Polk and the Oregon Compromise

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POLK AND THE OREGON COMPROMISE OF I846T HOUGH his administration as for the most part bril-

liantly uccessful in the attainment f its objects, Polkhas not been kindly dealt with by historians. The great

event of his administration, he war with Mexico, is commonlyregarded as a wanton and unjustifiable poliation of a weakneighbor. The sinister shadow of sectional strife darkens thewhole period, and the Whig and Abolitionist view of the presi-dent has passed into history. " Polk the Mendacious " is aMachiavelli of unheroic proportions, y fortuitous ircumstancesthe protagonist of the forces of slavery. Historians haveadopted the methods of the bar rather han of the bench andhave condemned him unheard. The recent publication of hisdiary throws new light on many of the questions of his admin-istration. The president's purpose in keeping this journal wasto retain fresh n memory he events of the administration sthey occurred day by day. There is no evidence that it wasintended for publication. It is, therefore, record not only ofgreat importance but of far more value and trustworthinessthan the accounts which public men have written or the per-usal of others. It is difficult o see why, n a document of thiskind, the writer should seek to falsify r distort the facts. A

transcript f the diary was prepared for the use of George Ban-croft, Polk's secretary of the navy, and is included in thevoluminous Bancroft Collection of Manuscripts, but historianshave made little use of it. The purpose of this paper is toreview the question of the Oregon boundary, which was finallysettled during the period covered by this diary, specially n thelight of the information ontained in that document.

For more than a quarter of a century before the election ofPolk the respective claims of the United States and of GreatBritain to territory est of the Rocky Mountains had formeda subject for diplomatic negotiation between the two govern-ments. Whatever may have been the theoretical claims ofeither, negotiation had proceeded upon the basis of division

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444 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL.XXVI

and compromise. The atttitude f each government had beenin the main consistent. The United States had proposed toextend from the crest of the Rocky Mountains to the PacificOcean the line of the forty-ninth arallel, already its northernboundary as far west as the mountains. Great Britain hadoffered s the boundary the same line from he mountains o itsintersection with the Columbia River, thence the mid-channelof that river to the ocean. Neither government being dis-posed to make further oncessions, the device of a joint occu-

pation of the disputed territory as adopted in I8I8, and wascontinued by a convention n I827, to last until terminated byeither government n a twelve months' notice.

In the early forties the settlement of the Oregon boundarybecame a vital question. The decisive factor in making adefinite boundary line a necessity was the immigration ofAmerican citizens into the territory. Under such circum-stances joint occupation could not last long without producingserious friction. In the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of I842the question of the Oregon boundary was not included, becauseit was feared that this might endanger the settlement f thenortheastern boundary., Lord Ashburton, however, had re-ceived detailed instructions from his government concerningOregon, and Lord Aberdeen, the British foreign minister, wasanxious to effect a speedy settlement of the northwestern

boundary. Accordingly, in February, I844, Pakenham, theBritish minister o the United States, introduced the subject toUpshur, Tyler's secretary of state. The tragic death of thelatter, however, occurred before negotiations could be begun,and the duty of treating with Pakenham devolved upon Cal-houn, Upshur's successor in the State Department. The Cal-houn-Pakenham negotiations roduced a repetition f the offerswhich both governments ad made before on several occasions,Calhoun proposing the forty-ninth arallel from the Rockies tothe Pacific, Pakenham offering he same parallel to its inter-section with the Columbia and thence the course of the riverto its mouth. During the negotiations Calhoun took occasionto advance the argument f " manifest estiny," n these words:

1First ession, 29th Congress, Globe,Appendix, . 23.




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There can be no doubt now that the operation f the same causeswhich mpelled ur population estward rom he hores f the Atlanticacross the Alleghany o the valley f the Mississippiwill mpel themonwardwith ccumulating orce cross the RockyMountains nto hevalley f the Columbia, nd that the whole region drained by it isdestined o be peopledby us.'

The negotiations nding in a deadlock, the British minister ro-posed, in January, 845, that the question be submitted toarbitration.2 This offer was rejected by the secretary f state,for the reason, among others, hat the president till hoped thatthe question would be settled by direct negotiation.

