CHAP'TER 6

POLITICS OF RESERVATION POLICY

6.1 Introduction

Reservation policy has had a profound impact or1 all political parties

particularly since the implementation of the Mandal Comn~ission Report. Political

parties of various lines were indccd compelled to effect a complete overhaul of

their idcology and approach leaders from the backward class in order to give the

party a backward caste ti-iendly appearance. At the same time several members of

the party hclongitig to the backward class utiliscd their caste label effectively as a

bargaining chip to gain leverage. particularly in securing party nomination during

election5 and positions in the party leadership. Caste conglomeration, polarisation

on caste l i ~ ~ c \ . inler-caste strife, mi~shrooming of political outfits, and defections

from par-ties \verc tiit: i~nrnediate consequence of the decision. Many political

parties tried 1 0 perform a line balancing act to retain its hold on upper castes and

also to makc sonic gains over the backward castes. Certain political parties while

supporting rcserv;itions on caste hahis also demanded the inclusion of economic

criterion or tile cr'lation of :separate quota h r the poor among the forward castes.

This woi~lii. t1icrcfi)re. serve then1 well in appeasing both the forward and

backward c:~stcs. Flc~wever. none 01' the political parties dared to challenge the

rationale ot rcscrv, i l io~~ pc~licy as sucli

' h i s clialiter examines the approach and attitude of political parties towards

tht: rcscrvalioll issue and the changc of stand adopted by them abruptly particularly

in the wake a)l'the implementation oSMandal Commission Report.

6.2 Congress Party

'I-hc t'ongress party at the centre was seized of the issued of reservation for

BC after the Supreme C'ourt's verdict against the Madras Ciovernment's communal

order of 1947 as uncc~nstitutional. The agitation that was launched by the

opposition lc;iilcr!; c1gain:;t the Supreme C:ourt's verdict in hladras disturbed the

regional corlgrcss lc;~tier:; and engendered a fear of loosing their hold over the

highly organiscd tlachward castes.' They prevailed over the then Prime Minister

Pandit .Iawah;lrlal Nehru who then conceded to introduce the first amendment to

the constitutio~l pr- i~vl~l~ng reiewation for the backward classes. Nehru admitted in

Parlianicnt " I I I C I loilse hllt)ws very well and there is no need to hush it up, that this

particular nr;+rlcr ill rllis particillar shape arose because of certain happenings in

Madras" (Ciuhan. 1991 - 48).

Thereoriel-. i t was then realised that steps should be taken to improve the lot

of the backw21ril castes all over the countrq. In pursuance of this objective the First

BC Conlrnissioll Ma:; appointed undel. the Chairmanship of Kaka Kalelkar in January

3953. l'hc rcpor-I ( I : 1h1s commission which was submitted in 1955, recommended

70% resen.alloll , ~ t ,:cat\ Ibr OBCs in educational institutions. tilowever. the report

was replete will1 ~ii\scnsions by the majority of members and was even vehemently

oppost:d h) i i h i l l ;~i t rni~i~ himself who expressed the fear that its implementation

would s t~~kl : c;istclst tcni;ion. I ' t ~ t , centre hence decided against the implementation

of the report hut :it t11e same tirile allowed the states to evolve their own policy

towards [he amelic~ra~ion of UC.5 c\en as it expressed a preference for reservations

2 on economlc status rather than caste.

I t \vas only alter the Janata Government's interregnum that the issue of

reservation of seats ibr BCs in central services cropped up. The then Prime

Minister Morarji 1)esai set up the Second BC Commission in 1979 under the

chairnlari ship of 13inilhyeswari f'rasad Mandal a former Chief Minister of Bihar.

The comr~~ission suhmitied its report only after the collapse of the Janata

<iovernnrer~t and attcr the rc-election of Mrs. Gandhi as the Prime Minister in

1980. I t recommendetl 2'7% reser\:ation for the BCs.

'I IIC ('ongr-css government claims to have discussed and debated the report,

but steps her? 1101 initiated in implementing the rcport fearing a backlash.

Accordirrg to V. N. Gadgil. thc then General Secretary, All India Congress

Committee (1) ;1nd official spokcsrnan of the party "it is not correct say that the

Congress ( I ) pur the report in cold storage. Between 1980 and 1989 there were at

least threc liill-lledged (debates i r ~ I'arliament on thc report. We made attempts at a

specially convened mceting of tlie Chief Ministers to a l~ ive at some kind of

natiot~ai cunscnsus on tile findings of the commission but unfortunately that could

not be rcnclrctl. Uc thought the report should not be touched without a national

consensus :I\ the rcc(.~rnmendation of the commission were socially sensitive and

politic;,ll! c \p l t~s~ \c . So we p~ctcrred ro postpone a decision rather than rush

through L\ 1 1 1 1 i t ar~d i~nlca::h socl:~I unl-cst . . . . . ..." (Kcddy 19')0:3 1 ). However the

report did not scc the light of the day right through the Congrcss rule up to Rajiv

Gandhi. Thc report continued to gather dust until V. P. Singh announced his

decision to implernet~t it ,on August 7 . 1990. The Congress, taken unawares, was

forced to take a stanti and to procide justification for its lackadaisical attitude

towards the implemcn~ation of the report. At one stroke it changed its stand and

began to vociferously advocate for reservations. The violence that the decision of

implemcntation ot'thc report unleashed and the severe accusations levelled against

certain congress leaders for instigating violence, and the fear of losing its vote

banks placed the part!. in an unenviable position. The Congress party accused the

government 01 indulging in a political gimmickry in the name of providing relief to

BC:;. It was in ordcr lo overcome the odds faced by the party due to inner party

conflicts that such a decision was taken. Fear of the dismissed leader Devi Lal's

boat club rail) to hc llrl'd on Auguit 9 the same ycar was according to them the

prirne cause for the ~rnplementation i ~ f t h e report. 3

Although the Congress part? declared full suppor~ for the implementation

of the report, i t alzo made i t clear o f its desire for inclusion of economic criteria too

4 alongside c:iste criterla They floated a separate outfit known as the 'Equality

Front' in order ti) win [.he support o f the agitators and also to look and sound

diffcrcnt'. I'lie tongrest; working committee in a last bid effbrt evolved a separate

formula 'thc I < c t j i \ fiirn-~ula' comprising principles of economic criterion,

reservatiorl tor erllirc lot of con~niunities other than Ilindus and waiver of fees for

cligible caniiitiatcs L I ~ I J ~ I - the Matidal Report." However the formula was rejected

by the st~ttch I n :I r,rtllel surprisin: statcment Kajic Ciandhi accepted that the party

had cornlnittcd rn:st;~hes with regard to reservation policy but absolved himself of

any blame or rcspon\ibil::ty for it.s She congress also accused the prime minister

of diluting thc reco~n~ncndations b) excluding several sectors from the ambit o f

reservations as suggested in the Mandal Report. "Even on the question of

reservations while the Prime Ministcr has been saying again and again that there

will be no dilution 01 the provision of reservations, he has announced so many

exemptions. Fir:it he said reservations would not be applicable to the defence

sector. Then came tbc clarification (hat they would not be imposed on states and

would not he applicable to educational institutions. Finally. the Prime Minister

said reservations would riot be applicable to promotions" (Reddy 1990: 32).

The assassination of Rajiv Ciandhi had a lulling effect on the intensity o f

anti and pro-reservation stirs across the country. However the members of the

agitation werr still a l ~ \ ' e with various political parties in red alert to reap dividends

of it. '('he Narasin-iha l<ao led Congrcss government announced a slightly modified

version ofreservation policy from that of the V. P. Singh Government. It enhanced

the reservation percentage to 59.5'!'0 by including economic criteria and also

reserving 10%) of' scats for the poor among the socially and educationally backward

k i

sections. rhus it was a deft attempt to steal the thunder frorn the Janata Dal and

also a step appease the forwards and backwards in an atternpt to keep its flock

togelher. I he gavel-n~nent . ~ l s o dcc~ded to offer a package to provide economic

assistance, technical 11-airing and so on i n order to equip the BCs adequately

cnough to itlil)~~o\c tlii'ir i:oriditiou a ~ ~ d rrdr~ce dependence on the government for

It8 ~hci r ad\;lnccnlciit Uatasimha Rai i had cir~tuitted all the major political parties

by this part~cuia~- (Sel~ stroke." Nonc of the pat-ties could accuse him of betraying

the noble cause ol'social justice lor he had only widened the ambit of reservations

by clubbing the H C ' and the poor ainong the forward castes giving the policy a

12 class orientat~on rather than a caste orientation.

6.3 Janata Dal and the Mandal Commission Report

The itnplementation crf the Matidal Commission Report although did feature in

the Janata L h l ~natutksto. did not figure prominently in its election campaigns. It did

neither fcat~lrc in the ('ommc,n Minimum Programme formulated along with its allies

like the RSI' ; u a i tllc I eti parties in the govenlatlce of the country. The National Front

(comprising the J~inata I )a]. BJP and 1,cfi parties) was voted to power not on the promise

of implementation of tile Mandal report but due to the allegations of cormption and

other evils levelled against the Congress Clod led by Rajiv Gandhi. Riding on the crest

of the wave { i t ' pcrsonal popularity 01 V. 1'. Singh, the National Front succeeded in

dislodging the C'o~iggress tiom power.

Howc\cr its success was slrort lived with infighting within the party

bccoming a daily affair. irhc Janata l)al was a loose conglomeration of disgruntled

politicians and clctkctors particularly from the Congress party. In the initial stages

itself there prevailed severe discontent among the other two major leaders like

Chandrasckhnl- and 1)evilal with re l i rd to V.P Singh's elevation to the post of

I i t'rime Minisri.1 I)e\ 1la1 althougll appointed as Deputy I'rinie Minister became a

severe hcatlacl~c to I' I' Singh w h ( ~ began meddling illto affairs other than his

p i ~ t o l i o . I[ tlc.g;t~i ( ( 1 be ;I great hind1 :lnce not only to V.P Singh but it also evoked

the ire of thc .~llles I c.. the BJI' and the Left. Together they expelled Devilal from

the National IFront ( h F ) governnletlt. Devilal in a bid to avenge his expulsion

decided to oiganise i~ huge rally in the boat club Maidan in New Delhi on August

9, 1990 with the intention of dislodging V.P. Singh. Devilal had a huge following

among thc peasants and farmers of whom the majority were members of his casteJats.

The announcement of 1)evilal instilled a great sense of fear in the mind of V.P.

singh.I4 fle \uddt.nl) k l t an urgent need to outdo Devilal. The sense o f urgency

felt by V. 1'. Singh was so great that he resurrected the Mandal Commission Report

from the colil storage and announced its implementation on August 7, 1990. This

act was contr;u-) 111 the understanding arrived at among the allies of the government

which stipulated that decisions on issues particularly of controversial nature shall be

arrived at on the basis o f mutual discussions. This step was resorted to by V.P. Singh

to silencc so~iit. 0 1 ' h ~ s hit1:er critics i n his party as well as his allies. He thought

that it would criahle him to creatc a powerful dent into the vote bank of BJP by

slicing i t inlo iwo ilni~s- thc tbrward and backward caste, the latter's support which

he could also lay vlain~ to." It would polarise the entire nation on casteist lines

and would alht~ g i ~ c 1)eviIal a run ror his money for the Jats were not included in

the list of backward ~ ~ s t c s " ' in the Mandal Commission report. This view was

reached by \' 1'. Singh by taking into consideration Dr. Rarn Manohar Lohia's

ideas and the cc)nseilucrlt influence \sieldcd by the OBCs in Indian politics. 17

V. 1'. Singh'h decision unleaslled a sudden spate of violence that engulfed

the entil-c natlc>n. (',isti: violencc winch was until then confined to a few states

suddt:nl> acclu~~cii ;I ndiolial character and that too on a common issue. Students

took to the \rrcct-. xnti lhcgan to iirdulge in arson and v i o ~ e n c e . ' ~ I'rovocative

statements from .Innat3 L)al leaders like Ram Vilas Paswan and Sharad Yadav

19 added fuel 1,: the tirc ol' caste ua r Ram Vilas Paswan who on a previous

20 occasion plcailed l 0 r the enlargemen1 of reservation policy. To include the poor

among the toruaril caste now tiid a volteface by vehemently opposing the

inclusion of any nature o-f econornic scale for determining backwardne~s.~' In this

he openly charted a style at variancc with that of Babu Jagjivan Ram. The anti-

reservation stir ot students which was lacking in leaderslup nowr found it in

Mdendra Siligh I ikair, tke .lat leader of Bharathiya Kisan union (BKU). The "Anti-

Mar~dal C'omnrissiori I:onmU which compromised mainly of students forged an

alliance with l i k ; ~ l r ~vhich culminatcd in the boat club rally on October 2. 1990.~'

Tikaits rnairi griebanct. was in the Jat community's exclusion from reservation

policy. 1-his allicincc had the taci~ support of Devilal and of even some Congress

leaders. 7 '11~ Jlio\crriclit gor hijacked from the students by Tikait and it eventually

resulted in l lo~ i l rga~i~s~n ancl vandalism and almost degenerated into a street affair

and threw the aritl-reservation stir in disarray and confusion.

1)iscordant \ii~cei, began to he heard within the Janata Dal itself'3 Several

of i.he leadcl-5 Ikarccl ihe loosing ot their traditional vote banks which to a great

deg,ree was ~icpc.iitit.nl on the stippilrt of upper castes. They also felt that V.P.

Singh \\as inorc con~erticd with entrenching his own position in Indian politics.

The Suprcnic our^ 01-der i~nposlng a stay on the implementation Mandal

Comniissiir~i lic[xll-~ y,;~vt: a rcprievc to all parties and it also helped in lowering the

~ ~ l t ~ l r l ~ l r l ! ~ pitch of a,

Mean~ttiilc 11rc li . lP i n an attetnpt lo hold its flock together had launched a

Rath Yatra detnariuing the construction of a Ram temple at ~ ~ o d h ~ a . ~ ~ he arrest of

L. K. Advant. the 1c;l~lcr of the Yatr;r culminated in the BJP withdrawing its support to

the National Front a i d tile eventual resignation of V. P. Singh.

Thc ~intirnel? tlcmise of thi: ('ongress leader Rajiv Gandhi, the BJP's Rath

Yatra, the acccptanct of Pdandal Conlmission report were all factors responsible for

the Mandal (:o~nrnisstcvl n:port loosing its impact on the masses and its potentiality to

attract votes. A \yrnptithy wave following Rajiv Gandhi's assassination engulfed the

nation, which divertetl the attention of the inasses from the Manclal issue. B.J.P's Rath

Yatra and it5 iiinscquclit conununalisation of the electorate proved to be an effective

combatanr to castcisnr propagated b! Janata Dal and its allies. Moreover the final

verdict o l the Suprcti~e Court ordering the exclusion of creamy layer, which in

other words \ \as larlr;iti~ourrt to acceptance of an economic criteria, gained greater

legitirnac: ;111ii iicC~,lJtilnce ibr parlies like Congress. BJP and the Left who had

earlier dernatlded thc inclusion of an economic criterion. As agitation became

intense V. I? Singh 11inl:ielf seelned to have felt uncomfortable as his subsequent

announcemenl t ~ , rhc e tkct were [(: prove to exclude certain sectors like defence

and educational tns~ttutions from reservations, and also promising not to impose

, z ,

the reporr on the 51~1te:;: Bereti of reservation issue, the .lanata Dal was left

groping i r r t l ~c iiarl, to lind an alternative issue and ideology to approach the

electorate I o a)Jd I I I 11.; woes. Jat);~la Ilal began to splinter up rapidly which was

to result i i ~ i t i \ore, p,ctring scatti.rt.d. The first split occurred with the departure of

Chandnrarl1eAha1, : i ~ ~ t i i :le\,ilal alun;' with 54 Ml's. leading to a situation where the

Dellii thronc h,ld t i , lic s;lcrificetl :anti elections ordered. The next round came in

1991 when .!ijit Singh lilade his csit, for by supporting reservations he stood to

loose and alienate h l i po\uerful Sat Lote bank. A last ditched attempt was launched

by V.P Sing11 to scrl\ age his image and resuscitate his party from being pushed into

political obl~vion. ,A hjlandal Y;iti-d on similar lines of the Rath Yatra of L.K

Advani was undertaken by V.1' S ~ n g h and his Mandal lieutenants like Sharad

Yatiav and llaswan. U ~ I it failed to take off as too many Yatras were also begun

by other parties. part~c~.llal-ly the ( ongrcss party.26 The Janata Dal even made

attempts to comrrlclnorate llecember I as "Mandal Vijay Saptah" (Mandal Victory

Week). In the 1001 ciectiuns. the .l;~nata Dal fared poorly loosing prominent states

like IJP, P1fJ and Kajasthan, the statas where they used the Mandal card to the hilt.

Janata Ual as 11 party was reducrd to regional outfits under the leadership of

prominent icadcrs o l ihc ~oncerlicd states and failed to become a party of national

stature since ihcr:'

V.P Sir~gh tbulld solace in his statement that "it is my earnest belief that

the Janata 1)aI alicr its ibnnation had shown two clear aspects-one, of the political

party and scconci. c ~ l r t nlovemenf [ h e impact it has made on all political parties to

add social jusricc ro rhe~r agenda IS something very radical. This has happened for

the lirst linle and \tithin three Jwrs . we have mandalised every political party.

That is in itselt is ;I big achie\eil~i,nt. The Prime Minister goes to the Red Fort,

chants 'Mandal. Mand,il' and gcrs down. The BJP is now forced to pass a

resolution i;i\our-ing M:lnclal.

I had also said ti-iat I would no1 I-cturn to Delhi unless the Mandal Commission

Report is implcmenteil I will retuni IO Delhi only to garland the candidates selected

by the UPS(' or else lrly dead body w11l come-not before that. It is not just a political

one or an electr~ral one. b ~ ~ t a long thought out plan for which we paid a heavy price,

the loss of govemmerrl. In our ow71 programme we have 10 percent for the poorer

sections of thc upper caste:; toon(Pandc 1993: 120-12 I ).

I'me, V.P. Sit~gh <.an undo~ibtcdly take the credit for having implemented the

Mandal Conlrnissi~~n rcpoi-t. when orhcr parties had made it only a passing reference to

i t both in their marlifesloe:; and campaigns. At the same time he can also be accused

of taking a hzuty a id unin-~aginativc step towards its implementation by not consulting

at least his allies, which he always took to confidence before making an announcement

towards its implenlenta~ion. This would have helped him in evolving a consensus and

to incorporate divergenl and practical points of view into the report before announcing

its implen~cn~ation. It uas only aliel agitations against the report attained a feverish

pitch and the Supreme (:ourt's vctdlct that he favoured a 10% reservation for the

weaker sections among the forward castes. Hut it was too late a move and also it

lacked any novelty for several other parties had advocated such a measure.

Suspicions were raised against such a move for many suspected it as another

attempt by \:.IJ. Singti to salvage 111s image and to make himself acceptable to his

caste men-thc Rajputs-whom he 11:1(i alienated by the Mandal decision. Thus the

Janata 1)al b) leanitlp, too lheavil> O I I Mandal Commission Report, which by now

'i became rnel-i~iy a pop~llist measul-L, redui:ed itself into a cipher forfeiting the fund

of good will tind the cnot.nmus m:illci;ilc with which it came to power.

6.4 Bharatiya Janata Party (B.IP) and Reservation Policy

The Rhara~hiyn Sanata Party':- (HIP) support base comprised mainly o f the

Hindu upper casteb. They ofien llarpcd on issues affecting Hindu religious

sentiments. which gained them man) dividends politically. As a prominent ally in

the National Front, they never mentioned anything regarding the implementation of

Marldal Commission report emphatically in the manifestoes of the National

~ront.~"~his was primarily due to the fact that support to reservation on caste

basis would Iixfeit thcrn their predominant upper caste vote banks and hence they

were always for reservations on the basis of economic criteria.l0 But the promise

of building a Ham I ernple at the disputed site in Ayodhya figured prominently in

their election manifesto. A compro~nisc on this issue was a l~ ived at between the

Janata 1)al and HJP to havt: it resol\.ed though mutual consultations and of course

in a peaceful manner. 'The National Front Government had agreed upon a formula

to take decisions on :serious and c~~ntroversial issues after holding consultations

with its allies, the HJ t' and the Lett. [Jntil the announcement of implementation of

the Mandal Repori this formula \+\.as strictly adhered to." The above decision

caused a great deal of consternation in the BJP camp. The BJP feared that it would

cause a sevcre crosion of their votc banks by depriving them of OBC votes and

inflicting a schism within the Ilitidu religion itself. rendering its efforts to forge a

unity in the llindu community f ~ i t i l ~ . Severe condemnation was the initial reaction

2 1 to the arinouncemcnt. Later tlic party retracted its statements fearing the

3 7 anlagoniz~ng o f H('s.

Tlie l i . l l l was i'accd with a g1-;i\ c situation, which it had never confronted in

the past decades since its birth. Support or opposition to the report would result in

;in irretrievable damagt: of forfeiting tile support of the upper and lower castes, and

would also cause great division on caste lines in the F-lindu religion. It had to

evolve an eilkctivc strategy to salvage itself from such an eventuality. BJP then

thought of enlivening the Ram Jarunabhoomi issue which was lying almost

dormant as a counter ~r~easure to Mandal report and thus to divert the attention of

the people from blandal icontrovers) . The controversy over the construction o f a

Ram temple at Ayodhya was raging over rhe years and now it began to mobilise its

feeder organisations like the RSS and V H P towards this goal." A Ratha Yatra was

organized under thc leadership rot 1-.K. Advani from Somanath to Ayodhya

demanding tlic constructi'on of the ternplc from 25 September 1990.~' This enabled

the BJP to s~rccesrtiiliy divert thc attention of the masses from Mandal to Mandir.

Cornmunalisni began ro triumph. Communal riots overshadowed caste wars and it

tiagmented thc t ~ e s between Musliins, OBCs and SClSTs which the leaders of

Janata Dal like K;im Vilas f'aswan. Sharad Yadav and Mulayam Singh Yadav were

attempting ttr tbrye. As the Rat11 Yatra of' L. K. Advani entered Bihar, the Chief

Minster of thc stare ~ssut.:d (orders 01 his arrest at Samastipur. Immediately the BJP

withdraw its support to the NF Cioc-erriment which led to its imminent collapse.

in ~ h c post hlitnclal electicm,, 13JP registered brilliant success in four major

stales like I ;l'. Mi'., Kajasthan a id Gujarat. It was also able to increase its

numbcrs in tlic 1'arli.lmenr. Thc s!.mpethy wave generated as a consequence of

Kqjiv ( i ; r r l i i l ~ i ;~i\;i.s>ination pro\.cJ to he a great harricr in increasingly its tally in

the elect~on l'arlianient. I t was also able to open its account in the southem state

of Karnatak;~ \vherc its pr,?sence was nominal.

l 'he HJP still kept its efforts alive to gamer several caste bastions into its fold

ever1 after it began to lose several states like Rajasthan and M.P after the 1993

elections. The most irnportant step was to placate the Jats of Rajasthan particularly

after it lost out thc state to Congress. It was the redemption of an election promise

made hy thc 11SP to the Jal cornmunit] in the course of its campaign to include them in

the list of h~ckward communities eligible for reservation benefits at the centre.36 This

facilitated in weaning away the Jat bates from the Congress (1) and also to create a

dent in the I ole bank of the powerful .lat leader Devilal and his cronies.

6.5 Left Parties and Reservation Policy

Ih t . i cti pal-tics like Communist Party o f lndia3' (CPI) and the Communist

Part of India (Marxist) ((:PM)" were always in favour of reservation policy for the

backward cl;~sses Wiiilc the CPI is l i ~ r total implementation of the report without

the econonilc criterion fol- ten years CPI(M) is for the criterion of economic

criterion. Both these parties are of the firm opinion that reservation in jobs alone

will not iniprove the conditions of the RCs. Land re foms and economic policy

changes should a t so be effected to improve the lot of the HCs. However the CPM

in a later \ci-sion ot it:; policy had dcmanded that reservations be made for women

also. I t ha\ lio\+c.vc~ de~nanded that the economic criteria for the identification of

creamy layci- ;IS iri tli(. case of agriculturists be deleted. It has also expressed the

a p p ~ - d ~ e ~ i s ~ i ~ i ~ ilia^ x \ c r u l castes illrtl communities deserving of rcscrvation may be

deprived of the herielit owing to diilerent nomenclature. In ;I statement the CPI

said, '"I'he pafly IS ol'the view that all profession-based and artisan communities which

find place in thc common list has to be released by the government of India. And this

should be applicable. irrespective ot'lhcir religion or faith". The CPI holds that nearly

40 percent of the people are belo\\( the poverty line. Reservation should also be

extended to thc economically weaker ~ections of the socially advanced communities.

A. 10 percent reservation !ihould be provided to such weaker sections. There is a

consensus among political parties oti this issue (Pande 199335). The CPI is also in

favour o l adopting the Karpoori I'hakur formula in places where the system of

reservation dozsn't cxist but at the same time in states which have their own version of

reservation policy. i t shoulcl be left untouched. (Reddy 1991)

The I x f i panics. the other allies of the Front, were, however, unfazed. Though

they did cxpres.: unhappiness over r h ~ response of the government to the anti-quota

:stir, they stuck to tiie~r guns anti drained from demanding a defem~ent of the

reservatio~i decisiori. 1-hey instead lltv<,ured efforts for a dialogue on the issue. In the

perception ofthe L.efi. the ;anti quota stlr had taken an ugly turn largely because of the

dubious role played h\ the Congress ( l i and the BJP (Reddy 1990: 12).

Political partics have adopted almost divergent attitudes when it came to

deal with rescr\ation issue in state.. fhey took almost a different approach to suit

the situation prevale~it in various st;itcs. Hence it is necessary to analyse their

views on this ISSLIC i n the :states.

6.6 Uttar Pradesh (UP)

Ilttar l'radesli. with its huge HC and being the state where the disputed site

of Ram Mandir is locatetl, was seriously affected by both the Mandal and Mandir

issue. I t was also a state where caste consciousness is at its highest and since it

sends the largest number of MPs to Parliament, politicians always put up a valiant

fight in order to malntain their holti over the electorate in the state.

UP was ti)llowinl: a reservation policy o f 15% for BCs, which alongside

reservations fix SC:S'I. zx--service mcn, the disabled and dependents of freedom

39 fighters makc up LI total of nearly 40%. Barring a two-year disruption, after the

High Coud asked the government li)r a review of its policy, the state government

under N.1) l iwa r~ appointed a committee for this purpose and upon whose

recommendi~tion wnh rcstored the 15% quota of OBCs in June 1989 by the

Mulayam Singh govcrnnlent. This. however, did not evoke rr~uch protest and none

of the politicians did maice it an issue in their campaigns.

