Polls And Poor

1

The Polls and the Poor Filipinos:

Pikon, Talo or

Gutom1, Natalo2 Introduction I do not wish to question what is now fact. That Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has been sworn in as President. I intend instead to analyze what the last elections had brought out aside from this fact. Those who voted for the President have dismissed the complaints of the opposition, mainly the Poe supporters, as mere rantings. They called for a healing period that could lead to national unity and reconciliation. The President herself promised to show the example. Forgive and forget. But were the Poe supporters plain sore losers? Or were these the chronic poor who saw the recent elections as one of their remaining hopes and lost, deprived even of expressing their true sentiments openly in a democratic society? During the 40 days of fasting from the official results, only the results of an exit poll and the continuing tally of the election watchdog gave an idea of what is to be expected. In fact one week after elections, a presidential candidate already conceded to Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on the basis of this information. It later turned out that the margin of victory was less than initially projected. The Poe voters continue to cry out that the release of information and the method of canvassing were designed to accommodate irregularities in the count to favor the incumbent. It might be more than sour-graping for them. I intend to show that this status quo which seems to perpetuate poverty and inequity cannot go on because the economic and social situation, as depicted by some trends from forty years back when I think the slide began, is anything but assuring. And this vitriol from the seemingly vanquished may be the early tremors of the seething socioeconomic volcano.

1 About 3 months after this paper was first completed, two press releases on hunger came out in the news. On 4 October, Social Weather Station reported that 15.1% of household heads said their families had experienced hunger, without having anything to eat, at least once in the last 3 months. On 12 October, Today newspaper posted an article on abs-cbnNEWS.com by the Food and Nutrition Research Institute claiming that 80 percent of Filipinos were wracked by food insecurity or lack of food to eat in 2001 due to financial inability to purchase food. 2 By Tomas P. Africa. Prepared in July 2004. Updated in October 2004

2

Forty days of fast On 20 June 2004, the tabulation of votes cast during the May 10 elections was finally completed. On the basis of 180 certificates of canvass, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected President3. But before this final canvass of Congress was out, for forty days, two sets of election result forecasts circulated and based on these both the GMA and FPJ camps jumped to conclusions and drafted plans of action. These were the results of the so-called exit polls conducted by the Social Weather Station (SWS) and the tallies being done by an accredited organization, the National Citizen’s Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)4. The SWS, a reputable tried-and-tested polling outfit, announced a few days after election the following results:

3 Report of the Joint Committee on the Canvass of Votes for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections, http://www.inq7.net/verbatim/Congress-canvassing-committee-report.pdf. 4 The National Citizen’s Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel) conducts a parallel, independent quick count for national elections – a service it has been doing, at no cost to the government, in every election since the 1984 Batasan polls.

(as of 2004-06-26, 08:21 pm) 1. Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria (GMA) 12,905,808 40.0% 2. Poe, Fernando, Jr. (FPJ) 11,782,232 36.5% 3. Lacson, Panfilo 3,510,080 10.9% 4. Roco, Raul 2,082,762 6.5% 5. Villanueva, Eduardo 1,988,218 6.2%

TOTAL 32,269,100 100.0%

Table 1. Results of Congress Canvass (as of 2004-06-20) Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria (GMA) 12,905,808 40.0% Poe, Fernando, Jr. (FPJ) 11,782,232 36.5% Lacson, Panfilo 3,510,080 10.9% Roco, Raul 2,082,762 6.5% Villanueva, Eduardo 1,988,218 6.2%

TOTAL 32,269,100 100.0%

Table 2. Results of Exit Polls (as of 2004-05-19) Survey responses Initial Adjusted Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria 41% 45% Poe, Fernando, Jr. 32% 34% Lacson, Panfilo 9% 10% Roco, Raul 5% 6% Villanueva, Eduardo 5% 5% No answer 8%

TOTAL 100% 100%

3

The SWS Exit Poll interviews were conducted on May 10 in people's homes, after they had come home from voting. By May 13, 2004, the poll obtained data from a final national sample of 5,963 registered voters, of whom 4,824 voted and 1,139 did not. There were also 1,462 refusals, implying a 20% refusal rate of the 7,425 (= 5,963 + 1,462) personally encountered by the field staff.5 The NAMFREL closed out its tally on 5 June 2004, having completed 79.2 percent of its projected tallies from 171,395 out of 216,382 precincts nationwide. It was unfinished but the results showed that although the rankings were the same the shares of votes were much closer between GMA and FPJ.6 The opposition also suspected that areas known to be GMA strongholds were counted first and that the tally was terminated when Poe was closing in. This could not be substantiated as NAMFREL did not release to the press the areas covered in the tallies that it released. GMA won. But could the results have been otherwise? The Poe supporters had claimed that the SWS and the NAMFREL manipulated the results of their surveys/tallies to condition the minds of the electorate that GMA had indeed won and to justify any ‘cheating’ to be carried out by the administration in the preparation of the canvasses. The results of the NAMFREL tally were close to that of the canvass by Congress. The SWS results were slightly off, underestimating the Poe votes by 4.5 percent. In spite of having a fine track record, among others, with its exit polls on national elections since 1992, concerns were raised in the SWS estimates for the

5 http://www.sws.org.ph/pr051904.htm 6 http://www.eleksyon2004.com/display.php?fld=tally&art=tally_namfrel.php; http://www.sws.org.ph/EX04b_namfrel%20by%20region.htm

Table 3. Results of NAMFREL Tally (as of 2004-06-05) Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria 9,674,597 39.0% Poe, Fernando, Jr. 9,158,999 37.0% Lacson, Panfilo 2,687,574 10.8% Roco, Raul 1,727,995 7.0% Villanueva, Eduardo 1,526,925 6.2%

TOTAL 24,776,090 100.0%

4

presidential race, particularly the votes for Poe, while the congressional canvass was going on.

Table 4. Comparative Results of Counted Votes for President Choices Congress SWS NAMFREL

Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria 40.0% 41% 39.0% Poe, Fernando, Jr. 36.5% 32% 37.0% Lacson, Panfilo 10.9% 9% 10.8% Roco, Raul 6.5% 5% 7.0% Villanueva, Eduardo 6.2% 5% 6.2% No answer 8%

If the SWS results were compared with the congressional canvass, the 8 percent ‘no-answers’ in the results of its exit polls imply that SWS underestimated the votes for Poe (4.5 percent), Lacson (1.9 percent), Roco (1.5 percent) and Villanueva (1.2 percent) and overestimated that for Arroyo (1 percent). What may also be disconcerting is the amount of outright refusals in its exit poll. From the distribution of survey respondents below and from the quoted SWS release, the refusals amounted to 20 percent. What amount of this were FPJ votes?7

Total personally encountered by field staff: 7425 Less: Refusals: 1462 Equals: Consented to be Interviewed: 5963 Less: Did not vote: 1139 Equals: Voted: 4824 Less: Invalid votes: 379 Equals: Valid votes: 4445

I understand that the percentages of refusals and non-voters were not any different from those obtained at the exit poll done during the Estrada time and it was not too different from one economic class to the other. But SWS and TNS-Trends should study this (non-) respondent behavior more closely as this reaction may not be assumed as similar to that observed in the past.8 This 7 Mercy Abad of TNS Trends, the outfit that conducts the data gathering for SWS says however that ‘some sociologists [do] assert that the FPJ vote may be suppressed in an exit poll because people might be too shy to admit that they are for FPJ. This is contrary to what we observed in field. Those for FPJ were more assertive and vocal. They want a change.’ 8 A review committee organized at the initiative of SWS and composed of four members from the academe and three from the Marketing and Opinion Research of the Philippines released last October 2004 its