President Tyler's annual message of December, I843, hadadvanced the theoretical laim of the United States to the entireOregon territory, tretching orth f 420, the northern oundaryof the Mexican province of California, o 540 40', the southernlimit of Russia's claims. It referred o the failure of preced-

ing negotiations based upon the principle of compromise." While nothing will be done," wrote Tyler, " to compromit herights r honor of the United States, every proper expedientwill be resorted o in order to bring the negotiations now in theprogress of resumption o a speedy and happy termination."

By I844, therefore, he Oregon question had become one offirst-class mportance, demanding an immediate ettlement. Itwas on its own merits well worth the consideration of thenational nominating onventions which met that year. Whilethe whole nation was not convinced that " our title to the wholeof the territory f Oregon is clear and unquestionable; that noportion of the same ought to be ceded to England, .. .." as wasaffirmed n the Democratic platform, he claim of the UnitedStates to the whole was by no means novel. The theory hatthe Oregon plank was inserted n the platform nd coupled with

the demand for the " reannexation of Texas merely to makethe acquisition of slave territory more palatable to the northernwing of the Democracy, by creating a makeweight, s it were,of free territory, eaves out of consideration the intrinsic m-

1First ession, 29th Congress, Globe,Appendix, . 26. 2 [bid. p. 29.




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446 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. XXVI

portance of Oregon., Had the annexation of Texas not beenin contemplation, here would still have been an Oregon ques-tion to be settled by Great Britain and the United States at nodistant day.

During the early months of his term as president, Oregonoccupied the thoughts of Polk more than all other subjects.2Nor is this difficult o understand, f we succeed in freeing ur-selves from the notion that during this period there were novery important questions in the history of the United States

save those connected with lavery. It is not strange hat Oregon,threatening s it did war with England, loomed even larger onPolk's political horizon han Texas, threatening ar with Mexico.

The president's naugural stated that our title to Oregon was"clear and unquestionable." That he may have been sincerelyof this opinion does not seem to be regarded by most historiansas possible. It was " a diatribe for political effect," stagethunder," bluff." Controlled, s it is assumed that he was,by the interests f the " slavocracy," Polk, it is argued, couldhave taken no real interest n the bleak Northwest, here, by nostretch f the imagination, could cotton be introduced. Cal-houn, who regarded himself s the particular ponsor of com-promise on the forty-ninth arallel, considered the statementsof the inaugural "unfortunate" and a " profound blunder."Indeed, he had tried, though in vain, to influence he president

against the too bold course which he took. The true policyof the United States, according to Calhoun, was " to be quiet, todo nothing o excite attention nd leave time to operate." 3

In order to understand how Polk, elected on a platformwhich asserted the right of the United States to all Oregon,came to make an offer f compromise to the British govern-ment, t must be remembered hat at the time of his inaugura-

1" After he election herewas no enthusiasm n the Oregon question; an agree-ment wasmade, without murmur f Democratic dissatisfaction, pon the line of490 . Stanwood,History of the Presidency, . 228. This is a sample of muchthat has found ts way nto histories n this ubject; it s also an example f the com-plete acrifice f facts o theories.

2Diary, vol. i, p. 4.'Letters of Calhoun, Annual Report of the American Historical Association,

I899, vol. ii, pp. 653, 656, 66o.




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tion the negotiation which had been carried on by Pakenhamand Calhoun was regarded as still pending., An abrupt term-ination of this negotiation would be likely to precipitate war.The election, moreover, had been close, and the Whigs, as wellas many Democrats, were opposed to the extreme Americanclaim. Polk must have known that the nation would not sup-port his administration n a war waged for " fifty-four orty,"until every effort ad been made to secure a satisfactory ettle-ment of the question without war. At any rate, the president

