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MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.Issue:Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.Held:YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

Poe vs. Arroyo PET Case No. 0002, March 29, 2005Facts: During the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections, Arroyo was declared as the candidate who garnered the most number of votes for the presidency while FPJ followed in the second place. July 23, 2004 FPJ filed an election protest at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal contesting the votes of Arroyo. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Luke’s Hospital.

Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s presidential protest case?

Held: NO.Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.Since in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant, the petition must be dismissed.

Legarda vs De Castro

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P.E.T. Case 0003March 31, 2005Loren B. Legarda, protestant, vs Noli L.De Castro, protestee.Facts: In a Resolution dated January 18, 2005, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) confirmed the jurisdiction over the protest of Loren B. Legarda and denied the motion of protestee, Noli L. de Castro for its outright dismissal. The Tribunal further ordered concerned officials to undertake measures for the protection and preservation of the ballot boxes and election documents subject of the protest. On February 4, 2005, De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said resolution. De Castro argues that where the correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots; that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made; that since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing election returns. He also contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC). But it is not suggested by any of the parties that questions on the validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.ISSUE: Whether or not the Tribunal can re-canvass the ballots and can correct the manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.RULING:Yes. The SC finds no reason why the Tribunal cannot perform this function. SC agrees that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is involved. Legarda merely seeks the correction of manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of transposition and addition of votes.The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs. There is no necessity, in the SC’s view, to amend the PET Rules to perform this function within the ambit of its constitutional function. In the instant protest, Legarda enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to De Castro’s title to his office.Considering that the protest is sufficient in form and substance, the SC again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the Legarda the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunal’s rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

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SOLIVEN, petitioner VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR, respondent167 SCRA 393FACTS:This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of ManilaISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President

2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause

3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit

DECISION:Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED.RATIO:Background of the first issue

MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was

denied by the Secretary of Justice MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the

resolution of the Secretary of Justice MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary

Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a “Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed”, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.Second issueThis calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest:Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witness.Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable

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cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.Third issuePetitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court’s jurisdiction. àThis would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf.-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).Additional Issue:Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point.

Planas v GilG.R. No. L-46440 January 18, 1939Laurel, J.:Facts:1. The case stemmed from a statement made by petitioner which was published in a newspaper (La Guardia) wherein he criticized certain government officials acts as well as the election of Assemblyman in 1938. Petitioner was a member of the municipal board of Manila.2. An investigation directed by the authority of the President was conducted by the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service. Hence this petition for prohibition where petitioner contends that respondent lacks the jurisdiction to investigate him and that it violates Art. 7, Sec.11 (1) of the Constitution, as it seeks to remove or suspend him.

ISSUE: W/N the President has the legal authority to order the investigationYES. Provided the investigation should be in accordance with law.The constitution grants to the President the powers of control and supervision. The power to exercise general supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed authorizes him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner herein.Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation.

The President in the exercise of the executive power under the Constitution may act through the heads of the executive departments. The heads of the executive departments are his authorized assistants and agents in the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his acts.

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The power of removal which the President may exercise directly and the practical necessities of efficient government brought about by administrative centralization easily make the President the head of the administration.

Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998, penned by Chief Justice Reynaldo Puno)In 1996, President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308, entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System,” the pertinent portions of which reads:ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEMWHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities;WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security providing agencies and other government instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby established.xxxSEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems.A.O. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order and usurps the power of Congress to legislateCongress is vested with the power to enact laws, while the President executes the laws. The President’s administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. An “administrative order” refers to “[a]cts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.” An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.A.O. No. 308 establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It does not simply implement the Administrative Code of 1987. This administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of the citizenry vis-a-vis the State, as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress. It deals with a subject that should be covered by law.A.O. violates the right to privacyIn striking down A.O. 308, the SC emphasized that the Court is not per se against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. The SC also emphasized that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into the right to individual privacy. This right merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a

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compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.The right to privacy is a constitutional right, granted recognition independently of its identification with liberty. It is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution, specifically in Sections 1, 2, 3 (1), 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights. Zones of privacy are also recognized and protected in our laws, including certain provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code, as well as in special laws (e.g., Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act and the Intellectual Property Code).The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thefore, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. The government failed to discharge this burden.A.O. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. While it is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. 308, it is not arguable that the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. 308, if implemented, will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger.The heart of A.O. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a “common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies” through the use of “Biometrics Technology” and “computer application designs.” Biometry or biometrics is “the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data.” The methods or forms of biological encoding include finger-scanning and retinal scanning, as well as the method known as the “artificial nose” and the thermogram. A.O. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used.Moreover, A.O. 308 does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. The Solicitor General’s claim that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the “generation of population data for development planning” is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. 308. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information, but there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system.A.O. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

Marcos, petitioner VS Manglapus, respondent (Part 1) Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But

