Political Theory and the Criminal Law

Political Theory and the Criminal Law

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PhilosophicalFoundationsofCriminalLawR.A.DuffandStuartGreen

Printpublicationdate:2011PrintISBN-13:9780199559152PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:May2011DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001

PoliticalTheoryandtheCriminalLawMattMatravers(ContributorWebpage)

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0004

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapteraskswhatcontractarianpoliticaltheorycantellusabouttheplaceofthecriminallaw,andofcriminals,inaliberalsociety.Itbeginsbydistinguishingtwoformsofcontractarianthinking:oneowedtothemutualadvantagetraditionofHobbes;theothertotheimpartialisttraditionofKant.Theargumentisthatbothcanunderwriteasystemofcriminallaw,andofpunishment,forsimilarreasons.

Keywords:criminallaw,contractariantheory,Hobbes,Kant,punishment,liberalsociety

1INTRODUCTIONThischapteraskswhatcontractarianpoliticaltheorycantellusabouttheplaceofthecriminallaw,andofcriminals,inaliberalsociety.Itbeginsbydistinguishingtwoformsofcontractarianthinking:oneowedtothemutualadvantagetraditionofHobbes;theothertotheimpartialisttraditionofKant.Theargumentisthatbothcanunderwriteasystemofcriminallaw,andofpunishment,forsimilarreasons.


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However,atthispointthetraditionsdiverge.Themutualadvantagetraditionallowsindeed,commendsthetransmissionofnaturalinequalitiesintojustoutcomes.TheKantiantradition,inparticularinRawls,doesnot.Instead,itpositsapositionoffundamentalequalityfromwhich,indistributivejusticeatleast,wemoveonlywhen,inRawls'slanguage,weagreetoshareoneanother'sfate.Much(p.68) oftheargumentthenconcernswhetheritispossibleto(andwhetherthereisreasonto)applythisRawlsianinsighttotheretributivesphereandwhatitwouldmeantodoso.

Theargumentproceedsatahighlevelofbothabstractionandgenerality.Tosomeextentthisisinevitable,itseemstome,giventhatpoliticaltheorytendstooperateatsomedistancefromtheimmediateandpracticalandgiventhatitisprobablyrighttodoso.Politicaltheorytendstogenerategeneral,abstractprinciplesthatmaywellnotbefinegrainedenoughtoanswerthequestionofwhetherweshoulddoXorYwhenconfrontedwiththatchoiceofpolicyoptions.1Nevertheless,thechapterconcludeswithsomereflectionsontheattitudecitizensshouldtaketooneanotherandtothecriminaljusticesystemthattheyreflectivelyendorseinthecontract.

2THECRIMINALLAWINALIBERALSTATE

2.1MethodologicalpreambleOnemethodofinquiryintothephilosophicalfoundationsofthecriminallaw,or(onlyslightly)moremodestlyintotheplaceandnatureofthecriminallawinaliberalstate,istoaskwhatpeoplewouldagreetoinsomehypotheticalchoosingsituation(thatis,toinvokecontractarianism).Contracttheoryisoftenallegedtohidesubstantivenormativecommitmentsinitselfandhasvariouslybeencriticizedassexist,speciesist,andnormativelyindividualisticbutcontracttheory,suitablyunderstood,neednotbeanyofthesethings;italldependsonthespecificationofthechoosingsituationandofthosewhodothechoosing.2

Ihavearguedelsewherethatrational,self-interestedchooserscouldendorserulesofcooperationasmoralnorms,butinordersotodotheywould(givencertain(p.69)plausiblebackgroundfactorsobtaining)alsohavetoendorseasystemofpunishment.3Thefunctionofthesystemofpunishmentwouldbetoaddressanassuranceproblem(partiescanonlybeexpectedtoendorseconstraintsontheirpursuitofself-interestiftheycanbeassuredthatotherswilldosotoo);tocommunicatetotheoffenderthesignificanceofthecommitmenttomorality(bothindividualandgeneral);and,wherenecessary,toeducatetheoffendersoastoenhancehisabilitytoengagewithothersonmoralterms.Rationalitydoesnotcompelpersonstoendorsetherulesofcooperationasmoral,itcannotcompelacceptanceofthesystemofpunishment,butitdoesnotunderminethisrationaleforthesepractices.

Clearly,theparticularformofcontractarianismIdefendcontainssubstantivenormativeandmethodologicalcommitments,andtheseareofcoursenotuncontroversial.4However,forpresentpurposes,Iintendtotrytoworkwithgeneral(Ihope),plausible,andlesscontroversialclaimsinordertodevelopanaccountofsomeaspectsofthecriminallawthatcouldbeacceptedatleastbymostliberals.Togivejustoneexampleof


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thekindofconsensuswithwhichthepapertriestowork,considerthe(somewouldsayspecial)needtojustifysocialarrangementstothoseindividualswhodoworstunderthosearrangements.

AccordingtothecontractarianpositionIdefend,itmakesnosensetothinkthatjustificationisowedtoothers.Rather,the(primary)problemofmoralityishowtojustifytooneselfmoralconstraintsonthepursuitofone'sself-interest.Accordingtothemuchmorecommonliberalcontractarianismof,forexample,Rawls,Barry,andScanlon,theissueiswhatweoweandcanjustifytoeachother.5Thisdissimilarityreflectsafundamentaldifferencebetweenmyargumentandthatofliberalegalitariansaboutthenatureandscopeofmorality.Nevertheless,onbothaccountsitisplausibletothinkthatthereissomethingspecialaboutthosewhodoworstunderanygivensetofsocialarrangements.Foronbothaccountsthereissomesetofsocialarrangements,whichcouldbeotherwise,underwhichsomepersonsdoworsethanothers.Itseemsnaturaltothink,fromtheoneperspective,thatsomejustificationneedstobeofferedtothesepeopleinparticular,6and,fromtheother,thattheproblemofjustifyingtooneselfacommitmenttoconstrainthepursuitofone'sself-interestinaccordancewithnormsthatarepartofasetofsocialarrangements(p.70) underwhichonedoesworsethanothers,willbeparticularlyacute.Astheargumentproceeds,morewillhavetobesaidaboutthesetwoformsofcontractarianism,notleastwhentheyrecommenddifferentdeterminateanswerstopressinglegalandpoliticalproblems.