decided to await the result of further negotiation. A com-promise on the forty-ninth. arallel, he believed, would notmaterially njure the interests of the United States, since thebest part of the Oregon territory ay south of that line. Thepart lying north of 490 was believed to be unfit for agricultureand of value only for the fur trade.2 There was surely abun-dant precedent for an offer f compromise on this ine. If theUnited States again offered nd Great Britain again rejectedthe forty-ninth arallel, and war resulted, he former would bein the right nd could then insist on its claims up to 540 40'.3The renewal of negotiations in July, 1845, is sometimes re-garded as evidence that Polk never had any intention f carry-ing out the Oregon plank in his platform, nd that n reality hewas always in favor of compromise on the forty-ninth arallel.We have, however, official estimony o the contrary. In a

letter written o the United States minister t London on theday on which the president's offer was made, Buchanan, thensecretary f state, said that, were the question a new one, thepresident would not have presented such a proposition4; andon another occasion he wrote that nothing but deference to the

I According o Benton, Polk's inaugural had the effect f arousing public senti-ment n England, and the administration as in a dilemma. To insist n 540 40,meant war, o recede from t was to abandon the platform. Benton, who representshimnselfs the real hero of the Oregon negotiations which resulted n the treaty f1846,tellsus that arly n April I845, Buchanan, Polk's secretary f state, onsultedhim, nd that he said he was in favor f compromise n the forty-ninth arallel ndwould upport uch a proposition f made by the administration. ee Thirty ears'View, vol. ii, p. 66I.

'Works of Buchanan ed. by J. B. Moore), vol. vi, p. I91.'Ibid. p. I9I. 4lbid. p. 193.




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repeated actions of his predecessors and the desire to preserve

friendly elationswith Great Britainhad induced the president

" to depart from his well-known pinions." Since Polk's offerof JUly 2, I845, though roposing 90 as a compromise, ith-held a concession upon which the British government aid greatstress and which earlier administrations had been willing tomake, namely, the free navigation of the Columbia, and sincethe settlement ffered was therefore ecidedly less favorable toGreat Britain than others which that country had rejected, t

seems questionable whether the president entertained the ex-pectation that t would be accepted. Buchanan wrote:

Should t be rejected, hePresident illbe relieved rom he embarrass-ment n which e has been involved y the acts, offers nd declara-tions f his predecessors. Afterwards,f the difficulty an only e re-solvedby the word,wemay hen ppealwith onfidence o the worldfor heequity nd ustice f our cause.'

This letter of Buchanan was official; the sentiments xpressedwere those of the president. The offer f July 12 was rejectedby Pakenham on the 29th, and the hope was expressed by theBritish minister hat some further roposal would be made bythe United States, " more consistent with fairness nd equity andwith the reasonable expectations of the British government." 2

If the traditional iew, that Polk was really n favor of the

forty-ninth arallel, be correct, he must have received Paken-ham's reply to his offer with regret. Such, however, was notthe case. The president was not sorry. Since his offer hadbeen rejected, he said, he would no longer be willing to com-promise on the same terms.

The President urther emarked . . that hough ehad given is ssentto the proposition ocompromiset 49', he must ay he did not regret

that t had been rejected by the BritishMinister. We had shown byit our nxious esire odo full ustice oGreat Britain nd to preservepeace, but t having een rejected he felt no longerbound by t, and

i Works of Buchanan, vol. vi, pp. 193, 194.2For the offer f July 2, see Works of Buchanan,vol. vi, pp. 194et seQ. For

Pakenham's rejection, ee ibid. pp. 212 Ce e9.




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would not be now willing o compromise n that boundary. Mr.Buchanan hen ntimated hat f the President's iewswere arried ut,we would have war. To which the President eplied, f we do havewar, it will not be our fault. Mr. Buchanan . . . expressed the opinionthat hepeopleof the United States wouldnot be willing o sustainwarfor hecountry orth f 490.... The President iffered ith Mr.Buchanan s to the popular entiment, nd he thought e had thestrongest vidence hat was to be anywhere een that the peoplewouldbe prompt nd ready o sustain he Governmentn the ourse which eproposed o pursue.'