5

campaign had been one of the most bitterly fought since the 1986 snap elections. A closer scrutiny of the SWS regional forecasts compared to the final results in fact bears out that GMA indeed got a favorable forecast of votes from the exit polls while the canvassing was going on in Congress. (See Appendix F.) If the assumption of similarity in such behavior as in the past were not valid in this particular survey, the conjecture that Poe may have won in the voting but lost in the elections cannot be entirely dismissed9. And the behavior of the opposition, like filibustering, sporadic rallies, and inflammatory declarations, during the Congressional canvass might perhaps be explained in rational terms10. But a question that lingers is why was FPJ able to put up a very good fight against the incumbent President in spite of his limited educational and zero public service background, lack of campaign resources, ineffective campaign machinery, near absence of platform of governance, and unfavorable media exposure for periods of time. He won in 37 provinces compared to Arroyo’s 39, 6 regions vs. Arroyo’s 9, and in 14 chartered cities vs. Arroyo’s 6. He had a plurality of 1.8 million in Luzon while Arroyo had a winning margin of 2.3 million in the Visayas and 500 thousand in Mindanao.

Where did they win?, by Area Area Lacson Arroyo Poe Roco Villanueva

Regions - 9 6 1 - Provinces 1 39 37 2 - Chartered Cities* - 6 13 - -

Winning margins (millions) Luzon xxxxxx 1.756 xxxxxx xxxxxx Visayas xxxxxx 2.324 xxxxxx xxxxxx Mindanao xxxxxx 0.496 xxxxxx xxxxxx *Malabon excluded; available information combines it with Navotas municipality. Canvass also did not provide separate tallies for cities of Angeles, Lucena, Olongapo, Mandaue, Butuan, General Santos and Iligan.

findings from the review on the exit polls. Apparent discrepancies of the exit poll from the official results arose from, among others, the huge percentage of non-respondents, especially in Metro Manila. 9 That is, if one considers voting as one of the two components of an election; the other is counting the votes. 10 SWS also estimated that 2.1 percent (over 900 thousand) of registered voters did not vote because they could not find their names in the voters list, although the portion of Poe voters among these could not be determined.

6

The Class D and E Voters It has been accepted that most of the voters for Poe come from the D and E socioeconomic classes11, where the bulk of the electorate belongs. SWS had estimated that 7 percent of voters belong to the ABC classes; 64 percent, to the D class; and 28 percent, to the E class. Poll surveys confirmed this although GMA consistently got the bigger share of votes than Poe from the D class from end of January up to early April12. (Appendix A) It was also reported in the same release that the combined shares of those with no preference, refused to be interviewed, and were undecided crept up from 3 percent during 23 January to 8 February, to 8 percent during February 16 to 20, and to 10 percent during 27 March to 4 April. This same pattern was evident in the vote-rich D and E classes.

Normally the trend of the ‘undecideds’ should decrease as elections near and as platforms become clear. But this did not; it even went up. Were these the voters who did not have preference for a candidate yet because the relevant issues that had to be discussed had not been discussed? Or again, were these votes for FPJ? Some of those who were for the least qualified candidate for President might have registered their preference as ‘undecided’ rather than bear 11 Class AB households have the following characteristics – dwelling unit made of heavy, high quality materials, usually very well maintained, not in need of repair, well-painted, sprawling lawn or garden, expensive furnishings, located in exclusive subdivision, house stands out if in mixed neighborhood. Class C – dwelling unit made of mixed heavy and light materials, well maintained, may or may not have a lawn or yard, adequate furnishings, usually found in mixed neighborhood or middle class subdivision. Class D – dwelling unit made of light, cheap materials, generally shabby appearance, no lawn or yard, scanty furnishings, crowded or shabby neighborhood. Class E – dwelling unit is small, dilapidated, temporary makeshift structure, usually a barong-barong, cramped space, bare furnishings, located in slum districts. 12 Pulse Asia’s March 2004 National Survey on Presidential and Vice-Presidential Preferences. Media Release 12 April 2004

Table 5. First Choice Presidential Preference, January to April 2004

Preference/Socioeconomic Class Total ABC D E None/Refused/Undecided

March 27- April 4 10% 6% 12% 8% February 16 – 20 8% 11% 8% 7% January 23 – February 8 3% 5% 3% 3%

7

harassment or losing political favor. The bitter campaign conducted over a significantly fragmented electorate apparently might have brought this feeling on, especially for D and E voters. But were these elections bereft of issues? Did voters make their choices on the basis of some issues or platforms they wanted the government to focus on? The Issues As Viewed by the Voters There was a nationwide survey of 1620 respondents from 324 barangays (110 urban and 214 rural) located in 17 cities and 90 municipalities that was conducted from 27-30 March 2004. The results were unpublished since this was funded by a political organization, which chose not to release the findings. One distinctive feature of this inquiry was that it asked the respondents who among the Presidential candidates they believed could solve the problems of graft and corruption, peace and order, unemployment and the lack of livelihood opportunities. The respondents ranked these problems as follows: first, lack of jobs and livelihood, followed by graft and corruption, and last, peace and order. In particular the D and E voters ranked unemployment first, lack of peace and order second, and graft and corruption third. It was interesting to note that the E voters were the least concerned about graft and corruption. As to who could solve these, the differences between candidates were barely significant. This was no surprise as there was no serious debate on issues of governance during the campaign. A little over a third (35.6 percent) of them perceived Arroyo as the candidate who could solve the lack of jobs and livelihood. Nearly a third (31.5 percent) felt that Lacson could solve the peace and order problem. No one was clearly identified by the voters as the one wo could eradicate graft and corruption. Most of those who voted for Arroyo liked her capability to solve the lack of jobs and livelihood among others. In the case of Lacson, his would-be voters felt that his strength was in solving the peace and order problem. For Roco, it was solving the lack of jobs and livelihood and for Villanueva, it was graft and corruption. For Poe, his would-be voters felt that their candidate could come out strong on all three issues. It appears that somehow the voters by themselves had identified issues and linked these to their preferred candidates in the absence of debate and interactive discussion of issues during the campaign. No one will ever know if the choices of the electorate would have been different had there been the debates, as was the case in the past.

8

The Income Divide So GMA obtained a million votes more than Poe. It is time to move on and leave the rancor and imperfections behind. However the strength of Poe could be mainly attributed to the D and E voters for whom the government has consistently failed to sufficiently provide. Ending up in the losing end again may further intensify the discontentment by most of them, especially coming out of this bitter election exercise. I am not sure if the election did provide the chance for them to vent out their feelings of hopelessness and despair over the status quo. Has this prevailing sense of desperation translated into further fragmentation of society? Will a release of this tension in some (hopefully non-violent) form come in the near future? How wide in the nation is the breach in terms of lack of income and assets, opportunities and access, and participation and power in society? The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) actually views these inadequacies as constituting a broad view of poverty, distinguishing three related dimensions: poverty of income and assets - sustained or sustainable livelihood; poverty of access to essential services, and poverty of participation and power. Poverty reduction in one dimension (e.g. income poverty) often requires poverty reduction in the others as well. For poverty reduction to be sustainable, the poor have to be empowered to reduce their own poverty, that is, they have to be given the means to do it themselves. Even as we limit the focus solely to poverty of income13, the gaping inequality in its distribution illustrates how much wider and comprehensive the poverty really is. Maldistribution of Income Available information provides sufficient basis to conclude the existence of a very wide gap in the distribution of income and assets. There is also enough reason to conjecture that the distributions of opportunities and access, and those of participation and power are likewise lopsided and reflect a deep division within the nation. Median family income increased by 80 times since 1961. But its distribution barely moved. The lowest half (50 percent) of families had only 17.6 percent of total income in 1961. Forty years later, they still had essentially the same (17.8 13 The Annual Poverty Indicators Survey conducted by the National Statistics Office can provide indicators on the other dimensions of poverty at the provincial level.