Thereference(inthepreviousparagraph)tothefactthatsocialarrangementscouldbeotherwisehidesonesubstantivecommitment.Thisistotheclaimthatcontractarianismbuildsonnaturalfactsaboutusandtheworld,butthatthesefactsarenormativelyinert.Thatis,naturalfactsthemselvesare(inRawls'swords)neitherjustnorunjust,andtheydonotdictatetheshapeofagreedsocialarrangements.Rather,wemustrecognizethatthesocialsystemisnotanunchangeableorderbeyondhumancontrolbutapatternofhumanaction.7Thatsystemcanbejustorunjustanditisuptouswhichitis.Forexample,thefactthathumanbeingsnormallyfeelpainisnotinitselfjustorunjust,rightorwrong.Itisjustafactaboutthepsycho-physicalmake-upofhumanbeings.Butasetofinstitutionsthatneedlesslyallowstheinflictingofpainonsomesetofhumanbeingsmaywellbeunjustand,insofarasitis,andwereflectivelyendorseitinacontractarianthoughtexperiment,wearecomplicitinthatinjustice.

Itakeitthatthisconstructivistcommitmentneednotbesharedbyallcontractarians.Forexample,atheoristcouldinvokecontractualthinkingmerelyasaheuristicdeviceandusethecontractorsasmeanstoreflectontheinnatemoralorderoftheuniverseasgivenbyGod.ThusinstipulatingitasacommitmentIamrulingoutcertainformsofnaturallawtheory(andcertainunderstandingsofsuchthingsaswrongsinthemselves).However,Idonotthinkthisisparticularlysignificant.Thereareotherformsofnaturallawtheorythatcouldfittheproposedcontractualscheme,butevenifthatwerenotthecase,theconstructivistcommitmentissomethingthatissharedbythosewhoseliberaldispositionsarethetargetofthischapter.


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Itisworthmakingonefinalremarkabouttheuseofcontracttheoryinthischapter.Itmightbethoughtthatiftheargumentisgoingtorelyoneithershared,uncontroversial,premises,orpremisesthatareexplicitlyspeltoutsoastomakedifferencesbetweencontractualaccountstransparent,thenitcouldproceedwithoutanyreferencetocontract.Theargumentwouldsimplymove(p.71) frompremisetoconclusion.Whatthenisthepurposeofthelanguageofcontract?Ofcourse,thisisacommonquestionaskedofcontracttheoryandalineofcriticismwithimpeccablephilosophicalcredentialshasitthattalkofcontractsis(atbest)littlemorethanunnecessarywindowdressing.8Theanswer,thebestaccountofwhichisgivenbySamuelFreeman,isthatcontracttheorydescribesaformofrationalreflection.Anyone,atanytime,canenterthecontractsimplybythinkinginthemannerdescribedintheconstructionofthehypotheticalchoosingsituation.Thatpersonthenreasonsfrompremisetoconclusion;intherhetoric,shechoosesprinciplesofjustice(orwhatever).Thenotionofcontractcapturestwoideas:first,thatifthechoosingsituationisproperlyconstructedtheneverypersonenteringthecontractandthinkinginthiswayoughttobeabletoacknowledgetheconclusionsasbothrightandtheirs.Second,eachagreesonlyontheunderstandingthatothersdo,too.AsFreemanputsit,themutualacknowledgementofprincipleswarrantsthetermagreement,andthemutualprecommitmentinvolvedmightjustaswellbecalledacontract.9

2.2ContractarianismandthecriminallawAsnotedabove,Ihavearguedelsewherethatwecantakingupthestandpointofself-interestedagentsengagedwithoneanotherformutualadvantagereflectivelyendorseasystemofcriminalprohibitions,enforcement,andpunishment.Thisistrue,too,forKantian-inspiredcontractarianism.Thereasonisthatwhenwecontracttolivetogetheronmoraltermsortermsthatbindustogetherascitizensinawell-orderedsocietywedosoonthebasisthatothersdoso,too,andthatwecanbereasonablyassuredoftheircompliancewiththetermsofagreement.Thestate'senforcingofthelawinrelationto,forexample,taxationallowseachpersonreflectivelytoendorsehercommitmenttotheschemeofsocialcooperation.

Asstated,itmaynotbeimmediatelyclearwhytheassuranceproblemrequirescriminalizationratherthanjustregulation.Theshortversionoftheansweristhatitdoesnot.However,ifthearrangementsendorsedbythecontractingpartiesaretobestableandaretoavoidsomeofthewell-documentedfailuresofmutualadvantagetheory,thenthepartiesmustaffirmtheprinciplesbywhichtheyagreetobegovernedashavingtheimperativalforceofmoralprinciples.Itisthisthatmakesitatheoryofmoralityratherthanofmerecooperation.10(p.72)

Failurebyonepersontoadheretotherules,then,isamoralfailureinrelationtoallothers.Moreover,onthisaccount,itisaparticularlydamagingfailuresincetheschemeworksonlytothedegreethatallcontractorsarewillingtomakethenecessarycommitment,whichitselfdependsontheirbeingassuredthatotherswilldosotoo.Theappropriateresponsetosuchafailure,then,isoneofcondemnationandnotsimplyofcorrection.Incondemningtheoffender,thestatereassertsthemoralvalueofthe


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agreedprinciplesandremindstheoffenderofhisagreementtoabidebythoseprinciples.Atleast,thatholdsforthosewhoagreetocontractbyreflectivelyendorsingtheprinciplesasprinciplesthatrightfullygoverntheirpursuitoftheirownadvantage.Theneedtoaddresstheassuranceproblem,andrecognitionoftheprudentialreasonofagents,underpinsanaccountofhardtreatment.Therecognitionofthemoralcommitmentofthepartiestotheconstructionofthecommunityunderpinstheaccountofcensureandcondemnation.

Thiscontractualaccountofthecriminallawisclearlysketchy.Thedegreetowhichtheprocedurecangeneratepreciseanswersastothecontentandscopeofthecriminallawisaninterestingquestion,butonewhichIamnotgoingtopursuehere.Obviously,giventhetypesofbeingsthatwe(humanbeings)are,thecontentofthecriminallawwillconcernwrongfulharmsofcertainkinds,andgiventhekindsofcommunityinwhichwecurrentlyexist,itwillalsocovercertaineconomicandsocialspheres.ThequestionIwanttopursueconcernsthejustificationofthesystemasawhole,itsrelationshiptoideasofdesert,andtheattitudeparticipantsshouldhavetooneanother(includingtothosewhoarepunished).

