POSC 2200 – The IndividualPOSC 2200 – The Individual

Russell Alan WilliamsRussell Alan WilliamsDepartment of Political ScienceDepartment of Political Science

Unit Four: Unit Four: The IndividualThe Individual (Feb 9 & 11) (Feb 9 & 11)

Required Reading:Required Reading: Mingst, Chapter 5Mingst, Chapter 5 Jervis, Jervis, Hypotheses on MisperceptionHypotheses on Misperception, Mingst , Mingst

and Snyder, pp. 189-199, and Snyder, pp. 189-199,

Outline:Outline:1.1. IntroductionIntroduction2.2. The Role of ElitesThe Role of Elites3.3. Individuals in Decision-makingIndividuals in Decision-making4.4. The Role of the PublicThe Role of the Public

1) Introduction:1) Introduction:

Role of individual open to debateRole of individual open to debate . . . (?) . . . (?)

Some see individuals as largely unimportant Some see individuals as largely unimportant in international relations – including leaders in international relations – including leaders

NeorealistsNeorealists – National interest and international – National interest and international structurestructure

RadicalsRadicals – International capitalist system – International capitalist system

Some see large role for individualsSome see large role for individuals

LiberalsLiberals – as policymaking elites . . . – as policymaking elites . . .

Lots of latitude of decision-makers to Lots of latitude of decision-makers to implement policies that pursue their interestsimplement policies that pursue their interests

ConstructivistsConstructivists – as holders of values – as holders of values

Major change in IR can be associated with Major change in IR can be associated with new leaders bringing new values to forefrontnew leaders bringing new values to forefront

E.g. Gorbachev and Soviet security E.g. Gorbachev and Soviet security concernsconcerns

In practical terms . . .In practical terms . . . Hard not to see a role for individuals in IR – Hard not to see a role for individuals in IR –

particularly “heads of state”particularly “heads of state”

However:However: Complicates analyses – hard to predict foreign Complicates analyses – hard to predict foreign

policy – policy – becomes more like Historybecomes more like History At a general level, possible to overstate importance At a general level, possible to overstate importance

of individualsof individuals E.g. Continuity in foreign policy regardless of E.g. Continuity in foreign policy regardless of

who is in officewho is in office Canada’s foreign policy may have more to do with Canada’s foreign policy may have more to do with

international structure then individuals . . .international structure then individuals . . .

How can we clarify, How can we clarify, or hypothesize,or hypothesize, the the role of individuals?role of individuals?

Several strategies:Several strategies:

Clarify the conditions under which individuals are Clarify the conditions under which individuals are more importantmore important

Examine individual Examine individual andand group psychological group psychological effects that may allow us to predict responses to effects that may allow us to predict responses to eventsevents

Examine role in Examine role in foreign policy decision makingforeign policy decision making and and diplomacydiplomacy

2) The Role of Elites:2) The Role of Elites:

a) Under what conditions are the actions and values of a) Under what conditions are the actions and values of individual leadersindividual leaders more important? more important?

1) When political institutions are 1) When political institutions are unstableunstable

Gives decisive leaders opportunity to pursue own goalsGives decisive leaders opportunity to pursue own goals Institutions new – Post colonial states and new Institutions new – Post colonial states and new

democraciesdemocracies E.g. Golda MiairE.g. Golda Miair E.g. Vladimir PutinE.g. Vladimir Putin

Institutions in crisis or failing – Institutions in crisis or failing – E.g. Weimar Germany and Adolph HitlerE.g. Weimar Germany and Adolph Hitler

2) When institutional constraints are 2) When institutional constraints are limitedlimited

E.g. Totalitarian states – limited channels to put E.g. Totalitarian states – limited channels to put pressure on leaderspressure on leaders

E.g. China and NixonE.g. China and Nixon

3) When the situation does not result in a clearly 3) When the situation does not result in a clearly defined national interestdefined national interest

Issue is peripheral or unimportantIssue is peripheral or unimportant

Issue is ambiguous – lack of information for a Issue is ambiguous – lack of information for a rational assessment of the national interestrational assessment of the national interest

E.g. Surprise situationsE.g. Surprise situations

Does this describe most situations in IR?Does this describe most situations in IR?

