Politics, politicians, and public servants in non-partisan local governments

m i d siegel

Abstract: One of the major characteristics of the increasing complexity of government in the 1990s is the heightened power of public servants. This phenomenon has been well documented at the federal and provincial levels. The smaller size of local governments has meant that this trend has been slower to develop there, but it seems clear that it is emerging as an issue at this level of government as well.

The increasing power of public servants challenges the traditional, simple paradigm of the role of politicians and public servants, simply expressed as "politicians on top, experts on tap." This paradigm is breaking down in a number of ways as decision-making processes become more complex. This means that this once-clear statement of "politicians on top, experts on tap" needs to be replaced by a more complex understanding of the relationship between politicians and staff. Power is now shared by politicians and staff, but the tricky part of the sharing is that democratic principles require that elected politicians must maintain a predominant position. Any revised paradigm must recognize both the sharing of power, and the fact that the sharing cannot be equal.

This paper will borrow a framework commonly used to examine the power of public servants in the federal and provincial governments and apply it to local government. As the article will indicate, many of the principles are similar, but there are some important variations. This revised paradigm provides a practical guide for action for both councillors and staff in their dealings with one another.

Politics, politicians, and public servants in non-partisan

Sommaire ; L'augmentation du pouvoir des fonctionnaires constitue I'une des princi- pales caracteristiques de la complexit6 croissante du gouvernement dans les annees 1990. Les preuves de ce phenomhe sont nombreuses aux paliers federal et provincial. Etant donn6 la taille plus rkduite des gouvernements locaux, cette tendance s'y developpe plus lentement, mais elle commence 18 aussi B susciter des preoc- cupations Ce phenomhe remet en question le paradigme traditionnel sur le r61e des elus et des fonctionnaires, que l'on peut exprimer tres simplement comme suit cc les klus en haut, les experts en disponibilite. )) Ces rapports se d6sagrPgent de diverses faqons B mesure que le processus decisionnel devient plus complexe. Cet enonce, jadis tres clair, doit &re remplace par une comprehension accrue des rapports entre elus et fonctionnaires. En effet, si les deux groupes partagent maintenant le pouvoir,

The author is associate professor of politics, Brock University. He would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Michael Boggs, Kenneth Kernaghan, Andrew Sancton, and two anonymous reviewers. As usual, all opinions and errors are the responsibility of the author.

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION / ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA VOLUME 37, NO. 1 (SPRING/PRINTEMPS), PP. 7-30.

DAVID SIEGEL

la difficult6 dans ce partage rkside en ce que les principes democratiques exigent que les representants politiques Plus maintiennent une position dominante. Toute redefinition du paradigme traditionnel doit admettre A la fois le partage d u pouvoir et le fait que ce partage est forcement inkgal.

Le pr6sent article emprunte un cadre gbneralement utilise pour examiner le pouvoir des fonctionnaires au sein des gouvernements f6deral et provinciaux, et I’applique au gouvernement local. L’article souligne que de nombreux principes sont \imilaires, bien qu’ayant toutefois des variations importantes. Cette redefinition constitue un guide d’action pratique tant pour les conseillers municipaux que pour leur personnel dans leurs transactions mutuelles.

One of the major characteristics of the increasing complexity of government is the heightened power of public servants. This increase in power has not accrued steadily over time and across all jurisdictions. For example, Prime Minister Mulroney’s augmentation of the role of political staff might have tilted the balance away from public servants somewhat. However, these kinds of specific variations have not significantly altered the long-term trend of the increasing size and complexity of government which has inevitably increased the power of public servants in the governing process. This phenomenon has been well documented at the federal and provincial levels.

However, it is difficult to discern how this trend has affected local government. On the one hand, it would seem that local politicians shoitld be able to exercise more control over their staff because the smaller size of local governments makes it easier for politicians to become more directly involved in issues. On the other hand, the role of local politicians is significantly weakened by the residuum of certain structural reforms undertaken as a part of the “turn of the century reform movement” for the explicit purpose of increasing the power of “experts” at the expense of local politicians who were seen as corrupt or short-sighted.’ In most local governments, this structural weakness is exacerbated by councillors’ part-time position, the absence of expert political staff working directly for them, and the lack of a party system which would help to structure issues.

The increasing power of public servants is challenging the traditional, clear paradigm of the role of politicians and public servants, which has been expressed very simply as “politicians on top, experts on tap.” Politicians rely on experts to provide them with technical advice; then the politicians make clear and concise political decisions which are carried out conscientiously by staff.

This paradigm is breaking down in a number of ways as decision-making processes become more complex. In the first place, the concept of purely tc-rlztiical adzlice is becoming an anachronism as more issues develop into

1 lohn C. Weaver, Shnpiiig the Cnirndiari Cify: Essnys on Urban Pditics mid Policy, 2890-2920 (Toronto: Institute of Public AJminis&ra&ion of Canada, 1977).

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POLITICIANS, PUBLIC SERVANTS IN NON-PARTISAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

mixed political-technical concerns. One of the best examples of this is the area of solid waste disposal. The location of a sanitary landfill site used to be a purely technical issue determined by such considerations as soil conditions and drainage requirements. This issue is now becoming one of the most highly politically charged decisions which must be made, although it should not be made without regard to technical considerations.

Secondly, councils find it difficult in some cases to provide staff with clear, precise statements of what they want staff to do. More and more often, councils are finding themselves in the position of telling staff: 'This is the sort of direction we want to move in. We would like you to negotiate with the relevant groups and do the best you can to move us in that direction." This is frequently encountered in the areas of land-use planning and economic development.*

These developments mean that the once-clear statement of "politicians on top, experts on tap" needs to be replaced by a more complex understanding of the relationship between politicians and staff. This restatement must reflect the fact that power is now shared by politicians and staff, but the tricky part of this division of power is that democratic principles require that elected politicians must maintain a predominant position. Any revised paradigm must recognize both the sharing of power, and the fact that the sharing cannot be equal.

The purpose of this article is to develop a set of principles to guide relations between councillors and staff. These principles will assist both sets of participants in structuring this more complex relationship while maintaining the political neutrality which is essential to a professional public service.

The concept of political neutrality The phrase "political neutrality" is not commonly used in non-partisan local governments because it is often taken to refer to neutrality as between political parties. This is a misunderstanding of the term. Yes, it can refer to neutrality between political parties, but it means much more than that.