9

percent). The upper half had more than 80 percent of total income during the same forty-year period. Per se, this income distribution picture has been consistently lopsided for over four decades.

Table 6. Median Income, in pesos, and Income Distribution

Family Income 1961 2000 Median (P) 1,105 88,782 % Share of Upper 50% of families 82.4 82.2 % Share of Lower 50% of families 17.6 17.8 Source: National Statistics Office. Website: http://www.census.gov.ph; Family Income and Expenditures publications.

Table 7. Measures of Income Distribution in 16 Countries in Asia Gini coefficient Period covered Country

Number of cases Mean Min Max

Standard deviation 1st yr Last yr

Ratio of income shares:

top/bottom quintiles

Nepal 1 30.06 30.06 30.06 1984 1984 4.43

Lao PDR 1 30.40 30.40 30.40 1992 1992 4.21

Pakistan 9 31.5 29.91 32.44 0.86 1969 1991 4.68

India 31 32.55 29.17 37.05 2.06 1951 1992 4.98

China 12 32.68 25.7 37.8 3.78 1980 1992 5.17

Indonesia 11 33.49 30.70 38.59 2.17 1964 1993 5.22

Viet Nam 1 35.71 35.71 35.71 1992 1992 5.51

Bangladesh 10 34.51 28.27 39.00 3.52 1963 1992 5.72

Republic of Korea 14 34.19 29.82 39.1 1953 1988 6.29

Singapore 6 40.12 37.00 42.00 1.81 1973 1989 6.71

Japan 23 34.82 32.50 37.60 1.35 1962 1990 7.06

Sri Lanka 9 41.71 30.10 47.80 6.10 1953 1990 7.98

Hong Kong 7 41.48 37.30 45.18 2.81 1971 1991 9.46

Thailand 8 45.48 41.28 51.50 3.78 1962 1992 11.65

Philippines 7 47.62 45.00 51.32 2.46 1957 1991 12.00

Malaysia 6 50.36 48.00 53.00 1.96 1970 1989 14.18

10

Moreover, the Philippines was near the bottom of the list in income equality based on series data of income distribution of 16 countries in Asia available until the early nineties (Table 7)14. There are no data yet for more recent years, neither is there evidence that our ranking in this list would have improved a decade later. And we know that the economies of Thailand, and Malaysia grew faster than the Philippines during this period. In 1985, a family that earned at least P178,000 was included in the top one percent. The highest one percent of families (less than 100 thousand) had an income share equivalent to the combined income shares of the bottom 32 percent of families, about 3.15 million. Fifteen years later in 2000, a family that earned P830,000 was included in the top one percent. The income earned by the highest one percent of families (about 150 thousand) was as large as the combined incomes of the bottom 38 percent of families, about 5.8 million. (See Appendix B.) Another way of analyzing distributions is by examining the dispersion or variability of component groups. In this particular instance, all the families are lined up from lowest to highest in terms of their incomes earned into one hundred groups of equal numbers. For each of the one hundred groups, the coefficient of variation (CV), which is an articulation of variability measured in terms of the standard deviation, was calculated to see if the earned incomes of families are spread far apart or clustered. A high CV indicates wider variability within the group; thus incomes among families vary widely. A lower CV implies that the family incomes are more alike, the spread is narrower. In Appendix C, only the top quintile (top 5 percent of families) in the 2000 family income distribution had a CV of more than 1 percent (6.56 percent). On the other hand there was a large cluster comprising the 4th quintile up to the 16th quintile (that is, from the bottom 16 to upper 80 percent of families) with CVs ranging in the narrow band from 0.08 percent to 0.11 percent. The incomes of some 65 percent (in the middle part of the distribution) of families do not vary much.

14 Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire. A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality’. The World Bank Economic Review Vol. 10, No.3, pp.565-91

11

CVs of Income Quintiles 2000

0.00%

1.00%2.00%

3.00%

4.00%

5.00%6.00%

7.00%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Income Quintiles

CV

s

This heavy clustering may be one reason why cut-offs to determine the low-, the middle- and the high-income classes are difficult to establish.15 There might just be a very, very small high-income class, a small middle-income class and a very, very large low-income class in the Philippine situation. Note that official poverty incidence is based on a poverty line derived from normative nutritional requirements and priced accordingly, independent of the income distribution. Thus the number of the poor can go up or down on the basis of changes in the poverty threshold without a substantive re-distribution of income. Such movement can merely be caused by relative price changes rather than policy-driven income shifts. In 2000 poverty incidence in the country or the proportion of families with per capita incomes below the poverty threshold was 28.4 percent.16 In 2000 the legislated (minimum) daily wage rate of non-agricultural workers in Metro Manila was P249.3117. This translates to annual earnings of P65,820 for the family he supports, placing it in the 37th percentile of the income distribution. On the other hand, the Filipino overseas worker remitted on average P66, 146 during the six-month period covering April to September 2000. This translates to an approximate remittance of P11 thousand (about $25018) monthly or P132

15This is probably why the ABCDE scheme used by market research firms has been recognized even at the levels of policy discussions. As a side note, families in the ABC classes of roughly 7 percent of families had 31.7 percent income share; in the D class of 64 percent of families, 61.09 percent income share; and in the E class of 28 percent of families, 7.2 percent income share. 16 http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2000/00povin1.asp 17 P249.31 times 22 working days per month = P5,485 times 12 months = P65,820. 18 P66,146 (remittance over 6 months)divided by 6 months = P11,024 times 12 months = P132,292 (remittance over 12 months). Assuming the rate of P44:$1, P11,024 is equivalent to $250 and P132,292 is equivalent to $3,000.

12

thousand (about $3,000) annually.19 Based on the average remittances alone, the income of the family of the overseas worker in 2000 belonged to the 67th percentile, or the upper third of the distribution. A review of some indicators that have been available during the past four decades may provide us an idea of how this low point has been reached. Whether it is already the lowest point is not a concern of this study. Forty Years of Growth and Decline It has been 40 years from 1960 to 2000. During all this time, we tried to progress. Let me run by you some indicators. Economic output

Our gross domestic product (GDP) multiplied by 11 times, although many in the region exceeded this performance. Indonesia, by 18 times. Malaysia, by 39 times. Thailand, by 48 times. Korea, by 120 times. Singapore, by 132 times Hongkong, by 172 times.

19 These figures were obtained from the 2000 Survey on Overseas Filipinos conducted by the National Statistics Office.

Table 8. Gross Domestic Product, in US $ million

Country 1960 2000 2000/1960

Philippines 6,980 75,186 10.8 Hong Kong 950 163,261 171.9 Indonesia 8,670 153,255 17.7 Korea 3,810 457,219 120.0 Malaysia 2,290 89,321 39.0 Singapore 700 92,252 131.8 Thailand 2,560 121,927 47.6 Source: World Bank. World Development Report 1981 and 2002.

13

Government Finance

The income earned by government increased by about 194 times since 1967, the time of the first Marcos presidency. Government expenditures however rose by 234 times. The budget had almost always ended up in deficit.

