POLS 425 U.S. Foreign Policy

Week 2: Major WorldviewsPractice and Analytical

Implications

January 17, 2007

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Three Readings

Mearscheimer and Walt, “An Unncessary War”

RUPE, “Behind the War in Iraq”

Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Liberal Realism”

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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An Unnecessary War

Why was the U.S.war against Iraqunnecessary?

Professors John Mearscheimer and Stephen Walt

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Why was the War Unnecessary? The war was unnecessary because the

justifications for the war were based on distorted history, and more importantly, faulty logic

The primary flaw in the argument for war was that Saddam, as the leader of sovereign state, was somehow immune to the laws of realism, that he was a fundamentally irrational and therefore undeterrable “madman”

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Why was the War Unnecessary?

The logic of realism tells us that “madman” arguments are, on their face, almost always wrong!

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Why was the War Unnecessary?

Key assumptions and logic in Realism

Actors are presumed to be rational

Saddam, as a rational actor, was deterrable

The principle of deterrability means that Saddam did not represent a military threat to the United States

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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"I acted because I was not about to leavethe security of the American people inthe hands of a madman. I was notabout to stand by and wait and trust in

the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein”- George W. Bush October 10, 2003

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Was Saddam a Serial Aggressor?

A look at the evidence

Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): The “First” Gulf War

Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Iran-Iraq War

Iraq was threatened by the emergence of new, very hostile regime

Iran was diplomatically isolated

Iraq’s was supported by a “coalition of the willing” including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and France

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Iran-Iraq War

U.S. support of Iraq: a critical point

Realist logic: Washington feared the spread of Iran's theocratic, anti-Western ideology, which threatened American interests in the region

With American support, Iraq’s capacity to achieve its strategic goal was very high

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait

The authors: “Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was primarily an attempt to deal with Iraq's continued vulnerability”

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait

“We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America”

April GlaspieUS Ambassador to Iraq

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Why didn’t Saddam Back Down? Wasn’t that irrational?

Remember: Acting rationally does not mean you always make the right decision; sometimes you make a bad decision, but this is because actors generally do not have access to “perfect information”

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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Why didn’t Saddam Back Down?

Other points

Once the US response was unmistakable, Saddam tried to negotiate a diplomatic settlement

During the conflict, Iraq did not use chemical-biological weapons against the US or its allies; nor were “Scuds” used against Saudi Arabia

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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What about a nuclear Iraq? Now that’s a clear threat, isn’t it?

Direct threat to the United States

Indirect threat, through “nuclear blackmail”

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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and

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“The first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they [Iraqis] do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration”

- Condoleeza Rice