In a cabinet meeting of August 26 the president explainedhis future policy in the Oregon question. Buchanan's note inanswer to Pakenham's rejection of the American offer houldassert our right to all Oregon from 42' to 540 40'. It shoulddistinctly tate that the offer had been made in deference toacts of predecessors and to preserve peace; that it had beenrejected by the British minister n language " scarcely ourteousor respectful ; that no counter proposition had been submitted;and that the offer was now withdrawn y the United States, tobe no longer considered as pending for the consideration f theBritish government. Polk desired the matter o rest unless theBritish minister hose to renew he negotiation.2 Buchanan wasfor holding out the olive branch by inserting n his reply toPakenham a paragraph to the effect that the United States

would consider any further roposition which the British min-ister might submit. Polk objected to this on the ground thatPakenham would infer that we were prepared to accept termsless favorable to the United States than those which had beenoffered, ince he could not be expected to propose terms morefavorable to the United States than those he had just rejected.3The British minister, olk insisted, must take the initiative, fnegotiations were to be renewed; and this proposition he presi-dent maintained throughout the discussion of the question.Buchanan favored postponing the reply to Pakenham until itshould be known whether there was to be war with Mexico ornot4; but Polk declared that there was no necessary onnection

' Diary, vol. i, p. 4. AIbid. . 2. 'Ibid. p. 3- 4Ibid. p. 4.




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between the two questions, and he objected to a postponementof the reply because it would suggest indecision on the part ofthe United States. On August 27 the secretary f state read inthe cabinet the answer he had prepared.' The president b-served that t was an "1 dmirable paper," and that the argumentfor the claims of the United States was unanswerable. " Inthis opinion," wrote Polk, " all the members of the Cabinetconcurred. The Postmaster General remarked that, f he hadheard that argument before the compromise of 490 was pro-

posed, he would not have agreed to it." The note of Buchanan,withdrawing he American offer, as delivered to Pakenham onAugust 30.

The action of the president n formally withdrawing is offer,after it had been rejected by the British minister, while quiteconsistent with he views expressed in his inaugural, s explainedby Benton as a concession to the radical democracy of theNorthwest, which insisted on 540 40' and, having learned ofPolk's offer f compromise, raised such a storm of protest hatthe administration quailed-recoiled-and withdrew ts offerof 49'."3 According to Benton, however, the president re-mained secretly n favor of a compromise on the forty-ninthparallel.

The withdrawal f the American offer vidently roduced animpression on the British government. A dispatch from

McLane, United States minister t London, dated October 3,described an interview etween himself and Lord Aberdeen, inwhich his lordship xpressed regret hat Pakenham had rejectedthe proposition made by the United States and desired to knowif the president would negotiate further. Polk took this asevidence that the British government ad "' lowered their tone."He remarked that any further proposition from the other sidewould be received and considered, but repeated that he wouldnot now accept the terms which he had previously ffered. Hesaw no reason to believe that any proposition would be madewhich could be accepted; and this opinion he expressed on

I\Vorks of Buchanan, vol. vi, pp. 23I el seq. I Diary, vol. i, p- 7-3 Benton, Thirty Years' View, vol. ii, p. 662.




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Polk did not yield. He was, in fact, becoming convincedthat the demand for all Oregon was growing in popular favor.In reply to Buchanan's statement that the nation would notjustify war for the territory orth of 490 and that the presi-dent was in danger of being attacked for his belligerency, olksaid that his greatest danger was that he had yielded to his pre-decessor's example in offering o compromise. Had that offerbeen accepted by Great Britain, his administration, e thought,would have encountered great opposition.'

The message, then, so far as it related to Oregon, evidentlyexpressed the views of the president rather than those of thesecretary of state.2 Polk announced that his offer of com-promise was withdrawn nd the American title to all Oregonasserted. He recommended that notice be given to abrogatethe convention of I827 and to terminate he joint occupation.The Monroe Doctrine was reaffirmed n strong terms. TheUnited States would not permit European interference n thiscontinent, or could the principle of the balance of power beextended to North America in order to prevent the UnitedStates from dding to its territory. It is noteworthy hat themessage devoted almost as much space to Oregon as to Texasand Mexico. That its recommendations, f carried out, wouldprobably lead to war was the opinion of the press and thenation.3 It was, however, well received-" better received,"

wrote Buchanan, " than any similar communication o Congressin my day." 4 Though the president could not have foreseenthe exact results which his message would produce, there canbe little doubt that the decided and bold tone which he assumedwas a factor of great importance n causing the British govern-ment to renew the negotiations which resulted n the settlementof the Oregon question.5

