granted a firearms permit. The Safety Board has conducted an investigation into the fact that he had a firearms permit and, what that fact teaches us about the functioning of the system that regulates the legal possession of firearms. During the investigation, the key question was: Why is the “fear of abuse” not recognised in some cases by the system that governs the legal possession of firearms?

This investigation only focuses on the legal possession of firearms by sport shooters.

Granting a permit to Tristan van der V.Tristan van der V. became a member of a shooting club in 2007. In 2008, the Hollands Midden police granted him a firearms permit. This permit has been renewed two times. In April 2011, he legally owned three guns, including a semi-automatic rifle.

The investigation shows that different people, including his parents and his medical professionals, knew that Tristan van der V. suffered from schizophrenia and that he was prone to suicidal thoughts. Furthermore, different people knew that he had been admitted to an institution for compulsory treatment. This type of information should have constituted enough reason for the police to conduct a more thorough investigation and to possibly reject the firearms permit application.

His parents and medical professionals did not discuss their concerns with the police for reasons that were justifiable to them. Once the parents of Tristan van der V. realised that their son wanted to apply for a firearms permit, they discussed their concerns with the mental institution. The institution’s medical professionals told the parents that they shared their concern, but that they were bound by medical secrecy laws, and that they could only intervene in the event of an acute and immediate threat. According to them, this was not the case at the time.

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Since the police had provided assistance with the compulsory treatment in 2006, the police had the information pertaining to this treatment on file. The police did not use this information to evaluate the permit application, because the information never made it to the police clerk who was in charge of processing the application. The Dutch Safety Board did not investigate the matter more thoroughly because the Dutch National Police Internal Investigations Department started an investigation into this permit application at the same time.

The governing board of the shooting club where Tristan van der V. was a member, saw no reason to question whether it would be safe for him to own firearms. Furthermore, the board of the club thought that the gun Tristan van der V. had applied for, a semi-automatic rifle, could be used to practice a certain type of shooting sport at the club. The police approved this application. Nevertheless, the investigation shows that this gun could not be used at the club according to the competition rules laid down by the KNSA, the Royal Dutch Shooters Association.

Conclusions from the investigationThe Dutch system for the legal possession of firearms has been established to ensure that legal firearms are only in the possession of those who can handle the responsibility of owning and using a firearm. The setup of this system is such that this goal can be achieved. However, the system, including its execution, does have a number of flaws.

A firearms permit is authorised by the chief of police, who must perform a proper evaluation. In reality, the police often perform the legal duties of granting and issuing permits, enforcing permit rules and monitoring activities as if these were routine, administrative duties. The ultimate objective, which is to evaluate whether there is any fear of abuse, has been pushed aside. The Safety Board concludes that this is because police management assign a low priority to the task. It is also a low priority for the Minister of Security and Justice, who is charged with overseeing the execution of the law.

The system does not guarantee that the police, who must determine whether a fear of abuse exists, can actually gain access to the information that is necessary to fulfil this task. In the existing system, the applicant is not obliged to provide the police with all the information required to make a good decision. The police should play a more active role in gathering relevant information.

Since this task has a low priority, police management and the minister do not notice the system’s shortcomings. This means that nothing may be done to correct such shortcomings.

Why information about (future) firearms owners is not considered when evaluating riskThe (future) firearms owner is the only person who has a personal interest in obtaining the firearms permit. He is the one who determines for the most part what information he will provide to the police upon submitting his application. He also determines for the most part what information to provide to the shooting club for his membership interview and during the term of his membership.

The applicant’s family and friends have a relationship based on trust with the applicant. Therefore, they generally know more about him; however, for the same reason they often feel they cannot take the initiative to provide information to the police.

(Medical) professionals are primarily responsible for looking after their patients. They also have a relationship of trust with the applicant. They do not play a formal role in the system that regulates the legal possession of firearms.

Shooting clubs do play a role in granting permits. Anyone who wants a firearms permit must be a member of a shooting club. They also see the (aspirant) permit holder on a regular basis when he is handling his gun. However, they do not have sufficient knowledge of the signs they should pay attention to that can indicate a risk of abuse.

Since the police do not receive useful information about these applicants or owners of firearms, they base their actions for granting permits primarily on the information they have on file, such as criminal court convictions.

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Why have problems with the system not been resolvedThe Minister of Security and Justice, who is responsible for the proper functioning of the system, is far removed from making sure the police, the KNSA Royal Dutch Shooters Association and the shooting clubs enforce the system rules. He does not have a good understanding of the execution problems in the police districts. Furthermore, he does not monitor the process; neither does he have insight into things like the number of shooting incidents, the number of rejected permit applications or the number of granted permits that in fact should have been rejected. He does not know whether the system is accomplishing its task: to protect society against the risks of firearms possession. Therefore, he cannot make any adjustments based on actual information. He does not acquire any knowledge in order to be able to determine what kind of information is relevant and necessary (and that must be known about the applicant) in order to be able to make an appropriate risk assessment.

The police do not acquire this knowledge either. They also do not gather any management information on things like the number of (fatal) shooting incidents with legal firearms or the reasons why a permit has been refused. Tellingly, there was not a lot of relevant information on hand right away for this investigation. Effective procedures in some police districts are not standard in other police districts and qualification and workload of their staff differ from district to district.

The KNSA is the governing body of shooting clubs that regulates sport shooting. The KNSA does not pay enough attention to whether its affiliated shooting clubs follow these rules properly. The KNSA only evaluates whether these clubs are following the KNSA rules and guidelines upon becoming members. Once a shooting club becomes a member, the KNSA practically ceases to monitor its activities. Certification can encourage better monitoring, but this process is still in the early stages.

Most important lessonsA firearms permit is not an automatic entitlement. The Board believes that it is up to the (future) individual firearms owner to provide all (medical) information required so that the application can be properly evaluated for any risks of abuse. It is in this person’s own interest to share this information. After all, he wants to own a firearm and will be in a special position in comparison with other citizens, whom are prohibited from owning a firearm. Therefore, society should be able to place demands on him and expect him to prove that in this special position he will not be a threat to anyone. This could mean that he would give his doctor permission to disclose medical information.

The assumption that the applicant provides the information required is already common practice in other areas, such as when applying for a firearms permit in some other countries, or when an applicant aged 70 years and older applies for a driving licence in the Netherlands. The Dutch Safety Board firmly believes that it is essential to provide all parties involved with information about an applicant’s personal situation that is relevant to assessing whether there is any risk of abuse. This “reversal of the burden of proof” means that the emphasis moves from the party granting the permit to the applicant: it is not up to the police to prove that the applicant is unfit; it is up to the applicant to prove that he is fit to own a firearm.

The chief of police is the one who is authorised to grant a firearms permit, whereby the information is considered. The police should be more active and critical in its authority than is currently the case when evaluating permit applications.

The annual permit renewal process in no way guarantees that the firearm is, and remains, in safe hands. The police currently handle these permit renewals as if they were nothing more than a routine, administrative task. The police base their assessment on too little information. Furthermore, this assessment only represents a random indication. However, the danger that is involved in firearms possession exists all year round. The firearms owner’s personal situation can change at any time. This is why the shooting clubs must continuously monitor whether each of their members is still fit to own a firearm. Currently, this does not occur often enough.

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Other lessonsThe Safety Board believes it is important to hold home inspections based on a risk analysis, so that firearms owners with a higher risk of abuse are inspected sooner, or more often, than others. During our investigation it appeared that the chiefs of police announced that they will improve the process of granting/renewing and monitoring permits throughout the whole police organisation.

The Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act classifies many firearms under category III. In reality, this means that fully automatic firearms and hand grenades (category II) are the only firearms that are not allowed to fall into the hands of private citizens. Within this broad category III, it is up to the KNSA sports association to determine which firearms can be used for sport shooting, while keeping honest competition in mind. The government does not set any requirements for the different shooting sport disciplines and leaves it up to the KNSA to decide which guns can be used for each discipline. For example, some disciplines permit the use of semi-automatic rifles. These guns fire many shots within a short period of time, which could result in a lot of victims in the event of abuse. The serious shooting incidents in Alphen aan den Rijn and in Utøya (Norway) unfortunately prove this fact.

Medical professionals are not permitted to disclose information about their patients to the police without their patients’ permission. There are exceptions to this rule, such as: in the event of acute and immediate danger or child abuse, or to counter the spread of an infectious disease. The Dutch Safety Board spoke with a number of physicians during the investigation. They indicated that they needed the option to be able to share information under certain conditions, even if there is no acute or immediate danger. The Dutch Safety Board believes it is necessary that physicians take a stance on how to handle such knowledge. The Dutch Safety Board is interested in options that are already available within the medical sector (such as the obligation that already exists to report suspected child abuse) instead of creating a formal role for physicians within the system that regulates the legal possession of firearms.

On a final noteLuckily, very few shooting incidents have occurred with legally owned firearms these past years. Nevertheless, the events in Alphen aan den Rijn prove that if things do go wrong, the consequences are dramatic. This emphasises the high level of importance of having a well-functioning firearms permit system.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

The Safety Board has the following recommendations.

Have the applicants provide more information

1. To the Minister of Security and Justice

a. Add a provision to the law that obligates the applicant to provide more information about his personal situation that is relevant for evaluating the existence of a “fear of abuse”. The Board recommends a “reversal of the burden of proof”: It is not up to the police to prove that the applicant is unfit to own a firearm, it is up to the applicant to prove that he is worthy of owning a firearm. He could provide a doctors certificate, the results of a psychological test or a statement prepared by members of his household for this purpose.

b. Encourage the police to actively and critically evaluate this information:• upon receipt of an application for a firearms permit;• upon the annual renewal of the firearms permit;• whenever there is a change in information provided earlier;• whenever the police believe a re-evaluation would be necessary or desirable.

Improve the process used by the police for granting permits

2. To the quartermaster of the national police and to the (future) chief of police of the national police

Ensure that police management are involved in carrying out the duties that arise from the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act, and that they analyse at least once a year whether the system’s objectives are actually being achieved. Therefore, the capability to generate management information is essential.

Evaluate risk indicators and apply them


a. Periodically assess what kind of information about a person can potentially indicate that this person may be at risk of firearms abuse. Use experiences and knowledge from actual situations and events in the Netherlands and abroad, along with the results of scientific studies.

b. Ensure that these indicators are used when granting permits.c. Inform the KNSA Royal Dutch Shooters Association of these indicators.d. Develop applicable procedures and methods for obtaining information about these indicators

and include information from people who know the applicant personally.

Improve risk management by shooting clubs

4. To the KNSA Royal Dutch Shooters Association

a. Ensure that your affiliated shooting clubs evaluate the fear of abuse:• whenever a new member joins the club;• whenever a member applies for a firearms permit;• whenever a member purchases a firearm;• in general during the membership.

b. Develop measures that match the level of fear of abuse.c. Ensure that your members have the expertise required to recognise impending abuse and

to take the right measures. If necessary, offer training and guidance.d. Include the above steps in the certification requirements for shooting clubs.

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Set up the system in such a way that a firearms permit can only be granted if the applicant is a member of a club that proves that it performs this risk assessment; you could consider a KNSA certification as referenced in recommendation 4.

Find out whether the system is providing the desired results


a. Obtain information each year from the police, the KNSA and the Judicial Enforcement Service for Assessment, Integrity and Screening about the effectiveness of the legal system governing the legal possession of firearms;

b. Include an evaluation provision in the Weapons and Ammunition Act.

Study options for medical professionals

7. To the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG), in consultation with the Netherlands Mental Health Care Institution (GGZ), the Netherlands Association for Psychiatry (NVP) and the Dutch general practitioners association (NHG)

Establish a stance on the issue of what medical professionals and other care providers can do, whenever they learn of the (intended) possession of a firearm by one of their patients and this would involve a potential danger for any third party.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AWB General Administrative Law Act

BIG Dutch Law on Individual Healthcare ProvisionsBPS Business Processes System

CBR National Driving Licence AgencyCWM Weapons and Ammunition CircularCWR Central Weapons Register (Belgium)

FTW Flora and Fauna ActFWD Federal Firearms Service (Belgium)

GGZ Mental Health Care

IBS Compulsory admission to an institutionIGZ Health care inspection

KNJV Royal Dutch Hunting Association KNSA Royal Dutch Shooters Association KNMG Royal Dutch agency for the promotion of health care

LPV National platform for firearms

NFI Dutch Forensic Institute NHG Dutch General Practitioners’ Society NVW Dutch Association for Weapons Trade

OM Public Prosecutor’s Office

PWD Provincial Firearms Service (Belgium)

RWM Weapons and Ammunition Regulation

VOG Certificate of Good Behaviour VOS System for permits and exemptions

WM2 Permit for obtaining a firearmWM3 Application for a permit to own firearms and/or ammunitionWM4 Permit for owning firearms and/or ammunitionWODC Scientific Research and Documentation Centre WWM The Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act

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1 INTRODUCTION

On Saturday, 9 April 2011, just after 12:00 pm, a car enters the car park at the Ridderhof shopping centre in Alphen aan den Rijn. A man gets out of the car and takes three guns out of the boot: a pistol, a revolver and a semi-automatic rifle. He shoots a passer-by. He then enters the shopping centre. There, he fires more shots. A total of twenty two people are shot. Five of them die at the scene and one person dies later in the hospital. Another sixteen people are injured, some of them seriously. The man then fatally shoots himself.

The events in Alphen aan den Rijn leave a deep impression on the people who have been injured, the many witnesses, the first responders and care providers, and the surviving family members. This event and its outcome have brought about feelings of anxiety, astonishment and outrage In the Netherlands and abroad. These feelings escalate once the police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office announce the day after the incident that the shooter, Tristan van der V., had a firearms permit for the three guns he used that day, and that he had been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital for treatment in 2006. 2

1.1 History

Tristan van der V. was a 24 year old man from Alphen aan den Rijn.3 He lived at home with his parents. His father is a sport shooter and had been a member of a shooting club for a number of years.

In 2005, when Tristan van der V. was 19 years old, he submitted his first application for a firearms permit to the Hollands Midden police. The application was rejected. The reason having been, the police discovered while evaluating his application that he had been involved in an incident with an airgun in 2003. Even though this case with respect to Tristan van der V. had been dismissed, the police took this incident into consideration and refused to grant him a firearms permit.

In 2006, Tristan van der V. was involuntarily committed to a mental health institution (GGZ) due to the chance he might commit suicide. The police provided assistance to the GGZ in this regard. He was discharged after having been hospitalised for a total of fifteen days at two different institutions. He then continued to receive outpatient treatment by the mental health institution.

In September 2007, he submitted an application to the Dagschuttersvereniging shooting club in Nieuwkoop. This is the same club his father belonged to.

In August 2008, Tristan van der V. took an overdose of sleeping pills. He was admitted to a general hospital for a short period of time in connection with this overdose. After his release in 2006, he remained in treatment with the psychiatric hospital. This treatment is also continued after his hospitalisation in 2008.

In November 2008, one year after he had submitted his membership application to the shooting club, he again submitted an application for a firearms permit to the Hollands Midden police. The police conducted yet another investigation to see if there was any reason to reject his application; for example, due to a risk of abuse. This time, the police saw no reason to reject the application; thus they granted him a permit. That same day, he purchased a pistol. In the years 2009-2011 he purchased another two pistols, two revolvers and one rifle. He resells two of these pistols and one revolver. In April 2011, he owned three guns. These are the three guns he had with him on 9 April 2011.

2 Collective press releases issued by Hollands Midden police and the Public Prosecution Office on 10 and 11 April 2011.

3 The shooter in this report is referred to as Tristan van der V.

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In November 2009 and November 2010 the Hollands Midden police renewed the firearms permit. In December 2010, the police visited Tristan van der V.’s home that he shared with his parents. They conducted an inspection to ensure the guns and ammunition are stored in accordance with the rules. No anomalies were noted.

1.2 investigation by tHe DutcH safety boarD

During the period after the incident, many people wondered how it was possible that Tristan van der V. could legally own three guns and ammunition, while it became apparent soon after the incident that he suffered from schizophrenia and was undergoing treatment at a mental health institution. The shooting incident not only resulted in a lot of media attention, it also caught the attention of the Lower House.4 The Minister of Security and Justice decided to request the Dutch Safety Board to “start an investigation into the Dutch system that regulates legal firearms possession and to determine whether the system is functioning and has been functioning properly in connection with the incident.”5

The Dutch Safety Board has been assigned to find out what caused the (near-)accidents in order to decrease the probability of recurrence or to limit the consequences of such accidents. The Dutch Safety Board is emphatically not focusing on whom should be blamed, such as is the case with a criminal investigation. The most important question for the Board is: “What can we learn from this incident?”

The possession of firearms forms a safety risk and society must be protected against this type of risk as much as possible. This is the fundamental reason why the possession of firearms in the Netherlands is prohibited. However, there are exceptions to the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act, which lays out this ban, for certain groups, including exceptions for sport shooters. A sport shooter who has been a member of a shooting club for at least one year, and who has participated in a sufficient number of shooting events, has a reasonable interest in owning a firearm. Before he can purchase his own firearm, he must apply for a permit – a firearms permit. He can obtain a permit by meeting a number of conditions and as long as no reason is found to refuse a firearms permit. One reason for refusing a permit is if there is a risk that the aspirant firearms owner may abuse the firearm.

The purpose of the legal system is to manage the risks associated with firearms possession.6 The system has not been able to prevent someone in Alphen aan den Rijn who apparently could not be trusted with a firearm from legally owning one.

1.3 inciDents witH legal firearms

In order to gain a good understanding of the scope of the problem surrounding the legal possession of firearms, it is important to know the frequency of incidents that occur with legally owned guns. However, it appeared that the police do not have any record of the exact number of incidents that have taken place with legal and illegal guns. There are only estimates available of shooting incidents without fatalities.

4 After the incident, many members of Parliament have asked questions, including the members Gesthuizen (SP, submitted on 22 April 2011), Bruins Slot and Van Toorenburg (CDA, submitted on 22 April 2011), Marcouch (PvdA, submitted on 7 June 2011) and Hennis-Plasschaert and Van der Steur (VVD, submitted on 15 July 2011).

5 Letter from the Minister of Security and Justice to the House of Representatives, 12 April 2011, reference 5693140/11 and a letter from Minister of Security and Justice to the Dutch Safety Board on 12 April 2011, reference 5693158/11.

6 The term “system” refers to all the rules and parties involved in obtaining and retaining a firearm.

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The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics has information about the total number of people who have been shot and killed by a gun, but this information is not categorised by legal and illegal firearms. This information is also not available elsewhere. The Dutch Safety Board has prepared a summary of shooting incidents with legal firearms (which excludes service firearms that are used during the line of duty) based on media reports over the 1999-2011 time period. This summary is included in appendix 4. There were nine incidents with a total of 21 deaths. This summary was put together based on media reports; therefore, it may not be complete.7

The table below combines the figures from the Central Bureau of Statistics and the figures from the summary from media reports.

199

9

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

201

0

201

1

Number of people killed by a legal firearm8 1 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 2 1 1 1 6

Total number of people killed by a firearm9 75 66 69 63 56 53 54 31 40 37 41 - -

Table 1: Summary of number of persons killed by firearms

The table shows that 3% of the victims killed during the 1999-2009 timeframe were shot and killed by a legally owned firearm.10 This matches the estimates issued by the Netherlands Forensic Institute that showed that less than 5% of shooting incidents took place with legally owned firearms.

When comparing this figure to the total number of incidents that have occurred with firearms, there have been relatively few incidents with legally owned firearms. However, this has no effect on the fact that the incident in Alphen aan den Rijn, considering the scope and the impact of the incident, gives the Dutch Safety Board a reason to critically review the system that manages the possession of firearms in the Netherlands and to determine any weak links in this process.

1.4 investigation questions

The Dutch Safety Board wants to know what the incident says about how well the system governing legal firearms possession works. A lesson can only be learned from the incident if the occurrences can be explained, in other words, if it is known which factors contributed to the events leading up to the incident.

Therefore, the intent of the investigation is to explain how the risk of abuse of a legal firearm, which has been obtained for the purpose of sport shooting, is managed. The next objective is to learn from the explanations in order to improve the system for managing the legal possession of firearms.

7 See appendix 4 for more statistics.8 Source: our own research into news reports.9 Source: Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics. The statistics for 2010 and 2011 were not yet available at

the time of this publication.10 Almost all earlier shooting incidents with a legal firearm in the Netherlands over the past eleven years

involved a (family) relationship between the shooter and the victims. One shooting involved an intruder who was shot by the occupant and another shooting involved a kidnapping. There has never been a shooting incident in the Netherlands like the one in Alphen aan den Rijn, whereby the offender shot unknown people without an apparent reason.

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The key question of the investigation is as follows:

Why is the “fear of abuse” not recognised in some cases by the system that governs the legal possession of firearms?

The objective and the key question have resulted in the following questions:1. Firearms possession in the Netherlands is regulated by a system of different parties. What is

the intended effect of this system? 2. How did the system regulating the legal possession of firearms work in Tristan van der V.’s

case? We will look at the following sub-questions:• Which events occurred prior to granting the permit?• Which events took place prior to renewing the permit? • Did any events take place between the time the permit was granted and the times the

annual permit renewals were granted?3. What explanations are there to clarify how the system functioned?4. What can we learn from other systems?

Based on the findings, the Dutch Safety Board will draw up conclusions and recommendations.

1.5 scope: wHat Has anD Has not been stuDieD?

This purpose of this investigation is to study how the system that governs the legal possession of firearms operates. The point of departure for the investigation is the permit granted to Tristan van der V. The actual events in the Ridderhof on Saturday, 9 April 2011, are beyond the scope of the investigation, even though these events may form the main purpose of this investigation for the parties who were directly involved in the incident. There are two reasons for this.

First of all, the Board is investigating the events that could lead up to the fact that Tristan van der V. legally had three firearms in his possession that day. Secondly, the actual facts surrounding the shooting incident itself have already been investigated thoroughly by the Public Prosecution Office. Investigations into the shooting were conducted by a so-called large-scale investigation team of the Haaglanden and Hollands Midden police districts. The Dutch National Police Internal Investigations Department investigated the process used by the Hollands Midden police district to grant the permit to Tristan van der V. Some of the information from these investigation reports is repeated in this report. This will provide an independently readable report.11

There is also another area of importance. The investigation is aimed exclusively at managing the risk of abuse by sport shooters. The legal system that governs the legal possession of firearms not only covers sport shooting, but also hunting, gun collections, use of a firearm in the line of duty, and firearms trade. The permits that are required for these aforementioned activities are beyond the scope of this investigation because they are not related, or only indirectly related, to the case at hand, which is the permit that was granted to Tristan van der V. The possession of illegal firearms and firearms that do not require a permit (such as air guns) are also beyond the scope of this investigation.

11 Other investigations include: - Investigation by the Public Order and Safety Inspectorate into the actions taken by emergency service

providers during and after the incident; - Investigation by the Dutch Police Academy into the dilemmas and the choices that were made by the

different professionals that could occur in situations such as the one in Alphen aan den Rijn when weighing multiple and, sometimes conflicting interests, of an operational, supervisory and social nature;

- Investigation by the GGZ mental institution where Tristan van der V. was a patient. A central theme of this investigation is the question whether health care professionals have acted responsibly and provided responsible care to Tristan van der V.. The IGZ health inspector will then assess whether any blame can be placed on the actions of the health care professionals.

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1.6 basic assumptions of tHe DutcH safety boarD

The Safety Board assumes that in any process things can go wrong that directly or indirectly can lead to exposure to danger or to damage. These types of events are seldom the result of the malicious intent on the part of the officer involved, who is actually doing his job with the best of intentions. As explained here above, it is crucial to identify the underlying factors that have led to such an incident. After all, knowing these underlying factors and dealing with them can help to reduce the risk: in other words, it can reduce the likelihood of future accidents and their severity.

The Dutch Safety Board maintains the assumption that the parties responsible must limit the risk as much as possible.12 This means that all available measures for mitigating risk must be taken on a continuous basis, unless these measures involve verifiable unreasonable costs and/or other negative consequences. This implies that 100% safety does not exist, but also that risks that are (relatively) easy to prevent, should not exist.

In order to prevent things from going wrong, with the result that people and/or goods are exposed to danger, the parties involved must manage their processes and the associated risks. This is called safety management. The Dutch Safety Board has five basic assumptions to evaluate how all parties involved handle safety:1. The safety management is based on knowledge of the mechanisms that cause all dangers; 2. The safety management is realistic and has been drawn up explicitly in writing;3. The safety management is feasible;4. The company’s management is responsible for the safety management;5. The safety management is continuously being evaluated and adjusted where necessary.

Comparable assumptions form the basis for numerous standards that organisations in all areas of society use to establish their safety management processes. These assumptions are explained in more detail in the investigation report (Appendix 1).

Sometimes, activities by certain parties can involve risk for another party, or another party can take action to manage that risk. In that case, the parties must be capable of managing the risks together. The parties involved are jointly responsible for the entire system.

1.7 proceDure

The Safety Board has investigated the process of how the permit was granted to Tristan van der V. What can be learned from the actual fuctioning of the system that regulates the legal possession of firearms. Within this system, a number of different parties evaluate whether someone can be trusted with a firearm. If this evaluation process is not conducted properly, there is a risk that someone receives a firearms permit who should not be allowed to own a firearm. What checks and balances have been built into the system to limit this risk as much as reasonably possible?

The Safety Board has thoroughly reviewed whether information that contributes towards managing the risk of abuse, is known to anyone and whether this information is available to the parties who must evaluate this risk.13 These parties are not just the organisations with a formal role, such as the police, the Ministry of Security and Justice, the KNSA Dutch shooters association or the shooting club where Tristan van der V. was a member.14 People who had direct contact with Tristan van der V., such as his parents, health care providers and friends also play a role. They may also have information that could be important to the aforementioned processes.

12 In technical terms: ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable).13 See the investigation explanation in appendix 1 for more details.14 The role of these organisations is outlined in paragraph 2.1.

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The Safety Board has received cooperation from a large number of people who were directly involved: the parents of Tristan van der V., the Hollands Midden police district, the KNSA Dutch shooters association, the GGZ mental institution where Tristan van der V. was being treated, the shooting club where Tristan van der V. was a member and the Ministry of Security and Justice. These parties have participated actively in the investigation and provided full cooperation and information. The same holds true for the Public Prosecution Office and the Dutch National Police Internal Investigations Department. The Safety Board used the investigation materials that were collected for the above mentioned investigations conducted by the Dutch National Police Internal Investigations Department and the Large-Scale Investigation Team, including official reports of meetings with family members.

1.8 outline

In order to gain a proper understand of the incident, it is important to know how the legal possession of firearms in the Netherlands is governed. How does the legal system work? In other words: What does a sport shooter have to do to legally obtain and keep a firearm? Therefore, the report (in chapter 2) begins with an explanation of the procedures a person has to follow to obtain a firearm for sport shooting purposes, and what he has to do to keep the firearm.

Chapter 3 then explains how the permit was granted to Tristan van der V. The chapter explores the events that took place, which resulted in Tristan van der V. being able to acquire and keep a firearms permit, while in retrospect it turned out that he did not meet (or did no longer meet) the condition that he could not pose a risk to himself, the public order or public safety. What information was used to grant him the permit? What information did other people know and what happened to that information?

Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the factors that explain the occurrence of the incident. This chapter focuses on the system used for governing the legal possession of firearms and the importance of that information. It looks at how the different parties evaluate whether there is a risk for firearms abuse, what information is available to them and to what degree the parties involved in the system are capable of learning from their experiences. A diagram is used to illustrate how the system works.

Chapter 5 looks at how the risks in a few similar systems are managed and how the medical circumstances of someone can be included in the risk assessment.

Chapter 6 contains the conclusions, and in chapter 7, the Safety Board provides a number of recommendations based on this investigation.

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2 DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM FOR GRANTING A FIREARMS PERMIT

2.1 introDuction

This chapter discusses the procedures involved in the system for someone to obtain a firearm for sport shooting purposes (paragraph 2.2) and what this person must do in order to keep the firearm legally (paragraph 2.3).

2.1.1 Dutch Weapons and Ammunition ActThe private possession of firearms is fundamentally prohibited in the Netherlands. This is a law that is laid out in the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act, the purpose of which is to regulate the legal possession of firearms and to counter illegal firearms possession.15 However, this ban is not absolute. The law recognises the importance of the private ownership of firearms for certain groups, for example, the 28,000 sport shooters who own firearms.16 They have a so-called firearms permit.

A firearms permit is granted if a number of conditions are met and if there is no fear of abuse. Therefore, obtaining an exception is not a favour, but an entitlement – as long as the applicant meets all the requirements. The Ministry of Security and Justice shares the following statement:

“A person is given the opportunity to use a firearm for the purpose of practicing a hobby with the shooting club. In this regard, it is important to realise that firearms and ammunition form a potentially serious threat to the safety in society if these firearms come into the hands of people who are not trustworthy enough to handle firearms and ammunition. A person who becomes a member of a shooting club will be in a special position in comparison with his/her fellow citizens, whom are prohibited from having any firearms or ammunition (and other similar items). The position requires the holder to strictly abide by the legal requirements (for firearms). He/she is also expected to refrain from breaching any of the rules that could have a (serious) effect on the public order.”17

The laws concerning firearms in the Netherlands consist of: – The Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act; – The Weapons and Ammunition Regulation - ministerial provision; – The Weapons and Ammunition Circular 2005 - It includes more thorough instructions by the

Minister of Security and Justice to the chiefs of police regarding the enforcement of the law and the policy to be upheld by the chiefs of police.

2.1.2 Self-regulationThe system contains an important role for the KNSA shooters association and the shooting clubs. In its role as sports association, the KNSA regulates the shooting sport in the Netherlands. The KNSA also establishes requirements for its affiliated clubs, which includes accepting and dismissing members from shooting clubs.18 In this role, the KNSA is an important fellow lawmaker.

One of the conditions for legally owning a firearm is that the sport shooter must have a KNSA licence. This means that he must be a member of a shooting club that is a member of the KNSA.19

15 Memorie van Toelichting, Lower House, session 1994–1995, 24 107, No. 3.16 See appendix 4 for more statistics.17 Ministry of Security and Justice, Justice Service, Screeningsprofel Lidmaatschap Schietsportvereniging,

December 2010.18 Shooting clubs are members of the KNSA and sport shooters are members of a shooting club. Thus,

individual sport shooters are not members of the KNSA; however, they do have a KNSA licence because the KNSA centrally maintains the membership lists for the shooting clubs.

19 There are 781 KNSA shooting clubs, which have a total of 42,290 members. See appendix 4.

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The KNSA has the following standards and rules for its members (the shooting clubs): – Rules for KNSA membership, “the orange booklet”. Shooting clubs are to meet these

requirements in order to obtain KNSA membership; . – KNSA certification system.20 Certification is voluntary. There are 256 requirements that a

club must meet, including those pertaining to the canteen, security and clean shooting ranges. Clubs are evaluated every four years;. Certification also depends on how much attention the club pays to the ballotage of its members;.

– Rules for completing and signing sections of the application form for a firearms permit (WM3 form) by boards of shooting clubs;

– Diverse templates for household rules, statutes, the different records to be maintained and the application form for aspirant members.

2.2 obtaining a legal firearm for sport sHooting purposes

2.2.1 IntroductionA sport shooter who wishes to own his own firearm must submit an application for a firearms permit to the chief of police for his area. The applicant must meet two general criteria: he must have a reasonable interest and there must be no reason to believe that the firearm will be abused.21 A valid reasonable interest for sport shooters is the participation, in a club setting, in a shooting sport discipline that is regulated or recognised by the KNSA. Therefore, the first step towards obtaining a firearm for sport shooting purposes is to become a member of a shooting club.

Once the sport shooter has been a member of a shooting club for one year, he is eligible to apply for a permit. The chief of police evaluates this application. In the event of a positive decision, the sport shooter may purchase one firearm and ammunition for that firearm. In the event of a negative decision, the applicant may begin an appeals process. Figure 1 illustrates these processes.

2.2.2 Becoming a member of a shooting clubThe first step a person must take to own a firearm to pursue sport shooting, is to become a member of a shooting club that is affiliated with the KNSA Dutch shooters association.

The rules for KNSA membership contain a procedure for obtaining a club membership. There are four stages to the procedure (see outline on page 22). The purpose of this procedure is for the club to form a thorough picture of the person who wishes to become a member and to allow him/her to become proficient in handling firearms in a safe manner.

20 KNSA, KNSA-certificeringssysteem; bekroning van kwaliteit, 200721 The applicant must also be at least 18 years of age.

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Obtain a VOG certificate of good behaviour

Be accepted to club

Take out an option to reserve a firearm

Receive certificate from the club (WM3)

check reasonable interest

investigate past records

conduct home inspection

Applying for a permit (§ 2.2.3)

Becoming a member of a club (§ 2.2.2)

permitgranted

permit notgranted

appeal passed,permit

granted

legal possession of firearms prohibited

appealfailed

appeal(optional)(§ 2.2.6)

Evaluation of permit application (§ 2.2.4)

Purchase of firearmand ammunition

(§ 2.2.5)

legal possession of

firearms permitted

permit notgranted

Receive KNSA licence

judgement interview (for intended refusal) standpoint

Figure 1: The processes a sport shooter must pass in order to legally own a firearm. The paragraph number where the corresponding process is outlined is in brackets

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Procedure for obtaining a shooting club membership22

1. The KNSA obligates the clubs to ask its membership applicants about their involvement in criminal activities on the application form. They must also supply a copy of their personal identification along with a recent Certificate of Good Behaviour (VOG).

2. Once all the documents have been approved, there will be a probationary period of at least one month, in which the probationary member must visit the club at least four times. During this time, the board of the club or a ballotage committee will conduct interviews with the probationary member in order to form a picture of this person (topics of discussion: any history of crime, criminal records of other members of the applicant’s household, the home situation, any relationship problems).

3. Once the probationary member has successfully completed the probationary period, he can become an aspirant member. Aspirant membership lasts at least six months. During this period, the aspirant member must learn how to handle firearms in a safe manner: The KNSA provides a training course template to its affiliated clubs for this purpose. The aspirant member must also pass a proficiency test.