Political neutrality is a constitutional convention which provides that public servants should avoid activities likely to impair, or to seem to impair, their political impartiality or the political impartiality of the public service ... The ethic of neutrality requires that public servants be neutral not only in the partisan sense but also in the broader sense of leaving as many value choices as possible to elected official^.^

2 A method of doing this and preserving democratic control is discussed in John P. Burke, Bureaucratic Responsibility (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), pp. 203ff. A good discussion of the dangers inherent in moving too far in this direction is contained in TJ. Plunkett and G.M. Betts, The Management of Canadian Urban Government (Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Local Government, Queen's University, 1978), pp. 161-62. 3 Kenneth Kernaghan and John W. Langford, The Responsible Public Servant (Halifax and Toronto: The Institute for Research on Public Policy and the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1990), p. 56.

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In this context, it also refers to the neutrality which professional public servants must maintain on all political issues and on all divisions between their political masters, whether those divisions are based on partisan or other differences. When used in this broader way, the term political neutrality is certainly applicable to non-partisan local governments.

Political neutrality is important because it helps maintain the confidence which both politicians and the general public must have in the impartiality of the public service. Adherence to the concept of political neutrality will signal to politicians that professional public servants will be willing and able to serve loyally elected politicians of any stripe. It will also ensure that citizens will be treated fairly regardless of their backgrounds. In sum, the maintenance of political neutrality is essential for the preservation of a high- quality, professional public service.

The principles of political neutrality in parliamentary governments have been discussed widely so that there is fairly general agreement on their essential aspects. These principles have not been so well defined as they relate uniquely to local governments. This article will build on the parliamentary principles to develop principles of political neutrality which can be used i n local government.

Before discussing the principles faced by local government officials, it is important to set the scene by discussing some of the differences between the structures of the two governments which have an impact on political neutrality and administrative responsibility.

Differences between parliamentary and local governments

Absence of n iinified executive. In the standard Canadian model of parliamentary government, most public servants work for a minister: who is a member of cabinet. The cabinet is composed of members of the same political party, which means that all members of cabinet should view issues in a somewhat similar fashion. At any rate, the concept of collective ministerial responsibility requires that cabinet members publicly present a unified position on all issues affecting the government. Admittedly, this is a bit cosmetic. There can be significant disagreements within cabinet when decisions are being made, and this can cause some real difficulty for senior public servants. However, cabinet must present a unified face to the legisla- ture, regardless of how patched that face might be behind the scenes.

A municipal council cannot be compared to a cabinet. In a non-partisan

4 There are a few public servants outside this structure in such independent agencies as auditors general, electoral offices, and ombudsmen, but these all serve a very specialized purpose. Most public servants delivering services to the public work for a minister either directly in an operating department or at arm’s length in a regulatory agency or crown corporation.


POLEICIANS, PUBLIC SERVANTS IN NON-PARTISAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

municipal council, individual councillors are elected on their own. There can be significant divisions on council based on such factors as ideological perspective, ward considerations, or personal ambition. Someone once joked that a university is a group of anarchists held together by a common parking lot. The same can be said of many municipal councils.

The effect of the absence of a unified executive is that municipal staff frequently do not receive clear and concise instructions from council. In fact, some instructions which come from council are deliberately vague, because this is the only way that the coalition needed to adopt the policy can be developed. In a situation like this, municipal administrators must undertake some action knowing that council is badly split on the issue and knowing that they do not have the equivalent of a minister to turn to for advice and protection.

Open government and luck of anonymity. Secrecy is one of the main principles of parliamentary government. Cabinet solidarity requires that cabinet deliberations be held in secret. Ministerial responsibility is mirrored by public service anonymity so that public servants provide their advice to their minister in confidence. This protects public servants from being drawn into political controversy if cabinet rejects their advice. It also protects the neutrality of public servants in that they are not publicly identified with the policies of the previous government when governments change.

Local governments are much more open.' Generally speaking, local council meetings must be held in public! Before council makes decisions it will want to hear the advice of its staff experts, and that advice must ordinarily be rendered in public.' In fact, the main "stuff" of most council meetings is the consideration of staff reports. These reports provide the background for an issue, discuss the options available to council for dealing with the issue, and, in some cases, offer a recommendation.

All of this is done in a very public way. The staff report will be part of the council agenda, which is sent to councillors (and any other interested parties) several days before council meets. During the meeting, the department head who is responsible for a report will sometimes be asked to present a verbal summary of the report, and if there are concerns about the contents of the report, he or she will be asked to explain and defend its findings. No matter how carefully the staff person proceeds in this endeav-

5 It is somewhat ironic that provincial governments, which are very secretive, are now passing legislation requiring local governments to be open. 6 Open meetings are ordinarily required by provincial legislation, except when a certain limited number of topics are being discussed such as personnel matters, property acquisition, and legal cases. 7 T.J. Plunkett, City Management in Canada: The Role of the Chief Administrative Officer (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1992), pp. 2,40.


our, her or his conclusions will almost certainly anger someone. The council-staff relationship is a much more public relationship than that between politicians and public servants in parliamentary systems. The absence of any tradition of public service anonymity for senior municipal administrators places them in a very difficult position when they provide advice.

These are the main differences in the operation of parliamentary and local government systems which have an impact on the political neutrality and administrative responsibility of public servants. With due respect to federal and provincial governments, which are larger and more complex than most municipal governments, it is likely that the local level public servants' relationships with their political masters are considerably more complex and fraught with danger than those of their parliamentary counterparts.

Framework for administrative responsibility in local government

The left half of Table 1 presents the widely accepted framework for political neutrality of public servants developed by Kenneth Kernaghan for parliamentary governments.' The right side revises these principles for use in local government.

These six points constitute the operating principles or framework describ- ing the ideal conditions of political neutrality.' This section discusses both the ideal and how closely reality coincides with this ideal. In some cases the ideal and reality are fairly close, and in others the chasm between the two is quite wide.

1. Politics and policy are separated from administration; politicians make policy decisions; public servants execute these decisions.

