Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer

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POLITICS, STRUCTURE, AND PUBLIC POLICY:

THE CASE OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Jill Nicholson-Crotty

and

Kenneth J. Meier

Dept. of Political Science

andGeorge Bush School of Government

Texas A&M University

4348 TAMUS

College Station, TX 77843-4348

[email protected]

979-845-4232979-847-8924

[email protected]

979-458-0104

Forthcoming Educational Policy

mailto:[email protected]






ABSTRACT

This study examines whether governance structures facilitate or impede political forces

by testing two competing hypotheses concerning the ability of bureaucratic structures to insulate

higher education policies from politics. Centralized structures both create autonomy and

facilitate access by environmental forces. This study examines the structures of higher education

boards to gain a better understanding of how they interact with politics to affect higher education

policy. To the extent that variation in governance structures is correlated with bureaucratic

autonomy, it should limit the ability of elected officials to influence education policies. The

transaction costs of individuals seeking to influence overall agency policy are lowered, however,

in more centralized organizations. Political actors can focus their attention on a single

geographic site rather than multiple sites that are adapting to different sets of institutional

arrangements and different local environments. These hypotheses are tested in a 47-state, eight-

year analysis.

Key words: higher education, politics, structure



1

POLITICS, STRUCTURE, AND PUBLIC POLICY:

THE CASE OF HIGHER EDUCATION

The relationship between government structure and performance can be dated to both the

debates over the U.S. Constitution and the attempts by ancient philosophers such as Aristotle to

design the ideal polity. Unfortunately, until recently, systematic empirical attention to this issue

in higher education has not been a high priority (McLendon forthcoming). Using formal work

from the political control of bureaucracy literature (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; Moe

1990) as its guide, political scientists (Lowry, 2001 and Knott and Payne, 2002) have started an

empirical investigation of the role that structure plays in determining higher education policy

outputs. A second branch of empirical work by education scholars grows out of organization

theory and a substantive interest in higher education (see Hearn and Griswold 1994; Hearn,

Griswold, and Marine 1996; McLendon, Heller and Young 2002; Volkwein 1986; 1989; Zumeta

1992, 1996).

The structure question in higher education links to an important theoretical literature in

political science. Structural questions are an essential part of the political control literature

because some advocates believe that structures are little more than hardwired political biases that

affect who benefits from administrative decisions (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987).

Structures, however, have a second function. They set the rules of game and, thus, advantage

some interests rather than others without actually hardwiring biases into the system. As an

illustration, providing for legislative oversight of administrative agencies advantages the

political interests who control the legislature but does not guarantee that the wishes of one

faction will forever triumph over another (Moe 1990). Lowry (2001), in his seminal study of

structures and higher education, demonstrated the first aspect of higher education structures; they



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are associated with the distribution of policy benefits (in a different tradition see similar studies

by Hearn and Griswold 1994; Hearn, Griswold, and Marine 1996; McLendon, Heller and Young

2002; and Volkwein 1986; 1989). This paper examines the second dimension of higher

education structures; do some structures facilitate or impede the political forces regardless of

ideology?

Any assessment of higher education governance structures must recognize that the

agencies responsible for implementing postsecondary education policy differ markedly across

the nation. Three distinct structures are used to govern higher education at the state level--

consolidated governing boards, coordinating boards, and planning/service agencies. While the

number of consolidated governing boards approximately equals the number of coordinating

boards, only two states have planning/service agencies. Because of differences in the scope of

their activities and the control they have over important functions such as budgeting, these

boards differ both in autonomy and the degree of centralization. This paper uses structural

theories of politics to derive and test hypotheses about individual governing boards and their

ability to insulate policies from politics. In an important addition to previous studies, this

analysis also controls for the means by which agencies receive their power.

First, the theoretical relationship between structure and policy outcomes will be outlined.