3CONTRACTARIANISMANDNATURAL(DIS)ADVANTAGESConsiderthepositionofthosewhoareborndeaf.Presume(plausibly)thatmodernsocietiesmakedeafnessmoreofadisadvantagethanitwouldbeunderothermoresimplesocialarrangements.Ontheaccountofcontractarianismbasedonmutualadvantage,thecriticalquestionforthedeafandthehearingiswhethermutuallyadvantageouscooperationispossibleand,ifso,underwhatconditions.(p.73)

Forthemutualadvantagetheorist,eachcontractormustadvancehisintereststhroughcooperationrelativetothebaselineofnon-cooperation.Whatthismaymeanisthatnomutuallyadvantageousdealcanbedone,inwhichcasethoseleftoutsidecooperationareleftbeyondthepaletheprotectionofmorality.11Whereadealcanbedone,thebargainingsolutionwillreflecttheunequalstartingpointsofthepartiesand,inthissense,naturaladvantageanddisadvantagewillbetransmittedthroughthebargainintotheoutcome.Formany,thisisonereasonwhythemutualadvantagetraditionincontractarianismisflawed(andworse12).Foritscritics,thejobofjusticeis(atleastinpart)toprotecttheweaknotleastbynegatingtheeffectsofnaturalinequalities.Thisis,ofcourse,attheheartofRawlsiancontractarianism.

Asalreadynoted,forRawlsthefactthatsomepeopleareborn,forexample,deafisneitherjustnorunjust.Whatcanbejustorunjustisthesocialsystemgiventhefactthatsomepeoplearehearingandothersdeaf.ForRawls,ajustsocialsystemwillnotreflect,butwillneutralize,naturaladvantagesanddisadvantages.Injusticeasfairness,asRawlsmemorablyputsit,weagreetoshareoneanother'sfate.13Thatistosay,forRawlsthequestionofwhetherthehearingwouldadvancetheirinterestsbyexcludingthedeaffromcooperationisnotrelevant.Inreflectingonprinciplesofjustice,werealizethemorallyarbitrarynatureofnatural(dis)advantagesandcommittolivetogetherinawell-orderedsociety.Weinitiallyshareoneanother'sfatesinthisexample,wesharethefateofthedeafbyexcludingknowledgeofallpersonalinformationinthechoosing


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situation(thatis,byimposingtheveilofignoranceonthepartiesinthechoosingsituation).Bydoingthiswerecognizethemorallyarbitrarynatureofnaturalstartingpointsandensurethatthose(unequal)startingpointsarenotautomaticallytransmittedintounequaloutcomes(eveninthecasewhereallowingnaturalinequalitiestobereflectedintheoutcomeofthecontractwouldbetotheadvantageofsomeofus).14

Rawls'saccountofthemoralarbitrarinessofbothsocialandnatural(dis)advantagesunderpinshisradicalaccountofequalityofopportunity.Ifjusticerequiresequalityofopportunity,thenweshouldignorenatural(dis)advantagejustaswe(p.74) ignoresocial(dis)advantage.Ingeneralterms,thisgivesrisetoRawls'snon-desertbasedprinciplesofdistributivejustice(inwhichlegitimateexpectationsreplacedesert),whichensureequalityinthedistributionofbasicrights,equalityofopportunity,andinequalitiesinthedistributionofsocialandeconomicgoodsonlyinsofarasthoseinequalitiesmaximallybenefittheleastwelloff.15

Whatthismeansfordeafandnaturallydisadvantagedpeopleissomethinglikethis:theyare,ofcourse,includedinthecontractandthusareentitledtotheprotectionsofthefirstprinciple(thatis,toequalbasicliberties).Theyarealsoentitledtoequalityofopportunitywhenitcomestothechancetoenjoysocialandeconomicinequalities.Quitewhatthismeansinpracticewillbecomplicated,buttheideaisclearlythatopportunitiesshouldbemadeavailabletoallwhereveritisreasonabletodoso.Despitetheseprotections,itmaywellbethatsomeofthosewhoarenaturally(and/orsocially)disadvantagedstillendupintheeconomicallyworst-offgroup.However,ifthatisthecase,theydonotdosobecausetheyarelessableorlessdeserving.Rather,thereareinequalitiesinthesysteminequalitiesthatallowotherstodobetterthanthemonlybecausethoseinequalitiesmaximallybenefitthepositionoftheworstoff.Inthissense,too,weshareoneanother'sfatesinthatnaturalfeaturesofpersonsplayaroleindistributionthatisconstrainedbythesystemasawhole.Ifthetalenteddowellitisonlybecausebydoingwelltheybenefittheworstoff.

Whatistherelevanceofthistoquestionsaboutthecriminallaw?Ononeaccount,none,becauseretributivejustice(broadlyconceived)isdifferentfromdistributivejusticeandtheargumentsintheonespheredonottranslateintotheother.16However,Ihavearguedelsewherethatthisisnotthecase:thesameconcernsshouldunderpinouranalysisofthebasicstructurewhetherinrelationtoretributiveortodistributivejustice.17Iwillnotrehearsethatargumenthere,butIhopethatthediscussionoftheexamplesthatfollowwillmakethecaseseemplausible(evenifnotproven).

AllowingthatRawls'sbroadapproachcanbeappliedintheretributivespheremeansdepartingfromRawls'sownassumptionsofidealtheoryandfullcompliance.Italsomeansapplyinghisaccounttoaquestiontowhichhethoughtitdidnotapply.Thatis,onecannotbetruetothetextandaskwhatthepersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldchooseinrelationtocriminaljusticebecauseRawlsdidnotbelievethequestiontobeoneappropriatelydealtwithinthisway.18WecandepartfromRawlswhilstborrowingfromhisaccount,though,whichistheprojecthere.This(p.75) meansavoidingthedetails,buthangingontothemoralcommitmentsthatdrivethetheory.


