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Political Risk and Firm Default Probability
Exploring Export Credits to HighRisk Countries
August, 2006
Preliminary version, comments welcome
Annika SandströmDepartment of Finance and Statistics
Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration
P.O.Box 479, FIN00101 Helsinki, FINLANDemail: [email protected]
Political Risk and Firm Default Probability
Exploring Export Credits to HighRisk Countries
Abstract
Despite the increased presence and importance of political risk and export credit financing in the
world economy, these topics have not been well covered in the empirical credit risk literature. In
this article, we model default probabilities for private firms from selected highrisk countries,
and condition these on a vector of country specific political risk variables, indicators of the level
of democracy, legal environments and the quality of credit information, in addition to the
traditional firm specific financial variables usually employed. The study is an empirical
application to a unique dataset on export credit facilities, not studied previously in a credit risk
framework. The preliminary results from Argentina, Indonesia, Nigeria, Poland and Saudi
Arabia indicate that information on socioeconomic conditions, military in politics and external
conflict in a country constitute significant predictors for firm default, that may not otherwise be
detected with scarcely available, or unreliable accounting information.
Key Words: Probability of Default; Company Failure Risk; Export Credits; Political Risk
1
1. Introduction
Analysis of financial statements is the starting point in any classification of companies into
healthy and financially distressed (or bankrupt) firms. Among the first known attempts to
distinguish companies based on their accounting is Fitzpatrick (1932), who compared financial
ratios between successful industrial enterprises from those that failed, and found that the
probability of default was related to the individual characteristics of firms. Since then, a large
number of empirical studies has been published and well known applications of credit scoring,
e.g. the Altman’s ZScore model (Altman, 1968) and the Moody’s KMV EDF RiskCalc
Model, are widely used in the industry. These accountingbased models are usually applied when
no publicly traded securities are available or when secondary market prices are unreliable.
Meanwhile, some of the caveats of the accountingbased models is that they rely on financial
statements that capture the past performance of the firm rather than its future performance. As
noted by Hol et al. (2002), it still seems that the extensive research effort on bankruptcy, and
default prediction has failed to produce an agreement on which variables are good predictors and
why. This may be partly attributed to the fact that the studies refer to different time periods,
countries and industries. Most studies are also claimed to lack a theoretical framework to guide
the empirical research effort1. Traditionally, default probability is estimated from failed and
nonfailed firms, given historical data using annual financial statements. In this paper, we ask
whether there could be other important factors to consider, in order to improve model
performance, especially in situations when the financial information is scarcely available or
unreliable, as might be the case in developing countries.
1 Hol et al. (2002) have recently suggested a capital structure based default theory.
2
While the financial figures of a company are the basis for evaluating its credit profile, non
financial and environmental characteristics seem necessary to complete the picture. The new
approach in this paper is to discuss linkages between firm default probability and the political
and legal risk environments that prevail in the country where the borrowing company operates.
To what extent do political events or unstable legal environments constitute a risk for foreign
lenders, that might not otherwise be reflected in the financial figures of the borrowing company?
The main objective of this study is to assess whether political and commercial factors can be
distinguished in the credit risk assessment process.
A novel feature of the present study is also the use of export credit guaranteed debt contracts in
the attempt to model default probabilities from realized payment interruptions2. We empirically
explore the relationships between default probabilities and political risk for a group of firms from
selected highrisk countries, including Argentina, Indonesia, Nigeria, Poland and Saudi Arabia.
In this version of the paper, these countries are selected to represent examples of most active
recipients of worldwide export credits among developing countries, and reflect also the largest
export streams from Finland to developing countries in the last two decades.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review
on default probability estimation. In section 3, we discuss the question of the impact of political
risk on credit defaults and formulate our main research hypothesis. Section 4 presents our
research design and data in more detail. In section 5, we present our results with a short analysis
of our target countries. Section 6 concludes with suggestions for further research.
2 This type of data has not been previously addressed in similar credit risk or default probability studies, due to a general secrecysurrounding Export Credit Agencies and consequently, the unavailability of data. For the purposes of this research project,initiated in cooperation with the Finnish Export Credit Agency, Finnvera plc, we have the unique opportunity to explore archivesof historical credit and political risk data from various countries.
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2. Default probability estimation
There are two schools of thought in the use of statistical methods to predict firm default. One
holds that default is modeled using accounting data, whereas the other recommends using market
information. Accordingly, the existing models are usually classified into the marketbased
models, which rely on security prices, and the so called fundamentalsbased models, which can
further be divided in models that rely on accounting, systematic market and economic factors, or
rating information. In this study, for brevity reasons and in order to follow our research setup for
private firms, we will focus mainly on the accountingbased models4.
Fundamentalsbased estimation with accounting info
The literature on credit scoring is based on the original work of Beaver (1966) and Altman
(1968). Being a classic among the early studies, Beaver (1966) conducted a comprehensive study
using a variety of financial ratios and concluded that the cash flow to debt ratio was the single
best predictor of firm default. Beaver’s univariate approach of discriminant analysis led the way
to a multivariate analysis by Altman (1968) who adopted a multivariate discriminant analysis
(MDA) framework in his effort to find a bankruptcy prediction model. This became the popular
Zscore model, where the financial ratios used are: 1) working capital over total assets; 2)
retained earnings over total assets; 3) earnings before interest and taxation over total assets; 4)
market value of equity over book value of liabilities; and 5) sales over total assets. In Altman’s
study, the ZScore correctly classified 94% of the bankrupt companies and 97% of the non
bankrupt companies one year prior to bankruptcy. Later, Altman has revised the model for
private firms by substituting book value for market value in the calculation of the ratio of market
4 For a good review of the marketbased models, see e.g. ChanLau (2006)
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value of equities to the book value of liabilities5. The popularity of the Altman Zscore is
explained by its parsimony and ease of interpretation. Some of its shortcomings are discussed in
Engelmann et al (2003).
Explanatory variables and statistical techniques
A large number of financial ratios can be used as explanatory variables in the accounting based
models. Typically, the greatest variations in the probabilities of default come from ratios
capturing firms’ profitability, growth opportunities, level of indebtness, and liquidity. To obtain a
parsimonious model, some selection criteria are needed, and the variables selected are usually
those with the higher discriminating power for explaining the default frequency after performing
univariate analysis. However, these steps can only be taken once a robust database has been
compiled. There is usually also the risk of “overfitting”, that is, the model functions only on the
sample data but fails to engage with realworld data that it has not “seen” before.
Once variables have been selected, a variety of statistical techniques have been used to assess the
default probability of a firm, including econometric models, linear discriminant analysis, k
nearest neighbor classifier, neural networks, and support vector machine classifier among others
(ChanLau, 2006). For obvious problems with the assumptions of the initially employed
discriminant analysis, discrete dependent variable econometric models (i.e. logit or probit
models), have become more popular tools for credit scoring. Ohlson (1980) and Platt & Platt
(1990) present some of the early studies using the logit. A more recent example is Laitinen
(1999), who used automatic selection procedures to select the set of variables to be used in
logistic and linear models, which were then thoroughly tested outofsample.
5 A summary of the methodologies is given in Chuvakhin & Gertmenian (2003)
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3. Political risk and credit
Political risk may be defined as "the probability of the occurrence of some political event that
will change the prospects for the profitability of a given investment”. This definition, originally
given by Haendel (1979), appears often in studies of political risk due to its simplicity and
flexibility against the interest and need of the definer (e.g. a corporate, a private insurance firm,
an export credit agency, a bank or a multinational organization). In the credit risk framework,
political risk may be defined as “the possibility of delayed, reduced, or nonpayment of interest
and principal where the outcome is attributable to the country of the borrower” (Caouette,
Altman and Narayanan, 1998).
There has been a growing interest in the academic literature on the link between political
institutions and political risks facing multinational corporations. A large part of this research is
devoted on domestic institutions and FDI inflows (see e.g. Henisz 2002, and Jensen 2006).
Meanwhile, only few authors have investigated the relationship between political risk and credit,
and the focus has been mainly on sovereign borrowing (see e.g. Citron and Nickelsburg 1987,
Balkan 1992, Edwards 1986, Brewer and Rivoli 1989 and Peter 2000) and the relationship
between democratic institutions and borrowing (see e.g. Schultz and Weingast 2003 and Saiegh
2005). To the best of our knowledge, there are no prior studies using political risk factors to
study corporate credit defaults.
