Political protection and the origins of the Gulf Cartel

Political protection and the origins of the Gulf Cartel

Carlos Antonio Flores Pérez

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The history of drug trafficking in Mexico appears to be strongly influencedby specific features of the post-revolutionary authoritarian regime that has beencharacterized by its rampant corruption and poor levels of accountability. This is arigorous empirical case study of state domination of the relationship with traffickersin a particular historical epoch and place. Based on research conducted through theexamination of historic sources, this work explores the hypothesis that some politicalfigures might have been colluding with members of criminal organizations, with theaim of protecting their businesses and fostering their consolidation. Such collusionhas hindered the institutional functioning of key law enforcement and judicialinstitutions in the country. The present analysis considers these relationships in thecourse of three decades, the 1960s through the 1990s, and focuses on the Mexicanstate of Tamaulipas, where one of the most powerful and dangerous organized crimegroups emerged, the so-called Gulf Cartel.

Introduction

The official and media images of organized crime in Mexico attempt to convince thepublic 1) that the environment is generally hostile to criminal organizations; 2) thatgovernment officials as a whole have no knowledge, except in exceptional cases, of theillicit activities of the criminal groups they are in charge of prosecuting; 3) that thedocumented cases of corrupt linkages between criminal organizations and publicofficials at various hierarchical levels are the result of individual transgressions, butare not institutionalized practices and are not widespread within the government; and 4)

Crime Law Soc ChangeDOI 10.1007/s10611-013-9499-x

A previous version of this work was published in Payan, Tony, Kathleen Staudt and Z. Anthony Kruzewski (eds.).2013. A war that can’t be won: binational perspectives on the war on drugs. University of Arizona Press, U. S.I would like to thank Tony Payan, Anne Gebelein and Guadalupe Correa Cabrera, for translating this work intoEnglish; and also my friends Salvador Yáñez, Alejandro Medina and Rubén Alcántara, for helping with the SNAgraphic.

C. A. Flores Pérez (*)Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, CIESAS,Juárez 87, col. Tlalpan, C.P. 14000 México, DF, Mexicoe-mail: [email protected]

C. A. Flores Péreze-mail: [email protected]

that, in any case, it is the criminals who corrupt government officials. This study arguesthe opposite: that the penetration of governmental structures by organized crime isinstitutional and systemic, that it reaches all levels of government, and that it helpssustain the illegal operations of organized crime. It is argued that regardless of thedefinition of organized crime, the existence of wide networks of crime-governmentcorruption is important for the operations of any criminal group—and that the existencesuch networks of corruption within governmental and political arenas are crucial andcarefully cultivated.1

As is frequent in the social sciences, there is no consensus on organized crime’sdefinition.

However, many academic works remark upon how relevant the existence of acorrupted network within politics and government is for the criminal group to operateand endure (Naylor, 1997: 6 [49]; Albini, 1971 [2]; Bailey and Godson, 2000: 19 [5];Geffray, 2002: 47 [41]; Chambliss, 1978 [15]; Block, 1994: 10 [8]; McIllwain, 1993:304 [45]); Snyder and Duran Martinez, 2009: 254–261 [60]).

The analysis of this dimension of the phenomenon of organized crime is key tounderstanding the depths to which corruption has reached in Mexico and its effect onthe governance of the country. In this case, we focus on the most powerful form oforganized crime, drug trafficking. The historical analysis of this activitydemonstrates, as will be seen in the following pages, that among the social actorsthat played a role in the exponential growth of this illicit activity in the country weremajor political figures and bureaucrats, who used their positions of power and publicinfluence to provide institutional protection for the trafficking of illegal drugs. It willbe argued as well that the characteristics of the Mexican State and its political regimeare conducive to the role that politicians and bureaucrats play in organized criminalactivities, a role even more decisive in sustaining organized crime than the role playedby the criminals themselves. It will be hypothesized as well that criminals were oftenunder the control of politicians and bureaucrats and not the other way around. It ispossible to maintain such an assertion based on an analysis of various documentaryand testimonial sources, most of them publicly available. In this chapter, to illustratethis point, historical evidence will be presented pointing to the existence of high-levelpolitical protection and the role that it played in the emergence of a powerful drugtrafficking organization in Mexico. Said organization includes high ranking officialsfrom the Federal Security Directorate, the Federal Attorney Office, local policeofficers, but also important politicians, from both the federal and the stategovernment. This article will focus on the case of the Gulf Cartel. Originallyheadquartered in the state of Tamaulipas, this criminal structure was able to rapidlydevelop national and transnational logistics to traffic drugs using networks ofinstitutional protection. Research was conducted in local and national newspapers,as well as in the archives of the Federal Security Directorate (DFS) and theDirectorate of Political and Social Investigations (IPS), mostly through direct requests

1 In 2000, in the characterization of work that was to be understood internationally as an “organizedcriminal group” within the framework of the United Nations Convention against Transnational OrganizedCrime held in Palermo, Italy, a large number of assistants strongly pleaded to include among several of itsmain characteristics the systematic use of violence and government corruption (UN, 2002: 4–5) [62].

C.A. Flores Pérez

to the Federal Institute for Information Access (IFAI) to obtain declassifiedinformation. DFS and IPS formed the civil intelligence branch of the MexicanFederal Government and both belonged to the Governing Secretariat, an equivalentto the Ministry of the Interior. They reported to the Secretary of the Interior and to thePresident of the Republic. DFS and IPS were dismantled in 1985, after the scandalcaused by DFS’ involvement in protecting drug trafficking and the murder of EnriqueCamarena, a DEA agent that same year. Their archives are now public in the NationalGeneral Archive in Mexico City. The period analyzed ranges from the 1960s to the1990s, but occasionally reference will be made to some relevant facts that occurredoutside this period of time.

Before proceeding, it is important to mention that this work in no way pretends toprovide proof of culpability in terms of judicial process. That could not be expectedfrom an academic work, considering that even the much more plentiful resources ofjustice systems often fall short of proving collusion beyond any reasonable doubt.When reading these papers it should be considered that they are addressing a veryelusive, usually clandestine topic. Organized criminal corruption is usually hiddenand there is a deliberate effort to keep it that way, carried out by its participants. Giventhese conditions, Ockham’s Razor might not be the best approach to evaluate theevidence, because unlike with other objects for analysis, here we face a deliberateeffort to mislead the investigator to guarantee impunity. Those who are familiar withorganized crime prosecution know that the criminal group usually carries outstrategies designed to keep its highest echelons from confronting judicial trial.Organized crime usually tries to separate the material culprit from those whocommand the illicit enterprise, who stay in less visible positions, and are not directlytransporting drugs nor killing people. Neither judicial nor academic research couldoversee this situation. The Mexican authoritarian regime has been characterized by apersistent influence of the executive over the justice system. This often led to asituation in which men in power enjoyed a good deal of impunity, due to theircapacity to directly appoint and remove attorneys as well as judges and judicialministries. As a consequence, the prosecutions of high ranking public officials andpoliticians, under charges of corruption or involvement with drug trafficking, havebeen rather irregular. Furthermore, in some cases, even condemnatory sentences havebeen withdrawn.

However, a description of the problem, as thoroughly as the information availableallows it, allows as a next step for further theorization. In mathematics, the theoremsof Gödel and Tarski have demonstrated that no system could be completely provenbased solely on the foundation of its own premise (Morin, 1991: 191–193 [47]). Andif this is valid for such an epistemically clean discipline as mathematics, it might bemore so for subjects like the one we analyze here. In this case, those who should beprosecuted are sometimes in a position to obstruct judicial institutions and to erasetheir own tracks. There is a gap between what is true and the part of the truth whichcan be proven.

There is good historical evidence that shows that certain individuals wereapparently protecting drug trafficking operations during the decades in question.However, the information is heterogeneous: this is only the information found inthe files the author had access to, but this does not necessarily mean that they were theonly ones which existed in the Mexican institutions. Hence, it could not be assumed


that the people mentioned in a report merited their implication in crime, or if so, thatthey were the only ones. All these are limitations of a clandestine topic, a ratherunder-investigated one, and might only be resolved through additional research work.

The state, the political regime and organized crime in Mexico

Collusion between officials and criminals fits the definition of corruption. In itssimplest sense it can be understood as the misuse of public power to achieve privategains (Rose-Ackerman, 1999: 91 [59]). Public actors participate in acts or omissionsthat amount to corruption when, in the administration of the state resources undertheir custody, they exchange favors in the exercise of their public power for privategain. Among specialists who analyze organized crime, particularly drug trafficking,corruption is often an indispensable element for the existence of criminal groups(Lupsha, 1988: 2 [43]).2 Only with the cooperation of at least some public actors canan illegal activity of an organized nature–and the group of individuals who carry itout–flourish in a context in which the State has formally banned the illicit activity, itsmechanisms, and, at least presumably, concentrates a considerable proportion of itsinstitutionalized efforts to combat them.

The previous observation holds true in any context in which organized crimeoperates–practically the whole world. However, the degree to which a government-criminal organization linkage is present is specific to and more concretely related tothe history of the country. The breadth and depth of the complicity is determined byvarious aspects, among which the structural features of the political environmentexert an especially important role. The transactional relationship between officialsand criminals can be articulated under different conditions of equilibrium, dependingon the State’s strength or weakness, and can be magnified or moderated based on thepolitical regime’s conditions. These two factors, one structural and onecircumstantial, constitute the conditions in which the exchanges between publicofficials and criminals develop. These factors also determine the resources that onegroup or the other may rely on, in order to maximize its own profits.

I have developed in detail a theoretical framework that explains the influence thatthe State’s structural strength or weakness exerts, jointly with the political regime’sfeatures, on the links between officials and criminals (Flores Pérez, 2009: 105–136[40]). Here, for lack of space, I will only show a table of the typology that I proposedelsewhere.

The typology showed in Table 1 is, in any event, self-explanatory. Thus, I willsimply add that the table is based on three criteria: 1) the concentration or dispersal ofthe actors that exercise dominant control in corruption links; 2) the direction of theinfluence, i.e., the existence of a relatively clear hierarchical relationship between

2 For example, one of the most renowned specialists in the analysis of the political links of organized crime,Peter Lupsha, said: “The key macro variable to both the propagation and the persistent of Organized Crimeis politics: political culture, and the operation of Political systems. It is a truism that cannot exist withoutOrganized Crime Political Corruption. Important as is the fact that organized crime cannot prosper withoutgovernments creating black markets, regulatory, economic and social bottlenecks, and exacerbatingconditions of strain and discontinuity.”

C.A. Flores Pérez

Tab

le1

Proposedtypology

ofrelatio

nsbetweenorganizedcrim

eandpolitics

Regim

eStrong

state-authoritarianregime

Strong

state-

democratic

regime

Weakstate-

authoritarian

regime

Weakstate-democratic

regime

Totalitarianism

Liberal

democracy

Authoritarianism

Dem

ocracy

with

weaklib

eral

content

Type

oflin

kwith

theendo

geno

uscrim

inal

organizatio

ns.