4. Those who successfully complete their aspirant membership are eligible for full membership.

Once someone becomes a full member of the club, the club will report his membership to the KNSA. This application must be accompanied by a Certificate of Good Behaviour (VOG).23 A VOG is issued by the Judicial Enforcement Service for Assessment, Integrity and Screening24, an enforcement agency of the Ministry of Security and Justice. When a person applies for a VOG for shooting club membership purposes, the Justice Service reviews eight years of history to determine whether the applicant has been convicted of certain criminal offenses based on an existing screening profile established for this purpose.

Once a person has been listed as a member in the KNSA administration, he will receive his KNSA licence via the club where he is a member.25 He now has access to the club’s firearms, which he can use for shooting rounds in order to improve his shooting skills. The club maintains notes about his shooting rounds in the member’s shooting record (“shooting booklet”).

22 KNSA, Richtlijnen voor KNSA-lidmaatschap (Rules for KNSA membership), 2006.23 KNSA Rules, article 9. This requirement does not apply to aspirant members who already have a firearms

permit. In this case, a copy of the firearms permit is sufficient. The rules for KNSA membership state that the individual clubs must require a VOG Certificate of Good Behaviour to be submitted as a part of the membership application.

24 The udicial Enforcement Service for Assessment, Integrity and Screening (hereafter referred to as Dienst Justis) is the integrity screening authority of the Ministry of Security and Justice. The Justice Service assesses whether people have a prior history that would form an obstacle for working in a certain profession or job. In addition, the Justice Service also assesses whether the parties who apply for certain certificates, permits and subsidies meet integrity requirements. Source: www.rijksoverheid.nl

25 The KNSA has taken the licensing task as requested by the Minister of Justice. This became effective after three shooting incidents with legally owned firearms in Kerkrade, Landgraaf and Tiel. The government wanted to prevent undesirable people from becoming members of a shooting club, but club rights set limits to the requirements the government may set for membership. At that time, the Minister and the KNSA made the following agreement: the KNSA will require a certificate of good behaviour and will ensure thorough ballotage of new shooting club members; The Justice Service will state in the CWM that a KNSA licence is required for the legal possession of a firearm. The agreements have not (yet) been laid down in writing, such as in a covenant.

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GuestsMembers can introduce other people to the shooting club under certain conditions. In this case, the club or the member will provide firearms to the guest. The Weapons and Ammunition Circular include a number of rules for this purpose. These rules are also endorsed by the KNSA:1. The shooting club maintains a guest register, in accordance with the KNSA template.2. The gun and ammunition may only be handed to the shooter at the moment he is on the

firing point of the shooting range. 3. The person who is authorised to have the firearm will stay with the shooter while shooting. 4. The guest must return the gun and all unused cartridges to the person authorised for the

firearm immediately after the guest has finished shooting and before leaving the firing point.

5. The person who is authorised to have the firearm, must check whether the number of cartridges plus the number of unused cartridges are equal to the number of cartridges issues to the guest.

6. The same guest may be introduced a maximum of three times within a 12 month period.

2.2.3 Applying for a permitThe Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act has four firearms categories.26 Sport shooters can apply for a firearms permit for category III firearms: revolvers, pistols and rifles, either regular or semi-automatic ones. This firearms permit gives the holder the right to have a firearm and it usually also gives him the right to transport it and to purchase ammunition in the same category.

A firearms permit is issued by the chief of police in charge of the area where the applicant lives.27 In practice, this authority is assigned to the special laws department for the area covered by that police district.28 A permit is valid for a period of up to one year and can be renewed each year for one year.29 A permit is issued to a person and cannot be transferred.

A permit to own a category III firearm and the corresponding ammunition is issued under the following conditions:1. There is a reasonable interest for granting the permit.30 Sport shooters meet this requirement

of reasonable interest by practicing a sport shooting discipline that is regulated or recognised by the KNSA at a sport shooting club where the applicant is a member.

2. Upon receipt of application and the twelve months prior to the application, the applicant has been a member for twelve months31 of a shooting club in the Netherlands that is affiliated with the KNSA and which holds a valid, KNSA licence in the club’s name.32

3. The applicant is at least eighteen years old, apart from exceptions made for promising competitive sport shooters.33

4. The applicant must have participated in at least eighteen shooting rounds in the twelve months prior to the application.34

26 See Appendix 3.27 Article 28, paragraph 1 WWM.28 Special laws (also ‘korpscheftaken’ - chief of police district duties) reference all rules and regulations the

chief of police must abide by when serving as an administrative body as specified in the General Administrative Law Act. Besides the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act, it also contains the Dutch laws pertaining to Flora and Fauna, Private Security Organisations and Detective Agencies, Explosives for Civil Use and the Investigating Officers Decree. Furthermore, the duties handled by the special laws department may differ by police district.

29 There is a bill with the Upper House that proposes to extend the permit duration to five years in order to reduce administrative paperwork. However, the home inspection and the screening will continue to take place each year.

30 Article 28, paragraph 2 sub a WWM, in conjunction with CWM B2.4.1 e.31 The applicant has been a regular member for twelve months, in other words not an aspirant member or

a youth member.32 CWM B2.4.1.33 Article 28, paragraph 2 sub c WWM in conjunction with CWM B2.4.1.34 CWM B2.4.1.

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5. The applicant must not form a danger to himself, the public order or public safety.35 According to the Weapons and Ammunition Circular 2005, this criterion falls under the broad concept, “fear of abuse” as stated in the grounds for refusal in paragraph 2.2.4.

Information that is necessary to verify some of these requirements is provided by the shooting club where the sport shooter is a member. This applies to the information required under the above mentioned conditions 1, 2 and 4. Since the club must state that the firearm to be purchased will be used for a branch of sport shooting that is practiced in a club setting by the club, the sport shooter first reserves a firearm with a firearms retailer (takes out an option). Once the club has completed and signed the statement (part of the application form, WM3), the sport shooter can apply for a permit with the police in his area.

Taking an option on a firearmA sport shooter goes to a firearms retailer to reserve a firearm. The retailer will give him recommendations, depending on the type of shooting sport the shooter wishes to practice and on the options available at his club. Once the shooter has selected a firearm, he will take an option to purchase it and a purchase order is created. The firearms retailer often prepares a WM3 form (even though this is not the firearms retailer’s job according to law), which contains the information about the firearm in digital format so that no errors are made when copying the numbers.

The statement from the shooting clubA member of the board of the shooting club where the applicant is a member must co-sign the permit application (WM3). The sections the board member must sign include statements and certificate information in addition to information regarding the club’s identity:1. The applicant’s membership start date2. The number of shooting rounds the applicant has completed in the past year3. A statement confirming that the applicant has gained sufficient skills to properly handle firearms4. A statement confirming that the firearm the applicant wishes to purchase with this permit will

be used for a branch of sport shooting that can be practised in a club setting at this club.

The KNSA has guidelines36 to assist boards of shooting clubs with completing a WM3 form. These guidelines provide information about the skills required for handling firearms. The board can assess these skills while observing the applicant during the probationary period and during the aspirant membership, or when conducting a skills test.

The guidelines also provide assistance when evaluating the sport shooting discipline the applicant has listed on the WM 3 form. The board must assess whether the discipline is regulated or recognised by the KNSA, and whether the discipline can be practiced in a club setting at this club.

Submitting an application to the police districtThe applicant must submit the application in person at the police station. He must take with him the application form, a passport picture and identification so that the staff in the special laws department can see and meet the applicant.

2.2.4 Evaluating the permit applicationThe chief of the police district in the area where the applicant lives determines who can own a firearm with ammunition by granting, refusing and suspending firearms permits. He plays a critical role in fulfilling the objectives of the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act: maintaining control over the possession of legal firearms.

The special laws department evaluates a permit application in three steps. The first step is to check whether the formal requirements have been met, including “reasonable interest” (conditions 1 through 4, see paragraph 2.2.3).

35 Article 28, paragraph 2 sub b WWM, jo. CWM B2.4.1 b.36 Guidelines for completing certain sections and co-signing WM3 forms by boardmembers of shooting

clubs.

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The form must be completed in full by the applicant and the shooting club. The second step is to conduct a background check to see if there is a possible fear of abuse (condition 5, see paragraph 2.2.3). The last step is to conduct a home inspection. In Verona37 the special laws clerk keeps a record of how the procedure is progressing, from receipt of application, to the decision of whether to grant a permit, up to the time that the person possesses a firearm.

The background check and the home inspection are discussed here below in more detail.

Background check The special laws clerk looks up different police and court records to ascertain whether the police or the courts have information on any activities on the part of the applicant that could form a reason to refuse a firearms permit.38 When reviewing this information, the special laws clerk must base considerations on the laws governing firearms and, in particular, on screening for fear of abuse.39 Some police districts have established additional policies that have to be considered during this process.

The Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act provides the following general grounds for refusing a firearms permit:40

– Risk that the applicant cannot be trusted with firearms or ammunition; – Fear of abuse of the permit or of firearms or ammunition; – Urgent reasons arising from common interests.

The Weapons and Ammunition Circular 2005 notes that “fear of abuse” and “not being able to trust” are actually two descriptions for the same situation. The circular further determines that even minor doubts in this area form sufficient grounds to not grant a permit and/or to revoke an existing permit. These doubts must be based on a motive that can be objectively assessed.

In order to determine whether there is a risk of abuse according to the circular, one must look at criminal offenses and other known activities involving the applicant. The following activities also form a reason to reject a permit application or to revoke an existing permit:a. The applicant or holder of a firearms permit has been placed in a psychiatric hospital or has

received a psychiatric care order due to a punishable offense in the past eight years;41

b. The applicant or holder of a firearms permit has been irrevocably convicted by the court during the past eight years for:i. Committing a crime that resulted in actual or suspended imprisonment;ii. Committing a crime whereby violence or threats were met with violence;iii. Committing a crime or a violation that goes against the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition

Act; iv. Committing a crime or violation that goes against the Opium Act.

c. The applicant or holder of a firearms permit has been convicted by the court during the past four years for committing a crime that was punishable by a fine or community service hours.

37 Verona is the name of the Police Suite Permits Enforcement Module system. Verona registers police activities that are considered as chief of police tasks.

38 The CWM 2005 sums up a number of judicial and police sources, including information from the Judicial Documentation Register, the internal police records and the Criminal Information Unit records.

39 CWM B1.40 Article 7 paragraph 1 WWM.41 This refers to compulsory admission to a psychiatric hospital (Art 37 of the Dutch criminal law book) –or

placement under a mental hospital (Art 37a of the Dutch criminal law book) , in both cases as handed down by the court in connection with a criminal offense. The circular does not go into explicit detail about another form of compulsory treatment, the compulsory admission (IBS) in accordance with the Dutch Compulsory Admission to Psychiatric Hospitals Act.

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The following known facts (often referred to by police as “soft information”) are reasons to reject a permit application or to revoke an existing permit:42

1. Case dismissals and legal proceedings: If a case is dismissed due to procedural errors during the investigation phase, or because the case has been open too long due to the case being a minor offense or due to minor crime value, there may be a clearer reason for refusing or revoking a permit. If a case is dismissed because the person involved was wrongly cited as a suspect, it will not be able to play a role in the evaluation. The fear of abuse also cannot be based on legal proceedings that have not (yet) led to a conviction. A case in which legal proceedings have not (yet) led to a conviction occurs when the case is so recent that no decision has (could have) been made by the court or the public prosecutor.43

2. Mental state: The applicant/permit holder is under high mental pressure, due to reasons that are internal or external in nature, which manifests itself in unpredictable behaviour or (for example) alcohol and drugs abuse, and whereby the impression exists that the applicant/ permit holder does not have good control of himself. A permit holder/ applicant can provide proof to the contrary by submitting a certificate by a physician/psychiatrist. This certificate must clearly show that the physician/psychiatrist is familiar with the person’s problems and that they do not (no longer) form an obstacle for granting the applicant a permit for the possession of firearms.

3. Moving in criminal circles:Evidence or indications that point to the applicant’s (permit holder’s) involvement in any form of drug trafficking or heavy (organised) criminal activity or moving in (serious) criminal circles.

4. Involved third parties: Risk of abuse by third parties, for example by someone who shares a household with the person who is applying for the permit. In such cases, it is not always necessary to reject the permit application. A solution can also be found by adding limitations and rules to the permit.44 For example, a stipulation could be that the firearm and the ammunition can only be stored in the safe at the shooting club or with a recognised permit holder.

Soft information, like the information listed above, is only reviewed if facts known about the applicant that have been registered with the police and the court form a reason to do so.

Not all police districts review the records the same way. There are many records available for review.45 Not all special laws officers in all police districts have access to all the systems that provide access to these records.

These records can also be searched with the aid of the global police search engine, BlueView.46 The staff of the special laws department in some police districts have a BlueView account, while the staff in other districts only have direct access to the regional police systems. In this case they have to ask a different department that is in charge of processing information (information distribution) to look up information using BlueView. The special laws department also cannot access investigation information directly.

42 Weapons and Ammunition Circular 2005, p.32. This summary is not exhaustive according to the Justice Service, even though the police sometimes interpret it that way.

43 CWM, section B, p. 31.44 Article 6 WWM. The acknowledgments, permissions, permits, licences, exemptions and releases listed in

this act can be granted with restrictions. They may also have rules attached to them.45 See appendix 6.46 BlueView is a system that searches information from different sources of data collection, including the

Enforcement Database and the Investigation Database. Its operation can be compared to that of an internet search engine. See appendix 6.

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Home inspectionIf no issues are found during the background check, a police officer will conduct a home inspection. During this visit, the officer will see if the storage options for firearms and ammunition fulfil the requirements: firearms and ammunition must be stored separately from one another in locked safes that are anchored to the wall or the floor. The home inspection also provides the opportunity to evaluate the applicant’s living environment, because this could provide indicators for further investigation. However, a home inspection is not a home search. The officer is not permitted to enter all rooms of the home without the applicant’s permission, only the areas required to pass through to access the safe.

Once the background check and the home inspection have been completed, the chief of police decides whether or not the permit should be granted.

Positive decisionThe permit must be granted if there is no reason to refuse it. Upon granting the permit, the “WWM permit” (“verlof WWM”) document is issued.47 The firearm for which the permit has been granted is listed on the document attached to the permit. A “WM2 permit to acquire” (“verlof tot verkrijging”) document“ is also issued that is to be submitted to the firearms retailer upon purchasing the firearm. In some police districts, the WM4 and the WM2 must be picked up in person from the special laws department. In other police districts, the special laws officer takes the documents with him to the home inspection and hands them to the applicant if the home inspection is successful. The permit goes into effect once the permit applicant has paid the fees and has signed.

Negative decisionIf the records reveal any information about the applicant, this information is evaluated to see if there is a reason to refuse the permit. As far as the Safety Board knows, most police districts evaluate this information by consulting with one another and through informal assessments.

If the applicant does not fulfil all the requirements or if there is a fear of abuse, the chief of police must refuse the permit. Sometimes, he seeks legal advice from the police district’s legal department to determine whether there is sufficient justification for the intended refusal in accordance with the assumptions specified in the General Administrative Law Act.

The applicant is then informed that the chief of police intends to reject his application. At this point, an applicant is entitled to a judgement review before an application is rejected.48 During a judgment review, the applicant also has the option to withdraw his application to avoid receiving a negative decision.

If the chief of police does not change his mind after evaluating a judgment review, he issues a decision with a justification for the rejection. The police reports a negative decision to the KNSA. If the applicant withdraws his application after a judgment review, the KNSA will not receive a report regarding the intended rejection.

Annually 0.3% of the permits are refused (applications) or revoked (existing permits). Furthermore, the rates of permit refusal or revocation differ greatly among the different police districts: this percentage varies from 0.07% a year to 0.69% a year.49 Refer to paragraph 2.3.4 for more details about revoking a firearms permit.

47 According to the Ministry of Security and Justice, the WM4 form has been discontinued and has been replaced by the WM26 and WM27 forms.

48 A decision to suspend or refuse a permit must be carefully made and must meet the requirements set forth by the General Administrative Law Act. CWM 1.4.4.6.

49 See appendix 4 for statistics by police district.

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Laws and actual practiceBased on conversations with people from thirteen police districts50 the Dutch Safety Board has determined that the police districts enforce the laws that regulate the firearms permit process in different ways. There are differences among the police districts in how the police systems are accessed and which systems are accessible. It also appears that the quality of enforcement is not the same for all police districts.51

Note that there are differences in judicial and technical knowledge on the part of the police officers and staff. There are also differences in the significance that the different police districts assign to the factual information they know about an applicant. This applies to both the hard facts that are included in the records and the soft information that arises during the application process. The law offers the chief of police room for his own considerations so that he can do justice to special details for each individual case. Often, no fixed rules have been established within the police districts regarding how to weigh the facts that have been encountered. If police districts have their own rules, these are mostly not harmonised with those of other police districts nor with those of the ministry. Most of the police districts appear to limit themselves to the information that can be found in the records they can access.52

2.2.5 Purchasing a firearm and ammunition

Acquiring a firearmThe first year that a permit has been granted, the permit is valid for one firearm53, after the first year, it is valid for five firearms at the most.54

The permit holder can take his firearms permit and WM2 form to the firearms retailer to purchase the firearm that he had already reserved previously. The firearms retailer checks the permit (which already contains the firearm number that the police had written on the permit previously), takes the WM2 form and writes down the permit holder’s ID information and date he transferred the firearm to the permit holder. If the firearm number is correct, the seller signs the form. The firearms retailer then presents the firearm to the permit holder, who then pays the bill.55 The ammunition that the permit holder wishes to buy for that firearm is also supplied.

The firearms retailer must register all incoming and outgoing firearms and ammunition.56 He must send monthly reports (paper or digital) to the police. The police processes this information in Verona. However, police districts often have a backlog in entering this information.57

Purchasing ammunitionSport shooters who have a firearms permit, also have a permit to hold and purchase the corresponding category III ammunition. Thus, the permit holder is only allowed to purchase category III ammunition that is technically compatible with the corresponding firearm. Ammunition can be purchased from a firearms retailer or from some shooting clubs.

50 Refer to the investigation report in appendix 1.51 Refer to the Chief of Police duties under development. Special laws and BOA duties discussed again.

Policy document 2011-2015, January 2010. This police document shows that “the duty of granting permits is not being fulfilled in an unambiguous manner.”

52 Ministry of Security and Justice, Weapons and Ammunition Circular 2005 (Circulaire wapens en munitie) Evaluation Report, August 2010 (not yet published at the time of this report).

53 CWM B2.4.1.54 Article 43 paragraph 1 RWM.55 A firearm can be sold by a firearms retailer, but also by others who are entitled to possess firearms.

They include firearms permit holders and hunting licence holders. Refer to article 31 of the WWM also for rules regarding to whom a firearm can be transferred along with form WM2, section 3 for a statement regarding the type of entitlement connected to the firearm before it is transferred to the new owner.

56 Article 12 RWM.57 Sources: NVW – Netherlands association for the sale of firearms (Nederlandse Vereniging voor de

Wapenhandel) and the Ministry of Security and Justice, Weapons and Ammunition Circular 2005 (Circulaire wapens en munitie) Evaluation report, August 2010 (Not yet published at the time of this report).

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A firearms retailer can only sell firearms to the permit holder upon presentation of the firearms permit (WM4), and can only sell ammunition that is technically compatible with one of the firearms listed on the permit. The firearms retailer keeps a record of ammunition sales, but ammunition purchases are not registered in Verona.

The shooting club registers the name of the buyer and the quantity of ammunition purchased.5858 The purpose of the record is to prevent ammunition from falling into the hands of unauthorised people, not to record how much ammunition a permit holder has on hand. Therefore, no one knows this information about the permit holders.

Another reason why no one knows how much ammunition a sport shooter has on hand, is that many sport shooters (the KNSA estimates approximately 20%) make their own ammunition or reload it. They either do this to save money or because it is a part of their sport, since they are making the ammunition specifically for a particular gun based on their individual preferences. This improves shooting scores.

Storage location of firearms and ammunitionFirearms and ammunition must be stored separately, each in its own safe.59 In the event of a burglary, this prevents the thief from seizing both guns and ammunition so that the gun is not immediately ready to shoot. It also prevents the storage of loaded guns, thus eliminating the risk that the gun fires accidentally. Separate storage also prevents someone from being able to pick up a gun and ammunition on impulse.

The number of cartridges of ammunition that a permit holder can have is currently only managed by environmental laws. As a result of the Entities and Permits Order pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act, a permit holder can have 10,000 unit cartridges on hand without an environmental permit. This is not necessarily to manage the risk of firearms abuse, but to manage the risks involved in unintentional explosion of ammunition in storage or during transport.

Storage of firearms and ammunitionPrior to the establishment of the Weapons and Ammunition Circular in 2005, the Lower house had suggested that it might be a good idea to store firearms and/or ammunition at the shooting club instead of at home. The minister of Justice responded at that time: “The obligation to store all firearms at the shooting club is unsafe, not feasible from a logistics and financial standpoint, and it will seriously damage competitive sport shooting’.60 These were his arguments:

– Storing everything at the shooting club means there will be a large number of guns and ammunition on hand at a site that is not continuously staffed. This makes it an appealing target for criminals and terrorists. Storage at the shooter’s home spreads the risk and practically eliminates it.

– Only a permit holder can have access to his own gun. Therefore, a shooting club would have to have a separate safe for each member. There is often a lack of space and funds for this.

– Once the shooter has finished shooting, the gun must be cleaned. Members should also be able to clean their guns at the club.

– This solution does not work for hunters, who also have guns and ammunition.

58 KNSA, Rules for issuing club firearms and ammunition and what is involved.59 CWM B8.60 Lower House, session 2003-2004, 26 494, No. 6.

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As a result of the shooting incidents in Alphen aan den Rijn and Utøya (Norway) diverse parties have suggested that firearms and ammunition should be stored separately in the future. This suggestion was proposed by the Chiefs of Police Council. This council wants ammunition to only be stored at the shooting club and no longer at the gun owner’s home. Such a measure forms an additional obstacle for the gun owner to act (impulsively).

On the other hand, different people who have been interviewed during the investigation have stated that it would be easy to evade such a measure. The measure requires strict supervision and accurate records; the question is whether such a system can be that secure. Besides, some gun owners make their own ammunition at home. This would no longer be an option.

2.2.6 Appeals procedureIf the chief of police decides to refuse or revoke a permit, the applicant can appeal the decision with the Minister of Security and Justice.61 Approximately two thirds of the applicants in this position take advantage of this option to lodge an appeal.62 The Justice Service handles this so-called “administrative appeal” and the State Secretary of Security and Justice is the one who signs the decision.63

The minister evaluates all formal and specific aspects of the decision made by the chief of police for this administrative appeal. Thus, the minister reconsiders all the facts, including the evaluation of whether there is a fear of abuse.

The process the Justice Service follows within the scope of the administrative appeal of the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act, is as follows:

– Declare the notice of appeal admissible or inadmissible – Request documents from the chief of police – Conduct a hearing (optional; does not generally take place). Generally there is a special

laws officer present on behalf of the chief of police – The Justice Service prepares a preliminary decision. At least two officers have evaluated

the case – Final decision is made by State Secretary of Security and Justice

The appeals options outlined in the General Administrative Law Act apply to the appeals procedure. If the applicant’s appeal is rejected, he can lodge an appeal with the administrative court.6464 This judicial evaluation concerns the legitimacy of the decision and marginally looks at the accuracy of the content (marginal evaluation whether the decision is not unreasonable). The reason for this is to prevent the court from “standing in the administrator’s shoes”. After the appeal with the court, the next level is an appeal with the Council of State. The different appeals options are illustrated in figure 2.

61 Article 34 WWM.62 See appendix 4.63 There is a proposal in the Upper house for a mandate provision, whereby the Justice Service can decide

on an administrative appeal on behalf of the minister.64 The Council of State has decided that the chief of police cannot appeal a decision made by the Minister of

Justice. After all, the authority exercised by the chief of police in accordance with the WWM takes place under the responsibility of the Minister of Justice. The chief of police is not cited as a person of interest in the sense of the Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht because he does not have an interest that is separate from the interest of the Minister of Justice. The administrative procedures department of the Council of State, 6 November 2002, LJN: AE9910, Case No: 200103516/1.

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administrative appeal administrative

court

administrative appeal Minister

appeal with the Council of State

Permit not granted

Figure 2: Appeals options

Almost all appeals cases have to do with “fear of abuse” of the firearm or the firearms permit. The Justice Service estimates that approximately 70-80% of the appeals in this category are related to criminal acts; approximately 10% are related to improper storage of firearms and ammunition; and the remainder varies from an untrustworthy housemate, moving in criminal circles, and also incidental occurrences of a psychiatric condition.65

In an administrative appeals procedure, the appeals body evaluates whether the chief of police’s decision fulfils all formal requirements and whether the considerations made by the chief of police are correct. Formal requirements refer to whether there is sufficient justification for the decision, whether the decision was made carefully, and whether the right legal grounds for the decision were stated, etc. The next question is whether there is sufficient justification for the fear of abuse. This is important in order to do justice to the general fundamentals of appropriate control, such as the fundamentals of justification and the prevention of arbitrary decisions. Insufficient justification refers to the question whether reasonable justification has been made in connection with the question or whether there is plausible argumentation that is sufficiently concrete and justified.

These past years, the Justice Service found that the appeal was justified 27% of the time (also see appendix 4). Most of the well-founded statements are based on formal grounds. Also, a new decision of refusal can be made based on a formal well-founded statement. Thus, applicants cannot wrongly obtain a permit on the grounds of errors on the form, while there are (sufficiently justified) objections based on specific content.

Issuing a firearms permit is a so-called ‘binding administrative competence’: if an applicant meets the requirements, a permit must be granted. The provision is formulated as being a citizen’s entitlement. Therefore, the government must grant a permit to those who meet the criteria, although the chief of police has quite a bit of freedom in this matter.66

2.3 Keeping a legal firearm for sport sHooting purposes

A firearms permit is valid for one year. When a permit expires, is not renewed or is revoked, the firearms owner is no longer permitted to keep the firearms and must sell them or surrender them to the police.

In order to keep a firearm, a permit holder must renew his permit each year (paragraph 2.3.1). Each time the permit is renewed, an evaluation takes place again to ensure that there is still reasonable interest and that there is still no fear of abuse associated with the applicant. In addition to the administrative examination for the annual renewal, the police must also conduct an unannounced inspection once a year to verify that the firearm and the ammunition are stored correctly at home (paragraph 2.3.2). Furthermore, the police can respond to signs that are related to fear of abuse by the permit holder. These signs can originate from the permit holder’s social environment or from the shooting club where he is a member (paragraph 2.3.3).

65 It is not easy to generate this information from the Justice Service registration system. Therefore, the statistics are based on experience.

66 Explanatory Statement for Article 28 of the WWM.

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2.3.1 Renewing a permitThe firearms permit is renewed if the requirements for the initial permit have been fulfilled. The evaluation procedure is the same as with the permit application as discussed in paragraph 2.2.4. The background check procedure by some police districts consists of a condensed review of the police and court records, reviewing information from the past one year and a half (instead of eight years as is the case with the initial permit application). An application for renewing the firearms permit can be submitted verbally, unless any changes have occurred with the person or with the person’s personal circumstances.67 In this case, a new application must be submitted.

2.3.2 Home inspection by policeThe circular determines that all permit holders must receive a “randomly chosen home inspection at least once a year”68 The firearms the permit holder owns will be examined to ensure they meet the description on the permit and whether the firearms and the ammunition are stored correctly at home.69 Like the first time the permit was granted, the police use this home inspection to form a picture of the living conditions of the permit holder. Furthermore, the home inspection is a good time for the police to come into contact with others who know the permit holder socially, such as those who share a household with the permit holder and the neighbours.

At some police districts, including the Holland Midden police district, the police officers from the basic law enforcement services70 or other units conduct the home inspections instead of the special laws officers. This is often due to efficiency considerations: many police districts do not have enough capacity to check up on all permit holders. The best times for the visits (between 6:00 pm and 9:00 pm) also play a role.

Most police districts are not successful in checking all permit holders once a year as stipulated. The percentage varies from 3% in the Twente district to 100% in Flevoland.71 The investigation shows that almost none of the police districts conducts the visits based on a risk approach, whereby permit holders who have a higher risk of abuse are given a higher priority than others.

The Minister of Justice at that time pointed out in 2005 that a risk approach was desirable, and indicated that those who did not comply with the rules as strictly as they should, should be subjected to more intensive monitoring than those who have proven that they follow the rules to the letter. The minister preferred this approach since an annual visit to each permit holder claimed a lot of time from the available police capacity. “It is better to use the capacity where the most risks are”, the minister wrote to the Lower House.72

2.3.3 Sport shooter at the clubThe shooting sport is very diverse (different disciplines), depending on the type of firearm, the type of practice and the calibre used for shooting.

67 CWM A1.4.4.1.68 The investigation showed that the Ministry of Security and Justice means that an unannounced visit

must take place each year at the homes of all permit holders. The police also interprets the same meaning. Upon reviewing the preliminary report, it was brought up that the KNSA interprets this as a randomised home inspection in the literal sense of the word, meaning that some permit holders are to receive a home inspection (on a random basis).

69 CWM B9.1.70 ‘Basispolitiezorg’ (BPZ – basic law enforcement service) is the general name for a number of typical

police duties, such as police patrol, handling incidents, recording crime reports, conducting simple detective work, providing assistance, providing emergency aid to victims and witnesses, and giving preventive recommendations.

71 See appendix 4 for the home inspection statistics by police district, according to the information available at the Safety Board.

72 Letter by minister of Justice to the Lower House, 25 September 2005, 28684, No. 63. See also par. 9.1 of the Weapons and Ammunition Circular.

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There are also big differences among the approximately eight hundred shooting clubs that are affiliated with the KNSA, such as differences in size and the disciplines that are practised there. There are clubs where members can only shoot clay pigeons with small calibre guns, while other clubs have a wide range of disciplines that can be practised. Half of the shooters are members of a mid-size club (51-200 members). There are also a small number (43) of large clubs (more than 200 members) and a large number (539) of small clubs (50 members or less). Appendix 4 contains a detailed summary of these statistics.

Even thought the KNSA sports association attempts to have all its affiliated sports clubs pursue their activities in a standard manner by implementing rules and document templates, there appear to be considerable differences in how a shooting club handles its affairs. These differences do not have a lot to do with how procedures are arranged, but they do affect how these procedures are fulfilled: for example the level of professionalism by the boards of shooting clubs, or the quality of the ballotage meetings. The KNSA rules state that a shooting range commissioner, also referred to as a shooting range commander, must be appointed. This officer must ensure that sport shooters practise safety when shooting. He must also sign off on the shooting rounds in the personal shooting rounds register (the “shooting booklet”) that every sport shooter has. However, not all clubs have a shooting range commissioner. The KNSA only assesses their certified clubs periodically on whether they have a shooting range commissioner.

Many shooters have one or more steady club evening(s) that they go to the club. The shooters who go to the club the same evening every week know each other. At most clubs this serves as a form of social monitoring to a certain degree. The KNSA indicates that it is important for club members to keep an eye on each other and to report to the board of the club any members who appear to be having problems. The KNSA also believes it is important for the boards of the shooting clubs to talk to a member who appears to be having problems and in consultation, if necessary, to advise the member in question to temporarily surrender his firearms to the club. The KNSA generally assumes that the boards of the shooting clubs can handle this responsibility.

The KNSA only checks up on a club if there are any indications that something is not right. This can occur because of a report the KNSA has received or because a misunderstanding comes to light via the media. Officials of the KNSA also visit clubs when they host competitions and training sessions, which allows them to observe the clubs first hand. The KNSA indicates that it will intervene in a club if it finds any issues.

If their statutes and household rules allow, shooting clubs can draw up rules and guidelines that their members must comply with and attach disciplinary measures to non-compliance. Due to the large number of clubs, the Dutch Safety Board has not been able to determine to what extent this is common practice and how the clubs handle this.

2.3.4 Revoking a permitNon-compliance with the rules and regulations almost always has consequences for the firearms permit, with or without a prior official warning from the chief of police. Besides revoking the permit, a decision can also be made to set a restriction on the permit, such as obligating the permit holder to store the gun at the shooting club.73

Whenever the police receives soft information about a firearms owner that justify the fear of abuse, the firearms owner is generally called in for a meeting with a special laws officer. This could occur in the event of serious relationship problems, medical treatment of the firearms owner or of those who share a household with him due to mental problems, or the suspicion that the firearms owner can no longer be trusted with a firearm due to a physical problem. During the meeting, the officer attempts to establish whether there is fear of abuse. He will often try to talk the firearms owner into voluntarily surrendering his firearms, temporarily or permanently.

73 It is not compulsory for shooting clubs to cooperate.

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A firearms permit can be revoked temporarily or permanently. If a permit is revoked, the chief of police summons the firearms owner to surrender his firearms to the police. In consultation with the police, the firearms owner may also surrender his firearms to a recognised permit holder (for example a firearms retailer). If the permit will only be revoked temporarily, there may be conditions attached to ending the revocation.

The police can initiate the revocation of the firearms permit; however, the shooting club may also have a reason to terminate the shooter’s club membership. In this case, he will lose his KNSA licence, which means he will no longer meet the requirements for holding a firearms permit.

Consequences of refusing or revoking a permitThe main consequence of revoking a permit is that as soon as the irrevocable decision has been made to revoke the permit, the holder can no longer legally possess firearms. Firearms possession then becomes punishable by law.