Second, a description of the structures and powers of the three types of governing boards is

presented. Third, a short review of the literature that examines the effects of politics on

bureaucratic structure will provide a set of contrasting hypotheses. Finally, a preliminary test of

these hypotheses linking structure and politics will involve a quantitative analysis of how higher

education costs are distributed among tuition, state appropriations, and need-based aid.

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND THEORY



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A number of structural dimensions must be addressed in order to comprehend fully how a

board’s structure affects the insulation of the costs of higher education from political forces. As

a first step this study will deal with two issues conceptually—autonomy and centralization.1 We

will do so using insights from both organizational theory and the literature on bureaucratic

politics.

Seidman (1970) argues that political structures determine power and that organizational

structures are an instrument of politics, position, and power. He contends that there are critical

differences between institutional types in terms of the composition of the directing authority

(single or multi-headed), qualifications for appointment, procedures for the appointment and

removal of principal officers, method of financing, budget and audit controls, personnel

regulations, and advisory councils and committees (Seidman 1970, 242; Meier 1980).

According to Seidman these provisions determine the degree of organizational and operating

autonomy as well as the relationship between an agency and its political environment (but see

Volkwein 1986).

The tension between autonomy and political control is obvious. Scholars argue that for a

bureaucracy to implement policy effectively it must have a certain level of autonomy and that

autonomy allows for insulation from politics (Meier 2000; Selznick 1948; Wilson 1989; Ingram

1990; West 1997). This autonomy and power then influences the ability of an agency to reshape

legislation in a way that more closely fits its mission. According to Rourke (1969, 43), agencies

that are highly professional in their orientation are allowed a degree of independence and

autonomy not afforded to all public agencies. The level of autonomy is important to this study,

as is the level of discretion that an agency has to choose the way that it will carry out its mission

(Meier 2000). Agency structure can have some role in determining the level of autonomy.



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A combination of these theories leads us to the proposition that bureaucracies structured

to be insulated from politics have a greater degree of autonomy and greater control over policy

outcomes. If structures allow for influence from political changes, the likelihood of autonomy

for the organization decreases. This study examines the structures of higher education boards to

gain a better understanding of how they affect policies pertaining to higher education. To the

extent that variation in governance structures is correlated with bureaucratic autonomy, it should

correlate with differences in the ability of elected officials to influence policies pertaining to

education.

A second structural view of bureaucracy deals with the notion of centralization and

decentralization. To the degree that organizations are centralized, the transaction costs are lower

for individuals seeking to influence overall agency policy. Political actors focus their attention

on a single geographic site rather than multiple sites that might be adapting to different sets of

institutional arrangements and different local environments. Despite the conclusions of Seidman

that decentralized bureaucracy exists to match the structure of Congress (read the legislature),

any political institution seeking to control a bureaucracy has lower transactions costs in a

centralized bureaucracy, if all other things are equal. The perceived centralization benefit, in

fact, has specifically guided the design of higher education structures (see McGuinness 1999;

McLendon forthcoming and the citations therein).

HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

Much of the literature concerning postsecondary education policy debates how much the

structure of higher education systems affects higher education policies. Studies focus on the

power of the governor, the character of the governing system, and the effects of the market.

Richardson et al. (1999) discuss the importance of political actors in the governance of higher



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education as well as the increased interest of these parties in existing systems. With a seven

state comparative study, they examine the structures of state education boards and how state

governments influence education policies. Jones et al. (1998) provide a generalized overview of

higher education governance and attempt to set a research agenda for further examination in this

area. Zumeta (1992) provides a broad study of the effects of changes in state tuition and board

structures on scholarships for private universities. Hearn, Griswold and Marine (1996) show that

higher education structures are associated with changes in tuition costs and financial aid, but the

relationships are not always consistent across types of institution (e.g., four year versus two

year). Hearn and Griswold (1994) find these structures affect innovation rates among higher

education systems. McLendon, Heller and Young (2002) examine six policy innovations dealing

with finances and accountability; they find modest influences of structure. Volkwein (1986;

1989), in contrast, found no relationship between structural autonomy and the quality of

education offered.