This is a restatement of what has traditionally been described as the politics- ndtninistratiorz liiclzotorny or the policy-adnlinistration dichotomy. This principle holds that clear distinctions can be made between politics and policy on the one hand, and administration on the other. This kind of thinking has a long tradition in the general literature on public administration. In 1887 Wood- row Wilson wrote: "[A]dministration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although

8 'The framework used in Table 1 was first presented in "Politics, Policy and Public Servants: I'olitical Neutrality Revisited," CANADIAN PUBLIC AL~MINISTRATION 19, no. 3 (Fall 1976), pp. 432-56. An updated version can be found in Kenneth Kernaghan and David Siegel, Public ..~drt7itiistmticir7 itz Cntindn, 2nd ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1991), ch. 13. c7 The word "ideal" is used here in the Weberian sense to refer to the polar or extreme view of a principle. This is not exactly the same as the standard dictionary definition of perfection or desirable.



Table 1. Elements of Administrative Responsibility

Parliamentary Principle Non-Partisan

Local Government Variation

1. Politics and policy are separated from administration; thus politicians make policy decisions; public servants execute these decisions.

2. Public servants are appointed and promoted on the basis of merit rather than on party affiliation or contributions.

3. Public servants do not engage in partisan political activities.

4. Public servants do not express publicly their personal views on government policies or administration.

5. Public servants provide forthright and objective advice to their political masters in private and in confidence; in return, political executives protect the anonymity of public servants by publicly accepting responsibility for departmental decisions.

6. Public servants execute policy decisions loyally, irrespective of the philosophy and programs of the party in power and regardless of their personal opinions; as a result, public servants enjoy security of tenure during good behaviour and satisfactory performance.

1. Politics and policy are separated from administration; politicians make policy decisions; public servants execute these decisions.

2. Public servants are appointed and promoted on the basis of merit rather than on relationships with any councillor or group of councillors.

3. Public servants do not engage in partisan political activities or any type of electoral politics at the local level, and avoid involvement at the federal or provincial levels as well.

4. Public servants do not express publicly their personal views on their government’s policies or administration.

5. Public servants provide forthright and objective advice to their political masters in an open and honest manner. When they are required to make recommendations, they present all available options in a balanced manner. In return, politicians recognize that administrators are using their best administrative judgment and do not criticize them in public for providing honest and forthright advice.

decisions loyally, irrespective of their personal opinions; as a result, public servants enjoy freedom from public criticism by councillors and security of tenure during good behaviour and satisfactory performance.

6. Public servants execute policy


DAVID SIEGEL

politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to mani- pulate its offices ... [Tlhis discrimination between administration and politics is now, happily, too obvious to need further discussion.””

The same line of thinking is clear in the writings of the turn-of-the- century reformers in local government.” In the most extreme views of the proponents of this perspective, local government is administration. Since there is no political way to build a road, there is no room for ”politics” in local government. “Municipal government is pure business and nothing else - absolutely nothing else.”’2 Obviously, if a city was pure business and no politics, then one only needed technical experts to run it, not politicians. Thus, the turn-of-the-century reformers assumed that the city ”contained a complex of services best kept away from a body tainted by corruption and incompetence; the well-paid expert emerged as the ideal for proper city g~vernment.”’~

There might have been historical reasons why writers once wrote of the politics-administration dichotomy, but

the conventional view that a clear division may be made between policy and administration has always been a fiction, but has become increasingly untenable with the continuing growth of government activities and bureaucratic power. The terms policy and administration are of limited use in distinguishing between the roles of political executives (i.e., Cabinet ministers) and public servants because political executives and public servants are jointly involved in the administration of p01icy.’~

The modern view of the government policy process is that it is too dynamic for a simple division into policy making and policy administration. The policy-making process can be viewed as divided into three parts: policy development, policy adoption, and policy implementati~n.’~ However, these three stages should not be viewed as totally separate and discrete. There is significant overlap.

10 “The Study of Administration,” reprinted in Peter Woll, ed., Public Admittistration and Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 29. 11 This movement has been described in a number of places. See, for example, Weaver, Shaping the Canadian City; C.R. Tindal and S. Nobes Tindal, Local Goziernment in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1990), ch. 3. 12 From a speech by Charles Y . Elliot, president of Harvard University, to the Economic Club of Boston, 1 1 January 1907. Quoted in H.H. Gaetz, “Municipal Legislation,” in Jack K. Masson and James D. Anderson, eds., Ernergirtg Party Politics in Urban Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1972), pp. 27-28. I3 Weaver, Slmpittg the Canadiari City, p. 45. 14 Kernaghan and Siegel, Public Administration in Cunada, p. 298. 15 A somewhat different and interesting way of analysing the nature of the politics-adniinis- tration relationship is found in James H. Svara, “Dichotomy and Duality: Reconceptualizing the Relationship between Policy and Administration in Council-Manager Cities,” in H. George Frederickson, ed., Ideal and Practice in Cotmil-Manager Government (Washington, LX: Inter- national City Management Association, 1989), pp. 5349.



In practice, policymaking is a shared responsibility of the governing body and the professional administrator. In theory, the governing body assumes responsibility for formulating policy and delegates responsibility for its execution to the manager. Such clear distinctions are misleading, however, in that managers play a significant role in policy formulation and municipal governing bodies exercise careful oversight and sometimes intervene directly in policy execution.I6

For example, policy implementation is hardly ever really final.

Urban policy making will become a continuous process in which a particular problem receives brief, often frantic, attention; some kind of decision is made, which bounces around in the implementation process; and then the problem pops up again in a new or slightly altered form ... Thus policy making on any one problem or set of problems is unlikely to develop in a linear fashion or in small closely related incremental steps."

Just as the stages are muddled, so it is clear that no stage is the sole preserve of any group of actors. However, certain general statements about the role of various actors in each phase can be made. The policy development phase is the most ambiguous phase. Public servants probably have the main role in terms of researching available alternatives, considering the consequences of each, and refining them into specific proposals. However, politicians and interest groups will want to play a significant role at this phase. The policy adoption phase is fairly clearly dominated by politicians, although interest groups will have some role in influencing their actions. The policy implementatiun phase is dominated by the public servants, but wise politicians and interest groups will maintain a careful watch on the activities of public servants at this phase. The recent interest in the study of policy implementation has suggested that policies can be significantly changed between the adoption and implementation phases."

Thus, public servants are involved in the policy process at two key points - policy development and policy implementation.