The police must report the refusal or revocation of a sport shooter’s permit to the KNSA in accordance with the Weapons and Ammunition Circular. After receiving such a report, the KNSA then revokes the shooting licence it had issued previously.74 The police never reports the reason for revoking a permit to the KNSA or to the associated club due to privacy reasons. Since the reason is unknown and is possibly serious, the KNSA requires the club to immediately expel the shooter in question from the club.75 Almost five hundred members have been expelled since 2005 after receiving a report by the police about the member; this is an average of almost two club members a week and approximately 0.3% of the total number of shooters with a firearms permit per year.76

The shooter can register a protest with the KNSA. In this case he must submit the decision issued by the chief of police with the reasons for refusing or revoking the permit. Depending on the reason for revoking the permit, the person may then be able to obtain his KNSA licence again. He will then only be able to practise the sport with firearms that belong to the club; he will not be able to own his own gun and ammunition. The KNSA has a record of who has been expelled; therefore, a shooter who has been expelled cannot become a member of a shooting club again. If the protest is not honoured, the shooter still has an option to lodge an appeal with the KNSA’s Appeals Committee.

2.4 summary

The law states that private ownership of firearms and ammunition is prohibited in principle. Society must be protected against the dangers of firearms. An exception to this rule can be made for those who have a reasonable interest in owning a firearm, as long as there is no fear of abuse of the firearm. A firearms permit is only granted if both conditions are met. In order to be able to determine whether there exists any fear of abuse, knowledge about the person applying for a permit is essential.

To manage the risk of abuse of firearms by sport shooters, the government has established the permit system. The chief of police is in charge of granting permits to sport shooters. An important role has also been set aside for the parties from the sport shooting world: the shooting clubs and their sports association, the KNSA.

Whether the police assume fear of abuse depends largely on the information from the records maintained by the police and the courts.

The police districts have organised their legal duties related to granting permits and monitoring firearms owners in different ways. There are substantial differences in how the districts conduct the annual home inspections. These differences apply to which police department conducts the visits and the percentage of firearms owners who actually receive a home inspection.

74 CWM A1.4.4.775 Expelling someone refers to terminating a person’s membership.76 See appendix 4, paragraph 3.

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3 CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN GRANTING FIREARMS PERMIT TO TRISTAN VAN DER V.

3.1 introDuction

This chapter discusses the question which facts and events led to Tristan van der V. being able to receive and keep a firearms permit, even though, as it proved later, he (no longer) met the requirement that he did not form a danger to himself, the public order or safety. What information was consulted when his permit was granted? Which information did others have about him and what happened with that information?

The chapter describes the actual events, including the actions of the different parties involved. It also discusses matters that are not directly related to the firearms permit, but that are still relevant to having a good understanding of the case, such as background information about Tristan van der V., the shooting club where he was a member and the police district that granted him the permit. The purpose of this chapter is not to explain or judge the choices that were made; explanations will be discussed in chapter 4.

This chapter begins in 2005, the year in which Tristan van der V. applied for a firearms permit for the first time. The timeline of the events discussed in this chapter, is illustrated in figure 3.

3.2 2005: first permit application

In August 2005 Tristan van der V. submitted an application for a firearms permit for the first time. He submitted this application to the special laws department of the Hollands Midden police district. The department accepted the application for processing and commenced the investigation into any records he might have. It is plausible that Tristan van der V. had been a member of the Dagschutters-vereniging shooting club in Nieuwkoop for a year at the time he submitted his permit application. Being a member for a year prior to the permit application was also a requirement at that time. Since the administration of the shooting club at that time is no longer available, it is not absolutely certain that he met this requirement.

The background check into his past records showed that he had been charged with a crime on two separate occasions. In February 2003, he was involved in the destruction of property with an airgun; in March 2003, he was involved in a threat with an airgun, whereby someone was shot in the ankle. Other people were involved in these incidents along with Tristan van der V. Both charges were combined into a single case by the Public Prosecution Office and were later dismissed due to minor involvement by Tristan van der V.

These incidents formed a reason for the special laws department to assume that Tristan van der V. formed a increased risk and, all things considered, to refuse him the permit. The Chief of Police of the Hollands Midden police district informed Tristan van der V. in writing of its intent to reject the application. Tristan van der V. did not take advantage of the opportunity to defend himself. Afterwards, the chief of police submitted the final decision on 1 September 2005 that stated that the permit was refused. The KNSA indicated during the investigation that it was not aware that the permit had been refused.77

The correspondence regarding the application and the refusal were recorded in the physical file, but not in the computerised VOS – Permits and Exemptions System (Vergunningen- en Ontheffngen-Systeem) that the special laws agency used at that time. The system did not allow them to register these refusals.

77 The Hollands-Midden police district could no longer ascertain whether KNSA had been informed of the refusal in 2005 as required.

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2-9-2007Central body that issues certificates of

good behaviour (Centraal OrgaanVerklaringen Omtrent Gedrag) issuesVOG (certificate of good behaviour)

9-12-2010Hollands Midden police conducts

home inspection

1-8-2005submits 1st application for firearms permit

8-4-2011lDelivery of 3 additional ammunition cartridges for Tristan vd V.’s gun (ordered in January)

9-4-2011Shooting incident in Ridderhof shopping centre

27-8-2008admitted to hospital due to attempted suicide

8-9-2008Member of DVN shooting club for 1 year

11-10-2008Submits 2nd application for firearms permit

10-11-2008acquires 1st gun

13-6-2004Tristan van der V. 18 years old

8-9-2007becomes a member of DVN shooting club

1-9-2005Hollands Midden refuses to issue

firearms permit due to incidents in 2003

3-9-2006Committed to a mental institution (15 days) due to suicide risk

16-11-2010Hollands Midden police renews

firearms permit

10-11-2008Hollands Midden police conducts home

inspection and grants firearms permit

9-11-2009Hollands Midden police renews

firearms permit

2-2-2003Involved in incident with airgun (dismissed)

7-3-2003involved in incident with airgun (dismissed)

Figure 3: Timeline of events leading up to the shooting incident in Alphen aan den Rijn

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The region covered by the Hollands Midden district is the North East side of the province of Zuid-Holland. The area runs from the coast (Noordwijk aan Zee) via the cities of Leiden, Alphen aan den Rijn and Gouda to the river Lek (Schoonhoven) and has a population of more than 750,000 people. A total of 2299 people in this area had a firearms permit or a hunting licence; 357 of them had been issued a permit or licence for the first time, while the remainder involved renewals.78

The special laws agency (9.1 FTE) is not only involved in evaluating firearms permit applications submitted by sport shooters, but also with similar applications submitted by hunters, private security guards, the foodservice industry and permits submitted for the civilian use of explosives. The agency covered four districts until 2009. For this reason, and because the head of the team also had many other duties besides his duties for this department, the staff of this department had a high level of independence. April 2009 marked the beginning of the reorganisation of this department, after problems had surfaced in one of the districts. This did not involve the district Alphen aan den Rijn, which processed the firearms permit application submitted by Tristan van der V. The special laws department became a centrally managed and organised department with its own special laws head of the team.

In terms of the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act, the administrative processes, the evaluation/approvals processes and the supervisory/enforcement processes have been separated where possible. Unannounced home inspections to inspect safes that should take place once a year, have been assigned primarily to the basic law enforcement services department. In 2009, 11.5% of home inspections actually took place. In 2010, this was 21.4%.

3.3 2006: committeD to a mental institution

On 3 September 2006, the mayor committed Tristan van der V. to a psychiatric hospital due to a fear of suicide. This type of compulsory admission (IBS or compulsory admission) can only occur if someone forms an immediate danger to himself or his environment.79 The parents of Tristan van der V. feared that he might use his father’s gun. Tristan van der V. lived with his parents and his father had a firearms permit for different guns at that time.

Tristan van der V.’s father was a member of the Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop shooting club and had had a permit since 2003 for firearms and related ammunition. In 2006, he had five guns and related ammunition. He stored the guns and the ammunition in separate safes in his home. Others did not know where he stored the keys or the lock combination to the safe.

This permit was renewed eight times, 21 February 2011 was the last time. There were no special indications upon issuing and renewing the permits. In this case, only the father’s background history was checked. Family members can also be included in this screening, but in reality, family members are only screened if the situation calls for such a screening. In this case, the family members were not screened.

The Hollands Midden police district provided assistance for the compulsory admittance to the crisis centre of the mental health institution (Geestelijke Gezondheidszorg - GGZ) in Alphen aan den Rijn. Police assistance is not standard procedure in such a case. However, there was an agreement in the Hollands Midden district that the police would provide assistance whenever someone had to be removed from his home against his will. Anyway, the compulsory admission took place without any incident. The police officers prepared an internal police report of their services and entered this report into the Hollands Midden police district’s business processes system (BPS). This is how the police learnt of the compulsory admission to a mental health hospital.

78 See appendix 4.79 The Dutch law governing compulsory admission to psychiatric hospitals.

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A compulsory admission without police assistance is not reported to the police and is also not registered in any police system.

The mayor informed the Healthcare Inspector and the Public Prosecutor verbally, and later in writing, of the compulsory admission as prescribed by the Dutch Special Admissions to Psychiatric Hospitals Act (BOPZ Act). The information that the Public Prosecutor and the court had regarding this compulsory admission is not passed along to the Central Judicial Documentation Register, because this information is not considered as judicial information pursuant to the Dutch Judicial Information and Criminal Records Act. Therefore, in a way, it was a coincidence that the Hollands Midden police had information about the compulsory admission.

The court extended the compulsory admission after four days. After a total of fifteen days of compulsory treatment at two institutions, there was no longer a reason for the second institution to keep Tristan van der V. in the hospital, in part because he wanted to cooperate with ambulatory treatment. For this reason, he was released from the institution after fifteen days. While he was hospitalised, it was determined that Tristan van der V. was psychotic at that time. A diagnosis of schizophrenia was made. He also suffered from sleeping disorders. He started receiving medication for these conditions in 2007. After his hospitalisation, he remained under voluntary treatment by a multi-disciplinary treatment team consisting of a psychotherapist, a social psychiatric nurse, a clinical nurse, a psychiatrist and a cognitive behavioural therapist.

3.4 2007: sHooting club membersHip

After his permit application was rejected in 2005, Tristan van der V. became a member (again) of the Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop shooting club. By being a member of a club he could meet one of the eligibility requirements for a firearms permit: to be a member of a shooting club for at least one year. It also allowed him to meet the requirement of completing eighteen shooting rounds during a one year period. He submitted a certificate of good behaviour (VOG) along with his membership application. The shooting club sent Tristan van der V.’s information, including this certificate of good behaviour, to the KNSA, who then issued him a licence.

The Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop (DVN) shooting club rents shooting ranges from a commercial sport shooting centre.80 This centre has shooting ranges, a firearms retailer and a party centre. All are owned by the same person.

When a person applies for membership with a shooting club, two or three members of the council have a meeting with him, in order to find out his motives for becoming a member. If there are no objections, the person completes the membership application form and requests a VOG (certificate of good behaviour). The time before receiving the VOG is considered a probationary period at the Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop. Upon receipt of the VOG, the applicant becomes a member; thus, there is a probationary period, but there is no aspirant membership. Once the KNSA issues the licence, the new member can start shooting with a small calibre gun owned by the club. In the beginning, he receives guidance from the shooting range commissioner. The (safety) rules and shooting techniques will be explained to him. Once the new member has proven that he has developed sufficient skills, he is allowed to shoot independently. DVN does not have a training plan and there are no tests to measure the new member’s progress as prescribed by the KNSA rules. DVN explains that all new shooters are thoroughly trained and that they are monitored continuously to ensure safe and responsible gun handling.

In August 2008, Tristan van der V. was admitted for a short period of time to a general hospital after a suicide attempt. The shooting club states that it was not aware of the hospitalisation in 2006 nor of the suicide attempt in 2008.

80 http://www.vdwschietsport.nl/

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3.5 2008: seconD permit application

Permit applicationOn 11 October 2008, once he had been a member of the shooting club for more than a year, Tristan van der V. submitted an application for a firearms permit with the special laws department with the Hollands Midden police district for a second time. Another background check was conducted. The officer at the special laws agency requested an excerpt of the judicial documents from the judicial documentation service. The officer also asked the BUV Business Unit Processing ( “Business Unit Veredeling”) of its own district to review different police systems including BPS and BlueView in accordance with the “guidelines for internal questioning”. BPS is the business processes system for the Hollands Midden Police (and others); BlueView reviews all requested information in the BPS systems of other police districts. This resulted in an overview of Tristan van der V’s records.

The Business Unit Processing inquires the police information system upon the request of different departments within the Hollands Midden police district, and sends the information it finds to the appropriate department. The Business Unit Processing department only collects the information; the department requesting the information is the one that evaluates it. Information from the Judicial Information Service and information from the firearms registration system, Verona, is requested by the officers of the special laws agency.

Prior incidentsThe excerpt from the Judicial Information Service showed that Tristan van der V. had received two ticket violations. These violations involved setting off fireworks beyond the permitted times (in 2002) and speeding (in 2007). The events from 2003 mentioned previously (involvement in the incidents with an airgun), that formed a reason to reject the permit application in 2005, were not listed on the excerpt from the Judicial Information Service because these acts were dismissed due to little involvement.

The events from 2003 were still listed in the summary of records from the different police systems, which the officer from the Business Unit Processing sent to the officer of the special laws department. Examination by the officer of the special laws department showed that Tristan van der V. had not been convicted of the events that took place in 2003, which had been dismissed in the meantime. Thus, these incidents were taken into consideration when the decision was made to either grant or refuse the permit.

Compulsory hospitalisation in 2006The information regarding the compulsory hospitalisation in 2006 was not included in the evaluation of the background screening procedure. There are two possible explanations for this: 1. The information was not listed in the summary the Business Unit Processing sent to the Special

Laws Department.2. The information was listed in the summary the Business Unit Processing sent to the Special

Laws Department, but was overlooked during the evaluation.

Ad 1) The wording of the internal questioning guidelines (“Richtlijn interne bevragingen” ) by the portfolio holder for special laws addressed to the head of the team of the Business Unit Processing did not appear to be consistent, and the Special Laws department is not familiar with the guidelines in general.

Ad 2) Research conducted by the Dutch National Police Internal Investigations Department showed that the information regarding Tristan van der V.’s compulsory hospitalisation was recorded in the business processes system (BPS) and is displayed when queried. At that point a message appears: “emergency services assistance for other institutions” (“hulpverlening overige instanties”).

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This information is displayed whenever the currently installed version of the police enforcement database (BasisVoorziening Handhaving, BVH – the successor of the BPS system), is queried. This proves that the information from BPS has been transferred to BVH. The Dutch National Police Internal Investigations Department (Rijksrecherche) was unable to determine whether this information appeared when querying the business processes system that was in use in 2008.81

Changes in the police systemsBesides the business processes system where the police record their location, this system also contains information about registered permit holders. Up until 2006 this was maintained in the VOS – permits and exemptions system (“vergunningen- en ontheffingensysteem”), and was then migrated to a new system (Verona).

The second permit application screening also did not show that the earlier permit application submitted by Tristan van der V. had been rejected. When the information was migrated from VOS to Verona, the physical file that contained the application rejection was not completely transferred to the new system. The physical file was not saved; therefore, the documentation of the first permit application and the application rejection from 2005 had not been transferred to the information systems that had been queried.82

DecisionTherefore, the officer at the Special Laws department who processed Tristan van der V.’s application was not aware of the compulsory hospitalisation. The officer was also not aware of the fact that a firearms permit had been refused in 2005. The officer had evaluated whether Tristan van der V. met the condition that he could not endanger himself, the public order or security, based on the information that was available to him at that time. Based on this evaluation, the forms that had been submitted and the fact that Tristan van der V. met all the other requirements of the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act, the officer saw no reason to reject the application. When asked, he stated that he would have come to a different decision if he had known about the missing information.

As prescribed by the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act, the Hollands Midden police conducted an inspection of Tristan van der V.’s home to verify that the storage safes where the firearms and ammunition were stored, fulfilled the necessary requirements. This inspection took place on 10 November 2008. The officer in the special laws department indicated that the storage safes met the requirements.

On 10 November 2008, the Hollands Midden police district issued a WM4 – firearms and ammunition permit on behalf of the chief of police. This permit was for the purpose of possessing and transporting the firearm and its ammunition specified in the attachment to the permit. The attachment specified a pistol, brand Sig Sauer, calibre 9 x 19 mm, number U126668.83 Tristan van der V. had already entered an option for this firearm earlier, and once the police had issued a (WM2) permit for this firearm, he bought the pistol from a firearms retailer.

3.6 annual renewal

After the permit had been issued for the first time on 10 November 2008, this permit was renewed twice; on 9 November 2009 and on 16 November 2010. A background check was conducted for both annual renewals. The background check did not review eight years as is the case with a new permit; it only reviewed the renewal period (approximately 1.5 years). This background check did not provide any new information. Tristan van der V. proved that he had met the requirement of participating in at least eighteen shooting rounds. When his permit was up for renewal, no one found a reason to refuse the permit or to establish additional conditions to the renewal.

81 At the time the investigation was completed by the Dutch Safety Board, the Dutch Forensic Institute conducted a more thorough investigation into the matter upon the request of the Public Prosecutor.

82 The documents associated with this refusal were found in Tristan van der V’s home.83 Tristan van der V. purchased this firearm again at a later date. This firearm was not one of the guns that

he had used at the shooting incident in Alphen aan den Rijn.

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A second inspection of the firearms safe took place on 9 December 2010. Everything was found to be in order during this inspection. The Hollands Midden police district did not conduct home inspections as frequently as was prescribed, but it had conducted one relatively briefly before the shooting incident.

3.7 information Known to tHe surrounDing areas

Chapter 2 explains that the system that governs the legal possession of firearms requires different types of information to ensure the system functions properly. It is also important that the parties can access the information required to properly execute their processes. Furthermore, they must be capable of processing this information adequately. Not only the police, the Ministry of Security and Justice or the Royal Netherlands Shooters Association (KNSA) have relevant information about the (aspirant) shooter, the shooting clubs and other people who know the applicant/permit holder, such as the parents and any medical professionals, have this information available to them. They also have information that may be important to determining whether someone can (still) be entrusted with a firearm.

Therefore, the Dutch Safety Board has attempted to gain insight into the question about what information was available about Tristan van der V. and who had access to this information. This involves information that might have played a role in the consideration of whether he fulfilled the condition set forth by the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act that he did not form a threat to himself, the public order or public safety. It appeared that the people and institutions involved held different points of view regarding the amount of information that was shared, and with whom. This will be discussed below in more detail.

The Dutch Safety Board bases its findings on the information provided by Tristan van der V.’s parents and others who knew him. The Dutch Safety Board has presented this information to the mental health institution where Tristan van der V. was being treated, for verification purposes.

ParentsTristan van der V. lived with his parents most of the time from 2005 until 2011. In 2005, he lived alone for a few months; however, he moved back to his parents’ house after that time. Therefore, his parents were aware of his syndrome and his suicide attempt to a certain extent. They have regularly met with care providers from the mental health institution were Tristan van der V. was being treated. Before he received a permit, his parents mentioned to his medical professionals that he wanted to purchase a gun and that they were concerned about this.84 The healthcare providers believed this was a reason for concern, but indicated that this meant that his parents had to pay close attention to Tristan van der V. Due to their privacy oath, they could not and did not want to disclose any information about Tristan van der V. to any third parties, such as the police.

During the time period before Tristan van der V. obtained a firearms permit, his parents had discussed the subject of firearms in relation to Tristan van der V. many times with the mental health institution. The subject was never raised again in later contexts, once he had obtained a firearms permit.

His parents indicated that they told a member of the board of the shooting club that Tristan van der V. had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital in 2006.

Others who knew himDifferent people who knew Tristan van der V. were aware of the fact that he had guns and that he had mental problems. The information in this paragraph is based on the reports from meetings that the police conducted with different people who knew Tristan van der V.

84 The parents only expressed their concerns to the mental healthcare staff.

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Tristan van der V. is described by them as a nice, quiet person. However, in retrospect, he did exhibit behaviour that could have been cause for concern. People around him were aware that he was interested in the shooting incident that took place at the Columbine High School in the United States in 1999. Even though he said that he did not approve of the incident, he understood the shooters. People also knew that he heard voices in his head, including the voice of one of the shooters involved in the Columbine shooting. There were also indications that Tristan van der V. might have owned guns for more reasons than just for the purpose of practising sport shooting. He had indicated more than once that he wanted to own a gun because he did not feel safe. Lastly, he had repeatedly told another person that he was planning to shoot and kill people, whereby he also mentioned the name of the Ridderhof shopping centre. It is unknown whether someone who knew him was aware of all of this information, thus having had a total picture of the situation.

None of the people who knew Tristan van der V. saw any reason to inform the permit approval authority of any danger for the abuse of firearms. The people who knew him well were surprised that a firearms permit had been issued to Tristan van der V. However, they thought that the police obviously saw no danger, otherwise they would not have issued him a permit. People assumed that the police were aware of his mental problems.

Shooting clubThe shooting club saw Tristan van der V. as a person who did not draw attention to himself in any way. During the first meeting with him before he re-applied for membership, there were no reasons not to grant him membership. He was disciplined on the shooting range and he always followed the rules; he often came alone and sometimes with his father to shoot. The members of the board never suspected that he formed a risk for firearms abuse.

The shooting club indicates that it never knew that Tristan van der V. had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital.

Primary care physicianHis primary care physician indicates that he was not aware of the fact that Tristan van der V. owned any firearms. The physician did know that his father owned firearms.

Mental health institution The mental health institution where Tristan van der V. was being treated, confirmed his parents’ story. The institution also confirmed that, before he purchased a firearm, his parents reported that he wanted a gun and they expressed their fears. It is not known when the institution learnt this information. The institution shared the parents’ fears concerning this intention, but states that it did not know that Tristan van der V. had a firearms permit or that he had a firearm.

The institution also explained how it handles the term “conflict of interests” as it applies to the medical secrecy laws. The institution states that it acted in accordance with the KNMG Royal Dutch Medical Association (Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst ). According to the rules, the institution could only breach the medical secrecy laws if, in the presence of his care providers, Tristan van der V. had expressed an acute and immediate threat that posed a real danger to Tristan van der V. himself or to others.8585 Lastly, the institution confirms that it had the same impression as Tristan van der V’s parents, that he was doing better the past year and that there was no reason to suspect that things were not going well.

85 The KNMG rules are outlined in paragraph 4.2.3.

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3.8 tHe purcHase of firearms anD ammunition

Tristan van der V. received a permit, with which he purchased and sold firearms as illustrated in the table below

Firearm Type Permit granted Sold

Sig Sauer, No. U126668 Pistol 10 November 2008 21 October 2009

Taurus 66, No. NH993807 Revolver 21 October 2009 11 March 2010

Norinco, No. BF00478 Pistol 24 November 2009 12 January 2010

Colt .45 CP, No. C189640 Pistol 29 January 2010

Taurus 66, No. BN579786 Revolver 19 April 2010

Smith & Wesson MP15-22 Rifle 5 January 2011

Table 2: Summary of firearms

Rules for completing WM3 formBefore purchasing a firearm, the purchaser must complete a WM3 form. The firearms retailer and the board of the shooting club must also complete and sign a section of this form. The board of the shooting club can review the KNSA “guidelines for completing and signing the section of the WM3 forms by boards of clubs” (’Richtlijnen voor het mede invullen en ondertekenen van WM3-formulieren door verenigingenbestuurders).86

These guidelines specify the following information:‘7) The applicant is to complete the sport shooting discipline (section) that he wishes to practise with his firearm; after all, he knows what he wants; he has been practising the sport shooting discipline for a while now with firearms that belong to the club, he has taken a keen interest in this discipline and cannot progress any further with the club’s firearms or the firearms belonging to the other members of the club. This is the reason why he wishes to purchase his own firearm; let it be known that a generic name like “large calibre pistol” is not a valid response, the section must contain the name of the shooting discipline. Thus, the board does not write down the sport shooting discipline, he just checks the discipline written on the application.”

Completing the WM3 formThe purpose of the application specified on the front page of the WM3 application form that Tristan van der V. submitted so that he could purchase the Smith & Wesson MP15-22-rifle was: “To practise sport shooting in accordance with the Weapons and Ammunition Act / KNSA rules.”

On the back page of the WM3 form, the board of the shooting club states that “the firearm listed in this application will be used for the following sport shooting discipline: “small calibre rifle”, which is practised by the club in a club setting.”

Analysis‘Small calibre rifle’ is not a shooting sport discipline, but a firearm group. This firearm group is used in tens of disciplines for three types of firearms: small calibre free rifle, small calibre carbine, and a small calibre sport rifle. However, Tristan van der V. could not use the Smith & Wesson MP15-22 rifle at the Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop shooting club for practising any of these shooting disciplines:• The discipline ‘small calibre sport rifle: is only designated for women;• The firearm does not meet the technical requirements for a carbine set forth in the KNSA87 shooting

and competition rules, which includes the shape of the barrel and the size of the gunsights;• The only small calibre, free rifle discipline that is practised at the Dagschuttersvereniging

Nieuwkoop shooting club is: “small calibre free rifle, 12 metres”. The Smith & Wesson MP15-22 rifle is not permitted for that discipline because it deviates from the requirements88 for this discipline.

86 KNSA, Guidelines for completing and signing sections of WM3 forms by the board of the club87 KNSA, KNSA Dutch shooters and competition rules (KNSA Schiet- en Wedstrijdreglement) part III.88 KNSA, KNSA comprehensive overview of regulated disciplines.

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One of the requirements for a small calibre rifle that can be used for this discipline is that is must be a single shot rifle. That means that the shooter must reload the rifle manually after every shot. A semi-automatic rifle, like the Smith & Wesson MP15-22 rifle, is not a single shot rifle because the shooter does not have to reload the gun after every shot.

Approval of the WM3 formThe police approved the WM3 form, which means they granted the firearms permit. According to the Weapons and Ammunition Circular (Circulaire wapens en munitie) the police do not need to assess whether the firearm can be used at the shooting club; they can continue on the assumption that a correct statement has been made by the board of the shooting club on the application form.89

ConclusionThe board of the shooting club signed a WM3 form for the semi-automatic Smith & Wesson rifle, even though this firearm cannot be used for one of the sport shooting disciplines that are practised at this club. This deviates from the KNSA guidelines and it goes against the provisions of the Weapons and Ammunition Circular.

As a result of the responses to the preliminary report, it appears that both the shooting club and the police have a different view of the KNSA rules that apply to these regulations than was intended by the KNSA. The Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop shooting club and the Hollands Midden police state that the gun can be considered as a carbine and, therefore, its use is permitted on the shooting range of the VDW Schietsportcentrum Nieuwkoop sport shooting centre.

Acquisition of firearms and accessoriesOn 7 January 2011, Tristan van der V. acquired the Smith & Wesson rifle at a firearms retailer at the sport shooting centre. One shot cartridge for up to 25 shots is supplied with the rifle. Upon delivery, Tristan van der V. ordered a second shot cartridge that was delivered approximately four weeks later. Later in January, he ordered three shot cartridges from a different firearms retailer. There was a longer delivery time this time and in March 2011, he ordered another two shot cartridges from yet a different firearms retailer. However, he cancelled this last order. The order he placed in January 2011 was delivered on 8 April 2011, the day before the shooting incident.

In the months leading up to the shooting incident, Tristan van der V. also bought a bullet proof vest, ammunition and shot cartridges, and a gun sight for the rifle.

3.9 conclusions

Which facts and events resulted in Tristan van der V. being able to obtain and keep a firearms permit even though, in retrospect, he did not meet the requirement that he could not pose a danger to himself, the public order or safety? In order to answer this question, the Dutch Safety Board has described the events starting with the very first application in 2005. This leads to the following observations.

Tristan van der V. – Requested to become a member of the Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop sport shooting

club and was granted membership. – Purchased in the months leading up to the shooting incident a bullet proof vest, ammunition

and shot cartridges and a gun sight, which do not match the reasonable interest requirement specified on the firearms permit.

89 CWM B2.4.1 under e.

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The DVN shooting club – Conducted an intake meeting with Tristan van der V. but did not have him take a shooting

skills test; – Does not have an aspirant membership level. This deviates from the KNSA rules; – Sent the membership application and the certificate of good behaviour (VOG) for Tristan

van der V. to the KNSA; – Does not always administer ammunition sales. This deviates from the KNSA rules; – Indicates it was not aware of the fact that Tristan van der V. had been admitted to a

psychiatric hospital; – Signed a WM3 form for a semi-automatic Smith & Wesson rifle, while this gun cannot be

used for the sport shooting disciplines that are practised at this club. This deviates from the KNSA rules and goes against the provisions of the Weapons and Ammunition Circular.

The KNSA – Was not aware of the fact that a permit had been refused in 2005; – Issued a KNSA licence.

The Hollands Midden police – Received the permit application in October 2008 and started processing it; – Included the airgun incidents from 2003 in the risk assessment. The police saw no reason

for refusal based on this risk assessment; – Did not take the rejected permit application from 2005 into consideration when processing

the second application in 2008; – Mistakenly did not include the information regarding the compulsory hospitalisation from

2006 in the assessment; – Was not aware that Tristan van der V. had been undergoing treatment on a continual basis

with the mental institution since 2006, nor that he had attempted suicide in 2008. The police did not take this information into consideration when processing the application;

– Did not notice any anomalies upon inspecting the safe during home inspections and decided to grant and renew the firearms permit;

– When evaluating the WM3 form it presumed the correctness of the statement issued by the board of the sport shooting club and granted a permit for the purchase of a semi-automatic Smith & Wesson rifle, even though this firearm cannot be used for the sport shooting discipline that can be practised at this club.

In addition to these parties, who have been actively involved in the permit application and in the acquisition of firearms and ammunition, there are other parties who did not have an official role, but who did have information. Their statements showed the following:

The parents – Were aware that Tristan van der V. had been involuntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospital

in 2006 and underwent voluntary treatment in 2008 in a general hospital due to a suicide attempt;

– Indicate that they had spoken to a board member of the shooting club about the compulsory hospitalisation;

– Indicate that they had spoken with the care providers at different times about Tristan van der V.’s condition up to 2008 and his intention to purchase a gun.

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The GGZ institution – Was aware that Tristan der V. in 2006 had been voluntarily admitted to a general hospital in

2008 due to a suicide attempt; – Confirmed that the parents had expressed their concerns about their son’s intention of

wanting to purchase a gun; – Did not know that Tristan van der V. owned a gun; – Confirms that they spoke to the parents at different times about Tristan van der V.’s mental

condition and the risks involved in combination with the presence of the father’s firearms in the home;

– Must comply with the medical secrecy laws and uses the applicable KNMG rules. It saw no reason to breach the secrecy laws because, according to the institution, there was no acute or immediate danger to the patient, the care providers or others.

The club members – Had the idea that Tristan van der V. was a calm young man who did not draw attention to

himself.

The Dutch Safety Board concludes that the police did not use all the information that existed to grant and renew the firearms permit. In particular, the information about Tristan van der V.’s mental condition was not included in the application process. This conclusion is the starting point for the following chapter, in which the system that could allow this to happen is studied in more detail.

The Dutch Safety Board also concludes that different parties who knew Tristan van der V. (in particular, the shooting club, his parents and care providers) had different points of view about who had information and what parties could and could not do with this information. The dilemma that is coming into play will also be discussed in the following chapter.

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4 LESSONS ABOUT THE WORKINGS OF THE SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO GRANTING A FIREARMS PERMIT

4.1 introDuction

The previous chapter outlined how Tristan van der V. was able to (continue to) possess firearms, which ultimately enabled him to carry out his actions on 9 April 2011.

This chapter addresses the question as to what characteristics of the system can explain the (continued) existence of this situation. The investigation reveals three weaknesses in the system that manages the legal possession of firearms:1. Known information about (future) firearms owners that may also be relevant to assessing the

risk of abuse is not always available to the police or the shooting club, which are the parties that must determine the risk of abuse;

2. Even if they are aware of relevant information, it cannot always be used to take the right measures to manage the risk of abuse;

3. There is no adequate guarantee that the parties in the system will have an opportunity to learn.

The diagram below was used in the study. It summarises the workings of the system as discussed in Chapter 2 into three processes:

– Being aware of potential risk factors with respect to the (future) gun owner (green section in diagram 4, see also paragraph 4.2);

– Assessing the risk of abuse (orange section in diagram 4, see also paragraph 4.3); and – Creating the conditions for the workings of the system (blue section in diagram 4, see also

paragraph 4.4).A specific group of parties is involved in each of these processes.

Setting up and improving the system §4.4

Assessing the risk of abuse §4.3

Knowledge of the (future) firearms owner §4.2

KNSAChief ofpolice

Minister of Security

and Justice

Dienst Justis(only after

previous refusal)

Shootingclubs

(future)firearms owner

Policerecords

Special lawsdepartments

(medical and other)

professionals

Socialenvironment

Diagram 4: Main processes in the system for the legal possession of firearms90

Based on these processes, paragraphs 4.2 through 4.4 outline the characteristics of the system that explain how the above-mentioned weaknesses can (continue to) exist.

90 See Appendix 1 for an explanatory note on this diagram.

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4.2 KnowleDge of tHe (future) firearms owner

4.2.1 Signs and sources of informationAll of the parties to which the Dutch Safety Board spoke – the Ministry, police districts, KNSA and shooting clubs – have emphasised the fact that it is important to know the (future) firearms owner, in order to determine whether he can be entrusted with a firearm.

While some information about the (future) firearms owner may already be known, if it is recorded in the records of the police or judicial authorities, information can also come from the (future) firearms owner himself or from people in his environment such as friends, family, colleagues, members of the shooting club or medical professionals. They are usually considerably closer to the (future) firearms owner than the police, who grant the permit, and therefore they may have more information and be in a better position to interpret it.

Knowledge of the (future) firearms owner


Police records

(medical andother)

professionals

Social environment

Diagram 5: The parties that may have information about the (future) firearms owner

Information relevant to determining whether there is reason to fear abuse of the firearm may include:

– A criminal record; – Physical disposition; – Mental disposition and mood; – Ability to handle a firearm properly; – Other behaviours and circumstances (use of alcohol or drugs, serious traffic violations,

frequent disputes with neighbours, etc.); – A fascination with firearms or violence; – Persons in the environment of the (future) firearms owner who could abuse the firearm.