The present study examines 47 states that have either a consolidated governing board or a

coordinating board. Because Michigan and Delaware do not have either type of board, they are

excluded from this study. Nebraska is excluded because its legislature is nonpartisan and

legislative partisanship is a key variable in our analysis. The starting point of our analysis is the

work of Lowry (2001), Hearn, Griswold and Marine (1996), and McLendon, Heller and Young

2002). Lowry is attempting to synthesize some of the literature and at the same time study

higher education structures in all fifty states. His work examines the effects of institutions on

policy implementation. Although he finds that universities whose trustees are selected by

nonacademic stakeholders charge prices that are significantly lower than states with

decentralized systems where trustees chosen by academic stakeholders (see also Hearn,



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Griswold and Marine 1996), he also suggests that structures can enhance political control (see

also Knott and Payne 2002, 6). Lowry does not actually incorporate political factors in his

model, however, or interact those political forces with structures. McLendon, Heller, and Young

(2002) without using an interaction term find direct effects of political variables on the adoption

of education policy innovations; political factors, in fact, far outweigh structural ones in terms of

influence.

Both Lowry (2001) and Knott and Payne (2002) note the complex relationship between

structure and organizational outputs. Lowry (2001, 859) concludes that different structures

could lead to similar ends as demonstrated by his empirical results. Knott and Payne (2002)

show structures including some political aspects (number of gubernatorial appointments on

governing boards) affect decisions made by universities. Both of Hearn’s studies show that

structures are associated with different outcomes in different policy areas (but see McLendon,

Heller and Young 2002). In short, these studies find that different structures can produce similar

results and vice versa.

THE STRUCTURE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION GOVERNANCE BOARDS

Although the structural governance of higher education varies from state to state,

postsecondary education structures generally consist of three types of boards that can be arrayed

on a continuum from more to less autonomy as well as on a continuum from more to less

centralized (Lowry 2001; Knott and Payne 2002, but see Volkwein 1986). Of the three boards,

consolidated governing boards appear to have the highest level of autonomy and are the most

centralized. Consolidated governing boards are assigned most, if not all, authority for

coordinating postsecondary education. The primary responsibility of these boards is to govern

the institutions under their jurisdiction. This responsibility, however, might be split between two



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boards, one for four-year institutions and one for community colleges or technical institutions.

Responsibilities of consolidated governing boards include the governance of a single

corporate entity. The state of North Carolina, for example, has a consolidated governing board

system. It is responsible for all decisions concerning that system, and individual institutions do

not have separate governing entities. Within this structure the boards have all the rights and

responsibilities of that corporation as defined by state law. Individual institutions under the

board’s jurisdiction do not have separate corporate status. These boards also coordinate

functions, including planning, setting a public agenda, policy analysis, and problem resolution.

Governing boards are responsible for academic program review and approval, budget

development, and maintaining information and accountability. These boards participate in

developing and implementing policy as well as advocating the needs of the institutions within

the board’s jurisdiction to the legislature and governor. Other responsibilities include

establishing faculty personnel policies such as awarding tenure and serving as the final point of

appeal on faculty grievances. These boards also allocate and reallocate resources between the

institutions in the jurisdiction and establish policies for, at times even setting, tuition and fees

(ECS 1997; McLendon forthcoming). To perform these functions, governing boards have

professional staff, which contributes to greater autonomy (Lowry 2001, 848).

Coordinating boards, in contrast, merely provide an interface between the state

government and the governing boards of the state’s systems and individual colleges and

universities. Coordinating boards are less likely to have the power and autonomy necessary to

resist political influence. Some coordinating boards are responsible for approving academic

programs. Other advisory coordinating boards only have the power to review and make

recommendations to institutional governing boards regarding academic programs. Some carry



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out only limited coordinating functions and primarily administer student financial aid or

licensure responsibilities (ECS 1997).