Pulicy development can occur in at least four different ways.'' All four involve public servants in quite direct ways. Many policy initiatives come directly from councillors. Elected people are in direct contact with constituents and they see the specific problems of the community. However, most local councillors are only part-time politicians and have no support from a

16 Wayne F. Anderson, Chester A. Newland, and Richard J. Stillman 11, The Effective Local Government Manager (Washington, DC: International City Management Association, 1983),

17 Douglas Yates, The Ungovernable City (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), p. 94. 18 Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Policy Iinplementafion and Bureaucracy, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1986). 19 Tindal and Tindal, Local Government in Canada, ch. 7; Donald J.H. Higgins, Local and Urban Poiitics in Canada (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing Company, 1986), ch. 4.

pp. 51-52.


DAVID SIEGEL

party office or caucus research staff. This means that while politicians can initiate the original ideas, they must rely heavily on staff to move those general ideas to specific policy proposals.

Some policy ideas arise as a result of initiatives of local citizens’ groups. These groups see problems in their communities and demand changes. Politicians are frequently involved in the early stages of this process, but, because of their part-time status, they usually must rely on staff to carry out detailed discussions with citizens’ group. This means that, once again, the specifics of the new policy proposal will be worked out by public servants.

Many local government policies are developed in response to initiatives of other levels of government. In some cases, these other governments simply impose requirements on local governments. In other cases, the senior governments have programs which make transfer payments available to local governments which undertake particular activities. Again, councillors must rely on the expertise of full-time staff to negotiate with and interpret exactly what needs to be done to satisfy the requirements of the other government.

Finally, some policy initiatives come from public servants. Like members of community groups, they are deeply involved in delivering policies and so are one of the first groups to be aware of problems or gaps in existing programs. Through their involvement in professional associations, they are ‘dso likely to be aware of activities of other governments which could be emulated.

The above discussion makes it clear that, regardless of the origin of the policy initiative, public servants will play a significant role in conceptualiz- ing the actual outlines of the policy and moving it on to the next stage. It would be an overstatement to suggest that staff has an absolute veto at the development stage if other actors feel very strongly about the policy. However, public servants have a great deal of leverage in moving polices ahead quickly or slowing them down, in packaging them in an attractive way or making them look like real losers. Public servants clearly have a great deal of influence2’ in the policy-making process at the development stage.

The policy inzplemeiztatiori phase is another source of bureaucratic influence. ‘This is an area which is clearly dominated by staff, and it is an area which is not the subject of much scrutiny. Traditionally, academics have simply ignored the entire implementation process. The thinking was that when a policy was decided upon, that was the end of the process. The policy was

2 0 The word ”iufluence” is used very deliberately here, rather than “control.” Both “influence” and “control” indicate that public servants have some power in the decision- making process, hut “influence” is clearly a weaker form of power than ”control.” For further elaboration of this relationship, see Kernaghan and Siegel, Public Adtrzirristmtiotz in Cntmdn, pp. 276 f f .



simply carried out in accordance with council’s wishes by public servants behaving as automatons. Recent analysis is more detailed.’l It suggests that there can be quite a bit of slippage between what politicians want when they approve a program and what public servants actually deliver. Sometimes this is accidental because of lack of understanding, sometimes it is a function of simply being physically unable to deliver a service as intended, and there are sometimes allegations that the slippage is deliberate because staff did not want to deliver the program as specified. The reason for the slippage is not as important for this analysis as the mere fact that it can occur.

In federal and provincial governments, politicians do not have time to become deeply involved in implementation. In local government, many councillors feel that it is their duty to become involved in implementation to make certain that their constituents are being treated fairly. This can frequently cause tension with public servants who feel that implementation is their role. Public servants are also concerned that a councillor might put them in a difficult position by making a snap commitment which the public servant knows is either at odds with council policy or is a physical impossi- bility.22

For these reasons, identifying the proper division between the role of politicians and administrators in the policy process is highly pr~blematic.’~ Administrators must understand that politicians have prime responsibility in the area of policy development. Politicians should understand that implementation is the prime domain of the public servant and that they put themselves in some political danger when they become too involved in this area. Specifically, politicians are not experts in implementation and do not always understand the technicalities of provincial and other legislation which must be followed, or the arcane details of collective agreements and other kinds of contracts which structure implementation of some policies. There are also some more general problems when politicians put themselves in the position of attempting to control the bureaucracy by specifying the process to be followed rather than the result to be attained.”

However, public servants must also understand that politicians need to ensure that their constituents’ interests are well served, and sometimes that means they might have to do a little public posturing on an issue or take a bit more credit than they actually deserve for something. Experienced

21 A review of the recent literature on implementation can be found in ibid., ch. 7. 22 Andrew Sancton and Paul Woolner, ”Full-Time Municipal Councillors,” CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 33, no. 4 (Winter 1990), p. 494. 23 Some good suggestions are offered in Plunkett and Betts, The Management of Cunadiurr Urban Gozxmment, pp. 203ff. 24 Judith E. Gruber, Controlling Bureaucracies: Dikrnrnas in Democratic Governance (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1987).


DAVID SIEGEL

public servants understand that politicians must put their jobs on the line every few years. Politicians have certain needs that must be satisfied and it is the job of the public servant to look inconspicuous in those cases.

An analysis of this tenet of the traditional framework of administrative responsibility produces unclear results. Kernaghan and Siegel’s discussion of this ambiguity refers to the federal sphere, but their comments are appropriate for the municipal sphere as well.

Despite the fact that politics and policy cannot be easily separated from administration, the distinctions commonly made between politics and administration, policy and administration, and policy formulation and implementation serve an extremely useful analytical and practical purpose. They enable political theorists to distinguish - not in an absolute sense but as a matter of degree and emphasis - between the constitutional and legal functions of political executives and public servants. While the policy role of public servants has led some writers to refer to them as ”permanent politicians” and ”ruling servants,” they remain, in fact and in democratic theory, subject to the overriding authority of elected representatives and the courts. It is useful, then, to refer to the predominance of ministers in policy formulation and the predominance of public servants in policy implementation, while acknowledging that both ministers and public servants are involved in both policy formulation and implementation.”

The final analysis is that while a firm division between policy and administration is simplistic, the concepts do have some values as practical guides for actions.