Mulayaln Singh 'fadav's decision to implement 27% reservation for OBCs

disturbed the ent~re social fabric in the state. His decision would have resulted in

an increase ofmorc than fifty percent in reservations. But he justified his decision

by stating that several states in thc south like Tamil Nadu and Kamataka were

pursuing reservation pol:.cies which exceeded the Fifty percent limit. It seems that

Mulayam S ~ n g l ~ ihas illt(:nt on niah~ng gains on two fronts. One by implementing

the Mandal C'ornm~.sslol-~ report he c.ould create a rift among the UP peasantry by

i l l alienating rllc .I:rt\ and tlii~s rcdllciiig the i~ifluence and domination of people like

Mahendra Singh I i k ; u ~ a ~ ~ d Ajit Singh. The increased benefits that would accrue

to Yadavas through hi:; decision would make him the undisputed leader of that

community. 11 \t.ctultl ;~lso blunt the DJP's increasing influence by alienating the

backward conitnunitics ttom the part! 41

The tlecision on Mandal report engulfed the entire state in violence.

Government offices and educational Institutions became targets of attack in several

places. As was the case with the centre no political party in UP could be bold

enough to condemn the reservatic~n issue for fear of losing their vote banks to

Mulayam Singh. Shc zasteist war i t unleashed spread out even to the rural areas.

Certainly a polari~ation on the basis of caste was the result of this decision. The

BJP and Congres.. ( 1 ) demanded the introduction of an economic criterion which

was stoutly opposed by Mulayam Singh Yadav fearing the alienation of his castes.

The I$.II' stnarring under thc Mandal onslaught decided to utilize the Mandir

issue to counter ~i a-' hili~slirns w a r also beneficiaries according to the report, and

Mulayatn Singh':, ;ippe,iscment ol Muslims served the BJP well to incite

communal passions." 1,ord Rama had a huge following among the Hindus in UP

and the site (11' his hirtk place whcr-e now a mosque exists was a bone of contention

between Hincius and h$I~:ililns panicularly since independence. The Mandir issue

ovens.helnicd the Mandal issue so much so that the casteist issue got gradually erased

from the miri~ls of'thc hackwards. Kir~ts which ibllowed in the wake of Advani's Rath

yatra also rcsulted in l3indu--Muslim divide. As a sop to the backward castes, they

projected mcu like K;:ll\iin Sing11 ;I tne1nbt.r of the backward Lodh caste as the

fore:most leader ot USI' i n the state. With the aid of Ayodhya a significant number

of OBCs wet-c weaned away from Mulayarn ~ i n g h . ~ ~

('ommunalism W:IS effectively used in disrupting the coalition forged by

Mulayam Singh Yadav a:mongst the backward classes. A vettical split among the

BCand their veering rourld the BJI' was the net impact of the Ayodhya campaign.

Congress secmed to have paid a hcwy price- first in forfeiting the upper caste

votes for nut condcrnnir~g the Mandal report and also of the Muslims for not

coming out prominently in denouncing the riots in the wake of I..K. Advani's Rath

yatra. Mulayam Sing11 Y,adav instead of evolving a consensus on both Mandal and

Maridir issues went to the extremes hy ordering lathi charges on the Karsevaks at

Ayodhya and on Mandal issue by openly exhorting the backward castes to confront

the opponents 01' Matldai, report in n violent manner. The state machinery was

uti l i~ed to commit cxces:ses on both the Karscvaks and Mandal opponents. The

severe loss 01' lifc and property that resulted due to the above measures cost

Mulayam Singh dearly. BJP utilized these two issues to the maximum and won

away the upper castes voters and consolidated its position among the BCs to

emerge triumphan1 in the 1991 polls.

The 1993 assm-rbly elections saw the emergence of (Bahujan Samaj Party)

BSP as ;i major f i c t~) r in 1JP elect~ons. The BSP which had only a marginal

cxistencc until tlicii and was virtuall! not a thctor to reckon with consolidated the

Dalit. voters u h o telt that they wertr exploited both by the OB(ls and upper castes.

Real isin? thc potct~rial of [lalit-Mi~\Iitr~-Backward Class alliance Mulayam Singh

Yadav bcgttn eifol-th ~owards thih isiirposc it1 right earnest. ~ f h u s the alliance

contributed sigiitticantly to the victclr! of B S P SJP combine under the leadership

of Kanshi Iiar~i and Mulayam Singh Yadav.

Thc Ma~ldal rcpon: ceased to he a prominent issue in the 1993 elections.

The major reason probably would be that the Dalits were neither gainers nor losers

in the Mandal commissiorl recommendations. According to Kanshi Ram: "Social

Justice rescr\ations. land reforms-all these ideas only give crutches to the

handicapped. All partics i ~ h i c h advocate social justice-Congress, Janata Dal, CPI,

CPI(M) and others want the downtrodden people to remain on crutches forever. I

want to niakc them stand up, walk, run and run faster. This way, they will acquire

so much speed that they will be able to compete with and defeat the privileged

people. I'hc crumbs given by reservations and land reforms are such that with

them, onc can neither l ~ v e nor die. hly concept of land reforms is to eliminate the

landless lhrr1iei- 0 1 t h ~ inarginal farmer and the exploited agricultural labourer. I

am thinking 111 cre:rting a new class called peasant proprietors. In a nut shell, the

agitarions are t i w rriaking the handicapped and oppressed classes capable in their

own right. so that they will demand and capture their share in the governance of

their land. 13) milking tllem capable we are helping society and the country"

(Ran-~akrish~ia~i 1O'M: 1 I ) Therefore. Kanshi Ram was firmly convinced that only

social rc\olution ~ ~ n d not affirmative action was going to solve the problem of

backj~ard cl:~\\es. For lhir-n reservation policy would only make the OBCs further

dependent 011 tlic e:;tahlishment and \ \ i l l not empower or instill confidence or make

them capahlc.

i rttat-aihand agitation proviiles a classical example as to how any policy

without takirig into consideration the demographic pattern of the state is bound to

Ikil. LJttarakhand rcg,ion comprised of eight hill districts of U. P., i.e., Tehri,

Garhwal. P;n~rli (iarhwal, Nainital. littarkashi, Chamoli, Pittorgarh, Ahmora and

Dehradun. I he uriiqi~c demographic feature of this area is that the population here

constituted ;I majority of socially and educationally backward forward castes

unlike in thc plains where the backward castes/classes constituted the majority.4s

A demand I ; I ~ lhc creation of scparate state comprising these regions was

consideretl thc best strlution to contact the backwardness of this area." Hence an

agitation ma\ car]-ied our raising this demand.47 Although several political parties

gave mentiol~ to this demand in t h e ~ r r n a n i f e s t o e ~ ~ ~ , it did not find any expression

in reality. ( h i June I ( ] . 1904 the SP-HSP government headed by Mulayam Singh

Yaclav appt-o\i.d the ICarna Shankar Kaushik Committee recommendation for the

formatic~n 0 1 ;I separart: state of [Jttarakhand and the Chief Minister had announced

that the proposal ~ . t , u l d be sent tci Dclhi for approval." The decision of U.P..

government ro implen~ent the Mandal report in the hill districts gave rise to intense

i l i agitations in the area. 'The people feared that providing 27% reservations for

castes u h o wsrc :I ri~i~iority would deprive the majority people of the area of their

rights, deny them ad~iiissions in educational institutions and jobs." A joint action

forum callcil thc ilrrarakhand Sarnyukt Sangharsh Samiti (USSS) was formed

comprised ill i~rcri~hc.~:; f'sorn several political parties including people from several

walks ol' l i l ~ , sucii .I., tfachers ant1 ex-service men. As the agitation gathered

i? rnomcntutlr \ iolcrrcc llsc, took its 1 0 1 1 in lives and property. The intransigent

attitudu 01' C'li~cl' Miliistm-r only iid~led Fuel to the fire of agitations. He made

several provocative spceches5' 2nd thc government whose responsibility of

maintenance 01' laiv older was quite hrgotten as the government itself called for a

bandh. The i Jitarakhand people detied the bandh calls4 by keeping several shops

and other establishments open while similar was the response of the plains people

to the bandh call given by the ~t tarkhandis .~ '

Muln)uln Sing11 by being irrr,conciIable to the demands made by the hill

people was makin? shrc\vd attempts to make gains on two fronts. By supporting

reservations lic could .wim the support and image as champion of BCs and by

conceding tilt. dernand t o r a separate ilttarakhand region he could win some

support oftlie tixward castes and also do away with an area where the upper caste

domination ~ o u l d iievtlr converted itself into a vote bank.'6 The Congress party,

supporter of SI'-F3SP crjalition go:o\,errinent in U.P, was maintaining a stoic silence

over the issur I ater ~ I Y the. agitations grew in intensity N.D. Tiwari demanded that

congress withilr-aw its s~~prlort to the governlnent, which has become an epitome of

lawlessness." f iJ I ' was also extcnding its support to the agitations and demanded

the dismissal i l l the government. Congress government at the centre was reluctant

to be activel) ~n \ .o l i c~ i tkaring the cot~sequences it would have in the forthcoming

elections in Atiiil~r;~ 1'1;lilesh and Karnataka where the RCs are powerful forces to

reckon with.'"lowr\'er the dismissal of Mulayam Singh following the rift

between Maya\i;~ti 2tt1d ltiru rcsultcil in calni prevailing in the state and the decision

getting shelvcd

N.1). I-iwari's tirrn defiance i ~ f the Congress high command and his strident

postures against Mulayarn Singh Yailav won him great dividends. In the elections

held to the ne~vly constitclted ilttarnnchal legislative assembly the congress won 36

seats in the house of '70 seats. In other words the reservation policy of Mulayam

Singh Yadav had accentuated the demand for the creation of a separate state of

Uttarakhand

Reservation issue was oncc again raked up in LIP during the tenure o f

Rajnath Singh. The I J . I ' government constituted a social justice committee in June

28, 2001 headed by liuk.um Singli. Minister for Parliamentary affairs to look into

the existing governmental schelncs. programmes and facilities for the welfare of

the SCIS.1' and the OHC:; and suggest within a period of two months improvements

to achieve tht. goal uf social justice in U.P. There are 66 scheduled caste groups

and 790 hackward class groups in U P . The data suggests that ChamarsIJatavs

amongbt thc SC". and thi: Yadavs alllongst the OBCs had a lion's share in jobs.

The new la\\ takes cognisance ol'this and tries to rectify the imbalance in

jot) reservations. It recognizes the: chamars as a separate category among the SC's.

The SC's have non been divided into chalnars versus 65 sub castes of non-

chamars. Of'the 21 percent of gavel-nment jobs that are reserved for the SCs, 10%

will now he li)r charnars and 1 1 % for the non-chamars.

Sini~iarly Of3C' groups ha\;c now been divided into three parts-A, B and C.

YadavsIAhirs are pl;~ced in par1 2 . Sonar. Sat. Kurrni. Giri, Gujjar. Gossain, Lodh

and K:t~nI?l~~~j i!i 1';ir.t-(3. and !he resi 70 (viz, Kahar, Kevat, Koeri. Kumhar.

Gaderia. Icli. Nat. 1,ol-~ar, Dhobi. blochi. Mali, etc.) in part (1. The new law has

raised OH(' quota fron-I 27%> to 28'?41 ot'the government jobs. In the OBC quota, 5

percent has been rescr\,ei~ fbr those I I I part A, 9 percent for Part B and 14 percent

for Part C. (Vcnna 2001 4452).

According to the report on the basis of their (YadavIAhir) population they

have been given only i0A, of the ()BC quota. Nine percent of the OBC quota has

beer1 reserved tar MKBC (More Backward Classes) and 14% for Most BC(MBC).

T'he report not only retains the creamy layer inhibitions for the

OBlIIMRR('IMI3C i l l accordance lo the Supreme Court Judgement but also

enlarges its scope (Ibid: 4455).

The tluku~n Sirigh Committee report consisting of 200 pages was submitted

on August ; I . 2001. '[he U. P. cabinet at its meeting on September 13, 2001

accepted the report atid cln Sept. 15 the lJttar Pradesh Public Service (Reservation

for SC, S I and OBC') ((Amendment) Ordinance 2001 was promulgated by the

Governor. I'lie I! P lcgislative asscnibly approved the ordinance on Sept. 27, thus

amending the existing littar Pradesli Public Service (Reservation for SC, ST and

OBC) Act 1003.

Illrough tne ~lnplernentaticm of this report Rajnath Singh was trying drive a

wedge bct\vcen tl~e various categories of OBCs. SC"s and ST'S. This would have a

powerful irnpact on lhc powerful \otc hank conglomerates of the SP and BSP. The

SP leadcr i\lulay;tln Singh Yada\ L I I I ~ liS1) leader Mayawati were greatly unsettled

obcr the i rnpl~men~:i t i~~r~ of the reIJort. I t cven caused a revolt within the B.11'

government. Ashok \ 'ad;~v a ministcr in the U.P. cabinet rcvolted and was expelled

both frorn thc government and party

Recruitment procedures began on a war footing soon afier the new law was

enacted. Over 20000 selections had been made under the new policy. The Chief

Minister Rajrlath Singh often stated that he intended to recruit 50000 youths under

the new policy before the elections (1.e. on February 2001). (Tripathi 2002: 36)

.]'he ricw reservatiori policy was challenged by the expelled BJP minister

Ashok Yada\; before the Supreme Court, questioning the constitutional validity of

the policy. I'hc thret. judge bench (of Supreme Court) comprising Chief Justice

S.P. Hharucha and .lustices Shivraj. P. Patil and B.P. Singh [ruled that "the entire

exercise seems to be iiont: in a hun-y". (The committee completed a marathon caste

census for the purpose in a record b v o month's time). It rejected the government's

contention. preserttcd by Attorney-(general Soli Sorabjee, that the recruitments be

allowed. suhjcct to the final judgenlent of the court. The judges said their order

was very clear and t ~ o more appointments should be made until all petitions

challenging the policy ha:; been disposed off. (Ibid).

I a tcs the Mayiwati government had the much publicised "quota within

quola" scheme of hrtner Chief Minister Kajnath Singh touted during the assembly

election campalgn scr-apptxl.

6.7 Rihar

13illar it1 the I ; I S I titteen heal-s has been following the Karpoori Thakur

or^^ I c e v ~ t i ~ I t had a ,,:r~mg component of econotnic criterion. which

excluded tllc ,ilfluent drnong backtlard col~i~iiunities from availing the benefits of

reservations. A strong bi;-ls in favour of women of all castes and also a quota for

economicall!, weaker sections among forward caste was provided at 3%. An

income tax ceiling was fixed to ident~fy the affluent members o f a community.

Lalloo t'rasad Yadav in inutation of V.P. Singh overhauled the entire

reservation lilrmula allopted in Bihar by doing away with two unique and widely

accepted pr<)iisiolrs. l i e annulled the provisions providing reservations for the

economically weaker seclions among the forward castes and that which provides

a quota for wornen regdrdless of caste and confined it to those belonging to SCIST.

I .!.he procision. which lprevented tlie aftluent among ~ ~ ' f r o l n taking advantage of 4~

i

the reservatio~i scheme, \was removcd. Lalloo justified his move to remove the

economic c r i t e r io~~ fiom his reservation scheme saying that the Supreme Court

does not allo\i the inclus~on of economic criterion in identifying b a c k w a r d n e s ~ . ~ ~

Thus he brought tlie Uihar reservation policy akin to Mandal reservation scheme

adopted at tlie C'entrc. .'Under the new scheme the ratio of reservations in

government jobs has been raised b) 2 percent each for the two sections of the

0BC:s i.c.. ' 1 I2 percmznt to 14 percent for the most backwards and from 8

percent lo I 0 percent for the backwards, The earlier provision of 3 percent

reservation li)r tht: eci)nnmically hackward upper caste people has been struck

down. i h c or~t~natlce ensures 2 percent job reservation for women belonging to the

SC/ Sl"s arrtl OB('s unl:y and has excluded the upper caste women from the

benetits of tc\cr\ation. (iender is thu. not considered to be a common denominator

o t soc io-cd i~ i i~ t~o~ia l l)ack\h;~rdness az was the case under the tax ceiling which had

been irnposrci undel rhc Karpoori i'hakur formula of reservation to prevent the

economicall\ prospcrou:; section among the OBCs from taking advantage of

reservation' (Chaudl-rary 1993: 1 1 4 - 4 6 )

Sudden outbursts of violence were the immediate result of V.P. Singh's

announcement 01 ' implementation of Mandal Commission Report. Bandh calls

were given by both prc:'-reservationists and anti-reservationists. Life came to a

starrdstill in \evcr.il parti oi Bihar. (iovemment establishments were set ablaze and

railway statlons \vcr-c attacked, and hostels were closed following violence.

Leaders were gu;irdcrl i:i their reactions to the report. While the BJP and Left

parties welco~~led the m'me they regarded the exclusive reliance on reservations

based on casrr as dangerous. Double speak was indulged in by several leaders who

refused to ti>c the oliicial line of the party. The reaction of Dr. Jagannath Mishra,

fonner Chiel Minister of' Bihar w;is quite virulent. He accused the Chief Minister

of inciting c;istcir;t tc~-~sion and converting the state into anarchy." AAiough the

Chief Ministel. admrtted that problcm of poverty and unemployment were the

greatest scourge. 11ailt:d 'V.P Singh's decision as historic, which aimed at keeping

the social fahr-ic intact. "Social changes invariably trigger reactions, but this is

certainly no agitdtio~i much less :I movement" (lipadhyaya 1990: 30) Lalloo

remarked t h u \ ab~lut the ongoing anti reservation agitation which he claimed had

no impact on his sti~tc Iven reactions within the partyiwas plso urging a rethink

on the pat-[ i l l t h r C'hicl Minister before going ahead with the implementation.b1

Significa~irl>. :\I1 India Congress C'olnniittce treasurer Sita Ram Kesal-i and

Congres. 1 \ 1 1 :\ I<atril;~hIian Singh Yadav (both belonging to the BCs). departing

from the part!'\ ol'lic~al stand. welcoined the implementation of the Mandal report,

a gesture acclainicd b l the Chief Minister.

I t was the pro-r-escrvation rally held on October 8 at I'atna which plunged

the entire state of Bihar into an unprecedented and unparalleled caste war. The

rally which Mas attended by leaders such as Ram Vilas Paswan, Sharad Yadav and

Prime Minister V.P Sing11 made rabble rousing speeches exhorting the BC and '

minorities to conlront the opponent\ of reservation policy. The Chief Minister

Lalloo Pra\ad wcnr ( ~ n to say "t vcn it the heavens falls there can be no

compromise on the Mandal decisitln" (IJpadhyaya 1990). Immediately after the

dispersal 01' thu rally t l ~ c Yadavas under the leadership of a Jarlata Dal MLA Pappu

Yadav unleashed ;i spl.ec of violencr beginning with an indiscriminate firing on a

! Bibs Villagc killing .;c\ieral persons. l'he Yadavas singled out the Brahmins r / regardless 01' (heir stalus in public lik or government services, looted their property

and killed rlicm. e r n f r h i lives several Brahmins even crossed over to

neighbour~ng Nepdl d~id other place\ "'

The I nlloc~ Pra,,nil Yadav go\emment had effected large scale transfer of

district ol'liccrs and St's posting backward caste officers in place of upper caste

officer$. Jaganratti M1s11r.l demandcd presidential intervention in Bihar in vlew of

the conlpletc brcah t l i ~ v n of the constitutional machinery in the state. Me charged

that the adnrinisrrat~i~n was in ~ l i ; ~ ~ n b l e s as a result of the Chief Minister's

pronounced h ~ a s i,.i\bartl:; his castc [lien in appointments, prolnotions and transfers

of ofliccrs. hignii i i ;~~~ll: , tlic S('s ii,~s kept thcniselves aloof from the violence

pcrpctratcti t?! the I ' ;~~i : i~ . ; i s . I l ' l iok~~r li>rmula was the most acceptahlc ol

all fonnulas for ihc (.'l'I(M). B.11:' ;lrld the Congress. The CPI was for undiluted

implementation ot'the hlmdal repon.

The C'on@,ress began to inake valiant attempts to infiltrate the powerfirl

backward class vote bat& deftly carved out by Lalloo Prasad Yadav. They approached

the other rnembcrs constit~~ting thc HCs particularly the ones under the most BCs

preaching to them that 1,alloo was intent only in furthering the interests of the Yadava

community. 111 order to woo them the) gave only 9.3% of the tickets of the Lok Sabha

elections to Yadava wi-lilt. 16.6% uerc given to the non-Yadavas. But all these efforts

ended in futility. 11 might be because 1,alloo Yadav had dinned into the ears of his

community members and others that all campaigns against Mandal report were to

perennially confine thern to the state t)S backwardness. Moreover Jagannath Mishra's

virulent campaign against the Mandal report and the delay in finalising the list of

contestants also contrihu~ed to the ('ongress' lacklustre performance at the Lok Sabha

poll:;. His caste brethren interpretccl every statement for dilution of Mandal

Commission report lilkc: including the economic criterion and reserving seats for the

weaker sections among hrward castes LS a ploy to upset the reservation policy. Since

this argument wa. so <on\,incingl!. put forth to this supporters, it only added to

Lalloo's image ant1 vc~c . The ambivalent stand of the congress party on the Mandal

commission rcport iulil thc polarisntiol~ of votes within it on caste lines eventually led

the party to put up on]! a weak fro111 against Lalloo Yadav. He even took special care

to cultivate the Kurmi:< and Koeris tt)o and forged an alliance with the Jharkhand

M~lukti MorctiLl (SMIvl ii~rd thus ~.lil1;11rccd his ambit ot' intluence much to the

~lisconifiturc i l l the ( 'OII>:I.L:;S.

! B.TP too atl.emptcc-l to wean a\\.ay some of the Yadavas from La1100 Prasad

I I / I

" 1 Yadavs sphere of inf11.1ence. L. I( ..\dvani thought of winning away the masses by r P

his '"Rath Yatra", which was successii~l to a considerable extent in the neighbouring

state ofU1'. Lalloc~ Prasatl Yadav issued orders of arrest of L.K. Advani as his rath

reached Samastipur in thc carly hout-s of October 23, 1991. He justified his action

saying: "By arresting this self-proclaimed reincarnate of Rama, I saved the country

from a massacre. Adwni wanted to use Rama's name for political ends. In fact he

stepped up his conimunal activities after he saw the implementation of the Mandal

commission recommendations was getting massive support from the people and

the BJP was loosi~ig it:; elTect". The unexpected development after Advani's arrest ?

. . ~~ .-

was a split in the state unit of the HSI'. Thirteen out of the thirty nine of its MLAS '. I

deserted the party to form a new oiltiit called the Sampurna Kranti Dal (SKD)

under the leadership tr~f lnder Sitigli Nanidliari and Shamresh Singh, who were

elected to the state assembly on the KJP ticket from Daltongunj and Bokaro in the

February 1990 elections. 'l'he SKI) has also forged an alliance with the JD and

JMM thus al~enating a sizeable chunk of votes from the BSP. Another greater

achievement was that he effectively controlled the occurrence of communal riot in

his :state in the wake :)t Advani's arrest unlike other neighbouring states which

failed to arrest communal conflagr-ations. This inspired the confidence of Muslim

community who began to veer tieliind him and this dealt a great blow to the

congress of ~vhicll the h4~1slinls \\CI.C traditiunal supporters. 12alloo Yadav also

wooed the Jissatisficd (:ongres,; 1erlde1-s particularly the members of

coillmunity iiicreasin: lie internal t l~ '~scns i (~n it1 the party.

l,allc~o's strategy paid hirn handsomely at the Lok Sabha elections in 1991

when he maintained his position slip,htly lesser than in 1989 (i.e. from 30 to 28). At

the same time thc HJI' and Congress were the ma,jor losers with their tally being

reduced Srom 0 scats in 1989 to 5 and from 4 seats in 1989 to 1 in 1991. The upper

caste votes shifted fiom the Congress to BJP and its traditional Muslim votes to NF

con~bine cost them dear:ly in reducing their share in their Lok Sabha seats. The

BCs and Muslims, stood solidly by l'adav in ensuring his success.

The ordinance pr~~mulgated hy 1,alloo Prasad again raised the controversial

reservation issue to the forefront. C'ungress (1) once again tried to fuel animosities

in the minds of the MUCs against the Yadavas. BJP tried to influence the Yadav

voters by appointing several members of the Yadava community to new outfits

floated by them. It even tried to woo the SC voters.

l.alloo becarnc coniident that as in the Loka Sabha elections of 1991, any

anti, reserkation movement wo~ilti only yield dividends for his party. The

movement had widened the gulf bctween the upper castes and backward castes.

This polarisation enabled the Janata Dal allies to win 49 seats out of 54 in the 1991

1-ok Sabha ciection. Similarly any rcxction against the ordinance would only result

in the exodus of upper caste voters to BJP and as a result would facilitate the

cementing olbackward 'fadava votcs behind him. Moreover his resolute attitude in

opposing ci)tnmunal propaganda and anti Muslim activities of the BJP had gained

imrnensc popularity Il:'r him.

hitisti Kuruat ra~sed the banner of revolt against L.aloo's reservation

scheme ;illcg~tig that ilic reversal of Karpoori Thakur formula would result in the

dubbing ot'Ol3(' .lnd MHC: by which the MBC would he losers. This was said at a

func:tion organized hy the Karpoori Thakur Rachna Chakra and the Jan Nayak

Karpoori 'I'hakur Victlar Kendra. It demanded that the government should not

reverse the Karpoori I'hakur formula (Choudhary 1993: 1 146)

Further. the dclegate session of the MBC Coordination Committee held at

Patna on F'chruary I i 093 demanded the increase o f I-eservations quota for them

to 16.5% fiom lii% in government jobs. However 1,alloo had the issue shrewdly

tackled with ihc hell1 of his colleague Sharad Yadav by increasing the quota of

MBCs thus preventing any erosion of his vote hanks.

Vhc LIII' howe\er still licking its wounds of defeat in the Lok Sabha

elections turncd n blind (:ye to the nianoeuvrings o f t h c Jar~ata Dal. They decided to

depend rno1.i. 01-, thc li.a~li Janrnabhoonii issue rather than on casteist issues.

However. thc Congress leader Jagannath Mishra criticised the decision of reversing

the Kaipoori formula as a violation of Supreme Court order which specifically

excludcs the .(.'ream) 1,ayer' from reservation beneficiaries."'

Ihe Sana1.a 1);11 (Ajit Group) also criticiscd the move and also protested the

move oftlit, govern~r~cnt for no1 i:otistituting a committee to review the Mandal list

of benelic~;~rtes :md L ~ I S O for identilying the creamy layer alllong the backward^.^'

Only the lcaiicrs of Samajwadi Sanata party fully approved of the new reservation

Sc,rnlul;t i ~ ~ , p l i . m u n ~ c ~ i 1,:; the Lalloc~ I'rasad Yada\. go\crnmcnt."'

I h c triumph 01 Lalloo Prasad in the 1995 Bihar Vidhan Sabha elections

proved the invincihilit! of his strategy. The Kurrni revolt led by Nitish Kumar and

the suhsequcd li)rnmation of Sa~nata Party had little impact on the Janata Dal.