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Theplacetostart,then,iswiththeconstructionoftheoriginalposition.Aswithnaturalinequalitiesandallotherpersonalfactors,one'sdispositiontocriminalbehaviourwouldbeincludedintheveilofignorance(thatis,itwouldnotbeknowntothecontractingparties).Ihavearguedabovethatthecontractingpartieswouldhavereasontochoosereflectivelytoendorseasystemofcriminallaw.Whattheveilofignoranceaddstothatisthatonewillnotknowone'sriskoffallingfoulofthatlaw,eitherbecauseofadispositiontocriminalbehaviourorbecauseofcircumstance,orforthatmattermistake(onyourpartoronthatofthesystem).Asarisk-aversecontractor,then,onehasreasontochooseasysteminrelationtocriminalbehaviourthatis,inthewordsofthesometimeUKPrimeMinisterTonyBlair,toughoncrimeandtoughonthecausesofcrime.Thatis,onewillchooseasystemofcriminallaw(forthereasonsgivenabove),butsurroundthatsystemwithprotectionsincluding,butgoingbeyondthoseofequallegalrights,etcthatreducetheprospectofonebeingsubjecttopunishment(thiswillholdevenwherepunishmentonlyaffectstheoffender,butwillbeevenmoreimportantgiventhespillovereffectsthatpunishmenthasonfamily,friends,jobprospects,etc,intherealworld).

Clearlythisaccountneedstobeunpacked,andtherewillbethosewhowillhavealreadybaulkedatbeingaskedtoconsidernaturalfactssuchastalentordisabilitytogetherwithadispositiontocriminalbehaviour,butitisworthpushingonalittlefurtherbeforeconsideringpossiblecriticisms.

Recall,fortheRawlsianliberalegalitarian,naturalfactsarewhatIcalledmorallyinert,orwhatRawlscallsmorallyarbitrary.Thismeansthatwebeginwithaconceptionofthemembersofthesocietyasfundamentalmoralequalsanddesignthebasicstructureonthatbasis.Oncethebasicstructureisinplace,ourordinarysocialpracticescontinue,butonthebasisoftheprincipleschosentogovernthatstructure.Thus,asRawlsputsit:

itistruethataspersonsandgroupstakepartinjustarrangements,theyacquireclaimsononeanotherdefinedbythepubliclyrecognizedrules.Havingdonevariousthingsencouragedbytheexistingarrangements,theynowhavecertainrights,andjustdistributiveshareshonortheseclaims.Ajustscheme,then,answerstowhatmenareentitledto;itsatisfiestheirlegitimateexpectationsasfoundeduponsocialinstitutions.19

Putmoreinformally,theargumentisthis:naturalpeople(sotospeak)differinbeingmoreorlesstalentedandinthingssuchastheirgenderandskincolour.Indecidingtheprinciplesofdistributionofrights,politicalliberties,andeconomicandsocialgoods,thesethingsarearbitrarybecausenoneisconnectedtoapre-justicialnotionofmoralworth.Therefore,theydonotfigureintheprinciplesofdistribution.(p.76) However,oncethoseprinciplesareinplace,theprinciplesmay(forreasonsof,forexample,efficiency)encouragethetalentedintowell-remuneratedprofessionssuchasbrainsurgery(onedoesnotwantatalentlessbrainsurgeon).Inthatcase,thetraineebrainsurgeonwilldevelopanexpectationthathertraining,ifsuccessful,willberewardedandthatexpectationislegitimate.20


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Toapplythistothecriminallaw,then,wouldbetoinsistthatinertnaturalfactsoughtnottodictatetheshapeoftheprinciplesof(retributive)justice.However,oncetheseprinciplesareinplace,suchfactsmaywellplayaroleinwhere,withinthescheme,agivenpersonendsup.Justasthetalented(andsociallylucky)willtendtowardsthebetter-offgroupsnotbecausejusticerequiresrewardingthetalented,butbecauserewardingthetalentedmaximallybenefitstheleastwelloffthosewhoaredisposedtobreakthecriminallaw(forwhateverreason)willtendtowardsthegroupwhoarepunished,butagainnotbecausejusticerequiresprinciplesthatpunishthosewhoactonsuchadisposition,butbecauseonlybypunishingthemwillthesystemprovidetheassuranceneededtobestable.21

ExtendingRawls'sargumentinthiswayissomethingforwhichonecanfindsomeencouragementinthetext.Afterall,Rawlsfamouslydeniestheconnectionbetweenjusticeandmoraldesert.Hewrites,inapassagethatfollowsdirectlyfromthatquotedabove:butwhatthey[personstakingpartinjustarrangements]areentitledtoisnotproportionaltonordependentupontheirintrinsicworth.Theprinciplesofjusticethatregulatethebasicstructureandspecifythedutiesandobligationsofindividualsdonotmentionmoraldesert,andthereisnotendencyfordistributivesharestocorrespondtoit.

Itseemstomethattheargumentofferedaboveisplausibleandis,indeed,onethatRawlsshouldhaveleftopen.However,asalreadynoted,andasthereferencetodistributivesharesinthelastquotationmakesclear,Rawlsisexplicitlycommittedtotheclaimthatdistributivejusticeisnotsomehowtheoppositeofretributivejustice.22Bythis,Rawlsseemstomeanthatprinciplesofretributivejusticecanlegitimatelyrefertothepre-justicialmoralworthoftheperson(ortheperson'sactions),andthusthesefeaturesofthepersonarenotmorallyarbitrary.23Thisisacommon(p.77) responseand,iftheargumentaboveistohaveanyplausibility,somethingneedstobesaidaboutthe(dis)analogyIamdrawingbetweendistributiveandretributivejustice(andsobetween,forexample,thecaseofthetalentlesspersonwhoendsupintheworst-offgroupandthepersondisposedtobreakthecriminallawwhoendsupbeingpunished).

Ihavearguedsofarthatwemightthinkofsharingeachother'sfateintheretributivesphereinawaythatisanalogoustothewayinwhichwedothatinthedistributivesphere.Retributivequestionsareaskedintheoriginalposition,andthepeopleinthatpositiondonotknowtheirtendencytodisobey,orthelikelihoodthattheywillfallfoulof,thecriminallaw.Theyhavereasontochooseasystemofcriminallaw,buttheyalsohavereasontosurroundthatsystemwithprotectionsthatwillreducethelikelihoodoftheirbeingpunished.Perhapsmoreradicalthanthatisthesuggestionthatjustasthosewhodowellorbadlyindistributivetermscanonlybeproperlythoughtofintermsoflegitimateentitlementandnotdesertonedoeswellbecausebydoingwellonemaximallybenefitstheleastwelloffandonedoesbadlyonlybecausepositionsofrelativedisadvantageexistonlysothattheleastwelloffcanbeaswelloffaspossiblesothosewhoarepunishedarepunishednotbecausethey(pre-justicially)deserveitbutbecausetheyareentitledtoitunderajustschemeinwhichpunishmenthassomeother,non-


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desertbased,rationale.