Moreover, in the past decade the revenue effort has gone down from 19.4 in 1994 to 13.4 in 2003 and the fiscal position has gone down from a surplus of 0.3 percent in 1996 to 5.3 percent in 2003.

Table 9. Government Finance, in million pesos

Outlay 1967 1990 2000 2000/1967

Income 2,653 177,216 514,762 194Expenditures 2,913 211,756 682,460 234Source: National Statistics Office. Philippine Yearbook 2002

Questions the poor may never ask: How can the Philippine economy catch up or narrow down the big lead that these countries have over our country? How will we get the confidence of investors to bring in their financial and technological investments into the country like they have done in these countries? How will we assure them of a level playing field, and a consistent policy regime? How will we address the complaints of the industrialists about the high cost of power and the poor state of infrastructure? How will we control the rogue elements from the military and law enforcement agencies? How will we win back the hearts of our Muslim brethren and bring back peace and order in Mindanao?

14

Foreign trade

Our foreign merchandise trade has grown 60 times over the past four decades. Exports, by 71 times. Imports, by 50 times. But these have not been enough. The exchange rate was P2 to US$1 in 1960. In 2000, it was down to P50 to US$1.

Table 10. Revenue Effort and Fiscal Position, 1994-2003 % of GNP 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003Revenue Effort*

19.4 18.4 18.2 18.7 16.4 15.3 14.7 14.4 13.2 13.4

Fiscal Surplus (+)/Deficit (-)**

-0.5 -0.2 0.3 -1.0 -3.0 -3.2 -4.3 -4.4 -5.2 -5.3

Sources: * Philippine Institute of Development Studies website: http://dirp.pids.gov.ph/cgi-bin/sg?key.tbl; **Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas website: http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/spei/tab28.htm

Questions the poor may never ask: Do we aim for a balanced budget by 2010 or a deficit of 1 trillion by then? Are we ready to collect the right taxes from the evaders among the powerful? If we do not generate enough revenues, will we be willing to cut down expenditures on health and education, which the poor can only obtain from the government? Will we allow additional borrowings? Will we continue incorporating debt payments automatically into the budget? What will we do to improve public services, accountability for their quality and consequently reduce graft and corruption?

15

Overseas workers’ remittances

Were it not for the Filipinos working abroad who sent hard-earned cash to their families back home, the exchange rate could have deteriorated even more significantly. In 2000, overseas workers sent home through remittances P281.672 billion (National Accounts, in current prices, National Statistical Coordination Board). Using the reference rate of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas period average for 2000 of P44.17 to the US dollar, this was equivalent to roughly $6.4 billion.

Table 11. Foreign Trade, FOB value in US $ million

Merchandise trade

1960 2000 2000/1960

Total 1,159.96 69,465.65 59.9

Exports 535.44 38,078.25 71.1

Imports 624.52 31,387.40 50.3

Peso-US dollar rate

2 50 25.0

Source: National Statistics Office. Philippine Yearbook 2002.

Questions the poor may never ask: Will we open up trade with other countries? Shall we become an even stronger ally of the United States at any expense? What is our view on the One-China policy? Will trading with Taiwan affect our benefiting from the phenomenal growth of China as what Japan has been doing to get off its decade-old recession? Shall we remain being a member of the World Trade Organization? Do we forecast an exchange rate of P25 to the dollar or P100 to the dollar by 2010? Will we continue to support the same industries in our export initiatives and maintain the same trading partners? Will we increase our reliance on the overseas workers to send their remittances to help stabilize the exchange rate?

16

Table 12. Selected Merchandise Exports, FOB value, in US $ billion, 2000

Commodity Value

Electronic equipment & parts 22.179 Overseas workers remittances 6.376 Machinery & transport 5.909 Total mineral products 0.650 Coconut oil 0.460 Fish & prawns 0.321 Bananas 0.285 Source: National Statistics Office. Philippine Yearbook 2002.

Ranged against merchandise exports, this remittance figure comes in as the second major dollar earner after electronics exports. Note further that there is no import content in overseas workers remittances unlike some of the exports listed above.

Questions the poor may never ask: Considering the ageing societies in the developed countries, are we ready to export even larger numbers of migrant workers, especially women, who will provide the work force and at the same time prop up their public, including pension, funds? Will we increase our reliance on the overseas workers to send their remittances to help stabilize the exchange rate? Are we satisfied that they remit only cash? Can we train them to gather socio-economic intelligence in the countries or even households where they work in? Do we want them to promote a desired ‘Filipinization’ of the globe? Will we establish adequate support mechanisms and safety nets for them while abroad and their families who are left behind? Will we promote the study of languages and cultures to facilitate their assimilation into the societies they will work in?

17

There is a serious concern though that ought to be addressed. Their numbers range from 3-7 million. Taking the high estimate of 7 million and considering that the number of families is about 15 million, nearly half of the families in the Philippine population are directly affected by overseas employment. But these improvements in the real sector have not been enough. There are more mouths to feed… Population

By 2029 the 2000 population will double. 1.8 million individuals (more than the size of the population in Rizal province in 2000) are added every year. It has already tripled (in 2003) since 1960. From 4.4 million in the 60’s, the total number of families has also grown threefold to 15.3 million.

Table 13. Population, in millions

Number 1948 1960 2000 2000/1960

People 19.2 27.1 76.5 2.8 Families 4.43

(1961)15.3 3.5

Source: National Statistics Office. Philippine Yearbook 2002

Questions the poor may never ask: Will we have, and are we ready to have, a population of 100 million Filipinos by 2014? If the answer is no, how will we convince the population that government policies on family planning are moral? If our answer is yes, how will we alleviate the conditions of the poor who have the bigger families and are less likely to practice family planning?

18

Neither have we distributed very well the opportunities from our modest gains.

Education

Every year at least 1.5 million children reach school age and hope to begin their education. It appears that every year, the government is finding it more and more difficult to meet this need. Already there has been a slight decline in the (simple) literacy rate, that is, to read and write a simple message, in the past 10 years.

Table 14. Literacy

Philippines 1970 1990 2000 Simple literacy rate 72 94 92 Source: National Statistics Office. Philippine Yearbook 2002

Table 15. Internet Access

Internet Subscriber per 100 Persons 1999

Brunei Darussalam 4.19Indonesia 0.14Malaysia 3.08Philippines 0.47Singapore 24.20Thailand 1.35Source: ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2001

Questions the poor may never ask: How do we intend to put these children through the educational system, as it has been established that in the medium term this is key to the reduction of poverty? How will we provide educational materials and facilities, including computers and Internet access, as well as good teachers to provide knowledge? Will the bridge program become mandatory?

19

Employment

For the past 15 years, 10.8 million found jobs. Most (7.1 million) of the jobs were created in the services sector. Agriculture and industry had less than 2 million more jobs. Industry share of employment, supposedly the job creator or multiplier, has not gone up enough (1 % up). That of agriculture went down by 11 percent. Some 1 million individuals found work during each of the last three years and the rates have shown some improvements. But the numbers of the unemployed remained at an average of 3 million and the underemployed close to 5 million.