A badly faction idde den Congress and a divided BJP did not pose any challenge to

him. Rut thc hluslim votes did rally solidly behind, thus compensating for any loss

he incurred due ro thc split of OR(: votes. However, the Janata Dal gained the

support ofttic Muslin~s only in areas whcre they are in a minority. Whereas in the

areas where they are in a majority their votes were split between Congress and

Janata Dal. (Chaudharl: 1995:18). Finally, t h o ~ ~ g h surprising it may seem, the OBC

- minority alliance: had not led to the empowemlent of the Muslims. Both Yadav

Chief Ministers (Mulayarn Singh Yadav and Lalloo Prasad Yadav) had projected

then~selves (and are perceived by the minorities) as defenders of Muslim interests.

Hut the fact rc~naills th;~t during their tenure Muslim representation in government

had rcached ;In all tinic low. Some commentators anticipate that the next threat to

the BC coalitions ~ o u l t i come from this quarter (eg. Jain 1996: 150)

1,alloo I'rasad Yadav has unlike Mulayam Singh Yadav-always identified

himself as all indistinguishable member of his fellow caste members. He

perfomled the role 01' ;I social rehmier too similar to that of E.V. Kamaswami

Naickes by s<)lemnising n-tarriages and thus breaking the monopoly of Brahmin

priests and inJucting I )slits into pr-icsthood. They understand his language, his

humour and hts tailings, They love to see him milking the cow in the Khatals of

tile Chief hlini>tct-'s rcs~denci. Lalloo 1'1-asad had made the people understand that

the tninol-ity ilpper cast(: elirc had rillcil 13iha1- li)r so long and ruined the state.

I'ower should now go to the majority backwards. This message had aroused the

downtrodden in Bihar. Hi: even adopted some populist measures for the benefit of

the poor and downtroddcn. On March 25, 1991 the decision to raise the wages ofbidi

workers from Ks. '21- Fc~r 5000 leaves to Rs. 201 was taken. He had also accepted in W r r

principle the right of tribals to n~irlor forest produce (Chaudhari 1991:21). He

proudly flaunts hts humble origins "Then as far as I am concerned, I have come

here from tht Ckiprasi (Peon's) qu;irters". "Come to my village some time. My

house was like pigsty. we lived like pigs. I recollect my mother making a gruel of

dahi (curd). roti of rnaclua (ragi) :ind maize, eaten with a paste of onion and

chillies. Who could get vegetables'! We used to herd cattle" "Look at my feet

(shows his toes). See no nails. Stuhbing our feet on stones and rocks, they have

gone ..... we are working people. In the city we used to study at night and even pull

rick.shaws 1,) eal-n our bread". (('haudhari 1991:22). The poor. who always

Z~ remained at the pzripher]~ of politics. have come to the fore. They are the ones who 4 \,,:, $

have made 1.alloo Prnsad Yadav practically all powerful. Crafty and shrewd, he is t c ;N&.~'

well auare of thy changes that are coming up, and therefore every political move

of his is measured and calculated (Chaudhari: 1993:37).

6.8 Madhya Pradesh

Ilie political 1rac.k record in M.P was one of total disregard to the electoral

potential ofthe (.)HC'\ w~lil the pre Mandal phase. Only very few members of the OBC

had got elccteil from this region. 'lhe Mandal decision, which was expected to create a

powerti~l dcnr in i<.ll'!; iilflnencc u11c1 gain dividends for ID, failed due to lack of caste

solidat-ity .I I ICI (hi: iiiliylrting witli~n the par?). Iloivever. the BSP had. realising the

potential or OR(' vetch. already begin to take steps to influence the OBCs by

promoting a f;,w of its members by assigning a few posts within the party and also

allotting a lei\ seats i l l rhe elections lo thc assembly and parliament. Most of these

members emerged successful in the elections and were later to be instrumental in

warding off threats to the BJP from OIICs aligned to other po1itic;ll outfits. 66

The ( ongress ( 1 1 ) 1;hen decided to capitalise on the political consciousness

among the ( ) 1 3 ~ ' s " ' \vhich swept the entire nation in the wake of the Mandal

68 Corr~missiotr Keporr's iniplementation. They decided to embarrass the BJP

government of. Sundcrlal Patwa by demanding the implementation of the Mahajan

commission Keporr. I 'hc Mahajan commission was appointed during the tenure of

AIJU" Singh as Chief Minister in 1981. The Mahajan commission had recommended

among several other things a reservation of 35% of posts in the state for Backward

classes."" 7 . h ~ C'origrcss (1)'s appeal was a blow to the BJP which had opposed the

7 11 Mahajan Con11nis:;ion Report. A hot contest between the Congress (I) and BJP

ensued in nominating the largest number of OBC candidates in an attempt to woo the

BC votes7' I lowcvcr ;is the election results of 1993 revealed, the strength of BJP

MLAs froni the lower castes declined but at the same time increased from the upper

castes. Even though tile BJP took some steps in assimilating some members of the

lower castes. sevc~-;rl of their lcadcrs were refusing to concede their castes as

backward."

'l'hc i.lectio11 rt:sults of 19C)F made it apparent to the BJP that its steps to

culrivatc the ( I f % ( I , ~rlaJecluate and that its ontiring and relentless efforts towards

shedtlins ; I , u p p c ~ \,I!;IC image ha> not ti-~tctified. 'They decided to bring about a

characteristic cliangc in ihc rank a d tile of its organisation by conceding several

key posts in thc party structure 1.0 OBC and SCIST.~~ This incensed its major

feeder organisation thc: K-ashtriya S\bayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) which felt that the

,/. '

BJP is dithering liom it:; main ideological plank i.e., casteless society or Hindu A .? -;

unity.7J O n severill occasions they \\ere at logger heads with the BJP on this issue. , /'

Statements issued hy leaders became contrary to the KSS ideology and BJP

~trategy. '~ liowe\,er the B.IP remained firm in their resolve in nominating more

and more OHCIS(' LYC ST members i n order to ward off any threats from opposition

parties in capitalising on the reservation issue and to shed its upper caste faqade.

6.9 Karnatake

In 1986 the Kamakrishna Hegde provided for 68 percent reservation which

covered 02 percent oltlic populatioli including the socially and politically powerful

Lingayats nnii Vokkaliga:.. I t was a ~~rodification of the Venkatswalily comlnission

report whicli cxcludcd the: two communities (Lingayats and \'okkaligas) from the

~ d l i s t stating thern to be \,cry advanced. The commission observed that there is

". . .. an unhappy and drsquieting situation in Kamataka where in the two premier

caste:-co1iimunity-c1~1sst's of Karn;~t;lka. the Lingayats and Vokkaligas each

claiming that the othcr is not a soc~ally and educationally BC and each keen to be

~ncluded in the 11s: o t >;ocially and e~lucationally BCs" (Pinto: 1994:2270). There

was a largc public outcr) against r h ~ , Ireport, that the then Chief Minister ~ e h Jf included thc111 in (hc RC' list and alsi) constituted a third BCs commission under

Justice C'hin11,ippa Ke~lil! in 1988 v,li~ch submitted its report in 1990. In his report

s t : c loo rc~iel-ttteil thc ialrre col~clusion with regard to Lingayat and

Vokkaligas ;is \vas 1na:ie by Verikatswamy Commission. Chinnappa Reddy

Con~mission had recomn-~ended the scaling down of OBC reservations from the

existing 5 0 percent to 38 percent. Fearing the wrath 01' the two powerful

communities Chief Minister Veerendra Patil dodged the issue by appointing a

cabinet sub committee to study the recommendations. Before the committee could

submit its report Veerendra Patil was removed and Bangarappa assumed office

who again I-econstituted the comnlittee for a third time. Thus the report was

frequently consigned to the cold storage.

The hotting up of dissidents within the Congress following Bangarappa's

ouster and the cfbrts ot' Janata 1)al to secure BC votes in the name of Mandal

prompted the Moil) government to implement a modified version of the

Chinnappa Keddy Cornmission Report. In a series of orders the Veerappa Moily

government implemci~tcd a diluted version of the Chinnappa Reddy Commission

report ignoring certain cardinal recolnmendations of the commission. On April 20,

1994 govern~nent order was passed to the effect that the percentage of reservations .̂ -.

for S& was enhanced fi'orn 15 percent to 18 percent and for ~TE$from 3 percent to

5 percent. 'This order amounted to tlic total reservation being increased to 73 per

cent (23 percent for S(.' and ST and i O percent for OBCs). This move was resorted

to by Moil) i l l a bid to Lippease a tl.w communities as only a month lay ahead for

the Zilla I'asishatl and l'aluk coninlittee elections and also only four months lay

ahead for thc assemhly elections. I t may be recollected that the Chinnappa Reddy

Commissiu~~ had rci:o~nr~icnded tllc limit of rcservation to 50 per cent in

consonance with the :iupre~iic ( ' C I L I I - I verdict. In order to assuage the Vokkaligas

and Lingl~yats w h ~ ~ r n the comrnissio~r had requcsted to he excluded from the BC

list was accommodated by creating a fburth category of BCs (in addition to those

recommended by the i:ommission). I t included Vokkaligas, Iingayats, Marathas,

Ehnts, Christians and Kodavs in the "rural areas" and apportioning it an additional

12 percent reservation Hut obviously it did not go far enough. (Krishnaswamy

1994: 143). On July 23 the cabinet decided to issue a "modified reservation order"

to "rectify the anomalies in the April 20 G.0". Under this the total reservation was

enhanced to 80 percent. with the ( ~ ) I 3 ( ' quota going up to 57 percent.76 his gave

Vokkaligas and l.ingayat.s 8 and I l percent reservations respectively in all

government education;il institutions and ,jobs. This was a premeditated step by

Moil;y since this order wa:; issued in .luly 23 which was indeed two days previous

to July 25 rally intended tc' be organi7r.d by Vokkaligas on July 25.

'l'he moditied government .~tder ol' .Iuly 23 didn't strike much in either

appeasing or ;issua:ing the Vokka l i~ i s . Their rally which mas held as per schedule

on July 25, the orre which Moily was trying to make lacklustre, demanded the

resumption 01' the ( i . 0 of October I q X ( 3 o f Ramakrishna Hegde until a Permanent

Backward C'lass (.'ornrr~is:;ion is appijinted. Several members of his cabinet like

Sorest minister 11. Vishwanath voicecl concern at the haste shown by Moily when

the Pcrmanc~lt HC Conrmittee (PUC( ' ) hcaded by Kudur Narayana Rai was going

into the cntlrc garnut of' reservation> ;ind exanlining representations fiom various

cornsnunities hloil! linr~ly disputed tht, charge that the govenunent had adopted this

sche~ne aficl- io~~stiltations with I e~a l porrilits. sociologists and a wide cross section of

the society alld I~ad 11ot actr:d i n has~l:. r'hc chaim-ran of the I'RCC was also consulted

according to bloily (Kr~isl~naswamy I <)94: 144). Kamataka Congress Party President S.

Bar~garappa told Frontline that the tnc~dified policy was a political gimmick by Moily

"with an eye on the vote banks"" (Ibld: 145). A number of political leaders, including

state Janata [)dl President H. D. Deve (iowda and Bharathiya Janata Party member and

leader of the oppositior-I i r ~ the asse~nhly K. V. Deshpande, wanted the government to

reve,rt to the Octolm 1986 order until the PBCC presented its recommendations. But

Moily dismissed that order as "an Adllnnc reservation policy lacking in many respects".

(Krishnaswanlny 1994: 135;l.

I'hc Vokkaliga Sangha and others in writ petitions, questioned the validity

of the April 20 and July 25 executive orders. They were in favour of implementing

the 1986 order. Another writ petition Srom Shamji Raghunath Rohidekar and

others challcr~ged for thc first time. besides the above orders, the legality of the

1986 Ci. 0. assailing i t on the ground that it was violative of a ruling in the Indira

Sawhney case. and thc h4andal case. hoth of which put the limit on reservation at

50 per cent.

The 10x6 C i . 0 and its irnplernentation had never been challenged. Its

implementatioll had becn taken for granted. The Moily government undertook in the

apex court or1 t\ugust 1 not to operatc until further orders the G.Os dated April 20 and

July 25. But lhc Suprernc (:out agreeing with the pleas ofthe petitioners in assailing the

legality ot'thc 1086 (i.0 on the groulid. that i t was not consistent with the 50 per cent

ceiling. directed. initiall! In interim ordcl-s on August 30 and later making it absolute on

Septentbcl- 9. t11;lt the state gouernmcllt 110t implement i t (Sharn~a 1994: 24).

Moil! tried to c ~ l a c ~ a bill to include the Kamataka reservation scheme in Ninth

Schedule of the (',.~nstitulion under Article 31f3 which takcs it away from judicial

scrutiny. Hut ;I dctenili~lecl opposition forestalled any such move by Moily in both

Ihouses oflcgislaturc in Kamataka.

It is strange tha~ a person of Vcerappa Moily's stature and political experience : ,\

should resort lo such sclfldestmcting tactics especially when a Supreme Court verdict , '?*.

,was enforced on al,. starcs. Moily could neither win backward votes or could hold his , '

/'

flock together in thc C~ongr~~ss. The dec~sion of Supreme Court prevented him not only

from increasing the rcscrvation quota but also resulted in decreasing the prevalent 68 per

cent reservatioti co 50 pcr cent. Dissidence within the party combined with failure on the

reservation front intlictcd a crushing defeat in the 1994 Assembly polls in Kamataka

6.10 Tamil Nadu

0 1 1 a l r a i n ~ ~ ~ e n l ol' independence the then Madras Government passed a

government ordei- (revised) in Novetnbcr 1947. It stipulated that in a unit of 14

appointnicnts. six i4l.O'Yl) were allocated to non-Brahmin Hindus, two (14.3%)

each to Backward tlintius., Brahmins and SC's and one (7.1 per cent) each to Anglo

IndiansiChr~slians and ivltlslims (G.1'3. 3437 Public, 21" November 1947).

I'hc Lladl-;.s I ligh Court and latcr thc Supreme Court struck down the

revised Ciolcl-ntnc.11 ()icier as ultra vlres o f t h e Constitution. The decision of High

Court and Supreme Coi~rl caused great consternation in Madras. Leaders like E. V.

.Ramas\vani~ haicLi,r lii-tnly protesrcci against the verdict and look out processions

;and icntlc;l\o~ircd I C I c;ill t..n all-pztl-ty struggle li)r the reintroduction of the revised

! :, Government Otdel The congress leaders got restive at rhe developments that

followed thc tit.c~siol-i oi'the courts. On April 1951 the Madras Assembly carried a

resolution 11io~e.I h y the Chief M~nisrer. I t authorised the government 'to adopt

such measures ;ir .ir< !necessary for admission to the government professional

colleges and appointtnents in government services as will conduce to the welfare

of all classes oi : i t l~ms'. Armed with this resolution and the related proceedings

supporting 11. thc ('hies Minister and other ministers rushed to Delhi seeking an

amendment to thc C'unstitution.

'['he ~:cntr:iI zovernment conceded the demands of the Madras government

and the firs1 ;~merrdtucnt to the Constitution was enacted by incorporating Article

15(4) which e~npowered the state to make any special provisions for the

advancemem i ) l socially and educationally BCs of citizens and also for SCIST not

withstanding the lpru\fsii"ns of Articles 15(1) and 29(2) on June 1951. The State

Govern~iient O I I enai:ting this amendment reintroduced reservation in both

educatiownl ; ~ n d employment with 15 percent for SC and ST and 25 percent for

social and educationally BC, leaving the rest for open competition by the entire

population. While the S(: and ST were already listed, the BC were communities

specified under thc Madras Educatioi~al Rules and converts to Christianity from SC

((3.0. 2432 l'uhllc '7 Sepr 1951).

Althoi~gh ihc ii-esh Goverrtnient Order could assuage the feelings of the

protestors. the Maiil-;IS Pt-ovisional Backward. SC and Tribes Federation were far

from satisliccl ' I t i < , \ demanded that reservations for BC S(: and ST be fixed at

65% and to ircliix tlic ij~~;~liti~;~iiot7 i;i;~ihs Sbt. a pass at the intemiediate eua~niwations

and adtnissitrli io ducetional instit~ctcons. The government found these demands

impractical and refuse to comply to them.

The Vi~nnc>.ar ( 'on~munity was much incensed at the lack of consideration

oftheir denialids stiowrc by the Congress. Frustrated at their inability they decided

to show their- powers in contesting as independents in the 1949 elections to the

district board5 I'ht. result>, were an e?e opener to the Congress with regard to the

influence that the Vanniyars were able to exert in the South Arcot district of

Madras state. Similarly lhcy formed an alliance with the toiling masses and formed

the Tamil Nadi~ l imilet-s Party. The I~ rmi l Nadu Toilers Party and Common Weal

Party won I9 and (I seats n:spectively in the 1952 Assembly elections. The Congress

which was short 01' rnaj(~rity in the assembly wooed the two parties of the Vanniyars

by offering t l ~ two stlilwarls of the Valmiyar movement, M. A. Manikavelu Nayakar

and S.S. Kamu,wiu~~~ I'adayachi posts in the eight member cabinet. The Vanniyar

movement thus pctcred offand the I-cscrvations continued as per G. 0. of 1951. 80

The I ) M k lost the main plank of its ideology i.e., anti-Brahmanism since

the Congress acconimudated several backward leaders like Omandur Ramaswamy

Reddiar as thc lirst ('irii:! Minister itrid later Kumara Swami Raja as CM and the

illustrious Kamaraj who uot only became the Chief Minister but also wielded

immense clil~it a\ ('orlgress president As a result they tried to forge marriage of

convt:niencc lirht with C'omrnunist I',lrty and later with the Brahmin dominated

Swantantra l'i117) I t iilso ti)cused on issues like food shortage and poverty with the

s;mm fer\.(1111 ,I.. [hi,, Ii.rd. .~ilvocateti ;inti-Brahmanism. The imposition of [Hindi was

aiiothrr is\~letl \iI~~clc c11ckid well \\it11 11ie electorate. 11 also added sliorrage of food

grains also to rtrc iihovc i ~ : j u e . ~ ' 7'he IIMK interpreted the introduction of Hindi as a

sinister attclirpr h;, the celnter to reduce the importance of Tamil and also as a ploy to

prevent the entn 01' Sc~utll Indians into the Central services. The food shortage was

portrayed as a tailure oil the part of tikunaraj who with his immense clout at the center

as Congress president to secure suffic~cnt food grains for Madras state. According to

then1 he coulti not even prevail over the center to avoid the imposition of the Hindi

language on l':mmil~. (:. Subramaniarn, the Central Food Minister, who also hailed

from Madras w u :~ccused of failure tc~ alleviate the food grain shortage in Madras. In

1967 the ilhll.: lecl n grand anti congress coalition and registered a spectacular victory

at the assembly porls I I I 1967.

l'he IIMK miriis1:ry in fulfilment of its electoral promise appointed the

Tamil Nadu I.ir5.t IK:s Commission under A.N. Sattanathan in 1969. The

commission \uhrnittcd its report in 1970. In its report the commission had observed

that just ninc O L I ~ i>l'tlic I-lumerous communities listed as backward, accounting for

only about I I pcr ecnt of the total RC population had cornered much of the

benefits available to the entire BC population, viz., 37 percent of the non-gazetted

and 48 per cent 01' tlic gazetted posts. 44 per cent o f the engineering and 47 per

cent. ol'the liiedic;~l college seats. and 34 pcr cent of scholarships. It was to prevent

this ' c reami~~g eflecr' :if the resel-\;ation policy that the commission recommended

an income Iilnrt 111' lis. 9000. Folloming the recommendations of this commission,

in 1971 the 1)Mh. 111inisl:ry enhanced the BC reservations from 25 per cent to 31

per cen1 (ag:illrsl iht, recummendcd :j per cent) and the SC-ST reservations to 18

per crnl (;~galn,l t i i i ~cconimentic~l coritin~~ation of the existing I6 per cent).

Howevcr i r icli~se~t to prescribe any income limit. lest i t should incur the

displ~tsure o i the \ ested interests (Kadhakrishnan 1989: 1265).

.l'hc ,IIAI:~MK ministry led by M.G. Ramachandran ventured to implement

the income cclling of' Rs. 9000 fixed by the Sattanathan Commission through a

Government i )r&r in .luly 1979. The DMK-DK combine took it as an excellent

opportunity t i 1 rcv~vc its sagging morale and also to combat the personal charisma

of MGli which was h~v:oming a stumbling block to their rise to power. Realising

the negative i r r~pau~ that I-~is order has had on the Lok Sabha elections in January

1980 which ended in his defeat, the MGR government withdraw the controversial

(3.0 and issued it li-rsh 1Ii.O. enhancing the reservation percentage from 31 percent

to 50 percent

The w~thdra\*al of the order was challenged at the courts by two students

who failed t o g c ~ adn~ission to professional colleges, and an aggrieved state

governmen1 cr~iploycc. ;inti the management of a private educational institution

which was conipelicd to implement the new measures challenged the constitutional

validity of the cwci (i.0:; of February 1. 1980 giving the effect to the two MGR

arlnouncernenrs o t .lanuar); 24, 1980. On October 15, 1982 the Supreme Court

directed the lalnii Nadu govr. to appoint a conlniission to review the entire list of

p,cs . f . ,I ttr C ~ I I L ~ U L I I I I ~ a11 enumer;~tion in a factual and scientific manner.

Accordingly. C l i r . I-talnachandran appointed a commission in December 13. 1982

under the cha~rni;ln:;hip of J.A. Amhasankar, a former chaimlan of the Public

Set-vice (?on~n~i>.loii with Z I member-.

Ihc . I : \ -\n~basiinkar c o n ~ ~ ~ ~ i s s i o n Report was noted for the dissent of the

majority n~~.inhers to i t . They (thc dissenters) i.e., 14 ot'the 21 members) made

clear that rhc csistlng 67% rcservation should continue to the backward

eornmunitics who are eligible tbr i ~ . l 'his was in contrast to the chairman's view

who recornmcndeti .i;!O/u rescrvatiolls for the BCs and the inclusion of 17 forward

communities as HC ant1 the deletion of 34 communities from the BC list. The

commission also did not recommend any income criteria to avoid the 'creaming

effect' of rcscrvation:;. The report was submitted in February 1985.

(Radhakrishnan. Ibid: 1268).

M.( I . Ka~nachandran refuseti to table the report probably due to the fear that

the commissions ('haimlan's recoln~nendation of deletion and inclusion and reduced

percentage 01 reserrations of BC wou ld flare up another stir despite repeated pleas.

Instead hc issi~ed a l i . ~ (3O's which revealed to be a selective implementation of the

recornmenilatton:\ likc continuation t i t h e existing percentage of 67% reservation, and

also the inclusior~ 0129 more communities into the BC list without excluding anyone

from the cu~sting list. 'The co~nrnission, however, recommended compartmental

reservations. that is grouping conveniently BC communities according to the degree of

their back\\u~-dness <uld allowing representation out of the reserved quota to the several

groups. 1 ' 1 1 ~ rcpo~l \\as tabled only two years after its submission by the M.

Karunanidh~ govcrnlnent (Ibid.).

\;;~lrniyar S.~rrgarn which n:rs lying dormant raised its banner of revolt after

thc de~rrihi. ( 1 1 I . 1talnachandr;in and thereafter the declaration of President's

I I 1 I Ilic \'anni\ar: ciclnand separate rcserbntion of 20% in state

services, edu~.;lt~i)naI institutions and 3 O h in central services exclusively for them.

The state cln~jcr- rhf Presidents rule consented to the implementation of

compartment:~l rcscr\:ition pending the submission of a comtnittee's report

appointed to <ur\,c) H(1 population and backwardness. This didn't pacify the

Vanniyars who i-c.;unied their agitation with reviewed vigour (Radhakrishnan

1996: 128).

Ilie 1)VK i11ni:tr) which assi~med charge after the January 1989 elections,

stopped the survey in IFzbruary 1980. and ordered compartmental reservations in the

. . following I I I ~ ) I ~ I I ~ . .hi\ \was partly in lulfilment of one of its poll promises and partly

to outwit its aii\cr-s'u> the Congress (I). Out of the overall 50 percent of backward

class rescrva~ions 1i1r ?(I1 cornmunitics accounting for an estimated 67 percent of the

state's popul;~lion. 11 sct a p:xt 20 percent for 39 communities listed as MRC within the

Backward ('lass l is1 and 68 communities listed as denotitied tribes. together

accountirig lor ; ~ h ~ u t 20 pel-cent of the backward class population (Ibid.)

I l le I leader Rarndxs severally criticised and opposed the new

scheme of ci)n?partmcntalisation of reservation alleging it to be weighed highly

unfavourable I , , the L';inniyar com~nunity. By expanding the list of MBC to 107 (i.e.,

39 for MU( olh8 for tienotified tribes) it would only deprive the benefits now being

enjc~yed h) rlrc \:trun~)ars substantially for it would cut into their benefits.

I I 1 \cc~~c-e a more acceptable percentage in MBC quota and also to

avenge ihe l-rc~ra!al i.;irli,;.r by thc (oilgress and now by the t>MK the Vanniyars

floated .! S C ~ ~ . I I ; I I L L ~ c t ~ t i ~ called t h ~ . I'attali Makkal Katchi ( P M K ) in July 1989."

The PMK par~icipatecl in electiotls for the first time in the November 1989

4ssembly election:; allti managed to secure 5.82% of votes entitling it to a status of

a recognised political party. Kealisrng the growing influence of the PMK, several

parties approached them for an alliance which was rejected outright by Ramdas.

PMK instead ti1rgi.d alliances with certain minor parties like Republican Party of

India (Rt'I) and communal outfits of Palani Baba. Even the Janata Dal was kept

side after thc keel1 intere!it was evinced at the initial stages by Ram Das towards

joining it, when a fcw unacceptable demands made by him was rejected by the

fomler. In thr 1901 l.ok. Sabha polls PMK polled the third largest votes in 120

assembly scgrtlettts.

"A contest ber\riecn the parties espousing two distinct rhetorical styles, with

associated differet~ces in electoral coalition and programmes styles is (I) termed as

empowemlent piiix~ltsrn and protection populism.

I usc the tc:rlu clnpowement populism to refer to a style of political rhetoric

that descrihrs suelet! ;as a contl ic~ demanding greater privileges for out-groups on

behalf of the people. 13) protection populism, on the other hand, I mean a rhetoric

that. e m p h a s ~ x s themes of vulnerability. offering to protect, 'the weak' and 'truly

needy'. Althtiugtr th?y often exist in the same movement or rhetoric, there is a

tension bet~veet~ thr themes of empowerment and protection as vision of social

piscine that , i l l i ~ , . ~ , ~ l i r ~ n to be championed by rival parties under competitive

cortditions. fhi> cam occur cithcr as an original movement splits, or when

defensive L , I ~ I L , ~ I I W \ ~ n d w i c i i .ai,tics' ro outflank insurgent counter-elites by

fi)r~iiit~g ;I co:~litioi~ \ \ it11 tttr ITIOSI Lli \adb~~~i~taged.