Monopolic-descendent-lim

ited.

Fragm

ented-

multid

irectio

nal-

limited.

Centralized-descendent-

increm

ental.

Atomized-m

ultidirectio

nal-

increm

ental.

Characteristics.

The

State

effectively

mon

opolizes

coercion

andis

capableof

controlling

all

social

subjects,so

that

itvertically

controlscrim

inal

groups.Criminal

activ

ities

arelim

itedto

thosethat

are

allowed

andsanctio

ned

(approved,

authorized)by

publicofficials.The

political

corruptio

nim

pliedby

the

linkbetweencrim

inalsand

officialsexistsin

specific

areasof

thepu

blicapparatus,

butitis(rem

ains)generally

fenced

in(lim

ited)

becausea

largepartof

theofficialsthat

makeup

thebu

reaucratic

apparatushave

internalized

notio

nsof

serviceto

the

public

good

andloyalty

totheState.

The

Stateeffectively

monopolizes

coercion;

governmento

fficialshave

interiorized

asenseof

service

tothepublicgood.T

helink

betweencrim

inalsand

officialsexists,w

ithvariable

fluctuations

inthosethat

controlthe

relatio

nship.The

crim

inal-politicallinkis

fenced

in(lim

ited)

bythe

fragmentatio

nof

power

typicalinademocracy,the

existenceof

controlsand

effectiveinstitu

tional

counterw

eightsandthe

professionalizationof

public

services.T

heactorsto

becorruptedaretoomanyand

notallofthem

arecorruptib

le.

The

Statetendsto

monopolize

coercion,w

ithvariable

deficiencies,according

toeach

historicalcase.Ittends

tocentrally

organize

thesocial

controlm

echanism

s,which

allowittodominate,variably,the

varioussocialactors,including

thecrim

inalgroups.T

hediscretionalu

seof

legalityand

thepatrim

onialand

patronage

conceptsin

publicpracticeallow

forthewidespreadproliferation

oflin

ksbetweencrim

inalsand

politicians,and

ofpolitical

corruptioningeneral.The

central

security

institu

tions

may

competeam

ongthem

selves

for

theextortionof

crim

inals,butthe

activ

ityof

these(the

latter),in

general,requires

thesteady

protectionof

thecentralp

ower.

The

Statetendsto

monopolize

coercion,w

ithvariable

deficiencies,according

toeach

historicalcase.P

ower

isdispersedam

ongpolitical

institutio

nsthatoperatewith

patrim

onialist,and/or

patronage

criteria,andinterpretlaw

attheir

[own]

convenience.Po

wer’s

fragmentationallowsmultip

lelin

ksbetweenpublicofficials

andcrim

inalorganizatio

nsanda

variablefluctuationin

power

amongthosethathave

leadership

rolesin

theserelatio

nships.T

hedispersalofcontrolleadstomore

widespreadconfrontations

within

thegovernmental

apparatus,motivated

bycollusion

with

differentcriminal

interests,becausetherearen’t

lastingagreem

entsto

regulate

illicitactiv

ities.


officials and criminals or a sense of who has the upper hand at any given point intime; and 3) the degree of negative influence on the functioning of the State.

The typology shown in Table 1 differentiates four models of corruption betweenorganized crime and elected or designated officials. The four categories stem from across-match between the strength or weakness of the state and the authoritarian ordemocratic nature of the regime in which they exist. The centralized-descendent-incremental model is the one which fits the features of Mexico during the studiedperiod, before 2000. It refers to the kind of corrupt linkage triggered by a relativelyweak state –unable to maintain its legitimized monopoly on violence, with uncleardistinction of the public and private spheres, an arbitrary enforcement of laws, and aset of de facto institutions overwhelming their formal counterparts. These statestructural conditions were paired with those of an authoritarian regime. Such modelis characterized by a relatively stable control of authorities over organized crime,mostly based on a complex mixture of collusive-extortive practices, implemented bythe former upon the latter, instead of the full rule of law and the operation of anefficient judicial system.

In States where the distinction between public and private interests is generallytenuous, public resources are used to benefit the private interests of the governmentalactors. In them, the political regime does not usually require transparency in itsoperating conditions, accountability and compliance with the law in all its aspectsand by all the actors. As a result, the existence of extensive ties of collusion betweenauthorities and criminals is considerably greater. In these conditions, such links arenot necessarily limited to the lower hierarchies of authority within power structures.

As the table shows, collusion between public officials and criminals can beperceived as an unequal exchange relationship. The former participate in therelationship to obtain illegal profits in addition to their legitimate incomes. The latterhave the need to share their profits with the State’s officials as a way of avoiding lawenforcement’s action or perhaps even to make use of such agencies’ resources to carryout their illegal activities. It is, therefore, a clandestine relationship that relies oncoercion but the resources that each actor has as his disposal are different. The actorswithin the State employ the resources of institutional violence entrusted to them bythe State to extract concessions from the criminals or help them in their activities. Onthe other hand, criminal actors fundamentally depend on their private resources, thatis, their accumulated fortunes and capacity to exercise violence. Depending on theState’s strength, these conditions confer superiority to government officials, becausethey have at their disposal the entire force of the State (Flores, 2009: 119–136 [40]).In some cases of acute weakness of the State, the malfeasance of public officialsreaches proportions in which the line between them and the criminals becomes veryfuzzy, and the distinction between one group and the other may be relevant only inanalytical terms.

Historical and contextual variables and criminal groups

In post-revolutionary Mexico and until the end of the 1990s, the prevailing rule wasthe dominance of government officials over criminals. The reason was the capacity ofthe authoritarian regime to exercise political and social control over Mexican society.

C.A. Flores Pérez

According to the typology formerly explained, the type of link that existed betweenthese actors during this period can be characterized as fitting a model of controllabeled centralized-descendent-incremental. The control of State over society wasconsolidated in the 1940s. Since those years and until the end of the 1990s, theMexican political regime was characterized by a considerable number of authoritarianfeatures. They were articulated around a central institutional figure, the MexicanPresidency (Cosío Villegas, 1982: 28–29 [16]). This institution constituted the actualaxis of the system. It had powerful formal and informal prerogatives and,additionally, it relied on other extralegal privileges that allowed it to de factosubordinate the other branches of government and the states and local governments(Carpizo, 1987: 191 [13]; Meyer, 2000: 915 [46]; Camacho Solís, 1977: 618 [11]).Still, to be sure, State control over the country’s territory has been imperfect at best,even if it has been comparatively more solid than that attained by other LatinAmerican countries. In fact, statements from officials of the Mexican Army pointto the precariousness of the State’s control over vast regions of the country, evenduring the period of greatest authoritarian centralization of power in the 1960s and1970s (Flores, 2009: 172–175 [40]). The centralization of political control in a singlepolitical party, the PRI, after the Mexican Revolution and the characteristics of theauthoritarian regime that emerged from that centralization of power supported theevolution of the relationship between the country’s criminal underbelly and thepolitical sphere (Morris, 1991: 25–26 [48]).

The political preeminence of the federal executive over national and state and localinstitutions was reinforced with the control that the president exercised over anothercrucial piece of the regime, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the State’sparty. Virtually all the country’s elected officials and all the public servants in thedifferent government spheres were members of PRI. The pivotal figure in all politicaldecision making was the president of Mexico, who had the final word onnominations, candidacies, appointments, and formal and informal privileges(Gonzalez Casanova, 1972: 45 [42]). The president was not only the Head of Statebut also of the government, of the party, and ruler of the official political class. As aconsequence of this concentration of power around the head of the federal executivebranch, his immediate collaborators, his staff, his cabinet, and anyone he designatedhad in turn a notable, marked preeminence in the national political spectrum.Centralized control was exercised in respect to all State authority structures,regardless of the nominal configuration of the country. Finally, running through theformal structure of the national, state and local political institutions, there was a well-articulated and complex grouping of social networks. They were cliques or politicalgroups. In a context of limited competition, these cliques employed their politicalinfluence and their contacts with other social actors to deliberately manipulate allgovernmental resources under their control. This was done to move forward theirpolitical aspirations and to protect their private interests and those of their respectiveclienteles and partners (Meyer, 2002: 919 [46]; Camacho, 1977: 619 [11]). Underthese networks and due to a lack of transparency and of checks and balances, theexistence of high levels of corruption in many areas of government grew. It was underthe political geometry of an authoritarian and centralized scheme that drugtrafficking, present in Mexico since the start of the twentieth century, grew andprospered (Astorga, 2003: 14 [3]; Flores, 2009: 137–228 [40]). And it did so as an


actor subordinated to the power that controlled all aspects of society, includingorganized crime, which was never above the State but under it.

Thus, it was highly desirable for drug traffickers and other organized criminalgroups to have the protection of political and governmental actors. The centralizationof power made negotiations in fact relatively simple (Astorga, 2003 [3]; Flores Pérez,2009 [40]). These factors were decisive for the criminal organization’s continuity.The State’s institutions and the officials in charge of them determined which illicitactivities would be tolerated and who could perform them. In other words, State’sactors determined the rules to which the more relevant criminal groups should adhere.Under this scheme, the criminals were essentially replaceable parts in the dynamics ofillegal operations, as they came and went. Criminals were always subjected to anetwork of relations in which protection and extortion by the State’s actors weremixed, and the latter received enormous economic profits from the performed illicitactivities (Flores Pérez, 2009: 169–227 [40]).

Hence, between the 1940s and 1990s, the years of the post-revolutionary regime,organized crime functioned like an outfit which could be approached as a socialnetwork. Nevertheless, its members had different roles and hierarchies and were alsosubjected to dissimilar limitations. In its lower level, this framework was made up ofconventional criminals who developed their own illicit activities, yet were alwayssubject to extortion by the State’s representatives. These criminals were often theweakest link in the chain, because their durability in the criminal enterprise, and eventheir own physical survival, was determined by the threshold of impunity dictated bytheir associates within governmental institutions. On the upper extreme were highranking politicians and bureaucrats, capable of appointing their underdogs within thejudicial system and institutions of national, state and local security. They manipulateddecision-making processes and institutional functioning to selectively guaranteecover for organized criminals.

In a middle position were law enforcement agencies, which were intermediariesbetween politicians and traditional criminals and disciplined the latter. Often, theseagencies collaborated directly with criminal groups, with agents committing crimesand supporting the operational and logistic development of the illicit business.Although they had a remarkable autonomy in their daily activities, agencies weresubordinate to high-level policy-makers, who appointed or removed their leaders.This structure, present at the national level, was replicated at the state and local levels.Naturally, local reproduction of these arrangements operated always following therules of the political regime, where the local powers were de facto subordinated to thecentralized institutions above and all the way to the federal executive branch. Inaddition, there were other economic actors at various levels capable of inserting theprofits of crime in the formal economy. This subgroup has been much more difficultto address, because there is not enough available information, in comparison to theforementioned actors.