Individual signs alone are often too weak to substantiate a real fear of abuse of the firearm. Therefore, it is important that various signs coincide and that they can be evaluated in conjunction with each other, as evidenced in Chapter 5 from an observation of other systems in which the risk of abusing firearms or other risks (such as the risk of causing an accident) are assessed. What information is available in the shooter’s social environment, among medical professionals, the police and judicial authorities? How is this information made available to the shooting clubs and/or the special laws department or how come this information is not made available to the shootings clubs and/or the police? That is what this paragraph will examine. Following this, paragraph 4.3 will examine the question of how the shooting clubs and the special laws departments weigh up this information.

4.2.2 Information from the social environmentChapter 3 showed that over the course of the years, various people in the environment of Tristan van der V. had information or picked up on signs that he was not always doing well. His parents, a number of family members and friends of Tristan van der V., as well as friends of his parents, were more or less aware of his mental disposition and, on occasion, of the fact that he owned a gun or that he wanted to apply for a firearms permit.

A person’s social environment is formed by people such as his parents, family, friends, room-mates, acquaintances, neighbours and colleagues. It is characteristic of the social environment that the relationships between involved parties are varied in nature and intensity. For example, they comprise emotional, affective, friendship and business relationships.

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People can usually be found in the social environment that (may) know the person involved and have a lot of information about him or her. Yet the system parties (police, KNSA and shooting club) do not usually involve people from the social environment when forming an opinion about a person’s suitability or behaviour. This is not a standard practice in becoming a member of a shooting club or obtaining or renewing a firearms permit. The officers of the special laws department or the shooting club do not actively question people from the social environment, unless there is reason to do so on the basis of other information. Nor are persons from the social environment invited or encouraged to come forward with information for the special laws department or the shooting club.91 Persons from a shooter’s social environment sporadically make reports to the police, the shooting club or the KNSA.

Relationships based on trustIt is important to understand that people from the social environment can easily end up with a conflict of interests, if they are made aware of facts that give cause to fear abuse of the firearm. As the bonds between the involved parties in the social environment are also affective and emotional in nature, there is often a high degree of loyalty and trust between the persons involved. The (unsolicited) provision of information to official authorities may damage this trust.

The parents of Tristan van der V. also struggled with the fact that he had psychological problems, while simultaneously being in possession of a firearm. They discussed their concerns with the care providers at the psychiatric hospital and with their son. They agreed with him that he would tell them when he was not doing well.

The parents have stated that they did not see how they could take any action against their son’s possession of a firearm. In that respect, they had the following considerations:

– First and foremost, they assumed that the permit application would be rejected, as there was a police record of his involuntary hospitalisation in 2006.

– The parents feared that they would become estranged from their son, if they broke his trust by going to the police.

– At the time that Tristan van der V. intended to obtain a permit, his parents discussed their concerns with the medical professionals at the psychatric institution. The medical professionals stated that on account of their professional confidentiality they could not share these concerns with any third parties but rather that they should keep a close eye on him, together with the parents.

– Subsequently, when Tristan van der V. had applied for and was granted the permit, his parents assumed that the police had acted carefully and, therefore, that the permit had been granted lawfully. In this respect, they assumed that the police were aware of all facts and circumstances, including his involuntary admission to a mental institution in 2006.

– When the permit was granted, Tristan van der V.’s mother then went on the Internet to look up whether or not involuntary hospitalisation was a reason to reject the permit application. Among other things, she noted that a proposal had been submitted in the Dutch Lower House to prevent psychiatric patients from obtaining firearms permits, although this proposal had not passed.

– Moreover, the parents thought that there was not much they could do about the decision to grant a firearms permit, since Tristan van der V. was of age.

– Over the course of the years, according to his parents, there was no longer any reason to take action against his possession of a firearm, as their son was behaving less and less depressed. His parents thought that he was doing better.

Role of the shooting clubThere can also be a conflict of interests among the members of a shooting club. The relationship of trust that can exist between members may dissuade them from reporting potentially relevant signs to their own club board, the police or the KNSA.

91 After the shooting incident in Alphen aan den Rijn, the KNSA announced that it was setting up a hotline for reporting shooters in cases in which there was a fear of firearms abuse. In practice, according to the KNSA, this is a formalisation of the current situation in which fellow shooters, neighbours, friends and family members occasionally file a report. (www.knsa.nl)

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4.2.3 Information from medical professionalsIn addition to the social environment, medical professionals may also have relevant information that the police, judicial authorities or the shooting club are not aware of. In the case of the incident in Alphen aan den Rijn, various professionals had information that could have caused the special laws department to fear abuse of the firearm or that could have been a reason for the shooting club not to sign Tristan van der V.’s permit application.

Incidentally, medical practitioners are not necessarily aware of all relevant information. Whether or not a client owns a firearm is not the kind of information that they automatically have.

Medical confidentiality(Medical) professionals are legally bound to the treatment agreement that they enter into with their patients. It follows from this that they must treat all information on the patient as confidential. They are prohibited from providing this information to third parties without the patient’s explicit consent.92 In addition, medical professionals who are bound by the Dutch Law on Individual Healthcare Provisions (the BIG Act), are bound to the medical confidentiality formulated in the Act.93 Medical confidentiality covers all information obtained by medical professionals while performing their duties. Medical confidentiality also covers information that the patient’s doctor received that is not related to the care, such as information on the patient’s private life or ordinary personal details.

The underlying idea of medical confidentiality is to prevent a scenario in which people who need healthcare are discouraged from seeking medical assistance for fear that the information with which they entrust the caregiver could be made public. While medical confidentiality is strict, it may be broken by the doctor in exceptional cases. These exceptional cases are as follows:1. The patient gives his consent;94

2. There is a statutory obligation to speak out;95

3. There is a conflict of duties.

A conflict of duties arises when failing to breach the confidentiality will, in all likelihood, result in more damage than breaching the confidentiality. In this case the doctor must have made every effort to obtain the patient’s consent, and there must be no other option open to him. Furthermore, the professional confidentiality must be violated as little as possible. Breaching professional confidentiality on the basis of a conflict of duties is something that the doctor must weigh up for himself on an individual basis. Only the doctor can make these considerations.96

In the case of Tristan van der V. the practitioners involved were of the opinion that there was no conflict of duties, nor was there any other circumstance to justify breaching professional confidentiality. The fact that in its guidelines97, the KNMG states that there is only a conflict of duties in the event of an acute and immediate danger, which also plays a role in this regard: ‘disclosing information to the police/judicial authorities can (potentially) prevent acute and immediate danger to the safety of the patient’s life or the lives of others’. The KNMG guidelines define acute and immediate danger as follows: ‘the situation is urgent; immediate; there is a direct danger to a person’.

92 Section 7:457, first paragraph BW.93 Section 88, BIG Act: ‘Everyone is obliged to observe confidentiality with respect to any information

entrusted to him in confidence while performing his duties in the field of individual healthcare, or any information he obtains that is, to his knowledge, confidential or any information he obtains in respect of which he ought to be aware of its confidential nature’.

94 If the patient gives his consent, a caregiver can provide information to third parties. However, the caregiver can refuse to do so. He must be satisfied that the patient understands the consequences of breaching professional confidentiality and assess whether or not this is in the patient’s interests.

95 For example, pursuant to the Dutch Infectious Diseases Act, in which respect the spread of the disease must be stopped. This exception is not addressed any further in this report.

96 H.J.J. Leenen, Healthcare Law Manual, Part 1: Rights of people in healthcare. 2000.97 KNMG, Professional confidentiality of doctors vis-à-vis the police and judicial authorities, KNMG IX.1 1.

2005.

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In the case of Tristan van der V., while his practitioners were aware that his father owned firearms, they were not aware that Tristan van der V. was also a gun owner. However, the practitioners were aware that Tristan van der V. intended to apply for a permit at any moment. However, both of these facts were an insufficient basis for the doctors to intervene – on the basis of the criterion of an acute and immediate danger – for example, by notifying the police of any of their concerns.

Relationship of trustA doctor’s primary concern is to give the best possible treatment to his patients. At the psychiatric healthcare this means that, for example, doctors must do everything they can to keep patients that do not have a high level of awareness of their illness in on course with their care. These patients are inclined to think that they can manage without medical assistance. Care providers generally try to exert pressure on, and mediate with, these patients in order to ensure that they keep taking their medication, stay in therapy and continue to visit their doctor. Any doctor that damages his patient’s trust, runs the risk of the patient breaking contact.

4.2.4 Information gathering by the police98

The Chief of Police is responsible for assessing the permit application. The police themselves may already have information about the (future) gun owner. This may already be available in police records or it may be collected by the police in the context of the permit application or renewal.

The police do not have any information on medical suitabilityThe police do not have automatic access to medical information. The Minister has not set any specific requirements with respect to the medical suitability of holders of firearms permits. In 2005 the Minister of Justice at that time responded as follows to questions from the Lower House: ‘...it is doubtful whether a mandatory medical certificate from a GP has an added value. First and foremost, the GP must be in a position to have a clear picture of the applicant. One doctor will be in a better position to do so than another, for example because one applicant visits his doctor more frequently than another. In addition, a medical certificate is a snapshot that does not provide any guarantees for the future’.99

The police can only resolve to refuse the permit application, if there have already been signs from another source which indicate that the applicant may not be medically suitable. The applicant can submit a written statement from a doctor/psychiatrist in response to this.

Information held on recordWhen the special laws department consults various databases (see Appendix 6), it often does so via the police district’s information unit. This department consults a large number of information systems that are available to the police. This often involves independent applications, although since 2006, these can largely be consulted via the global search engine, BlueView.

The systems provide a range of unsorted, non-related raw data. It is then the task of the information unit to prepare this information for operational use by the special laws department. The quality of the information provided by the systems depends on the way in which enquiries are made on the system and the way in which they present their output, as well as the care with which information is entered into these systems.

The advantage of introducing an information unit that collects information, processes it and sends it back to the instructing party is that there is a central location where the necessary actions are carried out by trained, competent staff, who have authorised access to the IT systems. However, this also involves the risk that employees from the special laws department, who do not have access to the information systems themselves, must fully rely on the data provided to them. Therefore, they are supposed to make a decision based on the completeness of data over which they only have a limited influence. This is a weakness in the information gathering.

98 The information on the working method used by the special laws departments is based on information from a total of fourteen districts. See also Appendix 1.

99 Lower House, session 2005–2006, 28 684, no. 63.

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Once the information has been sent to the special laws department, employees must carefully evaluate the information provided in terms of relevance, in addition to any information which they may have gathered themselves. Since the information provided can be extensive, and the presentation of data may vary from case to case, there is a risk that not all of the relevant information will stand out. As a result, it can so happen that certain facts relevant to determining the risk of abuse may be inadvertently left out of consideration.

One of the weaknesses in the information provision named by the police is that due to a lack of funds, the Verona system, in which firearms permits are registered, was delivered without the initially intended, automatic link to the other police systems.100 101 As a result, the system does not automatically ‘bleep’, if new information on a permit holder becomes available that may very well be a reason to reassess the risk of abuse.102

Collection of information by special laws departments themselvesA special laws department can also collect information itself on the (future) gun owner. The department can do so by speaking to the person in question himself or to persons from his environment. The special laws department can also make an on-site visit, for example to the involved party’s home or to his shooting club. Although there are differences between police districts, the investigation carried out by the Safety Board revealed that special laws departments rarely make contact with the social environment of a (future) firearms owner. While the Safety Board did not investigate why this does not happen, it is reasonable to assume that the above-mentioned lack of capacity plays a role in this, as well as the fact that in the absence of demonstrable substantiation, information cannot be properly used to justify the rejection of the permit application (this is addressed in greater detail in paragraph 4.3).

Personal contact with employees from the special laws department is essential when it comes to permit applications and renewals, and it is experienced as such by the police. Anyone making an application for a firearms permit must come to the police office to make his first application. This was also true in the case of Tristan van der V. He also went to the police station to make his application and renewals and to present the firearms he had acquired. In the period from November 2008, there was never any cause to revoke or restrict his permit. These occasional visits provide snapshots of a person. Nonetheless, it has been evidenced from other cases that such snapshots can be cause to revoke a permit. Indeed, there is usually limited personal contact when it comes to renewing a permit: in the case of certain police districts, an application for a renewal can be made by telephone, although it does need to be picked up in person.

Employees from the special laws department consider personal contact an important aspect of the system, as it offers them the opportunity to form an image of the (future) firearms owner in person. However, it appears that very little use is made of the option of using this opportunity to have a thorough discussion with the (future) firearms owner. Some employees from the special laws department have indicated that the police could do more in this regard and that the police ‘too often hide behind systems’.

A (scheduled) home inspection takes places in all of the police districts before the first permit is granted. In most cases these home inspections are carried out by the employees of the special laws department themselves; in some cases these inspections are carried out by specialists (so-called specific task-bearers) from within the basic police force.

100 Source: interviews, and: Ministry of Security and Justice and CWM Project Group 2005, Weapons and Ammunition Circular Evaluation Report 2005, August 2010 (not yet made public at the time of writing this report, see paragraph 4.4.1).

101 Police officers have pointed out that the real-time availability of Verona data is also important for basic police duties and the emergency rooms: if the police rush to an address, it is good to know whether there are firearms available there. Therefore, any link between Verona and other systems must work both ways.

102 Some police districts have set up BlueView in such a way that it they are automatically notified, if new information is made available about one of the permit holders in their region in the interim. However, the police consider this to be a temporary solution.

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According to the Weapons and Ammunitions Circular, this inspection is aimed at determining whether the firearms owner’s safe meets the requirements. Nevertheless, many of the police officers interviewed stated that the home visit is also used to gain insight into the living environment of the future firearms owner or to speak with other members of his household. However, the choice of whether or not to use it for this purpose too is left to the discretion of the person carrying out the inspection.

The unannounced, annual home inspections following renewal have not taken place every year in every police district for some time now, even though the Weapons and Ammunition Circular requires this. The police regions blame this on capacity shortages. The workload of the special laws departments has increased significantly in recent years (also due to the other tasks that the department performs, such as screening private security officers), while enrolment in many districts has lagged behind. The fact that with effect from 1 October 2009, government bodies face financial consequences, if they do not make a decision on an application on time, may also play a role in this.103

Home inspections are carried out if the special laws department has the available capacity; however, this capacity is not made free at the expense of other obligations. In some regions the home inspection is carried out by the basic police force, although this task is not high up on its list of priorities, and moreover, it does not have the required knowledge of firearms and the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act in all cases.

Indeed, the Safety Board noted that none of the police districts assign their available capacity to home inspections on the basis of a risk profile, whereby firearms owners with a higher risk of abuse are inspected more often or sooner than other firearms owners. Nor is such an approach encouraged, given the obligation in respect of a single annual inspection. Incidentally, in 2005, then Minister of Justice considered such a risk approach desirable (see paragraph 2.3.2).

Involved parties have stated that any negative decision made by the Chief of Police must be based on reasons that can be verified objectively.104 For this reason, they assume that the personal concerns of the attending police officer alone are not sufficient with respect to the fear of abuse. These concerns must always be confirmed by demonstrable facts or ‘hits’ in police records. In their assessments, special laws departments restrict themselves to information from those records that are available to them.

103 Awb, Section 4.1.3.2. In connection with the preliminary report, the Hollands Midden police have indicated that, given the limited capacity and the choices that need to be made partly as a result of that, the administrative section [deciding on permit applications] of the work is given higher priority. After all, if the deadlines are not met, that will lead to penalties in the context of the General Administrative Law Act. There are no penalties for not complying with the obligation for home visits.

104 CWM, B 1.2.

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4.3 assessing tHe risK of abuse

This paragraph addresses the manner in which shooting clubs, the police and the Dienst Justis assess the risk of a firearm being abused.

Inschatten van misbruikrisico

Dienst Justis(alleen na

eerdere afwijzing)

Schiet-verenigingen

Bureausbijzondere

wetten

Diagram 6: The parties that make a risk assessment

4.3.1 Shooting clubs

Assessing shooter performanceThe role of the shooting club in signalling any fear of abuse is twofold: assessing the fear of abuse prior to the acquisition of a firearms permit and monitoring the shooter for such time as he owns a firearm.

The board and members of the shooting clubs are in a unique position to do so: they are the only ones who are around a permit holder, in his capacity as a shooter, on a regular basis. As opposed to the social and medical environment, they are in a position to determine whether the shooter uses any firearms he may own discerningly. They are also in a position to form a picture of his behaviour at the shooting range and in the context of a club. As a result, they are in a better position than anyone else to form a picture of the mentality of the (future) firearms owner in his role as a shooter. The fact that they know a large number of sporting shooters and that they can compare their respective behaviour may help them observe changes in behaviour that could indicate an increased fear of abuse.

The shooting clubs are indeed potentially in a strong position to make a contribution towards managing the risk of abuse, yet at the same time, the shooting clubs are usually small and their committee executives are usually not professionals in the field of signal recognition. However, the KNSA, as an umbrella organisation, can support shooting clubs in this, for example by sharing scientific or industry knowledge, so that executives and members of shooting clubs are more aware of the signals they need to look out for and how to deal with them.

In the guidelines for KNSA membership the KNSA outlines the minimum requirements that must be met by the procedure for admitting new members to the shooting clubs (Article 4). The procedure described comprises four phases (registration – probationary period – prospective/aspirant membership – full membership). While the purpose of the procedure is not described in very many words, it seems to be twofold: teaching the discerning use of firearms and determining whether a member can be entrusted to handle firearms. With regard to the latter, the guidelines declare the following:‘During that same period the club committee or a ballot committee will have talks with the person involved. In any case, these talks will address any criminal history, as well as the criminal history of any housemates; the home situation will be discussed and any relational problems will be addressed, as will any other matters of importance to the possible membership of the club. If necessary, the board of the club will make a home visit.’

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In that respect, it should be noted that the KNSA has few opportunities to instruct clubs that do not abide by the guidelines. The KNSA can hold a meeting with the committee or, in extreme cases, it can expel the shooting club as a KNSA member. There are no other formal powers or penalties.

Matters such as what instructions the committee executives or members of the ballot committee must follow, whether and how they are required to hold a hearing or when a home visit is required and what needs to be addressed during this home visit are not addressed. Nor is the question of whether the other members of the shooting club must be asked for information about the prospective member or how this kind of information collection should take place addressed.

Completing WM3 formOn the WM3 form the club committee states, for example, the branch of shooting for which the firearm to which the application pertains will be used. By signing the form, the committee also declares that this branch of shooting is practised by the club in its capacity as a club.

The shooting and competition regulations are decisive when determining whether a firearm can be used for said branch of shooting. When completing the WM3 form, the committee can also make use of the ‘Total overview of KNSA-regulated disciplines’. This list contains a summary of the main requirements of the shooting and competition regulations for those disciplines regulated by the KNSA. The underlying purpose of the regulations and the list derived from these is to ensure fair competitions and not to manage the risk of abuse.

The Safety Board notes that the list does not contain all requirements. The list does help determine whether or not a permit can be granted for a firearm. However, since the list does not contain all of the requirements from the shooting and competition regulations, the list cannot give a definite answer as to whether or not a permit can be granted for a firearm. For this purpose, the complete shooting and competition regulations must be consulted.

In the event of a fear of abuse, a club committee can decide not to sign the future firearms owner’s WM3 application form. After all, unlike the police - who must issue a firearms permit, if the future firearms owner meets the requirements - the club cannot be forced to sign the form. It should be noted here that there may be a conflict of interests for the clubs: after all, they have an interest in admitting members, in order to continue to exist. A shooter can also become a member of another club.

KNSA supportThe KNSA supports the clubs with advice, training programmes and by making standard documents available. However, while these often devote attention to safety in the sense of preventing accidents while shooting, they do not do so with respect to safety in the sense of preventing the abuse of firearms.

– The following question is asked on the standard registration form for new members, ‘Are there, given the fact that firearms and ammunition are handled here, any facts or circumstances of which you can reasonably assume that the board of the shooting club should be aware of (perhaps confidentially)?’ Although the question in itself pertains to the risk of abuse (albeit implicitly), the disclosure of information depends completely on the initiative of the prospective member, who may have an interest in withholding relevant information.

– The household regulations template made available to new clubs by the KNSA, does not contain any regulations on observing and reporting any behaviour of fellow shooters that may be cause to fear abuse of a firearm.

– The template from the standard introduction course (which is compulsory, according to the guidelines) does not refer to safety or reporting fear of abuse; therefore, shooters are not necessarily familiar with such issues.

– The model from the safety regulations deals with preventing accidents as a result of the improper use of a firearm, as opposed to the abuse of a firearm.

– Nor does the certification system for shooting clubs contain any criterion or instruction on how clubs should act, in order to make a correct assessment of the risk posed by members or prospective members, how to make it possible to discuss changing behaviour and fear of abuse, etc.

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– Boards of shooting clubs are not offered any training that addresses making a risk assessment of new members. The executives and members of ballot committees are not offered any professionalisation programmes that also address creating a club culture with a healthy reporting climate and a lot of social control.

The KNSA is aware of the fact that the shooting clubs have an important task in terms of assessing their (prospective) members: ‘While the Certificate of Good Behaviour serves as a filter for keeping a large portion of undesirable persons out of shooting clubs, it does not relieve the club committee of its responsibility to continue conducting independent inspections itself’.105 In principle, the KNSA assumes that club committees are capable of fulfilling this responsibility. The KNSA considers it extremely important for members to relay signs that a person is not doing well or that a person is in a difficult mental state to the club committee. The club committee should then speak to the person and - in consultation, if needs be - advise the person in question to temporarily deposit his firearms. According to the KNSA, this happens dozens of times a year.

Based on conversations held by the Safety Board with a number of shooting clubs and experts, the impression emerges that there are considerable differences among clubs. The KNSA has little insight into the extent to which clubs abide by the KNSA guidelines. The manner in which balloting for new club members takes place is a criterion in the KNSA’s considerations in respect of admitting a club. In this respect, however, the actual conversation that a club holds with a new member is not verified; the KNSA does not have that authority.

The KNSA has indicated that it does not supervise the compliance with the guidelines of clubs that were once admitted to the KNSA. In its regulations or household regulations, the KNSA did not create any basis for enforcing the application of the guidelines. Therefore, the guidelines are to be regarded as an urgent recommendation to those clubs affiliated with the KNSA; the KNSA can only expel a club in extreme cases.

Certified clubs are an exception to this. The balloting procedure for these clubs is monitored every four years. The KNSA certifies shooting clubs to try to ensure that they make a greater effort in all fields (operation of business, training, safety, etc.). Balloting for new members is part of certification. As at 2011, 27 of the approximately eight hundred shooting clubs were certified. There are so few at present, as certification has only been around for a few years and, moreover, it takes place on a voluntary basis.

In fact, all in all, the clubs are thrown on their own resources, when it comes to determining any fear of the abuse of firearms. The KNSA can facilitate and promote this, partly because it is in a position (or at least in a better position than individual clubs) to collect relevant information, for example on signals that the club should look out for.

4.3.2 PoliceThe police’s special laws departments must ensure that only those persons who have a reasonable interest in having their own firearm and to whom a firearm can be entrusted are given a firearms permit. To this end, the department must make an assessment of the risk that this person will abuse the firearm or facilitate its misuse by third parties (whether intentionally or not). This risk assessment is called for on various occasions: on the occasion of the first application for the firearms permit, the annual renewal, the unscheduled home inspection and whenever signals give cause to do so.

Determining reasonable interestAccording to the Weapons and Ammunition Circular, the police can rely on the declaration as stated by the shoot club on the application form (WM3). This is what most police districts do. Indeed, the police are often aware of whether a firearm is suitable for the disciplines practised at a club, as they also inspect clubs that have their own firearms permit.

105 KNSA, CWM Evaluation Report 2005 ‘Kaf en Koren’ (Wheat from the chaff), 2009.

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According to employees at various special laws departments in various police districts it often so happens that shooting clubs issue a WM3 form for a discipline that cannot be practised in said club. For example, this involves clubs in which a discipline can be practised with a .22-calibre (5.6 mm), while there are also members that have a permit for a heavier calibre (9 mm). The KNSA does not inspect the clubs in this regard, nor do the police usually verify this.

There are some police districts that do so. In fact, this can give the police an insight into why a person wishes to obtain a firearm: is it for the shooting sport or is it about the firearm itself? In the latter case not only is there an absence of a reasonable interest, but in and of itself, this can also give the police reason to assume the fear of abuse of the firearm. In this respect, the police can consult the above-mentioned ‘Total overview of KNSA-related disciplines’, even though this list is not primarily drawn up for the purpose of managing the risk of abuse.

Substantiation of the fear of abuseTo make a risk assessment, the police collects information about the (future) firearms owner. This information can be obtained from various records managed by the police and their partners in the chain of criminal justice, from their own collection (for example, by way of personal contact with the (future) firearms owner at the time of the permit application or renewal), or it can come from third parties such as housemates, family, friends, colleagues, fellow club members and practitioners as detailed in paragraph 4.2.

Based on the information collected (see paragraph 4.2.4), the police must assess whether there is a fear that the (future) firearms owner may abuse any firearm entrusted to him. If that is the case, the permit must be refused or withdrawn.

The 2005 Weapons and Ammunition Circular states that a restrictive policy is pursued with respect to verifying the fear-of-abuse criterion. Granting a firearms permit places the person in question in an exceptional position vis-à-vis his fellow citizens and for that reason, according to the circular, ‘even slight concerns about whether the exception (to be) made is responsible […] is enough reason not to grant the permit or to withdraw it’. The circular lists a number of circumstances under which a fear of abuse can, in principle, always be assumed.106 All of these relate to proven involvement in certain crimes over the past eight years.

In addition, according to the Circular, fear of abuse can also be assumed on the basis of ‘other known facts about the applicant’.107

Since the General Administrative Law Act requires that the decision made by the Chief of Police is based on proper substantiation, such facts must be documented. This will prevent the (future) firearm’s interests being unreasonably damaged. Based on discussions that the Safety Board held with various police districts, they primarily find it difficult to substantiate a fear of abuse on the basis of this category of facts. There are two reasons for this.

First of all, there is no agreement on the question which facts are relevant under which circum-stances. For example, a police officer outlined the following dilemma for the Safety Board:‘During the home inspection in the context of the first permit application, it appears that the future firearms owner lives in a very dirty house, with cigarette burn holes in the carpet and a sink full of empty wine bottles. While such living conditions can indicate that the future firearms owner suffers from alcohol addiction, this cannot be determined with certainty. In such a case, if there are no (specific and adequately documented) nuisance complaints from neighbours, the Chief of Police does not have sufficient reason to refuse the permit application. A similar dilemma arises in cases in which a (future) firearms owner appears to have committed speeding offences regularly. This may be an indication that a person has little self-control when it comes to safety and therefore cannot be entrusted with a firearm, although it is difficult to substantiate this by way of objective verification.’

106 CWM, B1. 2a.107 CWM, B1. 2b.

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In this respect, facts that come from medical professionals have a special status. Not only are such facts rarely reported to the police on account of medical confidentiality (see paragraph 4.2.3), but the special laws department state that they are not in a position to consider these facts, if they are brought to the attention of the police. The police are not equipped to deduce a risk of abuse on the basis of a medical diagnosis, as they do not have the medical expertise required to do so.

Secondly, potentially relevant facts are sometimes inadequately documented. Examples of this are signals from neighbours or family members who state during the application procedure that they are against the permit being issued. If there is no record of such signals in the police systems (for example, because no notification was made or no report was filed), they do not usually form sufficient justification for a negative decision.

The person applying for a firearms permit is not the only one who can abuse the firearm. Other people in his direct environment can also do so. Therefore, it is also important to determine the potential unreliability of the future firearms owner’s housemates. However, the police do not usually actively screen family members, housemates or people from the social environment. This only happens if the police have evidence that this is necessary.

Police districts have indicated that when making a decision on applications, the risk of proceedings, i.e. the chance that a refusal will be declared unfounded in administrative appeal proceedings, is also taken into consideration. The investigation also revealed that in cases in which there is a fear of abuse that cannot be substantiated by way of objective verification on account of one of the above-mentioned circumstances, the special laws department is compelled to grant an application. Before making a final decision, the police will seek to persuade future firearms owners to voluntarily withdraw their applications or to persuade firearms owners to (temporarily) deposit their firearms. The use of less factual information (such as complaints or other signals from the environment or a feeling that the person handling the application gets) as a basis for refusal is insufficient to meet the administrative law requirements for proper decision-making by public authorities (substantiation principle). It is partly for this reason that the special laws departments prefer to base negative decisions on proven involvement in criminal offences. To this end, the decision is occasionally made, on the basis of the discretion granted to the Chief of Police, to perform a background check over a longer period of time, in the hope of finding a reason to refuse the permit application.108

The data recorded in the systems of the police and judicial authorities are recorded therein for the purpose of criminal justice. In this domain, the admissibility of facts as evidence is governed by extremely strict rules. After all, it is true in criminal law that if there is little doubt about a fact, this should not lead to a penalty, whereas little concern when granting a firearms permit is a good reason to fear a risk of abuse (in conjunction with other signals). This means that the special laws department must work with information that is not focused on the task in which this information is used, with the result that it is not always possible to properly demonstrate the fear of abuse.

4.3.3 Judicial Enforcement Service for Assessment, Integrity and Screening (Dienst Justis)If the Chief of Police decides to refuse a firearms permit application or withdraw a firearms permit, then the disadvantaged party can lodge an administrative appeal with the Minister of Security and Justice. The Weapons and Ammunition Act provides that only the applicant or holder of a permit can file an appeal.109 Other persons such as the parents or a housemate of the (future) firearms owner cannot lodge an appeal against a decision made by the Chief of Police. In the event of administrative proceedings, the Dienst Justis, which handles the appeal on behalf of the Minister, will once again make the same substantive considerations as the Chief of Police; in any case, the consideration as to whether there is in fact a fear of abuse will be addressed. The precondition for an objectively substantiated refusal is that all known facts must be properly documented, so that all information is available to the Dienst Justis.

108 The Safety Board based this on discussions it held with the police districts.109 The WWM doesn’t regard them as “third parties”

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In recent years the Dienst Justis declared the appeal to be well-founded in around one third of cases. The majority of these cases are declared well-founded on formal grounds. Formal grounds can relate to questions of whether the decision was adequately substantiated or carefully established, whether the correct legal ground was named, etc. The next question addressed is whether the fear of abuse was adequately substantiated. The latter is important to dispense justice to general principles of administrative management such as the substantiation principle and the prohibition of arbitrariness. Adequate substantiation relates to the question of whether there is a plausible argument that is sufficiently sound and adequately motivated. Moreover, a new negative decision can be made in respect of a case that was (formally) declared well-founded. Therefore, (future) firearms owners cannot obtain a permit on the basis of formal errors, if there are (adequately substantiated) substantive objections. The Dienst Justis indicated that in most cases, the substantive considerations made by the Chief of Police are correct.

4.4 organisation anD improvement of tHe system

The way in which the system is set up, is the choice of the parties that have an influence on this. Diagram 7 shows which parties play a role in creating terms and conditions for the proper functioning of the system, with the Minister of Security and Justice acting as the regulator and the Chief of Police and the KNSA acting as implementers. One specific division of the Ministry not recorded separately in this diagram but relevant as an implementer is the Dienst Justis.

Therefore, as part of the purpose of this chapter – which is to provide explanations of the way in which the system works – it is worth paying attention to the way in which these parties investigate how the system works in practice and whether any improvements can be made to this.

The question raised in this paragraph is the extent to which these parties learn from practical implementation: do they regularly take stock so that the system can be adjusted? Who examines whether the number of incorrectly rejected and incorrectly granted permits stays within a certain margin and how does he or she do so? Is there any monitoring of practical implementation? If so, who carries this out? If these information streams run well, the system should be capable of finding the bottlenecks found in the preceding paragraphs and resolve them itself.

Organising and improving the system

KNSAChief of police


and Justice

Diagram 7: The parties that play a role in organising and improving the system

4.4.1 Minister of Security and JusticeThe Minister of Security and Justice creates the framework for granting permits by way of legislation and regulations. Other parties, in particular the police, the KNSA and the Dienst Justis, have the task of implementation within this framework. In this respect, the Minister has a so-called system responsibility.

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When setting up the system, the Minister opted to distance himself from the practical implementation. In addition, the Minister decided on a form of self-regulation by the KNSA and the shooting clubs. There is no structure within this system for periodically receiving information on the practical implementation. One of the results of this decision is that the Minister lacks essential management information that provides a reliable picture of the functioning of the system. As a result, the Minister has little scope to improve the system in a targeted way (i.e. in response to signals from the practice). In 2009/2010, however, the Minister organised an evaluation of the Weapons and Ammunition Circular, as part of which the parties involved were given the opportunity to outline their vision.110

In what way does the Minister’s system responsibility relate to each of the other parties individually?

The powers exercised by the Chief of Police in his capacity as a permit granter and regulator, pursuant to the Weapons and Ammunition Act, are exercised under the responsibility of the Minister of Security and Justice. There are no additional agreements outside of the Act, the Regulation and the Circular, and the Minister does not supervise the manner in which the Chiefs of Police carry out their obligations in the context of the Weapons and Ammunition Act. Nor do the police districts systematically provide the Minister with information on the execution of the Weapons and Ammunition Act that could be cause to make amendments to it.

The KNSA plays an indirect role in granting permits. This role is in the form of admitting shooting clubs, issuing KSNA licences to shooters and the acknowledgement of sporting disciplines. Also, in the case of certain exceptions to the statutory rules (permits for sporting shooters under the age of eighteen, and the option of having more than five firearms on one permit), the KNSA plays an important advisory role. The KNSA’s activities and decisions are framed by the legislation and regulations. Within this framework, however, the KNSA has discretionary freedom. For example, this discretionary freedom finds expression in the decision to revoke a shooter’s permit or expel him from a club. The Minister has not made any written agreements with the KNSA with respect to the manner in which the KNSA performs its duties, nor is there any other written agreement.