2. Public servants are appointed and promoted on the basis of merit rather than on relationships with any councillor or group of councillors.

Merit-based appointment is one of the basic requirements for an efficient and professional public service. Employees must be appointed on the basis of what they know, not whom they know. This is partly a matter of fairness to citizens; everyone should have the same opportunity to serve in the public service. But it is mostly a matter of administrative efficiency. The only way to ensure that the public service will function as well as it should is if it is staffed by people hired on merit.

Canadian municipalities probably never experienced the excesses of patronage which accompanied machine politics in many large American cities.26 And a number of factors have combined in recent years to limit the influence of patronage in hiring even further, although there is wide variation among municipalities and even the best exhibit some back-sliding. One of these factors is the increasing professionalization of many local govern-

25 Kernaghan and Siegel, Public Administration in Canada, p. 301. 26 Plunkett and Betts, Tke Management of Canadian Urban Guuernment, p. 210.



ment occupations. The presence of professional qualifications provides an objective determination of at least a minimum level of merit. The feeling that certain positions require professional qualifications ties the hands of councillors who would like to make appointments on grounds other than merit.

Such traditional professions as accounting, engineering, and law have long been represented in local government, but lately there has been movement toward a greater emphasis on credentials among such groups as planners, recrea tionis ts, road superin tenden ts, parks supervisors, and economic development officers. In Ontario there is even an accreditation program for general managers operated under the aegis of the Ontario Municipal Management Institute. The increasing professionaliza tion or credentialism means that advertisements for positions almost automatically contain a requirement for the appropriate type of certification. Any councillor who wants to hire someone with other than the appropriate qualifications would have to provide a convincing explanation to her or his colleagues and the media. Councillors are also influenced by the practical aspects of professionalism. As local governments become larger and the problems they must face become more complex, councillors have begun to recognize that it would be politicalIy unwise to employ staff who were not technically competent.

Another impetus toward the merit system is the increasing emphasis on employment equity. This seems paradoxical because it is usually suggested that employment equity programs can act at cross-purposes to merit systems. This broader issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is usually the case that employment equity plans recognize the importance of merit and try to use it as one important aspect of the operation of the plan. The reason that employment equity has actually constituted a movement toward merit is that it has destroyed the informal “old boys’ network” of hiring, which discriminated not only against women, but also against men who were not plugged into the network. Employment equity plans usually require an open process of advertising vacant positions, a formal review of all applications, and an evaluation of all applications in an objective manner. The open formal nature of the process makes significant deviation from the merit principle (except deviations openly mandated by the employment equity plan) much more difficult.

Another paradoxical impetus toward merit is the increasing unionization of lower and even middle levels of the municipal workforce. Unions prefer open promotion processes based on seniority. While seniority is not always consonant with merit, it usually approximates it more closely than some of the extremes of patronage.

There is also a more practical, structural reason why patronage is somewhat difficult. Most senior appointments are made by council as a body rather than by individual councillors. In this process, councillors frequently


DAVID SIEGEL

act as a check on one another. Patronage has generally come to local governments somewhat grudgingly as a product of circumstances. While some councillors are choosing to forgo patronage out of high morality, others choose the same path out of expediency simply because only appointments based on merit can withstand the scrutiny inherent in the open forum. However, it is clear that, for whatever reason, the old idea of local government employment as the personal gift of councillors is dyingz7

Unfortunately, this general view is not always given statutory recognition. There are few institutional safeguards similar to those found in the federal or provincial governments which have watchdog agencies charged with the responsibility of preserving the merit principle. The merit system has more credibility and obvious legal weight when its principles are enshrined in a council by-law.*’

Hiring is one test of the merit principle, dismissal is the other. If people should only be hired based on merit, they should only be dismissed for demonstrable lack of merit. This is a very difficult issue in local government. Relationships between councillors and senior managers are highly personal. This same comment is frequently made about the relationship between a minister and her or his deputy minister, but the local government situation is made more complicated by the fact that the manager must get along with not just one person, but with as many as twenty or thirty different people, many of whom have little in common with one another. An additional difference is that senior managers in federal or provincial governments can frequently be moved laterally into less sensitive positions. The smaller operating scale of municipalities usually makes it impossible to shuffle a deposed employee in that manner.

The merit principle should protect professional employees from being dismissed merely because they served the previous regime loyally. This is problematic when a council is elected with a “new broom.” Councillors’ first impulse might be to view the existing staff as too close to the previous council. Staff members must prove that they can operate with the new council in a loyal and professional manner. As long as they do so, they should treated respectfully by the new council. It is impossible to obtain reliable comparable figures, but most observers would suggest that the number of cases of managers being fired (or agreeing to leave under duress) has increased in recent years. Each individual case has its own Rashomon-

27 There is a tradition in some places of councillors making patronage appointments to various agencies, boards, and comnussions. Placing incompetent people in these commissions can cause problems, but this will not be considered here because these appointments are outside the normal civil service and usually involve only limited responsibilities at negligible rates of pay. 28 A recent committee of inquiry in Britain has recommended this procedure. Secretary of State for the Environment, The Coilduct I$ h a / Aiithority Bitsiness (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1988), p. 22.



like qualities. Some members of councillors can identlfy clear indications of the person’s incompetence, while others are equally certain that the manager is being made a scapegoat. The existence of statutory safeguards for some position^?^ the increasing prevalence of employment contracts, and the changing case law on unjust dismissal provide managers with some protection, but one must be practical about situations in which councillors and administrators disagree on policy matters or other situations where levels of trust and understanding have deteriorated. The only reasonable outcome in a situation like this is for the senior manager to leave. The fact that this happens is a deviation from the strict application of the merit system, but an understandable one in some circumstances.

In sum, the situation with regard to the application of the merit principle is improving. Municipalities are more likely to advertise widely to fill positions than the former practice of hiring only from within the municipality. And those advertisements are likely to specify that applicants must pos- sess one of the rapidly growing number of professional credentials that more and more municipal employees are obtaining. The open hiring process makes it difficult for patronage considerations to hold sway. It is considerably more difficult to comment on the application of the merit principle with regard to dismissal. This requires a particular understanding of the dynamics of council-staff interaction in local level, but it is likely that the merit principle is not so firmly entrenched in this area.