Table 16a. Employment, October

Sector 1987 2003 Difference

Total: Thousands 20,795 31,520 10,725 9,940 11,675 1,735 Agriculture: Thousands

% Share 47.8 37.0 -10.8 3,045 4,941 1,896 Industry: Thousands

% Share 14.6 15.7 1.1 7,810 14,904 7,094 Services: Thousands

% Share 37.6 47.3 9.7 Source: National Statistics Office. Website: http://www.census.gov.ph

Table 16b. Employment, October

Quarter/Year 1/1987 4/2003 Difference

Total Labour Force: Thousands

31,684 35,078 3,394

28,087 31,524 3,437 Employed: ThousandsRate 88.6% 89.8%

3,597 3,554 (43) Unemployed: ThousandsRate 11.4% 10.1%

4,743 4,964 221 Underemployed: ThousandsRate 15.0% 14.2%

Source: National Statistics Office. Website: http://www.census.gov.ph

20

The number of farms has decreased from 1991 to 2002. Average farm size has decreased likewise.

Gender and Development

The Philippines fared better than other neighboring countries in terms of women participating in government, business and the economy. However it does not do as well when the composite indicator, Gender-related Development Indicator (GDI), of a long and healthy life, literacy and a decent standard of living is considered.20 20The Human Development Report 2001 produced by the United Nations Development Programme calculated the Human Development Index (HDI) of 162 countries. The HDI was based on life expectancy

Table 17. Data on Farms (Agriculture)

Farm, number and size 1991 2002 Difference

Number (in millions) 4.6 4.5 -0.1 Total area (in million hectares) 9.97 9.19 -0.8 Average size (in hectares) 2.16 2.04 -0.12 Source: National Statistics Office. Website: http://www.census.gov.ph

Questions the poor may never ask: How do we understand the effects on poverty reduction of a minimum wage rate? What kind of support will we give small and medium industries, which can provide the poor jobs and livelihood? Are we sufficiently promoting the culture of entrepreneurship? Are we predisposed to restrict strikes/work stoppages in industrial/export zones to assure investors of a strike-free regime? Is this moral? Is the decline in jobs and prospects in agriculture programmed or an accident? Are we open to increasingly import food products from other countries? How do we view agrarian reform and its impact on farm productivity?

21

Environment

at birth, adult literacy rate and gross enrolment ratio, and per capita Gross Domestic Product. It also calculated the Gender-related Development Index (GDI), a variant of the HDI accounting for gender differentials.

Table 18. Selected Gender and Development Indicators, 1999

Country Seats in parliament

held by women (%

of total)

Female legislators,

sr. officials & managers

(% of total)

Female professional & technical workers (%

of total)

Gender-related

Development Index (GDI)

Rank Japan 10.8 9 44 11

Hong Kong - 22 38 23 Singapore 6.5 21 42 26 Korea 5.9 5 31 29 Malaysia 14.5 21 44 55

Thailand - 22 55 58

Philippines 11.8 33 63 62 Source: United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2001.

Questions the poor may never ask: What is the relationship between family planning and reproductive health considering the high maternal mortality rate? Why are there bigger percentages of females who are obese and who are underweight? Is it alright to society as a whole that the largest proportion of women who go overseas to work are aged 25-29 and are hired as laborers or unskilled workers? What measures have been put in place to effectively control, if not eradicate, violence against women here and abroad?

22

We have managed to reduce the number, area and annual allowable cut of timber licenses from the highs during the early years of martial law. But the harm has been done. See how we compare with our ASEAN neighbors.

Table 20. Selected Forestry Indicators in ASEAN, 2000

Country Proportion of Land

Area covered by Forest (%)

Average Annual Rate

of Deforestation

(%)

National Protected

Areas (as % of Land Area)

Cambodia 52.9 0.6 18.5

Indonesia 58.0 1.2 19.7 Lao PDR 54.4 0.4 13.1 Malaysia 58.7 1.2 5.3 Myanmar 52.3 1.4 0.9

Philippines 19.4 1.4 5.7

Singapore 3.3 0.0 4.9

Thailand 28.9 0.7 13.9

Viet Nam 30.2 -0.5 3.5 Source: Asian Development Bank. Key Indicators 2003.

Many have said that our seas have been over-fished; however I have not been able to access data to objectify this claim.

Table 19. Selected Forestry Indicators: Number, Area and Allowable Cut of Timber Licenses

Calendar Year

Number Area Annual Allowable Cut

1972-73 338 8,453 16,810

1986 159 5,849 8,516 1992 71 2,311 1,936 1998 21 1,036 524 Source: Forest Management Bureau. In the Philippine Yearbook 2002, National Statistics Office

23

After going through these data, evidence holds that there has been more decline than growth in the past forty years and this has resulted in growing inequity, rising poverty in all its dimensions, and weakening competitiveness of both the economy and society. Pro-poor Growth? It might be worthwhile to ponder on the kind of growth that the government should strive at. Largely the kind of growth that has been experienced by the economy has not succeeded in fulfilling the requirements of pro-poor growth as described below21: Policy-makers need not only be concerned with the rate of growth but also its structure and quality. Unless governments take timely corrective action, economic growth can become lopsided and flawed. Determined efforts are needed to avoid growth that is jobless, ruthless, rootless, voiceless, and futureless. Unfortunately these features can be seen in the Philippine experience. Jobless growth occurs when the overall economy grows but does not expand the opportunities for development. It means long hours and very low incomes for the millions of people in low-productive work in agriculture and informal sector. Labor force statistics have been consistently portraying this scenario. Ruthless growth means that the fruits of economic growth mostly benefit the rich, leaving millions of people struggling in ever-deepening poverty. Income distribution statistics attest to this disturbing. Rootless growth is the one that causes

21 Mr. Onder Yucer, UNDP Resident Representative. Opening Statement at the Symposium on Pro-Poor Growth Policies organized by UNDP Pakistan and the Pakistan Institute of Developing Economics in March 2003

Questions the poor may never ask: How much further can our resources support the increasing population? Are we aware that poverty has contributed to deforestation in the rural areas? To what extent will we allow the exploration or exploitation of our mineral resources? How far are we from desertification as depletion of forest and water reserves continues?

24

people’s cultural identity to wither, like the growth in the Gross National Product attributed to remittances from overseas workers. Voiceless growth means that the economy has not been accompanied by empowerment. Voiceless growth can also be growth that gives women only a minor role in an economy’s management and direction. Lastly, futureless growth is the one where the present generation squanders resources (forests, water, minerals, etc.) needed by future generations. In the short term Representative Jose Salceda22 gave a succinct summary of the overall prospects of the country. I agree with most of his conclusions and I reproduce in full relevant points. “The key downside risk to the ongoing growth momentum remains external, particularly higher commodity prices given China's appetite for inputs. This has driven global oil prices to new highs since the 1991 Iraq crisis. In turn, this is putting upward pressure on consumer prices that could compel the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to raise domestic interest rates, which could in turn dampen domestic demand. xxx… The other risk is internal, namely: (1) a P200 billion annual fiscal deficit that has, thus far, been contained despite the pressure from the elections, and (2) the huge public debt of P5.2 trillion, which, when combined with higher domestic interest rates, could further increase an already huge public debt service. Nevertheless, the domestic economy appears to have sufficient internal momentum that could ride on favourable global economic trends to at least maintain a GDP growth rate of 5.5% for the rest of the year, driven principally by continued well-targeted expenditures in agriculture, bright prospects for telecommunications and IT sectors and major public investments in transportation that would be outlayed in the next nine months. In the long term, however, rapid economic growth needed to reduce poverty can only be sustained by investments.” The fresh mandate given the reelected President cannot be solely anchored on merely continuing past economic policies and present political dispensations. It also expects a fresh outlook toward the participation of the people, especially the

22His view was featured in the 9 June 2004 issue of BusinessWorldOnline. He was the chairman of the Congressional Oversight Committee that monitors performance of the president and of nearly every cabinet department and government agency.