The Dienst Justis occasionally submits substantive reports to the Ministry’s policy department, for example if an appeal case has potential implications for the existing policy. However, this does not have a systematic character. Moreover, the appeal cases handled by the Dienst Justis do not necessarily provide a clear picture of bottlenecks in practical implementation. There are various reasons for this. First of all, not everyone files an administrative appeal against a refusal. Secondly, a person will only appeal, if he does not agree with the refusal to grant a permit. A (future) firearms owner will not appeal, if a permit is granted erroneously. Therefore, by definition, such decisions are not verified by the Dienst Justis. In addition, there can be numerous weaknesses in the practical implementation of the permit system that do not, on the whole, become apparent in the administrative appeal.

In its capacity as an appeals office, the Dienst Justis is frequently confronted with weaknesses in the practical implementation of the permit system. The Dienst Justis has stated that its rulings are intended to have a learning effect; the administrative appeal also contributes to this, as all objections against an initial decision are reconsidered by the same authority.

It is unclear whether the Dienst Justis actually achieves the intended learning effects, as this is not verified systematically. The Dutch Safety Board has noted that the Dienst Justis only makes rulings in administrative appeals available to the relevant Chief of Police, and it does not make them widely accessible to the police. Nor does the Dienst Justis publish any reports from which police districts can draw lessons.

110 In August 2010 this evaluation led to a report that had not yet been disclosed at the time of the Safety Board’s investigation (July 2011). Ultimately, the evaluation must lead to a revision of the 2005 Weapons and Ammunition Circular. After the shooting incident in Alphen aan den Rijn, the evaluation and decision-making process was halted, while awaiting the results of the investigations conducted by the Public Prosecutor and the Dutch Safety Board. Over the course of time, the validity of the 2005 CWM was renewed three times.

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However, the Dienst Justis does serve as an informal source of information for police forces with respect to the Weapons and Ammunition Act, and it also occasionally provides the police districts with suggestions. The Dienst Justis is not involved in developments within the police force, such as the ‘Duties of the Chief of Police’ course offered by the police academy, nor is it involved in the enforcement guidelines drawn up by the police. Furthermore, the Dienst Justis no longer has any structural consultation with the police. In the past employees from the Dienst Justis and special laws employees regularly met each other at the National Special Laws Working group. This consultation was stopped (at the request of the police). It has not been replaced by any similar consultation.

4.4.2 Police

Provision of information within the forceThe Chiefs of Police, who are authorised to grant firearms permits, have all mandated this power to one or more officers from the special laws department in their district.111, 112

Various discussions held by the Dutch Safety Board with Chiefs of Police and employees from special laws departments have revealed that granting firearms permits – and implementing the special laws in general – is not a priority for the police. This may be related to the fact that the duties of the Chief of Police, which are performed by the special laws department, are administrative law duties, while the police is an organisation with a strong focus on criminal law. On more than one occasion the special laws department has been characterised as the ‘poor child’ of the force. These departments usually receive little or no attention from police management. For example, this extends to the fact that the special laws department is not mentioned in the annual plan in the majority of police districts.113 This means that no goals or targets are set in advance for a specific period and that no accountability is provided to the management afterwards in terms of how the special laws department is performing.

Verona, the information system in which the police record the permits granted is not set up to generate management information. Not only does this mean that senior police officers do not request information, but it also means that it is not possible to provide such information from the information systems.114

Development of expertise within the special laws departmentsWithin the special laws departments, it seems that little emphasis is placed on generating, storing and interpreting generally useful insights that arise from individual permit processes. Presumably, this is connected with tight staffing levels, with which many special laws departments are struggling. While such knowledge is present, particularly in relation to the manner in which known underlying facts concerning a (future) firearms owner must be taken into consideration, it is mainly in the employees’ heads. On a national scale, there is little coordinated thinking or thinking informed by scientific research within the police force, with respect to the kind of facts and circumstances that justify a fear of abuse.

111 Section 28 (1) WWM. This is one of the so-called duties of the Chief of Police.112 Section 10:1 AWB: A mandate is defined as the power to make decisions in the name of administrative

authorities. When a mandate is granted, the officer makes decisions on behalf of the Chief of Police, although the latter is still fully responsible. If the Chief of Police makes such a request, the mandated officer must provide information about the manner in which this power is exercised.

113 One of the persons interviewed stated that a summary of the annual plans for 2008 of all 25 police districts revealed that the WWM, the aspect of granting firearms permits and monitoring compliance did not appear in any of these documents.

114 This bottleneck in Verona was also confirmed in the report made by the Public Order and Safety Inspectorate, entitled Quality in private security?! Police supervision of private security organisations and detective agencies, 2009 and in Board Enforcement of the Council of Chief Constables, ‘Duties of the Chief of Police in development’; Policy document 2010-2015; special laws and BOA duties re- examined’, January 2010.

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Ability of the police to learn on a national scaleThe lack of attention and guidance from senior police officers in respect of the field of special laws/duties of the Chief of Police can also be seen in the Council of Chief Constables, where the topic has not been discussed in recent years. In 2010, however, the special laws portfolio holder made an effort within the Council of Chief Constables to improve training programmes and to implement improvements to Verona.

Verona has not (yet) been set up to generate management information, as a result of which the data stored on the system cannot be used to develop policy. Verona was developed on a limited budget and it was primarily set up for the purpose of granting permits.115

One of the continuing difficulties with improving training programs is that under the decentralised system, the police districts have a high degree of autonomy. This means that national policy is implemented in different ways. Compliance with joint decision is not always automatic, as (perceived) district and group interests may be in conflict.116 For example, working practices arise in various police districts that are not used in other regions. Examples include:• Having the evaluation of the fear of abuse and the decision on granting a permit carried out by

two different officers;• Examining whether the individual sporting disciplines can actually be practised;• Setting up the BlueView police system in such a way that a notification is generated as soon as

a permit holder has had contact with the police.

Despite (or precisely because of) the lack of guidance from senior police officers, regular work meetings were started ‘bottom up’ in 1996: the National Special Laws Working group. However, this working group did not have a mandate on policy decisions or on the implementation of these. In the case of implementing agreements, the recurring question was whether there were any powers of persistence within the organisation. In 2008 the working group was divided into a number of thematic groups, one of which related to the Weapons and Ammunition Act. The thematic group also issues recommendation on the Special Laws Expert Group, in which the Chairmen of all thematic groups are represented. The Expert Group takes a broader look at the impact of the published recommendations and can adjust these, if necessary. If the Expert Group approved a recommendation, the Expert Group will submit the document to the national portfolio holder of the Council of Chief Constables. Nor can the Expert Group make any decisions. For that reason, a management consultation team was set up in 2010, comprising the heads of the special laws departments of the police districts.117

In 2003 then Minister of Justice established an advisory working group for the Weapons and Ammunition Act.118 This working group can issue recommendations to the Minister on technical and legal aspects of the Weapons and Ammunition Act, whether or not they are asked to do so. The Public Prosecutor’s Office, the police and the customs authorities, among others, are represented in this working group. In part, these are the same people who are involved in the National Platform of Firearms Experts and the police’s Expert Group. In practice, the recommendations are technical and detailed in character.119

Despite various initiatives to this end, there is no organisation whereby the system can learn from practical experiences.

115 Source: Police academy.116 Netherlands Court of Audit, Police IT 2010, June 2011, p.11.117 A National Platform for Firearms (LPV) has also been in existence since 1999. This is a collaboration

between representatives of the 25 police regions, the national police force, customs, the Royal Military Police and the Ministry of Security and Justice. Since its establishment, the focus has been on illegal weapons; the LPV recently ventured into the field of legal firearms ownership.

118 Dutch Law Gazette, 3 June 2003, no. 104, page 13 and Dutch Law Gazette, 6 April 2011, no. 6017.119 The Ministry of Security and Justice is of the opinion that is neither desirable nor necessary for it to build

up in-depth technical expertise on firearm and ammunition (parts). It does have legal expertise in the field of firearms and ammunition but when it comes to categorising weapons in particular, it is necessary to use both technical and legal knowledge. The Ministry and the Dienst Justis avail themselves of the recommendations made by the working group. The Ministry is not involved in drafting the recommendations. Source: Explanatory note to decision in Dutch Law Gazette no. 6017, 6 April 2011.

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4.4.3 KNSAIn 2009 the KNSA drafted a report in which it evaluated the Weapons and Ammunition Circular.120 The KNSA did so in a pro-active manner, as the circular expired in 2009, and it wished to make a contribution to improving the system. The KNSA does not regularly submit accountability reports to the Minister of Security and Justice in relation to the various advisory and regulatory duties that it performs. However, there is regular informal contact between the KNSA and the Ministry.

As KNSA membership is mandatory for many shooting clubs121, the KNSA can set requirements in respect of the quality of these clubs. The KNSA does so by issuing guidelines for shooting clubs. However, once a shooting club becomes a member of the KNSA, there is no mechanism in place whereby the KNSA regularly supervises the quality of the club and the way in which the club implements the KNSA guidelines. The KNSA has stated that it does not periodically supervise clubs, as the logistical and organisational capacity to do so is not in place. Therefore, the manner in which shooting clubs fulfil their role in practice only becomes known, if abuses come to light.

4.5 conclusions

This chapter has shown that weaknesses, which occurred when granting the permit to Tristan van der V., can be traced back to the manner in which the system is set up and operates. This means that they could also arise in other situations. One of the weaknesses in the system has to do with knowing the (future) firearms owner. Other weaknesses have to do with assessing the fear of abuse and with the lack of learning capacity that characterises the system.

Acquaintanceship with the (future) firearms ownerIn Chapter 3 the Dutch Safety Board concluded that in relation to Tristan van der V., each of the family members, friends and medical professionals considered, from their own position and independently of each other, the question of whether they ought to take steps to address Tristan van der V.’s ownership of a firearm, in conjunction with his mental state.

In general, the social environment and (medical) professionals have relevant information on the (future) firearms owner. This is partly due to the relationship of trust they have with him. In the case of physicians, this relationship of trust is formalised by way of medical confidentiality. In the case of family and friends, this relationship of trust ensues from the very nature of these relationships. This same relationship of trust may prevent both groups from sharing information about their family member, friend or patient with the police, except in exceptional cases.

The police are expected to get to know the future firearms owner, in order to evaluate whether he can be entrusted with a firearm. That is why the Board considers personal contact between the police and the (future) firearms owner to be important. To this end, the granting of permits and monitoring must be carried out locally. At present, however, the police mainly look at what they already know about a (future) firearms owner, in which respect they only have immediate access to information that is recorded in their own systems. While these systems occasionally provide a great amount of data, since much of this data is not relevant to the permit application, there is a risk that information will not be retrieved from the systems, albeit unknowingly, or that relevant results will be overlooked. The police cannot automatically possess information from the (future) firearms owner’s private life, including medical information. Even if the police did have medical information, they do not have the (medical) expertise to make a risk assessment on the basis of this information.

120 KNSA, 2005 CWM Evaluation Report, entitled ‘Kaf & Koren’ (Wheat from the chaff), September 2009.121 Not all shooting clubs are members of the KNSA. Membership of the KNSA is not mandatory for clubs in

which only air-pressurised firearms can be shot. Nor are clubs that do not have any club firearms and the members of which acquired their firearms permit via another shooting club required to become a member of the KNSA.

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Assessing the fear of abuseWhen the police are evaluating the risk of abuse, there is a tense balance between the substantive consideration of the risk, on the one hand, and the administrative law guarantees, on the other. If the police cannot adequately substantiate the fear of abuse, they will occasionally issue firearms permits as a result of appeal proceedings, despite any suspicions of a fear of abuse.

The shooting clubs and the KNSA proceed with more reluctance in this regard. However, they are faced with another problem: they have a dual role, as they must keep undesirable persons out of the shooting sport, on the one hand, while on the other hand, they have an interest in acquiring new members. In its investigation, the Safety Board did not gain any insight into the extent to which the shooting clubs are in a practical position to manage the risk of abuse among their members ; there are too many different shooting clubs to do so. However, given the nature and scope of the shooting clubs, it cannot be reasonably expected that each club will develop its own expertise about the signals that must be picked up on to identify a fear of abuse. The KNSA guidelines on safety pertain to safety in terms of preventing accidents when handling firearms; essentially, they do not deal with safety in terms of preventing the abuse of the firearm. As a result, the question as to whether the shooting clubs devote any attention to this is largely dependent on the individual mission statements of the board members and site executives.

Ability to learnThe aforementioned problems may persist, as barely any systematic feedback takes place in the system in relation to the workings of the system. No systematic analysis is carried out that could reduce the chance that a person is still able to hold a firearms permit, despite a fear of abuse.

The Minister of Security and Justice has distanced himself from the implementation by the police and the KNSA. The Minister does not supervise the way in which they function, nor does he have any further accountability structure in place. The Dienst Justis submits an accountability report to the Minister twice a year, although this only pertains to the figures, as opposed to the content. Therefore, this accountability reporting does not provide the Minister with any insight into the manner in which considerations are made in relation to the arguments concerning the fear of abuse or whether this may need adjustment.

With few exceptions, the Chiefs of Police do not have any insight into the manner in which the officers mandated by them carry out the granting of permits in the context of the Weapons and Ammunition Act. There is usually a lack of internal accountability structures in the police districts, with regard to this topic.

Nor does the KNSA continuously supervise the shooting clubs after they have been admitted

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5 COMPARISON WITH OTHER SYSTEMS

5.1 introDuction

This chapter discusses how the problems observed here are handled in other, partially similar systems. The Dutch Safety Board has studied how the legal possession of firearms is managed in Belgium, Germany and Finland.122 These countries had shooting incidents in the past, after which they amended their laws. After the shooting incident in Utøya in Norway, the Safety Board also briefly studied the Norwegian system.

This chapter briefly clarifies a few relevant points from the different systems. Besides the firearms permit systems in Belgium, Germany and Finland, we will also look at the Dutch system for processing a driving licence application. The question remains, what can we learn from these other systems? The Dutch Safety Board’s investigation into other systems is by no means exhaustive. This chapter does not explore any aspects from the different systems that have nothing to do with the permit system associated with the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act.

Paragraph 5.2 medical information can be obtained in other systems for the purpose of evaluating a permit application. Then, paragraph 5.3 delves into the question of how monitoring is set up in other systems, and which signs and observations can be used for assessing risk.

5.2 obtaining meDical information in otHer systems

5.2.1 BelgiumIn Belgium, the (prospective) firearms permit owner must present a medical certificate that confirms he is capable of using a firearm without posing a danger to himself or to others. This certificate covers the applicant’s physical and mental capacity. This certificate must not be issued to “any person whose alcoholism, depression or aggressiveness has been acknowledged by the physician”. According to the clarification, this is similar to a sports check-up and the certificate is issued by the applicant’s primary care physician.123

Individuals who have undergone compulsory treatment in a psychiatric hospital due to a mental illness are prohibited from obtaining a firearms permit. Mental patients who have committed a crime, who have not undergone compulsory treatment, are also not eligible for a firearms permit.

Besides a medical certificate, the (prospective) firearms owner must also submit approval by adult members of the applicant’s household. These members of the household provide written permission to submit the application. The local police verify whether the members of the household really have given their approval.

5.2.2 GermanyIn order to obtain a firearms permit in Germany, each prospective firearms owner must certify that he is capable of having a firearm. He certifies that he has no physical limitations, is not addicted to drugs, and that he does not have any psychological problems.

122 See appendix 5 for more information.123 In the medical certificate, the GP states “I hereby certify that I have taken note of the valid criteria

established by the firearms law and, based on these criteria, my judgement is that Mr/Mrs… has (does not have) the physical and mental competency to physically and mentally manipulate a firearm without posing a danger to himself/herself or to others, to own firearms, to practise sport shooting, and/or to carry a firearm.”

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If there is any reason to doubt his statement, the agency that issues the firearms permit must require the (prospective) firearms owner to provide a certificate by a person who has relevant expertise. A number of different physicians and psychologists can be considered as having relevant expertise.

A series of tests has been available for use since 2009, the so-called “Testbatterie zur waffenrechtlichen Begutachtung”.124 This collection of validated tests provides insight into the reason why someone wishes to obtain a firearm and into certain character traits: such as whether a person is conscientious or aggressive, or whether a person acts on impulse. It is true that no one can say for sure whether or not a person will abuse the firearm; however, it does provide (justified, thus useful) insight into the character traits of the person applying for a firearms permit.

(Prospective) firearms owners younger than 25 years of age who apply for a permit for a firearm with a large calibre (5.6mm or more) must also be able to submit a certificate from a psychiatrist.

5.2.3 FinlandUntil recently (prospective) firearms owners in Finland had to submit a medical certificate from their primary care physician if they wanted to apply for a firearms permit. The medical certificate has recently been discontinued because physicians felt it was too much of a burden to issue these certificates.

Furthermore, there was discussion among medical professionals about whether or not a doctor should be considered capable of predicting whether a person has an increased risk of causing a shooting incident for example.

Since June 2011, anyone in Finland who applies for a firearms permit for the first time must take a psychological test at the police station. The police use this psychological test to help determine whether someone is violent, aggressive or suicidal, or whether this person poses a threat to himself or to others. There are two outcomes to the test: the (prospective) firearms holder can be considered capable, or further investigation is required. In the latter case, the prospect requires a doctors certificate to continue with the process.

Since June 2011, doctors are also required, and other medical professionals have the right, to notify police if they encounter someone who they believe is unfit to own firearms and ammunition.

5.2.4 NorwayA serious shooting incident occurred in Norway during the Safety Board’s investigation. On 22 July 2011, a 32 year old man shot and killed 69 people on Utøya island. The perpetrator had obtained the firearms and ammunition legally in accordance with the Norwegian firearms laws. He had been a member of a shooting club since 2005.

As a result of this incident, the Safety Board briefly studied how the legal possession of firearms is regulated in Norway.

The possession of firearms is in principle prohibited in Norway, unless certain conditions are met. The person applying for a firearms permit must be at least 21 years old. He must be a member of a registered shooting club, have a valid (written) reason why he wishes to obtain a firearm (permit), and he must have theoretical knowledge and practical skills. For this purpose, he must take part in a firearms safety training course and must have participated in at least fifteen training sessions over a six month period. The chief of police then verifies the applicant’s criminal and mental health records. The latter is examined by holding a meeting with the applicant at the police station. Firearms and ammunition must be stored in a secure and locked location, generally a safe in the home. The police may conduct announced home inspections.

124 A. S. Dobat, E. Prinz, D. Heubrock, TBWB - Testbatterie zur waffenrechtlichen Begutachtung, 2009.

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The Dutch Safety Board notes that the firearms laws in Norway are similar in certain areas to the laws in the Netherlands. This means that any changes that will be implemented in Norway as a result of the shooting incident there, could also make sense for the situation in the Netherlands.

5.2.5 Driving licence exams in the NetherlandsPeople who apply for a driving licence in the Netherlands complete their own certificate from the central agency for driving proficiency (CBR) in the Netherlands. The certificate contains ten questions about disorders that can have an effect on the evaluation of the applicant’s competency.

A person who is 70 years of age or older and who wishes to renew his driving licence, must also be examined by the primary care physician. The guidelines of the KNMG federation of doctors advise against the medical exam for the driving licence being performed by the person’s primary care physician, because this can damage the trust relationship between doctor and patient. The examining doctor (generally another primary care physician) evaluates the applicant’s physical and mental condition. This doctor does not evaluate whether the applicant is fit to have a driving licence, he/she provides an opinion about the applicant’s physical or mental condition. A medical advisor from the CBR then evaluates whether a certificate of competency can be awarded based on his own certificate and on the medical report issued by the applicant’s primary care physician. The medical advisor can make different decisions: 1. He awards a certificate of competency;2. He issues a certificate of competency with a limited period of validity and/or limited authority;3. He requests further medical examination;4. He declares the applicant to be unfit.

5.2.6 Lessons from the use of medical informationThe previous paragraphs discussed elements from other systems. Before we can learn something from all this, we must make a few side notes.

The measures that have been implemented in Belgium, Germany and Finland, were implemented shortly after shooting incidents had taken place and are of a recent date. None of these measures have been evaluated as of yet. Therefore, it is unclear whether and how they have contributed to the risk assessments made by the authorities. There is also no answer to the question whether the measures have actually reduced the risk. Since shooting incidents do not occur often, it takes a long period of time to determine the answer to that question.

Furthermore, the role of firearms and the possession of firearms in the different countries cannot be compared. The number of people that legally own a firearm in Finland and Germany is a lot higher than in the Netherlands. There are a lot of hunters in those countries; in Finland, one of every three people hunts.

The measures that have been put into place as a result of a number of shooting incidents in Belgium, Germany and Finland, are aimed at gathering more information and more observations about (prospective) firearms owners. The comparison with other countries and/or systems shows that there are a number of different options to obtain (more) information about the mental state of the firearms permit applicant, and to obtain more signs and observations that point to possible risks. Fundamentally it does not matter whether the applicant submits an application for his employer, a driving licence or a firearms permit. In general, we can differentiate between the following four methods:1. The applicant completes his own statement;2. The applicant undergoes a (medical) exam;3. The applicant requests a doctor to provide a medical certificate;4. The doctor provides information to agencies.

In most systems, the applicant provides the information and multiple sources of information are used.

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Permit applicant provides his own informationIn the Netherlands, the police officer can ask the (prospective) firearms owner to submit a written certificate issued by a doctor or psychiatrist, just like in Germany.125 The police may ask for this if there are any doubts as to the mental state of a (prospective) firearms owner (see paragraph 2.2.4). In practice, however, as described in chapter 4, police officers have little access to resources / aids to obtain information that could form the basis of any doubts. In Belgium, Germany and Finland, and also in the Netherlands for driving licence exams, this problem is overcome by having the applicant submit information about his physical or mental state.

If the applicant requests information from the doctor, or authorises the doctor to provide information to others, the objection doctors have regarding the breach in medical secrecy without the patient’s approval is not an issue. After all, the applicant is authorising the doctor to breach this medical secrecy.

By completing a statement, undergoing a medical examination or assessment, or requesting a medical certificate, the patient is approving (explicitly or implicitly) the disclosure of personal and medical information to others. In other words, it is the applicant who is responsible for organising the burden of proof.

Multiple sourcesA second important observation is that almost all systems discussed here assume that obstacles arise from multiple sources. A person who is 70 years of age or older and wishes to renew a driving licence completes a statement and undergoes a medical examination. If someone in Finland applies for a firearms permit, this person completes an electronic survey and requests a doctors certificate, if the computer assessment requests that information. A person in Germany who completes a statement that provides any reasons for doubt, he must submit a medical certificate completed by a medical doctor. A person in Belgium who applies for a permit, must submit a statement by all adults that share a household with the applicant, in addition to a doctors certificate.

Out of all the countries included in our investigation, Belgium was the only country where adult members of the household must provide their written approval when the applicant submits an application. This measure – requesting a statement from the applicant’s social circle – forms an additional source of information for the officer who issues the permit and an additional obstacle for prospective firearms owners for whom exists a fear of abuse.

Working with multiple sources of information has two effects: 1. The person who must evaluate the situation receives different types of information to evaluate

the risk of abuse.2. The prospective firearms owner encounters multiple obstacles and barriers to obtaining a

permit.

If one of the sources of information fails, information can still be obtained from other sources. This is important in part because the predictive value of this information is limited. Shooting incidents are a rare phenomenon. This is one of the reasons why it is difficult to create a model that predicts the actions of future shooters.126 The results of practically all investigations into shooting incidents show that there is no evidence to suggest that certain personal traits (such as fear or aggression) or certain psychiatric illnesses (such as schizophrenia, autism or ADHD) can predict future abuse. Whenever it turns out that a shooter was depressed, schizophrenic and/or autistic, it does say something about this shooter, but it says little about others with the same character traits or disorders.

125 Refer to the CWM, p.32 under ‘psychische gesteldheid’ (mental state).126 Meloy, J.R. and others, A comparative analysis of North American adolescent and adult mass murderers

in Behavioural Science and the Law 22, 2004, p. 294.

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The role of physiciansThe psychological tests of aspiring shooters who apply for a firearms permit, as is currently the case in Finland, raise a number of questions. To what extent does an electronic survey provide sufficient (reliable) information to assess the risk of future behaviour?

What does a snapshot mean? In other words, how useful is such a survey? The experts the Dutch Safety Board consulted, have different opinions.127 A number of experts expect that such a survey could be useful as a first “obstacle” in the system to identify possible individuals who are at risk. The condition is that supplemental information is queried whenever the survey results indicate the necessity. This is the same in Germany. Other experts see no value in this type of survey due to their limited predictive value.

In Belgium, the applicant’s primary care physician is requested to issue a medical certificate. In The Netherlands it is customary for a primary care physician to examine his own patients; treating and examining a patient in the Netherlands are two different activities. The examination required for obtaining a driving licence is not performed by the applicant’s primary care physician, but by a CBR doctor.

Belgium is the only country from the countries discussed here, that explicitly states that people who have been admitted to a psychiatric hospital cannot obtain a firearms permit. The exact reasons for this measure is unknown to the Dutch Safety Board. It is plausible that one assigns more value to keeping the group that wrongly receives a permit (so-called false positives) as small as possible, and to accept the fact that a number of people will be wrongly refused a permit (so-called false negatives).

In conclusion, care providers can report a fear of abuse. This has only been established by law in Finland, where doctors have a legal obligation and others who provide assistance have a legal right to report any suspected firearms abuse as a result of someone’s mental state. There is a similar arrangement in the Netherlands for reporting suspicions of domestic violence or child abuse. A professional who suspects domestic violence or child abuse must report it.128 Organisations and independent professionals in youth and health care, the police and education will soon be legally obliged to use a reporting code.129 The reporting code in the health care sector gives attention to the reporting right130 and its purpose is to make it easier for doctors to share suspicions of domestic violence with others.

A reporting right or reporting obligation for physicians in terms of the firearms laws would mean that physicians can and must speak up if they know their patient has a firearms permit and are worried about the patient’s mental state. On the basis of such a report, the police can (temporarily) withdraw or set limitations on the firearms permit. This can prevent this person from picking up his gun too easily. In order for this type of reporting code to be successful, doctors will have to actively gather information about their clients and ask them if they own any firearms.

127 The Dutch Safety Board has made use of a number of expert meetings with psychiatric hospital directors and primary care physicians. Furthermore, a (limited) study into available literature has been conducted that point to indicators that play a role in “mass murders”.

128 Article 53, paragraph 3 of the Wet op de Jeugdzorg (Dutch Youth Care Act) states that professionals who are bound by secrecy are permitted to provide information to the Bureau Jeugdzorg (youth care agency) without the consent of the parties involved if necessary to put a halt to a particular case of child abuse or to investigate any reasonable suspicions of child abuse.

129 The Wet meldcode Huiselijk Geweld en Kindermishandeling (the reporting code for domestic violence and child abuse act) is expected to enter into force in 2011.

130 The reporting right assumes “speak up, unless.” Therefore, the doctor is not obliged to report suspected child abuse if he has any reasons not to do so (KNMG reporting code 2008). A reporting obligation means that doctors are obliged to report their suspicions.

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5.3 recognising tHe risK of abuse

It is not only important to recognise any possible risks of abuse when obtaining a firearms permit, but also after a permit has been issued. This risk of abuse can be tracked in different ways. The following paragraph briefly explains how this is done by the police and customs. The paragraph after that describes the knowledge and information that are relevant to recognising the warning signs that point to possible abuse.

5.3.1 Professional firearms carriersNew officers with the police and customs are selected based on a number of predetermined criteria. For example, they must undergo a medical examination, a psychological test, personality tests and a practical test. it is important that the candidates are physically and mentally strong and stable. No special attention is given to whether they can be trusted with a gun.

Once police or customs officers have been trained and have been authorised to handle a gun, they are subjected to a reasonably strict regimen of (social) monitoring and assessment. This (social) monitoring consists of a number of aspects. Firstly, police and customs officers always work with one or more partners. As partners, they are expected to pay attention to one another and to report any incidents or warning signs. Secondly, police agents and customs officers have a team leader. This person monitors his team members and keep themselves well-informed of their team’s relevant private circumstances and any associated problems. Lastly, there are instructors who are in charge of the Integrale Beroepsvaardigheidstraining (integral professional skills training). For example, at customs, these instructors evaluate the individual (fire)arms carrier on his skills, attitude and behaviour. Firearms carriers regularly participate in shooting training.

Finally, active monitoring and evaluations take place. Each incidence of violence must be reported according to the rules. Gun safes regularly undergo unannounced inspections. Furthermore, a customs officer who does not participate in training for three months or longer must retake the skills exam to test his condition, knowledge and attitude.

5.3.2 Recognising the warning signsLearning how to recognise the warning signs that point to a fear of abuse is an important factor in effectively evaluating risk.

Literature shows that many so-called “mass murders” or “spree murders”131 arise from one or more grievances that the perpetrator has developed during the course of his life. These perpetrators often have the feeling that everyone in the world mistakenly is ignoring them. Furthermore, perpetrators plan their act in advance and often express their threats in which they announce the act they are going to commit.132 An often cited model, which shows how shooters arrive at their act, is the so-called “pathway to violence” by Calhoun and Weston133.133

131 Mass murder: In one case, a premeditated murder of three or four people took place. Source: Meloy, J.R. and others, A comparative analysis of North American adolescent and adult mass murderers in Behavioural Science and the Law 22, 2004, p. 291-309.

Spree murder: The murder of three or more people at different locations but within the context of a single event. Source: Keeney, B.T & Heide, K.M., Serial murder; a more accurate and inclusive definition in International journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 39(4), 1995, p.299-306.

132 US FBI, Campus attacks; Targeted violence affecting institutions of higher education, April 2010; Windesheim Hogeschool as requested by the Ministerie of OCW, assistance with prevention and dealing with school attacks, April 2011.

133 Calhoun, F.S. & Weston, S.W., Contemporary threat management: A practical guide for identifying, assessing and managing individuals of violent intent, 2003.

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According to this model, shooters go through a number of steps prior to the actual attack:

1. Develop grievancesa. anger and aggression problemsb. aversion to/ isolation from parents, teachers and studentsc. discipline problems

2. Idealise violence or show interest in prior attacksa. fantasies of violenceb. threatening with acts of violencec. looking up to negative role modelsd. fascination with prior (school) attacks

3. Plan the attacka. letting plans leak outb. expressing threats

4. Prepare for the attacka. expressions of gloominess and suicidal thoughtsb. martyrdomc. collection of guns, drawings and maps

5. Beginning the attacka. pick up gunsb. travel to site where attack will take place

6. Actual attack

A part of the pathway to violence is that, at a certain point, shooters actually start to threaten the people around them (step 3). Therefore, a number of articles emphasise the importance of these threats and the value of recognising them as a warning sign.134

In general, the risk that a threat will actually lead to action increases as the threat becomes more direct and elaborate. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recognises a number of threat levels that are used to evaluate the risk of so-called school shootings:1. Conditional threat: if you don’t do …. then ….;2. Disguised threat: no explicit threat; 3. Indirect threat: the threat is vague, unclear and ambiguous;4. Direct threat: the threat specifies time, target and place.

There are different evaluation and handling options for each threat level.

5.3.3 Warning signs of risk in the Alphen aan den Rijn caseIn retrospect, the investigation conducted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office into Tristan van der V.’s personality traits showed that many of the above mentioned warning signs were present in his case.135

Developing grievancesThe investigation conducted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office showed that he had different grievances. In 2003 Tristan van der V. started to develop a hatred towards God. He held God responsible for the suffering in the world and could not combine that with the belief that God was good. He felt rejected by God and wanted to punish God by killing His creatures.

Idealising violence or interest in prior attacksTristan van der V. did not idealise violence. However, he was very interested in guns; and he was also interested in the Columbine school shooting in the United States and in the perpetrators. He indicated that he understood how they had reached the point that led them to commit that act.

134 As an example, see: FBI Academy, The school shooter: a threat assessment perspective, 2000.; Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding (NCTb) Individuele bedreiger van publieke personen in Nederland; Fenomeenanalyse en een beleidsverkenning, June 2010.

135 Openbaar Ministerie, Samenvatting TGO onderzoek Komeet naar schietpartij Alphen aan den Rijn op 9 april 2011, 11 July 2011. Openbaar Ministerie, Samenvatting resultaten Rijksrechercheonderzoek, 11 July 2011. Also see the press conference held by the Dutch Public Prosecutor’s Office on 11 July 2011.

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Planning the attackAccording to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Tristan der V. repeatedly announced his plans. Sometimes not very clearly, but he explicitly named the Ridderhof to one or two individuals in his social circle.

Preparing the attackHe also prepared for his act. In January 2011, three months prior to the shooting incident, Tristan van der V. started purchasing items: the Smith & Wesson MP15-22 rifle, multiple shot cartridges, a gunsight for the rifle (a red dot viewer), a bullet proof vest and ammunition.

In retrospect, even though the warning signs seemed to be present in the Alphen aan den Rijn case, it is also possible for people to exhibit one or more of the referenced behaviours without actually carrying out an attack. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to these warning signs, but they must always be evaluated in conjunction with other signs and observations.

5.3.4 Lessons for recognising the signs that point to a risk of abuseThe signs of future abuse are often not separate warning signs; they can be a part of a series of events, the previously mentioned pathway to violence. A single warning sign is not a direct indicator of possible firearms abuse. This risk only becomes clear once signs are observed during the different steps or all the steps of the pathway to violence. In order to be able to interpret the signs accurately, and to prevent possible escalations, it is important that all the signs manifest themselves in the presence of a party or person who can interpret the underlying connection of these signs and can take the necessary actions. This can take place by looking for these signs when an applicant submits an application for a firearms permit and in between times too. After all, the circumstances of the firearms owner can change at any time.

The ability to determine whether there are any warning signs upon receiving an application for a firearms permit can occur by having the applicant complete a computer test, or by having someone complete a statement.

The best place to observe any warning signs at other times is during organised group activities, where everyone comes together on a regular basis, where a certain degree of social monitoring takes place and where agreements and rules can be made on what to do if any warning signs are encountered. Examples of social connections are professional firearms carriers such as the police and customs officers, but also shooting clubs provide a good basis. Shooting clubs are an important link in the network surrounding (prospective) firearms owners and can actively contribute in this role towards evaluating the question whether any of their member sport shooters are showing any signs that point to risks.

