Pols 5 PP12

Western Political Thought John Paul Tabakian, Ed.D.

Political Science 5 Fall 2014 – Power Point #12

COURSE LECTURE: WEEK 12 (1)

Today’s Lecture Covers The Following: • “The American Persona” • Rationale of domestic policy • Rationale of foreign policy • America’s rise to power • How citizens view their role • Domestic Policies • Foreign Policies • Major Power, Superpower, Hegemonic Power • How did America rise to power?


• Bureaucracies • Interest Groups • Obsolescence of War • Security Dilemma • Deterrence • Bandwagoning • Counterbalancing • Models of Decision Making • Decision Making As Steering • Group Psychology


• Crisis Management • Military Industrial Complex • Public Opinion • Legislatures • Strategic Defense Initiative • Missile Defense Agency

• Diplomats – Virtually all states maintain a diplomatic corps, or

foreign service, of diplomats in embassies in foreign capitals

– Political appointees – Career diplomats – Tension common between state leaders and foreign

policy bureaucrats • Interagency tensions

– Bureaucratic rivalry as an influence on foreign policy challenges the notion of states as unitary actors in the international system

BUREAUCRACIES

OBSOLESCENCE OF WAR

• Realism • Struggle for power remains constant

• Only variable balance of power • Bipolar

• Best method for maintaining peace • Multipolar • Unipolar • Deterrence Theory = war is obsolete!

SECURITY DILEMMA

• Nation-states pursue national-interests • Stable international system

• Competitive security system • States increase their security • Ego’s gain as alter’s loss

• Cooperative security system • States equate as collective good • National interests

• International interests

Deterrence has worked because neither side really knew what the other side was thinking. A problem with deterrence is that the more times bluffs are made it may lead to a time when someone is going to make the call. At this point there are only three alternatives: 1. Resort to nuclear war 2. Retreat 3. Resort to conventional war

DETERRENCE

SECURITY DILEMMA

• Nation-states pursue individual national-interests • Leads to a stable international system

• Competitive security system • States striving to increase their security • Ego’s gain as alter’s loss

• Cooperative security system • States equate security of each as to the collective good. • National interests are seen to bolster international interests

BANDWAGONING

•Bandwagoning results in attraction

•Countries ally themselves with another nation

COUNTERBALANCING

• Counterbalancing results in fear • Countries join together to

check another nation

• Foreign policies are the strategies governments use to guide their actions in the international arena – Spell out the objectives state leaders

have decided to pursue in a given relationship or situation

– Foreign policy process • How policies are arrived at and

implemented

MAKING FOREIGN POLICY

• Rational model – Decision makers set goals, evaluate

their relative importance, calculate the costs and benefits of each possible course of action, and then choose the one with the highest benefits and lowest costs.

– Role of uncertainty – Accepting of risk versus averse to risk

MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (1)

• Organizational process model – Foreign policy makers generally skip the labor-

intensive process of identifying goals and alternative actions, relying instead for most decisions on standardized responses or standard operating procedures (sop)

• Government bargaining (bureaucratic) model: – Foreign policy decisions result from the bargaining

process among various government agencies with somewhat divergent interests in the outcome

MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (2)

DECISION MAKING AS STEERING

• Study of individual decision making revolves around the question of rationality – To what extent are national leaders (or citizens)

able to make rational decisions in the national interest?

• Difficulties of oversimplification – Individual decision makers have differing values

and beliefs and have unique personalities. – Idiosyncrasies

INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (1)

• Beyond individual idiosyncrasies, individual decision making diverges from the rational model in at least three systematic ways:

• Decision makers suffer from misperceptions and selective perceptions when they compile information on the likely consequences of their choices

• The rationality of individual cost-benefit calculations is undermined by emotions that decision makers feel while thinking about the consequences of their actions (affective bias)


• Cognitive biases are systematic distortions of rational calculations based not on emotional feelings, but simply on the limitations of the human brain in making choices • Cognitive dissonance • Justification of effort • Wishful thinking • Mirror image • Projection • Historical analogies


• Two specific modifications of the rational model of decision making have been proposed to accommodate psychological realities – Bounded rationality:

• Takes into account the costs of seeking and processing information.