25

bulk heaped at the bottom of the income distribution, in the process of equitable and sustainable development. A Few Points to Ponder for the Medium Term Good news relating to sustainable change and healing divisions in society would take a long time in coming because it is not only the economy but also the polity that requires healing and mending. Perhaps somewhere in the policy sphere the following points are being seriously discussed for the medium-term. Allow me to raise these, just in case they are not. 1. Poverty incidence in 2000 was 41.4 percent in the rural areas, much higher than the 15.0 percent in the urban areas. One reason for this phenomenon is that more resources and opportunities available in the latter, particularly in Metro Manila and highly urbanized cities. This brings on rural-to-urban migration. However as more people flock to the urban areas, the demand for livelihood and employment increase disproportionately to what is available and place added pressure to existing habitat space and social services. Meanwhile in the rural areas, more farms may lie untilled and agricultural activity and output may dwindle with the exodus of young people who find limited opportunities in their hometowns. Is it not time to revisit the formula for determining internal revenue allotment (IRA) and reduce the weight for population size which is 50 percent, which clearly favors the densely-populated areas? As the urban population grows due to in-migration, the IRA of urban areas also increases, and the more people resettle under the bridges, in the parks, on the sidewalks, in the carts or any available space to become the urban poor. With the continuing reduction of IRA payments, which are their major sources of funds, the low-income municipalities will experience the outflow of population to their detriment, with their farms abandoned. And this unhealthy cycle, which is being seen now, may go on unreversed until something drastic is tried such as working on the IRA formula. 2. With the resulting decrease in the number of farms, the average farm size, and agricultural employment share, the specter of poor nutrition and even starvation in extreme cases should not be a surprise. The footnotes on reported ‘hunger’ and the ‘lack of food to eat’ should alert the government to the policy relevance of a ‘green revolution’ at this time. Going ‘green’ will not only mean the greening of our rice and vegetable farms but also refer to the processing of the resulting surplus which will not harm the environment. 3. The population of Japan is expected to decline by 2006; already its population of 65 years and older reached 17 percent in 2000. Moreover Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore as well as many European countries are reporting a rapid growth

26

of the elderly, declining numbers of the youth, and low fertility rates. Soon they will not have enough young people to join the work force and run the farms, factories, and firms. Soon their elderly will be receiving less and less from their pension systems as funds run down due to fewer contributions coming in. Labor surplus countries like ours would be sources of migrant workers, including women, who will provide the work force and at the same time prop up their public, including pension, funds. It will take time to arrest if intended, the growth of the Philippine population and with the twin problems of fiscal deficit and public debt, the limited provision of economic and social services and opportunities will continue to swell the ranks of the underemployed and the unemployed. Should the government not face up to the challenges of providing a wide array of goods and services to the demographic phenomenon of ageing (and wealthy) societies around us and direct the policy debate to how we can train and protect our migrant workers and further benefit from this strategy? After all, almost half of all the families in the country are affected by the fortunes of our overseas workers. 4. The income distribution is lopsided and had remained like that for four decades. We did see the trickle-down effects of growth; the charts in the appendixes vividly depict the ‘ski slope’, steep and narrow at the top and flat and long elsewhere, when income shares are plotted. The target of reducing poverty somehow implies that this is to be achieved by the government, and the elite, who will handle and dispose of the requisite resources. This effectively excludes the poor to be part of the liberating process and fosters patronage to the purse-keepers and its bad effects on the distribution of political power and exercise of governance in the country. Is it not time to discuss how the poor and the needy can actively participate in the poverty alleviation efforts? Should the target instead be to empower the poor, to work with them in their communities in providing better nutrition, health, and education? The media reports that daily the government continues to consider many policy options to stimulate growth that is hopefully pro-poor, but the above points may not have given enough exposure and scrutiny. SUMMARY

27

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has been elected President of the Philippines. But prior to this proclamation, one of the most bitterly fought campaigns in Philippine elections since the snap elections of 1986 had already preceded a long drawn- out period for the counting of votes from 10 May to 20 June, a forty day fast from the truth. Or was it? The Poe supporters complained that during this period the exit polls of the SWS (as of May 19) and the continuing tally of the NAMFREL had already psyched the public that the incumbent had won. Because of this, they alleged that the minds of the electorate had been conditioned to believe that their candidate had lost, and consequently due vigilance over the election returns dwindled allowing for irregularities and cheating in favor of the administration. Upon review, the early results of the SWS exit polls underestimated the Poe votes, possibly due to the ‘undecideds’ whose share increased as the elections neared. It did not help that the NAMFREL count was not quick enough, that it was perceived to have counted first the areas where GMA was strong, and that it ceased operations when some 20 percent of the precincts were still unaccounted for. There seemed to be reason for the opposition camp to suspect that there may have been some cheating in favor of the administration. But while the results are official and it is time to face the future together as a nation, the strong showing of a Poe bereft of a sound platform, good campaign, sufficient background and experience, an efficient organization, and favorable media coverage has to be examined more closely, especially since he was strong with the large and poor D and E socioeconomic class voters. An analysis of income distribution and other key economic indicators shows that there has been more decline than growth in the past forty years, and that this has resulted in growing inequity, rising poverty in all its dimensions, and weakening competitiveness of both the economy and society. Growth has not been pro-poor. Any development plan therefore has to accept the presence of this fragmentation of the economy (of the rich and the rest) and society (of the opportune and the oppressed). It must outline viable options to convince and involve the active participation of these groups in concert to bring about an equitable and sustainable growth process. We cannot continue to have growth that causes our economy to lag behind that of our neighbors, and our society to further fragment. REFERENCES

28

Articles and Publications ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2001. Jakarta, Indonesia. Asian Development Bank. Key Indicators 2003, Volume 34. Manila, Philippines. Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire. A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality’. The World Bank Economic Review Vol. 10, No.3, pp.565-91 National Statistics Office. Family Income and Expenditures Survey publications. Manila, Philippines ____________________. Philippine Yearbook 2002. Manila, Philippines: December 2002 Pulse Asia. March 2004 National Survey on Presidential and Vice-Presidential Preferences. Media Release 12 April 2004 Salceda, Jose. An Analysis of the 1st Quarter Performance of the RP Economy. BusinessWorldOnline, 9 June 2004. United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2001. New York. World Bank. World Development Report 1981 and 2002. Washington, DC. Yucer, Onder. Opening Statement at the Symposium on Pro-Poor Growth Policies organized by UNDP Pakistan and the Pakistan Institute of Developing Economics in March 2003 Internet Articles abs-cbn: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/NewsStory.aspx?section=Metro&OID=61430 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas: http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/spei/tab28.htm National Citizens Movement for Free Elections: http://www.eleksyon2004.com/display.php?fld=tally&art=tally_namfrel.php National Statistical Coordination Board: http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2000/00povin1.asp National Statistics Office: http://www.census.gov.ph

29

Philippine Daily Inquirer: http://www.inq7.net/opi/2004/jun/03/opi_mpdoyo-1.htm; , http://www.inq7.net/verbatim/Congress-canvassing-committee-report.pdf. Philippine Institute of Development Studies: http://dirp.pids.gov.ph/cgi-bin/sg?key.tbl Social Weather Stations: http://www.sws.org.ph/pr051904.htm; http://www.sws.org.ph/EX04b_namfrel%20by%20region.htm