The amount of relevant knowledge and warning signs gathered by (board) members about their members differ by club. A number of shooting clubs actively use the social function of the club to catch any warning signs by members. Members are expected to address other members about their behaviour and to monitor whether other members are having problems in their private lives that could possibly lead to risk factors, such as work-related stress, a divorce, or increasing forgetfulness. Other measures are also used to give shape to risk assessments, such as introducing a buddy system for young shooters, a “risk assessment” training for (board) members and a (bi)annual meeting with all members.

Shooting clubs are in a favourable position to actively make risk assessments and evaluations. The Safety Board is under the impression that not all clubs are actively working towards doing what they can to recognise and evaluate the risks. The KNSA can play a key role in making risk assessments by members standard practice at all shooting clubs.

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5.4 conclusions

Based on the brief comparison with other systems, the Safety Board concludes that there are opportunities to obtain more information about the mental state of (prospective) firearms owners in the Netherlands than is currently the case. This information is important to the special laws departments for evaluating the risk of abuse.

Information about an applicant’s mental state can be obtained in the following ways: 1. The (prospective) firearms owner provides his own information about his mental state. This can

be accomplished in a number of different ways: – The (prospective) firearms owner completes a statement or survey; – The (prospective) firearms owner asks his doctor for a medical certificate; – The (prospective) firearms owner undergoes a psychological test (at the doctor’s office or at

the police station); – The (prospective) firearms owner asks the members of his household/acquaintances for a

statement.2. Multiple sources of information can be used if there is a reason to do so:

– The applicant’s own statement may be reason to ask for a doctor’s certificate; – A survey completed by an applicant may be reason to ask for a doctor’s certificate or

examination; – The applicant not only completes his own statement; he also asks other adults whom he

knows socially.3. In a number of cases in other systems, doctors who know that a patient of theirs has a firearms

permit will take it upon themselves to report a fear of abuse.

Shooting clubs can learn from professional firearms carriers and from existing information about how to recognise the signs of possible abuse in a timely manner. Shooting clubs can pay careful attention to any signs that might indicate a danger of firearms abuse by their members.

As mentioned before, the Dutch Safety Board cannot pass any judgment on the effectiveness of these measures based on this first, limited analysis. Some of these measures have been implemented in other countries so recently that they have not yet been evaluated. Nevertheless, they do provide food for thought for making adjustments to our existing system. Any future changes to the Norwegian system may be a reason to change the Dutch system as well, considering the similarities between the two systems.

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6 CONCLUSIONS

During the shooting incident in Alphen aan den Rijn the shooter used guns that he legally owned. This begs the question whether the system established in the Netherlands to manage the risk of abuse of legal firearms functions as it should, in particular, the criterion “fear of abuse”, which determines whether a firearms permit can be refused or revoked. Therefore, the Safety Board focused on the following question in this report:

‘Why is the fear of abuse not recognised in some cases by the system that governs the legal possession of firearms”?

The way the system is currently set up, does not guarantee that institutions which must determine whether there exists a fear of abuse, actually have the information they require for this purpose.

The Dutch system for the legal possession of firearms has been established to ensure that legal firearms are only in the possession of those who can handle the responsibility of owning and using a firearm. The setup of this system is such that this goal can be achieved. However, the system, including its execution, does have a number of flaws.

The job of granting a firearms permit takes place under the authority of the chief of police, who must conduct an assessment. In reality, the police often perform their legal duties of granting, enforcing and monitoring permits as if these were purely administrative tasks. The ultimate goal, which is to evaluate whether a fear of abuse exists, is no longer the primary focus. The Safety Board concludes this occurs because the chiefs of police assign a low priority to these duties. The Minister of Security and Justice, who is in charge of monitoring this system, also sees it as a low priority.

The system does not guarantee that the police, who must determine whether a fear of abuse exists, can actually access the information they require to do the job. The current system does not require the applicant to provide the police with all the information they would need to make a good decision.

Since the system is not assigned a high priority, police management and the minister do not recognise the flaws in the system; therefore, these flaws continue to exist.

Since there is no guarantee that the police can access all the information required to issue a firearms permit, we cannot rule out the possibility that someone may obtain a firearm even though a fear of abuse exists. Our investigation shows that the Hollands Midden police did not use all the information available when granting and renewing the firearms permit. In particular, the information about Tristan van der V.’s mental state was not included in the permit review process.

This discrepancy that exists between the situation regarding the information and responsibility not only forms a weakness in employing the system as intended, it also exists when evaluating the functioning and the performance of the system: the parties who are responsible for resolving the problems that would lead to improvements in the system, do not use the information available to them. Conversely, the parties who know the weaknesses in the system do not have the authority to change it.

These conclusions are discussed in more detail here below. We will end this chapter with a few important points.

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6.1 wHy information about (prospective) firearms owners is not incluDeD in tHe risK assessment

As explained above, the right information does not always make it to the right place. The Safety Board believes there are a number of reasons for this.

Even though the (prospective) firearms owner is the only person who has a direct interest in obtaining or keeping a firearms permit, he does not have to provide all the relevant information.

The (prospective) firearms owner is the only person who has a direct interest in obtaining a firearms permit. He determines which information he provides to the police (upon submitting his application) and to the shooting club (during the prospective membership interview and during the course of membership).

People who know the (prospective) firearms owner socially, primarily have a relationship of trust with this person; therefore it is understandable that they find it difficult to take the initiative to provide relevant information.

People who know the (prospective) firearms owner socially find it difficult to share relevant information with agencies such as the police or the courts of justice because it will damage the relationship of trust they have with this person. Therefore, the people who know the person will probably not proactively report any fear of abuse. This would result in a conflict of loyalty with the firearms owner on the one hand and with the interests of society on the other hand.

Obviously, people who know the (prospective) firearms owner, who do have a formal responsibility to the system, can be approached with a request for information.

(Medical) professionals are responsible for the care of their patients. They do not have a formal role in the system that regulates the legal possession of firearms.

A doctor has a relationship of trust with his patients and must comply with medical secrecy laws. He does not have a formal role in the system that regulates the legal possession of firearms. If medical information is required when applying for a firearms permit, the prospective firearms owner must provide consent. In this case, there is no breach in the relationship of trust between doctor and patient.

During the investigation, the Safety Board spoke with a number of doctors. They indicated a need for an option to share information in certain cases, even in the absence of an acute or immediate danger (at that moment). Therefore, the Safety Board believes it is necessary that medical treatment providers determine a position on the question of how they can handle this type of information.

There is no sufficient assurance that the governing boards and other officers of the shooting clubs have an eye for the warning signs that could point to a club member’s increased risk of firearms abuse.

In principle, shooting clubs are in a good position to evaluate a firearms owner because they observe their actions as a shooter on a regular basis. However, there are no guarantees that the shooting clubs actually do this, or that they would even know what signs to pay attention to and how they should point them out.

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Shooting clubs are not asked by lawmakers, nor are they encouraged enough by the KNSA, to pay attention to the warning signs of possible firearms abuse by their members.

When signing the permit application, the governing board declares that the prospective firearms owner has sufficient skills to handle firearms, but not that there is no reason to fear abuse. The Weapons and Ammunition Circular 2005 does not set that as a condition.

The KNSA still provides little support to shooting clubs in terms of helping them to recognise the warning signs of firearms abuse. As a sports association, the KNSA is responsible for the climate in which sport shooting can thrive; however it does not monitor the shooting clubs’ operations in this regard. A club that has been certified by the KNSA is monitored. However, certification in its current form does not solve this problem because certification is voluntary for the clubs and because the certification requirements hardly pay any attention to observing the warning signs of abuse. Certification by the KNSA is still in its infancy: Up until 2011, only 27 of the approximately eight hundred shooting clubs were certified.

The police take insufficient advantage of their authority to use the relevant information about the (prospective) firearms owners in their evaluation.

The police districts’ special laws departments base their evaluations of a permit application primarily on the information (such as court convictions) that is available in the information systems accessible to them. The Weapons and Ammunition Circular does not specify options for obtaining other information about a (prospective) firearms owner, and the chief of police, who is ultimately responsible for the process, does not encourage them to do so. Therefore, the whole process of granting permits has become an automatic, administrative task, whereby the ultimate goal of the procedure has gone by the wayside. Examples from other systems show us that there are options to involve more information in the risk analysis.

The police must make a justifiable decision based on information that does not always allow them to do so.

According to the Weapons and Ammunition Circular, a firearms permit must be refused or revoked by the slightest indication for a fear of abuse.

The decision must also meet the requirements that the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) has set for making a careful decision. This means that the police must properly justify any doubts. Any signs that have not been substantially justified cannot be used in their argumentation. If the police do use these signs as justification, the decision to reject the application can be reversed during an administrative appeal. This situation also leads to the fact that information sources where these signs mainly originate, are not reviewed by the police.

For this reason, the reserve/restraint referenced in the circular for issuing firearms permits is not feasible in practice: a firearms permit is granted, unless there are sufficient grounds to suspect a fear of abuse, whereby the applicant cannot be trusted with a gun.

6.2 wHy problems in tHe system Have not been resolveD

Improvements can only be made if the people involved know where the system weaknesses are. The parties who are responsible for setting up the system and its operations (the Minister of Security and Justice, the KNSA and police management) do not have the relevant information in a consistent manner that would give them insight into the system’s operations, the problems with the system, or its effectiveness. In this way, the system that manages the legal possession of firearms can not be improved consistently throughout the system, but only on an incidental basis.

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The Minister of Security and Justice is far removed from police and KNSA operations.

The Minister of Security and Justice is responsible for the system. It is his job to set up the system to function properly. This also includes looking for and resolving any obstacles that impede the proper functioning of the system.

However, the Minister of Security and Justice does not collect enough information to identify possible obstacles: there is no national registry of the number of incidents that have occurred with legally owned firearms, the number of legal firearms in circulation, the number of permits that have been refused or withdrawn, the percentage of home inspections that have taken place, how well the shooting clubs are functioning, or what kind of a relationship the commercial firearms retailers have with the shooting clubs, etc. Therefore, he does not have a reliable picture of how the system functions. He does not monitor it either.

Information is not collected or shared in a consistent manner, and the risk assessments that are made of individuals are not improved based on information from research or from neighbouring countries.

Police districts do not learn much from their experiences or from other police districts.

The Dutch Safety Board has noted that the police districts follow the Weapons and Ammunition Circular in their own procedures, but that there are big differences – for no apparent reason – in how they perform these duties. The effective procedures of some special laws departments are not common and the qualifications and workload of their staff differ from district to district.

The chiefs of police often assign a low priority to the duties that arise from the Weapons and Ammunition Act, thus also to the improvement of those duties. Most police districts also do not generate management information in a consistent manner that allows them to evaluate the functioning of the system and to implement changes to their duties or to bring obstacles and deficiencies to the Minister’s attention.

Besides, the Dutch Safety Board has also noticed that the Dutch police have had a number of different initiatives with the intent that the districts would learn from each other’s experiences when performing their duties related to the Weapons and Ammunition Act. However, many of these initiatives appeared to have little success, and there are still many different procedures. Thus, there is no consistent knowledge development. The same applies to building knowledge about relevant risk indicators that the police can use to assume a fear of abuse.

The KNSA does evaluate affiliated clubs upon membership, but they seldom do so afterwards.

Just like the minister and the chiefs of police, the KNSA also does not gather information in a consistent manner to review how its affiliated clubs ensure the safety of the shooting sport, and how they handle any warning signs of firearms abuse by an individual shooter. The Dutch Safety Board concludes that there is a missed opportunity here in supporting the clubs with performing the duty they have to contribute to the safety of the legal possession of firearms.

6.3 important points to consiDer

In addition to the main conclusion stated above, which resulted from the procedure that was followed to grant a permit to Tristan van der V., the Dutch Safety Board notes that there are other topics that may also contribute towards an improved method to manage the legal possession of firearms.

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The Dutch Safety Board would also like the Minister of Security and Justice to give some thought to these topics.

Limited firearms permit for young shootersIf a permit applicant is a legal adult and meets the requirements set forth in the Weapons and Ammunition Act, in principle a permit is granted for any type of category III gun. No differentiation is made based on age, experience or type of gun. The Dutch Safety Board would like the Minister to give thought to studying whether the risks of legal firearms possession can be reduced by issuing a permit with limitations to young or less experienced shooters.

Approach to risk during home inspectionsThe minister pointed out in his letter to the Lower House dated 11 July 2011, that the chiefs of police have decided to implement standardisation and quality improvements to the process of granting and monitoring permits throughout the whole police organisation. A part of this plan is to conduct risk analyses so that there is a more targeted approach in monitoring firearms owners. The Safety Board believes this is particularly important when prioritising home inspections. This type of approach is not feasible with the current 100% requirement for home inspections.

Mixing sport shooting and commercial businessIn the Netherlands, there are shooting clubs that use shooting ranges at a commercial shooting sports centre, where other commercial business is located, such as a firearms retail shop or a party centre. The shooting club where Tristan van der V. was a member, also rented its shooting ranges at this type of commercial shooting sports centre. The Safety Board would like to point out that a conflict of interest between commercial business interests and other interests, such as sport shooting safety.

The KNSA rules specify that a club’s board members must not be involved in any way as a private party in the sale of firearms, ammunition, sport shooting accessories, shooting range rentals, or any other commercial interests that are directly associated with sport shooting. This does not prevent any other undesirable influences that could occur. The Dutch Safety Board would like the minister to give thought to studying whether or not it is desirable to add more limitations to this combination of functions.

Acceptance of Types of FirearmsThe legislator has chosen to group many types of firearms under Category III of the Weapons and Ammunition Act (refer to appendix 3). In practice, this means that only fully automatic rifles and hand grenades (category II) cannot come into the hands of any private parties. Within this broad category III, it is up to the KNSA to determine which firearms can be used for sport shooting purposes. The criterion the KNSA uses to determine whether a certain type of gun can be used for a certain sport shooting discipline, is that this particular gun can be used for the fair practice of that sport. Managing the risk of abuse does not form a criterion, even though it could lead to additional requirements. The government does not set any requirements on sport shooting disciplines and leaves the choice of guns to be used in these disciplines up to the KNSA. Certain disciplines permit the use of semi-automatic rifles. With these rifles, many shots can be fired within a short period of time, which could result in a relatively high number of victims if the rifle were to be abused. Unfortunately, the serious shooting incidents in Alphen aan den Rijn and in Utøya (Norway) prove this point.

The minister could have more influence by periodically answering the following questions: – Are certain guns desirable for practising sport shooting? and – Does the existing legal categorisation still suffice?

Adding a firearm to the permitIf a permit holder wishes to add a firearm to his permit, the shooting club is to state that the firearm in question can be used for a sport shooting branch that can be practised at the club. This is important because this helps to establish that the shooter has a “reasonable interest” in being allowed to own a gun. In this case, the reasonable interest is the (serious) practice of a certain sport shooting discipline.

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The police, who evaluate the application, “can base its evaluation on the statement entered by the board of the shooting club on the application form” according to the circular. The Board wonders how the Circular relates to the legal requirement imposed on the police to check up on the reasonable interest and the danger for abuse when granting a permit.

Therefore, the government gives the sport shooting sector a lot of room for permitting firearms in general and in adding firearms in a specific case. In this way, the police – and the government in general – maintains too little control on allowing guns in society.

GuestsThere are hardly any requirements related to guests at shooting clubs. This means that people who cannot obtain a Certificate of Good Behaviour or a firearms permit, thus people who are not eligible to practise sport shooting for a reason, can still learn how to use firearms if they are accompanied by a person who does have a Certificate of Good Behaviour or a firearms permit.

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7 RECOMMENDATIONS

The Safety Board has the following recommendations.

Have the applicants provide more information


a. Add a provision to the law that obligates the applicant to provide more information about his personal situation that is relevant for evaluating the existence of a “fear of abuse”. The Board recommends a “reversal of the burden of proof”: It is not up to the police to prove that the applicant is unfit to own a firearm, it is up to the applicant to prove that he is worthy of owning a firearm. He could provide a doctors certificate, the results of a psychological test or a statement prepared by members of his household for this purpose.

b. Encourage the police to actively and critically evaluate this information:• upon receipt of an application for a firearms permit;• upon the annual renewal of the firearms permit;• whenever there is a change in information provided earlier;• whenever the police believe a re-evaluation would be necessary or desirable.

Improve the process used by the police for granting permits

2. To the quartermaster of the national police and to the (future) chief of police of the national police

Ensure that police management are involved in carrying out the duties that arise from the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act, and that they analyse at least once a year whether the system’s objectives are actually being achieved. Therefore, the capability to generate management information is essential.

Evaluate risk indicators and apply them


a. Periodically assess what kind of information about a person can potentially indicate that this person may be at risk of firearms abuse. Use experiences and knowledge from actual situations and events in the Netherlands and abroad, along with the results of scientific studies.

b. Ensure that these indicators are used when granting permits.c. Inform the KNSA Royal Dutch Shooters Association of these indicators.d. Develop applicable procedures and methods for obtaining information about these indicators

and include information from people who know the applicant personally.

Improve risk management by shooting clubs

4. To the KNSA Royal Dutch Shooters Association

a. Ensure that your affiliated shooting clubs evaluate the fear of abuse:• whenever a new member joins the club;• whenever a member applies for a firearms permit;• whenever a member purchases a firearm;• in general during the membership.

b. Develop measures that match the level of fear of abuse.c. Ensure that your members have the expertise required to recognise impending abuse and

to take the right measures. If necessary, offer training and guidance.d. Include the above steps in the certification requirements for shooting clubs.

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Set up the system in such a way that a firearms permit can only be granted if the applicant is a member of a club that proves that it performs this risk assessment; you could consider a KNSA certification as referenced in recommendation 4.

Find out whether the system is providing the desired results


a. Obtain information each year from the police, the KNSA and the Judicial Enforcement Service for Assessment, Integrity and Screening about the effectiveness of the legal system governing the legal possession of firearms;

b. Include an evaluation provision in the Weapons and Ammunition Act.

Study options for medical professionals

7. To the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG), in consultation with the Netherlands Mental Health Care Institution (GGZ), the Netherlands Association for Psychiatry (NVP) and the Dutch general practitioners association (NHG)

Establish a stance on the issue of what medical professionals and other care providers can do, whenever they learn of the (intended) possession of a firearm by one of their patients and this would involve a potential danger for any third party.

Governing bodies who receive a recommendation are to inform the minister of their position regarding compliance with this recommendation within half a year from the publication date of this report. Non governing bodies or people who receive a recommendation are to inform the minister of their position regarding compliance with the recommendation within one year. A copy of this response must also be sent to the chairman of the Dutch Safety Board and to the Minister of Security and Justice.

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APPENDIX 1: INVESTIGATION EXPLANATION

Reason, problem and scope of the investigation are discussed in chapter 1.

The investigation intends in the first place to explain how the risk of abusing a legal firearm that has been obtained for the purpose of practising sport shooting, is managed. The next objective is to learn from the statements in order to improve the system that governs the legal possession of firearms. The key question of the investigation is as follows :

Why is the “fear of abuse” not recognised in some cases by the system that governs the legal possession of firearms?

Method of investigationIn order to answer this question, the investigation is based on the illustration of the system as shown below (figure 8).

Setting up and improving the system

Assessing the risk of abuse

Knowledge of the (future) firearms owner

KNSAChief ofpolice


and Justice

Dienst Justis(only after

previous refusal)

Shootingclubs


Policerecords

Special lawsdepartments

(medical and other)

professionals

Socialenvironment

Figure 8: Diagram of the system

The diagram shows that the system, as established by laws and regulations, has three main processes that affect one another: knowing the (possible) risk factors of the (intended) firearms owner, estimating and managing the risk of abuse, and setting up and improving the system. If these processes run smoothly, the risk of abuse of a legally obtained firearm is controlled as much as possible.

The processes take shape by the activities of the different parties involved in the system. The focus is on the parties who have the actual ability to affect the risk of abuse by taking measures to control risk (orange area). In order to do their job, these parties depend on information about any risk factors the (intended) firearms owner may have. The parties who have to evaluate the risks rely heavily on information. The green area shows the possible sources of this information; these are parties who know the (intended) firearms owner in one way or another. This information is the basis for the parties in the orange area, who must assess the risk and decide whether to deploy control measures – such as withdrawing or refusing a firearms permit.

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The parties in the blue area create the conditions for evaluating risk. They have a big influence on the set-up of the system and its effects, both in terms of issuing legislation and in terms of providing resources. In order to ensure that the system they have established achieves the intended results, these parties rely on information that gauges the actual effects of the system. They can receive or collect this information from those who are involved in the functioning of the system. Based on this information, they can take the necessary measures to promote the intended effects of the system, such as modifying the rules or providing more or different types of resources.

The model makes it clear that there are always two important aspects for the parties who “manage the risk” and the parties who “create the conditions”. These aspects are: the quality and availability of information and their ability to interpret this information and connect an action with it.

Based on the above model, chapter 4 maps out which characteristics of the system or the context in which the parties to the system operate might hinder the activities they perform. The Safety Board has used information from written sources, but they also conducted interviews with representatives of the parties to the system and with experts. Possible characteristics derive from general insights from the literature about the causes of accidents and risk management.

Connection case – systemThe facts and circumstances that contributed to Tristan van der V.’s being able to obtain and keep a firearms permit have been studied. The Safety Board has based much of its information on interrogations by the Rijksrecherche (Dutch national department of criminal investigation), and has conducted a limited, supplemental investigation on its own. The case specific findings are discussed in chapter 3.

A study was then conducted into which facts and circumstances that turned out to be relevant to the case, also influence the effects of the system in a broader sense. However, an essential one to one relationship does not exist between the findings that resulted from the case and the findings about the effects of the system in general. Some factors that turned out to be relevant to the case, appear not to occur in a broader sense, while there are also facts and circumstances that threaten the effects of the system in a broader sense, but did not play a role of any significance in the case.

Generalising the findingsThe system that manages the risk of abuse for legally owned firearms is characterised by a high degree of decentralisation, which makes it diverse. There are numerous larger and smaller differences in how the police districts issue and withdraw firearms permits; the same applies to how the shooting clubs handle the rules and guidelines imposed by the KNSA.

The Safety Board has attempted to form an accurate picture that represents how the system works. We spoke with many representatives from the different parties to the system, both individually and as a group. The report explicitly mentions any specific practices that cannot be generalised.

Assessment principlesThe Safety Board recognises that there is no such thing as a society without risk. Thus, the Board assumes that things can go wrong in any process, which could lead, directly or indirectly, to being exposed to danger or damage. Such events are seldom the result of malicious intent on the part of the officer involved, who generally acts with the best of intentions. Therefore, the purpose of the Safety Board is not so much to find out which “broken rule” contributed to the event, but which factors led to the way things were handled, despite the good intentions. After all, knowing and taking action on these underlying factors can help to reduce the chance of future accidents.

To prevent dangerous situations from occurring, and to protect property and people against the consequences of dangers that are already present, the parties must manage their processes. The parties not only have an individual responsibility, they also have a collective responsibility for the system as a whole. If a dangerous situation instigated by one party can lead to consequences for another party, or if the other party can contribute towards managing the risk of the danger by the instigating party, then the parties must give one another the ability to manage the risks together.

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The Safety Board bases its assessments of safety management by the parties involved on five assumptions. Similar assumptions form the basis of numerous standards136 that organisations at all levels of society use to give shape to their safety management activities.

1. The safety approach is based on knowledge of all the mechanisms that cause danger. The safety plan has the following basis:a. A methodical assessment of the undesirable events that can occur in the systemb. An assessment with the best possible justification of the chance that these undesirable

events occurc. An assessment with the best possible justification of the nature and scope of the

consequencesBased on the risk assessment, the party determines which risks to manage and up to what level. Where possible, he will draw up measurable safety objectives

2. The safetymanagement is realistic and is explicitly laid out. The party expresses the safety plan he will use to achieve the intended safety objectives. The safety plan meets the following requirements: a. The safetymanagement explains more clearly the relationship between managing risks

and taking preventive and repressive measures to control riskb. The safetymanagement does justice to:

i. valid legislationii. standards, guidelines and best practices from that sectoriii. the organisation’s insights and experiences

c. The safety management contains procedures to announce the safety plan to others who must implement it

d. The safety management contains procedures that serve to monitor and enforce its implementation

e. The safety plan is laid out in writing

3. The safety management is feasible. The implementation of the safety plan meets the following requirements: a. There are sufficient resources and expertise on hand to implement the safety

approach.b. Each part of the safety management is clear and can be implemented by those who

are tasked with working with the plan.

4. The safety plan is a management responsibility. Management: a. shows its involvement in formulating, implementing and monitoring the safety planb. promotes an organisational culture in which internal and external safety is a top

priorityc. encourages the existence of realistic expectations with respect to safety ambitions,

inside and outside the organisationd. makes agreements with other parties about collective risk management, if a safety

risk or the options available for managing those risks extend from one organisation to another

136 Also see NEN-ISO 31000:2009 NL, Risk Management.

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5. The safety management is continuously evaluated and adjusted where necessaryThe safety plan is continuously under consideration. This includes the following situations:a. Intended changes that affect operationsb. periodic inspections, audits, etc. of operationsc. periodic evaluations of the safety pland. investigations into accidents, near accidents and other incidents

Management always provides insight into whether the information that has become available forms a reason to make changes to the safety management, and which changes will or will not be made.

Written sources

LegislationThe WWM – Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act (Wet wapens en munitie), RWM – Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Regulation (Regeling wapens en munitie) and the CWM – Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Circular (Circulaire wapens en munitie 2005) lay out the conditions for and the method how a firearms permit is issued, refused and revoked. Relevant aspects ranging from access to the use of information in judicial records are regulated in the Judicial Records Act (Wet justitiële gegevens), the Judicial Records Directive (Besluit justitiële gegevens), and the Policies Regarding the Certificate of Good Behaviour (Beleidsregels Verklaring Omtrent Gedrag) of 2010. The following are also relevant: the Awb – Dutch General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) and the BIG – Dutch Individual Healthcare Professions Act (Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg).

Association regulationsThe (KNSA – Royal Dutch Shooters Association) regulates the shooting sport and the behaviour of its affiliated clubs. The investigation made use of the statutes and the KNSA’s rules and regulations, the guidelines for KNSA membership, the KNSA rules for competition sport shooting, the guidelines for completing and signing sections of the WM3 forms by boards of the clubs and the documentation associated with the KNSA certification procedure. A number of different templates that the KNSA provides to its members are also included in the investigation. These include the statutes template, the club rules template, the safety rules template, and templates for a number of different registers and forms.

Decentralised regulationsBoth the police districts and the shooting clubs can give further regulations to complement or to specify the centralised regulations. There are differences in how and to what extent the local shooting clubs and police districts have worked out the details of the existing regulations. Furthermore, there are lots of variations in the content of the different sets of rules found. For these reasons, decentralised regulations are not included systematically in the investigation. An exception was made for the decentralised regulations that were used by the Hollands Midden police district to grant the firearms permit to Tristan van der V. These rules were used to assess the actions taken by the parties involved.

The report also contains references to decentralised rules and regulations as clarification.

Consulted literature – Algemene Rekenkamer (Netherlands Court of Audit), IT Police 2010, 2011. – Bruinsma, M.Y. & Moors, H.A., IVA as assigned by WODC, Illegale vuurwapens; Gebruik,

bezit en handel in Nederland 2001-2003, 2005. – Calhoun, F.S. & Weston, S.W. (2003) Contemporary threat management: A practical guide

for identifying, assessing and managing individuals of violent intent, 2003. – FBI Academy, The school shooter: a threat assessment perspective, 2000. – FBI, Campus attacks; Targeted violence affecting institutions of higher education, April

2010.

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– Netherlands public order and safety inspectorate, Kwaliteit in particuliere veiligheid?! Politietoezicht op de particuliere beveiligingsorganisaties en recherchebureaus, 2009. (Quality in private security? Police monitoring of private security organisations and investigation offices, 2009)

– Keeney, B.T & Heide, K.M. Serial murder; a more accurate and inclusive definition in International journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 39(4), 1995, p.299-306.

– KNMG, Artsen en Kindermishandeling. Meldcode en Stappenplan, (Doctors and child abuse, report code and project plan 2008.)

– KNMG, Beroepsgeheim arts jegens politie en justitie (medical secrecy towards police and justice); IX.1 1, 2005.

– KNSA – Royal Dutch Shooters Association), Kaf en Koren; Evaluation Report CWM 2005, 2009.

– Ministry of Security and Justice, Evaluatierapport Circulaire wapens en munitie 2005 (non published draft of Weapons and Ammunition Circular evaluation report), 2010.

– Meloy, J.R., Hempel, A.G., Gray, B.T., Mohandie, K., Shiva, A. & Richards, T.C., A comparative analysis of North American adolescent and adult mass murderers in Behavioural Science and the Law 22, 2004, pp. 291-309.

– Nationale Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding (NCTb – national coordinator in the fight against terrorism), Individuele bedreiger van publieke personen in Nederland; Fenomeenanalyse en een beleidsverkenning (Individual intimidator of public persons in the Netherlands; Phenomenon analysis and an exploration into policy) , June 2010.

– Public Prosecutor’s Office, Samenvatting TGO onderzoek Komeet naar schietpartij Alphen aan den Rijn op 9 april 2011, (Summary of TGO investigation Komeet into shooting incident in Alphen aan den Rijn on 9 April 2011).

– Public Prosecutor’s Office, Samenvatting resultaten Rijksrechercheonderzoek, (Summary of results from investigation by Dutch National Police Internal Investigations Department) 11 July 2011.

– Council for chiefs of police, Korpscheftaken in ontwikkeling; Beleidsdocument korpscheftaken 2010-2015; Bijzondere wetten en BOA-taken opnieuw belicht, (police management duties under development; policy document of police management duties 2010-2015; Special laws and BOA tasks explained again)

– Windesheim Hogeschool as assigned by the Ministry of OCW (ministry of education, culture and science) Handreiking preventie en omgaan met schoolaanslagen, (Aid in preventing and dealing with school attacks) April 2011.

Interviews, conversations and expert meetingsThe investigators from the Dutch Safety Board have conducted a large number of interviews with people who, directly or indirectly, were involved in the event. These include the parents of Tristan van der V., a number of police officers from the Hollands Midden police district, a supervisor at the mental institution where Tristan van der V. was treated137, board members of the shooting club and the firearms retailer.

As a supplement to the written sources and the interviews, the Safety Board also conducted meetings with representatives from all parties that play a role in the system. These meetings focus on the questions: “What obstacles stand in the way of performing your duties in accordance with the system?”, “What obstacles do you see in the system?” and “What are the solutions to the obstacles you observe?”.

137 During the meeting with the GGZ mental institution, the Safety Board presented information that it had collected from other sources. The staff member at GGZ then responded to this information and confirmed the accuracy of the information if applicable.

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PoliceIn order to gain an understanding of the operations performed by the police, the Safety Board spoke with representatives from the police districts of Amsterdam-Amstelland, Zaanstreek-Waterland and Twente. On 8 June 2011, an expert meeting took place with the supervisors of the special laws departments /chiefs of police from ten other police districts138 where opinions were exchanged as a group regarding the fulfilment of the duties related to the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act.

ShootersInterviews were held with the director of the KNSA, as well as with members of the boards of a number of shooting clubs. We also spoke with representatives of the Dutch Association of fire arms trade (NVW) and the Royal Dutch Hunters Association (KNJV). We also spoke with Customs representatives because these officers carry a gun in the line of duty.

National governmentWe spoke with national government officers from the Directorate for Law Enforcement and the Fight Against Crime of the Ministry of Security and Justice, who is responsible for the Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Act.

Interviews were also conducted with representatives from the Justice Service, the implementation body of the ministry that processes the administrative appeals cases.

Medical profession groupExpert meetings took place on 26 and 31 May 2011 with representatives from two medical professions: mental health care professionals (represented by medical directors of mental healthcare institutions) and primary care physicians.

InternationalExploratory interviews were conducted with representatives from the Belgian, German and Finnish governments, in order to map out to what extent these countries’ methods for managing the risk of abuse of legal firearms differ from the laws and methods in the Netherlands. These exploratory interviews were of a global character, and purely served the purpose of determining the direction of the investigation. No exhaustive, methodical comparisons of the different laws took place. As a result of the event that took place in July in Norway, there is a brief description of how the legal possession of firearms is regulated in Norway. There were no further studies into this.

ExpertsThe Safety Board also spoke with people who are connected with the following organisations:

– National Firearms Platform – National Coordinator for the Fight against Terrorism – Police academy – WODC – scientific research and documentation centre

Other investigationsUnder the responsibility of the chief officer of justice, the Public Prosecutor’s Office ordered two investigations:

– An investigation into the shooting incident on 9 April 2011, which was conducted by a Large Scale Investigation Team (TGO)

– An investigation into issuing a firearms permit to Tristan van der V., which was conducted by the National Department of Criminal Investigation.

The Dutch Safety Board did not conduct its own investigation into the events on 9 April 2011 in the Ridderhof. However, the Board did request the Chief Justice Officer to provide access to the documents prepared by the TGO Large Scale Investigation Team that are of importance to this investigation. This request was fulfilled.

138 Drenthe, Gelderland-Midden, Gelderland-Zuid, Utrecht, Kennemerland, Haaglanden, Zuid-Holland-Zuid, Zeeland, Limburg-Zuid, Flevoland.

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The National Police Internal Investigations Department investigated whether the Hollands Midden police granted the firearms permit in accordance with applicable laws and whether the inspections were also performed in accordance with these laws. Upon the request and after the approval by the chief justice officer, the Dutch Safety Board was able to access all relevant sections of the file maintained by the National Police Internal Investigations Department. The Dutch Safety Board used the results from this investigation.

Investigation materials collected by the Large Scale Investigation Team and the National Police Internal Investigations Department were mainly used to describe the actual events in chapter 3 of this report.