If so, doesn’t this mean IR is driven by individual If so, doesn’t this mean IR is driven by individual level????level????

Or, does this just mean individuals effect things that Or, does this just mean individuals effect things that don’t matterdon’t matter

b) What is the role of leader’s personalities?b) What is the role of leader’s personalities? Can they help us understand states’ behavior?Can they help us understand states’ behavior?

Research underdeveloped – leaders won’t submit Research underdeveloped – leaders won’t submit to detailed observation and psychological to detailed observation and psychological analyses!!!!analyses!!!!

However, However, HermanHerman (1980) suggested a typology (1980) suggested a typology that some think can guide analysesthat some think can guide analyses

Argued: Two main types of leader personality that Argued: Two main types of leader personality that may effect foreign policymay effect foreign policy

The “Independent Leader”The “Independent Leader”

The “Participatory Leader”The “Participatory Leader”

The “Independent Leader”The “Independent Leader” Policy Orientations:Policy Orientations:

HighHigh nationalism nationalism HighHigh belief in control belief in control HighHigh need for power need for power HighHigh distrust of others distrust of others LowLow understanding – conceptual clarity understanding – conceptual clarity

The “Independent Leader”The “Independent Leader” Policy Orientations:Policy Orientations:

HighHigh nationalism nationalism HighHigh belief in control belief in control HighHigh need for power need for power HighHigh distrust for others distrust for others LowLow understanding –conceptual clarity understanding –conceptual clarity

BushBush Chavez Chavez Stalin Stalin

The “Participatory Leader”The “Participatory Leader” Policy Orientations:Policy Orientations:

LowLow nationalism nationalism LowLow belief in control belief in control LowLow in distrust of others in distrust of others HighHigh need for friendly affiliations need for friendly affiliations HighHigh understanding – conceptual complexity understanding – conceptual complexity

The “Participatory Leader”The “Participatory Leader” Policy Orientations:Policy Orientations:

LowLow nationalism nationalism LowLow belief in control belief in control LowLow in distrust of others in distrust of others HighHigh need for friendly affiliations need for friendly affiliations HighHigh understanding – conceptual complexity understanding – conceptual complexity

TrudeauTrudeau ClintonClinton ? ?

Risk of “circularity”(?)Risk of “circularity”(?)

Problem: We don’t know their Problem: We don’t know their real real personalitiespersonalities, only what they show in public , only what they show in public rolesroles

International structures and events make International structures and events make leaders exhibit “personality traits”leaders exhibit “personality traits”

E.g. Clinton and Bush not so different . . .E.g. Clinton and Bush not so different . . .

2) Individuals in Decision Making:2) Individuals in Decision Making:

Individual decision making never Individual decision making never totallytotally rationalrational

IR presents observer with information overloadIR presents observer with information overload

People use psychological shortcuts to “make People use psychological shortcuts to “make sense” of what they observesense” of what they observe

May influence foreign policy . . . . May influence foreign policy . . . .

Psychological processing concepts or Psychological processing concepts or “shortcuts”:“shortcuts”:

1) “1) “Belief SystemBelief System”:”: Organized, integrated Organized, integrated perceptions of individuals in society about perceptions of individuals in society about how the world “is”how the world “is”

Influence leaders’ decisionsInfluence leaders’ decisions

ConstructivismConstructivism – comes from history and – comes from history and normsnorms

E.g. Cold War – seeing Soviet Union as a E.g. Cold War – seeing Soviet Union as a threat because of image of communismthreat because of image of communism

2) “2) “Cognitive ConsistencyCognitive Consistency”:”: Tendency to see images in a way that is consistent Tendency to see images in a way that is consistent

with with belief systemsbelief systems or previous interpretation of or previous interpretation of factsfacts

E.g. US and the Falkland War . . . .E.g. US and the Falkland War . . . .