Coordinating boards differ from consolidated governing boards in that they do not govern

institutions, they do not appoint institutional chief executives or set faculty personnel policies.

They appoint, set compensations for, and evaluate only the board’s chief executive officer and

staff. The governor is sometimes actually responsible for appointing the agency executive but

usually on the recommendation of the coordinating board. Coordinating boards do not have

corporate status independent from the state government (ECS 1997). They focus on state and

system needs and priorities rather than advocating interests. They may or may not review and

make recommendations on budgets for the state’s system. The limited scope of these boards

means that they have less power.

Some coordinating agencies recommend consolidated budgets for the whole system

while others make recommendations to the governor or state legislature on individual or

segmental budgets. Most coordinating boards, however, have responsibility for implementing

budget policy only for funds appropriated specifically to the agency (as opposed to

appropriations to the individual campuses). Review or approval of academic programs and

authority to require institutions to review existing programs varies. In terms of faculty personnel

policy they are only responsible for carrying out legislative mandates for studies of issues such

as faculty workload and productivity or tenure policy (ECS 1997). Overall coordinating boards

clearly have less power and autonomy than governing boards; Lowry (2001, 847), in fact, treats

coordinating boards as merely extensions of the legislature or similar political principals.

The difference between consolidated governing boards and coordinating boards in terms

of autonomy is offset by their differences in centralization. Governing boards with their



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autonomy and capacity are centralized, making the logistics of interacting with them relatively

easy. Coordinating boards do not centralize power but rather leave the actual power of the

institutions decentralized in the various institutions. All things being equal, the lower

transactions costs of the centralized governing boards means that political influence should be

easier (Lowry 2001, 848). Quite clearly all things are not equal since the centralized governing

boards also have greater expertise and autonomy. This combination sets up an interesting

empirical contrast between centralized structures with autonomy versus decentralized structures

with less autonomy.

POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE

In addition to governing boards, other political institutions are also involved in the

governance of higher education within individual states. The governor and lieutenant governor

have some authority over higher education. Some governors and lieutenant governors exert

influence through formal powers such as appointment of board members or executives, while

others exert power through influence over the legislature. In addition to governors and

lieutenant governors, certain members of state legislatures also affect higher education policy.

Various positions in the legislature are allowed to appoint members to the boards, some powers

delineated from the constitution are given to the legislature, and those boards whose power

resides in statute can experience loss or gain depending on the character of the state legislature.

In addition, a variety of committees in state legislatures exert power over policies pertaining to

higher education (ECS 1997).

Based on the education policy and bureaucratic literature, this study examines how well

governing boards are able to insulate higher education policies in individual states from politics.

This study differs from previous studies because it not only examines the structure but the means



10

by which these agencies receive the powers that they have and therefore what process would

have to be under-taken by political actors to influence these boards. In addition, we will

examine the importance of how the board executive came to power, how powers are delineated,

and the ability of the higher education boards to insulate the governance of institutions of higher

education from policies driven by political desires.

Hypothesis 1: Consolidated governing boards will provide more insulation for

policies from politics because of the structure and autonomy that they have and

that will result in less political influence on education policy.

Hypothesis 2: Consolidated governing boards will generate lower transactions

costs to political actors owing to their centralization and this will result in greater

political influence on education policy.

The two hypotheses are essentially contradictory predictions. The reason for this is that

the design of governing boards is influenced by two different organizational principles. This

inherent theoretical conflict, in fact, might be why McGuinness (1999) concludes that the

evidence is inconclusive on the benefits and costs of various structures. It also could explain the

varied findings of Lowry (2001), Hearn and Griswold (1994), Hearn, Griswold, and Marine

(1996) and Volkwein (1986; 1989).