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President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese

arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar4. Honasan’s failed coup5. Communist insurgency movements6. secessionist movements in Mindanao7. devastated economy because of1. accumulated foreign debt2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Decision:No to both issues. Petition dismissed.Ratio:Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be

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considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

STEEL SEIZUREIn Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952),the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of an Executive Order directing the secretary ofcommerce to seize possession of the nation's steel mills during a labor dispute and keep themoperating while hostilities continued in the Korean War. Also known as the Steel Seizure Case,Youngstown Sheet & Tube stands for the proposition that the Executive Branch has noconstitutional authority to seize possession of private property, even if it is for public use duringtimes of national emergency because such authority is vested in the lawmaking powers ofCongress. Duringtimes of national emergency, the government's lawyers argued, the president may exercise theseinherent powers without violating the Constitution. Since wartime is traditionally considered a timeof national emergency, the president's seizure of the steel mills represented a legitimate exercise ofhis inherent powers.The Supreme Court disagreed with these arguments. Conceding that a strike could threatennational security by curtailing the production of armaments, the Court said that the commander inchief's authority to prosecute a foreign war does not empower him to seize private property in aneffort to resolve a domestic labor dispute. "This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers," Justice Blackwrote, "not for its military authorities." Black reminded the executive branch that only Congress canauthorize the taking of private property for public use under the eminent domain clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

 Duringtimes of national emergency, the government's lawyers argued, the president may exercise theseinherent powers without violating the Constitution. Since wartime is traditionally considered a timeof national emergency, the president's seizure of the steel mills represented a legitimate exercise ofhis inherent powers.The Supreme Court disagreed with these arguments. Conceding that a strike could threatennational security by curtailing the production of armaments, the Court said that the commander inchief's authority to prosecute a foreign war does not empower him to seize private property in aneffort to resolve a domestic labor dispute. "This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers," Justice Blackwrote, "not for its military authorities." Black reminded the executive branch that only Congress canauthorize the taking of private property for public use under the EMINENT DOMAIN CLAUSE of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

GONZALES VS. NARVASAG.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000

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FACTS:Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed apetition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on ConstitutionalReform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendmentsand/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43

HELD:The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR.  If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.  Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury.  Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities.  Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutionalissue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.  The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.

Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)FACTS:The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic BayMetropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art.

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IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against appointment or designation of elective officialsto other government posts.

RULING:

The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of other governmental duties.

The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.

Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.”

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The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

Manalo v SistozaFacts: RA 6975 was enacted by Corazon Aquino, creating DILG. Secs 26 and 31 pertain to the Chief of PNP as well as PNP officersand members as having to be confirmed by the CA before assuming their duties. Executive Secretary Drilon promoted the 15 respondentofficers and appointed them to the PNP in a permanent capacity. The petitioners assail the legality of such appointment because, invoking said provisions of RA 6975, confirmation of CA is needed. They also assail the disbursements made out by the DMB Secretary (Salvador Enriquez III)’s for the officers’ salaries and emoluments.

Issues:(1) Whether or not RA 6975 is a valid law

(2) Whether or not PNP officers are akin to the AFP, whose positions need CA confirmation

(3) Whether or not Salvador Enriquez III acted with grave abuse of discretion

Held:(1) Partly. Secs 26 and 31 go against the Constitution because according to Sec 16, Art 7, the PNP officers do not fall under the first group which requires the confirmation of the CA. courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit delineated by the fundamental law. However, the remainder of RA 6975 remains valid because assailed provisions are severable from the main statute.

(2) No. The constitution expressly provides for their distinction (See Secs 24 and 6 of Art 16). Also, RA 6975 provides that “no element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the AFP.”

(3) No. The disbursements and emoluments disbursed for the respondents are valid.

“Experience showed that when almost all presidential appointments required the consent of the CA, as was the case under the 1935Constitution, the commission became a venue for horse-trading and similar malpractices. On the other hand, placing absolute power to make appointments in the President with hardly any check by the legislature as what happened under the 1973 Constitution, leads to abuse of such powers. 1987 Constitution attempts a middle ground.”

Drilon vs LimGR No. 112497

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August 4, 1994The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.RTC’s Ruling:1. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.Petitioner’s Argument:1. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)2. Grounds of non-compliance of procedurea. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Codeb. Not publishedc. Not translated to tagalogSupreme Court’s Argument:1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance. What he found only was that it was illegal. That act is not control but supervision.2. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act undone or re-done. Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed.3. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra vires provisions (2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its enactment but were followed.The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public investment programs of LGU not to tax ordinances.

Carpio vs. Executive SecretaryPetitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”

ISSUEs: Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with,

and an abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers”

HELD:

Power of Administrative Control

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NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute thejudgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.

Power of Executive Control

Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a part of the organicduties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. PanoG.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967

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Sanchez, J.