3) “3) “Evoked SetEvoked Set””: Tendency to look for details in : Tendency to look for details in current situation that are similar to those current situation that are similar to those previously observedpreviously observed

E.g. US and Chinese RelationsE.g. US and Chinese Relations Realist view?Realist view? Liberal view?Liberal view?

Both based on selecting details that confirm past Both based on selecting details that confirm past lessons . . .lessons . . .

4) “4) “Mirror ImagesMirror Images””: Tendency to see other : Tendency to see other individuals and groups as having opposite individuals and groups as having opposite characteristics from oneselfcharacteristics from oneself

E.g. “Orientalism”E.g. “Orientalism” Jervis – “Hypotheses on Misperception”Jervis – “Hypotheses on Misperception”

Also a tendency to see behavior of others as Also a tendency to see behavior of others as centralized and coordinated centralized and coordinated

=A kind of paranoia?=A kind of paranoia?

5) “5) “GroupthinkGroupthink””: Tendency of small groups to : Tendency of small groups to form a consensus and resist criticism of form a consensus and resist criticism of consensusconsensus

Disregard contradictory factsDisregard contradictory facts

Ostracize members who do not share viewOstracize members who do not share view

E.g. US intelligence and Iraqi WMD’sE.g. US intelligence and Iraqi WMD’s

6) “6) “SatisificingSatisificing””: Tendency to accept minimally : Tendency to accept minimally acceptable solution rather then best possible acceptable solution rather then best possible outcomeoutcome

In order to support consensus (“In order to support consensus (“bureaucratic bureaucratic politicspolitics”)”)

Or, because people are lazyOr, because people are lazy

Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception”Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception”

Classic piece on the “irrationality” of rational Classic piece on the “irrationality” of rational foreign policyforeign policy

Argues:Argues: Decision makers fit new information into Decision makers fit new information into

existing beliefsexisting beliefs More likely when:More likely when:

Facts ambiguous – situation complexFacts ambiguous – situation complex People think existing theory well proven People think existing theory well proven

ResultResult: Decision makers more likely to ignore : Decision makers more likely to ignore new “discordant” information then to change new “discordant” information then to change their existing theoriestheir existing theories

Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception”Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” Example: “Example: “Domino TheoryDomino Theory””

Theory that communist Theory that communist revolutions spread like a chain revolutions spread like a chain reactionreaction

I.e. Success in North Vietnam I.e. Success in North Vietnam meant it would spread to rest meant it would spread to rest of S. E. Asiaof S. E. Asia

Required “containment”Required “containment” Support for anticommunist Support for anticommunist

alliesallies Result: US intervention in VietnamResult: US intervention in Vietnam

Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception”Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” Example: “Example: “Domino Domino

TheoryTheory”” US supports corrupt, US supports corrupt,

unpopular, anti-unpopular, anti-democratic regimesdemocratic regimes

Supplant French Supplant French colonial role in S. E. colonial role in S. E. AsiaAsia

US suffers 60,000 casualties, ends war effort in US suffers 60,000 casualties, ends war effort in defeatdefeat

No Domino effect . . . .No Domino effect . . . .

Theory was Theory was well establishedwell established and and situation complexsituation complex

Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception”Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception”

Solutions? See Jervis’s Safeguards – good advice!Solutions? See Jervis’s Safeguards – good advice!

1) 1) BeBe awareaware that observations are not unbiased that observations are not unbiased

2) 2) BeBe skeptical skeptical of supporting ideas that are not of supporting ideas that are not logically linked to one anotherlogically linked to one another

E.g. E.g. Iraq: WMD Iraq: WMD andand DemocracyDemocracy

WWII: Stalin and WWII: Stalin and “Barbarossa”“Barbarossa”

Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception”Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception”

3) 3) Be sureBe sure concepts are clearly spelled out – concepts are clearly spelled out – makes it possible to know when your ideas are makes it possible to know when your ideas are wrong or failingwrong or failing