METHODS

Our distinct theoretical contribution to the literature is to operationalize Lowry’s

hypothesis as an interaction between structure and politics. No prior test of this interaction

exists although most of the literature in the area has not precisely specified that an interaction

exists (see McLendon forthcoming). To test the hypotheses, we will code our structural variable

(S) as equal to 1 if the state has a coordinating board (rather than a consolidated governing



11

board). We will then define a vector of political variables (P) as well as a vector of control

variables (C). Whether or not structure facilitates or restricts the influence of political factors

then can be tested by interacting structure with politics and using a joint f-test for whether the

slopes of the interacted variables are different from zero (and thus different in states with

consolidated governing boards from those in states with coordinating boards). More formally,

O = 1S + 2P + 3SP +4C

Where O is some measure of output, and the key test is whether 3 is equal to zero.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Our concern is the costs of higher education and who incurs them. Four dependent

variables are used. The first is simply the total dollar cost per student of public higher education

in the state. Education, in an ideal world, has redistributive consequences; and to the extent that

the costs of education are low, these redistributive aspects can materialize. The other three

variables measure the distribution of costs; they are tuition per student, need-based scholarships

and financial aid per student, and state/local appropriations per student. The basic issue is who

pays for the costs of education. States that emphasize tuition place the burden on the individual

student; this burden is significantly higher if states do not provide much need-based aid. In

contrast states that fund more of higher education via appropriations take the burden of payment

off of students and use the general tax revenues.2 All data were taken from the Digest of

Educational Statistics (National Center for Education Statistics 1998). Because the distribution

of each of these variables is skewed, they will be subjected to a log transformation.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES–POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Three clusters of political forces will be examined in this research—partisanship,

ideology, and legislative characteristics. Politics in many cases means political parties. All



12

models will include both the political party of the governor (coded 1 if a Democrat and 0

otherwise) and the proportion of the legislature that are Democrats (Statistical Abstract, various

years). A priori one would expect that Democratic control would be more likely to decrease the

costs of education to students by increasing aid or by holding tuition down.

Although one can argue that the Democratic Party is always more liberal than the

Republican Party in a given state, party is only a rough surrogate for ideology. To more directly

capture the influence of ideology, we include Berry et al.’s (1996) measures of both government

and citizen ideology. Government ideology attempts to measure the political ideology of

government officials and thus fills in the gaps in the party measure. Citizen ideology is a

measure of mass preferences. Although the general public is unlikely to affect higher education

decisions directly, they could influence government officials to act on their behalf, that is to act

as delegates rather than trustees. Both measures are coded on a scale of 0 to 100 with 100 being

most liberal and 0 being most conservative.

The two remaining political variables are the professionalism of the state legislature and

a variable for conflict in the state legislature. The conditions that these variables represent are

likely to affect the policies and implementation in any state. Scholars have found that in times of

high conflict in a legislature, the interest and influence of members of Congress in policies also

increases (Bond and Fleisher 2000). More legislation is introduced, and more attempts to

oversee the implementation are made in an effort to claim responsibility for actions that might be

beneficial to one party or another. We expect that increased activity by a legislature could result

in the inability of boards to insulate the policy outputs from political influence. At the same time

greater legislative conflict could keep the legislature focused on internal battles and leave it little

time for overseeing the higher education system. Our indicator of legislative conflict is



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measured by how closely the legislature is to a perfect fifty-fifty party split.

Legislative professionalism is an important variable because it provides the capacity to

interact with the bureaucracy on a more equal basis. Full time legislatures who are paid more

are able to commit more time and resources to actual legislation and conduct more oversight into

the actions of higher education governing boards. The greater resources that more

professionalized legislatures have at their discretion allows them to overcome problems of

information asymmetry. According to the literature, legislatures who spend more time

influencing policy are more likely to be concerned with equity, and this should result in

decisions that affect the distribution of costs for higher education (Lowry 2001). Although

multi-indicator measures of legislative professionalism exist, they do not exist on an annual

basis. Studies have found, however, that legislative salaries are good surrogates for legislative

professionalism and that measure will be used here (Fiorina 1994; 1999; source: Council of State

Governments various years).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES–CONTROLS

Besides political variables, the model includes additional structural variables that might

affect the implementation of policies. Several of these pertain to how a board receives its power.