Actors, institutions and drug trafficking in Tamaulipas

In Tamaulipas, drug trafficking developed as an extension of other illicit activitiesalready established and rooted in the area for many years especially that of smuggling

C.A. Flores Pérez

merchandise. Reports from the 1850s show the existence of important networksengaged in smuggling merchandise in cities, whose trade routes years later wouldbe drug trafficking corridors. Prussian Consul General Ferdinand Von Seiffertinformed Berlin that year on the consequences of smuggling after the signing ofthe Guadalupe Hidalgo Peace Treaty of 1848. Referring to Matamoros, Tamaulipas,he pointed out that such cities “… [a]re almost of no importance any longer in regardto legal commerce, nor for commerce coming from Europe” (Bernecker, Walther,1994: 126–127 [6]). The direction of the smuggling flow was the opposite at that timeand then reversed. In the then recently annexed Texas, there was one city on theborder, Brownsville,

“…whose almost sole activity is smuggling to Mexico. Brownsville is today therepository of all the prohibited merchandise destined to enter clandestinely theMexican Republic. From there, they flow upriver to Camargo, where, as in allplaces, custody is so bad that the impudence of the Yankees does not havelimits, and the goods, through Monterrey, travel to Coahuila, Zacatecas andSan Luis” (Ibid). [6]

These remarks are relevant to the present:

“The customs officials, upon seeing that with tariff revenues they couldn’t evencomplete their own salaries, decided to ally themselves to the smugglers, tokeep more or less some commercial traffic in the city. For a fee, or for part ofthe profit of the contraband, they grant all kinds of certifications. Thegovernment is incapable of controlling this, and even if it had the means todo so, wouldn’t dare for fear that the border states would secede from the[Mexican] Federation, because what currently maintains commerce alive inthose states is contraband…”3(Idem) [6]

Thus, from very early on, smuggling was strong in the region. The originalfounder of the Gulf Cartel, Juan Nepomuceno Guerra Cárdenas (Juan N. Guerra)was a smuggler who ventured into drug trafficking. As can be ascertained throughavailable public evidence, his criminal career probably benefited from his relationswith many members of public security and political institutions. The sameinformation points out that those officials were likely protectors of this criminalenterprise. It was Juan N. Guerra, uncle of Juan García Ábrego, who originally setup the criminal organization’s networks within law enforcement agencies androunded up political support. Some sources indicate that the first politicalrelationships Juan N. Guerra cultivated were with political groups from the State ofHidalgo, specifically with the Rojo Gómez family, at the same time that one of hisbrothers, Roberta Guerra Cárdenas, became a compadre to Jorge Rojo Lugo, whowould become the head of the Mexican Agrarian Reform Ministry and then Governorof Hidalgo during the administration of José López Portillo (1976–1982) (Figueroa,1996: 35–146 [39]). Years later, Rojo Lugo, as head of the PRI in Tamaulipas, alongwith then Governor Emilio Martínez Manautou, would appoint Roberto Guerra

3 The report said that in other areas of the country contraband also flourished significantly, such as inSinaloa and Chihuahua, which also are currently geographical points of prime importance for drug aretrafficking.


Velasco, nephew of Juan N. Guerra, as mayoral candidate and eventually mayor ofMatamoros, Tamaulipas (1984–1987). As we will see forthwith, apparently MartínezManautou played a relevant role in the Gulf Cartel’s development (AGN, PublicVersion of Emilio Martínez Manautou’s file, DFS, docket 1: 27–28 [68]). 4 Thismarks the beginning of the leadership of Juan García Ábrego in the Gulf Cartel. Inaddition, Roberto Guerra Cárdenas, the younger brother of Juan Guerra Cárdenas,was head of the State District Attorney’s Office in Tamaulipas during theadministration of Governor Praxedis Balboa in 1963. Roberto would become oneof the figures of political patrilineage in that state. In a biography written by hiswidow, she reported that he had a deep friendship with “the ex-President of theMexican Republic, Emilio Portes Gil, and with former Tamaulipas governorsNorberto Treviño Zapata and Enrique Cárdenas” (Solorio, 1997: 360 [61]).

This is intriguing, if anything because of the fact that one of the brothers of themain trafficker of the region was in charge of the state agency responsible for localtaxes, equivalent to that which on the federal level was in charge of combatingsmuggling. Equally puzzling is the fact that the already mentioned Enrique CárdenasGonzález had been appointed in 1972 to be Undersecretary of Investigations at theMexican Treasury Department (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público) byPresident Luis Echeverría (Martínez, 2009 [44]). One of his duties was combatingborder smuggling. He resigned from that position to accept the PRI candidacy forgovernor of Tamaulipas, office he held between 1976 and 1981 (Camp, 1992: 95[12]). Since the beginning years of the 1970s, there had been references in the mediato the participation of the Guerra family in drug trafficking, such as during the seizurein Nuevo León of a truck transporting half a ton of marijuana and destined forTamaulipas. But the rise in drug trafficking became more conspicuous during theperiod between 1981 and 1987, with the arrival of Emilio Martínez Manautou asGovernor of Tamaulipas.

Although he became governor in the declining years of his political career, MartínezManautou was not a secondary figure in the national political context. He had beenSenator from 1958 to 1964, Chief of Staff for President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970), and one of the potential candidates to succeed Díaz Ordaz as president ofMexico,finally losing the designation to Luis Echeverría. His close personal relationship toPresident Gustavo Díaz Ordaz not onlymade him one of the favorites to succeed him butallowed him to maintain a strong influence in his home state. The testimony given byManuel A. Ravizé, Governor of Tamaulipas from 1969 to 1975, is revealing:

“I became governor because of Emilio Martínez Manautou, when he was Chiefof Staff during the administration of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz. It was with Emiliothat President Díaz Ordaz discussed any issue related to Tamaulipas. That iswhy, when they revealed that Luis Echeverría was the PRI candidate to succeedDíaz Ordaz, my first impulse was to turn in my resignation to President DíazOrdaz…[Martínez Manautou] named the state government’s secretary general,senior officers, the chief of police, and almost all the mayors of the importantmunicipalities.” (Diario de Nuevo Laredo, 1986: 1and 6C [21])

4 These documents are publicly available at National General Archive (AGN) in Mexico City, Mexico, inthe files of the former Federal Security Directorate (DFS)-Directorate of Political and Social Investigations(IPS).

C.A. Flores Pérez

The defeat of Martínez Manautou by Echeverría for the presidential successionkept the former ostracized during the 6-year administration of the latter. However,Martínez Manautou returned to public life as Health and Public Assistance Secretary,during the José López Portillo administration. López Portillo had been a MartínezManautou subordinate when the latter was Chief of Staff. It was López Portillo whoinvited Martínez Manautou to become governor of Tamaulipas at the end of the1970s.

He was officially named candidate to the governorship of Tamaulipas on June 15,1980 (El Bravo de Matamoros, 1980a: 1, first section [22]). His first campaign act inthe state took place in Matamoros. Martínez Manautou had begun his political careerin that city as a city councilman (El Mañana de Nuevo Laredo, 1980a: 4, secondsection [29]). This was the city where the Gulf Cartel was born. He had aspired tobecome governor in 1962, but Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos blocked him.The nomination went to Praxedis Balboa Gojon instead. His luck would change whenPresident López Mateos named Gustavo Díaz Ordaz as his successor, because he wasa close friend of Martínez Manautou. However, a document from the DFS –theregime’s political police– shows that an analysis of the candidates had beendeveloped and pointed out the close ties of his brother-in-law, Augusto Cárdenas,ex-mayor of Matamoros, to drug trafficking and indicated that he was “an accompliceof Juan N. Guerra, well known smuggler of all types of merchandise and evendrugs…” (AGN, Public Version of Emilio Martínez Manautou’s file, DFS, docket1: 46 [68]). It was becoming known that several members of the political clique thatMartínez Manautou belonged to apparently had a very relevant role in terms of theexponential growth of influence of the Guerra family. Thus it is worth looking intowho were the allies of Martínez Manautou.

A memorandum of the DFS, dated in August 1962 and signed by the then head ofthe DFS, Manuel Rangel Escamilla, refers to a meeting among former PresidentsEmilio Portes Gil, Lázaro Cárdenas and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, where the first statedthat the former Industry and Commerce Secretary, Raúl Salinas Lozano, had backedEmilio Martínez Manautou as candidate for governor of Tamaulipas (AGN, PublicVersion of Emilio Martínez Manautou’s file, DFS, docket 1: 60–62 [68]). Years later,according to statements made by his son, former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari,Raúl Salinas Lozano had also backed him in his search for the Mexican presidency(Castañeda, 1999: 233 [14]).

Toward the end of the Díaz Ordaz administration, among the figures close toMartínez Manautou and who supported his presidential aspirations for the successionwas Carlos Hank González. Hank had been a former head of the Food SupplyNational Agency (Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares, or CONASUPO),ex-governor of the State of Mexico, Mayor of Mexico City, and also fellowcongressman of Martínez Manautou, in the late 50s-early 60s. According to DFSdocuments, Hank González had a close relationship with Raúl Salinas Lozano, withwhom he had interests in business that, according to the same source, were practicallyproperty of General Bonifacio Salinas Leal, former governor of Nuevo León and,accordingly to the document, a relative of Salinas Lozano. Bonifacio Salinas’representative in those businesses was Roberto González Barrera, father-in-law ofCarlos Hank’s son (AGN, Public Version of Carlos Hank González’s file, IPS, docket2: 21–23 [67]). One of González Barrera’s enterprises, Maseca, was sponsored by


Hank González when he was head of CONASUPO, in the 1960s, and Raúl SalinasLozano would become later a counselor of the same company.

Years later, a secret document of the Center for Anti-drug Intelligence of theMexican Army, whose extracts circulated in the media in 1997, and to which theauthor of this study had access, pointed out alleged links among Hank, SalinasLozano, and González Barrera with the Gulf Cartel. It even implicated Carlos andRaúl Salinas de Gortari (Boyer, 2001: 115–143 [9]). Of the brothers, the former(Carlos) became president and the latter (Raúl) was prosecuted for money laundering.According to this information, Raúl was linked to, among others, the group led byJuan García Ábrego. He was also imprisoned for 10 years for being the intellectualauthor of the assassination of José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, who was in fact hisbrother-in-law. In 2005, Mexican courts threw his conviction out.