Project teamAnneke Bovens – project leaderEllen BerendsDirk IpenburgMaarten KoopmanPaul LipsAnnemiek NelisMaurice Peters Taco van ProoijenHans van RulerNiels SmitJaap van den TopJonneke Zwaan

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APPENDIX 2: COMMENTS TO PRELIMINARY REPORT

A preliminary version of this report has been presented to the parties involved in accordance with the Dutch Safety Board Kingdom Act. These parties have been requested to check the report for any factual inaccuracies. The report or a section of the report has been presented to the following people and organisations: • Ministry of Security and Justice• Hollands Midden police district• KNSA (Royal Dutch Shooters Association)• The parents of Tristan van der V.• Rivierduinen GGZ mental health care institution • Shooting Club Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop

All parties took the opportunity to respond.

Some comments have resulted in amendments to the report, while others have not. The responses that have not resulted in amendments to the report are included in the table below, along with the reasons why the response was not processed.

Editorial comments and detail level comments are not listed separately in this table.

Paragraph Comment + response by Dutch Safety Board

2.2.1 Ministry of Security and JusticeThe fear of abuse goes beyond the fear of abuse of the gun or the ammunition. There is also the fear of abuse of the authorization to have firearms or ammunition on hand. See 7, paragraph 1, section c of the WWM. See also page 22, line 32 of the report: “Practically all appeals cases concern fear of abuse of the gun or the firearms permit” (Vrijwel alle beroepszaken draaien om vrees voor misbruik van het wapen of het wapenverlof).

Safety Board:The extract appears in the introduction of a paragraph. This terminology is handled in more detail later on in the paragraph and the chapter. For the sake of readability, legislation is not cited in full in all sections of the report.

2.2.4 Hollands Midden PoliceAdd: As in Holland Midden in March 2007

Safety Board:This chapter describes the organisation of the system in general. Background checks are performed this way by all police districts, therefore, there is no reason to name Hollands Midden separately.

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2.3 KNSAThis paragraph and further in your report you maintain that a compulsory inspection is prescribed at least once a year for all firearms permit holders. In our opinion, this is incorrect. As cited by you, the Circular determines that “random” inspections of all permit holders are to take place once a year. In this connection, “Random” means that a random selection of all permit holders is to undergo an inspection once a year. Thus, this means that not all permit holders are required to be inspected each year.

Safety Board:The Circular states the requirement: “that all permit holders and hunting permit holders must undergo at random an inspection at least once a year.” According to the Ministry of Security and Justice, the objective of the home inspections is to assess whether all firearms and ammunition are stored correctly. This objective can only be achieved if all permit holders are subjected to an annual home inspection. If only some permit holders (a random sampling) are subjected to inspection, an assessment cannot be made as to whether all permit holders store their firearms and ammunition correctly, only whether some of them do so. Thus, according to the Ministry of Security and Justice the phrase “at random at least once a year” means that an unannounced inspection must take place once a year. The police also interpret the meaning in the CWM this way. The KNSA’s point of view has been included in a footnote in the report.

2.3.2 Ministry of Security and JusticeThe following could be added: “Many Special Laws departments in the police districts have insufficient capacity to inspect all permit holders.” A general reference to the police misses the point that the BPZ basic police service also forms a part of the capacity of the police force in each district.

Safety Board:Obviously the BPZ basic police service is a part of the police district. The point is that the districts named here apparently assign insufficient priority (and thus capacity) to performing special laws duties.

2.4 Ministry of Security and JusticePerhaps add: “Within the context of self-regulation, an important role is set aside for […].

Safety Board:The shooting clubs are not only important within the context of self-regulation, but also because the clubs are the only ones that have certain information about a permit holder in his capacity as a shooter. They are in an excellent position to observe a person’s behaviour on the shooting range and how this person handles a gun(s).

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3 Ministry of Security and JusticePerhaps consider including a paragraph about Van der V.’s first membership of the shooting club. See also page 31, lines 1-2, which includes a sentence about his second membership. Upon implementing this suggestion, it can also be amended on page 27, lines 14-16 and on page 28, figure 3.

Safety Board:The Safety Board has not been able to establish with absolute certainty that Tristan van der V. had already been a member once before. This information was not available at the shooting club concerned. However, it is plausible that he had been a member of the shooting club once before, otherwise the previous permit request would probably not have been accepted for processing. However, this logical reasoning, based on the method for granting permits, cannot be justified by actual evidence in this case. This is mentioned in the first section of paragraph 3.2.

3.3 Hollands Midden PoliceCorrection: Active inspections do not / are not permitted to take place with household members for example. The applicant is the one who is being evaluated for trustworthiness. If the police has obtained information in a different manner, this information could have an effect on the decision.

Safety Board:The firearms laws provide room for investigating the applicant’s household members. However, in practice, the police do not take advantage of the opportunity to do so. According to the Weapons and Ammunition Circular (p. 32), “the permit(…) can also be refused if the fear of abuse is not aimed at the applicant (the holder) of the permit itself, but at an apparently untrustworthy member of the applicant’s household, which does not rule out the possibility that this person could get his hands on the firearm. In such a case, the permit does not always have to be refused; a solution could be to add limitations and rules to the permit. (…). However, the justification issued by the chief of police will have to meet certain requirements, because the fear of abuse is not directed at the applicant (the holder) of the permit, but at a member of his household.”

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3.8 Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop shooting clubThe Dagschuttersvereniging shooting club completed the WM3 form. The application was for the small calibre rifle as referenced in the KNSA Shooting and Competition Rules. This is one of the disciplines that is practised at the Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop shooting club. The firearms that are permitted for the KNSA small calibre rifle discipline are the single shot, repeating shot (“bolt action”) and semi-automatic rifles. Contrary to the preliminary report, the distinguishing criterion is not whether it is single shot or semi-automatic. The firearm meets all the requirements to be used on the present shooting range in the KNSA small calibre rifle discipline, which does not detract from the fact that, strictly speaking, this is referring to a carbine.

In this connection, refer to Section III of the KNSA shooting and competition rules (“Small calibre rifle”). Chapter 17 explains the sub-discipline of the small calibre rifle discipline (KKG), small calibre carbine (KKK) including the (technical) requirements for the guns. The main discipline is indeed KKG (small calibre rifle discipline), but everyone (every sport shooter, police officer) knows, or should know, that all shooting clubs also use the KKG shooting ranges for KKK (small calibre carbine shooting). If the application is for a permit for a carbine and the application contains: “KKG”, the Specials Laws officer, as recently reported by a police officer to the DVN representative upon request, generally corrects this on the application on his own, assuming the officer even notices the mistake in the acronym, which does not have its own meaning,

Safety Board:The Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop shooting club and the Hollands Midden police district state that the semi-automatic Smith & Wesson rifle can be considered a carbine and therefore can be used at the Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop shooting club.

However, when the application is evaluated against the KNSA shooting and competition rules section III – small calibre rifle, this proves not to be the case. The gun does not meet the technical standards that the KNSA shooting competition rules require of a carbine, including the shape of the barrel and the size of the gun sights. The board of the DVN signed a WM3 form for the gun, even though this gun cannot be used for the sport shooting disciplines that can be practised at this club. This goes against the KNSA rules and is not in accordance with the provisions of the Weapons and Ammunition Circular.

The Safety Board points out that the manner in which a shooting club implements the KNSA rules is not monitored by the police or by the KNSA.

The police, who evaluates the application, “can base its assumptions on the statement that has been provided by the board of the shooting club on the application form”, according to the Circular. The Board wonders how the Circular at this point relates to the legal obligation by the police to verify the reasonable interest and the risk of abuse when granting a permit.

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3.9 Ministry of Security and JusticeSuggestion is to add the words “once again”, since Van der V. had already been a member before. “requested to become a member and has been granted membership once again.”

Safety Board:The Safety Board has not been able to determine with all certainty that he had been a member once before. That information was not available at the corresponding shooting club. However, it is plausible that he once was a member of a shooting club, otherwise the previous permit application probably would not have been accepted for processing. Nevertheless, in this case, there is no justifiable evidence to support this logical reasoning, which is based on the procedure for granting permits.

3.9 Hollands Midden PoliceUpon the request of the Hollands Midden police district and the Ministry of Security and Justice, the Safety Board has received a report from the Hollands Midden police district, which has been prepared by the Dutch organisation for police cooperation (voorziening tot samenwerking Politie Nederland – vtsPN). The four conclusions from this report are:

1. The Smith & Wesson rifle IS acceptable for the shooting discipline “small calibre rifle, sub discipline small calibre carbine”, also at the shooting range of the Dagschuttersvereniging Nieuwkoop shooting club.

2. The gun meets all requirements that have been established by the KNSA in the SWR Section III for this type of firearm.

3. A firearms permit (WM2) has NOT been wrongly issued for the addition to the WM4 firearms permit based on the above mentioned reasons, even though one minor, hardly relevant detail had not been completed in full on the application.

4. The WM3 application stated: “Small calibre rifle”. It should have stated: ‘small calibre rifle – sub discipline – small calibre carbine” or abbreviated as: “small calibre carbine” as is customary.

Safety Board:The Safety Board does not share these conclusions and refers to the comments to the response to paragraph 3.8 by DVN.

The DVN shooting club signed a WM3 form for the semi-automatic Smith & Wesson rifle, even though this gun cannot be used for the sport shooting disciplines that can be practised at this club. This goes against the KNSA rules and is not in accordance with the provisions defined in the Weapons and Ammunition Circular.

The Hollands Midden police assumed that the statement made by the board of the shooting club was correct when evaluating the WM3 form and granted a permit to obtain the semi-automatic Smith & Wesson rifle, even though this gun cannot be used for the sport shooting disciplines practised by this club.

The police, who evaluate the application, “can assume that the statement made by the board of the shooting club on the application form is correct” according to the Circular. The Safety Board wonders how the Circular at this point relates to the legal obligation by the police to verify the reasonable interest and the danger of abuse when issuing a firearms permit.

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4.3.1 Ministry of Security and JusticeThe current text gives the impression that the purpose of the KNSA list and the purpose of establishing requirements for firearms for sport shooting are mixed up. Here below is a proposed text, which explains the issue: “The list has been prepared to give as much insight as possible into which firearms are permitted for each discipline and which firearms can be approved on a permit. The list is based on the KNSA shooting and competition rules. These rules counteract competition falsification to ensure fair competitions. Certain requirements must be met by the firearm for this purpose.”

Safety Board:The text proposed by the Ministry has not been accepted because the list this response referes to does not contain all the requirements. The remaining requirements are listed in the KNSA shooting and competition rules, section III.

Furthermore, this paragraph is modified after receiving all the responses to the preliminary report; the purpose and the content of the list have also been clarified.

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APPENDIX 3: FIREARMS AND PERMITS ACCORDING TO THE DUTCH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION ACT

Gun categories

The Dutch weapons and ammunition act divides guns into categories (see table 3). This law specifies which actions are prohibited for each category, and whom and when this applies. It also specifies when an exception can be made.

Firearms have been categorised as follows:

Category I: Undesirable weapons that are not guns, such as switchblades, butterfly knives, knuckle dusters, arrows with sharp edges. Toy guns and air, gas and spring loaded guns that look so much like real guns that they could be used as a threat, are also in this Category.

Category II:

Military weapons, such as fully automatic firearms and hand grenades.Also objects that contain toxic, disarming or tear producing substances such as pepper spray, are in this Category

Category III:

Pistols, revolvers and riflesWarning guns and throwing knives also fall under Category III.

Category IV:

Cold steel weapons (knives), swords, sabres, batons, airguns, harpoons and crossbows. Also objects that are not meant to be weapons, but could be used as such (for example a baseball bat during a demonstration or a kitchen knife during a fight) fall under this Category under certain conditions.

Table 3: Division of weapons into categories

Exceptions, exemptions and permits

The assumption according to law is that all category I through III weapons are prohibited. However, this is not an absolute ban. Firstly, there are exceptions for certain occupational groups, such as the military and the police. Secondly, an exemption may be granted for antique weapons, emergency notification equipment and objects that are used to slaughter cattle for example. An exemption only applies to certain types of weapons and an application is not required.

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Thirdly, the possibility exists to grant a permit for performing specific actions with weapons. There are four types of permits:

Exemption Only granted to those who meet the conditions referenced in the Weapons and Ammunition Circular.

Issued by Minister of Security and Justice

Only category I and II weapons

Permit Permit for a certain action (permit to have on hand, carry, transport and for purchasing weapons and ammunition).

Issued by chief of police Valid for one year maximum - can then be renewed

Acknow ledg ment Permit for using weapons for business purposes (sales, rentals, repairs, etc.).

Issued by chief of police Maximum five years - can be renewed every five years

Consent Permit to import, export or forward.

Issued by central import/export service (Centrale Dienst voor In- en Uitvoer – CDIU) of the Ministry of Finance

Valid for one-time import or export

Table 4: Types of permits

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APPENDIX 4: STATISTICS

inciDents

Number of shooting incidentsThe police districts’ information systems do not have the capability to register the nature and scope of incidents that involved (fire) arms.139 The police do not register shooting incidents separately, they register shooting incidents under different names (such as robbery, domestic violence, etc.) without making it clear whether or not the incident involved a firearm.140 Therefore, it is impossible to obtain complete information about the number of incidents involving firearms from the police register. There is also no division of incidents involving legal or illegal firearms.

The Safety Board received estimates about the number of shooting incidents from the Weapons and Ammunition department of the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI). The NFI has no information about the number of incidents which involved gun threats. There has been a total of 400 to 500 shooting incidents141 per year over the 2009-2011 time period. This number refers to all shooting incidents, thus incidents involving both legal and illegal firearms, and fatal incidents and incidents without any fatalities. The number of suicides that were committed with a gun are generally excluded from these numbers.

Apart from that, the estimated total number of shooting incidents in the Netherlands around the 2002/2003 time frame, when it was at its peak, is approximately 600 to 700 incidents a year. The NFI estimates the percentage of shooting incidents that occurred with legal firearms at less than 5%.

Number of people killed by a gunTable 5 contains a summary of the number of people who have been shot and killed (murder and manslaughter) by a gun and by a legally owned gun respectively. Victims whom were shot during the line of duty (by the police for example) and suicides are not included in the table. A legally owned gun refers to a gun, for which a firearms permit exists. Therefore, it does not necessarily mean that the permit holder was the person who actually fired the gun during the incident.

199

9

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

201

0

201

1

Number of people shot and killed by a legally owned firearm142

1 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 2 1 1 1 6

Total number of people shot and killed by a firearm143 75 66 69 63 56 53 54 31 40 37 41 - -

Table 5: Summary of number of people who have been shot and killed by firearms

The information concerning the number of people who have been shot and killed by a legally owned firearm, as listed in the table, has been obtained from the media. Therefore, there are some doubts about the reliability and completeness of these statistics. From all the people who have been shot and killed by a gun, only a small number of them have been killed by a legally owned gun (3% during the 1999-2009 time period). Just like the statistics for the total number of shooting incidents,

139 National Platform for Firearms, newsletter, January 2010140 Source: National Platform for Firearms.141 The NFI bases its estimates on the information that it has obtained through its contacts with the Forensic

Investigation of the police (in particular with Integrated Ballistics Identification System stations) and the media, which provided some coverage of most shooting incidents.

142 Source: the Safety Board’s own investigation into media information.143 Source: Central Statistics Office. The statistics for 2010 and 2011 were not yet available at the time of

this publication.

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a legally owned gun was only used in a small part (a few percent) of the total number of fatal shooting incidents.

Summary of fatal shooting incidents with legally owned guns144

As far as the Board knows, there were nine shooting incidents with legally owned guns that took place during the 1999-2011 time period. Perhaps the summary in table 6 is not complete because this information is based on information obtained from the media. A total of 21 people were killed during these nine incidents. In four cases, the shooter committed suicide afterwards. The incident in Alphen aan den Rijn is the only incident whereby the shooter did not know the victims.

Year Location Incident Shooter

1999 Kerkrade A woman is shot and killed A member of a shooting club in Kerkrade

2003 Kerkrade Three people were killed in their home and a fourth person was shot at a sports school

An ex-marine, member of a shooting club.

2004 Tiel Two women and a man are killed at a shopping centre. The shooter then kills himself.

A member of a shooting club

2004 Landgraaf A man and a woman are shot and killed. The shooter then killed himself.


2007 Monster A married couple are killed in their home

A member of a shooting club who had signs of depression

2008 Almere A man is shot on the street and dies later on

A police office who uses her work gun after her shift

2009 Tilburg A woman is shot dead in a hotel A man who had stolen a gun from a friend, who was a member of a shooting club.

2010 Groot-Ammers A father shoots and kills his son in the bedroom and then kills himself


2011 Alphen aan den Rijn

Six people are shot and killed at a shopping centre, after which the shooter shot himself dead.

A member of a shooting club with a history of mental problems

Table 6: Summary of fatal shooting incidents with legally owned firearms145

number of illegal firearms

The number of illegal firearms can only be estimated. This is a laborious exercise. In the past, these estimates came from the Dutch Scientific Research and Documentation Centre (Weten-schappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum)146 based on information about legally owned firearms, confiscated firearms, and shooting and near shooting incidents collected from different police databases and systems.

144 Source: the Board’s own investigation into news published by the media, including InfoNu.nl » People and Society » Miscellaneous: “Firearms, shooting clubs and fatal shooting incidents for fatal shooting incidents with legally owned firearms”, the Haagsche Courant, AD (named sources all in Dutch). Since the sources for this investigation are reports published by the media instead of via methodical registration of events, some incidents may be missing.

145 This is a list of incidents in which a legally owned firearm was used with the intentional purpose to kill someone. Incidents with illegal firearms or with a legally owned firearm that unintentionally led to a person’s death are not included here.

146 The WODC is a section of the Ministry of Security and Justice.

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During the 2001-2003 time period, approximately 40,500 people had illegal firearms.147 This number is similar to the number of people who are registered permit holders. In 2007 there were 64,268 people with a hunting licence or a firearms permit (WM4); see the following paragraph concerning legal firearms for more information. In 2011 there were actually less people with hunting licences and less permit holders, only 59,200. See also table 8.

More recent statistics about the possession of illegal firearms are not available.

permit HolDers anD legal firearms

When the Safety Board asked for specific numbers about the legal possession of firearms, the Dutch Organisation for Police Cooperation148 created a number of summaries. These summaries are presented in this paragraph. The numbers are based on Verona. Verona is the name of the Police Suite Permit Enforcement Module (PSHVM). All actions and activities conducted by the police that are associated with chief of police duties are registered in Verona. Verona has not been set up to create information summaries. There are statistics available starting in 2007, because Verona became operational in 2006.

Legal firearmsTable 7 shows the development of the number of legal firearms over the past five years. The table has been split by permit holders (the subject of this investigation) and hunting licence holders on one side and all other permit types on the other side.

Year Firearms for hunting licence holders and permit holders (FFW149 and WM4150)

Firearms for holder of WM6B151, WM6152, WM8153, WM16154

Total number of firearms

2007 171,091 39,896 210,987

2008 169,963 43,455 213,418

2009 170,602 46,728 217,330

2010 172,314 49,974 222,288

2011 167,821 45,305 213,126

Table 7: Number of legal firearms

The number of legally owned firearms in the Netherlands has remained constant over the past five years. The same also applies to the number of firearms owned by hunting licence owners and permit owners. A small percentage of the firearms that are in the legal possession of hunting licence owners and permit holders fall under category II (approximately 400). These are automatic firearms owned by collectors. The remaining firearms fall under category III.

147 Bruinsma, M.Y. & Moors, H.A., IVA as assigned by WODC, Illegale vuurwapens; Gebruik, bezit en handel in Nederland (Illegal firearms, Use, possession and trade in the Netherlands) 2001-2003, 2005.

148 The service for collaboration by the Netherlands Police offers IT service and information management to the police.

149 Hunting licence (FFW).150 Permit to own firearms (WM4).151 Permit to have firearms for the use in the line of duty (WM6B), reasons for application: theatre company,

emergency alert method for the shipping industry, training (police) dogs, a stun gun for tranquilising animals, starting shots at sports events, exemption, killing farm or wild animals that have broken loose, animal control and damage prevention.

152 Permit for owning club firearms (WM6), reasons for application: shooting sport, re-enactment.153 Permit for owning firearms for the purpose of collecting them (WM8), reason for application: agency, private154 Proof of recognition (WM16), reasons for application: small, big.

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Permit holders and hunting licence holders

There are 59,299 people who have a firearms permit (WM4) or a hunting licence (FFW) in 2011. The group of permit holders and hunting licence holders are mainly men. Only 4% of this group are women.

Year Permit holders and hunting licence holders

Average number of firearms per person

2007 64,268 2.66

2008 62,194 2.73

2009 61,663 2.77

2010 61,299 2.81

2011 59,299 2.83

Table 8: Number of people with a permit or a hunting licence, as well as the average number of firearms per person have

The number of people with permits and hunting licences has decreased by 8% over the past five years. See table 8. The total number of firearms that are in the legal possession of these permit holders has not decreased, because the number of firearms owned per person has increased. It appears that the number of permit holders with one or two guns has decreased while the number of permit holders with four or five guns has increased. See table 9. Hunting licence holders are permitted to have maximum six guns, while permit holders can own a maximum of five guns. The number of guns listed in table 9 that exceeds the maximum is permitted because this information also includes collectors or promising competition shooters, who have been granted permission by the KNSA to own more guns than the standard maximum. There are a number of licenced gun owners with excess quantities (80 hunting licences and 283 permits) whereby it is unclear why they are permitted to own more than the maximum number of guns.

Aantal wapens op één vergunning

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

1 20,578 18,525 17,953 17,347 16,452

2 13,713 13,264 12,980 12,706 12,452

3 10,719 10,672 10,673 10,662 10,779

4 8,353 8,447 8,676 8,841 8,786

5 6,474 6,770 7,053 7,267 7,332

6 3,672 3,732 3,761 3,996 3,500

> 7 1,601 1,386 1,253 1,264 586

Table 9: The number of firearms spread over the number of firearms permit holders and hunting licence holders

A hunting licence (FFW) can be obtained for hunting, but a firearms permit (WM4) can be obtained for different reasons, see table 10. Sport shooting is the main reason (80% of the WM4).

Type of permit Reason for application Number in 2011

FFW Standard hunting licence 27,931

WM4 Sport shooting 27,461

WM4 Emergency alert method for the shipping industry 2,257

WM4 Warning pistol to disturb / repel animals 1,459

WM4 Training (police) dogs 1,037

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Type of permit Reason for application Number in 2011

WM4 Starting shots for sports events 463

WM4 Re-enactment 335

WM4 Killing farm or wild animals that have broken loose 310

WM4 Stun gun to stun animals 165

WM4 Damage control 146

WM4 Killing bred or wild animals 93

WM4 Exemption 86

WM4 Historic rolling stock 71

WM4 Pirating 32

WM4 Self defense 29

WM4 Keepsake from the resistance 21

WM4 Hunting in other countries 21

WM4 Firearms / ammunition collection 2

Table 10: Reasons for applying for a permit by permit holders and hunting licence holders

Table 11 shows the age groups of the permit holders and hunting licence holders. The average age of people with a permit or hunting licence is 54 years. Most people with a permit or hunting licence are between 40 and 69 years of age (71%). The number of permit holders and hunting licence holders is decreasing for all age groups, except for the 70-79 age group and the group over the age of 80. The number of young people under the age of 20 and those aged 20-29 with a permit or hunting licence is relatively small and is decreasing. Shooting clubs state that the reason for this decline are the costs associated with gun ownership (purchasing guns and ammunition).

Age category Number in 2011

<20 70

20-29 2,702

30-39 6,474

40-49 13,591

50-59 14,730

60-69 13,748

70-79 6,388

80+ 1,595

totaal 59,298

Table 11: Number of permit holders and hunting licence holder per age group

The number of permits per police district differs, see table 12. This is attributed in part to the number of residents; however, there are differences. When looking at the number of permits per 100,000 residents, the percentage of residents in Zeeland is at the high end of the spectrum where a firearms permit is four times higher than the percentage of residents in Amsterdam-Amstelland, which is at the low end of the spectrum.

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District Number of permit holders and hunting licence holders

Number of permits per 100,000 residents

Zeeland 2,549 687

Limburg-Noord 2,726 545

Gelderland-Noord-Oost 4,233 538

Twente 3,252 535

Drenthe 2,217 470

Brabant-Noord 2,772 449

Gelderland-Zuid 2,250 433

Friesland 2,700 432

Brabant-Midden- en West Brabant 4,285 411

Groningen 2,290 406

Gooi- en Vechtstreek 914 399

IJsselland 1,859 374

Zuid-Holland-Zuid 1,681 361

Brabant-Zuid-Oost 2,510 354

Gelderland-Midden 2,237 350

Noord-Holland-Noord 2,154 348

Haaglanden 3,258 343

Utrecht 3,623 305

Limburg-Zuid 1,801 303

Flevoland 1,106 300

Hollands Midden 2,205 299

Zaanstreek-Waterland 903 295

Kennemerland 1,458 293

Rotterdam-Rijnmond 2,690 222

Amsterdam-Amstelland 1,638 182

The Netherlands 59,311 370

Table 12: Number of permit holders and hunting licence holders per district

Refused permits / revoked permitsA total of 0.4% of new applications and renewals for firearms permits (WM4) that are submitted for the purpose of practising sport shooting are rejected or revoked. The percentage of rejection or revocation for all other firearms permits (WM4, see table 10 for an overview) is 0.2% for firearms permits and 0.3% for hunting licences (FFW).

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The percentage of rejected and revoked licences compared to the number of new applications and the renewal applications differ a lot per district, see table 13.

District Percentage

Brabant Zuid Oostpolice 0.69%

Kennemerland police 0.67%

Rotterdam-Rijnmond police 0.59%

Gooi & Vechtstreek police 0.56%

Friesland police 0.56%

Utrecht police 0.39%

Brabant Noord police 0.38%

Amsterdam-Amstelland police 0.34%

Midden en west -Brabant police 0.34%

Gelderland-Midden police 0.34%

Zeeland police 0.32%

Limburg Zuid police 0.31%

Twente police 0.30%

Groningen police 0.30%

Haaglanden police 0.26%

Hollands Midden police 0.24%

Noord Holland Noord police 0.24%

Zaanstreek-Waterland police 0.22%

Noord- en Oost Gelderland police 0.22%

Gelderland Zuid police 0.21%

Drenthe police 0.20%

Limburg Noord police 0.18%

Zuid Holland Zuid police 0.13%

Flevoland police 0.11%

IJsselland police 0.07%

The Netherlands 0.31%

Table 13: Percentage of rejected and revoked hunting licences and firearms permits for sport shooting purposes per district

Reasons for rejecting/revoking firearms permits per year.The Verona permit registration system registers the rejection or revocation of a permit. This permit is assigned the status of “rejected” or “revoked’ upon completion of the negative decision. However, this permit status makes no mention of the specific reasons for the decision. This type of information is only available in the special files that are stored with the police district in question.

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Home inspections

The annual home inspections for firearms, permit conditions and safes are not being conducted as often as they are prescribed.155 Many police districts do not achieve the one hundred percent requirement. The Dutch Safety Board has obtained statistics through interviews with the staff from special laws departments from Zaanstreek Waterland, Twente, Amsterdam-Amstelland and Hollands Midden regarding the number of permit holders and hunting licence holders who have had a home inspection in 2010. The media have requested the statistics for many districts.156 A summary is provided in table 14. There are huge differences among the districts.

District Percentage

Flevoland police 100%

Zaanstreek-Waterland police 98%

Groningen police* 93%

Limburg-Noord police* 60%

Amsterdam-Amstelland police 30%

Rotterdam-Rijnmond police* 30%

Gelderland-Midden police* 27%

Midden- en West-Brabant police* 25%

Hollands Midden police 21%

Brabant-Noord police* 19%

Drenthe police* 10%

Utrecht police* 10%

Limburg-Zuid police* 9%

Twente police 3%

Table 14: Percentage of the annual compulsory home inspections that have been conducted, 2010 (a * indicates that the statistic has been obtained from the media)

sHooting clubs anD sport sHooters157

Members (shooters)The members of the KNSA are not the individual sport shooters, but the clubs. Clubs must register all their members (shooters) with the KNSA, which provides the KNSA with the shooter’s status. The development of the numbers of clubs and shooters is shown in table 15.

Year158 Number of clubs Number of shooters

1991 666 28,793

1992 685 31,075

1993 700 33,003

1994 719 34,486

1995 735 35,097

1996 735 35,089

155 Source: Council of chiefs of police, Korpscheftaken in ontwikkeling; Beleidsdocument korpscheftaken 2010-2015; Special laws and BOA tasks explained again, 2010.

156 Sources: RTL News, Parool, RTV Drenthe, De Gelderlander, Brabants Dagblad.157 Source: KNSA.158 Reference date: 31 December of the corresponding year.

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Year158 Number of clubs Number of shooters

1997 740 34,636

1998 752 34,882

1999 720 35,043

2000 696 34,565

2001 682 35,168

2002 678 35,305

2003 671 34,764

2004 674 34,498

2005 669 34,825

2006 772 38,454

2007 790 40,633

2008 801 41,882

2009 792 42,103

2010 781 42,290

Table 15: Number of shootings clubs affiliated with the KNSA and the number of members belonging to these shooting clubs. A shooter who is a member of more than one club is counted as one member in this table.

Not all members of a shooting club have a firearms permit. Aspirant members and youth members cannot obtain a firearms permit. Some shooters use airguns (no firearms) or they use guns owned by the club. The KNSA does not register which shooters have a firearms permit and which ones do not.

Table 16 shows how the members are spread over the shooting clubs (only contributing shooters). Sport shooters may be members of more than one KNSA club. In that case, only one of the clubs has to pay dues to the KNSA for this shooter. The club that pays the dues is the club where the shooter is a contributing member.Therefore it is possible that a shooting club does not have any members. Almost 70% of the shooting clubs is small (50 members or less), but only one quarter of the shooters are members of a small club. Only 4% of the shooting clubs is large (201 members or more) and also a quarter of the shooters is a member of a medium-sized club (51-200 members).

Number of members

Frequency (number of clubs)

Portion of members

0 12 0%

1-10 139 2%

11-25 222 9%

26-50 166 14%

51-100 120 21%

101-200 84 27%

201-500 32 22%

501 or more 2 5%

Table 16: Distribution of shooters over the shooting clubs

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Table 17 shows the number of clubs that have applied for membership since 1 August 2005 up until today (9 June 2011):

1 aug 2005through

1 may 2007

1 may 2007through

9 june 2011

1 aug 2005through

9 june 2011Number of clubs that have applied for membership 190 47 237

Number of clubs that have become KNSA members 145 49 194

Number of clubs that did not become a member 45 - 43

Table 17: Number of shooting clubs that applied for KNSA membership

DisciplinesThere are 229 KNSA disciplines (12 April 2011). These disciplines can be divided into the following groups: airguns, small calibre rifles, large calibre rifles, pistols, clay pigeon and historic guns. A KNSA discipline refers to a discipline that is regulated by the KNSA and which the KNSA arranges competitions and championship matches for. A summary of the KNSA disciplines is available.159 This summary also names the sports technical and firearm technical characteristics for the corresponding discipline.

Besides the KNSA regulated disciplines, there are also disciplines that are recognised by the KNSA. A discipline recognised by the KNSA is not regulated by the KNSA, but by a different governing body that is affiliated with the KNSA. Disciplines are recognised upon the request of the governing body, if there are enough people who wish to practise the discipline and if the safety regulations are in order. Competitions and championship matches for these disciplines recognised by the KNSA are not organised by the KNSA but by the corresponding governing bodies.

The disciplines of the organisations that are recognised as of today are listed in table 18.

Disciplines recognised by the KNSA Governing body that regulates this discipline

Practical shootingWith pistol, revolver and rifle

NPSA Dutch Practical Shooters Association(Nederlands Parcours Schutters Associatie)

Silhouette shooting with pistol and revolver NSSA – Dutch Silhouette Shooters Association(Nederlandse Silhouet Schutters Associatie)

Shooting with carbines .30M1 at 25-, 50- and 100-meters

Shooting Club .30M1 Netherlands

Shooting with ‘dynamic service rife’ (DSR) Association for Practical Shooting (APS)

Traditional shooting in connection with rifle clubs and rifle shooting clubs

– Federation of Gelders rifle shooting associations and rifle clubs St. Hubertus

– the North Brabant Federation of shooting associations

– the Oud-Limburgse Rifle Shooters Federation

Field Target disciplines Dutch Field Target Association (DFTA)

Table 18: Disciplines recognised by the KNSA

159 KNSA, Total Summary of KNSA regulated disciplines (Totaaloverzicht KNSA gereglementeerde disciplines). http://www.knsa.nl/pdfs/Totaaloverzicht KNSA gereglementeerde disciplines 3.1.pdf

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ExpulsionsDuring the period from 1 August 2005 through 9 June 2011, the KNSA has expelled 47 clubs.

The number of shooters that have been expelled by their club after receiving a report from the police, is about 100 members a year (approximately 0.3% of the total number of shooters). See table 19. The number of protests is approximately 30 a year; they lodge an appeal with the KNSA. The appeal is honoured for about 20 shooters (thus, two thirds of the appeals cases).

1 aug 2005 until

9 june 2011Average number of expelled members over the year after police reports (total) 101

Average number of protests against the decision of expulsion over the year. 29

Average number of honoured protests over the year. 18

Average number of expelled shooters over the year . 83

Table 19: The number of disbarred members from shooting clubs and the number of corresponding protests

Hunters160

Not all hunters are members of the KNJV. There are more hunting licence owners than there are KNJV members. See table 20. The number of hunting licence owners is decreasing, but the number of KNJV members is not (no longer) decreasing. In 2011, three quarters of the hunting licence owners were members of the KNJV.

Year Hunting licence holders

KNJV members

1990 33,400 21,800

1995 32,300 23,000

2000 30,100 22,900

2005 unknown 20,200

2006 26,545 19,857

2007 28,450 19,772

2008 28,481 20,309

2009 28,170 20,694

2010 27,450 20,749

Table 20: The number of hunting licence holders and members of the KNJV.