First, we code whether the legal basis for board actions comes directly from the state constitution

or if the powers are statutory (coded 1 if statutory, a historical justification for this variable can

be found in McLendon forthcoming). Second, a dummy variable is included that measures

whether or not the chief executive of the board is a member of the governor’s cabinet; one might

hypothesize that a cabinet post would allow the governor to have greater influence on policy.

The final structural variable included is whether or not a board is elected or appointed. This is a

dummy variable coded 1 for the four states with elected boards and 0 otherwise. Appointments



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can be done by a state legislature, the governor, or another high-ranking state governmental

official. States that are coded elected are popularly elected by the general population. All

structural variables are from the Educational Commission of the States (1997).

In addition to controlling for structural variables, the model also controls for two

economic/demographic variables as well. Per capita personal income should influence the need

that a state might have for either more need-based scholarships and grants or for a reduction in

tuition as well as the state’s ability to do so based on its income (Statistical Abstract, various

years). This ability might also affect the overall distribution of higher education costs. The total

fall undergraduate enrollment is included in all models in case economies of scale change the

cost factors (ECS 1997). All variables other than the dummy variables were logged and thus can

be interpreted as elasticities.

The analysis is a pooled time series of 47 states from 1989 to 1996. A few data points

are missing for a few states and thus the pool does not total exactly 376 cases. To control for

any time dominance in the pool, dummy variables for individual years are included in all

regressions.

FINDINGS

Given the initial exploratory nature of this research and the two contradictory hypotheses

about how structure might interact with political forces, the discussion of the findings will focus

on general patterns. The use of models with several interaction terms such as these are often

affected by collinearity and thus the individual regression coefficients might be unreliable.

Tables 1 through 4 present the results for the total higher education costs per student, tuition per

student, state appropriations per student, and need-based aid per student respectively.

[Tables 1-4 About Here]



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Before progressing to the main set of hypotheses, the general impact of coordinating

boards versus consolidating governing boards should be noted. The first regression coefficient

in each table indicates how much impact a coordinating board has relative to a consolidated

governing board. Because the variable is a dummy variable, it can be converted to a percentage

change by using a binomial expansion (see Tufte 1974). All other things being equal, states with

coordinating boards have 40% lower total costs for higher education and their tuition costs per

student are 52% lower (both appropriations and scholarships appear unrelated to the distinction

between coordinating boards and governing boards). These are substantively large differences

that indicate coordinating boards are associated with providing relatively inexpensive education.

Whether this might be a preference for low cost methods of delivery of education (e.g.,

community colleges or four year schools versus comprehensive universities) is the subject of

future research.

The two key hypotheses are whether coordinating boards facilitate the ability of political

factors to influence higher education policy or not. Unfortunately, the pattern of coefficients

does not reveal a clear and consistent set of relationships. An optimal pattern might, for

example, show significant relationships for the coordinating board interactions and no

relationship for the noninteracted relationships (or vice versa). Instead we get a general pattern

where some of the coordinating board relationships are significant and some of the governing

board relationships are significant. What is clear from the tables is that higher education

structures do significantly affect the ability of political forces to influence higher education. In

all four cases the joint f-test shows that the sets of coefficients are significantly different from

each other. This concisely shows that how politics affect higher education in states with

consolidated governing boards is different from how politics affects higher education in states



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with coordinating boards.

To illustrate the differences, the impact of legislative professionalism on tuition costs

will be used (see Table 2). In states with consolidated governing boards, a one percent increase

in legislative professionalism is associated with a .0437 percent decrease in tuition per student.