The difference f opinion between Buchanan and Polk, whichhas been referred o, was illustrated n the preparation of a dis-

I Diary, vol. i, pp. io6, 107.2 " The fact s," wrote Polk, "that the tariff art of the message nd every ther

part of it is my own." Ibid. vol. , p. 124.3Works f Calhoun ed. by Crall6), vol. iv, pp. 260, 26I.4Works of Buchanan, vol. vi, p. 342. 5Diary, vol. ii, p. i68.




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patch written o McLane on December I 3, I 845. Buchanan'sdraft ontained the statement hat if Great Britain should offerthe forty-ninth arallel and abandon its claim to the free navi-gation of the Columbia, the United States at the same timeyielding the southern ape of Vancouver's Island, the presidentwould feel inclined to submit such a proposition o the Senatefor ts advice. The president aused this to be altered so as toread, in substance, that, hould the British government make anew proposition, he president would judge of its character, nd

if, n his opinion, t was such as to justify t, he would feel nclinedto submit t to the Senate for " previous advice" before actingon it, ince the decision on such a proposition might nvolve theissue of war or peace.' Buchanan thought that the president'salteration gave McLane no real information, nd that, unlessPolk was willing to let the dispatch stand as he had written t,the United States had better prepare for war.

On January 9, I 846, the secretary f state wrote to McLanethat the extreme claim to Oregon was growing more and morepopular. He referred to resolutions of state conventions andlegislatures in favor of 540 40'; and he suggested that McLanecautiously nform the British government hat, while the presi-dent would never abandon his position as regarded the Ameri-can claim to all Oregon, and would not now authorize theconclusion of a treaty n the basis of the offer e had previouslymade, the Senate was then in session. The question of peaceor war might be involved n the issue. Since the Senate was apart of the war-making s well as of the treaty-making ower,the president would feel it his duty to submit to that body forits previous advice a proposition similar to that which he hadoffered nd withdrawn.2 In a private etter of February 26, hetold McLane that a proposition to compromise on the forty-ninth parallel would probably receive a two-thirds ote of the

Senate. Public opinion, however, was more radical than Con-gress. "Discreet friends of peace clearly perceive that thequestion must be settled peacefully within he year or war maybe the consequence." 3

I Diary, vol. i, pp. 122, 123. For the letter, ee Works of Buchanan, vol. vi,p. 341.

'Works of Buchanan, vol. vi, pp. 367, 368. 3Ibid. pp. 385, 386.




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To arbitrate was the proposal with which the British ministersought to reopen the discussion of the Oregon question.

Arbi-tration, t will be remembered, had been offered before byPakenham and refused by Calhoun. Learning that the Britishminister would soon propose it again, the cabinet now agreedunanimously hat it could not be accepted. In the first place,they thought that a compromise of this kind was not a fit ub-ject for arbitration; n the second place, an impartial umpirecould not be found., On December 27, IPakenham formally

proposed the submission of the question of an " equitable divi-sion" of Oregon to arbitration. He spoke of the "efferves-cence" of popular feeling, which might greatly nterfere withthe efforts f Great Britain and the United States to preservepeace.2 Pakenham suggested as possible arbitrators witzer-land, Hamburg or Bremen. Buchanan, in jest, proposed thepope.3 He explained that rbitration mplied the right f GreatBritain to a part of the territory, hile the president was con-vinced of the validity f the American title up to 540 40'. OnJanuary 3, the offer was formlially eclined.4 On January 6,Pakenham, returning o the subject, asked if the United Stateswould submit to arbitration, irst, he question of the title ofeither party to the whole territory, nd then, f neither werefound to have a valid claim to the whole, the division of theterritory etween the two according to the justice of the claims

of each.5 On February 4, this question was answered in thenegative.6The Twenty-ninth ongress convened amidst loud talk of

war. This was the epoch of "Fifty-four Forty or Fight."Great Britain nd the United States stood, indeed, on the brinkof hostilities. The former, moreover, was known to be makingextensive warlike preparations. Pakenham, t is true, assuredBuchanan that they had no connection with Oregon, but theadministration was manifestly uneasy, and McLane was in-structed obring the subject to the attention f Lord Aberdeen.