Forsomeaswehaveseen,includingRawlsthispositionisunsustainable.Oneversionoftheobjectioncanbecapturedifonethinksofonewayinwhichthepositionofthetalentlesspersonwhoendsupintheworst-offgroupandthepersondisposedtocriminalbehaviourwhoendsuppunishedseemdisanalogous.Inaddressingthetalentless,itisnotjustRawlswhomightholdthatthereissomethingobjectionableinsaying,justlikethat,theexplanationandjustificationforyourbeingworseoffthanothersisthatyouaretalentless.However,inthecaseofthepunished,itseemsenoughtosaytheexplanationandjustificationforyourbeingpunishedisthatyoubrokethelaw.Thedifferenceseemstobeoneofresponsibility.Accordingtoawell-establishedliberalposition,itisnotjustifiabletoholdpeopletoaccount,andtomakethempickuptheburden,forthingsoverwhichtheyhadnocontrol.Thetalentlessdidnotchoosetobetalentless,butthecriminal,exhypothesi,didchoosetobreakthelaw.

AccordingtoonereadingofRawls,moralarbitrarinessdependsonnotbeingresponsible.So,factorssuchasone'sheight,intelligence,andtalentsaremorallyarbitrarybecausetheyareunchosen.Onthisreading,itisthusbecausetheyareunchosenthatthesefeaturesofpeoplearehiddenfromtheviewofthepeopleintheoriginalpositionbytheveilofignorance.Ifso,andifcriminalbehaviourischosen,thenone'stendencytocriminalitywouldhavetobeknowntothepeopleinthe(p.78) originalpositionandthuswouldbeexcludedfromtherealminwhichweshareoneanother'sfates.

Althoughthereissometextualevidenceforthisview,itisnotRawls's.24Rather,forRawlstheveilofignorancecapturesthecommitmenttotheideathatpersonsarefundamentallyequal.Moraldesertasabasisforjusticeisrejectedbecausethereisnosensiblewayofmovingfromdeserttodistributiveoutcomes(anargumentthatseemstometobeatleastasplausibleinthecaseofretributivejudgementsasdistributiveones).

Nevertheless,theresponsibilitysensitivepositionissowidespreadthatitisworthconsideringitsapplicationherebefore,finally,consideringhowandinwhatwayswesharethefateofothersintheretributivesphere.

3.1Responsibilityandnatural(dis)advantageConsidersomeonewhoisdisabled,butnotvisiblyso,whoentersatwo-storeybuildingandasksthatthejanitorcomeouttoactivatetheelevator.Thejanitormaywellaskwhyheshouldbeinconvenienced,butonbeingtoldofthedisabilityhewouldpresumablyacceptthatthepersonhasgoodreasonsforneedingtheelevatorandwouldactaccordingly.Contrastthiswithanagentpredisposedtoaggression.Thecasehereismorecomplicated.Assumetheagenttohaveassaultedsomeoneasaresultofaperceived(orreal)minorslight.Inthiscase,weholdtheagentresponsible.Iftheagentexplainsthatheisgenuinelyincapableofactingotherwisehehasadisordersuchthathelosescontroloverhimselfcompletelythenthatjudgementisrevised.However,ifhisexplanationisthatheissimplythekindofpersonwhoisquicklyangeredandactsonthatanger,thenwedonotthinkthatanexcuse.Theagentisthesubjectofourreactive


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attitudesandisheldresponsibleforhisaggressiveact.

Accordingtomainstreamcompatibilistaccounts,inbothcasestheprincipalactorsactforreasons,butthedisabledpersonhasgoodreasons,andreasonsthatunderwritehisnotfullybearingthecostsofhisdisability.Theaggressiveindividualalsoactsonreasons,butitonthebasisofsodoingthatheisrightlyheldtoaccountandaskedtopickupthebillforhisactions.

Now,onestrategyinresponsetothismightbetodenythatcompatibilismcandotheworkaskedofit.Onemighthereappealtothe(mis)readingofRawlsthathasitthatallfeaturesofindividualsareunchosenandsoundeserveduptoandincludingthereasonsonwhichweact.Ifso,mainstreamcompatibilismdoesnotadequatelyjustifyourreactiveattitudesandthepracticesofblamingandpunishing(aswellaspraisingandrewarding)thatareassociatedwiththem.Compatibilism,arguably,(p.79) showsthatsomeformofresponsibilityiscompatiblewiththetruthofthecausalthesis,butitisahollowformofresponsibilitywhenwhatweseekissomethingmuchmorerobusttounderwritethosepractices.25Althoughinteresting,Iwanttoputthisresponsetooneside.

Thesecondresponseadmitstherelevanceofresponsibility,butonlyafterthesystemofjusticeisestablished.Thisis,ofcourse,simplytoreturntotheentitlementsystemcommendedbyRawlsinrelationtodistributivejustice.Afterall,thestudentwhoworkshardtobeabrainsurgeonactsresponsiblyandisrightlypraised.Heisnot,though,rewardeddirectlybecauseofhistalents(includingthetalentofworkinghard),butbecausethesystemthatrewardspeoplelikehimmaximallybenefitstheworstoff.Thereasonforthis,aswehaveseen,isnotbecauseofsomeincompatibilistpremisethatRawlsfailedtomakeexplicit.Itisthatthereisnojustificationforallowinginequalitiesinnaturalfacts(orsocialluck)tobereflectedintheprinciplesofjustice.Theinitialpositionofequalityisfundamental.Steppingawayfromequalitycanbejustifiedinsomecasesnotinmattersofbasicrights,butintheeconomicrealmbutonthegroundsofadvancingthepositionoftheworstoffandnotongroundsofmoraldesert.Evenwerewetoattempttofindsomeproxyformoraldesertsuchasthewillingnesstoengageinconscientiouseffort,wewouldbedefeatedsinceeventhat,Rawlsnotes,isasmuchtodowithone'supbringingasone'snaturaltalents.26