30

Appendix A

31

Appendix B

Income Distribution of Filipino Families, 2000 and 1985 In Pesos Source: Family Income and Expenditures Survey, National Statistics Office 2 0 0 0 1 9 8 5 % Share of Income Minimum Maximum Coefficient % Share of Income Minimum Maximum Coefficient

Percentile Sum of Income Individual Cumulative Income* Income* of Variation Sum of Income Individual Cumulative Income* Income*

of Variation

1st 1,751,363,144 0.08 s 15,240 1.34% 286,242,806 0.09 s 3,809 2.26% 2nd 2,606,663,845 0.12 0.20 15,297 18,947 0.39% 431,855,889 0.14 0.23 3,811 4,907 0.57% 3rd 3,061,187,339 0.14 0.34 18,952 21,512 0.22% 516,633,824 0.17 0.40 4,911 5,554 0.30% 4th 3,410,511,351 0.16 0.50 21,517 23,654 0.18% 577,688,097 0.19 0.59 5,560 6,110 0.24% 5th 3,716,765,309 0.17 0.67 23,655 25,645 0.14% 622,193,267 0.20 0.80 6,111 6,603 0.19% 6th 3,998,185,931 0.18 0.85 25,648 27,363 0.11% 670,459,509 0.22 1.02 6,609 7,025 0.15% 7th 4,259,262,447 0.19 1.04 27,364 29,017 0.10% 719,812,687 0.24 1.25 7,027 7,434 0.13% 8th 4,499,393,572 0.21 1.25 29,023 30,605 0.10% 745,925,199 0.24 1.49 7,438 7,803 0.10% 9th 4,702,775,740 0.22 1.46 30,608 31,935 0.07% 782,021,953 0.26 1.75 7,807 8,162 0.10%

10th 4,932,572,118 0.23 1.69 31,942 33,384 0.08% 823,353,815 0.27 2.02 8,168 8,521 0.10% 11th 5,134,408,374 0.23 1.92 33,385 34,723 0.07% 855,458,837 0.28 2.30 8,523 8,838 0.08% 12th 5,331,428,353 0.24 2.17 34,726 35,991 0.06% 890,280,511 0.29 2.59 8,839 9,147 0.08% 13th 5,517,857,465 0.25 2.42 35,999 37,246 0.06% 915,400,379 0.30 2.89 9,150 9,454 0.08% 14th 5,699,926,571 0.26 2.68 37,248 38,541 0.07% 942,141,187 0.31 3.20 9,456 9,719 0.06% 15th 5,906,273,665 0.27 2.95 38,542 39,788 0.05% 966,949,058 0.32 3.51 9,723 9,951 0.06% 16th 6,086,596,175 0.28 3.23 39,794 40,876 0.04% 995,055,704 0.33 3.84 9,952 10,228 0.06% 17th 6,248,211,563 0.29 3.51 40,877 42,097 0.06% 1,023,958,424 0.33 4.17 10,230 10,517 0.06% 18th 6,443,965,506 0.29 3.81 42,100 43,249 0.05% 1,044,611,814 0.34 4.52 10,523 10,781 0.06% 19th 6,587,902,892 0.30 4.11 43,250 44,170 0.04% 1,073,984,119 0.35 4.87 10,782 11,043 0.05% 20th 6,754,686,084 0.31 4.42 44,171 45,366 0.05% 1,105,466,378 0.36 5.23 11,045 11,332 0.06% 21st 6,894,251,871 0.32 4.73 45,368 46,395 0.04% 1,126,965,076 0.37 5.60 11,333 11,600 0.06%

22nd 7,095,957,144 0.32 5.06 46,397 47,549 0.04% 1,152,286,484 0.38 5.97 11,604 11,859 0.05% 23rd 7,268,888,791 0.33 5.39 47,550 48,645 0.04% 1,180,238,728 0.39 6.36 11,861 12,129 0.05% 24th 7,389,704,075 0.34 5.73 48,650 49,795 0.04% 1,214,482,537 0.40 6.76 12,132 12,441 0.06% 25th 7,620,857,881 0.35 6.08 49,797 51,156 0.05% 1,239,147,204 0.41 7.16 12,443 12,752 0.05% 26th 7,811,724,288 0.36 6.43 51,160 52,488 0.04% 1,271,682,988 0.42 7.58 12,755 13,017 0.05% 27th 8,011,264,723 0.37 6.80 52,496 53,735 0.04% 1,299,386,509 0.42 8.00 13,019 13,287 0.05% 28th 8,188,892,146 0.37 7.17 53,739 54,987 0.04% 1,315,744,033 0.43 8.43 13,288 13,541 0.04% 29th 8,375,601,667 0.38 7.56 54,990 56,206 0.04% 1,349,128,306 0.44 8.88 13,551 13,849 0.05% 30th 8,580,729,207 0.39 7.95 56,218 57,514 0.04% 1,368,743,585 0.45 9.32 13,851 14,083 0.04%

32

31st 8,748,233,849 0.40 8.35 57,517 58,695 0.04% 1,407,515,077 0.46 9.78 14,085 14,354 0.04% 32nd 8,951,978,995 0.41 8.76 58,700 60,052 0.04% 1,426,434,406 0.47 10.25 14,355 14,608 0.04% 33rd 9,151,074,422 0.42 9.18 60,055 61,398 0.03% 1,454,542,594 0.48 10.73 14,620 14,908 0.05% 34th 9,340,200,853 0.43 9.60 61,399 62,630 0.03% 1,477,041,768 0.48 11.21 14,910 15,192 0.04% 35th 9,556,837,277 0.44 10.04 62,632 64,126 0.04% 1,505,534,558 0.49 11.70 15,193 15,497 0.05% 36th 9,783,031,851 0.45 10.49 64,141 65,570 0.04% 1,546,857,445 0.51 12.21 15,499 15,763 0.04% 37th 9,984,322,635 0.46 10.95 65,581 66,961 0.03% 1,568,841,255 0.51 12.72 15,764 16,028 0.04% 38th 10,212,043,257 0.47 11.41 66,964 68,426 0.04% 1,591,956,695 0.52 13.24 16,029 16,353 0.05% 39th 10,429,396,355 0.48 11.89 68,430 69,981 0.03% 1,632,503,513 0.53 13.77 16,357 16,689 0.05% 40th 10,658,027,983 0.49 12.38 69,985 71,375 0.03% 1,647,699,886 0.54 14.31 16,691 16,963 0.04% 41st 10,874,582,237 0.50 12.87 71,380 73,001 0.04% 1,680,223,790 0.55 14.86 16,966 17,301 0.05%

42nd 11,133,693,245 0.51 13.38 73,006 74,712 0.04% 1,736,312,005 0.57 15.43 17,304 17,656 0.05% 43rd 11,390,641,028 0.52 13.90 74,716 76,480 0.04% 1,745,807,464 0.57 16.00 17,658 17,961 0.04% 44th 11,662,185,589 0.53 14.44 76,482 78,278 0.04% 1,787,754,317 0.58 16.59 17,963 18,345 0.05% 45th 11,924,779,727 0.55 14.98 78,279 80,187 0.04% 1,836,128,302 0.60 17.19 18,347 18,710 0.05% 46th 12,230,372,492 0.56 15.54 80,188 81,998 0.04% 1,855,700,277 0.61 17.79 18,713 19,017 0.04% 47th 12,550,106,802 0.57 16.11 82,000 83,998 0.04% 1,886,387,801 0.62 18.41 19,019 19,350 0.04% 48th 12,741,282,739 0.58 16.70 84,000 85,720 0.03% 1,917,053,120 0.63 19.04 19,352 19,715 0.04% 49th 13,050,087,003 0.60 17.29 85,722 87,648 0.04% 1,961,782,969 0.64 19.68 19,716 20,063 0.04% 50th 13,381,820,564 0.61 17.91 87,650 89,800 0.04% 1,999,434,766 0.65 20.33 20,064 20,480 0.05% 51st 13,664,691,510 0.62 18.53 89,810 91,758 0.04% 2,036,656,485 0.67 21.00 20,486 20,886 0.05%