IDiary, vol. i, p. 134.'Ibid. pp. 351, 352.5Zbid.P 358.

2Works of Buchanan,vol. vi, p. 349.4Ibid. p. 355.6 bid. pp. 370 etseq.




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No. 3] POLK AND THE OREGON COMPROMISE 455

On December 23, the question of war was seriously discussedin the cabinet. The president favored vigorous preparations oput the country n a state of defence. Buchanan, too, thoughtwe should prepare for war. The secretaries of war and of thenavy were directed to consult with the chairmen f the militaryand naval committees of the two houses, communicate o themthe views of the cabinet and aid in drafting uitable bills.-

In a cabinet meeting held February 28, I 846, Buchanan sug-gested that the president send a message to Congress recom-

mending provision for the public defence. Most of the cabinetfavored this proposal, but Polk feared that such a messagemight reate a panic. He wished that Congress had put thecountry n a better tate of defence quietly nd without rousingunnecessary larm, nd he thought hat the state of our relationswith Great Britain and Mexico required that this should bedone. It was finally greed to postpone the further onsidera-tion of a special message until the arrival of the next mail fromEngland.2

In answer to an inquiry of the Senate, whether n his judg-ment the state of our foreign relations required an increase ofnaval or military orce, the president ent a special message tothat body on March 24.3 In this document he referred o thewarlike preparations making both in England and in the Britishpossessions n North America, which, he said, were proceeding

with view of the possibility of war with the United States.He accordingly dvocated the increase of the land and navalforces. He still adhered, he said, to the recommendations fhis annual message.

The president was especially desirous that Congress shouldpass the measures recommended in his message, particularlythe notice necessary to terminate oint occupation. Until thatwas done, he believed the British government would yield noneof its claims. In Polk's words: " The only way to treat John

I Diary, vol. , pp. I33, 134. Von Hoist accepts the Whig view that Polk hadin reality o idea of war, and would not hesitate o back down, f necessary, oavoidit. Constitutional nd Political History f the United States,vol. iii, p. 192.

2Diary, ol. i, pp. 257, 258, 270.3Richardson,Messages nd Papersof the Presidents, ol. iv, pp. 426 el seq.




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Bull was to look him straight n the eye." I The debate onthe question of giving the notice showed, however, that ifthe president should refuse a British offer of compromiseon the forty-ninth arallel he would split his party. The atti-tude of Calhoun was particularly mportant, n account of hisinfluence over the southern wing of the Democracy. Cal-houn was opposed to giving the notice recommended by thepresident, which he regarded as a warlike measure, because hewas strongly n favor of peace and believed that compromise

was still possible.2 In the course of an interview with thepresident on January O, he remarked hat those who voted forthe notice would do so from different motives. Some, theradicals, would regard it as a measure which would preventany compromise; others would support it in the belief that,when the matter was brought to a crisis, compromise wouldbe the result. Calhoun himself strongly favored the forty-ninth parallel, and considered that Great Britain had as good aclaim to the Frazer as the United States had to the Columbia.Polk, indeed, concluded that Calhoun would soon be in opposi-tion to his admninistration.3 enton, too, was known to favorcompromise, ridiculing "fifty-four forty.-" The southernDemocracy, it was clear, would break with the administrationif an offer o compromise on 490 were refused. But thenorthwestern Democrats were clamorous for all Oregon.