One member has been expelled from the KNJV since 1 August 2005.

ammunition

The amount of ammunition a sport shooter or a hunter purchases is not registered in a central database. Shooting clubs keep a record of how much ammunition a member purchases from the club (ammunition record). This information is maintained for three years and is then destroyed. The police can request this information if there is a reason to do so.

160 Source: KNJV. The KNJV obtained the information about the hunting licence holders via the Dutch Hunting Fund until 2002, which was disbanded once the Dutch Flora and Fauna Act went into effect. Starting in 2006, this information has been obtained from the police.

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Besides the sport shooter himself, no one else knows how much ammunition a shooter generally has at home. The ammunition records at the shooting clubs do not provide a reliable picture. After all, this is the ammunition that sport shooters purchase from the clubs, which does not include any ammunition that sport shooters obtain elsewhere. The maximum number of cartridges that sport shooters are permitted to keep at home is 10,000 cartridges, as a result of environmental legislation.

appeals cases161

Whenever a firearms permit or a hunting licence is refused or revoked, the (aspirant) permit holder has the option to lodge an administrative appeal. Approximately two thirds of the (aspirant) permit holders take advantage of this option (418 of the 636), see table 21. Ultimately, in 122 cases, the appeal was declared legitimate. That is a fifth of the total number of revoked and refused permits. A (formal) legitimate ruling can still lead to a new decision to refuse a permit.

There are approximately as many hunting licence holders as there are permit holders. The permit is refused or revoked for both groups fairly evenly. Permit holders and hunting licence holders also lodge a similar number of appeals.

Total Legitimate Percentage og legitimate

Refused/ revoked by the police 636

Total for Administrative Appeals 418162 113 27%

Appeal with the court 70 8 11%

Appeal with the Council of State 6 1 17%

Table 21: Number of appeals during the 2008-2010 time period as a result of revoking a firearms permit or hunting licence by the police.

The percentage of the total number of revoked and refused permits, whereby an administrative appeal has been declared granted, differs widely per district. See table 22.

Refused/ revoked by the police

Administrative appeals

Granted

Groningen Police 20 16 3

Friesland Police 50 16 1

Drenthe Police 13 2 1

IJsselland Police 4 1 0

Twente Police 32 9 2

Noord- en Oost Gelderland Police 28 18 6

Gelderland-Midden Police 23 12 4

Gelderland-Zuid Police 18 15 1

Utrecht Police 48 32 8

Noord-Holland-Noord Police 16 10 2

Zaanstreek-Waterland Police 6 2 0

Kennemerland Police 29 16 9

Amsterdam-Amstelland Police 17 26 10

161 Source: Dienst Justis.162 Of all these 418 cases, 416 of them resulted from a decision by the police and 2 from a decision by customs.

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Refused/ revoked by the police

Administrative appeals

Granted

Gooi & Vechtstreek Police 15 9 4

Haaglanden Police 29 25 4

Hollands Midden Police 19 14 5

Rotterdam-Rijnmond Police 47 23 5

Zuid-Holland-Zuid Police 7 6 0

Zeeland Police 31 13 6

Midden- en West-Brabant Police 51 23 6

Brabant-Noord Police 34 22 1

Brabant-Zuid-Oost Police 57 40 8

Limburg-Noord Police 17 28 10

Limburg-Zuid Police 21 35 16

Flevoland Police 4 3 1

636 416 113

Table 22: Number of administrative appeals per district during the 2008-2010 time period as a result of a firearms permit or hunting licence being revoked by the police163

163 The information regarding the number of revoked/ refused permits and the number of legitimate declarations come from different sources. It is also possible that an appeal is lodged during the year after the permit has been revoked (for example: permit was revoked in December, the appeal is lodged in January). Therefore, the numbers do not match up perfectly.

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APPENDIX 5: MANAGING THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES

The Dutch Safety Board has studied how the legal possession of firearms is organised in three European countries: Belgium, Germany and Finland. These countries have had shooting incidents in the past, after which the laws were changed. This appendix gives a brief summary of how the possession of firearms is organised in each of the three countries and it contains an illustration, which compares the three countries in a number of areas.

As a result of the shooting incident in Utøya (Norway), which took place during the Dutch Safety Board’s investigation, there is also a brief summary of how the legal possession of firearms is regulated in Norway. This study was less in-depth than the study of the other three countries listed.

belgium

In Belgium, an 18 year old man shot and killed two people on the streets of Antwerp on 11 May 2006. One person was seriously injured. The shooter had racist motives and had purchased a gun from a firearms retailer right before the incident. As a result of the incident, the firearms laws became stricter in Belgium. Not only has it become impossible to freely purchase guns; anyone who applies for a permit must also submit a medical statement from his own general practitioner.

Laws

GeneralThe Belgian government implemented a new law concerning firearms after a serious shooting incident in Antwerp in 2006. The purpose of the new law was to prevent people from purchasing firearms on impulse. The law went into effect on 8 June 2006. No executory decision was involved in this legislation, which resulted in a lack of clarity upon enforcing the law. That changed in November 2010, once the circular regarding the firearms law had been published.

The Federal Firearms Service (Federale Wapendienst - FWD) was established at the same time that the law went into effect. It forms a part of the Justice federal government service. The FWD is responsible for the standard enforcement of the law and it fulfils this duty by meeting bimonthly with representatives from the ten provincial firearms services.

Central weapons registerThe firearms law dictates that all weapons that have been produced or imported into Belgium must be registered in a central weapons register (CWR).164

The CWR is a database that was established in 1989, and it houses the information regarding the possession of firearms. It is managed by a police operations information service of the general management of the operations support provided by the federal police. The CWR is used by a variety of government services and is not accessible to the public. It is a database that contains administrative information about the applications and permits for firearms, and the people who have firearms.

For each type of firearm, the type, brand, model, calibre and serial number are registered and maintained, along with the names and addresses of the supplier and the person who has purchased or otherwise obtained the firearm, unless the gun is located at a recognised firearms retailer, who

164 Article 28 of the Royal Decision to Implement the Firearms Law 1991 (Koninklijk besluit tot uitvoering van de Wapenwet 1991).

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has included this information in his own register. The registered information is saved for at least twenty years.

The European guideline 91/477/EEG states in article 4, paragraph 2: “All member states must establish and maintain either a centralised or decentralised, automated database that contains information about each firearm that is subject to this provision; and they must ensure that this database is accessible to the authorised agencies and institutions by 31 December 2014 at the latest.”

Personal requirements• Legal adult: 18 years of age• No criminal offenses• Never admitted to a psychiatric hospital• No prior refused or revoked firearms permit• Medically able (certificate)• Theoretical knowledge and practical skills

PermitThe process of issuing a permit begins by submitting an application to the provincial firearms service. The following information must be submitted along with the application:• A medical certificate, which states that the applicant is able to handle a gun without endangering

himself or others. This is a certificate of a person’s physical and mental state, which a physician cannot issue to a person who has a known alcohol, depression or anger management problem. This certificate can be issued by the applicant’s attending physician (for example his general practitioner) and is analogous to the requirements for insurance that are often established for practising any sport.Only a recent medical certificate provides insight into the applicant’s current state of health. Therefore, the certificate must not be more than three months old. An official meeting took place with the Belgian Order of Physicians and they were instructed to only issue a certificate that a person was capable of handling a firearm if the physician truly believed this to be the case. If this person causes problems and it turns out that the physician was aware of the reason for these problems, the physician will have some explaining to do.

• When applying for a permit for the first time: certificate of knowledge regarding laws that govern the use of firearms as well as the proper use of a firearm. If this is not the first time a permit has been granted to this person, this type of proof may no longer be required under certain conditions

• The applicant provides a legal reason: – Hunting and fauna control activities (valid licence) – Sport shooting (valid licence) and recreational shooting (proof of regularly scheduled

shooting activity is required in advance and also applies after the fact as a resolutive condition of the permit)

– Job with special risks (veterinarian, private surveillance or bodyguard, etc.) – Personal protection (proving that having a firearm generally meets this protection

requirement – Beginning gun collector – Participation in historic and folklore activities

• Approval by adult members of the household. They provide their written consent upon submission of the application. The local police verify whether consent has actually been given.

Once all required documents have been submitted, the local police will conduct their investigation into the applicant’s trustworthiness. They will check to see if the applicant has a record and if there are any special annotations concerning the applicant’s relationships with others, such as with family members and neighbours. If there are no anomalies, the applicant will receive a permit, which consists of a part A and a part B. The new permit holder will then have three months to purchase a firearm. The firearms retailer returns part B of the permit to the Provincial Firearms Service (PWD) as proof of purchase. The purchasing process is only complete once the applicant has visited the police station within eight days, where the police will inspect and verify the gun. The applicant will then pay a levy for the permit.

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A permit is valid for an indefinite period of time. Upon the initiative of the provincial firearms service, an inspection takes place every five years, or earlier if warranted (appropriateness/disturbance/ danger to the public order). The inspection consists of a morality examination and a voluntary home visit to inspect safety measures, including the correct storage of the firearms. If any discrepancies are found during the inspection, the permit will be revoked.

Since 2007, sport shooters have been able to own firearms165 based on a valid shooting sport licence. The same requirements apply to a licence as to a permit, except for the age requirement of 18 years. Shooting clubs permit 16 years olds and above to use a firearm under supervision.

The applicant supplies all necessary documents to the shooting sport federation, including a Certificate of Good Behaviour (VOG). The federation then issues the licence that is registered by the PWD, in the same manner that a permit is registered in the CWR. The sport shooter must also undergo inspection every five years. The federation also requires that the sport shooter has the licence validated each year with a vignette. This vignette is issued once the shooter proves that he is an active member (one of the requirements is 12 valid shooting rounds) and once he presents a non-incriminating certificate of good behaviour (VOG).

Belgium does not limit the number of firearms a person may own. Nevertheless, the PWD does review whether the number of guns owned matches the legal purpose of the application.

RegistrationThe file compliance system registers the entire process of granting, refusing, revoking and inspecting a permit. The system is linked to the CWR. In the future, these systems will be connected to a national government system.

Monitoring and enforcementThe FWD, the PWD and the local police are responsible for monitoring the enforcement of the firearms act according to a standard procedure.

A firearms permit is valid for an indefinite period of time. During each five year inspection, the firearms holder is subjected to a background check, a home inspection to verify compliance with safety measures (such as an alarm system, proper locks, etc.). The permit holder is not obliged to agree to a home visit.

If the police pick up any causes for alarm from the people who know the firearms permit holder, they will investigate the issue.

If there is any danger to the public order, this can result in constraints being placed on the permit. For example, the permit holder may be permitted to own a gun but without ammunition, or a limit may be set on the validity of the permit.

The breach of any provisions of the firearms laws can result in permit revocation, fines or imprisonment.

StatisticsThe FWD does not have any recent statistics. The CWR is not yet working at full capacity and has not fully caught up. Statistics that are available include the fact that in 2006, a total of 800,000 firearms were registered to 500,000 people, of which 600,000 firearms were subject to a permit obligation. It is estimated that the total number of registered firearms will increase up to 1.2 million. 130,000 firearms will be deducted from this number that have been surrendered during a large scale weapons amnesty campaign during the transition to the new law, as well as a large number that will be refused at the moment an application is submitted to renew an existing firearms permit. Ultimately, the expectation is to have approximately 800,000 registered, legally owned firearms. A smaller number probably points to a shift in the number of firearms to the illegal sector.

165 The licence only applies to owning firearms that appear on the list prepared by the Minister of Justice. All other firearms follow the standard application procedure.

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germany

On 26 April 2002, a 19 year old man shot and killed sixteen people at the Gutenberg gymnasium in Erfurt, Germany, after which the shooter shot himself. Seven people were injured. On 11 March 2009, a fatal shooting incident occurred at the Albertville-Realschule in Winnenden. This incident left sixteen people dead, including the shooter, a 17 year old boy. There were also some injuries. Another shooting incident with four victims took place in Eislingen on 10 April 2010.

As a result of the incident in 2002, the law concerning firearms became more strict. The minimum age for applying for a permit (for a gun with a calibre of 5.6 mm or higher) was raised from 18 to 21 years of age. Applicants up to the age of 25 must submit a statement that proves they are mentally capable.

Rules and regulationsIn Germany, firearms possession is laid down in the firearms law (Waffengesetz) and the general firearms directive (Allgemeine Waffengesetz-Verordnung). The possession of firearms in Germany is prohibited, unless certain conditions are met. The firearms law was revised after the shooting incident in April 2002 and was enacted quickly and then revised again in 2003 and 2009.

Firearms (unlimited) and ammunition (maximum 10,000 pieces) may be kept at home. In principle, firearms and ammunition must be stored separately, unless the safe meets certain standards. Safes that do not meet the minimum standard established in 1997, may not contain more than ten guns.

The law establishes that a national firearms register must be established with historical information (buyers and owners) of certain firearms with a permit obligation by 31 December 2012 (EU provision: in 2014) at the latest. The register must contain an electronic search and analysis function.

There is currently a debate as to whether a rule should be implemented that states that a firearm is to be evaluated every three years to verify whether it is still in use. If this is not the case, the gun should be surrendered. This matter is the subject of debate.

PermitThe process of applying for a permit up to and including the task of granting a firearms permit does not differ much from the process used in the Netherlands. The process assesses an applicant’s level of trustworthiness, personal ability, knowledge and necessity. Besides the government, sport shooting and hunting clubs also play a decisive role in the permit process.

General requirements to obtain a permit for firearms and ammunition:• At least 18 years of age• Possess necessary level of trustworthiness and personal abilities• Can prove necessary specialised knowledge• Can prove necessity• Can prove liability insurance that covers € 1 million for personal harm and damages to property

(whenever applying for a firearms or shooting licence).

The applicant is responsible for providing the following required documents when applying for a firearms permit: • Registration form (where the applicant must indicate any history of medical or psychological

problems)• Shooting booklet that shows that the applicant has practised shooting at least once a month or

18 times a year• A statement that proves that the applicant has been a member of a recognised shooting club

for one year• Approval by the shooting club• A medical / psychological certificate if justified or for applicants younger than 25 years of age

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• Persons younger than 25 years of age must submit a statement along with their first application that states they are mentally capable. This applies to permits for purchasing and owning firearms with a calibre of more than 5.6 mm (5.6 mm permitted for those ages 21 and over).

If an applicant has not lived in the area where the law applies for at least the past 5 years, a licence for a firearm can be refused.

The authorities will verify the level of trustworthiness and personal character of licence holders and, if a person applies for a firearms permit or shooting licence, the authorities will require proof of liability insurance at regular intervals of no more than three years.

The necessity must be verified, three years after the first licence has been granted.

If there are any doubts as to the personal character of the applicant or the documentation provided, the authorities will request the applicant to submit a statement regarding their psychological or mental state (from a health service officer, a specialist or a psychologist).

A licence for purchasing a firearm is valid for one year; a licence to possess firearms is issued without an expiration date.

Any changes in the firearm holder’s city of residence is registered.

Contrary to legislation (that states that only those who are 18 years of age or older are permitted to handle firearms or ammunition), young people may handle guns or ammunition during training or at work under the supervision of a person who is authorised to handle guns and to provide instruction. The authorities may grant general or individual exeptions in terms of age requirements for children and young people for special reasons, if they do not conflict with social interests.

Medical informationGermany handles medical information the same way as the Netherlands. The duty of professional confidentiality is maintained. Exceptions to the protection of personal information is to be evaluated by the person who has the information.

Furthermore, the law presumes that the applicant is healthy.

Monitoring and enforcementThe local authorities (official agencies and the police) monitor the enforcement of legal firearms possession.

Measures taken as a result of the shooting incidents

Erfurt, 2002:As indicated previously, a 19 year old man shot and killed sixteen people in the Gutenberg gymnasium in Erfurt, Germany on 26 April 2002. He then turned the gun on himself. As a result of this incident, the firearms law has become more strict in different areas.

Winnenden, 2009:With the incident in Winnenden, the shooter’s father’s legally owned gun was in a clothes closet instead of in a safe. This led to a meeting with the gun lobby and retail. The law had provisions for storing firearms.

The safe is only inspected if circumstances warrant an inspection. If a gun is not stored in accordance with the rules, sanctions can be enforced.

StatisticsThere are no national statistics regarding the number of legal firearms, number of ammunition cartridges, or firearms owners and permits. This information is not registered centrally.

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finlanD

In Finland, three shooting incidents have occurred in the past few years that can be considered as a “major event”. On 7 November 2007, a male student (18 years of age) shot and killed eight people in a school in the South Finnish town of Jokela, and then shot himself. On 23 September 2008, a young man shot and killed eleven people in a school for professional education in Kauhajoki, after which he committed suicide. On the day of New Year’s Eve, a middle-aged man shot and killed five people at a shopping centre, after which he shot and killed himself.

In Finland, the firearms law became more strict after the incidents in 2007 and 2008. Immediately following the shooting rampage in 2008, it was decided that anyone in Finland who wanted to apply for a firearms permit had to submit a doctor’s certificate, which states that the applicant is mentally capable.

Rules and regulationsA permit can be granted if there is an acceptable reason and if there is no reason to suspect abuse of the permit or of the firearms that will be purchased. This is a basic requirement for obtaining a firearms permit. The law also contains specific requirements in connection with permit applicants, firearms and their purpose. It is up to the agency granting the permit to evaluate whether the requirements are met by each individual applicant.

A permit to purchase a firearm can be granted to a person who is at least 18 years of age and whom is considered to be capable of handling firearms and parts based on his or her state of health. The agency that issues the permit is entitled to obtain a medical assessment from the applicant if it believes there is a reason to doubt the applicant’s capacity to own a firearm based on information obtained during a meeting or otherwise. Regardless the medical pledge of secrecy, the agency granting the permit is entitled to request medical health assessment information that is important for evaluating the applicant’s capacity to own a firearm. A higher age limit applies to some types of guns.

A permit to acquire a pistol, a small calibre pistol, a revolver or a small calibre revolver or any associated parts, can only be granted to persons aged 20 and older. A permit to acquire a gun for the purpose of sport shooting or shooting practice with the (above mentioned) handguns can only be granted to a natural person once that person submits proof of participation in a shooting sport or shooting practice for at least two years, issued by the firearms instructor of a club.

Hunting and sport shootingYouth ages 15-18 years can receive a parallel permit for rifles (hunting rifle, small calibre rifles, combination gun) if they meet certain requirements in accordance with the law and if the purpose for owning a rifle is hunting, sport shooting or shooting practice. A permit for handguns cannot be given to people under the age of 20, except for special reasons in exceptional cases.

Doctor’s certificateThe doctor’s certificate, which firearms permit applicants must submit, ultimately led to protests by doctors and firearms owners alike because they must submit a certificate time and again for each new application. The doctor’s certificate was replaced in June 2011 by a computer survey. The intended firearms owner must complete an electronic test that has been developed by psychologists from the Finnish Army. “The test” attempts to find out whether someone is violent or aggressive, whether he forms a danger to himself and to others, or whether he is suicidal.166

The test can have two outcomes: green (okay) or yellow (further examination necessary). Furthermore, the police are authorised to request medical information from the applicant’s physician.

166 Citation by the Finnish public officer who is responsible for developing the test, De Pers, 12 April 2011.

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Suitability testThe firearms permit applicant must submit his application in person to the local police district. A meeting is generally held with the applicant at the police station to determine his personal suitability and to verify the purpose of the firearm in accordance with Firearms regulations. Furthermore, the applicant must submit to the afore mentioned psychological test at the police station, which will measure the applicant’s tendency to violence, self-destruction and other character traits. The Firearms Act references exceptions to the obligation to undergo the suitability test.

Changes due to shooting incidentsAs instructed by the police, the availability of handgun permits is being limited. More attention is being paid to personal suitability than previously was the case. The information exchange between the authorities has improved, in part due to the changes to the Firearms Act. Guidelines are being issued to the agencies and institutions that issue handgun permits related to the purpose of the firearm that has been submitted. The applicant must provide details regarding the type of sport shooting to be practised with a handgun, as well as the suitability of the gun. The minimum age for handgun applicants has been raised to 20.

The supervision of permit holders has intensified, in part by linking the gun register to the information stored in the police database. If any information about the permit holder comes to light that has an effect on the firearms permit, revocation of the permit will be considered. These past years have seen more revoked firearms permits than in the years before. The permit application process and the permit revocation procedure alike have been harmonised according to the instructions provided by the police.

The Firearms Act has changed. As of 13 June 2011, doctors are obliged, and other medical professionals are entitled, to inform the police if they encounter someone whom they believe to be unsuitable to own guns and cartridges.

StatisticsStatistical information about the total number of firearms and firearms permit holders can be obtained from the firearms register. There are approximately 1.6 million firearms permits and about 670,000 permit holders. The number of permits to acquire and own a gun varies between 60,000 and 70,000 a year. The statistics categorise firearms into type of gun, function of gun and purpose of use. There are approximately 250,000 handguns registered.

The police do not maintain any statistics about ammunition. However, there are statistics regarding the number of ammunition permits.• Approximately 600 firearms retail permits have been granted in Finland.• Finland has approximately 300,000 hunters.• It is difficult to determine how many people practise sport shooting as a hobby. The number of

people that actively practise this hobby may be somewhere around 100,000.• There are approximately 1,450 firearms collectors with a permit.

Norway

In Norway, a 32 year old man shot and killed 69 people at a summer camp on the small island of Utøya on 22 July 2011. The shooter used two guns: a semi-automatic rifle and a semi-automatic handgun. The shooter had legally purchased both guns and ammunition in accordance with the Norwegian firearms laws. He had been a member of a shooting club since 2005.

Rules and regulationsIn Norway, firearms control is laid down in the Firearms and Ammunition Act of 1961 (Lov om skytevåpen og ammunisjon 1961). Firearms possession in Norway is not permitted in principle, unless certain requirements are met. The firearms law was modified for the last time in 2009.

In Norway there are multiple groups of citizens who are eligible for a firearms permit. The main groups are hunters, sport shooters and, to a lesser extent, collectors.

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Types of firearms and ammunitionThe possession of fully automatic firearms is prohibited in Norway. Semi-automatic and non-automatic firearms are permitted up to a certain calibre. The Norwegian Firearms Law has a maximum calibre limit on ammunition. Cartridges of 12.7 x 99 mm (.50BMG) or more powerful are prohibited. Citizens with a firearms permit can only have 10,000 to 15,000 pieces of ammunition (depending on the calibre).

Storage and supervisionFirearms (or in any case the essential parts of one, such as the firing pin) and ammunition must be stored in a safe and locked location. This generally means a safe that is attached to the wall or to the floor of the home. The police are permitted to conduct home inspections, but they must announce their visit at least 48 hours in advance.

Personal requirements:• Minimum 16 years of age for a permit for a hunting rifle• Minimum 21 years of age for a permit for sport shooting• No criminal convictions• Valid (written) reason why the applicant wishes to purchase a firearm (permit)• Theoretical and practical skills

PermitThere are two main tracks for granting a firearms permit in Norway: the hunting permit and the shooting sport permit. It is possible to have parallel permits in Norway to own firearms for hunting and to own firearms for sport shooting.

The sport shooting permitApplicants can obtain a permit for sport shooting at the age of 21. To obtain a permit, sport shooters must participate in a nine hour gun safety training course. This training course consists of a theory and a practical section. To participate in the practical section, the applicant must be a member of a registered shooting club. Unlike hunters, who can apply for a permit as soon as they pass the exam, sport shooters must prove that they intend to actively train at a shooting club in order to become eligible for a firearm. This means at least fifteen training sessions over a period of six months. After these six months have passed, the applicant may start the procedure to purchase a firearm. The applicant must present a signed recommendation by the chairman of the shooting club, his exam results and a document that lists his training hours to the chief of police.

Furthermore, the applicant must be able to prove in writing that it is necessary for him to own a firearm. In this case, the necessity will be the shooting sport. The chief of police then verifies the criminal and mental history of the applicant.

The latter is examined during a meeting at the police station. The applicant must present himself to the police as someone who is responsible, serious and careful (responsible and of sober habits). If the application is rejected, the applicant can appeal the decision. If the police approves the application and issues the sport shooting permit, the applicant may purchase a handgun.

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Belgium Germany Finland

Possession of firearms permitted?

No, with the exception of.... No, with the exception of... No, unless...

Reason (necessity for firearm (general requirement)

Legal reasons: hunting, fauna- management, sport shooting, occupation, personal protection, beginning gun collector, participation in historic and folklore activities.

Necessity: hunting, sport shooting, occupation, collector.

Acceptable reasons:Hunting, sport shooting, occupation, collector.

Personal requirements

Adult (18 years of age);No convictionsNever admitted to a psychiatric hospitalNo prior refusal or revocation of a firearms permitMedically competent (certificate).

18 years of age.Up to 25 years of age a psychological certificate is required if this is a first time application for a licence for acquiring a gun; this does not apply to guns with a calibre < 5.6 mm.

18 years of age: can purchase a firearm. Must be active in sport shooting for at least 2 years.No pistol/revolver for people under the age of 20. 15-18 years: possession with approval of parents (parallel permit).

Suitability/ trustworthiness

Investigation into applicant’s trustworthiness (background check, special circumstances in relationships). Approved by other adults in the household.

Trustworthiness and personalsuitability.Member of a sport shooting club for at least one year.

Personal meeting; based on health condition and behaviour. Suitability test (no reason for refusal). The results of the test are deleted immediately; only the person who takes the test is permitted to review the results. A medical evaluation may be requested if there are any doubts.

Evaluating fear of abuse

Autonomously by the governor. If there is any suspicion or possibility of abuse or of danger to the public order, the permit will be refused, revoked or suspended.

The local police. The authority that approves the permit / police.

Use of observations in the applicant’s environment

Not actively looking for this information. Information is verified by the police and, if necessary, observations are investigated, whereby in most cases, the permit is suspended until investigation has been completed.

No active search for information. Information that is known is included.

No active search for information. Any unofficial information about the social environment of the applicant that could affect the application must be verified.

Documents to be submitted

Application form, medical certificate, statement of good behaviour (VOG), certificate that applicant has successfully passed the skills test.

Shooting booklet (at least 18 shooting rounds a year or once a month). Approval by sport shooting club. Application form; it should include any medical or psychological history.

Statement that applicant is participating in shooting sports (hobby) by the firearms instructor.

Theory / practical test Theory and practical exams. Proven specialised knowledge. No information available.

Applicant’s medical information

Standard practice upon submitting an application. Medical statement (no more than 3 months old), regarding physical and mental suitability can be issued by the applicant’s physician. Physician must be fully convinced of applicant’s suitability if he fills in “suitable”.

Not a standard practice upon submitting an application. Applicant is requested to submit a medical certificate if there are any doubts or if documentation is incomplete. Assumption: applicant is healthy.

Not a standard practise upon submitting an application. On the grounds of results from suitability test and in the event of any doubts on the part of the person granting the permit.Compulsory reporting to police by doctor if fear of abuse is suspected (change in law on 13 June 2011).

Validity of permit Indefinite. One year (to obtain one). Permit for possession is granted for an indefinite period of time.

Owner’s permit is granted for an indefinite time period. First owner’s permit is granted for 5 years maximum.

Renewal Inspection takes place every 5 years (morality examination, background check and voluntary home inspection).

Possession is indefinite, necessity must be proven every 3 years (including background check). No renewals.

Maximum 5 years all at once (for jobs where it is essential to have a firearm). Submit statement that proves active participation in shooting sport / shooting practice sessions.

Activities of agency that approves permits

Once the morality examination has been completed, the police issues a recommendation to the governor. The governor then makes the decision to grant (and signs) or to refuse the permit.

High level of authority to revoke permits. High level of authority to revoke permits.

Maximum number of firearms

No limit (however, number should be in proportion to the reason for applying for the permit)

No information available. No information available.

Exceptions Sixteen year olds are permitted to use a gun on a shooting range under supervision.

Calibre > 5.6 mm is permitted for people over 21 years of age.

Parallel permit for minors in the 15-18 age category. Provides the option to benefit from someone else’s gun ownership.

Inspection and enforcement

Federal firearms service (FWD), Provincial firearms service (PWD) and local police.

Local authorities (government agencies and police). Every 3 years: examination into the person’s trustworthiness and the registers are checked for any criminal convictions.

Police is responsible for maintaining public order and security. Grants and revokes permits. National Police Council supervises police and generally monitors compliance with the Firearms Law.

In home safety inspection

Every 5 years. Permit holder is not under an obligation to have this inspection done.

If circumstances warrant this inspection. No information available.

Is the implementation/enforcement of the firearms laws regulated and laid down in writing?

There are no official arrangements. An internal evaluation occurs via the bi-monthly meetings of the provincial weapons services with the Ministry of Justice and ad hoc based on current affairs currently being discussed by Parliament or others.

No. No.

Table 23: Summary of how legal firearms possession is managed in Belgium, Germany and Finland

Types of firearms and am

munition

The possession

of fully

automatic

firearms

is prohibited

in N

orway.

Sem

i-automatic

and non-autom

atic firearms are perm

itted up to a certain calibre. The Norw

egian Firearms Law

has a m

aximum

calibre limit on am

munition. C

artridges of 12.7 x 99 mm

(.50BM

G) or m

ore powerful are

prohibited. Citizens w

ith a firearms perm

it can only have 10,000 to 15,000 pieces of amm

unition (depending on the calibre).

Storage and supervision

Firearms (or in any case the essential parts of one, such as the firing pin) and am

munition m

ust be stored in a safe and locked location. This generally m

eans a safe that is attached to the wall or to

the floor of the home. The police are perm

itted to conduct home inspections, but they m

ust announce their visit at least 48 hours in advance.

Personal requirements:

• M

inimum

16 years of age for a permit for a hunting rifle

• M

inimum

21 years of age for a permit for sport shooting

• N

o criminal convictions

• Valid (w

ritten) reason why the applicant w

ishes to purchase a firearm (perm

it)•

Theoretical and practical skills

Perm

itThere are tw

o main tracks for granting a firearm

s permit in N

orway: the hunting perm

it and the shooting sport perm

it. It is possible to have parallel permits in N

orway to ow

n firearms for hunting

and to own firearm

s for sport shooting.

The sport shooting permit

Applicants can obtain a perm

it for sport shooting at the age of 21. To obtain a permit, sport

shooters must participate in a nine hour gun safety training course. This training course consists of

a theory and a practical section. To participate in the practical section, the applicant must be a

mem

ber of a registered shooting club. Unlike hunters, w

ho can apply for a permit as soon as they

pass the exam, sport shooters m

ust prove that they intend to actively train at a shooting club in order to becom

e eligible for a firearm. This m

eans at least fifteen training sessions over a period of six m

onths. After these six m

onths have passed, the applicant may start the procedure to purchase

a firearm. The applicant m

ust present a signed recomm

endation by the chairman of the shooting

club, his exam results and a docum

ent that lists his training hours to the chief of police.

Furthermore, the applicant m

ust be able to prove in writing that it is necessary for him

to own a

firearm. In this case, the necessity w

ill be the shooting sport. The chief of police then verifies the crim

inal and mental history of the applicant.

The latter is examined during a m

eeting at the police station. The applicant must present him

self to the police as som

eone who is responsible, serious and careful (responsible and of sober habits). If

the application is rejected, the applicant can appeal the decision. If the police approves the application and issues the sport shooting perm

it, the applicant may purchase a handgun.

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APPENDIX 6: POLICE AND JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS

This appendix provides a summary of the systems that are consulted when processing a permit application. These systems are used throughout the country, but they differ per district in which police departments access them when processing a permit application.

polic

e m

anag

emen

t dut

ies

police inform

ationnational

non-police information

police inform

ationreg

ional

number of hits - no data

automatic link

GBA JDS

Shootingclubs

NSIS / LIST PAPOS

BlueView

OPS

HKS BVH BVO

Figure 9: Systems that are accessed when processing a permit application

The special laws department for the Hollands Midden district accesses:• Verona: The enforcement and permit module for the special laws department in a police

district. The system is linked to the Municipal Register of Persons (GBA) and the JDS. The special laws department officer uses Verona to update the progress of the process from application, granting or refusing the permit and the actual possession of a firearm or ammunition.

• JDS: The judicial documentation system contains all criminal records and a large number of offenses, which meet certain requirements (for example, they were handled by the Public Prosecutor’s Office or transactions and fines that exceed one hundred Euros).

• PAPOS: The court police system and the gate to the OPS portal. It contains information provided by the Central Judicial Collection Agency, which is used by the district police to collect payment for fines.

The Hollands Midden district info desk (Business Unit Processing) consults:• BlueView: a relational search engine and collection point of information from the law

enforcement systems for daily police work, including information from investigation systems. BlueView bundles the information from all police districts and from the Royal Military Police together. The system is linked to a national server, which supplies its information to the HKS, BVH and BVO information systems that are outlined here below.

• HKS: the recognition service system is a stand alone national system for the police districts and the Royal Military Police. It contains the registry of offenses and the crime reports and the suspects of those crimes. In operation since 1986.

• BPS: the business processes system was used to register reports, statements and incidents. BPS was replaced by BVH during the course of 2009.

• BVH: the enforcement database is a regional system for registering reports, statements and incidents.

• OPS: the national investigation register of untraceable convicted criminals.

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• NSIS-LIST: the National Schengen Information System – national information system for monitoring foreigners. It is connected to a network with the other Schengen partners.

• BVO: the investigation database is a national system that supports the investigation process. It was introduced in 2008 and its purpose is to standardise investigations and to improve the exchange of information.

• RBS: the investigation database was operational until mid 2008 and has been replaced by BVO.

The Dutch Safety Board

telephone +31(0)70 333 70 00 • e-mail [email protected] • website www.safetyboard.nl

visiting address Anna van Saksenlaan 50 • 2593 HT The Hague

postal address PO Box 95404 • 2509 CK The Hague • The Netherlands

Possession of firearms by sport shooters

Investigation into the system governing the

legal possession of firearms following a shooting

incident in Alphen aan den Rijn, 9th of April 2011

Po

ssession o

f firearms b

y spo

rt shoo

ters

Possession of firearms by sport shooters

Documents

Transcript of Possession of firearms by sport shooters