The ix~tent~;.il lilr 'jandwich ~oali t ions ' always exists because o f vertical

differentiation within !he constituer~c~cs clairrled by the rising social groups who

typically articc~iatc thersrcs o f empowcrmcnt populism, and because those with the

greatest uncertainty and tieprivaticw are likely to be more responsive to such

measures as social insurance and the provision of basic needs. Sandwich tactics

c:an be pursued in two ways: by seeking to target benefits towards 'the truly needy'

or by substitut~ng measures that provide for the needy in place of those who claim

to shift power duwnwasd" (Swam?.: 1'998: 109-1 10).

The anti-ManJ;iI agitation didn't break out in Tamil Nadu in the same

dimension as i r ~ the Northern States Ihe I>MK government of Karunanidhi during

its second tenure from January 198') to January 1991 enthusiastically supported the

implementation of Mandal C:ommission recommendations of the National Front o f

which his pan! too was a const i t~~er~r . The Tamil Nadu Assembly also passed a

resolution 111 this cffcct ';upporting the implementation of the report. If Tamil

Nadu was complacent during the ;VO0-91 Mandal agitations, the reason for it is

not fBr to seek: with ahout 80% of the state's population already nestling under its

protective umhre1l;l. il' the state's 1'380's sudden and steep hike in reservation from

50% to 68% itselfdicl rrot threaten i t with any Bihar or Gujarat type caste war, the

centre's introdl~ction <sf c mere 2;"40 reservation could not have done it either".

(The Hindu 1')-02- 10');).

The :4li\l)Mti (~ i l~v t . undct .I .layalalitha passed a resolution unanimously

with other ri~crnhcrs i l l ' the legis la~i i r dcn~anding SO'% reservation. I t said that

reservation should i~ot he limited r t l cent[-a1 services alone but should also extend to

educational ~nstitutions as well.

It was the Madras High ( 'ou r t which again stoked the dying embers of

reservation issue when i t ordered that reservation of 69% in educational institutions

should only be implemented in 1'103-04 and a ceiling of only 50% should be

effected from 1993-'15. 'The High Court pointedly said reservation was "a vety

sensitive. highly explosivz and ext~c~riely delicate issue". (Subrammian: 1993: 124).

Dissatisfied with the High court Lerdict ol' effecting 50% from 1994-95 onwards

only, ;In organisatio~) Voice (consuiller care council) challenged the order at the

Supremc Court. I'he Supreme C'c~urt ordered that the ceiling of 50% reservations

in educational in,ititution should b ~ , operational in 1993-94 instead of 1994-95.

However when the govt pressed ahead with 69 percent reservation in 1993-94,

itself in accordance with Madras High Court's verdict, the Supreme Court

construed i t a contempt of Court (Ibiil.).

'I he l arnil Nddu Assemhl:i alicr the issue of the above verdict by the

Supreme Coun passeti a resolution i)n November 9, 1993 with the support of all

partles which included AIADMK. rhc DMK, the Congress I, the CPI, CPI(M) and

MGKADMK pressing thc: centre to alllend the constitution for "the continuance of

69 percent 111 gc~bt serkice and ctli~cational institutions for all time to come"

(Subramanian 190;: 1:!4). Sayalalitlia also announced that the state would observe

a bandh on November I h , I993 to mpress the people's feelings on the issue. All

the political p;irt~c\ t:xpressscd tht.11 \t~l>porl both fi~r the resolution and the bandh.

I lowe\,tr. lia~ilnanidl~i. \;azhappaili l<a~ii;~~nurthy of the President of the TNCC ( I ) .

CPI (M) and I eadcr ol.thc opposirion iaultcd Jayalalitha for not convening an all

party meeting to discuss the issue beti~re the assembly elections. (ibid.).

The ('hiel Minister Jayalalitha was accused of betrayal of the resolution

moved by the Assembly for the protection of 69% reservation, when the govt. filed

a reply at the Suprer~le Court on November. 22, 1993 an "affidavit of compliance"

to adhere to 50% ceiling fixed by the ~ o u r t . " This incensed every political party

on the ground that they were not $consulted on the matter before the affidavit of

compliance was sllbrriitte~d to the Supreme Court. They refused to accompany her

to the Prime Ministcr Narasimha Rao in order to persuade him to amend the

constitution to retain the 69% rescrv~rtion in Tamil ~ a d u . " The opposition parties

in fact doubted the sincerity of the Chief Minister in this matter. Karunanidhi even

alleged that Sayalalitha was engaged in a 'double game' on this issue8'

(Subramanian 1993: 32).

Jayalalitha suc~:eeiled in gettlilg the presidential assent to the Tamil Nadu

RCs., SC' and S'r (reservation of seats in educational institutions and of

appointments or posts in 1:he service5 under the state Bill) 1993 on July 19, 1994.

'The consent \\as grantt:cl after a delegation led by the Chief Minister Jayalalitha

met the Prirnc Mi~iis~er and requested l i i i l i that the bill be included in the Ninth

!schedule of the C'onst11.ution afier in became an act under to take it away from

Xl , judicial scrutin~. It also demandcci that the centre amend the Constitution to

enable the state go\ cmments to Val-? the percentage of reservations depending on

their populetio~i anJ local t'actors ( I l ) i , i 1.

I'hc prot~st trra~lc agaillst the amendment by the organisation Voice

(consumer care) against the bill fol.ind its echo in the Madras High Court. Later the

petition was transl'errt:J to the Suprrtne Court. Jayalalitha wreaked her vengeance

on Vijayan. the chairman and trustee of the organisation (Voice) and also on

Dr. M. Anantlakrishnan by making physical assaults on them8'

Jayalalitha "success" in obtaining Presidential assent for the state's

controversial reservation bill and the subsequent passage of the Constitution

amendment bill by parliament providing for inclusion of the state Act in the Ninth

schedule of the C'onstitution soon ivori for her the acclaim of not only her own party

men but o i the leaders of a few other parties of little or no consequence in the state.

She was hailed as "Samooha Needhi Katha ~ e e r k m a i . ' (the brave lady who protected 6 -

social justice) at a felicitation hnct io~i In Madras. (Vishwmathan 1994:33).

6.11 Kerala

Kerala has bee11 following a reservation policy which provided for 49.5%

reservations li)r tht: S( '1 S'l"s & OU('s. This policy has been continuing for several

decades since independen8:e except for a brief protest being raised here and there.

In Kerala the HCs i~nd fnrward Castes arc very well organised and had been a force

to reckon with thr decades.

Eben though (he reservation policy did hamper the entry of forward castes

into the state service sector, they wcrc fairly satisfied with the open merit quota in

the central scl-\.ice. whicll enabled sucra l of their mcmbers to secure recruitment.

The dccisiotl to ~rnplcincnt the hl:l?~ial (~'onirnission dealt a lethal blow to the

forward c:isIci. i h e irno coalitio~l:;. rhc I:DF and the then ruling LDF, had several

supporters i ~ f both tllc forward and RC' communities whom both the coalitions

were uar ) ilntagonire. The greatest rift occurred in the UDF whose major

partner the Muslirn League was a great votary of the Mandal Commission report.

They refused to entertain any suggestion of inclusion of economic criterion, which

to them would be at (:he disadvantage ol' BCs. For them it was not the jobs or

income that would accrue by way of reservations, but the participation in

administration that thar was deemed ;IS importantxx.

Kunjalikutty. statt: secretary of the Muslim L,eague openly clashed with the

Congress ( I ) leader K. Icarunakaran on the issue o f economic criterion in the

reservation scheme. I le alleged that thcre was practically no difference with regard

to reservatioiis between the Congrris ( I ) and CPM for both favoured economic

criteria. 1 lowevcr. .iinc? both these coalitions had substantial number of members

from RCs. \\ho art: alsr~ in favour of I-cservations on the basis of caste they should

be prepared to polnrise inlo a single unit. cutting across political affiliations." The

moment thesc IK's join together and form a united front, the Muslim League

would not he li~und wanting in giving leadership to i t . He exhorted the majority of

the BCs and minorit> communities to organise against the unholy alliance of

Forward caste hrgernor~ist:; and conlmunal divisive forces. (Ashraf 1990: 7).

Thc ilcclaratio~~ of the SNI:)l' President with regard to the Rain Janma

YO f$hoorni issue gave grear inspiration to the League leaders. The SNDP President

K.K. Vishw;ln;ithan sevl-.rcly condeliit~~rl 111c l i . 1 . l ' ' ~ Rain Saluma Rhoorni issue and

even hr;~iidcil l old I I I I ~ i ' the Ibrward castes. The League even

rernindcd their tlindu brethren that the main aim of the BJP was to foster

communal \ iolencc. It pleaded to the BCs that they should unite forgetting their

religious aflinities. i n these circumstances the League would be a warrior at the

forefront in thc light f i ~ r the issue,, hut no political games could be resorted to.

Whcn the initial euphoria of V.P Singh's Mandal commission report

subsided. the h4uslim League began to campaign against him personally and

wanied thc Inasses not to fall into the trap laid by him. The League even branded

V.P. Singh as a torrner member of the R.S.S. (Ashraf 1992:12)

I hc Inrlcr party conflicts over the Mandal issue and the Ram Janmabhoomi

issue had its rr~eniher:; caught in a fix and they could not evolve a common

approach to the Maridal issue. The Muslim League's divergent view also confused

its predtlmrnant constituencies i n North Kerala. The L D F scored a sweeping

victor) at the Ihs t r~ct council elections making great inroads in to the Congress

strong holi i of coahtal Kerala and central Kerala to an extent and also into the

1,eague s t r~mg holds like Malappnram. Moreover the UDF's almost pro-reservation

posture niiniis ecclnomic criterion lost them the votes of the tbrward castes as well.

f;nthtrsed hy the success at the District Council elections, the LDF

government in Ker:ila decided to go in for elections to the assembly in 1991

forgoing iilmost a year of its gobei-nment mandate simultaneously with that of the ./

..~

Lok Sablizi pull.;. l he UI)F was wilting under pressures of inner contradiction^.^'

Hut thc i ;~i . t (~r . ; t l i ; ~ t contributed to the success of the LIIF victory at the District

C I r I c e r l a s t Thc Sanivarana Samudaya Munnani, (SSM) a

coalition 0 1 pro-r.e~cr\ationist li>rc.es had not committed itself to any of the

coalition parties. i3ut the LDF was confident that their votes would eventually fall

into their k i t r i

'l'hc assas:.;ination of Rajiv (;andhi had turned the attention of electorate

front the reservation controversy. Marly of the Latin Christians, who were

beneficiaries 01' reset-vation policy. were completely sidelined by the sympathy

factor that sncpt the lat ti on in the wake of Rajiv's assassination. The SSM were

provoked ;it the derogatory comments made by Marxist veteran E.M.S.

Narnboodiripad crt~out certain prominent leaders of the Ezhava Community who

were the flag 1heart:rs of llzhava Social reform movement. 92

The I . I ) I , did a damage cx~ntrolling exercise by stopping all attacks of

Ezhava castetsl lcadt:r:i and won the ~lnconditional support of the SSM. It is

doubtful whetller this dicl succeed ill pacifying the wounded sentiments o f the

Ezhava conui~unit> the I , D 1;'i performance at the polls showed (Isaac and

Kurnar: I901 7 ( 1 2 ~ 0 ; ) . The refi~sal 01' the LDF to accommodate the Muslit11

League led to :r very ut1c~1mlortable position. The support the SSM had pledged to

1,DF made i t ~ i i t l i cu l~ k ~ r League I,., continue in the SSM. They made a tactical

escape fiom thts tr;~p by il~litting thc SSM.

It \ \as i n ccntrtrl Kerala that the caste polarisation was Inore evident. The

silent anti-blvlnr~dal selltl!mmsnt swecpitrg across the districts like Pathananithitta,

Itlukki. Kotta?;l~n. anti l~.rnakulam ivm:)i-ked effectively in creating a loose solidarity

between Nail* tirid ( ' I I I ~sc~;tns. t lent c as far as Kcrala was concerned Manctal

rernaincd o n l y a iubject o f political debate only. The Muslim 1,eague became wiser

after its experience i n the hands i ) f LDF when the latter after utilising its clout at

the ilistrici ('our~cil elections reiilsed to accommodate them in the LDF coalition.

Their return to the 1 ll:ll.' not only strengthened it but reduced the SSM's strength on

whom the I.L)t;' was lcaning heavily upon (Kala Kaumudi 3010611991).

The too close identification of the LDF with SSM provoked alienation of

some ol.thc upper caste sympathisers of the LDF. Some of the Christian Bishops

came out in public filrl.~n~s with plcas to vote in favour of I D F in the second leg o f

the campaign. With the t:xit of the IlJML (Indian Union Muslim League) from the

SSM and the rleutrali~.ation of the Latin Catholics after the assassinatioll of Rajiv

Gandhi, the SSM hat1 virtually been reduced to its Ezhava base, most of whom

even otherwise had be#-n traditional supporters of the lefi. Thus the net gain of the

LDl7 from its cscapati'r Srom SShl 1s a doubtful i s s ~ ~ e (Isaac and Mohan Kumar

1991 : 2702-03).

6.12 West Bengal

The West Hengal Chief Minister Jyothi Basu had informed the CPI (M)

central leadel-ship ihat he will not implement the recommendations of the Mandal

Commission t i l l thc anomalies ;ire removed. Basu reportedly told senior

colleagues "thai tlic co~.nn~ission's recommendations on the 27% job reservation for

the BC was all ahsurd 111-1.8position is h r as West Bengal was concerned". He said

SCI ST' and other m~~iorit:y interests are well protected in the state and any further

iconcessio~ls \roulcl tiat111.;1IIy Iia11ipi.1. iithers (The Telegraph X!O/OO). Although this

was in colisonatrce with the CPI (M)'s view of rcservations, it was diametrically,

opposite to his perso~ial views, which he had expressed in favour of reservation

previously. !\ccortiing to the C:PI(ILT) theoreticians, caste-based reservation policy

tends to perpetuate narrow caste consciousness and therefore is a hindrance to the

development of class consciousness. Such a policy is basically intended to serve the

purpose of a bourgeoisie democracy. By generating inner conflicts among the toilers

and splitting the unity of thc oppressed class. the policy of reservation proves to be a

stumbling block to the revolutionary c l a s formation (Guru 1985:184).

iiccording. to the 1981 census, West Hengal has a total population o f 54.6

million of\vhich the SC population 1s 12 inillion and the ST population 3 million.

'Thus the SC' constitutt:~ 22 per cent and the ST component is about 6 per cent of

the state's population (Bhattacharya 1997: 185).

West f3engal has reserved I per cent and 5 per cent seats in government

services !i)r SC' a i d S I ' respectively. However these provisions were not adhered in

most govcrnnient establi::hments arid in 1976 it was Sound that the SC/ST were not

adequately represented. Hut the West Bengal government in their deposition to the

Mandal Con~rnissiori Report had opposed the idea of reservation of seats of BCs

and had itidce~i suggested poverty and living standards to be made the measuring

scale in dctcrmitiirig backwardness.

-l'hrrc bere ntre~npts in \Vest Rengal towards organizing the RCs and

demanding reser\ations in govcrnnlcnt ser\.ice. The political history of West

Bengal is l ' l ~ l i i ~ l ~ ~ l a s l i e s between tlic \amasctdras and other communities. The RCs

In \Yest Iicng,~l ma1111> constituted the largest segment ot the rural population

engaged in ugsici~ltural activitie:;. The social dimension of the process of

community tlmllstorrnatic~n and vari(~us land reform measures however had their

impact like other states, in West Bcngal too in giving a new shape to a major

section of the backwani ~:sopulation l'he impact was not homogeneous. During the

fifties they improved thzir social and economic conditions, but the process of

evolution of ,I sepdr'ite .ocial entit) did not succeed In later years, however, in

they emerged as s corr~paratively new force in rural West Bengal which nourished

an antagonistic. ;ittitilde towards the social political base of the CPM (Kushry

I t WCI\ in the late sixties that the leadership of Biplabi Bangla Congress had

organized thi. convention of the Alitayaja (low born) peasants and Namasudras in

Calcittta. I ' I ~ L . pomerful politician of 1967, the man who was instrumental in

installing thc tirst llnited Front C;ov.crnment in the state, Sushi1 Dhara was also the

moving spirit hehind this conference. In f'act even at that time the smaller political

parties in Ucst Hcngal had been banking on the support of the rural middle classes

for their existence. Shcy had demanded a certain percentage of reservations in the

job:;. Priln;iril> thc political m o w mas to consolidate the base of the party among

the lowcs castcs. l l i c party could rtot hold the ground for long, since after 1969 the

CPI(M) ~noilntrci a 5ysternatic attack on its social base and the party gave in ([bid).

.She r ~ s c 01 the leii and radical politics has lcd to the forgoing of links with

t i r i i~ .~\scs I pJrposes ( r l political mobilization. Even

indt:pcnJci~c~, JJ!~. tlrc e f t partic:; Iralc been ac1iX.c in mobilizing the peasantry .--__,

against the niujor ~ssut. ~'loppressi.r.c taxes. Sharing of cornmon political values by

the members 01' diSi't:rcnt castes has paved the ground for a "class" orientation

among the rural tnasscs, tlenee battles are waged between classes and not castes,

and the slogans arc pi~li t~cal and riot parochial. (Bhattacharya: 1997:194).

Vchcment pr(ites~s were raiscd by the allies of the state govemment against

the government's dcc~:;ion not to implement the Mandal Report. They alleged that

the upper castes west: firmly entrenched both in the govemment and party cadres

and hence the govet-nment was aliaid of antagonising them. These upper castes

have thwarted all cllirts to pro\.idc participation to the backwards in the

administration. An organisation called Mandal Commission Action Committee

headed by a Senior 1 ct i Front Minister and Chairman of the State Forward Bloc,

Bhakti Rhusan blandal had emphat~cally claimed that at least 50 per cent of the

total popula~ion of West Bengal bclonged to the OBC. He then listed nearly 173

castes as hclongi~~g to OH(: group The castes belonging to OBCs are mainly

engaged in agricultural production andlor as artisans. Their representation in

education. c ~ ~ ~ p l u , ~ ~ n c n t and other vvalks of life were also negligible.

It is quite oh\:ioui that the ('1'1 (M) leadership in a very tactful manner had

been trying I O maintain 1:he status quo of the power structure, the power structure

which had ci-ystallisc.tl into a social structure. Any shift in its stand would

jeopardize i t \ S O ~ : I L I I base. The dec~sion making process in the CPI (M) is now

controlled h\ rural tiiiddle class and their urban allies. By agreeing to accept the

esi:jtence ( 1 1 0 1 4 1 ' i i i \i'c.;t Rct~gnl thc CI'I ( M ) would be forced to allow this

section lo i~aiticiiia~c In decision- 11taking. olshariny po\\el- or shaping the destiny

of the coul~t~! . Ilrtert::itingly, while the CPI (M) in other states, particularly the

llindi State\ tiad hccri l i)rcef~~lly demanding implementation of the Mandal

commission report arid reservation. it is not ready to concede the same in West

Bengal (Kustil-> I09 I :4?0).

6.13 Conclusion

I'olitical [~arties are very hesitant to oppose reservation policy as such.

There is a s c i ~ ~ c polarisation between the forward and backward caste members of

the political partics ho party can exclusively depend o n an issue permanently to

derive politic:iI i~~ilc;l::c. This was proved when the Justice I'arty and later DMK

began to tahc up I\!;IJ~:; other than social justice and reservations and forged

alliances with partici ~ , h o m they had deemed earlier as their inveterate foes.

Demograph) r ~ t ' a11 at-t:a should cilso be considered before reservations are

implementetl I ' o l ~ t ~ ~ a l parties have seized the opportunity in the Mandal

Cornmissio~~ \tatclnclll b:v V.P. Siligh when he gave freedom to the states to decide

upon the iniplctnentalior~ of the blandal formula in their respcctive states. When

states like 1 : . I ' ancl tiihar decided to implement the report, Orissa, Gujarat and

West Uengal retlseri I:(> implement i t in their states. West Bengal even made the

astclunding statenlent that LICs werc non-existent in that state and hence the report

could not hc iruplenii.nted there. I r i stark contrast, the LDF government headed by

CPM in Kc,r;~la. ivl~icl-~ 1:: I i r ahead in t c n i ~ s of social advancement has decided to

implement the reptr1.1 in the state ( 'crtain states like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka

had even \ iolatiil t l l ~ , ISriprrrne ( '(>.II-~ verdict of 50% ceiling in reservations. Tamil

Natlu Ii;ltl ;11so L , I I L I L , . I ~ O L I I - C C I to ~,lli.ct a constitutional nniendtnent o n this mattel-.

I'olitical I);II.~IL:S ha\? therelhre. tailored the reservation policy to suit their chances

of victor! at tlic poll\ They have done a fine balancing act to humour both the BC

and for\val-ti clt~sses hy [lot opposing reservation policy as such, and at the same time

~ntroduc~ng ,111 economic criterion l hey have not endeavoured even to debate the

reports ol \,inous conllnlsslons and ,ilso the reasons as to why the ~mplementation of

viuious other \ctletneh of reservation\ have failed to improve the lot of the intended

beneficiaries. fhey have also fought shy to the demand for the conduct of a caste based

census to assess the progress made by vGous caste groups in the social, educational

anti economic spheres. f.teservations after the initial euphoria in thc wake of Mandal

Commission I(cport llas been relcg;lted to political oblivion as it has not won the

expeetcd ill\~dznti\ lor ally the pol~licdl party particularly the Janata Dal, the foremost

and ardent champ~on ofthe Mandal Report

In 105 I. :liter the i:on>.titution ~ ; I S passed, the 'con~munal G.Os of 1947 were struck down h> the Madras ltigh ( ' ~ I I I ! and thereafter, by the Supreme C O L I ~ in two i~npol-tant deci:iii~~ls, namely Charlipakam Dorairajan versus the State of Madras in the case of cducation:iI institutions. a \ in Venkatramana versus the State of Madras in public \t.r~ices. 'II~l:st: decisions rriulted in agitations in Madras. [notably the one led by I'eri!;~~ I:V Hamaswami Naicker. K. Kamaraj was the leader of the Congress party ill tlic Madras State, although lic was not yet the Chief Minister, and he played a major role in conveying the deep concern of the people of Tamil Nadu to Nehru. This was the hachgroulld to the introduction of Article 15(4) in the constitution which perniittcd special mea:sures for the, benefit of socially and educationally backward clashes i l l admissio~l to educationnl institutions (Guhan 1991:48).

2 Predictah! l i b ? (1111 o f ten of tile com~nission members submitted their dissenting nore<. Of the tl~r~.e ,who strotigI\ opposed linking caste with backwardness and reser\atl<ui in goverllnlent serwce. one apprehended that far koln freezing, reservntlitlli \r'oul(l strengthen cnr;tc and social divisions, retard social cohesion, and cultninatt. I I I ilisaster. Another ~~leniher feared that apart from injecting the caste virus into politics. reser\;ltions will llclp c111ly the advanced sections among the backward. The thi rd ~iien~hcr lield that u l ~ i l v caste as a pathological condition of the society ce~i~iot hc ~ ~ ~ r o ~ c t i . i r s llo~~ld not lii. .~lloived to be used as a source for dl-rlwins benetits fron? t11v \t;i!c.

In a voltt, lice. In h ~ s letter forwarding the report, the chairman himself repudiated the cotinnix,ro~r'i \vi,~h. Stating t h ; ~ the realisation that the remedies suggested were worse t l rai i thv c \ i l to combat ilawrred on him almost towards the end o f the c o m r i i s i ~ ~ ~ ' i+orh; he asserted tlrat he was definitely against reservations in governrnellt service for any comn~unity. tte argued that the service was not meant for the ser\airts but fix tht: service o f wciety as a whole and as such the administration must have the hervices o f the best men in the land.

The nic~nc~randu~rr i 5 n the commiss~<~n's repol?, laid before the parliament (along with the report) in September 1956 hy G.B. Pant, Minister for Horne Affairs, was highly critical. i \~i iong uther things, i t slated that for inquiry contemplated in Article 340, the comrnissi~)n had 111 find indisputable yardsticks by which social and educational backwardness cc~ul~i be measured. and that far from being unanimous, i t s report revealed co~~sidcrahle divergence olopinion.

When i t \ effort\ I(' devise 'positive and workable criteria' other than caste failed, in May 19(11 thc governnrent o f 1ndi;r decided against drawing up an all-India lists o f OBCs and cstendi~~p reservations ill i ts service for any group other than the SCs and ST.;. Ci~n\equuitl). in August 1'161 it informed the state governments that while they have thc i l ixxet~on 10 choose tliril- I I W ~ critcria, it would be better to apply economic tests (Kadhakrislinan 1:': 1990: 23 X 74).

This polit~call! mi~tivat~ed decisiul~ \bas to counter the August 9 rally organized by the ousted 1)eputy Prinre Minister L)evilal. That i s why the Congress denounced the gavel-nnie~ir e l~d tlic Prime Millister in str-ong words. The Congress Working Conirnittcc r -esi~l r~t~i~n assailed him for "betl-aying a degree o f cynical opportunism, intcllccti~;tl dislronc5ty and polit~c;rl rnalfeasarrce never before seen at the highest levels ofgoi.errirnuiit irr the history of independent India". (Mura1idhar.K : 1990:21).

1 "We welc,)~ire t t11~11.1glr i t is a liqpr~critical and politically motivated decision. You have done uhat we co~~l id not for 10 long years though essentially to counter the threat posed h) Llevilal'~; sclieduled rail!. oti August 9. You wi l l have our unqualified support i n the implc~nentation of tlrc report" said P. Shiv Shankar, the leader o f the oppositio~~ in the Ralya Sabha, hour\ afier the announcement by the Prime Minister in the Llpper House. In fact Shiv Shankar went a step ahead and argued that without reser\atio~rh in cdi~iatii>nal institut~o~rs the whole purpose o f the report would be nullified. l l lc ('ongres:: (I) leader pleaded for economic criteria within the 52 percent Other l3ackwal-d ('lasses (OBC) groi~pc and made out a case for reservations to ~ninoritie.; In eftect. he was for implcmentation o f the report with minor modifications (Ibid.261

5 I~n~boldenccl tl) t l ic V O C ~ ~ ~ ~ O L I S pr(ltvcts by the allies o f the Natiorial Front against the decis~orr { i t ' the go\r:rnrnent wit111111t c ~ n s i ~ l t i n g tliern and the success o f the anti- reser\iitio~r~sti ill thc capital, the C'ollgress (I) floated its own outfit the Equality Front to n i n the \uppi111 oftrn iversity st~~(li.nts.