3. Public servants do not engage in partisan political activities or any type of electoral politics at the local level, and avoid involvement at the federal or provincial levels as well.

This is a key component of political neutrality. A public servant who was seen to support (or oppose) any candidate for office could not maintain the confidence of politicians or the public. When a public servant becomes active in the electoral process, all her or his actions after that will be ques- tioned. Politicians might ask themselves: Is this advice being offered because it is the best possible advice or because it will advance her or his political interests? Citizens might ask: Was I treated fairly or was I discriminated against because of my political views?

This principle constitutes an abridgment of the normal political rights of citizens, but there would seem to be a valid reason for limiting rights in this circumstance. It is frequently overlooked that this restriction also provides a certain amount of protection to public servants. The weakness of the merit principle discussed above, especially as it applies to dismissal, can put municipal employees under significant pressure when candidates solicit

29 For example, under the Ontario Municipal Act, certain senior officials are entitled to a hearing in front of the full council before they can be dismissed.


DAVID SIEGEL

their support. Many people see the prohibition on political activity as a restriction on public servants’ rights, but it can also be a valuable protection for them.

One way to deal with the balance between political rights and political neutrality is the tiered approach employed by the federal government and most provinces.m This allows employees at different levels in the hierarchy different amounts of freedom of participation. Elected people work closely with senior administrators and with staff members who have sensitive responsibilities.’’ Politicians need to have a great deal of confidence in the neutrality and objectivity of these people. For this reason, the political rights of staff in these types of positions are the most restricted.

At the opposite extreme, there seems to be less reason to limit the political rights of a clerk or labourer. In the federal and many provincial governments, junior employees without sensitive responsibilities have the right to participate fully in the partisan political process, including running for political office.32 For example, the federal government has frequently provided leaves of absence for public servants to stand for office.33 As a result, there are now a number of public servants (on leave) who are members of federal and provincial legislatures. This situation has sometimes led to opposition claims of conflict of interest, but few serious problems seem to have arisen in these cases.

Similar leave provisions could likely be made for municipal employees, but there is a practical problem. Federal and provincial legislators generally receive full-time pay as legislators, which would replace their public service income. It would be difficult for a municipal employee to forgo her or his full-time pay for the stipend usually paid to municipal councillors. For whatever reason, there seems to be little pressure from municipal employees demanding the right to participate in electoral politics. Many of them work closely enough with politicians to understand the toll that politics takes on participants and they are quite happy to remain outside the process.

There would seem to be few arguments in favour of extending extensive political rights to municipal employees. Federal and provincial politics are generally fought out between political parties. Local politics can become much more personal. When public servants who have served as elected members return to the large federal or provincial bureaucracy, they will

30 Kernaghan and Langford, The Resptisible Piiblic Serziurzf, ch. 3. 31 The phrase ”sensitive responsibilities” is not amenable to a precise definition. Because of historical problems, people employed in the personnel and purchasing functions are generally expected to refrain from political activities. Employees with regulatory and enforcement powers (e.g., police officers, building inspectors) are usually considered in the same category. 32 A recent committee of inquiry has recommended such a tiered system for local government in Britain. Secretary of State for the Environment, The Cotzdttct of Local Aiithority Business, p. 19. 33 Kernaghan and Langford, The Resptisible Public Seniant, pp. 64-66.



generally have the twin protections of anonymity and union membership. When local public servants return to their previous positions, they will likely not have the same protections. It is possible that councillors will have doubts about the objectivity of a public servant who once sat around the table with them stating her or his opinions both on issues and possibly on council colleagues. The personal nature of local politics makes it difficult for councillors to forget previous disagreements with former council opponents who are returning to even fairly junior positions.

The Charter of Rights and various court decisions might some day provide municipal staff with considerably more political rights than they now have. A wise person will recognize that it will not always be prudent to exercise all the rights which are available. Alternatively, when one chooses to exercise these rights, one should not be surprised that former opponents attempt to retaliate. This gives rise to two related issues. First, should a municipal employee be able to participate in the political process in a different municipality? This could occur when a person lives in a municipality near the one in which he or she is employed or where the person owns a cottage. This would seem to present few of the difficulties cited above. However, one factor which an employee should consider is that neighbouring municipalities can have disputes with one another over matters such as planning or allocation of quotas on water or sewer mains. If these types of disputes are likely to occur, councillors who must engage in tough negotiations with their employer could find themselves in an untenable situation.

The second issue concerns involvement in federal or provincial politics. This is more problematic. There would seem to be no direct impediment to prevent public servants employed in a non-partisan local government from becoming involved in politics at other levels of government, but two caveats should be considered. The first is similar to that in the previous paragraph. Local governments frequently feud with federal and/or provincial governments. This could put the municipal employee/political activist in a difficult position. The second consideration is that many of the same people who participate in local government as councillors or candidates also participate in some way in federal or provincial politics. Therefore, there is a fairly strong likelihood that a local public servant could find herself or himself on the opposite side of the spectrum from one of her or his political masters. This would obviously be an awkward position.

It is clear that local public servants should not become involved in local politics, at least within the jurisdiction in which they are employed. Civil servants would be well served if there was a firm policy absolutely prohibit- ing their involvement in local politics. This would clarify expectations and make it impossible for unscrupulous local politicians to apply inappropriate pressure on staff to force them to become involved. A cautious person would probably decide not to take part in any form of electoral politics


DAVID SIEGEL

beyond exercising the right to a secret ballot. This seems to be the policy pursued by most public servants. However, some would regard this as overly cautious. There is usually no law or firm prohibition against local public servants participating more actively in the political process at the federal or provincial level, but anyone doing so should understand that certain consequences ensue.

4. Public servants do not express publicly their personal views on their government’s policies or administration.

It is quite clear that there are limits on the manner in which public servants can criticize publicly the policies of their governments. Engaging in this kind of activity would be an embarrassment to their political masters and it would call into question the ability of the pubic servants to administer fairlv the policy in question.

There are very few cases of this activity a t the local level that have been the subject of adjudication, but there is an interesting federal case. Mr. Neil Fraser, an auditor for the Department of National Revenue-Taxation, became an outspoken critic of the government’s metrication program and the Char- ter of Rights. His dismissal by the department was ultimately supported by a judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada which held that

public servants have some freedom to criticize the government. But it is not an absolute freedom ... In some circumstances a public servant may actively and publicly express opposition to the policies of a government. This would be appropriate if, for example, the government were engaged in illegal acts, or if its policies jeopardized the life, health, or safety of the public servant or others, or if the public servant‘s criticism had no impact on his or her ability to perform effectively the duties of a public servant or on the public perception of that ability.”