Apparently, the relationship between Hank and Martínez Manautou included otherbusinesses. A brother of Emilio Martínez Manautou, Federico, was Secretary General ofthe State of Baja California, from 1965 to 1971 (Blancornelas, 1997 [7]), and mayor ofMexicali, Baja California between 1960 and 1962. According to DFS reports, during histime as Secretary, Federico had a conflict with the State’s governor, Raúl Sánchez Díaz. Atleast, that was said in the local press at the time. The DFS report says that the newspapersattributed the dispute to the governor’s attempt to regulate various clandestine activities,such as gambling and prostitution, which generated resistance by Federico, who,according to media reports, gave them protection. His brother, Emilio, was the Chief ofStaff of the Mexican Presidency and Federico felt that he did not have to pay heed to hishierarchical superior (the governor). The report ended with a denial, signed by the head ofthe DFS, FernandoGutiérrez Barrio, eulogistically exonerating the brother of the powerfulpotential presidential candidate Emilio Martínez Manautou (AGN, Public Version ofEmilio Martínez Manautou’s file, DFS, docket 1: 109–111 [68]).

In any case, years later, a letter published in Proceso by a reader named RobertoSoto affirmed that, in the State of Baja California, there were rumors that FedericoMartínez Manautou had received as a gift a mansion located in Playas de Rosarito;the mansion had in the past been a casino (Proceso, 1984b [52]). The gift allegedly camefrom a businessman named Johnny Alessio. Since 1963, Alessio had been given thelicense to operate the Agua Caliente racetrack. Johnny Alessio was apparently linked tothe Italian-American mafia. This racetrack and several other gambling businessassociated to it have been for years linked to the Hank family (Martínez, 2000: 161–173 [44]). Jesús Garduño, the Agua Caliente’s manager, had been a Carlos Hanksubordinate in different public posts, alternating both roles over time (Proceso, 1984a[51]). In regard to Johnny Alessio, he had invested in several casinos and racetracksalong the northernMexican border. The businessman JoséMaría Guardia, former ownerof Ciudad Juárez racetrack, said in an interview that this establishment had belonged toJohnny Alessio until 1990. The permission to operate this business had been offered toGuardia by the forementioned Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, already Secretary of theInterior, in the 90s (Revista Fortuna, 2005 [58]). Back in the Eighties, in 1983, theracetrack in Nuevo Laredo would open its doors. It was inaugurated by Emilio MartínezManautou, political associate of Carlos Hank (Proceso, 1984a [51]).

Another member of the political clique that had backed the presidential candidacy ofMartínez Manautou was Leopoldo Sánchez Celis, former member of Congress andHank’s colleague. He had been governor of Sinaloa (1963–1968) and has been

C.A. Flores Pérez

identified by multiple sources as a personal friend of Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, acapo from Sinaloa State and main figure of the drug trafficking world in Mexico duringthe 1970s and 1980s. Settled in Guadalajara, Miguel Ángel Félix had been deemed theinitiator of massive cocaine trafficking from South America through Mexico, and theninto the United States (Proceso, 1989 [53]).5 At the end of his administration, SánchezCelis was welcomed by Carlos Hank, then Governor of the State of Mexico, whogranted him various responsibilities in the state government. Hank and Sánchez Celisstrongly tightened their relations during this time. In fact, during his last state of theunion address as governor, Hank made a special mention of gratitude to Sánchez Celis.DFS reports detail that “…a great number of Congressmen received financing for theircampaigns from Professor Hank González, through Leopoldo Sánchez Celis.” (AGN,Public Version of Carlos Hank González’s file, DFS, docket 2: 274 [66]). Apparently theability of Sánchez Celis to obtain campaign resources was legendary. Already in 1962,having been a potential candidate for governor of Sinaloa, sources cited by the renownedhistorian of drug trafficking in Mexico, Luis Astorga, identified Sánchez Celis as thecandidate of the opium poppy or “sleeping plant” producers, who apparently providedfinancing for him (Astorga, 2003: 144–145 [3]).6

The relationship between Sánchez Celis and Martínez Manautou was close. ThePolitical and Social Investigations Directorate reported trips made together bySánchez Celis and a brother of Martínez Manautou, with whom he toured severalSinaloa municipalities, during a week in April of 1972 (AGN, Public Version ofLeopoldo Sánchez Celis’ file, IPS, docket 1: 7 [74]). Sánchez Celis had helpedMartínez Manautou’s maneuvers to oust the Dean of the National AutonomousUniversity of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, or UNAM),Ignacio Chávez. A DFS report states the operations of a certain “Sinaloa Group”made up of students from the National Polytechnic Institute (Instituto PolitécnicoNacional) and the UNAM were involved. The report explicitly points out that,

“The activities of the so-called Sinaloa Group have Leopoldo Sánchez Duarteas their common denominator. Sánchez Duarte is the son of the formergovernor of Sinaloa, and we considered that, through him, the money for theseactivities was supplied.” (AGN, Public Version of Leopoldo Sánchez Celis’file, DFS, docket 2: 201 [73]).

In 1966, the mobilization of Sánchez Duarte’s student group received lenienttreatment from the head of the Special Services Section of the Mexico City Police, RaúlMendiolea Cerecero. Mendiolea Cerecero was directly linked with another ally ofMartinez Manautou in the bid to succeed Díaz Ordaz, Oscar Flores Sánchez. Floreshad been Governor of Chihuahua State during the 1960s and would be future MexicanAttorney General from 1976 to 1978. According to a DFS document, classified as“secret” and dated August 1978, Flores Sánchez was a supporter of Martínez Manautou

5 In the late 1990’s, Roberto Sánchez Duarte, son of Sanchez Celis who was baptized by Felix Gallardo,was executed by firings of an AK-47, .9 mm pistol assault rifle in Ecatepec, Mexico. His brother Leopold,then advisor of Carlos Hank in the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, told reporters that it wasnot a matter of the press but a family affair to be handled privately (Proceso, 1990 [54]).6 Astorga refers a letter from John Reese, an American based in Mazatlán, Sinaloa, to Captain JamesHamilton, of the intelligence division of the LAPD. The document is dated August 20 and 29, 1962. U.S.National Archives, DEA, SFBNDD, 1916–1970, RG, 170, NACP.


in his bid to succeed Díaz Ordaz and he was the political protector of Raúl MendioleaCerecero. When Flores Sánchez became Attorney General, Mendiolea was appointedChief of the Federal Judicial Police. Flores Sánchez also promoted Carlos AguilarGarza, Coordinator of the Mexican Federal Attorney’s Offices in Sinaloa, Chihuahuaand Durango, during Operation Condor. The document explains:

“We do not have any evidence that demonstrates that Mr. Flores Sánchez hasbeen part of, or directly involved in, this commerce in any way; however, wehave ample evidence that some of his closest collaborators were in factinvolved, and continue to be involved at this time, directly or indirectly, in thebusiness of drug trafficking; and we also think that it is impossible for Floresnot to have any knowledge of these past and present activities.” (AGN, PublicVersion of Raúl Mendiolea Cerecero’s file, DFS, docket 1: 155–169 [72]).

Among the individuals mentioned in the report are Mendiolea Cerecero and AguilarGarza, who were called protectors of narcotrafficking (Ibidem [68]). One of the mainoperational contacts for Félix Gallardo during the 1970s was, precisely, Carlos AguilarGarza, who years later would be transferred to Tamaulipas with the same functions,practically simultaneously with the designation of Martínez Manautou as candidate forgovernor of Tamaulipas in 1980. Attorney General Oscar Flores Sánchez and his Chiefof the Judicial Federal Police, Raúl Mendiolea, announced the designation of CarlosAguilar Garza as coordinator of the Mexican Attorney General’s Office in Tamaulipason 17 June 1980, 2 days after the designation of Martínez Manautou as candidate forgovernor (El Mañana de Reynosa, 1980b [35]). Years later, in 1985, still during thegovernorship of Martínez Manautou, Aguilar Garza crashed in Nuevo León in a lightaircraft coming from Chetumal, Quintana Roo, and headed for Nuevo Laredo,Tamaulipas. The pilot of said aircraft was the Commander of Civil Aeronautics of theAirport of Nuevo Laredo, Manuel Amozorrutia, who stated to the authorities that theplane was loaded with cocaine and that Aguilar Garza participated in cocaine traffickingwith Juan N. Guerra (Federal Judicial Police Act, 1989).7

On 16 June 1980, a day after Emilio Martínez Manautou was named as the PRIcandidate for governor of Tamaulipas, Emilio López Parra was officially named the newcommander of the PJF (Federal Judicial Police) in Matamoros, as per instructions fromthe head of the PJF, Raúl Mendiolea Cerecero. During the year previous to hisdesignation, he had held the same position in Tijuana, Baja California. At the time, thefederal attorney in charge of the Regional Coordination of the Mexican Federal AttorneyOffices for that area was Carlos Aguilar Garza (El Bravo de Matamoros, 1980b [23]).

In May of 1989, López Parra was arrested and charged with money laundering. On18 November 1990, he was freed because of lack of evidence. In 1993, witnessesprotected by U.S. authorities offered testimony about the institutional protection thatEmilio López Parra gave to García Ábrego’s organization (Figueroa, 1996: 231–233[39]). In time, this criminal organization would become known as the Gulf Cartel.

Again on 14 June 1980, 1 day before the designation of Martínez Manautou ascandidate for governor, another figure in the realm of security was sent to Tamaulipas.

7 The Federal Judicial Police’s Act which contains Amozorrutia’s deposition, dated on July 11, 1989, could beconsulted in the National Journalism Award Winner, Oscar Treviño: http://careldematamoros.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html

C.A. Flores Pérez

http://careldematamoros.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html

http://careldematamoros.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html

It was Brigadier General Manuel Díaz Escobar, who was appointed Commander ofthe 8th Military Zone, headquartered in Tancol, Tamaulipas. A few years before, DíazEscobar had been in charge of Operation Condor in Badiraguato, Sinaloa, one of theemblematic towns in the history of drug trafficking in Mexico (El Mañana deReynosa, 1980a: 1, third section [34]). Manuel Díaz Escobar had been the militaryofficer in charge of training a paramilitary group known as Los Halcones (TheFalcons) that participated in the repression against student protests in 1968 and inthe massacre of students on Corpus Christi Day (10 June 1971), known in Mexico asLa Masacre del Jueves de Corpus (El Universal, 2008 [37]). In 1971, Diaz Escobaroperated under the institutional mandate of the then Regent of Mexico City, AlfonsoMartínez Domínguez. Los Halcones were paid through the government office underhis charge. Martínez Domínguez was another old ally of Martínez Manautou and, in1980, when the latter was named candidate for governor of Tamaulipas, the formerwas serving as Governor of Nuevo León.

On Sunday, 30 November 1980, the closing of Martinez Manautou’s campaignwould be held in Matamoros. A similar act was programmed for that afternoon, forthe closing of the campaign of the opposition candidate for mayor of Matamoros,Jorge Cárdenas Gonzalez, brother of ex-governor Enrique Cárdenas Gonzalez,already mentioned. The local newspaper reported that the Mexican Army patrolledthe street since the day before, in vehicles that had machine guns mounted on them.The operation was headed by the commander of the Military Zone, Manuel DiazEscobar (El Mañana de Nuevo Laredo, 1980c: 1, second section [31]).