'['he 1io111 i ; i l le~l Iur :I hand11 ~III r411g~1st 28. I t llopped as tlle Delhi ad~iiinistratiorr o~dercd LI, , \LI~v c o t i'~dclcation;rl i~i:; i~luti<)~is. Signiticantly. the Chngress (I) did not i l e t ~ ~ ihc. l~ ru i i r i i i v~ l t l~ displayed rtrcsi Icports to the effect that the Equality Front

enjoyed the supl~ort o l i ts student's hirig Contirmation o f the report came in the next two days as the ('i~ngress Working (:ommittee (CWC) o f the party rnet and rejected the conccpl ~~l'rcservntic~ns based only on caste. (Ibid.)

" After eighl Ilour, 01' liectic deliheratiuns tlie Congress Working Comtnittee (CWC) hammered out \vllat ha:< been chris~ened the "Rajiv formula", a euphemism for the applicatioii of cco~~i)ni ic criteriorl to improve upon the Mandal recommendations. Quoting the Suprerne Court judgments the CWC resolution sought to make out a case that ally definition (if the backwanl classes cannot exclude Muslirns, Christians, Parsis or other religii~u\ miiior~ties ..... . . . . I t proposed the exclusion from the Mandal list o f those fee-paying students in priblic schools, those in category A and B jobs, professionals. incon~r: tax payers and those who own a specified extent o f land or property (IhidT7)

7 Resistance from u~it l i in the p a w to the position i t had adopted came to the fore at the September 14 ('WC ml:eting. Pradesh Congress (I) Committee presidents and the Chief Mini.;ters of 411dhra Pradesl-I ;~nd Karnataka took the opportunity to lodge their protest ag;l~irst :,tatcrnerrts o f cert;tii~ leaders in the party and urged Rajiv Gandhi to clarifj. their- position. They told ilic High Command that i t was difficult to sell their party line in thc % u ~ i l l r . (Ibid.)

3 F'arty President K q ~ v (iandhi had to concede in his three- hour speech in the Lok Sabha that his party t~ad committed mistakes with regard to the criteria for reservation of jobs in ,indhra I'radesh and several other states. "But I am not responsible for it. Blame for what happcncd then cannot be laid at my doors. I was not in politics then", he deinui-red. r l l ~ ~ c l l t ~ l the amuserncrit o f tlie Treasury Benches (Ibid.)

9 l 'he unio~i cabinet that rnet on 241Y/1991 decided to go in for a package o f reservations with ;in ci.<>n<i~iric i:ritcria totalling 59.5%. The break up were as follows: 15% reservatio~~\ l i 1 1 sclizdr~led castes and 7.5% for scheduled Tribes would remain undisturhccl: there \+ i~uld be 27% reservation tbr socially and economically backward classes and IO'% lor tlie poor among the upward castes. In the opinion o f the governmclit 40.5%) r ~ f jobs would be open for general competition on merit and this was "sireahle" ( I'inies o f India (New Delhi) 25/9/1991)

The I 'n ion Social Welfare Minister Sitaram Kesari announced on September 8, 1991, the iniplerrientation with immediate efl'ect o f reservation of 27 percent jobs in tlie c.entral gu\ernnle~~l ,el-vices for ;:lie Socially and Economically Backward classes excepting tlic "('rea~ny !Layer" as per the recolnmendation of the Mandal Co~nmission (Muralidlial-an 1993 : I,$-35)

10 The goverlirnent l i a i decided to c5t;ihlish a National Backward Classes Finance and I)eveloprirc~lt ('or-p<l~-ation to prom(icc economic and developmental activities for the benrlit of hackw;ird classes, l l i e cc~rporation with an initial paid up capital o f 100 crores and oi i t l ior i~e~l share capital i ~ f 500 crores wi l l assist individuals or groups o f individu;~l.- belongi~ig to back\varJ classes by way o f loans and advances for cconomicall~ ~ I I I ~ liiiitil~:iall\- \,iahlc sclie~nes and projects. The assistance, however. wi l l he \r~Iilcct ~ii 1111:0111~1 or ec~ i i~( i i i i c criteria to be prescribed by the government from 1111ic t i , tii11c Ihc col-poratii;ir i i intended to promote sell'e~nploy~nent and ot11e1- \,enturci lhacl\\~:iiii ~l;rzscs a1111 !rant concessional tinances in selected cases fol-

~~ ~

persons belonging to backward classes below the poverty line in collaboration with the ministries and departments at both the central and state levels to the extent o f the budgetaq assistatice granted to t l ic corporation. The corporation will also extend loans for pursuing general, professional. technical education or training at graduate and higher levels and assist in thc. upgradation of technical and entrepreneurial skills o f backward clrissei for efficient lrlaliagement of production units. Other objectives o f the corporation include assisting state level organizations dealing with backward classes by way o f providing financial assistance and refinancing. The corporation wi l l also act a\ an apex body for coordinating and monitoring the work o f all corporations and board. (Time o f India (New Uelhi) 26/9/91).

I I If he (V.P Singh) suffered any pique on account of Kesri's crude attempt to steal the credit for HC resen~ations, he did not show it. He only showed a concern for softening the blow on those atnong the supposedly forward classes, who might perceive themselves as disadvantaged. A constitutional amendment should be enacted he said, to see that a 10 percent reservation in government eniployment i s ensured for the economically backward among forward classes " . . . The Raja o f Mandal" V.P. Singh announced that September :25 would be observ~:d as victory day ... ....." "Let the government bring a constitutiotial atnendment and we wil l support it" (lbid:35)

On the .lar~ Sandesh Yatra trail in Karnataka, BJP president L.K. Advani welcomed the dcc i i i o~~ . but said he would be truly happy only if reservations were to apply to all the disadvantaged irrespective of caste.

'The L.efi parties in general were: favourably disposed to the decision though the IColnmuni\t Party ( ~ f India felt the exemption o f 'creamy layer' from the benefits o f reservatiotis was unwarranted (Ibid. 1

I? . Thc Narastmha Kao government had tried to move from a largely caste based policy to :I more class oriented one by taking greater cognisance o f economic factors. Politicall). ton, the government tiad tried to k i l l two birds with one stone; it had delivered on its election promise; thc CPI(M)'s demand for the inclusion o f economic criteria was accepted; the BJP's accusation that the poorer members o f the upper castes are being ignored by reserving an additional 10% for the economically backward sections who are not covcred by other schemes; and lastly, the Janata Dal's main platform was also hijacked. In one deft stroke, the congress government had thrown hot11 pro- Mandal and anti-Mandalites into confusion. Sliarad Yadav's threat to fight t o < ~ t l ~ and nail "fbr the remobal of all economic criteria" was reminiscent o f his nakedly eggrcssive call for a caste bar against those opposed to Mandal; it also clearly exposed his narrow sectarian interest. Yadav could not care less for the weaker sections 01 iociety; hi. worry was that the powerful Yadav community which he represents would find it Inore difficult to comer all the benefits since the genuine have notes wil l he g i ~ e n prefi:rence under the modified package (The Telegraph 27/9/91)

I i I>evilal ~regardcd as a rustic did not szern to have any chance o f making it to the post of f'rime Mit~ister. In fact. he himsell deprecated any talk o f such a possibility- at least in public l i ~ t t XIIII~. WII: else has chc8si.n lo don the inantle o f challenger to V.P. Singh. Chat~drax~Lhat [:ad $one on record it1 a widely published interview that he would like to :jet i l l to t11r I'titnc Mit~ist~:rs seat so .rs to be able to implement his ideas. The senior Janata Ilal leildel iitid t i ~ i ~ ~ ~ d u r president of tlic 01-iginal Janata Patty. whicli was bl-ietly in power, It;itl IIO~ c\l~tt.\re.l ~ u c h scntitncnts iti >\I explicit a fashion berole (Sahay: 1990 : 18)

I 4 The fact that 1)cvilal ha'd found a new ally in the Bahujan Samaj Party led by Kanshi Ram might also have added to the urgency to accept the Mandal report. The government's decisicln vias not only ~udden but also unilateral. I t did not wait for the responsc of the state governments to whom the report had earlier been referred. The whole process was sharply differeni frorn the typical consensus style o f V.P. Singh. (Burnran : 1990: 5. 35) .

I S V.P. Singh could not resist the temptation to use the Mandal Co~nmission Report as a political waaport without botherill:! about the long-term consequences o f succumbing to short tern1 political expediency. By one master stroke o f Mandal he planned to wean away the hacku,ard caste vote bank o f Devilal and to politically marginalise him. Secondly, he thought that this o ~ i e step would divide the Hindu vote bank o f the BJP and BC vote banks i :~f the Congrcss and they would be for his keeps. He was aware that there would be sonle opposit~uti. but was confident that no political party would be able to oppose hiin on this because o f political consideration (Patriot, New Delhi) 261 121 1990)

I t is pointed out that V.P Singh was looking for some controversy to divert attention f i o ~ n the Ram lanm;~bhoomi issue and take the heat o f f it. He also calculated, i t is said by oppoticnts. the ~tnnouncement o f the implementation o f the report would divide 1-lindus 011 C'r~ste lincc. and thus weaken the Hindutva concept o f the BSP. The BJP had c:ultivated a seclion o f the OBCs as its vote bank in the name o f Ram Janmabhoomi during the last general elections in November 1989. This announcement would weaken tlic RSP's electoral base and would make it less aggressive and finally V.P. Singh would be able to gamer the OBC vote (who anyway constitute more than 50% o f Indian lilectorate) and thus emerge as a strong force in his own right, in the Indian power structure i l e would then not have to depend on the support o f the BJP (Engineel. 1991 - 45.5101.

th If Devilal'. uhjt:ctive was to denrorrstrate that the "rural people" cared Inore for him than the V P Singh government. the Prime Minister on his part was anxious to take the wind out of the liaryana Patriarch's sail by showing how genuinely concerned he was aboi~t the interest o f the weaker sections and not so much about the affluent elements ofrur:11 society. The bulk o f the OBCs live in the rural areas, and such a bait thrown at them was expected to give V.P Singh a place in the hearts o f the rural voters.

Parity fot [ l ie ru:-al people had beeri 1)evilal's pet theme since the run up to the general elections i t 1 November 1989. t l e had been tirelessly articulating the slogan that the rural pcoplc inrust be given t h c i ~ due share in every field o f activity- from represelltattoll III parliament and htate legislature to the appointment of envoys overseas He alway:; carried in lhi3 pocket statistics about what the National Front (3overnrne11t l ~ a d already done for the benefit o f rural people, and claims fill1 credit for the allocntio~i of 50 pcrceilt ofthc litt~ds ill that year's budget for the rural areas.

The C)ev~l;~l prc:,crlptiu~~ for rural ttl>lili had struck the people's imagination. He built up a I I I~ \S I \C W)IC h:11ik by fo1.tir11~ i l t i allia~ice of Ahirs, Sats. Gijjars and Rajpi~ts ( ~ i ~ ~ i i ~ ~ i u ~ i l \ I c I C I ~ . L ' ~ 10 :IS the A.I(;;\I( alliance) in Haryana and Westel-n UP. None o f these c o ~ i i i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i t i c s cxept Aliir\ \\:I\ however recognized as a backward class in the

area but they werc ;jll :;old out on Llevilal's slogan o f a bigger share o f the caste cake for the rural peoplc Their cry has hecorne so strident that V.P. Singh faced the risk o f being accused 01' rci~cging on his promise if nothing concrete was done to show his governnicnr'i ionvern for the weaker sections.

But the Prirne V i r l~sre~ hoped to gain a lot of political mileage from the reservation's for OBCs who a c c < ~ r d i ~ ~ g to the Mandal Commission, constitute as much as 52 percent o f India's p o p ~ ~ l a t i o ~ ~ . (One immetliate gain was the dent in Devilal's AJGAR alliance. Ahirs, al l OBC wolrld no longer make colnmon cause with Jats, Gujjars and Rajputs. Yadavas. who together with Kurrn~s and Koeris constitute the largest segment o f tlie OBC population in Northern India, seem to have already lined themselves behind V.P. Singh.

The amb~valent 'tilrid of some o f Devilal's close Yadav proteges such as Sharad Yadav, Mulayarn Singh Yadav arrd Lallu Prasad Yadav in the controversy over Om Prakash Chautilla g.lvt: the irnpression that they were no longer beholden to the Haryanri patriarch. A l l these considerations must have weighed with the Prime Minister ar~d his political advisers hefore the decision to redeem the National Front's Pledge o t ~ t l ie i \ la l~r l : i l <:ornmission report was announced in Parliament (Chakravarthy 1990: 24-3h).

.lats incidentally did not figure in the backward classes list, and former Deputy Prirne Minister i kv i l a l had expressed h ~ j reservations about the Mandal report's suggestion of castc basrd quota. In his characteristic way, Devilal first suggested econo~nic criteria. tlicn the irlclusion o f Jats in the BC list and thereafterjob reservations for the rural peoplc. And l'ikxit would not have a different view (Roy: 1990:32)

17 - The ideoliig~cal ~upp'ort tur the mube to cultivate tlie backward classes was provided by Dr. l.oliia's ihesis brhich tried to create a new paradigm that sought to equate class conflict \+IIII cacte cilntradictio~i. I'rum 1967 onwards the backward castes have began to seriousl> challenge the higher citadels of power (Sachidananda: 1990:19)

After indeprndcncc. because o f abolition o f Zamindari and conferral o f ownership rights on various cillegorres o f tenants a new class o f peasant-proprietors were born. This led their aspiilng for political power, colntnensurate with their numerical strengtl~. Ueforc iO67, their resentment against the dominance o f Brahmin-Bania alliance in the ;orlgres:; was expressed by voting for independents and other small parties. 1)r Lohla \+as the first to realise the potential o f OBCs and advocated them as the best Incans 11) dislodge the congress. His theory seemed to be proved correct in 1967. whe~i t l ie co~rj~rcss was defeated in nine states resulting in the formation o f oppositio~i go~errir~~eii ts i n them [Patriot (New Delhi) 26/12/1990]

Chaudhar! ( ' l i n ra~~ >;inl:h left the congress and formed the Bharathiya Kranti Dal (BKL)) to I C ~ ~ ~ \ C I I I itg~arian interests. In his endeavour to forln an anti- congl-ess front, he wah wholc hcartedly supported by the middle class peasantry. Thus AJGAR was a co i~~~ te r t i> I l i r llralimin - SC - Muslim vote bank o f the congress. Under Charan Singh's \ t t ~ \ \ i ~ r d ~ / i ~ l ' I\.JGAR beci~i~ic a fot-midable political force, and coupled with other ~ I I I I - I I ~ f : ~ . it was re?,ponsible k)r the opposition victories i r i 1977 and 1989 (Iblcl!

Polit~cal n~obilization of' castes i t 1 lndia has undergone three phases. The first phase ended aIt11osl inil i i~diately after itidcpet~dcnce when the large scale ~nobilization o f the upper caste (elite or twice borti rxstes) was given a goodbye by the lndia National Congress in the wakr o f the rise o i hitherto neglected middle castes. The latter were largely peasant ur cultivating castes and represented the most a~norphous and ambiguous category. The secotld phase o f caste mobilization can be said to have ended when under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership decided to change its strategy in favour o f mobilization of the lower most stratum o f the caste hierarchy along with some other weaker scctions and the minorities like the Muslims (Kumar: 1990: 143,144).

18 For l l e l h ~ Ilnivers~ty, the action on the Mandal Commission Report had been a ticket for trouble. putting i t in the grip o f unprecedented anti- reservations fever. Within three weeks, the capital had seer1 demonstrations, torch-light processions, traffic disruptions and mass tloycott o f ,:lasses. And remarkably, the movement had been both apolitical and leaderless through well orchestrated.

The demonstration^ had been attetlded by increasing numbers o f students- the candle light proccssior~ at hlai~rice Nagar on the main campus on August 14 had as many as 3000 participants. 1:vcn tlie so-callcd elitist colleges, known for "keeping away from trouble". liad jumped iin the band.vagon. Also unprecedented is the support in the isolated south campus colleges of the ilniversity.

'The driving force of tl-ie movetilent has been the "Anti-Mandal Commission Forum (AMCF)" spearheading the show from i t s "Kranti Chowk Headquarters" at the Maurice Nagar intersection inside l lelhi University. Said an activist o f the Forum: "what i s remarkable abollt the movenicnt i s its spontaneity. Support has been forthcoming from the 111ost unexl)ected qttarters. iltiiversity sanitary staff many o f whom are belonging to the backward classes, are silpporting the stir. On Independence Day, one o f them unfurled tlie tri-colour at Kranti Chow k"

The peaceful agitat~onists had employed all methods o f protest to catch the publics imagination and to get their messagc act-oss- from making bonfires o f their degrees to polishing shoes and cleaning caa; around the prominent markets. They had gone around residential itreas begging t i ) fiind their lnovelnent and collected over Rs. 80,000.

Not surpri\ir~gl>, the ag~tation had tziken a heavy toll o f the students unions that dared to defy the popular sentiment. Ttic President and the general secretary of the unions o f both Jawaliaralal hehru Ilniversi1:f and the A l l lndia Institute o f Medical Sciences resigned in the wak<.- of tlie gericr;ll body's decision to throw in its lot with the agitating students

Bur tlic aghratloll tc)ol.: a violent turn OII August 24 when the police 11-ied to thwart an attempt h) ahou: 10000 students ta lilt-111 a chain around Parliament I-louse. The police fired ah0111 50 tearfa!; shells and rt:s~)lted to lathi charge at the Boat Club grounds in whic l~ 300 were inj11rr:d (Kalkuh-: lS'')O: 75)

I '1 At tllc O~,loher X I':itti,r r.rlly of tlic 1x0 ~rcservationists tlie tone and tenor o f Union labour Millister K;III~ Vi la i Pas\r:t~i ;n~d l'eutiles Minister Sllarad Yadav and Biliar

Cliief Minlster I.allu I'rasad Yadar, which virtually amounted to a call to take up arms. Consider. fix irlstance Pas\+an's call to the backward classes, the scheduled castes and the s~hcduled lribes alicl r l ~ c minorities to unite and fight for tlieir rights. "It i s not on11 a questii~l- ol'jobs", l ie :said. "The era o f Jagjivan Ram is over: now the era o f Paswin1 has l ~ e g t ~ t ~ " Sharad Yadav drove home the message even more forcefully: " Beware o l the R~II I Ralh Yatra rushing the Mandal Chariot .... You should be prepared, therefbre. to sacrifice a thousand lives to save one Muslim, life" and he declared: 'If onc ef'ligy of V.P. Singh i s burnt, we wil l get one lakh additional votes". A t another rally the fbllowing da). Sharad Yadav asked the audience to go back to the villages and crush t l ~ c people who "liave been oppressing you for centuries". Not to be outdone, l inion Mi11rstt:r o f state Subodh Kant Sahay warned that those who tried to stop the wheels o f change would be crushed under it. (Upadhyaya: 1990: 24-25)

'Three yeat-< hall hri11.1ght about a sea change in the views o f Ram Vilas Paswan on reservations for Harijans and other backward classes in the government services. Speaking 31 a rneeti~ig on 12 Decelnber 1987 in his capacity as Dalit Sena President and Janata Part!. le:rder in Benipatli. a Brahmin dominated area o f Madhubani district in north Rihar pleaded fbr amendment of the Constitution to end the present system o f reservatio~~ fi,r t l ie I (ar~jans and other Backward classes in the government services and replacing 11 b) right to work for everybody. Inaugurating the Dalit Sena conference of the Mithila region 3 years later he said that the reservation system had failed to achieve i t s purpose and had created social tensions in the country. Paswan said that despite colistitutional p~ovisions and related laws, the government at the centre and the state had failed to protect the interests o f the Harijans (Times o f India (New Delhi) 15,'Y/liV)0).

20 According to l<al i i Vilas Paswai~. "Tlie talk o f using the econolnic criterion i s r~onsensical ibr the simple reason that nearly 90 per cent o f the people below the poverty l ine i r i ilic ictuntry are thosc who belong to the BCs and the SC's and tribes. Some ha\e raised the issue of dlrharriiig from reservation BC families wliicll have risen economically. The question wil l arise only when the SC/ST and the backward classes arc able to fill their qilota. As i t is, in spite o f more than 40 years o f reservation for SCISl's, candidates uf this group are able to fill only 8 per cent o f their quota against the 23.5 per cent resel-ved for them. As and when the SCISTs and the backward i:lasses come close to li l l ing their quota, the question o f debarring those no longer poor can he taker up (Vyas: 1990: 27).

2 I Jagjivan Kaln spokr of the cripplitig psycl~ological effect when he said that permanent privileges 'would inake people rhliik that the SC community is a community o f incompetcrrl and interior people. C)tlrers \lave noted that Class-IV jobs the [nost that can be ezpected li.crni reservations wil l not lead to social emancipation. Finally o f course the malpractices that flow ti.o~n the "Brahmanisation" o f a select few defeat the ostensible purpose of refbrm. l ' \ r o evalnples wil l suffice, some years later after partition. tlir llarclinnd Siiigh con111iittee found that "influential SC bureaucrats and public mel~" ill Pull-lab liad brougl-it holdings incredibly cheap and then disposed off their lands ar exorhilallt prices to n<)n-sclieduled caste persons". Secondly tlie Tata Institute (11' ioci;ll \~:ienccs I-eport~xl t l ~ a t 1175% o f Tamil Nadu's BC people liad covered ;; \"/n 01. INIII pvctted post: aild 48.2% o f the gazetted posts to tlie detrilnent o f their c,l i te hrrtlirct~ ( I he Statesll:;li~. 2OI9/199 1 ).

22 What hegar1 as >tudents agitat~vn demanding the withdrawal o f the Mandal Com~nrssii)n report had degenerated into a movement o f the st~~dents by the political parties f l ~ r dislodging V.P. Singh. However, on October 2, the Bharathiya Kisan Union ( M U ) Supremu, Mahe~idra Singh Tikait, did in Delhi what V.P. Singh aitd all the law enhrcerncnt agencies ciluld not: with one stroke broke up the 57 day long agitation

The Boat club rally marked the cul~nination of the criminalisation o f the movement, a process which had beg,an soon after the second self imrnolatiorl attempt near the A l l lndia Institute o f Medical Sciences The orgy o f violence after the October 2 rally, which leli threc dead and over 20 injured, proved the proverbial last straw on the camel's hack. For apart from giving the rnovement a severe jolt, i t robbed the peaceful and democratic agitation o f all its credibility and lefi the Anti-Mandal Commission Forum (I'rMCF), which has been spearheading the movement in the north, in disarray

The last hlow to tliv Forum canie at the Boat Club rally. The inflamtnatory speech o f Tikait set the tone lor the proceedings. He exhorted the crowd to punish the people's representatives for 11i)t coming oul against the reservation policy. "First go back to your district\ and villages. Then ask your MP's and MLA's to resign. If they do not agree. d o u x them with Kerosene and set them ablaze", he bellowed.

The BKLI chief callrd fix the comh~~iation o f the students' youthful exuberance with his experience to usreah vengeance on the government and to decide the strategy for a long battle

The fact tc~naini that iuodlums and ariti-soci:il elements who had infiltrated the crowd had come \ r ~ t h the hole intention ol' causing violence. This was evident from the manner ill whicli the nrob after the rally, went around smashing window panes. Setting tire to water tankers, hijacking public and private vehicles and looting roadside kiosks.

But the students were quick to realric tlie mistake o f having allowed the Kisan leader to hijack tllcir inuvernent. And to mike amends, the activists o f the forum attended the funeral of the con:;tables killed ill the violence near lndia gate. The AMCF in a unique gesture. donated Rs. 1 1000 tm3 the family o f the deceased.

In their desperation lo forge wider all~ances, t l ie student leaders sought the assistance o f Tikait who. in ).he eyes o f many, epitomises also some o f the most repressive trends in rural socict\.. 115 oppo:;ition to thc blandal report does not stem from the fear that merit would beci)nic a cahualty or t h ; ~ liidian Nationalism would be fractured, but out o f the anger that J d s dc not quality for reservatio~is.

Wtiile 'likait led lio111 thc frot11: polit~cal parties and disgruntled Janata Dal leaders were playilly their roles l iom behind tlie screen. I t is alleged that former Deputy Prime Minister 1)evilal distributed 1ari.c s~rms o f money in the villages to keep the anti-reset-v:tt~oti flanle, alive. ?'here ;IIC siniilar alle~ations about his son Om Prakasli Chsutal;~.

Jats by their hundreds came from Bharatpur in Rajasthan, the constituency o f Vishwe~~dl-a Sil~gh WIIO resigned hi5 Lok Sabha seat in protest against the government decision. \:ishwe~~dra Singh a protege o f both Devilal and Tikait, had earlier been "conferred." thr. ma~itlc of the lcadcr of the agitation by the B K U supreme, a move which aroused considerable hostilit? among AMCF activists and other student groups. (Kalkur: 1990).

Murmurs 0 1 I'rotest in the Janata [)a1 on the report continued with both the pro and anti-Mandal sections equally ranged against each other. The general secretary o f the National I:ront Parliamentary Party in the Lok Sabha, Harmohan Dhawan, accused the Prime Minister o f taking a populist decision since the broad thrust o f its economic policies raised questions about the "very sincerity o f the Government". It's objection was not ti, the implementatic~n of the Mandal report but to its selective ~mplementation. Reforms to change "oppressive production" relations, reform o f the educational system and setting up of financial and technical institutions to help the backwards should travt. been on lop of tlie agenda of the government if it had the political \+ill to implement the Mandal Report. Dhawan wondered if the government had the guts I tdke on the el i te and the powerful national and multinational corporatio~ir. ' I t \vould have helped evolve more logical atid effective mechanisms tbr pursuing the essential purpose o f the uplift o f the socially, educationally and economicallj backward cornmunitics, the only caste o f the poor, irrespective of their religion and region"

Then thcrc were anti-Mandal voici:?, within the Janata Dal though not all o f them had a~ticulated their vicws in public. Prominent leaders o f the Janata Dal such as Chandrashchhar and Devilal had on more than one occasion favoured reservations on the basis of econo~nic criteria. Their statements to this effect immediately after V.P. Singh became Prime Minister caused serious embarrassment to the Janata Dal leadership cven as 311 anti-reservation movement started in the Hindi belt against the decision of the National Front to cx~cnd political reservations for the scheduled castes and scheduled I ' r ib t :~ for another ten years. Later, Devilal campaigned for the inclusio~~ , ) f l a t s . the community to which he belongs, in the l i s t o f backwards (Reddy: 1990:28)

I t has been opposed by Inany in the ruling Janata Dal itself, not to speak o f others, that without creating coriditions for educating the OBCs it was f ~ ~ t i l e offering them job quotas. F(lr in the ;~hsence of education there simply wi l l not be enough applicants except fro111 the uppel- crust OBCs ,who are backward only in name (Roy: 1990:28)

!4 l'hc refere~~cc pu~nt wab September 1990, when the virulent political backlash against Mandal in the nortllcrr~ belt pro~r~pted L.K. Advani into launching his infamous Rath Yatra to .A.i~)dh?a. With a certain l,olitical shrewdness Advani saw that one way o f composinp (he repcllel-~t antagor~isl~is Mandal had brought to the surface was to redirect t l ~ c energies ot'~.he supposedly seamless 'Hindu' society towards demolishing (or supplanting) a Muslim place of'worship in Ayodhya.