– Optimizing – Satisfying

– Prospect theory: • Decision makes go through two phases: editing

phase and the evaluation phase. • Holds that evaluations take place by comparison

with a reference point, which is often the status quo but might be some past or expected situation


• Group dynamics can be a promoter of state interests but they can also introduce new sources of irrationality into the decision-making process

• Groupthink – Refers to the tendency for groups to reach decisions

without accurately assessing their consequences, because individual members tend to go along with ideas they think the others support

– Groups tend to be overly optimistic about the chances of success and are thus more willing to take risks

• Iran-Contra scandal

GROUP PSYCHOLOGY

• Crises are foreign policy situations in which outcomes are very important and time frames are compressed –Time constraints –Groupthink –Psychological stress

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

• Huge interlocking network of governmental agencies, industrial corporations, and research institutes, working together to supply a nation’s military forces

• Response to the growing importance of technology • Encompasses a variety of constituencies, each of which has

an interest in military spending – Corporations, military officers, universities, and scientific

institutes that receive military research contracts – Revolving door – PACS from the military industry

MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1)

The phrase, “Military Industrial Complex” was first used by President Dwight D. Eisenhower during his farewell address to the nation on January 17, 1961. He warns against the increasing influence of corporate influence in all areas of government.

MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2)

• Range of views on foreign policy issues held by the citizens of a state

• Has a greater influence on foreign policy in democracies than in authoritarian governments – Legitimacy – Propaganda – Journalists as gatekeepers

PUBLIC OPINION (1)

• In democracies, public opinion generally has less effect on foreign policy than on domestic policy – Attentive public – Foreign policy elite – Rally ’round the flag syndrome – Diversionary foreign policy

PUBLIC OPINION (2)

• Conduit through which interest groups and public opinion can wield influence – Presidential systems; separate elections

• Legislatures play a direct role in foreign policy • Different rules apply to military force

– Rally ’round the flag – May challenge the president if they have power

of the “purse”

LEGISLATURES (1)

– Parliamentary systems; political parties are dominant • Often parliamentary executives do not need

to submit treaties or policies for formal approval by the legislature

• Call elections; new executive • Legislatures play a key role in designing

and implementing foreign policy

LEGISLATURES (2)

AIRBORNE LASER LABORATORY The Airborne Laser Lab was a gas-dynamic laser mounted in a modified version of a KC-135 used for flight testing. Similar to the commercial Boeing 707, the slightly smaller KC-135 was designed to military specifications and operated at hight gross weights. The NKC-135A (S/N 55-3123) is one of 14 KC-135As permanently converted for special testing. It was extensively modified by the Air Force weapons Labratory at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, and used in an 11-year experiment to prove a high-energy laser could be operated in an aircraft and employed against airborne targets. During the experiment, the Airborne Laser Lab destroyed five AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and a Navy BQM-34A target drone.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (1)

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (2)

MDA’s mision is to develop and field an integrated, layered, ballistic missile defense system to defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends against all ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. The fundamental objective of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program is to develop the capability to defend forces and territories of the United States, its allies and friends against all classes and ranges of ballistic missile threats.

LAYERED DEFENSE

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has developed a research, development and test program focusing on missile defense as a single layered defense system. The structure involves three basic phases of ballistic missile trajectories: boost, midcourse and terminal. Boost phase is the portion of flight immediately after launch, when the missile is to gain acceleration under power to lift its payload into the air (airspace). This lasts 3-5 minutes.

Midcourse phase is the longest part of the missile flight. It is where the missile payload has separated from the booster rocket and is coasting unpowered toward a target. This phase can be as long as 20 minutes. The final phase is called terminal. This is when the missile's warhead re-enters the earth's atmosphere and falls towards its target, propelled only by its momentum and the force of gravity. However, its speed can be thousands of miles per hour. This phase lasts approximately 30 seconds.

BOOST PHASE DEFENSE The boost phase is the part of a missile flight path from launch until it stops accelerating under its own power. Typically the boost phase ends at altitudes of 300 miles or less, and within the first 3 to 5 minutes of flight. During this phase, the rocket is climbing against the Earth's gravity. Intercepting a missile in its boost phase is the ideal solution. We can defend a large area of the globe and prevent midcourse decoys from being deployed by destroying the missile early in its flight. Of the boost phase defenses, the Airborne Laser (ABL) is the most mature.

The two types of boost defense elements are: 1. Directed energy systems using high power lasers

such as the Airborne Laser 2. Kinetic energy interceptors Boost phase elements will be integrated into an overall Ballistic Missile Defense operational concept. Sensors developed in this segment will have multi-mission capabilities intended to provide critical tracking data for threat ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.