Additionally, that same newspaper pointed out that the day before, partisan assaultgroups had arrived to Matamoros, sent by the governor of Nuevo León, AlfonsoMartinez Dominguez. Their orders were to support Martinez Manautou and prevent,or squash, protests in favor of Jorge Cárdenas Gonzalez (Ibidem [31]). Jorge CárdenasGonzales would win in Matamoros, despite the resistance by the government apparatus.The relationship between Jorge Cárdenas and Martinez Manautou was a tense one. Tosucceed Jorge Cárdenas in 1984, the governor Emilio Martinez Manautou wouldsupport, for the PRI candidacy, an individual named Jesús Roberto Guerra Velasco.He was son of Roberto Guerra Cárdenas, nephew of Juan N. Guerra and cousin of JuanGarcía Ábrego.

The relationship of Martinez Manautou with the new mayor was a close one. TheMexican Interior Department detailed in its reports multiple meetings and tours that thegovernor and Guerra Velasco took together, particularly to inaugurate public worksfinanced with state and municipal investment. Some of these public works were valuedat MX$1,500 million (AGN, Public Version of Emilio Martínez Manautou’s file, IPS,docket 1: 45–47 and 50–51 [70]), an amount which contrasts with the retention of publicresources that Jorge Cárdenas suffered fromMartínez Manautou’s government (Ibidem:296 [66]). Guerra Velasco and Martínez Manautou even carried out joint acts with thethen Secretary of National Defense, Juan Arévalo Gardoqui, who in an official visit tothe state would make a stop in Matamoros, where he would be received by MayorGuerra Velasco, together with governor Martinez Manautou (AGN, Public Version ofEmilio Martínez Manautou’s file, IPS, docket 1: 72 [70]). This was indeed a verypeculiar meeting, taking into account the existence of several versions of events whichtalk about the participation of General Arévalo Gardoqui in drug trafficking during thatera (Astorga, 2005: 143–144 [4]; Cabildo, 1992 [10]).


Concerning the DFS, in 1980 Commander Rafael Chao López was its regionalcoordinator in the northeastern portion of the country. He was the main decision-maker in the offices of that federal police agency in the state of Tamaulipas. Chaoheld that position until the beginning of 1984 (Diario de Nuevo Laredo, 1984a: 3C[17]). In 1973, Chao had the position of Chief of State Security –it doesn’t say whichagency or institution he belonged to– in Sinaloa, according to the director of the DFS,Capitan Luis de la Barreda Solórzano (AGN, Public Version of Rafael Chao López’sfile, DFS, docket 1: 1 [65]). The DFS public version of Chao’s personal file statesthat, in this period, he commanded anti-drug tasks and arrested various drugtraffickers in the region (Ibidem [69]).

In the late 1970s, Miguel Nazar Haro, then head of the DFS, sent Chao to theNorthwestern region (AGN, Public Version of Emilio Martínez Manautou’s file, DFS,docket 2: 88–91 [69]). Chao had the support of another political group distinct fromthat of Martinez Manautou: the one that backed Nazar Haro, originally aligned underthe orders of Fernando Gutierrez Barrios. Toward the end of the 70s, Nazar Haro hadsupposedly changed his political loyalty to another ex-director of the DFS and arelevant political figure: Javier García Paniagua (Aguayo Quezada, 2001: 234 [1]).

Because of this, the activities of Chao in Tamaulipas between the end of the 70s andbeginning of the 80s show more direct extortion of drug traffickers, various criminals,and even people without any apparent criminal backgrounds (AGN, Public Version ofRafael Chao López’s file, DFS, docket 1: 6 [65]). In 1979, the DFS reported the detentionof individuals who served as “aids” or “assistants” of commander Chao for engagementin extortion (Idem: 6 [65]). Chao López was detained 5 years later inManzanillo, Colima.His own nephew accused him, after being himself detained in possession of a load ofcocaine hidden in a truck that was carrying apples (El Norte, 1989b [28]).

Years later, Chao López was also identified as a protector of drug traffickinggroups from Sinaloa. Specifically he was accused of protecting in 1985 the escape toSinaloa of relatives of Rafael Caro Quintero, after they had killed an agent of theFederal Highway Police in Nuevo León. After his detention, Rafael Caro Quinterohimself stated that he had paid bribes to Chao. According to a newspaper story, inmid-1985 federal authorities had detected properties of Chao López valuedcollectively at $2 billion pesos (El Norte, 1989a [27]).

In Tamaulipas, the performance of DFS elements headed by Chao shows a treatmentof local criminals based on traditional extortion schemes. That even led to occasionaltensions and disputes between traffickers, local police agencies and their politicalbackers on one hand, and DFS agents on the other. This is apparent, for example, inthe political pressures applied by the associates of Martinez Manautou against thecommanders of the DFS, aimed at removing them. Such a situation could also beinterpreted in regard to the information exposed in a DFS document, dated in May28th 1981, signed byMiguel Nazar Haro, head of the DFS, and sent to the sub-secretaryof the interior, Fernando Gutierrez Barrios. In the document, Nazar replied to EmilioMartinez Manautou’s complaints regarding Chao López and his agents (AGN, PublicVersion of Emilio Martínez Manautou’s file, DFS, docket 2: 88–91 [69]).8 In another

8 Public denouncements of DFS abuses were published in Tamaulipas’ press. Some samples could be readin (El Mañana de Nuevo Laredo, 1981: 1, second section [32]; El Bravo de Matamoros, 1981: 6–5 [24];Idem, 1984: 1, second section [25]).

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case, DFS agents also made a special display of their investigative capabilities topressure governor Martínez Manautou, as they investigated the alleged smuggling of18-wheelers loadedwith PVC pipes supposedly belonging to him. The DFS commanderfollowed the case with singular persistence (AGN, Public Version of Emilio MartínezManautou’s file, IPS, docket 2: 20–21 [71]).

Considering the personal background of the people involved, a dispute for the bootyfrom drug trafficking and other types of smuggling between two different politicalgroups should not be discarded as a reason for this pressure. In the end, the economicinterests over drug trafficking would dilute these differences. After his arrest, in his firststatements to the authorities, Chao admitted to being involved in drug trafficking andindicated the participation of Carlos Aguilar Garza in this same activity. Specifically, heconfirmed that the plane in which the latter had crashed was transporting 600 kg ofcocaine and that Chao himself had been in charge of guaranteeing that the drugwould beunloaded from the plane and then hidden. He had also provided immediate protectionfor Aguilar Garza, as well as the lawyer and associate of the latter, Miguel Ángel delBosque Cardona, and the pilot, Manuel Amozorrutia Silva; also of the then commanderof the DFS, Manuel García García, and the copilot Fernando de la Jara Martinez, all ofwhom had also been victims of this plane crash (El Norte, 1989b [28]).

It is in these years when the massive trafficking of cocaine begins through thenortheastern region of the country, especially through Tamaulipas. In April of 1977,the head of the Federal Attorney Office in this zone stated that between April of 1977and June of 1980, the Federal Judicial Police had only confiscated 10.4 kg of this drug(El Mañana de Nuevo Laredo, 1980b [30]). In October of 1984 the local newspapersreported in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, the biggest cocaine seizure until then in thehistory of the country: 300 kg (Diario de Nuevo Laredo, 1984c [19]). In this last case,the cocaine was first transported from Medellín, Colombia, to Guadalajara, México(Idem, 1984d [20]). The fore mentioned drug baron, Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo,linked to Carlos Aguilar Garza, commanded drug trafficking in Guadalajara. Thecocaine boom in Tamaulipas occurred after Aguilar was transferred to this state.

It is also during this period when the violence associated with drug trafficking startsgetting worse in Tamaulipas, as a result of the consolidation of the pre-eminence of thecriminal organization headed by Juan N. Guerra and his nephew, Juan García Ábrego.The support of various political and security authorities were a determining factor in thisprocess. They consolidated the organization’s hegemony by arresting or killing severalcompetitors and launching violence uponmany others in order to force them to work forthe Guerra-García Abrego’s criminal group. All this, in the context of a new, emergingdrug market allured all participants with the expectations of huge profits from cocaine.

Manuel Amozorrutia, Carlos Aguilar Garza’s pilot, who confessed the transportingof cocaine in the plane in which both crashed to the ground, also explained the drugtrafficking links between Aguilar Garza and Juan N. Guerra (Federal Judicial PoliceAct, 1989 [38]).

According to Amozorrutia, Aguilar Garza and Juan N. Guerra had authorized theexecution of an old associate in narcotrafficking, Casimiro Espinoza Campos, inMatamoros. The attack would occur under the operational supervision of Juan GarcíaAbrego. The original attack, carried out by Oscar López Olivares, a subordinate of thelatter, had failed. Oscar López Olivares later became a protected witness of the U.S.authorities. Such failure led to an additional attack, to be carried out while Espinoza


was wounded and convalescing in a hospital in Matamoros (Diario de Nuevo Laredo,1984b: 6C [18]). Seven people who were patients at that hospital died in that attack,which could be considered the first public and extremely violent eruption of theorganization that in the following years would be colloquially known as the GulfCartel. Paradoxically, Espinoza Campos had survived that attack as well and only losthis life several days later because of his wounds.

The following were ultimately incapable of finding the individuals responsible forthat attack: the municipal police, under the orders of mayor Jesús Roberto GuerraVelasco; the State Public Security Agency, under the orders of Major Abdón TrejoNava, old collaborator of Martinez Manautou in the Secretariat of the Presidency; andthe State Judicial Police, under the orders of Ricardo Zolezzi Cavazos (El Mañana deNuevo Laredo, 1982: 1–6 s section [33]), directly appointed to that position by thegovernor, Emilio Martinez Manautou, the DFS and the PJF.

Conclusion

It is possible that all these individuals were only coincidentally involved in thecircumstances narrated up to this point. Another more logical possibility is that all thesefacts show concerted action designed to cover up, conceal or abet drug trafficking fromseveral of the most important political and security institutions in the country and the stateof Tamaulipas. A DFS document dated in 1970, signed by his station chief in the state ofNuevo León and sent to the agency’s head, Captain Luis de la BarredaMoreno, brings thepoint home by clearly describing an analogous situation. It narrates meetings in the stateof Nuevo León, next to the State of Tamaulipas, attended by high custom officials,Tamaulipas cities’ former majors and traffickers, to “organize smuggling in accordancewith Headquarters of the First Zone of Custom Protection, based in the city ofMonterrey.” There, Captain Alfonso Domene–brother of the senior officer of the Officeof the Mexican Presidency, at that time headed by Emilio Martinez Manautou–hadmeetings with politicians that stood out “…as sympathizers…” of the latter in hispresidential aspirations. According to the report, among those present at those meetingswas “Juan N. Guerra, a famous smuggler, pimp and trafficker from Matamoros, agenerous contributor to the pre-campaign of his friend, doctor Martinez Manautou…”(AGN, Public Version of Emilio MartínezManautou’s file, DFS, docket 1:182–183 [68])

According to several sources, all the described conditions would be even worse by1988. At least until 1994, most of the detentions of drug traffickers in Tamaulipas wouldbe of members of rival organizations to the one headed by Juan N. Guerra and JuanGarcía Ábrego or at least would not affect the central nucleus of the latter. Juan N. Guerrawas detained in 1991 but he was promptly freed. He died a freeman inMatamoros in Julyof 2001 (El Universal, 2001 [36]). Juan García Ábrego was not detained until 1996.