Hypothesis development
The overall hypothesis in the present study is that outcomes from lending decisions to
importing/borrowing companies are uncertain not only because of the company as an individual
obligor, but also due to surrounding political and legal risk factors, that may have nothing to do
with the firm itself. We ask to what extent comprehensive measures of political risk would be
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useful in the assessment of default probabilities at the transaction level.
We conjecture that the political risk in a country affects the credit risk of firms operating in the
country through subcategories of political risk, identified as 1) risk of expropriation or
confiscation (e.g. of the exported merchandise by a foreign government); 2) risk of currency
convertibility and transferability (i.e. the customer in the foreign country is unable to obtain
foreign exchange in order to pay or is unable to send payments out of the country due to
governmental restrictions or foreign exchange transfers); and 3) political violence (war, sabotage
or terrorism). All these situations involve specific risks that might cause a buying firm that would
otherwise be willing to pay the creditor to be unable to do so. In addition, there might be other
unanticipated changes in regulations, corruption or failure by the government to implement tariff
adjustments because of political considerations. Further, quasicommercial risks may arise when
the project or business of the company is facing stateowed suppliers or customers, whose ability
or willingness to fulfill their contractual obligations towards the project might be questionable.
Ultimately, political risk relates to the preferences of political leaders, parties, and actions, as
well as their capacity to execute their stated policies when confronted with internal and external
challenges. Changes in the regulatory environment, attitudes towards corporate governance,
reaction to international competition, labour laws, witholding and other taxes are concerns,
which may all affect the firm in an extent leading to nonpayment of its obligations. The causes
for the above conditions may be influenced by hard to discern shifts in the political landscape
(Bremmer et al. 2006), so the big challenge in any studies on political risk is how to measure it.
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Measuring Political and Legal Risk
In this study, we analyze political and legal risk through selected indicators employed in the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Polity IV Project and the World Bank’s “Doing
Business” database. These ratings are all illustrative of the above stated conditions from a
project and company perspective.
The ICRG system by the PRS Group is a numerical rating system that scores a number of
components for political, economic and financial risk to determine a rating for each category6.
We use the ICRG Political Risk Rating and its subcomponents, which aim to provide a means of
assessing the political stability of countries on a comparable basis. ICRG assigns risk points to a
preset of group of factors, termed political risk components. The range of points that can be
assigned to each component varies between zero and a fixed weight, that the particular
component is given in the overall political risk assessment. The lower the risk point total
indicates for higher political risk, so we expect an inverse relationship with firm default
probabilities.
Appendix I lists the political risk components for the ICRG Political Risk Rating (icrg). Among
the components, for example, Democratic accountability (Component K) is an indicator of
whether a government will take precipitous actions such as expropriation. Law and Order
(Component I) is seen as an indicator of the stability and transparency of the legal system and an
indication of whether contracts might be abrogated. Ethnic tensions (Component J) are often a
preliminary condition to strife that leads to political violence against investors and creditors, or
on their property.
6 These three ratings are used to determine an overall composite rating, a number from 0 to 100 (zero being high risk, 100 beingthe lowest risk).
8
In addition to the ICRG risk components, we will also test for other measures of the legal and
political system in a country (also listed in Appendix 1). We describe the quality of a country’s
political institutions in terms of the exposure to democracy; using the "Polity Index" from the
Polity IV dataset. This index measures the degree to which a nation is either autocratic or
democratic on a scale from 10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). According to
the “democratic advantage” argument, democracies pay lower interest rates for the sovereign
debt than authoritarian regimes because they are better able to make credible commitments (see
e.g. Schultz and Weingast 1996, 1998). We test whether this argument is reflected also on firm
level and expect a negative relationship between default probabilities and the level of host
country democracy.
We define political stability also in terms of the frequency of regime change. This is
approximated in the “Polity IV Regime Durability Variable” (durable), that measures the years
since the most recent regime change or the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable
political institutions. We expect a negative relationship with firm default probabilities, that is, the
longer the time since last regime change, the lower is the firm probability of default.
Finally, we ask how legal and financial rights of the creditor and debtor affect default
probabilities? On the one hand, legal costs may prevent the borrower to incur a “strategic
default”, where the firm fails to pay the amount stipulated in the debt contract even though it
possesses resources to do so. On the other, with costly liquidation, creditors may prefer to
forgive part of debt, which may result in equityholders’ incentives to default opportunistically7.
7 See e.g. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2003).9 This includes manually kept records from the 1980s as well as electronic registers from the later decade.
9
To capture the effects of legal risk, we include two additional indices from the World Bank’s
Doing Business database, that measure credit information registries and the effectiveness of
collateral and bankruptcy laws in facilitating lending. The legal rights index (legal) reflects the
legal rights of borrowers and lenders, by measuring the degree to which collateral and
bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. The index includes 3 aspects related to legal rights in
bankruptcy and 7 aspects found in collateral law. It has a scale from 0 to 10, with higher scores
indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit. The
credit information index (credit) measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility and quality of
credit information available through either public or private bureaus. The index ranges from 0 to
6, featuring the credit information system. Higher values indicate that more credit information is
available from either a public registry or a private bureau to facilitate lending decisions. A
negative sign is expected for these variables, that is, better laws in place or more credit
information available lowers the firm probability of default.
4. Research Design
We model the default probability for a set of borrowing firms, using a dynamic binary estimation
method where the dependent variable is 1 if the firm defaults in a specific year and 0 otherwise.
The estimated default probabilities are conditioned over a vector of lagged explanatory variables
including firmspecific financial ratios and countryspecific political and legal risk indicators.
We use export credit guaranteed debt contracts, and to the greatest extent possible, we aim to
picture a realistic decision making process at the time when the lending decision was made.
What comes to lending to highrisk countries, there is usually a special concern regarding the
availability and reliability of the financial information.
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Data Considerations
The main data for our research project is obtained from the official Export Credit Agency (ECA)
of Finland, Finnvera plc, that consists of trade credit contracts (i.e. commercial loans between
Finnish exporters and foreign buying companies), between years 19802005. These loans are
granted by banks or other financial institutions and guaranteed by Finnvera plc against
commercial and political risks. Detailed credit information underlying each guarantee is
collected by combining data from comprehensive records of Finnvera plc9. This information
includes dates of initiation and the end of the contract; identification number for each guarantee,
information on the parties involved, default date and indemnifications (if any), contract values,
currencies, trade items etc. During the 25year study period, some 30 000 contracts were in force
between Finland and importing companies from over 132 different countries around the world.
Country and Sample Selection
The selected data for this study consists of export credit guaranteed debt contracts between the
Finnvera plc and companies from Argentina, Indonesia, Nigeria, Poland and Saudi Arabia10. The
selection of these countries for this version of the paper is based on choosing the most active
‘highrisk’ export countries of Finland during the last decades, representing five different world
regions. Also on a larger scale, these countries represent type examples of countries that have
received the majority of world export credit. For example, in 1996, Indonesia, Nigeria and
Poland were among the top ten countries, that together accounted for 30 percent of the industrial
country ECAs’ contribution (see Table 1). Argentina, is our example country from the financial
crisis affected Latin American region and Saudi Arabia represents an oildependent, arab nation.
At the policy level, there are of course no obvious reasons to compare these countries as such.
10 In our further research agenda, we plan to append our country selection.
11
Instead, we consider them as type examples of countries facing various economic, commercial
and political risks, where an increasing number of western businesses may still find it desirable
to export and invest in.
We employ the following criteria in our further sample selection;
§ Only firms that are outside governmental control are included in the sample. Thus, credit
counterparts that are public bodies or stateowned enterprises, are excluded11.
§ All industries, except financial sector firms, are included. As common in similar studies,
we exclude banks and financial firms due to the specificity of their financial statements.
§ All different types of guarantee contracts issued by Finnvera are included in the sample.
The most common forms of export credit are buyer credit, credit risk and letter of credit
guarantees, which are also the most common forms of contracts in our sample12.
§ We include contracts that have been effective during some time period between 1980
2005. Thus, some guarantees in the sample have been initiated before 1980 but are still in
force during our study period.
§ Due to limitations in the oldest data and the problem of changes in accounting methods,
we collect data on firm financial variables for firms/guarantees effective after year 1989.