62nd 17,525,383,869 0.80 26.42 115,302 118,140 0.04% 2,523,072,477 0.83 29.23 25,450 25,969 0.05% 63rd 18,086,373,878 0.83 27.25 118,150 121,153 0.05% 2,592,177,729 0.85 30.08 25,976 26,541 0.05%

33

64th 18,470,931,207 0.84 28.09 121,160 124,200 0.04% 2,634,612,462 0.86 30.94 26,544 27,049 0.04% 65th 18,973,565,693 0.87 28.96 124,210 127,433 0.04% 2,697,419,682 0.88 31.82 27,050 27,683 0.05% 66th 19,483,543,913 0.89 29.85 127,445 131,008 0.05% 2,752,266,229 0.90 32.72 27,685 28,240 0.04% 67th 19,993,829,572 0.91 30.76 131,040 134,537 0.04% 2,790,788,486 0.91 33.63 28,250 28,881 0.05% 68th 20,542,786,112 0.94 31.70 134,554 138,574 0.05% 2,893,265,904 0.95 34.58 28,891 29,610 0.06% 69th 21,260,041,288 0.97 32.68 138,580 142,684 0.05% 2,957,296,482 0.97 35.55 29,615 30,284 0.05% 70th 21,703,190,717 0.99 33.67 142,687 146,490 0.04% 3,004,523,509 0.98 36.53 30,285 30,996 0.05% 71st 22,392,490,642 1.02 34.69 146,499 150,560 0.05% 3,097,726,960 1.01 37.54 30,999 31,730 0.05%


82nd 30,912,779,737 1.41 48.11 201,819 208,777 0.05% 4,186,523,868 1.37 50.60 41,850 43,116 0.07% 83rd 32,074,262,218 1.47 49.58 208,800 215,940 0.06% 4,308,263,632 1.41 52.01 43,138 44,521 0.07% 84th 33,224,129,135 1.52 51.10 215,985 224,654 0.07% 4,463,842,536 1.46 53.47 44,522 46,044 0.07% 85th 34,474,175,168 1.58 52.68 224,700 234,229 0.07% 4,631,867,681 1.51 54.98 46,049 47,820 0.09% 86th 35,966,659,179 1.64 54.32 234,230 243,696 0.06% 4,803,716,845 1.57 56.55 47,835 49,751 0.09% 87th 37,564,996,699 1.72 56.04 243,716 253,830 0.07% 5,007,374,843 1.64 58.19 49,765 51,787 0.09% 88th 39,097,855,707 1.79 57.83 253,840 265,050 0.07% 5,201,377,483 1.70 59.89 51,794 54,214 0.10% 89th 40,957,513,706 1.87 59.70 265,090 279,100 0.09% 5,482,433,165 1.79 61.69 54,226 56,856 0.10% 90th 43,057,387,439 1.97 61.67 279,130 294,077 0.09% 5,733,100,616 1.87 63.56 56,857 59,546 0.09%

34

91st 45,585,353,913 2.08 63.75 294,100 309,823 0.08% 6,036,838,590 1.97 65.54 59,550 62,9

92nd 47,806,928,830 2.19 65.94 309,882 326,764 0.09% 6,338,132,565 2.07 67.61 62,915 66,593rd 50,875,322,163 2.33 68.26 326,770 348,550 0.10% 6,764,468,716 2.21 69.82 66,600 71,594th 54,506,584,623 2.49 70.75 348,620 376,378 0.13% 7,335,613,111 2.40 72.22 71,594 77,595th 59,303,913,034 2.71 73.47 376,452 413,750 0.16% 8,020,323,906 2.62 74.84 77,624 85,396th 65,493,172,690 2.99 76.46 413,760 454,526 0.17% 8,827,011,189 2.89 77.73 85,398 95,297th 72,829,021,107 3.33 79.79 454,590 517,200 0.22% 9,954,000,857 3.26 80.98 95,238 109,398th 85,085,381,204 3.89 83.68 517,230 619,356 0.34% 11,714,278,760 3.83 84.82 109,420 132,399th 105,742,039,422 4.83 88.51 619,360 830,246 0.48% 15,025,223,602 4.91 89.73 132,870 177,2

100th 251,217,216,765 11.49 100.00 831,800 s 10.10% 31,404,471,680 10.27 100.00 178,082 TOTAL 2,187,250,216,737 100.00 305,775,274,227 100.00

% Share of Income Minimum Maximum Coefficient % Share of Income Minimum Maximu

Percentile Sum of Income Individual Cumulative Income* Income* of Variation Sum of Income Individual Cumulative Income* Income*

Note: * - obtained from sample data s - suppressed

35

Appendix C Income Distribution of Filipino Families, 2000 and 1985 In Pesos Source: Family Income and Expenditures Survey, National Statistics Office

2 0 0 0 1 9 8 5 Quintiles Coefficient Minimum Maximum Coefficient Minimum Maximum Variation Income* Income* Variation Income* Income* 1st 0.76% s 25,645 1.09% s 6,6032nd 0.20% 25,648 33,384 0.28% 6,609 8,5213rd 0.13% 33,385 39,788 0.16% 8,523 9,9514th 0.10% 39,794 45,366 0.13% 9,952 11,3325th 0.09% 45,368 51,156 0.13% 11,333 12,7526th 0.09% 51,160 57,514 0.10% 12,755 14,0837th 0.08% 57,517 64,126 0.10% 14,085 15,4978th 0.08% 64,141 71,375 0.10% 15,499 16,9639th 0.09% 71,380 80,187 0.10% 16,966 18,71010th 0.08% 80,188 89,800 0.09% 18,713 20,48011th 0.08% 89,810 100,389 0.09% 20,486 22,43612th 0.09% 100,400 112,529 0.11% 22,437 24,94913th 0.09% 112,532 127,433 0.10% 24,950 27,68314th 0.10% 127,445 146,490 0.12% 27,685 30,99615th 0.11% 146,499 168,180 0.13% 30,999 35,07116th 0.11% 168,200 195,050 0.14% 35,075 40,60717th 0.14% 195,060 234,229 0.16% 40,610 47,82018th 0.17% 234,230 294,077 0.22% 47,835 59,54619th 0.26% 294,100 413,750 0.35% 59,550 85,38720th 6.56% 413,760 s 3.00% 85,398 s Note: obtained from sample data s - suppressed

36

Appendix D

CVs of Income Quintiles 2000

0.00%

1.00%2.00%

3.00%

4.00%

5.00%6.00%

7.00%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Income Quintiles

CVs

CVs of Income Quintiles, 1985

0.00%

0.50%1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%3.00%

3.50%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Income Quintiles

CVs

37

Appendix E

Income Shares to Total 1985

0.00

2.004.00

6.00

8.00

10.0012.00

14.00

1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97

Income Percentiles

Inco

me

Sha

res

Income Shares to Total 2000

0.00

2.004.00

6.00

8.00

10.0012.00

14.00

1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97

Income Percentiles

Inco

me

Shar

es

Polls And Poor

News & Politics

Transcript of Polls And Poor