4SHARINGONEANOTHER'SFATEINRETRIBUTIVEJUSTICETorecap:IhavearguedthatifweextendRawls'sargumentsabouttheirrelevanceofnaturalstartingpointsandthesociallotteryfromdistributivetoretributivejusticetwoimportantthingsresult.First,andunlikethemutualadvantagetradition,weexcludethepossibilityofplacingsomethecongenitallydangerous,sayoutsidetheprotectionofjustice.Sincetodosomightwellbemutuallyadvantageousforthosewhoremain,Itakethistobeaninitialaspectofwhatitistoshareoneanother's(p.80) fate;itistoincludeallwhatevertheirability(orinability)tocontributetothesocialproduct.Second,thejustificationforthesystemofpunishmentasawholewilllieprimarilyinitsprovidingthenecessaryassurancetomakecontracting(reflectiveendorsement)possible.Onceinplace,thesystemofcriminallawandpunishmentwillgiverisetolegitimateexpectationsthatthesystemmusthonour.Thearrangementsthatgiverisetotheseexpectationswill


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beresponsibility-sensitive(sinceitisonlybypunishingonlytheguiltythatthepurposesofthesystemcanbeachieved)suchthatthosewhoarepunishedcanbetoldthattheyarebeingpunishedbecauseoftheiractionsagainstabackgroundinwhichagreatdealisdonetomitigatenatural,andeliminatesocial,causesofcrime.However,inreplytothequestionofwhythereshouldbeasystemofpunishmentatall,theanswerdoesnotappealtomoraldeserttotheideathatthesystemexiststogivepre-justiciallydeservingpeoplethesufferingtheydeservebuttotheoverallgoodachievedbythesystemincludingthegoodofthepersonbeingpunished.

Itakeitthatthisistheanalogueoftheschemeofdistributivejusticeinwhichall(citizens)areincludedandinwhichunequalpositionsonlyexisttoachieveanoveralloutcome(thebestpositionfortheworstoffgroup).Thus,inresponsetothequestionofwhyagivenpersonshouldbelesswelloffthansomeoneinanotherposition,anexplanationcanbegivenintermsofthatperson'stalents,abilities,hardwork,andtheirresultingabilitytodothevariousthingsencouragedbytheexistingarrangements.However,askedwhyunequalpositionsexistatall(whichallowrewardsforthosethingsthatareencouraged),theanswerdoesnotappealtomoraldesert,buttotheoverallpositionoftheleastwelloff.Inthissense,too,weshareoneanother'sfate.

However,theideaofsharingoneanother'sfatealsoseemstohaveapersonaldimensionthatismissingfromtheaboveanalysis.What,itmightbeasked,isittoviewoneanotherinthislightintheretributivedomain?Tofocusonthisitmightbeworthposingachallenge.Recallthedisabledpersonaskingforaliftatsomeinconveniencetothejanitor.Givenhisdisability,itisreasonabletoaskfortheliftand(givencertainbackgroundfacts)itisreasonablethatthecostoftheliftissomehowshared.Moregenerally,wesharethefateofthedisabledbypayingintogeneraltaxationsomeofwhichisthenspentinprovidingthemwithsupport,ensuringequalopportunities,wherereasonable,etc.Comparethis,then,withsomeonepredisposedtoaggressionwhoentersthebuildingandasksthejanitortotakeabeatingsothathecanrelievehisaggressivetendencies.Clearly,here,wedonotthinkthatthejanitor(oranyoneelse)shouldcomply.Sharingoneanother'sfatemustnotbereducedtothis.

Thequestionofgeneraltaxation,though,ismoredifficult.Obviously,wedonotthinkthatweshouldpayintogeneraltaxationtosupportlifestylesthatarecriminaloraggressive.However,wedothinkthatitisareasonableuseofgeneraltaxationtosupportthosewhohavefallenfoulofthecriminallawtorebuildtheirlives.(p.81) Moreover,asIhavealreadyargued,wethinkitisareasonableuseofgeneraltaxationtoreducethesocialcausesofcrime,andtoprovideearlyinterventionforthosewhoseemtobesetonapathofcriminality.

Thesethings,Ithink,speaktoawayinwhichwesharethefateofothersatapersonallevel.Underpinningthepositionisasenseofthecontingencyofnaturalstartingpoints,upbringing,andsocialarrangements.Andthisisthefinalsenseofsharingoneanother'sfatethatIwishtoconsider.

Itis,asalreadynoted,anaspectoftheconstructivistpositionthatsocialarrangements


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couldbeotherwise,andthatinreflectivelyendorsingthemwetogethertakeresponsibilityforthem.Itis,ofcourse,alsothecasethatagivensetofsocialarrangementsevenajustsetwillsuitsomemorethanothers.Thisisinpartsimplyamatterofcircumstance.Forexample,givensometechnologicaladvances,certainskillswillbecomeredundantandthosewhohavecultivatedthoseskillswillfindtheirrelativepositioninthemarketreduced.Otherskillsmay,forcontingentreasons,berareandsotheirmarketvalueenhanced.Thisdoesnotmeanthatweshouldnotadmiretheholderofsomerareskill,butitdoessurelymeanthatour,andher,attitudetoherplaceinthemarketshouldbetemperedbyanawarenessoftheroleofchanceandcontingency.Wedonothavetothinkofourselvesasentirelythehandmaidensoffatetoappreciateneverthelessthatthingscouldeasilybe,orhavebeen,differenteveninajustworld.

Itakeitthatthesameistrueintheretributivesphere.Ofcourse,herechoiceismoreimportant.Theexistenceofotherpeoplewithsimilarskillsaltersone'smarketpositionandthatissomethingthatisoutofone'scontrol(atleastinthefirstinstance).Thedecisiontocommitacriminalactisdifferent.Andyet,eveninajustworld,thepaththatleadstocriminalityisonethatisstrewnwithcontingentfeatures.Themodernworldprovidesformanypeopleaconfusing,fast-paced,highlystressedenvironment.Itcreatescriminogenicopportunitiesandprovidestemptationsintheformofhighlyvaluedgoods.Thisisnotunjust;itis(asthecolloquialsayinghasit)justlife.Thisdoesnot,ontheRawlsianinspiredaccountofferedabove,negateresponsibility,butitdoesaltertheattitudewehavetothosewhofindthetemptationtoactcriminallytoostrong.Ifso,thenperhapsweshouldendorseScanlon'sviewthatwhilsttherearecircumstancesinwhichwecanjustifiablyblameandcondemnpeople,ourattitudewhenwedososhouldnotbeYouaskedforthisbutratherTherebutforthegraceofGodgoI.27Ifso,thenthefinalsenseofsharingoneanother'sfateisnottothinkofcriminalsasdifferentfromtherestofusasthemasagainstusbutinsteadasjustlikeusonlyperhapslessfortunateineithertheirnatural(dis)advantages,theirsocialupbringing,ortheirfitwiththeworldthatsurroundsthem.28(p.82)