§ We define default as any payment interruption by the debtor company, that deviates from
the scheduled payments stipulated in the guarantee contract.
With these criteria and definitions, our sample consists of 1003 guarantees of which 128 (12.8%)
have experienced a default. Summary statistics of the credit data employed are presented in
Figures 12 and Tables 24.
11 Due to their specific relation to political risk, these are treated separately in an earlier article (Sandström, 2005).
12
For our modeling purposes, we measure our data in firm years, taking into account the yearly
stock of undefaulted effective guarantees and the stock of nonexpired guarantees in a default
state. For each guarantee, we know whether there has been an application for loss on the
underlying claim as well as the indemnifications by Finnvera. We don’t know the exact dates for
the loss claim decision, but have the dates for the corresponding first and last indemnification
payments. Accordingly, we consider the loan in a default state between these dates and analyze
the data in yearly intervals. According to Basel II, we specify the time horizon for the future
probability of default as one year which is consistent with the use in the banking practice and
prevalent in credit risk models.
Figures 1ae) illustrate the yearly distribution of new issued guarantees and the number of
defaults by sample countries. Summary statistics on credit contracts and firmyears by default
status and by country are summarized in Table 2 (Panel A). Average liabilities and
indemnifications by country are summarized in Table 2 (Panel B). Figures 2a and 2b compare
the industry distribution in our sample with the total Finnish Exports given by industry. Pulp and
paper have traditionally accounted for most of the Finnish exports. However, in the 1980s, its
majority share of exports started to fall as a result of the rapid growth in the industrial sector (e.g.
basic metals and metalworking; transport equipment; and electrical equipment). Shipbuilding in
particular, has led the development of heavy industry, and is the most important branch of the
transport sector13. The woodworking industry fostered also the industrials sector through its need
of papermaking equipment (e.g. mechanical and machine building) as well as the chemical sector
(bleaching, water purification, packaging materials etc.). As shown in Table 3 our sample is
fairly evenly split up in the industry groups, both in number of guarantees and in defaults.
12 A special type, an Investment Guarantee emerges a few times in our sample. The difference is that it is bigger in size, and theforms of investment which can be covered under this include equity investments, shareholder loans and guarantees granted by ashareholder. For our purposes, the nature of the guarantee does not affect model estimation.
13
Firm Financial Variables
We choose accounting variables based on how the decision process was initially undertaken,
considering the available information when the credit was granted. Following previous literature,
we select available ratios that measure different dimensions of companies’ healthiness, including
size, age, turnover, profitability, leverage liquidity and solidity. The definitions of the selected
financial ratios are provided in Appendix 2.
In order to collect the available financial figures, a sample of 108 annual, endofyear corporate
financial statement summaries are extracted from Finnvera's credit report database. These yearly
statements belong to 402 unique guarantees, from 1989 to 2005, of which 23 (5.7%) have had at
least one payment interruption or default in a given year. The financial accounts have been
originally obtained from reliable sources including Suomen Asiakastieto Oy, the leading
business and credit information company in Finland, whose data sources comprise the data
subjects, the authorities, and reliable partners14. A smaller part of the credit reports were obtained
from Dun & Bradstreet Credit Bureau and some complements were made directly from available
company financial reports. Summary statistics of the firm financial ratios are given in Table 4,
where Panel A presents the whole sample and Panel B the compares defaulting and non
defaulting firms. Summary statistics for political and legal risk indices (introduced in Section 3)
are presented in Table 5. Table 6 presents the correlations between firm financial (Panel A) and
political (Panel B) and the combined group (Panel C) of explanatory variables. The correlations
are generally very low (in most cases under ±0.2 ), except for icrg and its components, which are
naturally not tested jointly.
13 The biggest guarantee offers by Finnvera are applied to telecommunications and to shipping and shipbuilding.
14
Estimation Technique
The dependent variable yit in our model is the binary discrete variable indicating whether firm i
has defaulted or not in year t. The general representation of the model is
itkitkti eXfy += − ),( 1, β (1)
where kitX 1− represents the values of the k explanatory variables of firm i, (or a country specific
risk index) one year before the evaluation of the dependent variable. To examine the likelihood
of firm default, we estimate
pi,t = Pr ( tiy , = 1) = E ( tiy , | kitX 1− ) (2)
where pi,t is the probability that firm i will default in period t, conditional on the observed
covariates kitX 1− in the previous period. The functional form selected for this study is a dynamic
Logit model. Here, we assume that the variable yit ∈ {0,1} is related to an unobservable index
yi* by a linear function of the lagged explanatory variables xi1, xi2, … . , xik , and the random term
uit such that:
yi* = 0 + 1 xi1 + 2 xi2 + … + k xik + uit ( 3 )
yi = 1 if yi* > 0
yi = 0 otherwise
By this structure, we have
P(yi,t = 1| ‘Xi,t1 ) = P(ui > ‘Xi,t1 ) ( 4 )
= 1 F( ‘Xi,t1 )
with F( ) being the cumulative logistic distribution for u.
14 Suomen Asiakastieto Oy complies with the rules of good data processing practice of the international credit informationagencies FEBIS (Federation of Business Information Services) and ACCIS (Association of Consumer Credit InformationSuppliers).
15
Our methodology is an attempt to respond to the concerns of a singleperiod logit approach15, as
suggested in Shumway (2001) and Beck et al (1998), and will be further refined in our further
research work (e.g. to account for intertemporal correlation). Beck et al. (1998) demonstrate that
the use of ordinary singleperiod logit or probit on binary timeseries/crosssectional data (such
as default study data) can result in biased and inconsistent coefficients, as well as inflated t
statistics. A logistic discrete hazard model overcomes these methodological problems by
formally incorporating the dynamic nature of corporate default (see e.g. Hillegeist et al. 2004).
A logistic discrete hazard model, which is a discrete approximation to the Cox proportional
hazard model has the following form:
X ti,+=−
)(1
log,
, tp
p
ti
ti α , or (4)
X
X
ti
ti
,
,
)(
)(
, 1 +
+
+= t
t
ti eep α
α
(5)
where X ti, represents the independent variables observable at the end of year t and )(tα is a
timevarying covariate that captures the underlying “baseline” hazard rate. This maximum
likelihood estimator differs from ordinary logit by 1) the subscript t , that reflects the use of
multiple years of data for the same firm, and 2) discrete hazard model that includes the baseline
hazard rate )(tα . This allows a firm’s probability of default (and the associated covariates) to
change over time. In this version of the paper, we run the multiyear logit regressions by
assuming that the baseline hazard is constant.
15 Including 1) a sample selection bias from using only one, nonrandomly selected observation per defaulting firm, and 2) afailure to model timevarying changes in the underlying or baseline risk of default that induces crosssectional dependence in thedata.
16
5. Results
We estimate logit regressions for three broad model groups, including the traditional firm
financial ratios (Table 7); political and legal risk variables, either separately (Table 8); or in
combination with the firm financial ratios (Table 9). The hypothesis regarding firm size is not
supported with the data, why we disregard reporting models where the size and age variables are
included.
Accounting Ratios
Table 7 reports the results for Models 14 where lagged firm financial ratios measuring
Profitability and Leverage are tested jointly as predictors of firm default probability. The
indebtnessratio (indebt), measured by total liabilities to total assets, has the expected positive
influence on default probability in Models 1bd. However, it looses its explanatory power as
soon as it is combined with other financial variables or the icrg index (see e.g. Model 2b).
Similarly, the equity ratio (er) has the expected sign, and is significant in Models 1d, 2d and 2e.
The other variables measuring solidity or liquidity have the expected signs, but are not
significant except for the quick ratio (quick) in model 1e, and the net worth ratio (nw_ta) in
model 4b.
A surprising result is that profitability, as measured by earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization to total sales (ebitda) seem to have a significant but positive effect
on firm default probability. This would suggest, that the more profitable the firm was (before
interest, depreciation and amortization payments) the more it was likely to default on its debt.
This result has no clear interpretation; however, it allows oneself to be enticed in speculating on
the use of funds by the firms. It seems that these were profitable at first, but still unable or
unwilling to pay their foreign debts. The ratio is, on average, positive for most of the sample
17
firms with a mean value around 10% for the nondefaulting firms, and 20% for the defaulting
firms (see Table 4). This result may, of course, be caused by too few observations (the ebitda
figure is available for only 9 defaulting firms). Firm net profit as a percentage of total assets
(profit_ta) has the expected negative sign and is significant in Models 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b. While
the significance of some of the individual coefficients in the model are indicative, they do not
provide evidence concerning the collective group significance of accounting information.