Thus, the Supreme Court recognizes the right of public servants to speak out only in the limited cases when illegality, health, or safety are involved or when it would not jeopardize a public servant’s ability to perform her or his duties.

The normal local government practice is more complex. As discussed earlier, local governments operate in a very open manner and public servants are usually expected to provide their recommendations to council in a public forum. This can make it difficult for a public servant to maintain the facade that he or she supports the policy when it is a matter of public record that the council decision was contrary to the staff recommendation. The situation can become particularly difficult when the matter at hand

34 Supreme Court of Canada, Neil Fraser mid the Pzrblir Service Staff Relations Board, 119851 2 SCR, pp. 468, 470.



directly affects the status of the administrator's department. In the absence of a minister, the department head is the only person who can defend the overall position of the department. In the interests of maintaining good staff morale, the department head must sometimes make a strong case that levels of funding or staffing are inappropriate. This results in the classic "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation. If department heads speak strongly against a budget reduction, they risk angering councillors; if they do not speak out, they will compromise their positions with their employees because they will be seen as not defending the interests of their department.

The norms vary among councils. Most councillors understand that the department head needs to make the department's case, and will not react negatively as long as the department head's comments stay within certain bounds. First, they must be directed at the issue at hand and cannot become personal. Raising concerns about inadequate funding levels is quite appropriate; casting aspersions on the motivation of councillors involved in the decision is not. Secondly, department heads must not threaten councillors by raising the spectre of inflated imminent dangers to public health and safety.35 Within these limits, most councils will accept the right of department heads to make their case.

Another situation involving public comment occurs when public servants are asked to explain or interpret a policy of council to the public. They have an obligation to explain the policy and to explain council's reasoning in making the decision it did. However, they should stop short of either praising or criticizing any policy. It is sometimes tempting for a public servant to deflect the complaints of an irate citizen by saying something like: "I know it's a stupid policy, but it's what council decided so we have to make the best of it." Comments like this undermine the credibility of council, particularly when they are made by a senior public servant who has a certain status in the community. Anyone making such remarks should understand that councillors will feel personally attacked by such a statement, and might feel justified in replying in kind. If the citizen persists in complaining that council has made a bad decision, the public servant should politely suggest that the citizen can raise these kinds of concerns with her or his councillor.

It is important that the public servant caught in a situation like this should explain fully the decision of council, and certainly not criticize the decision. However, the public servant is under no obligation to provide a defence of council's political decision; that is the responsibility of councillors.

35 Of course, if the dangers are not inflated, then the public servant has a serious ethical and practical problem. Councillors can react strongly when they feel that a manager is using inflated rhetoric to coerce them into changing their decision. The point is that public servants should not raise these dangers lightly, like the boy who cried "wolf."


DAVID SIEGEL

The distinction between explaining and defending a policy can be difficult to make in practice, but public servants should not put themselves in the position of being too personally identified with a policy.

It might seem easier to speak strongly in favour of council policies. How- ever, even this should be avoided. Staff members should emphasize that their role as professional public servants is to implement the policies as established by council. It is not their role to pass judgment on whether those policies are good or bad. At the practical level, it can be awkward to be identified strongly with the old council’s policy when a reform council arrives .%

The point to remember is that a staff person who crosses the line and begins making political comments should understand that politicians are likely to respond to those comments at the political level. One seldom wins a public argument with one’s boss.

5. Public servants provide forthright and objective advice to their political masters in an open and honest manner. When they are required to make recommendations, they do so while presenting all available options in a balanced manner. In return, politicians recognize that administrators are using their best administrative judgment and do not criticize them in public for providing honest and forthright advice.

This is the principle which involves the greatest variation from the parliamentary approach.

Municipal CAOs and other senior city officials confront an entirely different institutional environment than do their counterparts in federal and provincial administrations. The recommendations that a CAO makes frequently embrace policies, programs, and major administrative actions. These are generally submitted in written form and they become public documents as part of the recorded proceed- ings of council. As well, administrators may be called upon to summarize, explain, clarify, and defend these recommendations at a public meeting of council or its committees. City councils, or any of the committees that they have established, must hold their meetings in

Public servants in local government do not have the luxury of providing advice in private. In fact, they should be careful to avoid the temptation to provide advice to a councillor or group of councillors which is not given to everyone else who is interested in an issue. All advice should be available equally to all interested parties.

In some cases, staff can avoid tahng a position by simply providing a

36 A graphic example of what can happen in this situation is contained in Anderson, Newland, and Stillman, The Effective Local Gozvnirnent Manager, p. 32. 37 Plunkett, City Managemfnt i n Canada, p. 46.



general assessment of the available alternatives, but this approach funs the danger of "leading the council into a prolonged, unfocused debate."% Most councils will request that staff make a firm recommendation. In making a recommendation, the public servant must be certain to provide an assessment of all the alternatives and a frank discussion of the positive and negative aspects of the suggested course of action. Managers should not withhold any information simply because it does not conform with their final re~ornmendation.3~

The public nature of this process produces two very specific dilemmas for staff. First, when several staff members are required to report on an issue, disagreements among them can be exposed to public view.40 This is an unfortunate situation, but it should not be hidden. The fact that different managers see an issue differently can be an important piece of information for council. Secondly, staff members frequently experience some difficulty when they know that their best technical and professional advice will be politically unacceptable to council or will cause a serious split among councillors. Staff people are hired for their technical and professional expertise. They are short-changing their employer if they do not provide the best advice they can in any circumstance. Public servants should recommend what they see as the best course of action for the municipality from their administrative perspective, regardless of its political consequences for any particular councillor or even the council as a whole. It is important for councillors to have the best possible objective and professional advice. If there are political factors to be injected into the decision-making process, it is council's job to introduce them.

Staff members face a particularly difficult situation when council is badly split on an issue.