The Ma11d;ll ~ c r d ~ c t calne at a titili. \+,he11 the Hindutva forces were mobilising for n~iot l~er pl1:1<e o- i.,>nli-i>~~tatin~~ :1t i\!,idIiyl. and tlie gavel-nlnent was going through tile

p - ~ ~ ~ ~ --

motions olcounsellillg restraint. For a while the possibility seemed open that the renewed momentum1 o f Mandal niight overturn the Mandal bandwagon (Muralidharan: 1992: 17).

2 5 Even on ilrc questl<,n o f reservatio~~s while the Prime Minister has been saying again and again tllat thcre will be 110 dilution i r l the provision o f reservations, he has announccil so Inany exemptions. t irst he said reservations would not be applicable to the defencc sector. l'herl came tllc clarification that they would not be imposed on states and wo111d rrot be app1ic;lble to educational institutions. Finally, the Prime Minister said rt:servi~tions would not he applicable to promotions. (Reddy: 1990:32).

26 The choice o l Murha in Madhepura district as the starting point was significant. I t was in this village that Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal, author o f the report recommending reservation o f 27 percent reservation was born. And i t lies in that part of Bjhar &her=. t l ie hackward-Uallt alliance clicked electorally and won a base for Janata Dill. The klantlal Rath beyan winding i t s way through Bihar and parts o f Uttar Pradesh from August 5 to Septemher 7. Named Mandal yatra, i t was a last-ditched attenipt h\ thr Janata [)a1 to sell the [message o f social justice (Pande, S.K. 1992: 37).

The Janat;r i>al's c f f i ~ ~ t s to revicu the Marldal issue met with a lukewarm response. The public apirth! witnessed towards the Mandal Yatra taken out by Sharad Yadav from Madhepura ill Hihar to Delhi seerned to suggest that the issue o f reservations for the hacku;~rd clashes was not ionc to attract wide popular allegiance. V.P. Singh himself scrmed to recognize this reality when at a public meeting in Muzaffarnagar i n Western I J P . he put OIJI a guarded appeal to forget his party's espotlsal o f the Mandal cause and to lend strength to the patty in its fight against the BJP and Congress (I) (Muralidharan IY9:Z: 18)

The Ma11d;ll Yatra se'emed to lla\e sparked o f f quite a few other yatl-as. Congress leader N 1) 1'1w;rr1 had launched :I Vikas (development) Yatra. (Pande. 1992:38).

27 Yet thcre sceltied 11ttlc left in Malrdal as an issue o f mass mobilization after the 1991 elections Once 11ut of power. [lit Janata Dal went into a prolonged and agonized ritual ot 'xl fdestl- i~ct ion And the 13JP managed to keep up the religious fervour on the Mandir ~ssue-provoking one co~lfrontation after another with the institutions o f den~ocl-atic gover-i~alice in its crusade to restitute a supposed historic wrong to the 'Hindu' C'omniunity (Muralidharan: 1992: 18).

?X Long betore \'I' Sing11 consoliilatrd the OBCs to counter the Congress (I) last year, the experiment, led by Lohia Socialists, has been tried in 1967 and 1977-with success on botli occasions. But each t i l r le i t proved to be a flash in the pan and could not be consectlt~velv I-~plicatcd. This silggested sufficiently that the political and social univerbe \+as u idc enough to ;~dmit o f considerations othel- than a Inere caste cor~sol idat i~~r~ ( l . ro~ l~ l jne Septelnher 15-28, 1990: 28).

I'optlllsli~ can acquire a negative <llniension when: the idea o f social justice i s [reduced to politic;~l ,gini~nich and no ine;~l i~t igf i~ l redistribution o f resources and power actually rakcs p1;li.e: \uhe~l overblo\vli h~strionics becomes a substitute for well worked policies. ~\hcl? nicasiltes announct? are see11 as temporaly palliatives to gal-net- votes at times ~ol'clc.ctio~i i\ ith<.)i~t any I-C:II ~iitelltion to implement effective meacul-es: when the ititc~c\c\ $>I' i:\cii e r I S i ~ i i r y disadvantaged people i ~ r c overlooked

~~ ~-

consistclitl) and p~ilicies are desired to win over only those groups who have political clout; when the leadership lacks the ability to give creative direction to popular sc~itinient\. I f the leadership fall, lo changed the aspirations o f their vote banks or support hahe in a way that goes beyond were sylnptomatic redressal o f group, grievances tonards effecting a more viable and healthy social and political balance, populislrl can assuritl: very negatike overtones (Kishwar: 1991 :7 ) .

Democrat~c popullsrn lias a logic of its own. A populist idea, once it i s out in the open, feeds on itself b~i i lding up irito a cyclonic storm. Nobody can thwart it. Those who dare t i ] resist receive sevcre pllnishment. The only way to deal with it is to keep away and stoically accept the destruction i t causes in its wake. I t w i l l just wither away, when its fi~rq. is spent. India is not only the world's most populous democracy. It i s becoming increasingly and intensively populist. Populism has two kinds o f manifestations in India. One i s when a commanding leader resorts to populist causes to reorder the systclr~ and functioning of governance. In the process, the leader also enhances his hold over the people. The othcr is when a populist idea slips out o f the hands o f a leadcr who is not sul-e u lh i s or her own base. In this second instance, the leader i s not in a positic~n to contr8nl or mould mass sentiments in relation to tlie idea. 'The idea goes herscrk, acquires its o w n dynamics and goes on wreaking havoc on populaticin i s tiut alway!; undesirably. I t serves usefill purposes, when it is, by design, employed to destroy or radically change ossified an adjust social. political and cultural values, to bring do\vn oppressivc hegemonies and to bring about a positive change in the political nietru. Hut its destrllctive power is fonnidable when i t appeals to the basest instlocts o f mall,, whips up mass hysteria and Inass hatred and turns society around on to a regres:;ive course (News Time: 2/10/1991).

'?~rn~le~nel~t;rtl<,~~ 01 tll,; recommendation was not high on the National Front's agenda. I t i s metitlorled OIII? on page 27 o f the 36 page English version of its election manifesto as onr. o f the items in the chapter on "Social tasks". Much higher on the list i s thc cotntl~itlilcr~r t ~ i c~~nstitutioii;tl changes so as to include the right to work among the fundamerltal rights enshrined in the C:onstitution.

The right to work. <in the other hatld. finds mention on page 16 in the chapter on "Econom~c I'ashs" 1111dt:r a bold subheading. The Mandal comlnission report was surely not one cil'the most talked about campaign issues (Chakravarthy: 1990:24).

:u The colnin~s>ion gave it:; report in 1080. I t i s possible that some castes identified as backward 21 decade hack are no lo~lgcr so backward. We are broadly in favour o f the Mandal repol-t but think that criteri;~ o f poverty should be taken into consideration. This is precisel? whq we have said in our election manifesto that while tlie Mandal report shotlld be implt:ni<:nted the ccunomically backward in other classes not covered by the S(' . the S I ;and the OBC' should also be considered. This will give a compreht.ll$l\e ructilrlr and enable the government to carry the whole society with them. 7hc bra) ill \\.Iiich the Mandal ('urnmission decision has been thrust has created an impression alrlong ;I large numbt:r o f students and unemployed youth that after this they are likcl! l o hc disc$-itninated (acaitist) or deprived o f their rights. Tliis is a good case tnisllar~<iletl b? ;I had advocate

Our party IS deadl! upposed to any reservations on religious basis. We have already tasted eiiough hitter lessons in t l ie shape o f partition by adopting a policy o f appeasetilent of'mi~iorities.

After the S('!Sl' if chert: i s any casc for reservation i t should be on the economic basis. Application o f the economic criterion would ensure that the benefit o f reservations goes to the most deserving sect~ons. A survey under Antyodaya by the Himachal government has revealcd that 67 percent o f people below the poverty line belonged to either the S(11Sl' or t3HC. So t~lt in~ately even with the economic criterion the biggest beneficiar~es would be those very sections which the government wants to help. We are also clear that the overall reservations should not exceed 50 percent. (Reddy: 1990:29-30).

3 1 On all these Issues with the excepc.ion o f Mandal commission, there was an endeavour towards a consensus. Ironically, iio decision has sparked o f f such controversy as the irnplemer~tation o t t l ~ e Mandal co~nmission report. T i l l then the government had been adopting 21 procedut-e o f going ;ahead only with those (pieces of) legislations or decisions or1 which there was at least a consensus between the ruling party and the :jupp~>rtit~s parties. Ev'en on the Prasar Bharati Bi l l there were consultations t i l l the last day of i ts passage I t was inlperative on the part o f the Prime Minister to have waited for the opin~on o f the supporting parties.

'There u a h total confit>.ion on tlic issue. Even in the all party meeting, the Prime Minister c~lu ld not ci:!nvince everybody as the why such a hasty step was taken without taking otlicr political parties into confidence and creating a psychological atmosphere in which the Mnr1da.l commission recommendations could not have further complicated the matter.

As for the ilrgulncllt that the NF \ v : ~ only fulfilling i t s e lec t io~~ manifesto commitment, we would like to r r ~ n i r ~ d the Prinlr Minister that they could not get an absolute verdict in favour o f their own election inanifesto. The NF government is a minority government formed with the suppvrt of the BJP and the left parties. The second argument relating to consensus is not correct. There was broader consensus on the incl~~sion ol.the riglit to work as a fi~ndamental right. There i s no controversy on this issue. Why didn't tlie government fulfi l this promise first. Had the Prime Minister come out with hot11 the Mandal report and the right to work, there would have been no controversy. l lad tht: Prime Min~ster and his two cabinet colleagues adopted an attitude of recollciliation rather than confrontation the situatiotl could have been saved (Reddy: 1990:24)

? ? . ['he KSS ~eacted strotigl) to what i t considered an attempt to exacerbate the internal divisions of thc ' I l in~Ju Nation' The front page o f t l ie Organiser o f 26 August 1990, entitled "Kaja's ('aste Wztr", i s liiglrly revealing in this respect. V.P. Singh threatens to acl~ie\e it1 CIIIC year what the British could not do in their 150 years long alien rule (----). t l e \\anis I<, ulnrlo the great task o f uniting Hindu society from the days o f Vivekananda. l)i+?i111311d Saraswatli~. Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Hedgewar [---I what VI'. Sinsli thr-,>ugh M:i~idalisatior c > f tlie society intends to achieve i s a division of Hindus on lior\v;~i-ti. lhacli\vard and Harija~i lines (Organiser: 26 August 1990: 1) In fact, the 0 1 - g a 1 i i ~ 1 cl- i t~t~l:ci l the polic\ ~ , f reservation itself Tlic politics o f I-esel-vatio~~

~ ~~- ~ ~.~

moveIi!en\ tor sebcral months. In lune, when asked by the editor o f Panchajanya what would bc the attitude o f the BJP towards the VHP's Kar Seva, he had answered that the Ayodhya affair was likely to precipitate the greatest mass movement o f lndia's history (('ired in f3.J.p.'~ White Paper P:40) However, he admitted that the Mandal affair cre;~ted 21 favourz~blc context (tiindustan Times, 21 September 1990).

36 The BJP led g(~vernment has delivered with extreme alacrity on its campaign to confer the backward class status on the Jats o f Rajastan. I t was a demand that had loomed large over the election campaign. though it' s precise impact is still debatable.

Indicatioli, are that the f3JP had succeeded in winning over a large section o f the Jat cornmunit3 from their traditional allegiance to the Congress (I) by assuring them that the demand for backward class status would be met.

I t (RJP) had under corlsideration a report by the National Commission on Backward Classes (N(:H(:,) dating back to November 1997, which had recommended that the Jats o f Rajastha11 did (merit the benefits o f the special protections available under the Mandal (.'ommissic~n recommendations. This was one o f the many advisories submitted hv the NC:BC recommending the inclusion o f 372 distinct con~munities in Ihe HC' l i \ t 11ie political motivat~on behind accepting the recommendation on the Rajasthan .lath ;~lonc has becornc obvious. The pace o f the government deliberations could in each case he carefully calibrated to a calculation o f the political dividends that could be earned fiotn cultivating a particular community (Muralidhar: 1999: 95)

il Everybod? is asking us how being iommunisls we can support reservations on caste criteria. Our answcr is. in India caste i s a major factor and one can never overlook i t however iiiucli one 1n.q wish to do so. Theoretically we are not opposed to reser\'atiuns or1 economic criteria. But a glance at the composition and structure o f our adrninistrat~ve serbice reveals Iiow loaded tlie system is against the backward cornn i i~n i t~c~. Wc feel that upper caste domination in various echelons o f the adrnir~istration is a n~ajor cause o f the backwardness o f the various castes listed by the Mandal c o n ~ n ~ i s s i ~ ~ r ~ Ultimatel) [me can apply the economic test to determine backwardl~ess. 411 we say is that at least for the next ten years the criteria suggested by Mandal ('ommission should be adopted. Let us give the backward classes their due. Even :irnorlg the upper castes, ,jobs have been ~nonopolized by a section o f them but nobod? is talking of economic criteria there. Where is merit'? Children from upper castes pay capitation fee and get medical seats. Nobody talks o f merit there. The atgulllent t l ia t reservations undertn~ne efticie~ncy does not hold water if one looks at the experience in the south. Reserbations for BC have been in vogue there for decades now and pcrtlap:, some o f the southern states are better managed than their Northern c~u~l terpart \ Kcservations are certaii~ly not a total or even partial method to uplift the backward cl:~sses. I'hcy have to do i(,~nething else. (Reddy: 1990:28)

'"aste is a t~ra,or tactor though no1 h e only factor in determining reservations. The Constitutioli 11as pnividcd for rescr\ations to economically and socially backward categorie\ other than SC and ST'S. Tile basic pliilosopliy behind the principle is that i t was not e110~1gh to proride 1-eservatlo~i to S(' and ST and tlie list needs to be enlarged. People p~ict is~nl : ccrtnin occupntioi~~ l t i i ~ e te~i iai~led backward: they liave been victi lni ot h,ith w<)noinic and social oppression (Keddy: 1990 32).

~ ~ ~~~

from the state p~l ic~izs, especially the land refonns, mainly abolition o f landlordism and grecn revolutlntr. The vact~tutn created by Charan Singh's death was filled up by

the leadel-s hclc~ngiti:: to the tion-Jat peasant castes, mainly Yadavas. Leadership o f l'ikait s ~ l t f r e d lk lm caste dissensions and .hyper localism' (Singh; 1992 : 97-103). Thc epochal factr1r:i mow favours Yadavs more than Jats (Singh: 2001 : 29652-66).

1 ~h e SOLI~II . ,. so1idartl.y tisrged in tlic.: course o f Ayodhya tnove~iient was clearly frustrated by the controversy ovtr Mandal Mandal made visible existing divisions and tensions in Hindu si7ciety and expose the difticulties in forging Hindu unity. Why reinforcing alternative soc~al allegiances, Mandal was able to partially offset the pull o f a co~nposite unified liinduistn The problem was a particularly serious one for the BJP as the party had clearly made signiticani inroads among the OBCs in large parts o f the state and could not atrord to alienate them by opposing reservations. This process has been reinforced by the significant representations given tto the OBCs which in turn has contributed to the dilution ofbrahnianical o r e i~lt f induism. (Hassan; 1998 : 102, 103).

'' Reservatio~~s for 0 1 3 C ' s placed the HJP in a dilemma. The party formally supported Mandal rec<1nir1rendatic,ns. but at the local level it encouraged upper castes to oppose it. Its tn<,re effective retaliation was a renewed attention to the liberation o f Ram .lanrnahlioi~~iii ~etnple in Ayodhya which along could 'transcend class and caste barriers and fill-ce li intlu society to think and act as one'. (Organiser, I I October 1990). I lic i i c c ~ ~ i < ~ i i to launch ;3 Kath yatra to Ayodhya at this juncture rapidly changed t l ~ e politic;jl discourse ti-om reservation to Hindu nationalism and Hindu unity. F;1ir1) cluickly. cas7.e conflict turned into Hindu - Muslim polarisation followed by rioting in which Muslirns were the main victims. (Ibid 103).

1, A panrplilct ci!.ci~lalt~(l in Khurja dis~rict o f Wester U.P exhorted the upper castes to unite againit the divisive tactics of Mandal and govemment's concession to minorities which werr dehcrihed as singularly evploitative o f the upper castes (Choudhary Ameer Singh. "Sirrhar Kc. Suvarno ke virudh Shadyantra, Suvarna Hit Raksliak Dal, September 1090) The BJP accordingly assumed an overtly anti-Mandal stand in Westeni I I I ' but in castern U.P u:hcre Mandal was popular i t skirted tlie issue by focusing on the Ayodhya issue (Ibid)

44 BJP succeedecl in weaning away t l ie kurtnis. and Lodhs in central atid eastern U.P and secured thelr support by increasing their presence in the party. As part o f their strategy. i t save greater prominence to Kurnii and Lodh leaders, most conspicuously Vinay Kati)ur from l'aizabad and Kalyan Singh from Aligarh. The vertical divisions between Yadavs, Kurmis and Lodhs lielped the BJP to stave off the challenge posed by the cr~hesiol~ ol.hackward castes under Mandal platform. (Ibid.)

15 While t3rali1n111h arld Kajputs (Chict among the so-called' forward caste's) are estimated 10 consrittttr: only 16 pcrcent o f tl ie plains population and OBCs approximatel) 37 per cettt; in Uttarakliand. these figures are estimated at SO percent and 2.3 percciit. rcipccti,~ely. Furtl-ier tlie 013C population o f 2-3 percent is not distributed eq11;11ly over the hi l l arcn, Out i s concentrated in tlie terai areas o f Dehra Dun and Na i~ i~ ta l (iistr-ii.~s :Mawtlsle> 1996: 205)

10 T l ~ e iron? I\ tliat .t 15 c ia i ,~ lq in thesr t ~ i o areas - goveninient jobs and education are so important t c ~ IIIC liill pe<>lilc. 111 the ahscn~e o f nlmost any signific;r~~t .\econdar-y or tertiary

~-

sector eriiplyvlnrtrit h~call> other than in thc terai areas o f Dehra Dun and Nainital districts, goveninieiit IWSI!, pro.vi~le the bulk of salaried employment in the region and are therefore highly priied. In the \illages I workcd in, it was the goal o f every family to get at least one male rcl:~tt\c in[<, 11 pl\errirnent job. I'his may be one reason why education i s deemed to be so ilnpiulanl 111 111,: liili districts, ivhicli have a high level o f literacy compared to the plains. M~rrec~vt.r, tl ic geographical constraints o f the mountainous environment, together with the iloiirinant ~iicio-cultural pattern of small, relatively evenly-divided land holdings, has meiliil tliat t l ~ c agl-o-forestty or' the area generally provides only a subsistence livelihood. ilncler tl-I< increasing pressures o f population growth and environmental dcgradati<~ti. tiiigratii,n froin the l i i l l b has been growing, and migrant remittances play an esseritial role In the liill t:conomy (Ibid).

47 The demand lc~r :i separate hil l tare comprising Kumaon and Garhwal was first fonriall> propoicd r r t 1952 by P.(:. Joshi, the general secretary o f the Communist Party of India. urrd i t i or-igiris go back cven earlier. Conferences were held in Rarnnagar in 1966 and 1967 on tile subject o f administrative autonomy for the hi l l areas o f U.P and in 1968 ;I dmio~islration was held at the Delhi boat club. I n 1979 the Uttarakhand Kranti L);II ( IJKII) \+;I!; limned, and in 1981 and 1982 U K D representatives met [ndira Gandhi. rhe tticn prinie minister, But while the idea o f separate hi l l state had never beer1 11ripop11131 in t l ic region, neither as i t ever prompted mass support. However, thcrc ih e\ idcrice I~ I sriggest that [Ir is changed slowly, for example with the election o f an UK1)-M1.A f r ~ ~ i l r Pitliorgarh in 1980's and early 1990s. Rallies were organised in 1986 and 1087 ;it thc Kurnaon and Garhwal comtnissions respectively and in Septenihct 1987 .!ti 1,ttarakhand f3andh was called in the hills followed by a rally in Delhi in Y<~\cllrher 987. In 1'390 a U K D delegation met the Home minister and Prime Fvlitrister to pre:is their demands (Ibid, 206-07).

48 I'lic gr<t'*uig p<~olrl;li-i!j o f thc demand was also indicated by its inclusion in the n~alrifcst<~, \a r io r i~ ~iolit ical pal-ties like the BJP, Janata Dal, the Samajwadi Party (Sf') arid I3Sl' , r i i t l so on. (:)nly two mainstream parties have opposed the 'Urtaraktl;i~ldis' ilciiiands for their own Himalayan state-the CPI (M) and the Congress (I) l'hc pt~sitic~n of the Congress that the area needs 'more development, not more pol i t ic< so~nething that the :iuccessful implementation o f panchayat Raj would encourage ('onsrt.br's oppositic~n i s based on its traditional hostility to the re-working o f statc bortndarics and the creation of smaller federal units, fearing as i t does a pandnrn', box oi' s;irtiilar demands that might follow (or be revitalized) were Uttarakliand i<~ gain statehood. IJniquely, two UP state governments have passed r e s o l ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ i i i in ~;I\CILI I of a separatc state for the hills: the BJP in Apri l 1993 and tlie SP- BSP i.~)alrti<,ir i t , , 1'194. H~we.icr, both have been accused o f a lack o f genuine commirrlrcrlt I ~ I ilir cause by thcir detractors. I t is argued that the BJP resolution was a toke11 clfciri rria(lc i t - order to help retain support won during the Ayodhya incidents, i i r I t 1 1 I tat-l ing to \$.;itre. When the matter was brought to tlie Lok Sabha in 9 I ,>i ie t<.Ii' MP cliosr to be present and the matter was not taken up any furIl1t.1 ill>l<l 20':

4') 1 I 7 !'wI \ i>,liwanatli !\nand had been appointed Additional Chief' Secretary e\c lu\~\c l? 111 , I I I I ~ C or t l i~ id i i~ in ist rar ive and financial affairs of the regiori. Moves ucrc .:I.,. : L ,.et irp a icparate Hil l cadre ill departmenc dealing with hi l l dcp;~rtiirct~I t K:II,I:I~ I i:,llria: I OC)4 126)

:,o The direct ~~i\oI\errir:nt 01' the 1 K1) intensitied the agitation; the party had been identified with t l i v rc~io l i i i l aspirations (11' the people since 1979. On August 2, 1994 the Dal i]rgani/cti i l r i indefinite Elst at the collectorate at Paurli Garhwal, which i~icluded ~IIIIII~IICIII icaders such ;I> [he 02-year-old Ratnamani Bhan and lnder~nani Badoni (Ihiil 1/71 'I lie) listed theii rliret. ~ i ia in aims as: (I) to have the whole hi l l area excluded froin [ l i e 127 per cent reservations fol- backward category (2) to ensure the strict implciiientati(~~i (IS an (often-p~~inised) hi l l cadre; and (3) to protest against the parameters 1;)r t l lc ciclimitation o f the r i eb panchayats in the hills. The reasoning was that 3 l i e u state \\.ould lie free to sc.t i t s owTn OBC quotas, and caste lists o f those who were eligible. P~:rhali:; Inore import;~ntly. ,not only would reservation quotas be more sensibly calct~lated. h1.11 host o f othlsr benefits would follow-mainly because a separate state would allom development policy to be designed, planned and administered for and uithrii tl ie liills. 'Tlicir arrest by tlrc police triggered massive protests i n the hills, and it was ;it abt~ut chis point that the nature of the agitations shifted, with the issue o f reservations beconiilig :subsumed beneath the powerful demand for statehood that swept through (iarh\val and Kumaori. On September 1 , 1994 in Khatima (Nainital), and Septemher 2. 1994 in Mussc'uri (Dehra Dun) the police killed seven and six demonstrators rcspecti\cly. These t u o incidents proved critical as the imovement blew up into ;ill <>per1 corlfrnntation with the state apparatus (Mawdsley: 1996: 206)

i 1 Accordirig ill \t~~derit leaders in Ki:,liikcsli, the applications for the courses themselves indicated tht. danger r!f an "inva>,ion fioin the plains". Dhirendra Joshi, a student activist, told frontline tliat more tliaii 1400 applications had come from the plains in the Govcrnmeni Degree College, 1)ehradun. "In the absence o f a sizable OBC population i r r tht: hills nearly one thil-d of the 2000 seats would have been cornered by the plain, pet>ple. thus denying t l ie hi l l people an opportunity to pursue higher educatioii r b e i i 1 1 t l r ~ i l ow11 area" .loshi said. The U K D leadership said not only were collcgc ad~i~iision:; affected b? t l ie reservation policy, appointments to 25000 vacancie\ in 52 I lill ilevelopment departments that employ some 75 000 people would also be clo~ni~ratcd lhy ,'o~ltsiders' l'lie) said the government's reservation policy would ensiirc tli;rt iic;lrl) 750 jobs 1,rcnt to thc plains people. The policy would lead to a stream i l t j o b seekers making fa tlie hills, and result in a significant shift in the demographic balancc ofthe area. the lJKD said. (Ramakrishnan: 1994 : 127)

" I The events o f (~ctohcr I!. 1994 at Muzaffarnagar, when a couple o f 100 buses were stoppcd o n their \ ia) to a rally in L>clIii, have become the most notorious so far. A CBI investigatiorl f ~ ~ t i n d that as many a:; I 9 llnarakhandis died in the firing that followed, seven \\oniell \\ere raped and 17 o111e1-s were molested. The stopping o f the buses itself wa!. o f debatable It:gality, ancl \ubsequent attempts by the state administration to play down the iriciderrt were st.t.11 hy lnany hi l l people as further proof o f their complicity in t h i ~ hrutal incident (blawdsley: 1996: 206).