We continue our analysis in Table 7 by combining firm financial ratios with the ICRG
Composite Political Risk Index (icrg) in Models 2 and 4. In all except one of the Models (4e),
this ratio gives the expected sign and is highly significant (at 1% level in Models 2ad, 4a and at
5% level in Models 4b4c). Looking at the overall pvalues for the models in Table 7, one can
conclude that they are statistically significant.
Political and Legal Risk
We next focus on political and legal risk indicators as predictors of firm default probabilities.
The general principle, when interpreting these results is that a negative coefficient for any
political or legal variable, indicates that an increase in the ratio (less risk) reduces the
probability of firm default. In various logit regressions16, most of the ICRG components show
the expected sign and are significant when tested separately. Combined in with each other, the
significance usually diminishes, except for the components measuring Socioeconomic Conditions
(socec), External Conflict (extcon) and Military in Politics (mil). Socioeconomic pressures at
work in a society may constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction, leading to
further instabilities. The risk rating is the sum of three subcomponents, including unemployment,
consumer confidence and poverty. It is conceivable that these malfunctions in society may well
16 Not reported here for brevity reasons; details on these are available from the author upon request.
18
lead also to firm deteoriation, and subsequently to its default. The External Conflict measure is
an assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from
nonviolent external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions,
territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent external pressure (crossborder conflicts to allout
war). One interpretation for the obtained result is that different forms of bilateral punishments do
not seem to act as enforcement mechanisms for debt repayments, but rather the opposite (see e.g.
Rose, 2002). However, external conflicts may also affect businesses adversely in other ways,
ranging from restrictions on operations, to trade and investment sanctions, to distortions in the
allocation of economic resources. Thus, any interpretation of the external conflictvariable
should be adjusted to the country and circumstances in question. Generally, these results would
suggest that the more external pressure a country has, the more the firms operating in that
country are likely to default on their foreign obligations.
It would be misleading to claim that only one political risk rating would serve as a single
predictor variable for firm default. Thus, we present the results in groups measuring 1. General
Political Stability (including government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment
climate, law and order and bureaucratic accountability); 2. Corruption&War (including
components of corruption, internal and external conflict, military and religion in politics as
well as ethnic tensions); and 3. Combined stability (with all included). Table 8 report the various
results for these groupings. Again, the component measuring Socioeconomic Conditions, remains
a significant predictor of firm default probability (7ae, 8a). Similarly, in models 6de, 7ad, 8bc
the External Conflict component is again negative and significant. Regarding the other political
and legal risk indices, no clearcut patterns may be observed from this data17.
17 The measure of corruption, is significant when measured alone. However, when combined with other components, it changessign and becomes insignificant. The Legal rights Index is significant only in models 7d and 8ae. The Creditor Rights Indexremains insignificant with a opposite sign to the hypothesized.
19
Combined Accounting Information, Political and Legal Risk
Finally, table 9 reports the results for the models, where financial ratios are combined with
selected political and legal indicators. Again, we find interesting results for the ebitdameasure,
which shows positive and significant coefficients (see e.g. models 9de, 10de and 11bd).
Meanwhile, the indebtness measure is significant only in one of the models (9d). On the political
risk side, the Socioeconomic conditions component show again the same significant patterns as
before. Also the Military in Politics component (mil) is significant and negative (e.g. models
10ae). The military’s involvement in politics, even at a peripheral level, can be seen as a
diminution of democratic accountability, and an indication that the government is unable to
function effectively. The signs for the other political and legal indices, when combined with
firm financial ratios, are insignificant or sometimes positive, why they can not be interpreted
within our stated hypothesis framework.
The overall presentiment of the above results is that, analyzed separately, both financial figures
and political risk indices, should be used in the credit evaluation of individual firms in foreign
countries. However, in combination, they might result in overfitting, and may be of little use for
predicting future outcomes.
The sample countries
It is clear that the choice of our sample countries (Argentina, Indonesia, Nigeria, Poland and
Saudi Arabia) may reveal patterns in the default history, that are driven by outside factors. We
briefly point out the main events in our sample countries, in order to assess the relevancy and
interpretability of the obtained results.
20
Among other things;
• The Argentine economic crisis was part of the situation that affected Argentina's whole
economy during the late 1990s and early 2000s. While the high level of Argentinian
defaults in our sample in year 2002 seem selfexplanatory, the situation is more
complicated, as almost all companies operating in the country were affected by the crisis,
but due to renegotiations of the debt contracts, many of them “survived” the difficult
period. The impact of the IMF bailouts and other forms of debt restructurings will be
further analyzed in our future versions of this paper.
• Indonesia is also a crisisaffected country, mainly by the 199798 Asian financial crisis,
which is shown in the default history in our data. However, other patterns of Indonesia
may be reflected in our data including the heavy borrowing from official creditors during
the 1980s. Overall, trading with and investing in Indonesia has for long been perceived to
entail a significant risk of financial loss as the legal system in the country has been
regarded very poor. Throughout the postwar history of Indonesia, the military have
played a key role in the politics of the country.
• In Nigeria, years of military rule, corruption, and mismanagement have hobbled
economic activity and output, and the indebtness situation is complex stemming from
immense interest arrears and external political factors concerning debt reductions. As
demonstrated by Udry (1994) for rural credit in Northern Nigeria, credit imperfections
can arise entirely from the problem of enforcement, rather than eg. imperfect information.
• Poland experienced a transition from a centrally planned to a market orientated economy,
some decade ago. The number of issued guarantees as well as defaults in Poland reflect
the general positive developments in the country during the 1990s as well as the fact, that
the country had rejoined international capital markets and regained favorable credit
ratings, triggering investment inflows.
• Saudi Arabia represents an example of an oildependent arab economy, that has strong
government controls over major economic activities. The country has not been able to
secure oil income for its own finances, which has led to substantial budgetary deficits and
borrowings every year since the early 1980s. The interpretation of the default causes in
Saudi Arabia are far from straightforward.
21
6. Some Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
In this study, we have constructed and compared default prediction models for two sets of
explanatory variables; traditional accounting ratios, and countryspecific political and legal risk
indicators. The models applied in this study were tested using export credit guaranteed debt as
underlying credit data. Following previous research, we included firmspecific accounting ratios
as traditional determinants of firm default probability. These included measures of profitability,
leverage, liquidity and solidity. Our new approach is to include measures of political and legal
risk in the analysis. In the second part of the analysis, we thus proxy the general political
stability, corruption, conflict/war, level of democracy, and legal and creditor rights, in
respective sample country by indices from wellestablished country risk experts, and test whether
these may work as good signals of future firm default risk.
Subject to the limitations with our preliminary data from five countries; Argentina, Indonesia,
Nigeria, Poland and Saudi Arabia, the results presented here suggest that indicators of political
risk, indeed affect the firm default probabilities. Without assessing the political and legal risk
landscape, the default probabilities may not be properly estimated using only scarcely available
accounting data. The firm financial variables alone, suggest that measures of indebtness may
indicate for future payment difficulties. Meanwhile, the profitability level is not clear in its
interpretation as the obtained coefficients and significance for the ebitdameasure suggest that
even the more profitable firms tend to default on their debts. This result, together with the high
significance of the ICRG Political Risk Index led our way to further tests with the political and
legal risk components as explanatory variables. From these tests, we can make a preliminary
conclusion that countryspecific measures on socioeconomic conditions, external conflict and
military in politics, seem to serve as justified indicators for firm default.
22
Some explanations for these preliminary results can of course be found by looking at the country
backgrounds. For example, the MENA region (and Saudi Arabia) has been for long the scene of
both internal crises and external conflicts. On several occasions, these crises have affected either
the flow energy exports or the development of energy production and thus, the export and
import capacity of the country. Also the socioeconomic conditions in Poland after the events of
1989 as well as the regime's ultimate collapse and the deflationary shock and rapid transition to a
market economy in 1990, certainly had its impact on the payment ability of the Polish
companies. The story in Indonesia is to a certain extent similar, with our data supporting for the
additional claim that military in politics may ultimately affect also firm defaults in the country.