E.g. “Victory Conditions”E.g. “Victory Conditions”

4) 4) Be sureBe sure to consider critical interpretations of to consider critical interpretations of new facts – don’t be surrounded by like-minded new facts – don’t be surrounded by like-minded ideologuesideologues

4) Role of the Public:4) Role of the Public: Traditionally little role for the public in foreign Traditionally little role for the public in foreign

policypolicy Perhaps . . . More impact in practice then in theoryPerhaps . . . More impact in practice then in theory

1) Private individuals:1) Private individuals: Some people have “resources” necessary to have Some people have “resources” necessary to have

influenceinfluence Financial – Bill GatesFinancial – Bill Gates Expertise – George SorrosExpertise – George Sorros

Play a role in conflict resolution Play a role in conflict resolution E.g. Carter FoundationE.g. Carter Foundation

““Track-two DiplomacyTrack-two Diplomacy””

Play a role in changing perceptions of foreign policyPlay a role in changing perceptions of foreign policy E.g. “Hanoi” Jane Fonda and Sean PennE.g. “Hanoi” Jane Fonda and Sean Penn

2) The “Mass Public” – impact on Foreign Policy?2) The “Mass Public” – impact on Foreign Policy?

a) Psychological factors?a) Psychological factors?

““Filtering” and interpretation problems (“shortcuts”) Filtering” and interpretation problems (“shortcuts”) may be similar to policymaking elitesmay be similar to policymaking elites

E.g. “E.g. “GroupthinkGroupthink”” and “ and “Mirror ImagesMirror Images””

May be specific mass psychology effects in IR:May be specific mass psychology effects in IR: ““Territorial ImperativeTerritorial Imperative”: Humans’ innate desire to ”: Humans’ innate desire to

control territorycontrol territory ““Frustration-Aggression SyndromeFrustration-Aggression Syndrome”: Societies ”: Societies

whose desires are thwarted likely to become whose desires are thwarted likely to become aggressiveaggressive

Hard to predict much based on these – people do not Hard to predict much based on these – people do not always respond in the same fashionalways respond in the same fashion

b) Public Opinion?b) Public Opinion?

Public orientations may have large impact on limiting Public orientations may have large impact on limiting range of policy options open to elitesrange of policy options open to elites

Media coverage and opinion polling can be a big Media coverage and opinion polling can be a big factor in what leaders may think is viablefactor in what leaders may think is viable

E.g. Walter Cronkite and the Vietnam WarE.g. Walter Cronkite and the Vietnam War However, public opinion never unified – creates However, public opinion never unified – creates

opportunities to move opinion in “necessary” opportunities to move opinion in “necessary” directiondirection

Result – New techniques:Result – New techniques: Priming and propagandaPriming and propaganda

E.g. The Kuwaiti victims . . .E.g. The Kuwaiti victims . . .

““Public DiplomacyPublic Diplomacy””: Diplomatic techniques designed : Diplomatic techniques designed to improve image of a state in other societiesto improve image of a state in other societies

E.g. Gorbechev’s “New York walkabout”E.g. Gorbechev’s “New York walkabout”

5) For Next Time . . .5) For Next Time . . .

MID TERM EXAMMID TERM EXAM (October 26 - In class)(October 26 - In class)

Format: Multiple choice & short answer definition questionsFormat: Multiple choice & short answer definition questions

Definitions do not need to be exact – just show you Definitions do not need to be exact – just show you know what they mean . . .know what they mean . . .

Lectures & Mingst textbook – as well as items from the Lectures & Mingst textbook – as well as items from the readerreader

Up to, Up to, and includingand including Chapter 6 – “The Individual” Chapter 6 – “The Individual”

Be sure to complete all of the reading!Be sure to complete all of the reading!

MID TERM EXAMMID TERM EXAM (October 26 - In class)(October 26 - In class)

Do not look at other peoples’ exams!Do not look at other peoples’ exams!

Do not write in pencilDo not write in pencil

Guess . . . if you have no other answer. . .Guess . . . if you have no other answer. . .