In 1989, answering a direct, specific question about his characteristics as a“politician,” given that there were public accounts that he had financed various politicalcampaigns in Tamaulipas, Juan N. Guerra himself indicated: “I am not a politician…butI am their friend. One thing’s for sure, I am a priísta.9 I’ve always been one and I vote for

9 In the Mexican lexicon, priísta refers to a militant, supporter or sympathizer of PRI, RevolutionaryInstitutionalized Party, the national political party which ruled the country for several decades.

C.A. Flores Pérez

its candidates.”According to the reporter, he then showed him his PRI membership card(Proceso, 1991 [55]).

Those statements were made a short while after the celebration of an official act inwhich a country roadway was re-inaugurated, a path that ended directly at the start of aproperty lot owned by Juan N. Guerra. According to the media, the work was developedwith resources from the National Solidarity Program (Progama Nacional deSolidaridad), which was in force during those years, with the goal of alleviating poverty.According to the newspaper story, among the individuals present were Senator ManuelCavazos Lerma and the federal congressman Tomás Yarrington (Ibidem [55]). Someyears afterwards, both of them became governors of the state of Tamaulipas.

In 2012, former Tamaulipas’ governor Tomás Yarrington was indicted by the U.S.government in a civil case. He was accused of receiving illicit payments from drugrelated organizations (United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, 2012: 3)[63]. In a criminal case against one of his associates, Yarrington was also mentioned as apolitician directly involved with the criminal endeavor of a later version of the GulfCartel (United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, 2012: 3) [64].

Back in 1988, some newspapers exposed that a criminal case was going on in Geneva,Switzerland. In this case, private company Rostuca Holdings, Ltd., was suing RobertoPolo, a financial adviser, for embezzling USD $60million (NewYork Times, 1988 [50]).Rostuca’s owner was former governor EmilioMartínezManautou (Proceso, 1993b [57]).Asked by the Swiss judge about the origins of his fortune, Martínez Manautou affirmedthat it was from his wife’s live-stock trade, but he did not produce any evidencesupporting his argument (El Correo, 1995 [26]). According to the same MartínezManautou, he had founded Rostuca in the Cayman Islands as a way to avoid publiclinkage to this capital and to get the money out ofMexico (Proceso, 1993a [56]). A ratherunusual fortune even for a very well-paid politician, according to official salary trackings.

All these dynamics show perfectly the way that these social networks operate in thecontext of the centralized-descendent-incremental model which was explained at thebeginning of this chapter. Beyond the case’s peculiarities, according to the evidenceshown, political actors played a fundamental role in the operation and growth of thecriminal organization. This criminal group remained sheltered and disciplined for a timeby the intermediaries of the security institutions, whom the former appointed.

Analogous situations prevailed in Tamaulipas and other regions of the country, at leastuntil the year 2000, when the PRI lost the Mexican Presidency. The pervasiveness ofequivalent situations inMexico demonstrates the proposed theoretical model’s usefulnessaddressing the nature and prevalence of organized criminal corruption in a paradigmaticcase of a democratizing country with a former authoritarian institutional framework.

Further investigation conducted on similar cases, using the proposed typology, mightshed additional light on the importance of understanding the background of authoritarianinstitutions in order to explain the resilience of corruptive practices linking state officials toorganized crime, in Mexico as well as in other countries facing democratizing processes.

After the opposition’s victory in the presidential elections in 2000, the government’srelationship to crime was profoundly altered. This change stemmed from a newcorrelation of power and the clash between political forces governing the federationand the states. These transformations would imply the rupture of the old mechanisms ofcollusion-extortion over criminal groups, without ending the endemic corruption thathad proliferated during the preceding regime. Indeed, it only fragmented it and made it


less coherent and predictable. These new conditions have been described above asbelonging to the model labeled atomized-multidirectional-incremental, controlledaccording to the typology already explained.

In Tamaulipas, the persistence of corruption and the power vacuum left after the arrestof Juan García Ábrego would give way to the emergence of a new organization headedby Osiel Cárdenas Guillén. This new trafficker did not come from a privileged positionwithin the structure of the old Juan N. Guerra-Juan García Ábrego’s criminal group.Notwithstanding, he would consolidate his new hegemony in the Northeast region ofMexico. His would be a new, much more violent organization which would lay thefoundations of its supremacy in the state by recruiting a highly capable enforcementgroup. The core of it was made up of deserters from the Special Forces of the MexicanArmy—Los Zetas—a fact that would strengthen their operational capability and theirresources to confront a fractured political class in various states of the country. However,this is a topic that needs to be tackled in another analysis. A final cautionary note is thatalthough association does not equal guilt, connections are often a beginning principle todetermine motives and means in organized crime. Given the cultural and politicalcontext in Mexico, and the association between those whose guilt has beendemonstrated and those whose guilt has not been demonstrated, we can safely assumethat any investigation should follow these connections as foundational to investigate theextent of the collusion between politicians, bureaucrats and organized crime. In otherwords, it is not beyond plausible that these connections are, in a way, the grease that oilsthe corruption of the State whose engine fuels organized crime.

Protector

Accomplice

Nephew

link

Close Friend

Assistant(Private Secretary)

Brother in law

Brother

Nephew

Cousin

Official (Mayor)

Son

Official (Chief prosecutor´soffice)

Official (Head of theMexican Agrarian Reform

Ministry)

Subordinate

Supporter of Emilio Martínez Manautouin the 1970´s presidential succession

Copilot Pilot

Passenger PassengerAssociate

Promised protection

Promised protection

During the 70's he was the operationalcontact of the narcotrafficker

Passenger

Manager

Brother

Owner until 1990Recipient

Grantor

Owner

Personal friend

Son

Supplied money

Follower

He paid bribes

Participant

Subordinated

Headed by Emilio

Associated

Disciple

Official (Secretary ofGovern)

Son

Friend

Official (Secretary ofTurism and Agriculture)

Son in law

Formerbrother in law

Formerbrother in law

Son

Brother

Associated

Father

Owner

Claimant Defendant

Sent assault gropusParticipant

Subordinated

He headed the vigilance in the streets

Trainer

Supporter of Emilio precandidacyin 1970

Subordinated

Ejecutor

Brother

Subordinated

Current photo

Gave protection

Tried toregulate activities

Emilio MartínezManautou links

Juan NepomucenoGuerrra Cárdenas

y/o Juan N. Guerra links

Juan García Abregolinks

Carlos Salinasde Gortari links

Carlos HankGonzález links

Miguel AlemánValdés link

Adolfo LópezMateos link

Pilot ofAguilar Garza

FriendshipBoth are members

of Oscar Flores Sanchez group

Official (Chief of Staff)

Official (Chief of Staff)Close friends

His widow wrote that her husbandhad a deep friendship with the

Mexican president Emilio Portes Gil.

His widow wrote about the deep frienshipof her husband and governor Norberto Treviño.

Official (Secretary ofAgrarian Reform)

They participated incocaine trafficking

Subordinate in the Mexican State goverment

Subordinate and supporterwas named Chief of PJF

Subordinate(Coordinator)

Official (Secretary ofIndustry and Commerce)

Subordinate

Brother

Political associate

Leader

Political relationship

A secret document of the Center for Anti-drugIntelligence of the Mexican Army, pointed out alleged links among Hank, Salinas Lozano and González Barrera with the Gulf Cartel, even implicated Carlos and Raúl Salinas de Gortari

Friendship

Link

Underling

Former disciple ofFernando Gutiérrez

Barrios

Gave resources to the group

Meetings in Tamaulipas

Political associate, formerCongress fellow

According to a DFS’document, he was the

General’s frontin business

Counselor in Bonifacio Salinas-Roberto

González business

Sponsor of Bonifacio Salinas-RobertoGonzález business

Operator

Gulf Cartel links

Other Gulf Cartel links

Official(Health Secretary)

Former Secretary of Programming and Budget

Founder Leader

Supervised the attack

Official (SHCP)

Head of the StateTreasury Department

Official(Undersecretary of

Agriculture)

Meetings in Tamaulipas

Give protectionto drug shipments

SIMBOLOGY

Fernando de la Jara Martínez

Manuel García García

Roberto Polo

President of Mexico (1934-1940)Lázaro Cárdenas

President of Mexico (1946-1952)Miguel Alemán Valdés

President of Mexico (1952-1958)Adolfo Ruiz Cortines

President of Mexico (1958-1964)Adolfo López Mateos

President of Mexico (1970-1976)Luis Echeverría Álvarez

President of Mexico (1982-1988)Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado

Governor of Tamaulipas (1957-1963)Norberto Treviño Zapata

Head of the PRI's state office during the mid-80's in Tamaulipas

Head of the Mexican Agrarian Reform MinistryJorge Rojo Lugo

Underling of Emilio Martínez Manautou in the Secretary of the Presidency

Head of the State Public Security Agency,during the Martínez Manautou administration

Abdón Trejo Nava

Miguel Ángel del Bosque Cardona

Agua Caliente RacetrackRacetrack, business and gambling

Ciudad Juárez Racetrack

Leopoldo Sánchez Duarte

Governor of Sinaloa (1963-1968)

Former member of Congress

Leopoldo Sánchez CelisHe supported the presidential candidacy

of Emilio Martínez Manautou. Through his sonhe had helped Martinez Manautou's maneuvers

to oust the Dean of the UNAM

Governor of Tamaulipas (1993-1999)

Former congressman and senator from TamaulipasManuel Cavazos Lerma

Second Commander of Customs in Monterrey (1970)

Captain

Alfonso Domene

Senior administration officer of the Secretary of the Mexican PresidencyJuan José Domene

Businessman owner of Maseca and BanorteRoberto González Barrera

Former Secretary General of PRI

Former Governor of Guerrero

José Francisco Ruiz Massieu

Murdered in Mexico City in 1994

Raúl Salinas Lozano

Mexican President (1928-1930)

Former governor of TamaulipasEmilio Portes Gil

Execution of Casimiro Espinoza Campos

According with the testimony of the pilot Manuel Amozorrutia,Aguilar Garza and Juan N. Guerra had authorized the

execution of an old associate in narcotrafficking, CasimiroEspinoza Campos. The attack would occur under the

operational supervision of Juan García Abrego.