This is conceivable, looking at Indonesia with the dramatic turnaround and political and
economic crises since 1997, the downfall of Suharto etc. Further, the anecdotal evidence on the
magnitude of corruption in Nigeria can hardly ignored, when considering payback ability and –
willingness of firms operating in Nigeria.
The political, economic, and legal risk dynamics that shape threats to international credit
contracts are complex. Understanding the factors behind these diverse forces as well as future
trends, needs detailed assessment of each country in question, taking each conceivable variable
into careful consideration. Our preliminary results from this study are only indicative, and
subject to further testing with more countries in our sample, further model validation and outof
sample testing. Whereas data drive default prediction models, it is our plan to augment the
sample countries, and include more advanced econometric models in our further research.
23
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25
Table 1 Twenty Main Recipients of Export Credits Among Developing Countries andCountries in Transition, 1996 (in billions of USD)
Source: Berne Union and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Gianturco (2001)
Country.
USDbnx
Russia 52.9
China 44.8
Indonesia 28.2
Nigeria 24.8
Brazil 24.7
Algeria 23.9
Poland 22.7
Turkey 18.0
Argentina 16.6
Mexico 16.4
Thailand 15.4
Iran, Islamic Republic 14.0
Eqypt 13.6
India 13.0
Iraq 11.2
Philippines 10.5
Hong Kong, SAR 10.1
Venezuela 6.2
South Africa 6.1
Morocco 6.0
26
Figure 1 ae) Sample Distribution by Year and Country
1b) Indonesia
0123456789
Bef
ore
1980
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
# gu
aran
tees
New guaranteesDefaults
1d) Poland
020406080
100120140160180
Before
1980
1981
1983
1985
1987
198919
911993
1995
199719
99200
120
03
Year
# gu
aran
tees
New guaranteesDefaults
1c) Nigeria
0
5
10
15
20
25
Bef
ore
1980
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
# gu
aran
tees
New guaranteesDefaults
1a) Argentina
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Bef
ore
1980
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
# gu
aran
tees
New guaranteesDefaults
1e) Saudi Arabia
0
5
10
15
20
25
Bef
ore
1980
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
# gu
aran
tees
New guaranteesDefaults
27
Table 2 Contract Statistics
Panel A: Observations by Country and Firm Years
Country.
Guarantees.
Defaults.
No default Defaultrate (1)
Argentina 296 45 251 15.2 %
Indonesia 36 21 15 58.3 %
Nigeria 56 13 43 23.2 %
Poland 469 9 460 1.9 %
Saudi Arabia 146 40 106 27.4 %
Total (avg) 1 003 128 875 12.8 %
Country.
Firmyears
Defaultyears
No defaultyears
Defaultrate (2)
Argentina 1 046 90 956 7.9 %
Indonesia 165 48 117 22.5 %
Nigeria 277 22 255 7.4 %
Poland 1 698 9 1 689 0.5 %
Saudi Arabia 535 47 488 8.1 %
Total (avg) 3 721 216 3 505 5.5 %
Panel B: Size of liabilities and indemnifications
Country.
Avg liability(mEUR)
St Dev.
Min.
Max.
Argentina 5.8 23.5 0.0 331.0
Indonesia 114.0 296.0 0.2 1 370.0
Nigeria 7.3 9.8 0.0 46.0
Poland 5.8 103.0 0.0 2 220.0
Saudi Arabia 4.9 11.0 0.1 84.4
Total (avg) 28
Country.
Avg indemnity(mEUR)
St Dev.
Min.
Max.
Argentina 4.5 6.4 0.1 26.3
Indonesia 58.6 99.1 0.1 317.0
Nigeria 1.5 1.3 0.1 4.4
Poland 0.6 1.0 0.0 2.9
Saudi Arabia 1.7 2.0 0.1 4.6
Total (avg) 13
28
Figure 2 Industry Distribution in the Sample and Finnish Exports of Goods
Figure 2a) Industry distribution in the Sample Figure 2b) Finnish exports of goodsSource: Finnvera plc. Source: Finnish National Board of Customs / TEKES
% of total exports of goods
Industrials37 %
Pulp andpaper35 %
Chemicals7 %
Construct ion3 %
Consumerproducts
12 %
Knowledgeintensive
6 %
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
Wood productsPulp, paper and paper productsBasic metals, and metal productsMachines, machinery and vehiclesElectronics and eletrotechnical productsChemicals and chemical productsOther goods
Table 3 Sectoral Composition of Sampled Firms
Source: Finnvera plc. Exports to Argentina, Indonesia, Nigeria, Poland and Saudi Arabia
Country.
Firm years.
Shareof total
Defaultrate
Industrials No. of default years 94 43.5 % 7.0 %Defaultfree years 1 334 35.9 %
Pulp and paper No. of default years 47 21.8 % 3.5 %Defaultfree years 1 332 35.8 %
Chemicals No. of default years 28 13.0 % 11.9 %Defaultfree years 236 6.3 %
Construction No. of default years 5 2.3 % 3.8 %Defaultfree years 132 3.5 %
Consumer products No. of default years 26 12.0 % 5.7 %Defaultfree years 455 12.2 %
Knowledge intensive No. of default years 16 7.4 % 6.9 %Defaultfree years 232 6.2 %
TOTAL No. of default years 216 5.8 %Defaultfree years 3 721
29
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics – Firm Variables
Panel A: Observations by Firm Years
Variable
agerevprofit
wcnwassetsliabequity
rev_taebitdaprof_taerindebtcurrentquicknw_ta
MaxObs Mean Std.Dev Min
64.0788 85.1 138.1 0.0 785.02470 24.2 19.5 1.0
139.8727 6.3 19.6 3.8
12.7700 32.0 70.9 19.3 403.9188 6.3 24.7 102.2
1085.1705 51.6 139.1 0.4 792.0749 93.2 208.6 0.0
403.9716 31.0 66.7 1.6
90.3711 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.5740 6.3 18.2 0.0
1.1705 0.2 1.3 5.1 1.1716 0.0 0.2 1.0
2.3509 2.7 10.1 0.0 83.3533 0.5 0.4 0.0
4.6690 0.5 0.3 0.5 1.2355 1.1 0.7 0.0
Panel B: Comparison Between Defaulting and Nondefaulting Firms
Variable
Comparison y = 0 y = 1 y = 0 y = 1 y = 0 y = 1 y = 0 y = 1 y = 0 y = 1
age 317 9 24.1 31.6 19.4 25.7 1.0 6.0 64.0 64.0rev 349 23 84.3 248.6 144.4 253.9 0.0 0.0 785.0 530.0profit 323 21 6.8 21.9 19.9 23.1 3.8 0.4 139.8 45.6
wc 93 3 7.2 5.9 24.5 3.3 93.5 2.1 7.8 7.8nw 304 21 39.2 104.1 83.2 101.6 19.3 0.9 359.8 207.9assets 336 23 100.4 452.6 208.8 491.6 0.0 0.0 1085.1 999.9liab 308 21 58.5 391.6 144.7 391.9 0.4 2.1 792.0 792.0equity 315 18 34.3 85.0 69.6 63.1 1.6 1.6 359.9 138.9
rev_ta 336 23 3.7 4.0 12.2 10.8 0.0 0.0 86.2 38.3ebitda 316 23 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.3 1.3 0.5 0.5prof_ta 317 21 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.1 1.1 0.1er 313 21 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.2 5.1 0.4 0.9 0.5indebt 236 20 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 2.3 1.5current 241 20 3.3 0.9 11.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 83.3 1.2quick 157 10 1.1 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.6 4.6 2.0nw_ta 303 21 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 1.2 0.6
MaxObs Mean Std.Dev Min
Definitions: age = years since firm establishment; rev = sales (USDm); profit = net profit (USDm); wc = working capital (USDm); nw = net worth (USDm); assets = total assets (USDm);liab = total liabilities (USDm); equity = owners equity (USDm); rev_ta = sales / total assets; ebitda = (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization)/sales;prof_ta = net profit / total assets; er = equity ratio; indebt = total liabilities/total assets; current = current ratio; quick = quick ratio; nw_ta = net worth / total assets.