Facts:

Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Paňo was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paňo’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor of Paňo. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

Issue:

whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary and whether it can be further delegated by the Executive Secretary

Held:

The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

OLAGUER VS MILITARY COMMISSIONGANCAYCO, J:

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FACTS:June 13. 1980 -the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 3 created the respondentMilitary Commission No 34 to try criminal case filed against the petitioners. July 30, 1980 - an amendedcharge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses, namely:(1) Unlawful possession of explosives and incendiarydevices;(2) Conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos;(3) Conspiracy to assassinate cabinetmembers Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno;(4) Conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. ArturoTangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus;(5) Arson of nine buildings;(6) Attempted murder of Messrs. LeonardoPerez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and(7) Conspiracy and proposal tocommit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.· December 4, 1984 - pending the resolution of the Petition, the respondent Military Commission No. 34 passedsentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution.· The thrust of petitioner’s arguments is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civiliansfor offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law. They also maintain that theproceedings before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right todue process of law.ISSUE:Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioningHELD:WHEREFORE,DISMISSED - the Petitions for habeas corpus are for having become moot and academic.GRANTED - The Petitions for certiorari and prohibition.DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL - The creation of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try civilians like the petitioners is hereby declared unconstitutional and all its proceedings are deemed null and void. The temporary restraining order issued against the respondents enjoining them from executing the Decision of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 is hereby made permanent and the said respondents are permanently prohibited from further pursuing Criminal Case No. MC-34-1 against the petitioners. The sentence rendered by the respondent Military Commission No. 34 imposing the death penalty on the petitioners is hereby vacated for being null and void, and all the items or properties taken from the petitioners in relation to the said criminal case should be returned to them immediately.RATIO:(1) Military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning.Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process.(2) Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have "exclusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.” In Toth v. Quarles, 40 the U.S. Supreme Court furtherstressed that the assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.(3) Following the principle of separation of powers underlyingthe existing constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpretingthe laws as when an individual should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts.(4) Respondent Military Commission No. 34 appears to have been rendered too hastily to the prejudice to the petitioners, and in complete disregard of their constitutional right to adduce evidence on their behalf.Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent Military Commission No. 34 does have the jurisdiction to try the petitioners, the Commission should be deemed ousted of its jurisdiction when, as observed by the SolicitorGeneral, the said tribunal acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of the

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accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the tribunal that rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.(5) Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January 17, 1981) officially lifting martial law in the Philippines and abolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to the national emergency effectively divests the respondent Military Commission No. 34 (and all military tribunals for that matter) of its supposed authority to try civilians, including the herein petitioners. The said proclamation states:

"The military tribunals created pursuant thereto are hereby dissolved upon final determination of case's pending therein which may not be transferred to the civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the state in view of the rules on double jeopardy, or other circumstances which render prosecution of the cases difficult, if not impossible."

(6) Certainly, the rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect because stability in jurisprudence is desirable. Nonetheless, reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. After all, more important than anything else is that this Court should be right.

AQUINO VS MILITARY COMMISSIONIn September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court. Ninoy argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.HELD: The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or military courts which are authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC basically rejected the “open court’ theory observed in the USA

LACSON VS PEREZFacts: On May 1, 2001, Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued a Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region because of the fact that she was faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearm, bladed weapons, clubs, stones, and other deadly weapons". She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrest of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. The petitioners filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary investigation. The petitioners assails the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President and the warrantless arrest allegedly effected by virtue hereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of state of rebellion is constitutional?

Ruling:Yes, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that "the President shall be the Commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the phil. and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

MONSANTO v. FACTORAN

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FACTS:• In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.• She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.• Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the entire period of her suspension.• Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment• The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.• In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.• Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.• The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the sameISSUE:(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.HELD:(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents.The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

LANSANG VS GARCIA

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Facts: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown at the miting the avance of the Liberal Party killing 8 persons and injuring many. Thus, on August 23 then President Marcos issued proclamation 889, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Herein petitioners were apprehended by members of the Philippine Constabulary having invoked the said proclamation. In effect the proclamation implies that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the writ belongs to the President and it expressly states that such declaration is deemed “final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons”

・ August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A, amending the previous proclamation. ・ September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities. ・ September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities. ・ October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on selected areas.

In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18 cities are still under the suspension of writ of habeas corpus

Issue: Whether the court would adhere to its previous decision in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda?

Held: First, Proclamation 889-A superseded the original proclamation and that flaws attributed thereto are formal in nature. Which actually emphasize the actuality of the intent to rise in arms. Second, The court intervention: In Sterling vs. Constantin, Chief Justice Hughes declared that “when there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured by the Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial review”. Thus, the grant of power to suspend the privilege of writ is neither absolute or unqualified The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not to be a wide-scale event, it may be declared even if it only involves a small part of the country. The president decision to suspend the writ was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he has three available courses to suppress rebellion. First, to call out the military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and lastly to declare martial law.

Petitions DENIED; the CFI is directed to conduct preliminary investigations