In states with coordinating boards, however, this relationship changes dramatically; and a one

percent increase in legislative professionalism is associated with a .058 percent increase in

tuition costs per student (the impact in coordinating board states is the sum of the two

coefficients). Both coefficients are significantly different from zero and significantly different

from each other.

The widely varying pattern of coefficients as politics interacts with structure suggests

that the relationships are highly complex. Providing an explanation for the patterns and how

those patterns should appear will require additional theoretical work. One possibility is that the

relationships are even more complex than the current regressions reveal them to be. For

example, the direction of impact of legislative professionalism might be a function of both the

structure of higher education and the ideology or partisanship of the legislature. This notion

suggests a three way or perhaps even a four way interaction of these terms.

The other structural factors that are not part of the interactive hypothesis merit some

discussion. All other things being equal, elected boards are associated with 14 percent lower

tuition per student and 11 percent lower state appropriations. In other words, states with elected

boards favor lower educational costs. Cabinet rank also appears to matter. All other things

being equal, states that provide cabinet rank for the chief education officer are associated with a

3% higher total cost per student, 6% higher tuition charges, and 4% lower state appropriations.

In short, such states appear to impose more of the costs of higher education on the student.



17

Finally, states that provide the legal authority for their higher education board via statute are

associated with 8% greater total costs per student, 14% higher tuition, 6% lower state

appropriations, but compliment that with a 58% percent greater allocation of financial aid.

CONCLUSION

Structural questions are an essential part of the political control literature. Building from

the work of Lowry, Hearn, McLendon and colleagues, who first demonstrated that higher

education structures are associated with the distribution of policy benefits, this paper examined

whether structures facilitate or impede political influences. Unfortunately, the theoretical

literature does not suggest a clear directional hypothesis regarding the impact of structure. A

combination of the theories of political structures led us to two competing hypotheses regarding

structure and political influence. First, we posited that bureaucracies structured to be insulated

from politics might have a greater degree of autonomy and greater control over policy outcomes.

Alternatively, any political institution seeking to control a bureaucracy has lower transaction

costs in a centralized bureaucracy.

Our hypotheses concerning the ability of particular structures to insulate or facilitate

higher education from politics produced mixed findings. The pattern of coefficients does not

reveal a clear and consistent set of relationships in terms of direction and signs. What is clear

from this analysis is that higher education structures do significantly affect how political forces

influence higher education. In all four cases the joint f-test shows that the sets of coefficients

are significantly different from each other. This clearly demonstrates that political forces affect

higher education differently in states with coordinating boards than in states with consolidated

governing boards, even though the research does not provide an answer concerning exactly how

structure affects political influence.



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Mixed findings such as these are obviously an invitation for further research, but they

also provide insights that should be incorporated into future studies of higher education. Our

findings suggest that structures affect how politics matters. Models of higher education policy

should include both structural variables and political factors. This insight should not be

surprising to students of public organizations, where findings consistently demonstrate that

bureaucratic structures influence outputs. It is nonetheless an element that can be explored in

more depth in future studies of state-run higher education systems. Even more work remains to

be done theoretically to develop a set of more precise hypotheses. We need to know what kinds

of political forces are mediated by the various structures, and how in combination these affect

higher education policy. Models will also need to reflect the possible complex patterns of

interactions among the various structures and the myriad political forces.



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Table 1: Determinates of Logged Total Cost Per Student of Higher

Education in the American States, 1989-1996

Independent Variables Slope t-score

Consolidating Governing Board -.5201 3.42*

Political Variables

Citizen Ideology .1373 2.26*

Government Ideology -.0459 1.97*

Legislative Professionalism -.0493 5.06*

Democratic Governor .0394 3.18*

Democratic Legislature Percent .1142 2.05*

Legislative Conflict .1277 2.12*

Political Variables Interacted With Structure

Citizen Ideology .1023 1.37

Government Ideology .0199 .49

Legislative Professionalism .0895 6.52*

Democratic Governor -.0615 6.45*

Democratic Legislature Percent -.0326 .34

Legislative Conflict .0621 .56

Elected Board .0195 1.11

Cabinet Rank .0327 3.01*

Statutory Authority .0806 7.88*

Per capita Income .4592 6.19*

Student Enrollment (millions) -.0020 .14

_______________________________________________________________________

R-Squared = .67 Standard Error = .0654 N = 372 F = 28.73

Joint f-test for political variables (6, 346) = 10.15 p = .0000

Coefficients for dummy variables not reported

*significant p < .05



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Table 2: Determinates of Logged Total Tuition per Student of Higher