30
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics – Political Risk Variables by Country
Rating Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Rating Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
icrg Argentina 21 66.10 8.20 53.67 76.42 religion Argentina 21 5.56 0.50 5.00 6.00Indonesia 21 50.95 8.76 39.83 66.92 Indonesia 21 2.53 1.39 1.00 5.00Nigeria 21 46.61 4.81 38.79 54.33 Nigeria 21 1.98 0.71 0.50 3.00Poland 21 69.26 12.31 47.57 86.58 Poland 21 3.81 1.57 1.00 5.00Saudi Arabia 21 61.51 7.59 49.25 70.00 Saudi Arabia 21 2.47 1.15 1.00 4.00
govstab Argentina 21 6.70 1.89 4.25 10.33 law Argentina 21 3.68 1.09 1.50 5.00Indonesia 21 7.39 1.40 5.50 10.75 Indonesia 21 2.68 1.02 1.50 4.75Nigeria 21 6.67 2.02 3.75 10.50 Nigeria 21 2.05 0.92 1.00 3.00Poland 21 6.87 1.67 4.50 10.58 Poland 21 4.52 0.75 4.00 6.00Saudi Arabia 21 8.22 1.70 5.92 10.92 Saudi Arabia 21 4.53 0.66 3.00 5.50
socec Argentina 21 4.90 1.34 2.13 6.75 ethnic Argentina 21 6.00 0.00 6.00 6.00Indonesia 21 5.31 2.22 2.00 8.58 Indonesia 21 2.13 0.75 1.00 3.00Nigeria 21 4.06 1.94 1.50 7.00 Nigeria 21 2.54 0.90 1.00 4.00Poland 21 5.22 0.62 4.08 6.92 Poland 21 5.55 0.50 5.00 6.00Saudi Arabia 21 6.85 1.17 5.46 9.75 Saudi Arabia 21 4.34 0.91 2.00 5.00
invest Argentina 21 5.57 1.41 3.33 8.00 democ Argentina 21 4.44 0.49 3.67 5.00Indonesia 21 6.12 1.31 4.00 8.92 Indonesia 21 3.15 0.76 1.00 4.83Nigeria 21 5.40 0.84 4.00 7.00 Nigeria 21 2.45 0.86 0.50 3.58Poland 21 7.26 2.79 3.17 11.50 Poland 21 4.13 1.72 1.57 6.00Saudi Arabia 21 7.70 1.88 5.33 11.00 Saudi Arabia 21 1.14 0.98 0.00 2.00
intcon Argentina 21 9.53 1.56 6.17 12.00 buerau Argentina 21 2.35 0.48 2.00 3.00Indonesia 21 6.88 1.41 4.08 9.00 Indonesia 21 1.31 1.10 0.00 3.00Nigeria 21 7.41 1.91 4.58 11.00 Nigeria 21 1.28 0.66 0.00 2.00Poland 21 10.08 1.46 8.00 12.00 Poland 21 2.44 0.95 1.00 3.33Saudi Arabia 21 8.74 2.02 4.67 12.00 Saudi Arabia 21 2.37 0.48 2.00 3.00
extcon Argentina 21 10.53 1.27 8.75 12.00 polity Argentina 24 5.54 5.38 9.00 8.00Indonesia 21 10.49 1.00 8.83 12.00 Indonesia 24 4.00 5.78 7.00 7.00Nigeria 21 10.03 0.79 7.58 11.50 Nigeria 24 5.29 18.53 88.00 7.00Poland 21 10.79 1.78 7.00 12.00 Poland 24 2.63 7.63 8.00 10.00Saudi Arabia 21 8.59 1.81 5.08 11.04 Saudi Arabia 24 10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00
corr Argentina 21 3.18 0.78 2.00 4.00 durable Argentina 24 9.38 6.03 0.00 20.00Indonesia 21 1.43 1.07 0.00 3.00 Indonesia 24 16.54 9.93 0.00 30.00Nigeria 21 1.67 0.45 1.00 2.00 Nigeria 24 4.63 3.99 0.00 13.00Poland 21 3.97 1.11 2.00 5.00 Poland 24 17.13 16.14 0.00 41.00Saudi Arabia 21 2.21 0.44 2.00 3.33 Saudi Arabia 24 65.50 7.07 54.00 77.00
mil Argentina 21 3.67 0.88 2.00 5.00Indonesia 21 1.52 0.78 0.00 2.50Nigeria 21 1.06 0.79 0.00 2.67Poland 21 4.63 2.06 1.00 6.00Saudi Arabia 21 4.37 0.87 3.00 5.00
Definitions: icrg = composite ICRG political risk index; govstab = government stability; socec = socioeconomic conditions; invest = investment profile; intcon = internal conflict;extcon = external conflict; corr = corruption; mil = military in politics; religion = religion in politics; law = law and order ; ethnic = ethnic tensions;democ = democratic accountability; burau = bureauracy quality; polity = level of democracy; durable = stability of regime.
31
Table 6 Correlation Among Explanatory Variables
Panel A: Firm Variables
rev_ta ebitda prof_ta indebt nw_ta er current quickrev_ta 1ebitda 0.052 1prof_ta 0.825 0.348 1indebt 0.385 0.446 0.298 1nw_ta 0.362 0.225 0.347 0.268 1er 0.011 0.161 0.167 0.052 0.467 1current 0.045 0.099 0.028 0.283 0.191 0.294 1quick 0.037 0.374 0.185 0.052 0.196 0.179 0.093 1
Panel B: Political Risk Variables
icrg govstab socec invest intconfl extconfl corrupt military religion law ethnic democ buerauc autoc polity durableicrg 1govstab 0.366 1socec 0.379 0.011 1invest 0.564 0.550 0.504 1intconfl 0.832 0.199 0.240 0.283 1extconfl 0.488 0.076 0.046 0.092 0.493 1corrupt 0.556 0.222 0.138 0.033 0.484 0.184 1military 0.849 0.320 0.243 0.468 0.646 0.304 0.467 1religion 0.777 0.092 0.122 0.175 0.656 0.529 0.469 0.544 1law 0.804 0.385 0.409 0.389 0.727 0.174 0.520 0.734 0.499 1ethnic 0.812 0.061 0.175 0.233 0.754 0.240 0.689 0.698 0.751 0.664 1democ 0.427 0.131 0.200 0.076 0.274 0.449 0.297 0.306 0.571 0.027 0.342 1buerauc 0.621 0.169 0.112 0.237 0.382 0.065 0.494 0.660 0.453 0.518 0.583 0.313 1autoc 0.001 0.146 0.388 0.095 0.030 0.063 0.070 0.034 0.136 0.039 0.040 0.161 0.087 1polity 0.374 0.141 0.174 0.057 0.247 0.432 0.331 0.368 0.431 0.089 0.400 0.657 0.411 0.423 1durable 0.127 0.314 0.548 0.388 0.084 0.453 0.135 0.258 0.201 0.434 0.088 0.624 0.108 0.403 0.391 1
Panel C: Combined
rev_ta ebitda prof_ta indebt current quick er nw_ta icrg polity durable legal creditrev_ta 1ebitda 0.051 1prof_ta 0.826 0.348 1indebt 0.395 0.455 0.303 1current 0.030 0.099 0.026 0.245 1quick 0.035 0.373 0.184 0.062 0.072 1er 0.005 0.159 0.167 0.077 0.253 0.172 1nw_ta 0.368 0.224 0.350 0.287 0.165 0.191 0.460 1icrg 0.074 0.125 0.218 0.123 0.109 0.143 0.103 0.009 1polity 0.122 0.097 0.046 0.278 0.054 0.314 0.035 0.094 0.452 1durable 0.196 0.171 0.123 0.331 0.005 0.325 0.023 0.072 0.446 0.955 1legal 0.133 0.159 0.077 0.281 0.024 0.298 0.040 0.048 0.449 0.988 0.974 1credit 0.013 0.433 0.183 0.002 0.522 0.059 0.530 0.305 0.078 0.288 0.328 0.402 1.000
Definitions: age = years since firm establishment; rev = sales (USDm); profit = net profit (USDm); wc = working capital (USDm); nw = net worth (USDm); assets = total assets (USDm); liab = total liabilities (USDm); equity = owners equity (USDm); rev_ta = sales / total assets; ebitda = (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization)/sales;
prof_ta = net profit / total assets; er = equity ratio; indebt = total liabilities/total assets; current = current ratio; quick = quick ratio; nw_ta = net worth / total assets.
icrg = composite ICRG political risk index; govstab = government stability; socec = socioeconomic conditions; invest = investment profile; intcon = internal conflict;extcon = external conflict; corr = corruption; mil = military in politics; religion = religion in politics; law = law and order ; ethnic = ethnic tensions;democ = democratic accountability; burau = bureauracy quality; polity = level of democracy; durable = stability of regime.