AIRBORNE LASER 1. Designed to detect, track, target, and

kill threatening missiles, no matter if they are short, medium, or long-range

2. Uses an amalgamation of technologies including a Boeing 747-400 freighter and Chemical, Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL)

3. Laser destroys the missile by heating its metal skin until it cracks

4. Infrared sensors were first tested on the F-14 "Tomcat" fighter aircraft shortly before the first Gulf War

Overview The Airborne Laser program brings together a combination of technologies: a 747 aircraft, an advanced detection and tracking system, adaptive optics, and a revolutionary high-energy laser, all of which are being integrated into a single weapon system for the first time

AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM

Operational Sequence 1. The Airborne Laser uses six strategically placed infrared

sensors to detect the exhaust plume of a boosting missile

2. Once a target is detected, a kilowatt-class laser, the Track Illuminator, tracks the missile and determines a precise aim point

3. The Beacon Illuminator, a second kilowatt-class laser, then measures disturbances in the atmosphere, which are corrected by the adaptive optics system to accurately point and focus the high energy laser

4. Using a very large telescope located in the nose turret, the beam control/fire control system focuses the megawatt class laser beam onto a pressurized area of the boosting missile

Development 1. Testing was completed on the High Energy Chemical Oxygen

Iodine Laser on December 6, 2005. The laser was fired continuously for more than 10 seconds at a power level sufficient to destroy a hostile ballistic missile.

2. The Low Power System Integration-active flight test series was successfully completed on Aug. 23, 2007 at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif. During the test, ABL used all three of the aircraft's laser systems to detect, track, and then engaged a target mounted on a test aircraft with a low-power laser that is serving as a surrogate for the high-power laser.

3. ABL has begun integration of the High Energy Laser system on the aircraft. Upon completion, the aircraft will undergo additional ground and flight tests prior to the lethal demonstration against a boosting missile in 2009.

KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS 1. The program's primary objective over the next

few years is developing an interceptor capable of destroying incoming missiles

2. The longer-term objective is to develop an interceptor that can kill ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight

3. The first generation of these interceptors, called the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) element

4. System was tested fully in 2011

Kinetic Energy Interceptors The Kinetic Energy Interceptors program’s mission is to provide the Ballistic Missile Defense System a strategically deployable, tactically mobile land and sea-based capability to defeat medium to long-range ballistic missiles during the boost, ascent, and midcourse phases of flight. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors weapon system has the potential capacity to be deployed as an element of the Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System in three configurations: land-mobile, sea-mobile, and land-fixed. These multiple deployment configurations increase engagement opportunities, enhance the Ballistic Missile Defense System’s layered defensive capability, and decrease life-cycle operation costs by leveraging common sub-components across the three deployed configurations.

Overview The Kinetic Energy Interceptors weapon system is comprised of three major components: a missile launcher; a fire control and communications unit; and a high acceleration interceptor that delivers payloads capable of destroying adversary ballistic missiles and their lethal payloads using kinetic energy.

Details 1. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors destroy ballistic

missiles in the boost, ascent, or midcourse phases of flight

2. During boost or ascent phase intercepts, the interceptor’s payload acquires, homes, and kinetically destroys a hot burning threat ballistic missile prior to deployment of its lethal payload, decoys, and countermeasures

3. For midcourse phase intercepts, the interceptor’s payload acquires, discriminates the missile’s deployed lethal payload from accompanying decoys, countermeasures and exhausted boost motors, and then destroys the lethal payload

4. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors weapon system’s mobility enables rapid deployment near an adversary’s launch sites and subsequent early battle-space engagements of the adversary’s ballistic missile in the boost, ascent, and early midcourse phases of flight.

5. Mobility provides the operational flexibility to respond to changing adversary conditions (countries, countermeasures, and tactics) and mitigates an adversary’s capability to exploit our fixed-site ballistic missile defense weapon systems.

6. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors fire control component interfaces with the Ballistic Missile Defense System command and control element, Ballistic Missile Defense System sensors and other overhead sensors to obtain threat tracking data.

MIDCOURSE PHASE DEFENSE The midcourse phase of a ballistic missile trajectory allows the longest window of opportunity to intercept an incoming missile up to 20 minutes. This is the point where the missile has stopped thrusting so it follows a more predictable glide path. The midcourse interceptor and a variety of radars and other sensors have a longer time to track and engage the target compared to boost and terminal interceptors. Also, more than one interceptor could be launched to ensure a successful hit. A downside to the longer intercept window is the attacker has an opportunity to deploy countermeasures against a defensive system.