Consolidating Governing Board -.7262 3.37*

Political Variables

Citizen Ideology .0208 .24

Government Ideology -.0078 .23


Democratic Governor .0061 .34

Democratic Legislature Percent .0549 .68

Legislative Conflict .1893 2.23*





Democratic Governor -.0312 1.20

Democratic Legislature Percent .1259 .91

Legislative Conflict .0832 .52

Elected Board -.1358 5.30*

Cabinet Rank .0575 3.63*


Per capita Income .5304 4.94*

Student Enrollment (millions) -.0185 .90

______________________________________________________________________







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Table 3: Determinates of Logged Total Appropriations Per Student of

Higher Education in the American States, 1989-1996


Consolidating Governing Board .2012 .94

Political Variables

Citizen Ideology -.2682 3.10*

Government Ideology .1142 3.38*


Democratic Governor -.0143 .81

Democratic Legislature Percent .1399 1.74

Legislative Conflict -.0403 .48



Government Ideology -.1454 2.48*


Democratic Governor .0354 1.38

Democratic Legislature Percent -.0323 .24

Legislative Conflict -.0517 .36

Elected Board -.1082 4.32*

Cabinet Rank -.0349 2.23*

Statutory Authority -.0542 3.71*

Per capita Income .0986 .92

Student Enrollment -.0314 1.53

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22

Table 4: Determinates of Logged Scholarships/Aid Per Student of Higher



Consolidating Governing Board -.5304 .66

Political Variables

Citizen Ideology 1.2168 3.74*

Government Ideology .5044 3.98*

Legislative Professionalism .0089 .17

Democratic Governor -.1299 1.95

Democratic Legislature Percent -.5834 1.93

Legislative Conflict .5052 1.59


Citizen Ideology .0680 .17



Democratic Governor .0496 .51

Democratic Legislature Percent .7125 1.38

Legislative Conflict .8384 1.40

Elected Board -.1485 1.58

Cabinet Rank .1085 1.84


Per capita Income .1913 .48

Student Enrollment .4178 5.42*

_______________________________________________________________________







23

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Biographical Statements

Kenneth J. Meier is the Charles Puryear Professor of Liberal Arts in the Department of Political

Science and holds the Sara Lindsey Chair in the Bush School of Government at Texas A&M

University. His work on education policy generally combines the themes of politics, equity, and

representation. His research agenda in education includes a new national study of race, ethnicity

and education in 1800 school districts and an on-going project on how school systems can be

managed effectively.

Jill Nicholson-Crotty is a PhD candidate in political science at Texas A&M University and

research director of the Texas Educational Excellence Project. Her research interests are public

administration and public policy with a special emphasis on gender, representation, and

management. She is currently working on projects involving gender and the management of

school districts, police and the enforcement of sexual assault laws, and the politics of public

health policy.



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1.There are a wide variety of other structural issues such as whether the board has

statutory or constitutional powers, whether it is part of the governor's cabinet, and the

degree of control vested in the governor versus other elected officials. On the last issue

see Knott and Payne (2002). Whether or not structure actually translates into autonomy

is an open question. A series of studies by Volkwein (1986; 1989, and references

therein) seek to measure autonomy and find it is not closely linked to structural form.

2.The other major sources of funds for higher education are research grants and private

contributions.

ENDNOTES

Politics Structure and Public Policy -Nicholson Meyer

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