Senator Allen of Ohio, a leader of the " Fifty-four orties"told Polk that the acceptance of a proposition such as Calhounand Benton favored would destroy he popularity f the admin-istration.4 Colonel Tod of Ohio, Democratic candidate forgovernor, aid that if a compromise were accepted the Demo-cratic party would be beaten in Ohio.5 A large majority f thepeople of Ohio, he thought, avored war. Senator Turney ofTennessee impressed upon Polk the obvious fact that he wasbetween two fires nd could not avoid displeasing a part of theDemocracy whatever ourse he followed.6

IDiary, vol. i, p. 155.2Ibid., vol. i, pp. '3", 154. Works of Calhoun ed. by CrallM), ol. iv, p. 261.3Diary, vol. i, p. 132. 4Ibid. p. 248. 5Ibid. p. 242. 6Ibid. p. I4I.




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he voiced were really those of Polk, the president was con-

signed to " a damnation o deep that the hand of resurrectionwill never be able to drag him forth." Hannegan himselfcalled on the president nd asked if he stood for 540 40' or forcompromise. Polk replied: " I am charged with the foreignrelations of the country, and it was unheard of that thepresident should declare in advance to anyone out of his cab-inet his intentions n reference o them." Senator Allen triedto commit Polk to 54' 40', and asked for permission o tell theSenate that the president had not changed his views on theOregon question. Polk declined to allow anyone to speak forhim. "I told him I stood on my published opinions andacts." 2

On January 24, the president suggested to the cabinet a newplan for the settlement f the Oregon question, by which t mightbe possible for the United States to secure the whole territory.

There was in his udgment no likelihood that a division could beagreed upon. Buit a treaty of commerce between the UnitedStates and Great Britaii. might be made the basis for an ad-justment f the Oregon dispute. Each country might gree torelax its restrictive ystem with respect to the other. Thereduction of our tariff would certainly e regarded with favorby Great Britain; and in order to secure it the British overn-ment might be willing to abandon all claim to Oregon, on re-ceiving a sum of money with which to indemnify he Hudson'sBay Company for the improvements t had made there. Thesuggestion was made merely as a possibility.3

Resolutions for giving the notice in a qualified form werefinally assed in the House by a large majority. In the Senatethe " Fifty-four orties" constituted small minority. Duringthe course of the long debates, public sentiment was growingmore favorable to compromise, and a large majoritv of theSenate favored a settlement f the question on that basis. OnMarch i6 Calhoun announced that the aspect of things was sodifferent rom what it had been when the annual message waspublished that he should vote for the notice in a modified orm,

IDiary, vol. i, pp. 270-274. 2Ibid. p. 279- 'Ibid. p. i9i.




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No.3] POLK AND THE OREGON COMPROMiMSE 459

because he regarded it as preliminary o a compromise.' Bythe votes of the Whig senators and of those Democrats whofavored compromise a resolution o give the notice was passed.A preamble, moreover, tated that ts object was to promote anamicable settlenment etween the two nations. Congress finallyauthorized the president to give the notice at his discretion.Though Polk would have preferred an unqualified notice, hesigned the resolution on April 28, and the formal notice wassoon given. Benton suggested that the president should ask

the Senate whether, n giving the notice, he should not renewthe offer f 49'. Senator McDuffie and Vice-President Dallasdesired a renewal of the president's former offer when thenotice was given. But the president nsisted that future propo-sitions must come from Great Britain.2

As Polk viewed it, the excitement in the Senate over thequestion of giving notice was caused by the political ambitionsof the leaders. Calhoun, he thought, oped by his early oppo-sition to the notice to become the leader of the peace party nd" advance his views on the presidency." Allen would probablyconsider war advantageous; Cass, too, was using " fifty-fourforty" for his own purposes. The president wrote in his diary:

The truth s that n all this Oregon iscussionn the Senate, oo manyDemocratic enators avebeen more oncerned bout the Presidentialelection n 48 than they ave been about settling regon either t490 or 540 40'. " Forty-eight has been with them hegreat ques-tion, nd hence the divisions f the Democratic arty.-

On June 3, I846, a dispatch from McLane was received,written fter t was known n England that Congress had passedthe notice. This dispatch contained the substance of a pro-posal which McLane had learned from Aberdeen would beoffered y the British minister t Washington. From the infor-mation sent by McLane, Polk was in doubt whether, when theproposal was formally made, he ought to submit it to theSenate or not. If he rejected it and made no counter-

' For this peech, see Works of Calhotin ed. by CralJ6), ol. iv, pp. 258 et seq.'Diary, vol. i, pp. 325, 348, 372. f bid. pp. 265, 280, 344, 345.