The original attack, carried out by Oscar López Olivares, had failed. He stated that his failure

had led to an additional attack, to be carried out whileEspinoza was wounded and convalescing in a hospital in

Matamoros. Seven patients at that hospital died in that attack.Espinoza Campos had survived that attack as well, and only

lost his life several days later, because of his wounds.

Protected witness of U.S. authoritiesOscar López Olivares (a) "EL Profe"

Oscar López Olivares (a) "EL Profe"Seclusion photo in Cereso Torreón

Governor of Baja CaliforniaRaúl Sánchez Díaz

Drug trafficker. Gulf Cartel's victim.Casimiro Espinoza Campos

President of Mexico (1964-1970)Gustavo Díaz Ordaz

Chief of PJE in Tamaulipas, during Emilio's administration

Ricardo Zolezzi Cavazos

Rafael Caro Quintero

Drug lord from Sinaloa who ordered the murder of DEA agent Enrique CamarenaWhen he was arrested he stated that

he had paid bribes to Rafael Chao

Cocain shippingIn 1985, still during the governorship of Martínez Manautou,Aguilar Garza crashed in Nuevo León in a light aircraft comingfrom Chetumal, Quintana Roo, and headed for Nuevo Laredo,Tamaulipas. The pilot of said aircraft was the Commander of

Civil Aeronautics of the Airport of Nuevo Laredo, Manuel Amozorrutia, who stated to the authorities that the plane was loaded with cocaine and that Aguilar Garza participated in cocaine trafficking with Juan N. Guerra.

After his arrest, Rafael Chao López confirmed that the plane in which the latter had crashed was transporting600 kilograms of cocaine and that he had been in charge of

guaranteeing that the drug would be unloaded from the plane and then hidden.He had also provided immediate protection

for Aguilar Garza, as well as the lawyer and associate of the latter, Miguel Ángel del Bosque Cardona, and the pilot, Manuel Amozorrutia Silva;

also of the then commander of the DFS, Manuel García García, and the copilot Fernando de la Jara Martinez.

Re-inaugurated roadway

According to the media, the work was developed withresources from the National Solidarity Program, which

was in force during those years with the goal of alleviating poverty. The roadway ended directly at the start of aproperty lot owned by Juan N. Guerra. At the event

were Senator Manuel Cavazos Lerma and FederalCongressman Tomás Yarrington; some years afterwards,

both of them became governors of Tamaulipas State.

Former Congressman

Maor of Matamoros (1993-1995)


Tomás YarringtonIn 2012, he was indicted by the U.S. government

in a civil case for receiving illicit payments from drug related organizations. And furthermore, in a criminal case against one of his associates he has been mentioned as a politician

directly involved with the criminal endeavor of a later account of the Gulf Cartel

Mayor of Mexicali (1960-1962)

Baja California (1965-1971)Federico Martínez Manautou

Roberto Soto

The magazine "Proceso" published a letter from a reader Roberto Soto who gave an account of the giftfrom Johnny Alessio to Federico Martinez Manautou

Lawsuit against Roberto Polo

Back in 1988, a criminal case in Geneva, Switzerland unfolded: Rostuca Holdings, Ltd., a private company of Emilios Manautou´s ownership,sued Roberto Polo,

a financial adviser, for embezzling USD $60 million.

Asked by the Swiss judge about the origins of his fortune, Martínez Manautou affirmed that it was his wife´s lifestock trade,

but he did not produce any evidence supporting his argument

Rostuca Holdings, Ltd.Founded in Cayman Islands

According to its owner, he founded Rostuca as away to avoid public linkage to this capital and get

money out of Mexico. A rather unusual fortuneeven for a very well paid politician, according to

official salary tracking

Closing of the campaign

November 30, 1980, marked the the closing of the campaign for the mayor of Matamoros candidates being Emilio Martínez

Manautou and Jorge Cárdenas Gonzalez.

The local newspaper reported that the Mexican Army patrolledthe street since the day before, in vehicles that had machine guns mounted on them. The operation was headed by the

commander of the Military Zone, Manuel Diaz Escobar.

Additionally, that same newspaper pointed out thatthe day before partisan assault groups had arrived in

Matamoros, sent by the governor of Nuevo LeónAlfonso Martinez Dominguez. Their orders were tosupport Martinez Manautou and prevent or squash

protests in favor of Jorge Cárdenas Gonzalez.

At the end, Jorge Cárdenas was the winner; as a consequence,the relationship between Jorge Cárdenas and Martinez Manautou

would be tense.

Governor of Nuevo León (1979-1985)

Former Mayor of Mexico City

Former National President of PRI

Alfonso Martínez Domínguez

Meeting in Nuevo León

A DFS document signed by his station chief in the state of Nuevo León, and sent to the agency’s head,Captain Luis de la Barreda Moreno, narrates meetings in

the state of Nuevo León, next to the State of Tamaulipas, attended by high custom officials, Tamaulipas cities´former

mayors and traffickers, to organize smuggling. There, CaptainAlfonso Domene had meetings with politicians who stood out

as sympathizers of Emilio Martinez Manautou in his presidentialaspirations. According to the report, among those present at

those meetings was Juan N. Guerra, a famous smuggler,pimp and trafficker from Matamoros, a generous contributor to the pre-campaign of his friend, doctor Martínez Manautou

Mayor of Matamoros (1981-1983)

Jorge Cárdenas González

He won the Mayorship of Matamoros, defeating Emilio Martínez Manautou

“Los Zetas”Osiel Cárdenas Guillén organized his owngang after Juan García Abrego ‘s arrest.The former was not a relevant member of

the later’s group.Los Zetas were recruited from deserters

of the Mexican Army’s Special Forces, who had also been commissioned as police officers.

They were assigned to PGR, to conduct anti-drug duties in Tamaulipas, where they

got in touch with Osiel Cárdenas. The new group would be more violent.

GULF CARTELThis organization was born in Matamoros City.

In the 1980s, several incidents of violence associated to drug trafficking in Tamaulipas

were carried out by this the Gulf Cartel. It washeaded by Juan N. Guerra and his nephew,

Juan García Abrego. Both individuals received protection from several politicians and security officials.

They forced other traffickers to work for them and killed other competitors.

Rojo Gómez FamilyMembers of a political group in thestate of Hidalgo. They were some of the initial political connections of

Juan N. Guerra.

Juan García AbregoHe was the operational chief of

the Gulf Cartel from the 1980s throughthe 1990s. He was arrested in January 1996

Main drug lord in Tamaulipas fromthe late 1990s through the early 2000s

Osiel Cárdenas Guillén


Augusto Cárdenas MontemayorA report from the DFS linked him

to Juan N. Guerra.Governor of Tamaulipas (1963-1969)

Práxedis Balboa Gojón


Manuel A. RavizéHe said "...I became a governor

because of Emilio Martínez Manautou..." Senator (1991-1997)


Undersecretary of Investigations atthe Mexican Treasury Department(SHCP) (1970-1975)

Enrique Cárdenas González

Senator (1958-1964)


Secretary of Public Health in the cabinet of López Portillo (1976-1980)

Secretary of the Presidency in the Díaz Ordaz administration

Congressman

Emilio Martínez ManautouPRI's Presidential pre-candidate in 1969

defeated by Minister of Interior Luis Echeverria.He played a relevant role in the Gulf Cartel's consolidation. During his administration, drug

trafficking flourished in Tamaulipas.Racetrack of Nuevo Laredo

It was inaugurated by Emilio Martínez Manautou.

Head of Federal Judicial Police (1976-1982)

Under-Chief of Mexico City´s Police Department (1964-1970)

General of the Mexican Army

Raúl Mendiolea CereceroA DFS memorandum mentioned

him as protector of drug traffickers

Cocaine trafficking increasesThe Federal Attorney Office stated that betweenApril 1977 and June of 1980, the Federal Judicial

Police had only confiscated 10.4 kilograms of this drug.In October of 1984, Tamaulipas newspapers reportedwhat was insofar the biggest cocaine seizure in the

country’s history: 300 kilograms, seized in Nuevo Laredo.

Director of DFS in the late 1970s-early 1980s

Miguel Nazar Haro

In the late 1970s, he sent Rafael Chao Lópezto conduct operations in the Northeast region.

Former disciple of Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios,he changed his political loyalty to Javier García Paniagua.

Paramilitary Group "Los Halcones"

He participated in state terror against studentprotests from 1968 through 1971. In this last year

they murdered several persons in the “Corpus Christy Day”, on June 10th. This groups was paid by

the office of Mexico City’s Mayor, Alfonso Martínez Domínguez.

Secretary of Defense (1982-1988)

Juan Arévalo Gardoqui

Visited Tamaulipas and was welcomed by mayorJesús Roberto Guerra Velasco and governor

Emilio Martínez Manautou, having a long meeting with them.

He was mentioned as drug trafficking protector, duringthe trials followed in U.S. Courts, for the murder of Enrique Camarena.

PGR’s Head attorney during “Operación Cóndor”in Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua in the late 1970s

Coordinator of the Mexican Attorney General Office(PGR) in Nuevo León, Tamaulipas and Coahuila

Carlos Aguilar GarzaFormer PGR’s head attorney in Sinaloa, Durangoand Chihuahua, during the Operación Cóndor.

In 1980 he had an equivalent appointment in Tamaulipas, Nuevo León and Coahuila.

He himself became drug trafficker. He was arrested by PGR in the late 1980s, freed and murdered later.

Main drug lord in Mexico in the 1970s and 1980s

Miguel Ángel Félix GallardoHe had been deemed the initiator of

massive cocaine trafficking from SouthAmerican through Mexico, and then into

United States Sinaloa Group

Comprised by UNAM and IPN students.The former helped to outs UNAM’s Dean,

Ignacio Chávez.

Presidential pre-candidate (1982)

Director of DFS in the mid-1970s

Javier García Paniagua

Undersecretary of Interior (1970-1982)

Director of DFS (1964-1970)

Governor of Veracruz

Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios

As head of DFS signed a documentdismissing Federico Martínez

Manautou

Military officer who trained a paramilitary group known as "Los Halcones"

Commander of the 8th Military Zone, headquartered in Tancol, Tamaulipas (1981)

Military head of "Operation Condor" in Badiraguato, Sinaloa.

Brigadier General

Manuel Díaz Escobar

On June 14, 1980, one day before the designation ofEmilio Martínez Manautou as candidate for governor,

the Generel Manuel Díaz Escobar was appointed Commanderof the 8th Military Zone, headquartered in Tancol, Tamaulipas.

Raúl Salinas de GortariHe was prosecuted for money laundering andalso imprisoned under charges for the murderof José Francisco Ruiz Massieu. His sentence

was reverted and the indictment dropped.