~ :, ~ 7 Representi~tivc\ 111 111,: local medi:, .irgued that this quota (Mandal - 27%), cliibbed with 23 pcl- ccnl rc:.ci.;atiorls liji t l ie xheduled caste-scheduled tribe population, would reduce the opl~c81-tunitic l i)r the niimerically larger but socially and econo~liicall! bachu;rrcl ~ippci .I.i\scs in the hills, and requested that tlie impleine~rtatioii ,t'tlic ?7 pcrceilt CI I IWI :~ he re\,ie\~ed. The Chief Minister retolted that a

I n a t t l r ~ i r c~ i i i ~ i~ ied j ) i ~ i t ,f I ' I' ;ill the la\vs and rules o f the state would apply cqt~;rll? ti, tliew ~iistricts I . I l > re \ i men walked out o f the press conference iii

-- ~~~ --

protest (I<;iinahri\hna~': 1094. 1'7). Mulayam Singh claimed that "as far as educational iils.ltutii~n\ are conceliicd the) (the hil l people) already have reservations in the iirit~tuti<,irs 111 !he plains: 4 percent in engineering colleges and 6 percent in medical ct)llcgc.\. Iri tll,: vocatii)nal institutions in the hills, such as the polytechnics, they havc S O percent rcservatioi~. I suppose this is fair enough. Right now, the goverrinieirt I\ williirg to grant 2 pcr cent inore reservations for the hil l people in all govt Job>. 11-rejpectivr of hills-plains differences. This is apart from 10 percent reservatioii 01 r i ic ecoi~oniically bsckward arnong upper castes". (Ibid: 128) Mulayam Singh bra> targuccl a!, responsibic lor their predicament, and has been particularly vilified bince hv had rnade certairl disparaging and offensive comments about the hi l l people (he is rc:ported to have said that he had no need o f the hil l people and that unless 'the) ac~ed reasonably' this they would be thrown out o f the plains). (India Today, Oct 15 1993) (Clawdsley: 1996: 207) Vinod Barthwal the national secretary o f the Sarnajwadi parry, publicity statcd, "the on-going agitation in the hills was not for llnarakharid state hut w;ts an agitation sponsored by the forces who do not want equality in soclet)~~. I-le went olr to claim, "this agitation is proudly against reservatio~is" (I4i1iiachal Times, Sept l I, 1994).

54 At 110 t i l i re wcrc c:aste and regional tensions engineered more clearly than on Septemher 1 3 . 1904. wllen a state wide bandh in support o f reservation was called by the littar I'l-;~desh giverrlnient itselll Everything in the hills remained obdurately open- in some places Sor longei than usual hours- and discounts were offered on goods by shop keepers. A \ t l i e iiiajority o f ti le population were in favour o f this act o f defiance, no trouble h l loued In the plains too the Bandh did not go uncontested. Anticipating violence. upper cartc traders in di:stricts like Gorakhpur and Kanpur announced that their trader'i ;r~soci;ition:; would repair shopping establishments damaged by pro- reservatioiiict dcrn(~n:;t~-;ito~-s if they were kept open on the 13th. In Lucknow cash rewards were ofkred to anybody who worked to prevent the success o f the bandh. The very call f i r the p1-11-I-essrvation B;tndh had aggravated caste sensibilities all over the state, and the upper i:;~sres in tlie plains had started perceiving the Uttarakhand agitation-vvtlich wa\ more an expreshion o f regional and developmental aspirations-as an extensi<~li i,lilicir i w n struggle against casteism. One o f the most widely criticised features LII the state handli concerned the involvement o f the police who in same places actliall) sidc(l with the pril-r8sst.rvationist demonstrators and helped to force the closure o l shiips ittempting to defy tlie bandh (or allowed pro-resewationist denionstrators to do \ < > ilnhindered. iritilnidating any opposition). The C P I (ML) said that the handh de~iioristratcd 'the ~1nprei:rdented use o f state machinery in open collusion with the lu~npen:,. hc.lortgirrg to the iruling combine" (Cited in Mawdsley: 1996:208).

The most iie,plcat~lc iicident took place in Allahabad where a bid by pro-bandh activists t o Ipievciit l;i\v\.~~rs froin appearing in courts led by pro-bandh activists led to a frcc li)r all. \ r l i ic l i ;livead cverr to the Chief Justices Chamber. The police, a section of which Ii:1(1 operil! aligned thciirsclves with supporters o f the bandh, was found u'anting III L IIIIII<,IIIII:L r i l e ;ituatioii , c i n~ucli so that the chiefjustice souglit tlie help o f the ,\rm? riliouj!h t i l l : Supreme ('olirl Chief Justice. The central govt. immediately deployed rli~. ,II~II?. C I I [ I I I ~ the cl~ao:i (Karnakrishnan: 1994: 1 I)

~. > T A call 1;)i .I i . ) , i ~ i i i ' ~ I',ii~[lli was ~ I \ L . I I by the USS tlie iinibi-ella organisation o f vat-ious

o t i t ~ i t l I I i ~ r o i i : ~ With this the hills regressed to tlrc situation inarhed h\ r.,r.iI . i i > i~ i~ lw ~ ~ I ' ~ o \ e i ~ r ~ ~ r c i r t a l activity (Ramakrishnan: 1994: 0)

v, At preseri! &1111? ilic i s VII-A's f i o ~ ~ i the hill districts belongs to the Sa~najwadi party o f the rest, I hcl<,~lgs 10 ilit: H.11'. one ib i~ldcjxnder~t and the Congress (I), the Janata Dal and the lJKD ha\< imc cacli All tbur MPs of the rc~ ion belongs to the BJP. Thus were a separate state crealcil MLI~;I!:III.I Sit~gh wol~ld l o x I8 ~r~e~libers o f the opposition in an asse~nbly o f 425. strenptl~ening 111. po:iitii~n agai~ist the opposition parties, as well as securing more roo111 lo rnanoelli.r-c with hi\ co;ilition partners (Mawdsley : 1996: 208)

57 'The (Jtta~ I'rade\l~ ('(ingress i ~ i i t t e e (IJPCC) executive passed a unanimous resolution that the ( ongt-r:ss support tbr the ruling coalition should be withdrawn. and added a rcquc.;t to 111c central govcriiment that they go further and invoke Article 356 lo dismiss the p,o\erllnl.:nt. If support were not withdrawn, Tiwari warned, he would resign. By taklr~g this htand Tiwari \&anted to stop the drift o f the forward castes to the BJP as uel l as henelit fi-om the ncln Yadav backward and dalit votes that could accrue to Co~ig~-c\ \ ( I ) , I ,I rcsult o f the ailti-Yadav backlash and low and order situation in the state. (Ibid)

58 . The (:ongre\s ct~uld not afford to bc labelled as an 'upper-caste' party for supporting Tiwari arld di:;rnisvirig a pro-backward government. The view amongst Rao's supporters was thar the dismissal o f Mulayam Singh's government would send the wrong message to roterr;, partic~llarly in the two states o f Kamataka and Andhl-a Pradesh. I of t i 1 were go i~ ig to the polls "......the dismissal o f the State governmeill. or evctl the \r,ithdra\r:nl o f support could earn Congress (I) the tag o f a brahmanical part?. ><~l~ieth ing not \cry desirable when about ten states are scheduled to go to tht. poll, betuccri Novembe~ and March next" (Ibid.)

59 l i e (Lalloo) arglin II~;II tlie apex (.'kurt in its judgement on the Mandal Commission l iepo~t II;I(I iiccl.~rc(l tlie job reservation sclie~rie on the basis o f economic backwardr~ex and gcnde~ 'unconstitutional'. The court has upheld reservation in jobs only 011 " ~ h c b ;~s~\ i~l ' i~,cial and educational backwardness " as per the provisions o f the constiln~~on. llcnct:. lie reasoils coritinuing job reservation on the basis o f economic lhack\rarcli~es~.. in the state was tantamount to a violation o f the judgement given by the liighc\i c~ul-r o f the I;III~ on the Mandal Report. However, he suggests that the ('cntral go\,crnment should thing about an amendment to the Constitution if it was willing io C,\ICII(I t l ~ e job resc~rv i i~ i~n facilities for the poor among the upper castes (Choudhal? I993 I 4 0 )

60 iagannatli Vishr:i. I I :I telegram to the I'rime Minister said: "Your sudden decision to implen~ent ilie R4:i11;lal ( ' c *mmiss i~~ i Report has sent shock waves in the country and in 13ihar partlctilarly I he reaction ha:; heen sharp and violent. This decision, whether you agree or niit. n c r d ;I lh<:rr)ugh reappraisal". (Upadhyaya: 1990:30)

61 h a i s I I ,t:lic ill \vhicli !tic affluent Bania (trading community) is listed as back\\ard \tale i lc.i l i l~ n ~ l d Pal-11;incntary Afrairs Minister Raghunatli Jha conceded that in l l i l i , ~ ~ i . i i . 7 ' 1118. Rirlah ,:oiil(l avail theinselves o f the facilities and job opportutiil~c\ ol.'c~i tile hackuard castes. The Chief Minister. however, denied that Maru';~ri\ \i~,n. I l \ ~ c i i i i i l ~ o ~ i ~ R ( - i 111 ljiliar.

t3iliai- A\\c~llIii! >i '~.:ht:r (;hula~ii i;;ii\i.ar. a leader of Muslims and pl-ohably the most s e s ~ i e i I I 111.: lcadc~ i l l lhe State .lanata Dal, did not rule out genuine

~~ ~~ - -- -~ ~

dit'ferenic\ o n tlic Mt~ndal conilrii\sioii recommendations. "To be frank, I too have some rc\c~v;itions ;ab(~ut it. T11ei.c i s liolle 111 the CoLlnty, not to speak o f political parties \rli(> wr>uld say that the ul~dcrprivileged should not be given an opportunity to develop I do not think that the hli~lrdai cv~n~nission is the last word on the subject and I wc~uld certainly like ;I iiational del~atc. on the issue taking into account the economic criteriol~ tilr dctertntning backwardness". Sarwar said, as for Muslims , he wanted the entire colrununity K\ be listed as hnrkward (Upadhyaya : 1990: 30)

62 Yadziv groups itopped the No. 4 I'utna - Gays train near the Parsa station and singled out nien~hcrs o f the tiirward castes Llr attack. But what took the cake was the violence let loose hy Yadavas on Brahmin:; 111 Madhepura district and villages in North Bihar. The) lilnt attacked the house o r the public prosecutor, Amarendra Kumar Mishra, who a l o ~ ~ x wit11 his farnily mernheii was beaten up. Then they singled out Brahmin t~ousuh~~ l~ l \ . inc;ludir~g lawyers. ~lc~ctors, anti teachers, for attack, beating up and looting reidents. They raided at le:rsl 50 houses, besides shops, and looted cash and valuables worth 60 lakhs. To cap il all. they pushed the Superintendent o f Police o f Madliepur;~. Rhavesll Thakur, a l31ah1nin under the car o f the District Magistrate, Rajesh (iulxa, ; ~ t the helipad in tk~c presence of the visiting Revenue Minister, Ram Hilas Singh (also a Yadava). Both his legs were crushed.

Accordiilg ((1 Sagannath hilishra, l.c;~dcr of the Opposition in the assembly at least 20 Brahmili I10~1st.s were iuoled in i.;iuhaha village while Brahmins in Saur village were beatell up :llid lc~oted In panic, nun) Brahmitis have taken shelter across the border in Nepal and in neighbouring district< of Saharasa and Purnea which too have been sucked into the whirlpo(:ml of viol en^:^ (Ilpadhyaya: 1990: 26-27)

(11 Jagan~tatli M~shra critici:ied the has[) appl-oval o f the ordinance by the state cabinet on the ground thar the verdict o f the Supreme Court regarding the Mandal report had not been widel? deb:ited bet. He held t t ~ ; ~ t the amendment o f the Karpoori Thakur formula on rexr\at io l~s wah "untimely, ii.r;irional and against the verdict o f the Supreme Court". I l e disparaged the Chief Minister for playing games with the MBCs and womcii oil iswe of reservations. '1-lic new fortnula he held were against the views o f Ram Manohar ILohia who stood for special investment for wolnen o f all castes. In addition, lie argued that the M a ~ ~ ( l ; i l C'o~nlnission recommendations were for the central services. Tlic ChieCMinistrr 111 his opinion i s playing into the hands of "haves" arnong the hackward castes and ha: done nothing for the depressed and most MBCs. Moreover the Hihar Pradesh Congreis Committee (BPCC - I) vehemently criticised the state guvr. for 'discriminating' against the wolnen and resolved to oppose the striking d o w ~ ~ o f i percent reservatioli in government jobs for the women belonging to all castes i(~'houdary : 1993 : 1 147.)

64 According t c i the Scn~ot. .lanata 11':1I iA.jith Group) leader Ram Sunder Das, the Karpdori 'lhakur scliemc was "IIIOI-c :.iientific and justifiable" in compariso~~ with the Maiid;il ( ' i> r r~n~i \> io i~ tepofl in thc p i~ ,wr i l siti~ation as it had job quotas for the poor among the upper iaste:; elid also 611 i\tllneii. He clarified that neither he nor his patty was ag:iin>t lhc Mantl;~l rt:port. I t o \ \ ~ . \ ~ ~ r . rile stele govt had no right to implement the Matidal I ~ S I r e \ r i l l i t> l~ l co~islitutitig a commission to categorise the backward castes ;,iiil ic i r~ i t i t j . i i s ;:c t l i ~ , directive o f the Supreme Court for the purpose <!I' e\clttsit~n. ',.ream? I;I\LI' ;Inii)ng the backwards (Hindustan Times. Fehruar! I . 10'); I

65 The Starc I'reiidrnt. the secretary and the general secretary o f the party, Ajith Kumar Mel~ta. l i ;~~c~~<l ra t ia rh Prasad and Kamsahal Singlr reiterated their total cotnrnitment to the Ma~i(laI ('(~~nmi:;sion Reporl, l h e y asserted that the Karpoori formula was titled in favour i l l tlic ulpper cirstcs. (Hindurtan litnes. (Patna) Feb 27, 1993)

66 In Ic)9(l. the reservation policy conlnrversy was an issue o f secondary importance during the election campaign in M.P. V.P. Singh's announcement about the Mandal Cornmi\\ic~n Kcport l i i led to provide a ~nobilisation o f the OBCs from which the BJP might 11:ilc suffered electorally. I ' i~r one 1hing the Janata Dal was weak (it did not win a single ic;~t in 190 I); for another, the OBCs had little tradition o f organisation, except in cer ta i~~ l)i,rdcr districts where such intluences had spread from UP Undoubtedly, their fragrncntatic,n stunted feeling. of caste solidarity. In 193 1, with the exception o f the Alin\ (or Yadavas) in Chattisgarh and Vindhya Pradesh, none o f the BCs represented more t l i a ~ ~ 5'%, 01' tht: populatic~~~ of ally four sub regions o f Madhya Pradesh. Accordiiiply. in 1084 this state had the lnuest proportion o f MPs from the BCs o f any state in lrldia namely 5% (Frankel. F and Rao M.S : 1990: 423).

An OHC \ole was irbsei\.able onl) 111 some northern districts adjacent to Uttar Pradesh where in l O V 1 the Hahijan Sama-i I'nrty won one seat in Rewa. However, even in this area, the I<JP tended to developed pockets o f influence among the backward castes. 'This LV;I\ :tcliicved hy e:itablishing a 'Kise~h Morcha" (Peasants Front) and 'Pichre Varg Morcha' ( 1 n!nt o f t l ie RC). The lattcr was set up under the chairmanship o f Babulal Rharnp~~r. :I rnemher of the Kusha.ih;~lia jati. l i c once worked in a Bhopal textile mi l l and jc)iricd the K.S.? in 1946 and thcn the Jana Sangh in 1952. He was also the co- fbundcr 111, the Rharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) (Interview with Babulal Bharnpur, 13 Nove~nhet 1990. Bhopal) a strategj that was to prove electorally successful in the nonliem ilishriz~ of the state. Besides I!ma Bharathi (a l.odlii active in the state BJP Kisan M<!rclia o f which she was thc Vice President) who was re-elected as the MP for Khajoraho. K.K. Kuhurnariya- a Kurtni and fomier Jana Sanghi from Da~iloh who was Presidctii ol'ilhc Kisan Morcha-was elc~tetl M.P for Damoh in 1991 ("Parliament of India, Tenth l ~ k Sahha who's who" : 377. I

b l In latc 1091. r l ~ e Sahu (Sahu's are oil pressers, they represent 4.2% o f the states populatio~l ai.cordiny ti:, the 193 1 ccnsus) Samaj o f Bhopal district held a convention at which tlie I li i ior~ Minister o f state f t x Finance, S. Potolukhe, declared that the Sahu Samaj w;15 iii favour of the full i~.~iplementati~>n of the Mandal Comnlission Report (National Mail. 23 Ikcernber 1001 1 In carly 1992, the 9"' Annual Conference o f Raipur district Sahu Sangh was inaugurated h) the Minister o f state for co-operation, Kriparam 5ahu and he declared that the number of MPs and MLA's from the communit> sl~ould hr increased (National Mail 5 January 1992). Besides the Sahus, tlie Kurm~s ;I pt:asailt Caste representing 2.6% o f tlie states population - also became better organiicd in c;irl:\ 1990's. c\pccially during election campaigns. In November 1093, the hur~n ih o l lli)shangah;~~l ~li\,ision held a big convention and pressed for candidates lion^ their c<~inmunii> io I I C given due priority in the allocation o f tickets (National Mail I 0 No\e~riber 19931.

6S It i s s i t i i l i ~ ~ t I I i g a r d t11;it 51;i Ram Kesari. the l in ion Minister for Welfare who had ;~l!lienlcJ 1,) ! l ie Sul)~eir~c I t i ~ r a decision in favour o f Mandal Cotiirntsc~,~,~ Kcpir11 \\;I\ i ~ ~ \ i t c d . . l r ~ \ : i 5 \ ill M;idlhya P~adesl~ (see for instance, this

speech ill Owaiior \ l i~nes o f India. 27 Sept 1993). He came to Bhopal in early October f;>r two day seminar on 'L~bcration' and 'Rehabilitation o f Scavengers'. He then po~lited <lut that. "the Uniori ( i i~vt 's decision to give 27% reservation for socially bachwai~ci cl;issci was yet another hint o f revolution taking place in the country for socialj l~st~zc (Natinlial lMail 3 Octnhcr. 1993)

'" Maliajari (o~nmission was named altcr Ramji Mahajan a former state minister who in 1981 had been askcd by Arjun Singh (iovt to identify the needs o f the OBCs in the state. Miulhy;~ Pradcsh was then tthc only large state apart from West Bengal, which liad never prep;tre<l ;I list o f OBCs or taken any separate action for their upliftment (sic) (Rcport o f thc H(:!; (lommission, New Delhi: Govt. o f lndia 1980, First Part: 1 I ) 'The Mahajan Report had been subniined in 1983. It identified 800 BCs (o f which 24 were Muslinrs): that together represented 48.08% the states population. The report recornmcnded the re\ervation o f 3:5"% o f posts in the state administration for the OBCs (Madhya I'radesh Kz!iy.l Picchra Varg Ayog - Antim Prativedan : Bhopal : Govt o f Madhya Pradesh 8 I ) . The Arjun Singh govt. had implemented one recommendation for 1111: provisioll o f quotas for OBCs in technical Colleges and for the granting o f ichislarships but the fbrmer decision was contested in the courts which issued a stay order (Interview with K . Mahajan, 19 February 1994 Bhopal as quoted in Jeffrelot: 1996: 4 I5 1.

'" In latc I')'J2. M;iliiga~i challenged I'atwa to a l l open debate on his report (Statesman, (Delhi) I . LIecemhci- 1092). During the 1993 election campaign, Madhav Rao Sindia and Arjuti Singh dcrnarrded its implelnentstiori and the Congress (I) took full credit for havirrg given effect to the Mandal Repoit. The party thus made a deliberate appeal to lower castc supporl. This was an astute move. First, there was no strong opponent projecti~~g ;I s i i tlnage: the JLI was weaker in Madhya Pradesh, than in the adjoining Il in<ii belt and the BSP \was still relatively unknown there. Second, although OBCs were lehs i>rganised in Medliya Pradesh than in Bihar or U.P, their level o f pol i t i~al a\*arenc.;h liad risen i r i the wake o f Mandal affair (Hindustan Times, 4 November 1993).

7 I The Cor~gress ( I ) included in its list o f candidates a record number o f tickets (70) for member5 olthc O t i ( : s and SC ancl ST were given their due share respectively - 74 and 45 tickets Hrah~ninr; were allotted 55, Rajputs 37, Baniyas 22 and Kayasthas 4. Candidates from t l ~ e minority ci~~nmunitier - Muslims, Christians and Sikhs -

numbered 13 (Hiridustan Times 4 November, 1993). During the campaign Arjun Sirlgh let i t be krlorvrt that, were the Congress (I) to win power again, i t would not appo~nl a11 uppt:r caste Chief Minister (limes o f India, 26 October 1993).

'l'lie fi.ll'. I i~~wevct r~onlinated a1111ost as many OBC candidates as the Congress (I) in 1993. 01t l ie candidates whose c:rte or tribe or community can be identified, besides 44 SC' and 73 ST. we lind 53 Bral-rn~iris. 27 Rajputs, 33 Baniyas, I I Jains, 2 Khattris, 3 Kay;tstli\ ? Sats-con\idered as hachwards ill t l ie Mahajan Report - I, Maratha, 1 Muslim aild 65 ORCs (Jeffrelot : 1096 : 415.)

'' The l\.Ll' did 11ot prcscnt its <)B(~' i~onii~ices a s backward caste leaders. This was due (arsely t t , I lir~clu iii~l:ioi~alist ideol~py: ti le i~i\istei~ce of the RSS and its offshoots on t l ie dc.~t;~l>ilit? 1 ' c m p l i a s i ~ i ~ i ~ . llic l l i ~ i c i i ~ seiise o f helo~~ging to an organic c o ~ ~ i i i i ~ ~ ~ i ~ \ l l i c ' l l i i d i i Natiol~' (I<:~\litr~il 1;11her tIia11 to pa17ic11I:rr castes. Second,

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niany l i ~ caste H.11' meinbers ho\c joined the Hindu nationalist movement under the logic ofsanskriti\a~io~i \whereby '[hey seek to emulate high caste patterns o f behaviour rather than shoui~ip pride in rhcir low origins. According to Ulna Bharthi thc acceptance (~ tsuc l i a r t otitlook has siven the ORCs ofthe BJP, a 'Brahmin's !mentality' ( I n t e r v ~ ~ , ~ . with l1111;i 13harati I 6 Fcli I994 as quoted in Jefferlot: 1996: 415).

Indeed. tntcr\ieu., with the RJI ' leaders from OBC revealed a certain reluctance to present ttiemselvc\ as low caste lcaders. Babulal Gaur said he was an Ahir and not a Yadav. the tertn otteii used by the most politically conscious members o f this caste in Hindi belt. tie al:io srressed rile special relationship that this caste o f herdsmen entertairied with Krishna-the cowherd deity-whereas Vaishnavaite folklore is not valued hb the politically conscious 'Yadav'. Another RJP leader from a low caste, Bherulal Patidar (M1.A from hlliow and Panehayat Minister in Patwa government) was reluctant to admit that he was a Kurmi: he preferred to present himself as a Patel, a name lie aqsociatetl with Grijarat's dominant caste (Interview with Bherulal Patidar, Bhopal. 17 Iebrr~ap 1094 as quoted in Jefforlot: 1996: 4 15).

In fact. HJP leaders from the lo\v caste attract little support from voters of the same social milieii. Whilc the propcriion o f OBC candidates fielded by the BJP for the assenihly elections increased. the proportion of the Party's MLA's froin these castes fell froni 77 2% in 1985 to 18.4°/0 in 1993. Simultaneously, the share o f upper caste M I A ' s was increasii~g slightly ;it 36.8%.

l'hc Bll' in Madlij';~ Pradesir I-emained identified with the upper castes because the latter rctainrd a tight hold on thc party apparatus both at the local and state levels. I n 1990 out o f 39 pi-esidents o f l3JI' district units, 27 belonged to the upper castes, 9 to thc ORCs and olie to the scheduled tribes. The over representation o f the upper castes i s eveti inore significant at the state level since, in 199 1-93 out o f 100 members o f the states cxecutive 60 were from tlie upper castes and only 13 from the OBCs (National Mail. 6 July 1901).

:'? Ihe 1093 electinn results prompted the BJP leaders to promote a large number of ORC's in thc party apparatus. 111 Madhya Pradesh six ofthe fifteen senior positions in the 13.11' state csecntive went to inembers of the OBCs, the other places going to two Hrahmins. one Kayastlia onc lac, rather than the outgoing Chief Minister, Sunder Lal Patwa and Varriia thus becarnt. leader o f the opposition in legislative assembly. I t also appoirited €labul;il (iaur, and Ali ir as i t s Chief Whip and nominated Bherulal Patidar, a l iur~irl. as its candidate for the post Deputy Speaker o f the assembly (he was duly clectcd to the po'jt). ,4t the National level, Urna Bharat (a Lodh) was asked to head the Ijharaiiya Janata Yuva Morclia. the Party's youth organisation. Before her ;~ppointineiit. she had argued- "We should change the image o f the party as a party o f thosc uho sit and smoke in ;III--conditioned rooms. This rnay hurt some but we should go ahead with i t We have to go to the grass roots. to the Dalits. This palty has become coir~placerit afier the Ram J;i~iriiabhoomi movement. Kanshi Ram has woken us up. (Nat~onal Mail. I 0 Decembet 1093 ) .

7 1 I l ie i in i l i tdv~,>catc o f thc i i ~ i i> ipo r ; i t i ~~n i>finort. lower caste members at al l levels of thc p:~rt) apparattis ,was opposed b\ sililie of l i i~ colleagiies and by RSS leaders who ohjccred ill princi[,le to ari? ;trtllici;tl ~rairsfot-nlation or tlie social ordel--generally seen I i i l i a s r c i i i o i ~ :incl did liot \\is11 t i ) tise caste criteria for appointments in

- ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~,~

response tu the pressiires exerted b! the Mandal commission. Sunder Singh Bhandari one of tile BJP's Vicc PI-esidents declai-ed: 'we wi l l keep social equilibrium in mind. I t i s an cxpa~lsion prograinrrte and there is no question o f being lopsided'. (National Mail, 26 Dcccnlher. 19'43). More in~p~~rtant ly . thc general secretary o f the RSS, H.V. ';heshadri. reacted lo the SP-B1;P propaganda in terms which showed that the organisat~o~~ was nor prepared tu a l l t~w the BJP to appeal to notions o f caste identity as a means of gathering support. 'Social justice can be rendered to the weaker sections of society onl) wllcn the sntire society i s imbued with the spirit o f oneness and internal harmony. Society I.; like a living body and its weak limb gets strengthened by the entire hmly, coming to its aid In eiery possible manner. And this becomes possible when the life (hrce of the body remains active and powerful. The fire-force in the case of society i s its vibrant awareness o f i t s abiding oneness. That alone wil l result in a spirit u l harmony among all its sections and ensuring the equality, dignity, security and justicc, especially to its weakel parts. And this precisely i s the path the Sangh has been p t ~ r s ~ ~ i n g thrr~~tgh its Shakha technique o f social reorganisation for the past 68 years (Organizer. I 0 Ilecemhel. 1993: 17). RSS leaders strongly criticized the progranilrie o f the SP and the USP From their point o f view the interests o f the low castes wcrc not distinct fiom those of the nation as a whole. Sheshadri expounded their positio~l In revealing tr:nns : '.... in any confrontation with the rest of the society, the weaker sections always stand to lose. It i s only with the goodwill and co-operation of the society that the:y car1 get the necessary opportunities to raise themselves up. The ver). concept o f soc:iel justice implies recognition o f equality, dignity and opportunity in ever). sphel-e o f national life h) entire society. And this is possible only when the society hecon~es imbued with the spirit o f oneness and harmony among all sections just as a weak life force is quite active and ensures that the entire society goes out to continuously nurture that limit. 'This i s exactly how the Hindutva life force works in the cause of our society (0rgani:ies 5 December, 1995 p.7).