Primary Elements Of Midcourse Defense Segment 1. Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 2. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD)

Ground Based Midcourse (GMD) 1. Defends against long-range ballistic missile attacks 2. During a GMD intercept, a booster missile flies

toward a target's predicted location and releases a "kill vehicle" on a path with the incoming target.

3. The kill vehicle uses data from ground-based radars and its own on-board sensors to collide with the target, thus destroying both the target and the kill vehicle using only the force of the impact

Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) The mission of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System is to defend the nation, our deployed personnel, and our friends and allies against a limited long-range ballistic missile attack. Overview 1. Uses an array of sensors, radars, and ground-based

interceptors that are capable of shooting down long-range ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase

2. Directly hits the incoming missile by ramming the warhead with a closing speed of approximately 15,000 miles per hour to destroy it. This is called “hit-to-kill” technology and has been proven to work

Details Ground-Based Midcourse Defense is composed of three main components: sensors, ground-based interceptors, and fire control and communications

1. Sensors: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense uses a variety of sensors and radars to obtain information on missile launches and to track, discriminate, and target an incoming warhead. This information is provided to the Ground-Based Interceptor before launch and during flight to help it find the incoming ballistic missile and close with it.

GROUND BASED INTERCEPTOR

2. Ground-Based Interceptor: A Ground-Based Interceptor is made up of a three-stage, solid fuel booster and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle. When launched, the booster missile carries the kill vehicle toward the target’s predicted location in space. Once released from the booster, the 152 pound kill vehicle uses data received in-flight from ground-based radars and its own on-board sensors to close with and destroy the target using only the force of the impact.

3. Fire Control and Communications: This is the central nervous system of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense element. It connects all of the hardware, software and communications systems necessary for planning, tasking and controlling Ground-Based Midcourse Defense.

Development 1. Interceptor missiles are emplaced at Fort Greely,

Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. More are planned to be emplaced in 2006

2. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense fire control centers are in Colorado and Alaska

3. Several existing early warning radars located around the world, including one on Shemya Island in the Alaskan Aleutian chain, have been upgraded to support flight tests and to provide tracking information in the event of a hostile missile attack

4. Nearing completion is a powerful, mobile Sea-based X-Band radar that is scheduled to be fully integrated into the Ballistic Missile Defense System in 2006

AEGIS The sea-based system is intended to intercept short to medium range hostile missiles in the ascent and descent phase of midcourse flight. Engaging missiles in the ascent phase reduces the overall BMD System's susceptibility to countermeasures. Builds upon technologies in the existing Aegis Weapons System now aboard U.S. Navy ships and uses the Standard Missile 3.

JAPANESE AEGIS DESTROYER

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is the sea-based element of the Missile Defense Agency’s Ballistic Missile Defense System that has been tactically certified, deployed and contributes to the ongoing BMD System under development. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense leverages and builds upon capabilities inherent in the Aegis Weapon System, Standard Missile, and Navy Ballistic Missile Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence systems. Aegis is at sea, on patrol, certified, and on alert, performing a strategic role in Homeland Defense.

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Long Range Surveillance and Track: 1. Aegis Destroyers, on Ballistic Missile Defense patrol, detect

and track Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and report track data to the missile defense system. This capability shares tracking data to cue other missile defense sensors and provides fire control data to Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. To date, sixteen Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers have been upgraded with the Long Range Surveillance and Track capability.

2. At-sea tracking events and flight tests have verified the capability to track Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and demonstrated the connectivity and reliability of long-haul transmission of track data across nine time zones.

Engagement Capability 1. Aegis Cruisers and Long Range Surveillance and Track

Destroyers are equipped with the capability to intercept short and medium range, unitary and separating ballistic missile threats with the Standard Missile 3.

2. Flight tests are conducted using operational warships, operated by fleet Sailors and Officers. Each test progressively increases the operational realism and complexity of targets and scenarios. To date, there have been nine successful intercepts out of eleven attempts. The next flight mission is scheduled for summer, 2008.

3. The engagement capability will be resident in three Aegis Cruisers and 15 Destroyers by 2009. Additionally, the capability is present on several Japanese ships and other nations are interested.