32
Table 7 Logit Results – Firm Variables and ICRGIndex
Model 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e
constant 0.94 3.78 3.11 1.63 0.68 5.01 5.59 6.60 7.69 5.74 5.18 3.89 2.54 2.01 4.56 1.58 3.56 4.81 5.95 8.55(1.37) (8.10)** (4.57)** (2.19)* (0.34) (3.38)** (2.21)* (2.45)* (2.89)** (0.72) (3.33)** (2.41)* (1.16) (0.63) (1.12) (0.53) (1.00) (1.32) (1.39) (0.93)
rev_ta 2.20 1.03 0.27 0.36 0.06 0.32 1.06 0.40 0.32 0.06 0.41 0.94(3.09)** (1.54) (0.29) (0.39) (0.05) (0.20) (0.67) (0.45) (0.38) (0.07) (0.28) (0.55)
ebitda 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.12(1.60) (2.16)* (4.67)** (4.52)** (3.19)** (2.29)* (1.98)* (3.83)** (3.67)** (2.43)* (1.73) (1.95)
prof_ta 0.67 0.04 14.23 12.65 10.34 9.19 8.91 14.70 12.60 10.08 8.51 8.04(0.32) (0.02) (2.87)** (2.24)* (1.73) (1.60) (1.61) (2.81)** (2.21)* (1.70) (1.57) (1.41)
indebt 1.79 1.57 1.22 0.12 0.21 0.15 0.36 0.35 1.35 0.78 0.54 0.51 3.70 0.41 0.43 0.60 0.67 3.66(3.90)** (3.24)** (2.56)* (0.06) (0.31) (0.20) (0.50) (0.16) (2.12)* (1.16) (0.75) (0.55) (1.05) (0.55) (0.46) (0.66) (0.60) (1.05)
nw_ta 1.32 1.05 2.65 1.60 0.24 1.80 3.98 3.94 4.25 2.43 4.26 4.12 4.70 2.01(1.10) (0.76) (0.96) (1.41) (0.17) (0.65) (1.91) (1.78) (1.82) (0.84) (1.98)* (1.79) (1.88) (0.68)
er 6.61 3.12 6.17 6.52 2.01 2.79 4.80 2.21 2.82 4.92(3.52)** (1.07) (3.25)** (2.60)** (0.89) (1.08) (1.65) (0.93) (0.99) (1.68)
current 1.81 0.13 0.42(1.46) (0.23) (0.39)
quick 1.62 0.39 0.04 0.03(2.09)* (0.77) (0.06) (0.04)
icrg 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05(4.16)** (3.73)** (3.71)** (3.64)** (0.51) (2.61)** (2.38)* (2.41)* (2.49)* (0.48)
Log Likelihood 62.49 59.76 58.54 52.13 25.20 53.41 51.40 50.09 44.16 28.52 45.95 42.80 42.40 41.31 24.73 42.19 39.47 39.03 37.68 24.60observations 318 249 237 237 162 318 249 237 237 162 236 228 228 214 153 236 228 228 214 153LR chi 24.39 14.76 15.26 28.08 19.12 42.55 31.48 32.15 44.01 12.47 40.26 45.20 46.00 45.67 18.99 47.78 51.86 52.74 52.92 19.25Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014Pseudo R2 0.163 0.110 0.115 0.212 0.275 0.285 0.234 0.243 0.333 0.179 0.305 0.346 0.352 0.356 0.277 0.362 0.397 0.403 0.413 0.281
1. Profitability vs. indebtness 2. Profitability, indebtness & ICRG 3. Profitability and leverage 4. Profitability, leverage & ICRG
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. *) Significant at 5%; **) Significant at 1%.
Definitions: rev_ta = sales / total assets; ebitda = (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization)/sales; prof_ta = net profit / total assets; indebt = total liabilities/total assets; nw_ta = net worth / total assets er = equity ratio;current = current ratio; quick = quick ratio; icrg = composite ICRG political risk index.
All explanatory variables are lagged by 1 year.
33
Table 8 Logit Results – Political Risk Variables
Model 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 7a 7b 7c 7d 7e 8a 8b 8c 8d 8e
constant 0.37 3.33 2.89 2.16 1.86 7.23 1.83 2.20 2.63 3.78 5.71 7.92 5.68 9.80 0.73 6.96 5.69 5.28 5.90 2.52(1.17) (7.97)** (6.81)** (5.25)** (4.42)** (7.09)** (6.76)** (6.50)** (7.12)** (8.41)** (5.07)** (5.95)** (4.47)** (6.83)** (0.45) (3.28)** (2.52)* (2.28)* (2.55)* (0.93)
govstab 0.36 0.26 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.24(7.33)** (6.35)** (1.09) (2.29)* (2.04)* (2.51)* (1.55) (2.46)* (2.49)* (2.51)* (1.85) (2.00)* (2.26)* (2.61)** (1.93)
socec 0.79 0.66 0.24 0.16 0.61 0.33 0.60 0.48 0.81 0.52 0.18 0.25 0.28 0.24(11.56)** (8.65)** (2.81)** (1.83) (5.37)** (2.58)* (4.65)** (4.33)** (6.03)** (4.20)** (1.22) (1.56) (1.70) (1.51)
invst 0.26 0.36 0.39 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.29 0.27 0.35 0.46(3.69)** (4.67)** (4.94)** (0.09) (0.29) (0.10) (0.57) (0.71) (0.07) (2.23)* (2.10)* (2.37)* (3.02)**
law 0.61 0.79 0.20 0.25 0.14 0.33 0.20 0.49 0.34 0.17 0.43 0.57(9.13)** (8.36)** (0.84) (1.00) (0.52) (1.24) (0.76) (2.03)* (1.31) (0.57) (1.24) (1.73)
bureau 0.37 0.69 0.86 0.68 0.43 0.65 0.31 0.13 0.82(2.65)** (3.31)** (3.65)** (3.13)** (1.90) (3.04)** (1.09) (0.39) (2.13)*
intcon 0.51 0.46 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.21 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.01(15.51)** (10.21)** (0.76) (0.33) (0.23) (1.19) (0.16) (0.80) (0.23) (1.56) (1.34) (0.76) (0.45) (0.05)
extcon 0.08 0.34 0.49 0.47 0.72 0.49 0.35 0.16 0.22 0.41 0.38 0.32 0.29(1.77) (6.17)** (7.59)** (3.74)** (5.00)** (3.28)** (2.67)** (1.04) (1.54) (2.48)* (2.24)* (1.75) (1.62)
mil 0.69 0.77 0.69 0.73 0.68 0.72 0.71 0.75 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.88(8.37)** (8.95)** (4.25)** (4.29)** (4.18)** (4.28)** (4.12)** (4.53)** (4.97)** (4.52)** (4.32)** (4.80)**
religion 0.34 0.31 0.52 0.24 0.37 0.44 0.26 0.56 0.67 0.51 0.12(5.20)** (1.87) (2.60)** (1.14) (2.14)* (2.57)* (1.67) (2.82)** (2.96)** (2.18)* (0.48)
ethnic 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.05 0.31 0.49 0.46 0.32 0.32 0.36(1.84) (0.56) (1.52) (0.20) (1.14) (1.90) (1.71) (1.06) (1.07) (1.22)
corr 0.47 0.34 0.19 0.36 0.34 0.56 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.46 0.85(8.50)** (2.44)* (1.25) (2.18)* (2.51)* (3.49)** (2.54)* (2.38)* (2.55)* (2.78)** (3.96)**
democ 1.07 1.00 1.14 1.28(4.03)** (3.71)** (3.47)** (3.84)**
polity 0.15 0.08 0.23(4.19)** (1.29) (1.78)
durable 0.00 0.13(0.20) (2.86)**
legal 0.89 0.82 0.73 0.66 0.92 0.00(4.93)** (4.27)** (3.89)** (3.34)** (3.22)** (0.01)
credit 0.98 0.45 0.38 0.42 0.32 0.20(3.97)** (1.77) (1.49) (1.62) (1.20) (0.64)
Log Likelihood 723.93 655.53 647.56 603.72 600.13 717.09 615.32 613.76 578.74 565.41 526.66 512.27 522.12 512.77 518.35 512.93 500.71 500.13 497.58 493.26observations 3443 3443 3443 3443 3443 3443 3443 3443 3443 3443 3443 3417 3417 3443 3443 3443 3443 3443 3417 3417LR chi 61.84 198.63 214.58 302.26 309.43 75.52 279.06 282.19 352.21 378.88 456.38 470.88 451.19 484.16 473.00 483.85 508.28 509.45 500.26 508.91Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Pseudo R2 0.041 0.132 0.142 0.200 0.205 0.005 0.185 0.187 0.233 0.251 0.302 0.315 0.302 0.321 0.313 0.321 0.337 0.337 0.335 0.340
5. General political stability 7. Combined stability 6. Corruption & War 8. Combined stability, legal/credit
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. *) Significant at 5%; **) Significant at 1%. All explanatory variables are lagged by 1 year.