In such instances the administrator must avoid any appearance of playing for the support of any faction, even if it represents a majority. That approach presents clear difficulties. First, there is no guarantee that a council majority that supports an administrator's proposal on one occasion will remain cohesive and provide support on another. Secondly, even if a majority group on council does maintain some degree of cohesion and an administrator makes an obvious play for their support, he/she may be seen as playing favourites as between factions or groups. The end result may be a loss of the confidence of the entire council, thereby creating an increasingly intolerable situation which may only be resolved with the administrator's resignation or dismissal. The only course open to the administrator is always to present the arguments on the merits of a proposal and avoid any actions that seem an obvious ploy for support!'

38 Ibid, p. 47. 39 Burke, Bureaucratic Responsibility, p. 98. 40 Plunkett provides some good practical advice for dealing with this problem. See City Management in Canada, p. 42. 41 Ibid., pp. 46-47.


DAVID SIEGEL

Administrators must understand that it is entirely appropriate for council to reject their advice on purely political grounds if it so chooses. Council is the ultimate decision maker and must consider all factors in arriving at a decision.

Good administrators develop the ability to argue clearly and forthrightly for a particular position and then gracefully and quietly accept defeat if that occurs. This is an area which requires good judgment on the part of a staff person. When council seems determined to take an action which the manager feels is not advisable, he or she has an obligation to make the case strongly to council about why its contemplated action is ill-advised. If an administrator “feels that his council is about to make an ass of itself he ought to feel no hesitation in making his views clear so that council decides with its eyes open.”42 However, when the staff person is certain that council understands the concerns, he or she must not be drawn into a political debate. At some point, the administrator must simply sit quietly and bite her or his tongue. No purpose is served by continuing to resist council’s direction or bringing up a matter again after council has made a decision.

When administrators behave in a proper and loyal manner, councillors have an obligation to respect their position. When councillors disagree with a staff recommendation, they have every right to voice that criticism. However, any criticism should be directed at the substance of the recommendation, and should not unjustifiably spill over to question the competence or integrity of the staff person making the recommendation.

This is not just a matter of polite civility, although civility should count for something. Councillors are best served by staff people who provide honest and forthright advice, rather than simply trying to guess at what council would like to hear. If councillors want honest and forthright advice, they must make it clear that they respect the advice given, even if they disagree with it. No one, least of all councillors, is well served by a situation where staff attempt to provide council with the advice it z~mfs to hear rather than with the advice it slrould hear. In practice, this nexus of council- staff interaction is one of the most difficult areas. It requires good judgment on the part of all concerned, but sometimes this is just not present in the heat of battle over serious issues.

Councillors tend to be the most serious offenders against this principle. When staff members produce a recommendation which is politically unacceptable, some councillors want to distance themselves so completely from the policy that they overstep the appropriate bounds and criticize the integrity and/or competence of the staff person who is making the proposal. This is clearly an unfair attack because the staff person has no way to

42 E.C.R. Had field and James E. MacColl, Rritish Locril Govertimetil (London: Hutchinson’s University Library, n.d.), p. 728.

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respond. When this happens, the role of the head of council is crucial. He or she must protect staff from these unfair attacks.

Staff people generally understand their role in the council chamber, although the art of knowing how far to present your views strongly to council without engaging in debate is a high art form only developed through years of practice. The major area in which public servants violate this principle is in being critical of council decisions in public. As pointed out, it is easy to deal with an irate citizen by agreeing that a particular policy of council is ill-founded. The final principle to be discussed empha- sizes the error of that action.

6. Public servants execute policy decisions loyally, irrespective of their personal opinions; as a result, public servants enjoy freedom from public criticism by councillors and security of tenure during good behaviour and satisfactory performance.

One reason that public servants should not become embroiled in controversy is that they must be able to implement the policy in the form finally adopted by council. If it becomes publicly known that senior administrators were bitterly opposed to a policy, then councillors and citizens will wonder if those people will implement and administer the policy in a fair manner.

As with point five, this also imposes a responsibility on councillors. As long as public servants conscientiously carry out the duties assigned to them by council, they should not be subject to public criticism and they should enjoy security of tenure. This is most problematic when a council is deeply divided or when a council carrying a “new broom” is elected. Councillors sometimes assume that just because senior officials were carrying out the policies prescribed by the previous council, they are incapable of being loyal to the new council. On the contrary, the essence of being a professional administrator is the ability to execute any reasonable policy that is established by council. Thus, it is inappropriate to assume that because an administrator was carrying out the previous council’s policy, the same administrator could not carry out a different policy established by a new council.

This is probably the most problematic of all six points. Senior administrators enjoy very limited security of tenure. Unjust dismissal laws and employment contracts might provide cash benefits, but that is poor compen- sation for the damage done to one’s reputation by an acrimonious firing. There are many cases where councils have unfairly fired people because those people have committed the offence of faithfully and competently carrying out the responsibilities legally assigned to them by a previous council or a different faction of the same council. Employees have little protection against this.

Administrators should avoid becoming too closely identified with any one

29 ADMlNlSTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA

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faction of council or in the community at large. It is easy to subtly develop this identification because of the close contact that occurs in the very public setting of municipal government. But as long as a staff person only carries out the duties assigned and does not become allied with a faction of council, he or she should enjoy security of tenure.

Conclusion Maintaining a good council-staff relationship is one of the most important and difficult tasks confronting councillors and administrators. Councillors and staff are human beings with all the normal human foibles. This cannot be overlooked in considering council-staff relationships.

Human relationships cannot be confined within regulations, and it would give a false picture of the working of a council to show members and officers at arm’s length across a committee table. The council is made up of councillors whose individual votes can make an officer’s life pleasant or most uncomfortable. He would be a very foolish officer who went out of his way to annoy his members. Equally foolish would be the councillors who made a habit of setting their officers’ teeth on edge. In practice everything depends on the good sense of both. Members and officers can lend a cat-nnd-dog life, and the welfare of the citizens will suffer a~cordingly.4~

A major part of the problem is that the respective roles of council members and staff are frequently not well defined and well understood by participants. This is an inherent problem in a political system in which expert professionals must cohabit publicly with amateur politicians. No guide for action will suffice for every situation in which politicians and staff must interact. However, each group must understand the position of the other. These principles should assist them in delineating this relationship.

43 Ibid., p. 126 (emphasis added).


Politics, politicians, and public servants in non-partisan local governments

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