5CONCLUDINGREMARKS(ORTWOCAVEATS)ThepositionforwhichIhavearguedinthebulkofthischapterflows,Ibelieve,fairlynaturallyfromitsRawlsianorigins.Forthosewhoarerepulsedbythemutualadvantagetradition'stransmissionofnaturalinequalitiesintojustoutcomes,and/orforthosewhoareimpressedbyRawls'sdeepsensitivitytochanceandcontingency,theargumentshouldhavesomeattraction.However,forothers,theconclusions,farfrombeingcompelling,maytaketheformofareductio.IfthisiswhatRawlsleadsto,theymaysay,thensomuchtheworseforRawls.Thischapterdoesnottakeapositiononthis.Asnotedabove,myowncommitmentsaretothemutualadvantagetradition,whichIbelievemustincorporatesomethingofthepersonaldimensionofsharingoneanother'sfatedescribedabove,butinwhichthescopeofwhocountsasarelevantotherisconstrainedbytheirabilitytobringsomethingadvantageoustothecontract.

Forthosewhoareconvincedorforwhomtheargumenthasatleastsomepurchasethepressurecomesfromadifferentdirection.Thepositionrequiresonetofaceuptothe


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consequencesofchanceandcontingencynotjustinthewaysinwhichtheyaffectusdirectly,butinthatevenajustworldisonethatdisadvantagessomewhilstmaintainingindividualresponsibilityforactions.Thisstrikesmeasdifficulttodo,andthestepfromtherebutforthegraceofGodgoItothinkingresponsibilityirrelevanttojusticeisashortone.29

Notes:(1)Thisisnottosaythatparticularpoliticaltheoristshavenotcontributedtospecificpolicydebates;clearlytheyhave.However,tousethetechniquesofcriticalrationalinquirytoexaminequestionsofwhatweshoulddodiffersfromderivingwhatweshoulddofromsomeabstractpoliticaltheory.BrianBarryisausefulcaseinpoint.HisCultureandEqualityandWhySocialJusticeMattersbothofferspecificpolicyproposals.ThesearesaidtosatisfythereasonablerejectabilitytestasdevelopedinhismoretheoreticalJusticeasImpartiality.Thisclaimcanbedisputed,butevenifitistrue,itdoesnotmeanthatthesearetheonlypoliciesthatcouldsatisfythecontractariantest(andBarrydoesnotclaimthattheyare).SeeBMBarry,JusticeasImpartiality:Volume2ofATreatiseonSocialJustice(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995);WhySocialJusticeMatters(Cambridge:PolityPress,2005);CultureandEquality:AnEgalitarianCritiqueofMulticulturalism(Cambridge:PolityPress,2001).

(2)AparticularlyusefulaccountofconstructivisttheorisingingeneralisinBMBarry,TheoriesofJustice:Volume1ofATreatiseonSocialJustice(HemelHempstead,Herts:Harvester-Wheatsheaf,1989),26284.

(3)SeeMMatravers,JusticeandPunishment:TheRationaleofCoercion(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000).

(4)Someofthemorecontroversialcommitmentsareusefullybroughtout,andsubjecttocriticism,inRShafer-Landau,MattMatravers,JusticeandPunishment:TheRationaleofCoercion(2004)114Ethics361.

(5)DavidGauthierusefullycomparestheideasofjustificationtoselfandtoothersinhisPoliticalContractarianism(1997)5JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy132.

(6)Ofcourse,Rawlsgoesfurtherthanthisandgivestheworst-offgroupaspecialstatusandtheequivalentofavetoontheagreedsetofsocialarrangements,butwhetherheisjustifiedindoingsoisamootpoint.Whetherheisornot,throughoutATheoryofJusticeitisclearthatRawlsthinksthatthereisaspecialneedtojustifyinequalitiestothosewhodoworseoutofthem.SeeJBRawls,ATheoryofJustice(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971).

(7)AllquotationsfromRawls,ibid102.

(8)DHume,OftheOriginalContract,inDHume,EssaysMoral,PoliticalandLiterary(EFMillered;Indianapolis:LibertyClassics,1987).


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(9)SFreeman,Introduction:JohnRawls:anOverview,inSFreeman(ed),TheCambridgeCompaniontoRawls(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),1,19,originalemphasis.Theseideasthatbyreflectiveendorsementwecommittosocialarrangementsthatweendorseasourswillbeimportantinwhatfollows.

(10)Ibelievetheabovedescriptionissufficientlybroadtoencompasstheoriesinboththemutualadvantagetradition(whichincludesHobbes,Gauthier,andtheaccountIdefendabove)andtheKantiantradition(ofKant,Rawls,Barry,andScanlon).Differencesbetweenthetraditionsemergeassoonasonedigsdeeper,inthiscase,intothenatureoftheendorsementoftheprinciplesasmoral.InATheoryofJustice,justiceandgoodnessaresaidtobecongruent,soonehasreasontoendorsetheprimacyofreasonsofjustice(relativetoprudentialreasonsofshort-termadvantage)becausetodosoisonesgoodasafree,rationalbeing.ThisistheaccountwithwhichRawlsbecamedisillusioned,andinPoliticalLiberalismthepartiesendorsetheprinciplesfromwithintheirowncomprehensiveviewsinanoverlappingconsensus.InBarry,thecontractorsaremotivatedbyasenseofjustice,whichamountstoarecognitionofthespecialplacethatshouldbeaccordedtoreasonsofjusticeinpracticaldeliberation.Themutualadvantagetraditionfindsithardertogroundtheimperativalforceofagreedprinciplesgiventhatthecontractisbuiltaroundtheideaofadvancingindividualcontractorsinterests.ForGauthier,whatmakeshistheoryanaccountofmoralsbyagreementandnotrulesbyagreementistheideathatitcanberationaltoadoptadisposition(constrainedmaximization)suchthatoneisdisposedtokeepagreementsevenwhereimmediateself-interestmightbetterbeservedbyfree-riding.Onmyaccount,rationalitycannotquitedeliverthat,sowhatisrequiredisanexistentialleaponthepartofthecontractorsseeBarry,JusticeasImpartiality;DGauthier,MoralsbyAgreement(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986);Matravers,JusticeandPunishment;Rawls,ATheoryofJustice;JRawls,PoliticalLiberalism:ExpandedEdition(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2005).