Definitions: govstab = government stability; socec = socioeconomic conditions; invest = investment profile; intcon = internal conflict; extcon = external conflict; corr = corruption; mil = military in politics; religion = religion in politics; law = law and order ;ethnic = ethnic tensions; democ = democratic accountability; burau = bureauracy quality; polity = level of democracy; durable = stability of regime; legal = ; credit = .
34
Table 9 Logit Results – Firm Financial Ratios and Political Risk Variables
Model 9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 10a 10b 10c 10d 10e 11a 11b 11c 11d 11e
constant 2.74 3.08 0.94 5.18 3.11 6.01 3.91 11.99 11.95 8.25 36.97 39.52 177.48 194.74 1,756.149(11.81)** (8.07)** (1.37) (3.33)** (1.45) (1.46) (0.92) (1.77) (1.59) (1.08) (2.93)** (2.87)** (.) (0.15) (.)
rev_ta 0.01 0.02 2.20 0.27 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.25 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.58 4.62 55.85(0.59) (0.84) (3.09)** (0.29) (0.08) (0.17) (0.24) (1.23) (0.27) (0.26) (0.61) (0.90) (0.92) (1.54) (1.79)
ebitda 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.26 0.37(1.57) (1.60) (4.67)** (2.59)** (1.95) (2.81)** (3.27)** (2.19)* (2.49)* (2.29)* (2.55)* (1.83)
prof_ta 0.67 14.23 9.60 3.64 20.79 20.71 4.79 62.65 82.27(0.32) (2.87)** (1.65) (1.12) (2.00)* (1.53) (1.27) (1.93) (1.32)
indebt 1.35 0.98 0.81 0.31 2.34 86.47(2.12)* (1.40) (0.58) (0.20) (0.74) (1.87)
er 3.14 5.23 123.28(1.36) (1.75) (2.09)*
socec 1.07 1.12 1.08 0.61 0.35 0.95 1.03 1.79 1.24 0.63(3.98)** (3.99)** (2.85)** (1.33) (0.64) (3.08)** (3.22)** (2.45)* (1.25) (0.23)
extcon 0.48 0.28 0.52 0.07 0.27 0.04 0.29 0.90 0.07 1.15(1.33) (0.79) (1.20) (0.13) (0.48) (0.10) (0.72) (1.24) (0.09) (0.93)
corr 0.47 0.53 0.50 0.10 0.50 1.16 1.44 1.84 0.58 3.22(1.49) (1.64) (1.12) (0.15) (0.62) (2.37)* (2.70)** (1.83) (0.47) (1.14)
mil 1.43 1.39 3.07 2.38 3.25 0.30 0.50 2.34 0.63 3.59(2.74)** (2.51)* (2.90)** (2.17)* (2.41)* (0.36) (0.57) (1.56) (0.37) (0.94)
democ 1.75 1.71 4.40 4.31 5.37 1.70 1.80 8.42 5.90 118.01(2.36)* (2.14)* (2.71)** (2.53)* (2.52)* (2.09)* (2.06)* (2.34)* (1.74) (2.01)*
legal 5.33 6.14 22.48 25.28 233.50(2.72)** (2.87)** (11.69)** (0.13) (0.17)
credit 1.82 1.94 11.81 14.66 102.59(2.34)* (2.33)* (5.04)** (0.12) (0.15)
Log Likelihood 82.02 79.23 62.49 45.95 44.99 55.48 52.68 36.31 28.72 26.82 50.77 46.59 29.91 20.98 11.67observations 350 330 318 236 236 350 330 318 236 236 350 330 318 236 236LR chi 0.29 3.20 24.39 40.26 42.19 53.37 56.30 76.75 74.72 78.53 62.79 68.48 89.54 90.20 108.83Prob > chi2 0.588 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Pseudo R2 0.002 0.020 0.163 0.305 0.319 0.325 0.348 0.514 0.565 0.594 0.382 0.424 0.600 0.683 0.824
9. Financial Accounting 10. Accounting & Political Risk 11. Accounting, Political & Legal Risk
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. *) Significant at 5%; **) Significant at 1%. All explanatory variables are lagged by 1 year.
Definitions: rev_ta = sales / total assets; ebitda = (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization)/sales; prof_ta = net profit / total assets; indebt = total liabilities/total assets; er = equity ratio; socec = socioeconomic conditions; extcon = external conflict;corr = corruption; mil = military in politics; democ = democratic accountability; legal = ; credit = .
35
Appendix I Description of Political Risk Variables
1) The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)Source: Researchers Dataset (April, 2005), The PRS Group.
The ICRG rating comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic. We apply thePolitical Risk index that is based on 100 points. The following risk components and weights are used to produce thepolitical risk rating.
Risk Component Weight Short name
A.Government Stability (12) govstabB. Socioeconomic Conditions (12) socecC. Investment Profile (12) investD. Internal conflict (12) intconE. External Conflict (12) extconF. Corruption (6) corrG. Military in Politics (6) milH. Religion in Politics (6) religionI. Law and Order (6) lawJ. Ethnic Tensions (6) ethnicK. Democratic Accountability (6) democL. Bureaucracy Quality (4) bureauComposite ICRG Political Risk (100) icrg
2) POLITY IVSource: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
The POLITY IV project rates the levels of democracy of all independent states from 1800 to 1999 resulting in a "PolityIndex", which has scale from 10 to +10 measuring the degree to which a nation is either autocratic or democratic. A scoreof +10 indicates a strongly democratic state; a score of 10 a strongly autocratic state. The Polity IV Regime DurabilityVariable measures the years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the POLITY scoreover a period of three years or less) or the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions.
Variable Short name
Polity IV Index polityPolity IV Durable Index durable
3) LEGAL RIGHTS / CREDITOR RIGHTSSource: World Bank / Governance indicators, 2005.
The Legal Rights index, measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. It is based on datacollected through study of collateral and insolvency laws, supported by the responses to the survey on secured transactionslaws. The index includes 3 aspects related to legal rights in bankruptcy and 7 aspects found in collateral law. The CreditInformation Index measures rules affecting the scope, access and quality of credit information.
Variable Short name
Legal Rights Index legal
Creditor Rights credit
36
Appendix II Description of Firm Variables
1) General Firm Variables
Variable Definition Short name
Size Natural logarithm of sales size 1Natural logarithm of total assets size 2
Age Years since incorporation* age
Employees Number of employees empl
2) Firm Accounting Variables (in USD millions**)
Variable Definition Short name
Sales Sales rev
Net income Net profit or loss profit
Working capital Working capital wc
Net worth Current assets – current liabilities nw
Total assets Balance sheet total assets
Liabilities Total longterm and shortterm liabilities liab
Equity Owners’ equity equity
3) Accounting Ratios
Area of measurement Definition Short name
Turnover Sales / Total assets rev_ta
Profitability Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation andamortization / Sales ebitda
Net profit or loss / Sales prof_ta
Leverage / gearing Total liabilities / Total assets indebt
Liquidity Current ratio = Current assets / Current liabilities current
Quick ratio = [Cash + Accounts receivable] / Current liabilities quick
Solidity Equity ratio = Book value of equity / Total assets er
Net worth ratio = Net worth / Total assets nw_ta
*) Measured from the fiscal year when the guarantee became effective**) Converted from local currency to USD at the prevailing market FXrate (Source: Economics Web Institute).
Source for data: Asiakastieto Oy, Firm Financial Statements, Finnvera Plc.