75 Suhsequci1tly, the 149,1-- 95 state elections revealed that the BJP was anxious to nominate an OB(' candidate wherever the arithmetic o f the constituency made this choice relevant. I f the selection of OBCs as candidates remains haphazard and does not lead to a systematic polic) of recruiting them in due proportion into the higher echelons o f the party at the n:ltional level as well as the state level the BJP may continuc t be handicapped b? the upper caste iinage which has restricted its expansion in the past (Jefferlot: 1996:536-554).

l6 F~irthcr tor c.ategory I (Most Backward), the "creamy layer" concept was done away w~th , and thc quota ,was increased from 5 per cent to 7 percent. Yadavas, Gollas and their \)nonyms were: shifted to category I which now lists 93 communities. Kcprescntatives of some comnnunities-among them Yadavas, Gollas and Kurubas - staged angry delr~oiistrations de~~ouncing the April 20 government order which had theti liitcd them under categor) 2 (More Backward) though they had been demanding to he ltsted under category 1 (bh~s t Backward).

C'ategop 2 I More Backward) ;inil categoiy 3 (Backward) were divided into two groups each-lA and 28. and :iA and 313 Category 2H comprised Muslims, Buddhists, converted (.titistl;~ns and Jeni!;, for wlr0111 there was a 6 per cent resewation; the rest o f the cs,m~~~rinitic:c lhitlierto under category 2 came under category 2A, with 20 per cent rcsct\;itl,,ns 7'11~ quota for calcp)ly 1 thus came doivti fi-om 28 per cent to 26 per cent.

C.'ategory -34. w t h :i qiiot;r o f 8 per cent, comprised Vokkaligas and their sub-castes, i l~cluding Kedd>s. li:dlik;rrs, Gowdas, Kuchatigas, Ikggades, Khannuas, Gounders and Kodabah; (~'atrgory 38, with an I I per cent quota, comprised Veerashaiva I.ingayats irnd the otI1i.r communities hitherto listed under Category 3.

T{y listing V ~ k k i i l ~ g i ~ i arid L.ingaya1.s in separate sub-categories, the government met a long standing demand of the nwl~~crically fewer Vokkaligas who felt that the educationally adva~~ccd Lingayats would corner the quotas. It also amended the "crearny layer" l is t to i~lclude doctors, lawyers, chartered accountants, income tax consultants. dental \urgeons, cnglncers and architects who are not assessees under inconic tau. wealth [ax and salcs !.as for all categories. I-lowever, the creamy layer norm did rlol apply to SC and Sf (Krishnaswamy: 1994: 143). The suggestion o f the comn~issior~ to exclude children 111 graduate parents did not find favour with the cabinct. l l l e govcnlment felt that the graduates could be ltnemployed and hence needed protectic,n. (Pinto 1994: 2271).

For the firs1 tilne ~~ccupational gl-oups regardless o f caste were brought under the purview ol' reservatlolllin accord;rnce with the recommendation o f the Chinnappa Keddy ('ommission. These include agricultural labour, marginal farmers with holdings of less than ont: hectarc dry land, handloom weavers working for wages, constructior~ workers. automobile drivers, conductors, cleaners, auto and cycle rickshau drivers, crr~ployees in factories excluding supervisory and managerial staff and worker-s on daily wages in various menial occupations. The occupational groups were not altered by the modified G O . (Ibid.)

77 I t was Uangilrappa's hnckward caste label that weighed in his favour at the time o f his selection as Chief Minister. He colnes from the ldiga (toody tapper) community and lost no opportunity i r ~ pro.jecting himself as a champion o f the cause o f BCs.

Those conimunitiei i:(~l~dcmned to backwardness by virtue o f caste and poverty have evcly reason. at a generalised level, to feel a sense o f belonging, confidence and courage, i f the) are representcd by a Chief Minister who comes from the same background and whti prornises to speak for them. But if there were such expectations, Bangarappa not nicrelq squandered a splendid opportunity to work for these deprived sections. he actually betrayed their hopes.

His perforinar~cc ;IS n belf-proclaimed representative o f the interests o f the Backward classes i s often contrasted with that one o f Karnataka's more illustrious Chief Vinisten. 1)evara.j ORS, considered the first and the only authentic spokesman for the backward classes ill the state. He placed the question o f the caste equation centre stage and actually ;rlte~-ed i t in favour o f the BCs. SC's and ST. I t was during his regime !hat t h i 1,and Refonns ACI was passed, which conferred tenancy rights on thousan(l\ of poor and ~narginal lirlners. He set up the First BCs Commission under L C . Hab;~l~ur \vliich introduced a reservation system that anticipated the Mandal iornniissioi>. I'hc irnylh o f thc n~itnerical supremacy o f the upper caste Lingayat- Vokhalig;~ cotnhil~c. u.:c dispr0Xt.d the socio-ecoliomic surveys he commissioned.

111 fact t5;iiigal-appa \vaL; ilever ccl~tl,~Ily i~rvc~l \ed \\it11 any socio-economic struggle o f the i3ach\\ard ('laise:; not even ,uI~t.n 11e \V;IS in tllc Socialist Party. The Kodagu

~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~- --

Satyagraha o i the earl) 1950's, a S(icialist Party led struggle in Shimoga district to confer teniinc) rights mainly for the ldigas, may have influenced Bangarappa but his name IS not amongst its leaders or heroes (Menon: 1992: 9 and 19).

Verappa h lo~ l ) l r a i l i ?rum the co~nniunity of Nadaswaram Players. "My community" he sahs. "i, rcally h;rckward, nearer io the SC's". Ridiculing Bangarappa's backward credential\. Moil) says that Bangarappa belongs to a community o f 'exploiters' o f societ). ;I pilirited )reference to the liquor barons, that allegedly cushions his dispensatiiin

Moi l ) also dnuhrs lii~nga~appa's commitment to the emanicipations o f the BCs. The govt. hai fought shy o f taking a firm stand on the implementation o f the recomme~i~iatio~i o f the Chinnappa Reddy Commission, the third BCs commission which sub~r~itte(l I(\ report to the goi.1. in April 1990. He also accuses Bangarappa o f having idcntilied himself with the agitations against the report o f the controversial Second R i ' h ('c~m~iiission headed Iby T.K. Venkataswamy. (Ramachandra C.M: 1992: 3 1-32).

7R After independence, the tirst organ~sed demands were for protecting this (3.0 in the wake of ;I ruling uf the Madras High Court in July 1950 that i t was ultravires o f the Constitution. I:ollo\virig a vigorou5 campaign by E.V. Ramaswami Naicker through his speechcs, his party Dravida Ka~hagam, and its organ Viduthalai, 14 August 1950 was abser-ved as "c'irn~munal G.0 [lay", with strikes by students, hartal by merchants, "Cornrnu~lal (;C) safeguard processions", and public meetings. Speaking on the occasio~l. Naicker dec.lared his intention to launch an all party struggle for the reintroduction \if the G.0. by restricting the rights and privileges o f every community strictly accordirlg t i? it:. population (G.O. 231 Public (Confidential), 30 January 1951) (Radhakrishnan, p 1996: 12 1).

'' It accuicd the gn\t 0 1 working foi advanced cornmunities at the expense o f the BCs and at thc same time pretending to safeguard and advance the interests o f the BCs. I t requeslctl tlie ('hieSMinister to increase the BCs reservations to 50 percent, to club the SC's, STs and tics as one category. for 65 percent reservations, and to treat a mere pass i ~ i iilter~iiediatf: examination as sufficient fur admission to graduate courses. I t warned hini tliat failure to complq with its I-equests would have grave consequences for his party ill the general electio~rs which was about to take place. In another letter, A. Suhran~anian, ('ongress M.I..A from Salem, requested him to allot the BCs atleast 60 percent of the educational institution's admissions, and 75 percent o f appointments, and threatened to walk out o f the (Iongress Party along with other BC members if he failed I,) 11ct.d to this request. The govl. however, found both the requests inadmissible ( ( ; .O. 2050. F.dr1catio11, 6 October. I95 I. (Kadhakrishnan, p : 1996: 122.123).

R0 Wit11 ti11, 110111 t l ie parries ie, I-oiler Parry of S.S. Ramaswami Padayachi and the Coriirnoll \h'e:11 1';lrty of M.A. Manickavelu Naykar were dissolved and their members jo i~~e i i IIIC, ('t>iigrcss (Rudolph and Kudolph: 1967: 52-54; Smith: 1963: 387-88). Tho11g11 tlicre \\ere questions and resolutions for Vanniyars in pa~ticular, and BCs in ge~ ic r :~ i rlir lr.;~clcrsii~p o f the \';lrrni\ars gradually became moribund, and for quite sorrlet!!lli. tl,e Varl~iiyar Inovenlent. a~rd for tliat matter the BCs movement in general, h e ~ ; ~ ~ i i ~ . , l , i r r r , i l ~ l t illid the reservittlolis introduced in the 1950's remained unchanged fi,r I I I~ ' ! ~ \ t I \$ ,> iir:c;jdes (Kadl l i~h~ islinan. p: 1996: 123).

81 By this time two changes had altcred the context in which the D M K had to compete. First. the redrawing o f state boundaries along linguistic lines, compelled by the demands of 7-elugu speaking-llravidians, left the D M K without a rationale for secession-the Tamil districts wert. considered too small to constitute a viable nation- but with a niore culturall! honiogi.neous political arena, in which the distinctly Tamil content of the DMK message would no longer be a handicap. Second, the rise o f K. Karnara.1 to the position o f Congress leader and Chief Minister in the state largely defused the charge that Congress was a Brahmin vehicle. Kamaraj, a member o f the formerly. 'backward', but upwardly nob bile Nadar community presided over a regime that was characterised both by cxtraordinarily successful efforts at industrial devclopment. and some quite notahle innovations in the area o f social insurance. Additionally, he was able to capture in some part the mantle o f Tamil regional pride and win support frnm the D.K. The I I M K began to emphasize issues o f poverty as much as ;inti-Brahtnini:in~, and in these films starred future Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran or MGK.

Contesting elections in 1957, the DMK rapidly established itself as a principal challenger to the Congrrss: in the state. While contesting half the seats, the party grew to win over a quarter o f the vote in 1962, while contesting over two-thirds o f the seats. Furthermore, a DMK.-C:ommunist alliance won municipal power in the state's two largest cities in 1959, while a DMK .illiance with the Brahmin led Swantantra Party in 1962 demonstrated that it was willrng to he quite pragmatic in its quest for power.

For the I Ib IK to replace congress. 1.t needed to undermine the latters claim to represent Tamil aspirations and the poor. Two events i n 1965 and 1966 allowed this to happen. First in 1965, riots erupted in the state over the central govt's decision to replace English cntirely with Hindi for official purposes - and in examinations. Second and more importantly. the drought and crop failures o f 1965-'66 caused wide spread food shortages.

The political consequr:nce o f shortagc require no explanation. A word on the salience o f the language issue in ratnil Nadu. however, i s in order. The impact o f this decision on the job prospects of educated Tan~ils would have been devastating: along with one o f the highest rate5 of literacy in the countr)., Tamil Nadu also had a wider gap between bilingualisn~ in English and Hindi in favour o f English than any other state (Swamy: 1996: 395,. The state govt's decision under Kamaraj's successor Bhaktavatsalam lo order the police to fire on the demonstrators leaving hundreds of middle class student.; dead, cornpelled a retraction by central govt, and permanently damaged the prestige i-lf the Congrer,~ (Dasgupta: 1970: 236-37; Barnett: 1976: 13 1-4).

Ironically. the i~npact . ) f these evciits were magnified by the prominent position occupied b> leading iorlgressmen in national politics. Kamaraj elevated to President o f the National ('ongres~; I )rganisati~n in 1964, was the reputed King maker of the Congress party i n the r n ~ i l 1')60's: his rival. C. Subramanian, chosen by lndira Gandhi to serve as minister. \pa,; to beco~nc the architect o f green revolution. That Kamaraj. who had dt.mon,;rr;ltcA ilic power t t j choose who would bc Prime Minister, was powerless ti, prevent pijlic?; lit. h ~ ~ z \ r w o ~ ~ l d be anaetliema to his state only 11nderscore5 the co~nplic: t! i o f the htate ('ongress in the debacle. That the 11nio11 ~iiinister could 11,): prin i(li: Iii.; OWII ,talc wi t l i food Iieightened the party's impotence.

XI By this time two changes had altered the context in which the D M K had to compete. First. the redrawinp, o f state hc~wndaries along linguistic lines, compelled by the demands of Telugu speaking-i)ravidians, left the D M K without a rationale for secession-the Tamil districts were ccinsidered too small to constitute a viable nation- but with a more culturall? hon~ogt:~~eous political arena, in which the distinctly Tamil content of the I I M K message would no longer be a handicap. Second, the rise o f K. Karnaraj to the pos~tion o f Congl-ess leader and Chief Minister in the state largely tiefused the charge that Congress ..v\.as a Brahmin vehicle. Kamaraj, a member o f the fbrnmerly. 'backward', hut upwardly inobile Nadar community presided over a regime that was characterised both by cxtraordinarily successful efforts at industrial development, and some quite nol.ahle innovations in the area o f social insurance. Additionally, he was able to capture in some part the mantle o f Tamil regional pride and win support from the D.K. The D M K began to emphasize issues o f poverty as much as anti-Brahminism, and in these films starred future Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran or MCiR

Contesting electiorls in 1957, the UMK rapidly established itself as a principal challenger to the Congress in the state. While contesting half the seats, the party grew to win over a quarter o f the vote in 1962, while contesting over two-thirds o f the seats. Furthermore, a DMK-Communist alliance won municipal power in the state's two largest cities in 1950, while a DMK. rrlliance with the Brahmin led Swantantra Party in 1962 demonstrated that i t was willing to be quite pragmatic in its quest for power.

For the I IMK to replace congress. vt needed to undermine the laners claim to represent Tamil aspirations and the poor. 'I'r\,o events in 1965 and 1966 allowed this to happen. First in 1965, riots erupted in thc state over the central govt's decision to replace English entirely with l l indi for official purposes - and in examinations. Second and more importantly. the drought and crop failures o f 1965-'66 caused wide spread food shortages.

The political conseqilence o f shorta~e require no explanation. A word on the salience o i the language issue in 'ratnil Nad~l, however, i s in order. The impact o f this decision on the job prospects of educated Tamils would have been devastating: along with one o f the highest rates ,-,I literacy in tlie country, Tamil Nadu also had a wider gap between bilingilalisnl in Fnglish arid Hindi in favour o f English than any other state (Swamy: 1996: 395). The state govt's decision under Kamaraj's successor Bhaktavatsalam to order the police to fire on the demonstrators leaving hundreds o f middle class students dead, coinpelled a retraction by central govt, and permanently damaged the prestige idthe Congress (Dasgupta: 1970: 236-37; Barnett: 1976: 13 1-4).

Ironically, the impact o f these c\<.-lnts \%,ere magnified by the prominent position occupied hy leading conp,ressmen ill liational politics. Kamaraj elevated to President o f the Nation;il ('ongrc\\ 01-ganisstio~i i n 1964, was the reputed King maker o f the Congress party in the iiiil:l1')60's: his rival. C. Subramanian, chosen by lndira Gandhi to serve as minister. & a \ tc becoriic tlie architect o f green revolution. That Kamaraj. who had dernonstrateti rhr. power to choose who would be Prirne Minister, was powerless to prevent ;i pnlicy lii. knew would be anaetherna to his state only ~lnderscores the c~iiiiplicit) o f the \talc Congress in the debacle. That the union minister could not pro\ i r ! ~ I i , < ) \ i n *talc \\:it11 food heightened the party's impotence.

In 1967, rlie D M K ,ii i~~le(-I a grand anti-congress coalition and campaigned on three issues-preserving i ~ i g l i s h as an official language. increasing state autonomy in economic decision making and prn i~d ing cheap rice. The rice issue was critical: the party's nlaln plank \\a!, a promise I:<> provide three measures o f rice for one rupee, and D M K slog~ns mocked Kamaraj and Subramanian by name for their inability to provide their home state with fond The D M K alliance won in a landslide, even though the Congress vote fell onl? by 4 percentage points, and both Kamaraj and Subrarnanian lost their parliamentan seats (Swamy. R: 1998: 114-1 16).

82 I'rom the beginning tht: identity sol~ght to be projected was a party o f all the oppressed castes including the SC Again. right from its inception i t was clearly articulated that the D M K would cha~t out a path independent of both D M K and AIADMK. Ramadas characterised Karunanidhi as a traitor o f the Dravidian Movement" (The Independent June, 1991 ), and "betrayer o f the L.TTE and the Mandal causes. .. ...... (who) ...." 'wi l l only speak and write copiously on the Mandal issue and the people know too well that he wi l l not tight for tht:ir cause' "(/\side, the Magazine o f Madras, March 15, 1993, p: 23) (Suresh. V: 1992: 23 17).

83 The current round ofcanlroversy e~upted when Anna University Vice Chancellor Dr. M. Anandakrishnan an~~ounced on June l I. 1994 that his university would stick to 50 percent reservations in admissions for 1994 - 95. This was to comply with the Supreme (:ourt orders -which were further confinned by the Madras High Court order and legal opinion". he said. The I-l~gh Court Order he referred to was the one issued on July 27. 1991, in I-esponse to the Pamil Nadu govt's petition following the Supreme Court's ruling in thc '-Mandal Case" that the total reservations should not exceed 50 percent It said that while 69 percent reservation, in force since 1980, could be fbllo\ved tor the ac:ldemic year 19'91 9 4 , the ceiling o f 50 percent should obtain from 1994-95

The voce (consumer care) council. represented by its trustee and advocate K.M. Vijayan, challenged chi!; in the Supreme Court which in its interim order on August 24, 1993 restrained the 'Tamil N a d i ~ Government from reserving more than 50 percent seats for the BCs. S.C"s and S.T's in professional colleges for 1993-94. When the state government went a head with 69 percent reservation on the basis o f the High Court ruling, Vijayan movcd a c.ontempt petition in the Supreme Court. And the then Tamil Nadu Chief Secretary T.V. Venkatara~nan, on November 11, 1993, had to tender an 'unconditional apology for the actions taken in violation o f the orders o f this l-lonourahle Court hy the state nf 'Tamil Nadu and i t s ofticersiauthorities'. Then fbllowed the ~'afidavit!; o f compliance" which were, however, kept a secret. The affidavit tiled separ:~tely by the I:lirector of Technical Education and the Secretary, Selection ('ommittec; 1:)epartment o f Health and Family Welfare, Tamil Nadu govt, stated "tI1;1t in ~i laklng iidniissions sl~bseqi~ent to 5-1 1-1993, the ceiling o f 50 percent reservatio~i fhr SC!ST. MBCIBC st~pulated by the order dated 24-8-1993 has been fbllowed h! reducing thc reservation for Backward classes to 18.6 percent from 30 percent ; l ~ ~ r l f i i r M I K ' 1.0 12.4 percent and retaining the reservation for SC at 18 percent a n d for S'I ;it I percent"

The I \ \ < , ! t ic~;l l \ ;II.,~ ,ilhrnitted rli:~t they had "co~i~pl ied with the directions" of the supreoir L, biln 1 , ) L~~, .~~i . st.\en pcri:clit extra seats in govt. engineering colleges and six

~~ ~ ~-

percent w1ra seats for M.B.B.S ar~d BDS courses in medical and dental colleges run by it and allotted '.tlit:in exciusivel\ to the open competition candidates strictly on the basis o f rrcerit"

I t is this at'fida\~r th:rt Karunanidhi cites to embarrass Jayalalitha. His poser to Jayalalita u'ws"l)o ><IO have the gurs to deny in a newspaper advertisement that your govt. has filed an aft ida~lt hefore the Supreme Court that you will abide by the 50 percent reservation quota'"' .layalalitha has not replied to this question (Subramanian. T : 1994: 32. I

84 'The ;atXd;rvit, according to the opposition parties, was concealed from them. They were not informed nhout i t either during the all-party meeting she convened on November. 26. I991 to discuss the move to pass the bil l seeking to continue the 69 percent rcscrvation k!r when it was passed by the assembly.

Says <:PI State Secrcr;wy R. Nallakannu: "How can we accompany her to meet the Prime Minister wher~ she has already given the undertaking to the Supreme Court? Wil l not the Prime Minister point to the undertaking and ask how the 69 percent reservation can he continued?" Political circles feel the situation would not have come to such n pass had the AIADMK govt taken effective follow-up action to get Presidential assent [ I ) ~ h c Hil l (Subramanian T.S : 1994: 33)

85 "But at that time (ullerr the Tamil Nadu assembly passed a resolution supporting the Mandal Co~nmissio~i recommendations), Jayalalitha gave interviews to 'The Hindu' and 'The Indian Express', demanding an economic yardstick for reservation for the BCs. When she has such a basic feeling against reservation, i t i s not surprising that she i s playing a doublc game to cheat the people o f Tamil Nadu".

Karunanidhl ircc~rsed the sitate govt. of failing to anticipate Vijayan's appeal in the Suprerile ('ourt and ti le .3 caveat. " Therefore, the Supreme Court passed ' exparte' interim orders that the total reservation in Tamil Nadu should not exceed 50 percent. When Vijayan field a contempt petition, the Jayalalitha government, instead o f arguing against it. tendered an unconditional apology. Not only that, her government gave an affidavit of'cornpliance that i t wi l l implement the 50 per cent reservation".

"In the two-page advertisement that Jayalalitha gave to newspapers to reply to opposition's ;rllegatior~s against her. she has argued that the reasons for the provision o f more than 50 per cent reservation in Kashmir, Karnataka, and Arunachal Pradesh are different from th(!se i r i Talnil Nadu. When she advances these reasons which a Supreme Court judge should do. it i s clear that she has no sense o f deep involvement in the issue. To confuse the situation f~lrtlier, the state cabinet has taken a decision to increase the number of seats in educatiolial institutions. Thi:, is, in fact, a plan to allot less than SO per cent seats for the H.(' s :ind the liill passed by :he Assembly seeking to continue the 69 per cent reservation lia\ ;ilso kcome subject to debate now"(1 bid: 34).

86 "The rescr\:Icl,vi pl>lic> which helps the advance~nent o f the Backward classes is a (matter oisoc1;11 ci,r i icrr l and i s within t l ie domain ofthe executive and interpretation of the Cor ist i t~~t i~ in <)I l i idi :~ should favour rather than harnper it". she (Jayalalitha) said (Subram~lnia~i I 5 l00,~l: I 19)

" But Vrlayaii. (3'11, paid the price ihr his grit. Early on July 21, as he was about to leave his lior~\c t i ) H! to Yew Delhi lo f i l e his transfer application in the Supreme Court, he was hrarer~ up hy four goondas who lay in wait for him. Vijayan suffered multiple fractures or1 his l~arltls and legs. 0 1 1 .July 13, hoodlums, armed with knives threatened D r Ar~:~iidekrish~ran. tlut he escaped physical harm because they were confused about his iderit~ty. Despite a complairit being lodged with the police, no arrest has been made in co~inectiori with this attempte:d assault (lhid: 120)

" Therc i s nu questiori of agreeing to reservations on economic criteria as the basis, which would be tantamount to ignoring the BCs in any circumstances. By securing a job does it mean that everythir;~p has been gained? A fish vendor in our place earns three tirnes that of the salary o f al l I.A.S. officer in a single day. Hence i t is not a job or salar! that a rnernber o f RC r~eeds. What they want instead i s participation in the administration. League wi l l support only those who are willing to extend it. (Kalakaurnudi : 1990 : 9).

In brief, tlie hluslirn 1,eague's political stand i s this: "The BCs o f both the coalition set up should unite disregarding their political affiliations. They should severe their ties with thc coalitions arid give rise to a new front." "If the exploitation o f the backward and dowiltrodden caster; by certair~ people in the nanle of religion is to end, the former should he enlightened the BCri about their rights but also to unite against their exploitation. 'The aini crf the Muslim League- a minoritie's organisation is also that. (Ibid 8).

w The arnbr\ale~rce o f the Congress; 11) on the Ram Janmabhoomi - Babri Masjid dispute and the Mandal cc~mrnission led to the disenchantment among its allies the Muslim I.eague. the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Socialist Republican Party (SRP) and c~ilminated in the departure o f the Muslim League, a long time ally o f the Congress (I) from the UDF fold. With the factional struggles and the resentment of the backward and minority comninnities (who stood to gain by Mandal Commission recommendations) taking their toll. the UDF became a cropper in the District Council Elections. Sensing the danger the ('ongress (I) has began wooing the League and even the Samvarana Samudaya Munnani (a coalition o f 60 odd castelco~nmunities of pro - reservationists) (Frontline: March 3 0 - April 12 1991:3l).

" The Southerti distr~cts have strung tr-aditions of Ezhava Social Reform (ESRM) and are supposed to be ;areas o f significant influence for Samvarana Samudaya ~ u n n a n i (SSM). Irritiallv, thc LDF had adopted a more balanced position o f supporting the com~nunal reservation policy while at the same time sharply attacking the communal leaders of the hackwal-d castes. IOlrt this stance underwent change towards the last phase of the May campaign in rcsponse to a tragi-comic situation that arose out of allegedl! derogatory comment.; of EMS Namboodiripad regarding the founders of Ezhava social Kef i~ni i Movement rhe occasion was a special issue o f Desabhimani, the party tially. in hon(.~ur o f T K. Madhavan, a leading Ezhava social reformer o f the early decades o f tlic cenlury. Thc i~~stor ic significance of T.K. Madllavan lay in the role he played rn l i~ ih ing up the I ~ ~ l i a v : ~ Social Reform Movement, that had ti l l then been confined to S:ir~skritisatii,n i-ciornis and struggles to remove caste grievances. with tlie la~ger ~natiollal inoven~eiic I l i e historical assessment by EMS o f tlie leaders o f the Erhav;r social K e i i ~ ~ n - M o \ c r ~ ~ c ~ i t in [l ie pre-T.K. Madhavair phase was taken out

o f c(,ntr\t and 1111sinrt:rpreted dcliherately as if to imply insult to the pioneers and ultinlatel! a sacrilegio~ls insult to Sree Narayana Guru - the founder o f Ezhava Social Refortil Movenient (Frontline: July 20 -- August 2, 1991:96).

92 I l i e Na~r-Syrian C'ornrnunities which has the largest number o f skilled and educated youtll uei-c haunted with a fear that Mandal would permanently close their access to employment in central services and also in other states. This fear was converted into anxiety a\ a result of the i:ontroverrinl statements that was doing its rounds in the state. 'The I.I)F could otlly create a f e w cleavages in these traditional vote banks of the Congresh. Hut these cleavages were filled up by these communities themselves (Kala Kaurnudi: 1991 :9).