Secretary of Agriculture (1990-1994)

Mayor of Mexico City (1976-1982)

Secretary of Tourism (1988-1990)

Congressman

Governor of State of Mexico (1969-1975)

Chief of CONASUPO

Carlos Hank González

Carlos Hank’s son

Governor of Baja California Sur (1959-1965)

Former Governor of Nuevo León

GeneralCommander of Military Zone in Tamaulipasduring the 40's

Bonifacio Salinas Leal

Commander of Civil Aeronauticsat the Airport of Nuevo Laredo

Manuel Amozorrutia Silva

Manager of “Agua Caliente” racerack in Tijuana

Johnny AlessioHe was linked to the Italian-American mafia.

Since 1963, he operated the racetrack “AguaCaliente”. He had investments in several casinos

and racetracks along the Mexican Northern border.

Tried to regulate some clandestine activities

During the administration of Raúl Sánchez Díaz,he tried to regulate some clandestine activities,such as gambling and prostitution, activities thatwere protected by Federico Martínez Manautou.

Mansion in Playas de RosaritoThe mansion had been formerly a casino,

and was a gift from Johnny Alessio toFederico Martínez Manautou.

Underling of Carlos Hank González in different public posts

Managero of the Agua Caliente racetrack in the 1980sJesús Garduño

Owner of Ciudad Juárez Racetrackin the 1990s

José María Guardia

President of Mexico (1976-1982)

José López PortilloHe worked for Martínez Manautou when the

later was Presidential Chief of Staff.In 1980, he invited Emilio Martínez to be

governor of Tamaulipas

President of Mexico (1988-1994)

Carlos Salinas de GortariHis father backed up Emilio Martínez Manautouto run for governor of Tamaulipas in the 1960s,and later, as presidential pre-candidate, in 1970.

Juan Nepomuceno Guerra CárdenasBest known as Juan N. Guerra.

The main drug lord and smuggler in Tamaulipas from the 1940s through the 1980s.

A very well connected figure, he denied to bea politician but also showed his PRI membership card.

He was arrested in 1991, but then was released soon after.He died in July 2001.

Former Commander of the PJF in Tijuana

Commander of the PJF in Matamoros

Emilio López ParraOn 16 June 1980, one day after Emilio Martínez

Manautou was appointed PRI’s candidate to run forgovernor of Tamaulipas, Emilio López Parra was also

appointed as the new commander of PJF in Matamoros.This was a decision of Federal Attorney General,

Óscar Flores Sánchez and PJF’s Chief, Raúl Mendiolea Cerecero.

Drug trafficker operating with his brother Juan N. Guerra

Official (Head of the State Treasury Department)

Roberto Guerra Cárdenas

Mexican Attorney General (1976-1982)

Governor of Chihuahua (1968-1974)

Undersecretary of Agriculture in the cabinet of Miguel Alemán (1946-1952)

Oscar Flores SánchezA document of the DFS linked many of his closest

underlings to drug trafficking.

Sponsored the public careers of Raúl Mendioleaand Carlos Aguilar Garza

Confrontation between governor Emilio MartínezManautou and Rafael Chao López.

A document from the DFS, signed by its directorMiguel Nazar Haro, was sent to undersecretary ofInterior, Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios. Nazar denied

the participation of his agents in illicit business.DFS agents pushed Martínez Manautou, when they

investigated an 18-wheels loaded with smuggled PVCpipes. The pipes supposedly belonged to the governor.


Jesús Roberto Guerra VelascoRojo Lugo and Emilio Martínez managed to appointhim PRI’s candidate to run for Matamoros’s govern.As mayor of Matamoros, Jesús Roberto received

governor Emilio Martinez’s help to inaugurate publicinfrastructure. Some of these public works were valuedin MX $1,500 million, an amount which contrast with theretention of state funds to Jesús Roberto’s predecessor.

Meeting of three former Presidents of Mexico.A memorandum of the DFS, dated on August 1962,

refers to a meeting of Emilio Portes Gil, Lázaro Cárdenas and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. Portes Gil pointed

out that Minister of Industry, Raúl Salinas Lozano, sponsored the ambitions of senator Emilio Martínez

Manautou to become governor of Tamaulipas

Commander of DFS

Rafael Chao López

Chao was DFS coordinator in Zone 5 (Coahuila,Nuevo León and Tamaulipas), in the early 1980s.His agents committed many extortions over drug

traffickers and even innocent people.

He helped Carlos Aguilar Garza to hide the cocainetransported in a plane, which crashed in Nuevo León.

In the mid-1980s, he was arrested and linked toRafael Caro Quintero.

C.A. Flores Pérez

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Seguridad. May 20.33. El Mañana de Nuevo Laredo. (1982). Asumió Solezzi la dirección de la polijudicial. April 16.34. El Mañana de Reynosa. (1980a). Asumirá el Mando Militar. June 14.35. El Mañana de Reynosa. (1980b). Nuevo Coordinador de la Campaña Antidrogas. June 18.36. El Universal. (2001). Falleció el fundador del Cártel del Golfo. July 12. Taken from: http://www.

eluniversal.com/.


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37. El Universal. (2008). Fallece el general Manuel Díaz Escobar, presunto creador de Los Halcones.September 11. Taken from: http://www.eluniversal.com/.

38. Federal Judicial Police Act. (1989). Deposition of Manuel Amozorrutia. Mexico City, July 11. http://careldematamoros.blogspot.com/.

39. Figueroa, Y. (1996). El capo del Golfo. Vida y captura de Juan García Abrego. México City: Grijalbo.40. Flores Pérez, C. A. (2009). El Estado en Crisis: Crimen Organizado y Política. Desafíos Para la

Consolidación Democrática. Mexico City: CIESAS.41. Geffray, C. (2002). Drug trafficking and the state. In Globalisation, drugs and criminalisation. Final

research report on Brazil, China, India and Mexico. Management of Social Transformations, UNESCO.42. Gonzalez Casanova, P. (1972). La Democracia en México. Mexico City: Era.43. Lupsha, P. (1988). Organized crime: Rational choice, not ethnic group behavior: A macro perspective.

Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis Digest, Winter.44. Martínez, J. (2009). Las enseñanzas del profesor: Indagación de Carlos Hank González. Lecciones de

poder, impunidad y corrupción (pp. 161–173). México City: Oceáno.45. McIllwain, J. S. (1999). Organized crime: a social network approach. Crime, law, and social change,

32(4), December, Springer, pp. 301–323.46. Meyer, L. (2000). La Institucionalización del Nuevo Régimen. In Historia General de Mexico, Version

2000. México: El Colegio de México.47. Morín, E. (1991). El Método. IV. Las ideas. Su hábitat, su vida, sus costumbres, su organización.

Madrid: Cátedra.48. Morris, S. D. (1991). Corruption and politics in contemporary Mexico. Tuscaloosa: The University of

Alabama Press.49. Naylor, R. T. (1997). Mafias, myths, and markets: on the theory and practice of enterprise crime.

Transnational Organized Crime, 3(3),1–45.50. New York Times. (1988). Missing financier failed to produce records, U.S. says in lawsuit. June 03,

online: http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/03/nyregion/missing-financier-failed-to-produce-records-us-says-in-lawsuit.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm.

51. Proceso. (1984a). Alemán, Hank, Balsa, Larrea, Moreno Valle Jr., entre los dueños. El gobierno bendice ysubsidia el juego en cuatro hipódromos. May 28. Taken from: http://www.proceso.com.mx/.

52. Proceso. (1984b). Datos sobre Federico Martínez Manautou (Carta de lector). June 18. Taken from:http://www.proceso.com.mx/.

53. Proceso. (1989). Alternaba públicamente con políticos y funcionarios Félix Gallardo ‘el hombre másbuscado del mundo’ durante 18 años, nunca se ocultó. April 17. Taken from: http://www.proceso.com.mx/.

54. Proceso. (1990). Asunto de familia, dijo su hermano. Rodolfo Sánchez Duarte y dos amigos,ametrallados. November 26. Taken from: http://www.proceso.com.mx/.

55. Proceso. (1991). A los 77 años y en silla de ruedas “New York Times” censuró la impunidad en México yen seguida la Judicial capturó a Juan N. Guerra. October 28. Taken from: http://www.proceso.com.mx/.

56. Proceso. (1993a). Martínez Manautou, al fiscal: No era conveniente para mi que se conocieran misinversiones en Estados Unidos. February 1st. Taken from: http://www.proceso.com.mx/.

57. Proceso. (1993b). Cómo operabaMartínezManautou para sacar su riqueza del país. A los ‘paraísos fiscales’efectivo, acciones, obras de arte, joyas y oro. February 15. Taken from: http://www.proceso.com.mx/.

58. Revista Fortuna. (2005). José María Guardia, ¡Me pueden llamar el Zar de los casinos! September.Taken from: http://fortunaweb.com.ar/.

59. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

60. Snyder, R., & Durán Martínez, A. (2009). Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets. In Crimen law and social change. Volume 52, Issue 3, September, Springer.

61. Solorio Martínez, J. Á. (n.d.). Grupos de gobierno. Tamaulipas 1929–1992, p. 360. Taken from: http://www.viraje.com/ (Accessed in June, 2009).

62. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2002). Results of a pilot survey of forty selected organizedcriminal groups in sixteen countries. Global Program Against Transnational Organized Crime.

U.S. Judicial Courts

63. United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Corpus Christi Division, Civil Case 2:12-cv-00167,Document 1, May 22nd, 2012.

64. United States District Court, for the Western District of Texas, Case 5:12-mj-00120-NSN, United Statesof America v. Antonio Pena-Arguelles, Document 3, June 2nd, 2012.

C.A. Flores Pérez


http://careldematamoros.blogspot.com/

http://careldematamoros.blogspot.com/

http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/03/nyregion/missing-financier-failed-to-produce-records-us-says-in-lawsuit.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm

http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/03/nyregion/missing-financier-failed-to-produce-records-us-says-in-lawsuit.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm

http://www.proceso.com.mx/







http://fortunaweb.com.ar/

http://www.viraje.com/

http://www.viraje.com/

Archives

National General Archive (AGN), México

65. Public Version of Chao López, Rafael’s file, DFS, docket 1.66. Public Version of Hank González, Carlos’ file, DFS, docket 2.67. Public Version of Hank González, Carlos’ file, IPS, docket 2.68. Public Version of Martínez Manautou, Emilio’s file, DFS, docket 1.69. Public Version of Martínez Manautou, Emilio’s file, DFS, docket 2.70. Public Version of Martínez Manautou, Emilio’s file, IPS, docket 1.71. Public Version of Martínez Manautou, Emilio’s file, IPS, docket 2.72. Public Version of Mendiolea Cerecero, Raúl’s file, DFS, docket 1.73. Public Version of Sánchez Celis, Leopoldo’s file, DFS, docket 2.74. Public Version of Sánchez Celis, Leopoldo’s file, IPS, docket 1.


Political protection and the origins of the Gulf Cartel

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Transcript of Political protection and the origins of the Gulf Cartel