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proposition, here would probably be war. " If I submit it tothe Senate and they should advise its acceptance I should bebound by their dvice, and yet I should do so reluctantly. OnJune 6 Buchanan read to the cabinet the official ffer which hehad just received from Pakenham, n the form of a convention.It provided, n substance, that Oregon be divided by the forty-ninth parallel from the Rocky Mountains o the Straits f Fuca.The Hudson's Bay Company and all British subjects in actualoccupancy of lands south of 490 were to be secured in their

titles but subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.The navigation of the Columbia was to be free to the Hudson'sBay Company and to British subjects trading with that com-pany but not to British ubjects in general. Most of the cab-inet advised the submission of the offer to the Senate for itsprevious advice. Buchanan, however, now displayed a strangechange of front. He had before been strongly n favor of theforty-ninth arallel. He now observed that the " Fifty-fourForties" were true friends f the administration, nd he wishedno backing-down. He favored the submission of the offer othe Senate, provided the president accompanied it with a mes-sage reiterating he opinions he had previously xpressed; hedeclined, however, o have any hand in the preparation of sucha message. Polk concluded that Buchanan intended to avoidall responsibility for the submission of the proposal to -the

Senate, and thus stand well in the favor of the " Fifty-fourForties," with a view to advancing his presidential mbitions.2On June IO, the president submitted the British offer o the

Senate for ts previous advice. For this unusual procedure hefound precedents n our early national history nd said that itmight properly be revived. The Senate was a branch of thetreaty-making ower and by consulting t in advance the presi-dent secured harmony f action between that body and himself.The Senate was also a branch of the war-making power, andthe president might very properly take its advice in advanceupon a question which might nvolve the issue of war or peace.He stated that his own views as expressed in his annual mes-

1Diary, vol. i, pp. 444, 445. 2Ibid. p. 456.




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No.3] POLK AND 7fHE OREGON COMPROMISE 46I

sage remained unchanged. If the Senate by a two-thirds oteadvised the acceptance of the British offer, e would follow tsadvice. Otherwise he would reject t.'

The Senate advised acceptance by a vote of 37 to I2, andlater ratified the treaty, I to I4. The Whig senators andthose Democrats who favored compromise voted in the affirm-ative; the " Fifty-four orties" in the negative.

The treaty was clearly not a party measure. It was in accord-ance neither with the Democratic platform f I 844 nor with thepresident's naugural nor with his annual message. The presi-dent had declined all responsibility or it. It was the Senate'streaty. BecausePolk refused o assume the responsibility orwarwith Great Britain, for the disruption of his party and for thefailure of his administration-and these apparently would havebeen the results of rejecting he British offer-we need not in-fer that he had been playing a double game. In consideringthe testimony f Benton, the well-known iews of that tatesman

on the Oregon question and his obvious desire to take for him-self the center of the stage and pose as the confidential dviserof the president must be taken into account. That Polk was ingreat haste to settle the Oregon question n order to have a freehand in his dealings with Mexico is a supposition wholly ncon-sistent with the evidence. If there had existed in his mind anysuch connection between Oregon and the dispute with Mexico,it is inconceivable that he should have ordered the movementof American troops to the Rio Grande, thus precipitating warwith Mexico, before the British roposal had been made.2 Hadthis proposal been delayed only a few days, news of the warbetween the United States and Mexico would have reachedEngland, and it would probably not have been offered. Thecredit for averting hostilities between the United States andGreat Britain belongs to the Government f Sir Robert Peel,

which wisely decided to make the best terms it could withoutrisking war to increase the British possessions on the Pacific.R. L. SCHUYLER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

' Richardson, ol. iv, pp. 449, 450.2Letters f Calhoun,Annual Report, AmericanHistorical Association, 899, vol.

ii, p. 698.

Polk and the Oregon Compromise

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