(11)Gauthier(in)famouslydescribesanimals,theunborn,thecongenitallyhandicappedanddefectiveasbeyondthepaleofamoralitytiedtomutualadvantage.SeeGauthier,ibid216.

(12)WillKymlicka(eg)describesthemutualadvantagetraditionasnotsupplyinganalternativetheoryofmorality,butanalternativemorality,andBrianBarrycharacterizesthepositionasmorallypathological.SeeBarry,JusticeasImpartialityandWKymlicka,TheSocialContractTradition,inPSinger(ed),ACompaniontoEthics(Oxford:Blackwell,1991).

(13)Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,102.

(14)ThosewhoaresuspiciousofRawlss(methodological)individualismsometimesbaulkatthecentralityheaccordstoideassuchasfraternityandtohisinvoking(here)oftheideaofsharingoneanothersfate.However,itneedstoberememberedthatthelanguageofself-interestedrationalchoiceisrelevantinRawlsonlyoncetheoriginalposition(thechoosingsituation)isdefined.Thecharacterizationoftheoriginalposition


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includingthethickveilofignorancereflectsdeepmoralconvictions(particularlyacommitmenttofundamentalequality).

(15)SeeparticularlyRawls,ATheoryofJustice,48.

(16)ThisistheargumentofRawlshimselfandSamuelScheffler:SScheffler,BoundariesandAllegiances:ProblemsofJusticeandResponsibilityinLiberalThought(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001).

(17)SeeMMatravers,Mad,Bad,orFaulty:DesertinDistributiveandRetributiveJustice,inCKnightandZStemplowska(eds),ResponsibilityandDistributiveJustice(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming).

(18)Thus,toaskwhataRawlsiantheoryofpunishmentwouldbelike,andtotrytoanswerthatquestionbytryingtoapplyRawlsstheorydirectly,strikesmeas(atbest)aninvitationtoperformintellectualcontortionsofaquitedemandingkindand(atworst)astraightforwardmistake.Thatisnottosaythatnothinginterestingresults.Eg,seeSDolovich,LegitimatePunishmentinLiberalDemocracy(200304)7BuffaloCriminalLawReview307.


(20)ThelegitimacyofthisclaimisdisputedbysomeincludingGACohen(seeGACohen,Incentives,Inequality,andCommunity,inSDarwall(ed),EqualFreedom:SelectedTannerLecturesonHumanValues(AnnArbor:TheUniversityofMichiganPress,1995),33197).

(21)TheaccountofferedinthelastfewparagraphsowesagreatdealtoadiscussionwithJoWolffattheUKALPPConference.WhatisremarkableisthedegreetowhichthepositionrecallsRawlssjustlyfamousdefenceofruleutilitarianisminTwoConceptsofRules.Inshort,theoverallpurposeofthesystemofpunishmentisgiven(primarily)bytheneedforassurance.Onceestablished,therulesgoverningtheapplicationofpunishmentareretributive.SeeJRawls,TwoConceptsofRules,inJBRawlsandSFreeman(eds),CollectedPapers(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1955(1999)).


(23)ItshouldbesaidthatRawlswritesofretributivejusticeindifferentwaysindifferentplaces.Sometimes,hecomesclosetothepost-justiciallegitimateexpectationsviewdescribedhere.Considerthefollowingpassage(235):ALegalsystemisacoerciveorderofpublicrulesaddressedtorationalpersonsforthepurposeofregulatingtheirconductandprovidingtheframeworkforsocialco-operation.Whentheserulesarejusttheyestablishabasisforlegitimateexpectations.Theyconstitutegroundsuponwhichpersonscanrelyononeanotherandrightlyobjectwhentheirexpectationsarenotfulfilled.


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(24)SeemyMMatravers,ResponsibilityandJustice(Cambridge:PolityPress,2007).

(25)SeeegGStrawson,TheImpossibilityofMoralResponsibility(1994)75PhilosophicalStudies5;andforadiscussionMatraversResponsibilityandJustice,ibid.Thephrasethecausalthesisistakenfrom(butpossiblynotoriginalto)Scanlontocapturetheclaimthatallouractionshaveantecedentcausestowhichtheyarelinkedbycausallawsofthekindthatgovernothereventsintheuniverse.TMScanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1998),250.


(27)Scanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther,294.

(28)Interestingly,RawlshimselfhintsassuchapossibilitywhenhewritestowardstheveryendofATheoryofJustice(576)thattheremaybesomeforwhombeingdisposedtoactjustlyisnotagood.Iftherearemanysuchpeople,Rawlswrites,thenpenaldeviceswillplayamuchlargerroleinthesocialsystem.But,ofthesepeople,headds,onecanonlysay:theirnatureistheirmisfortune.Theemphasisonnotseeingoffendersasthemtobecontrastedwiththelaw-abidingusisemphasizedthroughoutDuffswriting.

(29)Itisimportanttonotethatthisisnotanargumentaboutdoing(retributive)justiceina(distributively)unjustworld.Thatis,ofcourse,animportanttopic,butthepointhereisthatevenajustworldisonethatischosen(orreflectivelyendorsed)andisoneinwhichsomepeoplewillfarelesswellthanothers.Socialstructuresevenjustonesturnsomenaturalfactsintosocialdisadvantages.Thatisnoonesfault,butitissomethingthatontheRawlsianaccountweallshare.Inthisveryloosesense,wecanbethought(non-culpably)complicitincrimeevenwhileweholdthecriminalresponsible.Ifso,Ithinkwecanlearnfromthedoingjusticeinanunjustworldliteratureparticularlywithrespecttotheattitudeweshouldtaketocriminalinstitutions(andcriminals).Weshouldalwaysbehesitantaboutpunishmentanditsjustificationandwhenweuseitweshouldalwaysbeconsciousofadifferentwaytheoffenderandthesocialworldcouldhavebeen.Ifthissoundstosomereaderslikebleedingheartliberalism,thenRawlsiansshouldmakenoapologyforthat.Evenwithoutdistributiveinjustice,thisisarealminwhichwecansaythattheheartsofbleedingheartedliberalshavegoodreasontobleed:VTadros,PovertyandCriminalResponsibility(2009)43JournalofValueInquiry391,413.


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