Testing To date, including a dual engagement in November, 2007 and the first test by an allied Navy in December, 2007, the Aegis BMD has had 12 intercepts in 14 attempts, including two intercepts by two interceptors during one test. Multiple tests are planned for each year. Future Capabilities 1. Increased precision track data via radar signal

processing upgrades, improving both Long Range Surveillance and Track and engagement capabilities

2. Defense against intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles

3. Increased international participation in sea-based ballistic missile defense capabilities

TERMINAL PHASE DEFENSE A missile enters the terminal phase when the warhead falls back into the atmosphere. This phase generally lasts from 30 seconds to one minute. The primary elements in the Terminal Defense Segment are: 1. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 2. PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) 3. Arrow, a joint effort between the U.S. and Israel 4. Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a

co-developmental program with Germany and Italy

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) 1. THAAD will destroy a ballistic missile as it

transitions from the midcourse to terminal phase of its trajectory

2. A land-based element that has the capability to shoot down a short or medium range ballistic missile in its final stages of flight

3. Consists of four principal components: truck-mounted launchers; interceptors; radars; and command, control and battle management (C2BM)

4. All system components fit inside a C-130 aircraft for transport around the world

Arrow 1. Developed jointly by the U.S. and Israel.

Provides capability to defend against short and medium-range ballistic missiles

2. Became operational in October 2000 3. Arrow Deployability Program (ADP)

supports Israel's acquisition of a third Arrow battery and Arrows' interoperability with U.S. systems

4. Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP) includes both technical cooperation to improve the performance of the AWS and a cooperative test and evaluation program to validate the improved performance

PATRIOT PAC-3 Program 1. The most mature elements of the

BMDS 2. Transferred to the U. S. Army in 2003. 3. MDA still responsible for PAC-3's

integration into BMDS 4. Builds on the previous PATRIOT air

and missile defense infrastructure 5. PAC-3 missiles were deployed to

Southwest Asia as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003

PATRIOT

Medium Extended Air Defense System 1. A cooperative effort between the United

States, Germany, and Italy to develop an air and missile defense system that is mobile and transportable

2. Capable of countering ballistic missiles and air-breathing threats such as aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles, utilizing a radar with a 360 degree capability

3. Uses the combat-proven Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) as a platform

4. MEADS' role in ballistic missile defense is to bridge the gap between man-portable systems like the Stinger missile and the higher levels of the (BMDS), such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system

5. Offers the opportunity for U. S. forces to work in conjunction with our allies and contributes to the interoperability of U. S. and allied forces ballistic missile defense systems

6. Future development will be an Army-led effort because of its close association with PAC-3

Sensors An effective layered defense incorporates a wide-range of sensors to detect and track threat missiles through all phases of their trajectory. Satellites and a family of land-and sea-based radars provide worldwide sensor coverage.

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) The restructured Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) will be a constellation of interoperable Research and Development (R&D) satellites and supporting ground infrastructure for the detection, tracking and discrimination of ballistic missiles. Data from STSS will be used to allow BMDS interceptors to engage incoming missiles earlier in flight. Plans are for STSS to be incorporated into the missile defense Test Bed beginning in 2006-2007.

Defense Support Program (DSP) Satellites Existing Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, now orbiting the earth in a geosynchronous orbit, provide global coverage for early warning, tracking and identification. Besides warning of a ballistic missile launch, satellite sensors can develop an early estimate of where the hostile missile is headed. Integration of DSP into the initial missile defense capability provides first, accurate warning and early tracking of a ballistic missile launch.

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) constellation will provide early warning of ballistic missile attacks and accurate state vector information to effectively cue other Ballistic Missile Defense System elements to support, intercept and negate the threat. Currently under development by the U.S. Air Force, SBIRS will provide early warning messages, accurate launch point estimates to support theater attack operations, radar cue for enhanced active defense for both theater operations and Ground Missile Defense operations.

Early Warning Radars (EWR) MDA is upgrading the hardware and software of existing ground-based radars located in California, Alaska and overseas for incorporation into initial defense capabilities. These upgrades will allow the radar to more accurately determine where an incoming ballistic missile is headed.

THAAD Radar The TPS-X radar produced for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system will be upgraded to be used in the Test Bed to validate algorithms and support forward based capability for near and long-term missile defense capabilities.

Forward Deployable Radars (FDR) Forward Deployable Radars would provide additional layers of sensor capability and more effective tracking of hostile missiles. Forward basing of ground based radars places the radar where it can obtain data from early parts of an ICBM’s trajectory and provides for early and accurate target-tracing and signature data, permitting earlier launch of defense interceptors and a greater battle space within which they can operate. Derived from the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) X-band radar, it is air-transportable, adding the ability to quickly move the radar to where it is most needed.

Pols 5 PP12

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