Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept from...

World Political Science Review 2015; aop

Adolfo Garc é *

Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept from Selected Policy-Change Events in the Tabar é V á zquez Administration (Uruguay, 2005 – 2009) Abstract : In recent years authors have paid increasing attention to the study

of contextual factors that shape the use of research into a country ’ s public

policies. One of the most significant recent contributions to this body of lit-

erature is Campbell and Pedersen ’ s concept of Knowledge Regimes, which

focuses on the central characteristics of the relevant social research in a

given country. This article is a critique of this concept based on the study of

three key policy-change events during the Tabar é V á zquez administration in

Uruguay. In order to explain the dynamics of social research it is not merely

enough to understand the main features of the supply side; it is also necessary

to study the demand. This critical perspective has led to the construction of a

new concept.

Keywords: expertise; knowledge regimes; research and public policy nexus;

Uruguay.

Original reference: Garc é , Adolfo (2014). “ Reg í menes Pol í ticos de Conocimiento:

Construyendo un nuevo concepto a partir de eventos de cambio seleccionados

en pol í ticas p ú blicas del gobierno de Tabar é V á zquez (Uruguay, 2005 – 2009), ”

Revista de Ciencia Pol í tica 34:2, 439 – 458.

DOI 10.1515/wpsr-2014-0020

*Corresponding author: Adolfo Garc é , Professor in Political Science at Universidad de la

Rep ú blica, Constituyente 1502, CP 11200, Montevideo, Uruguay,

e-mail: [email protected]

Authenticated | [email protected] author's copyDownload Date | 2/7/15 1:35 AM

2 Adolfo Garc é

1 Introduction Well-known authors such as Harold Wilensky 1 (1997), Margaret Weir and Theda

Skocpol 2 (1993) have pointed out that nations differ considerably as to how

and how much their respective political systems use specialized knowledge

(the results of research) in policy making. In the long term some countries (like

Germany and Chile) have a high propensity to use information and results from

research in their public policies; whereas the experience in other countries (like

the USA and Uruguay) shows there can be a considerable disjunction between the

world of research and that of decision making. 3

Following up on this insight, John Campbell and Ove Pedersen have been

developing a typology of knowledge regimes from a political economy perspec-

tive, and this has contributed to our understanding of the features of social

research supply in a given country. In this article we will argue that besides ana-

lyzing the supply side it is also necessary to study and analytically hierarchize

the demand side.

This paper is organized as follows: in the first section we present and discuss

the concept of Knowledge Regimes developed by Campbell and Pedersen (2011) .

In the second section, we study three change events in public policies in Uruguay

to examine the strengths and weaknesses of this theoretical approach. In the

third section we return to the theoretical discussion and present a new concept

aimed at developing Campbell and Pedersen ’ s ideas.

1 Wilensky says, “ As a student of comparative political economy and social policy for 30 years,

I have interviewed more than four hundred politicians, budget officers, experts on taxing and

spending, health and welfare officials, and labor and management personnel in nineteen rich

democracies for my project on the politics of taxing and spending. I would like to share my obser-

vations about the similarities and differences among these nations in the interplay of knowledge

and public policy. It is clear that intellectuals, including social scientists, have typically had

tense relationships with men and women of power in all these countries. But it is also clear that

the disjunction between research and policy is perhaps most extreme in the US. The similarities

are rooted partly in the universal limitations of social science; the differences are due to the di-

verse contexts in which research is applied ” (1997: p. 1242).

2 Weir and Skocpol reviewed the various “ Keynesian responses ” to the 1929 crisis in the US,

Great Britain and Sweden. In a key passage they say: “ The distinct specific structures of States

shape the ways in which researchers and their ideas are used in the design of public policies at

given times ” (1993: p. 96). (Translated by AG).

3 Our aim in this article is not to review the state of the art in the age-old heated debate about the

use of research and specialized knowledge in decision making and public policies. The reader

who is interested in this aspect can consult Stone et al. (2001) , Nutley et al. (2007) , Jones et al.

(2009) and Carden (2009) . A more specific discussion of the connection between political struc-

tures and the use of social research can be found in Garc é (2011) .


Political-Knowledge Regimes: Building a New Concept 3

2 Knowledge Regimes: An Important but Insufficient Conceptual Contribution

At the present time, the concept that is closest to what we need is Campbell and

Pedersen ’ s (2011) notion of Knowledge Regimes: “ Knowledge regimes are the

organizational and institutional machinery that generates data, research, policy

recommendations and other ideas that influence public debate and policymak-

ing ” (Campbell and Pedersen 2014: p. 3). According to these authors, to define

a country ’ s knowledge regime it is necessary to study two structural variables:

the policy-making regime and the type of capitalism that prevails, as formulated

by Peter Hall and David Soskice. In line with this logic, Campbell and Pedersen

propose four kinds of knowledge regimes.

Both the type of capitalism and the kind of policy-making regime affect the

kind of Research Units (RUs) and the dynamic of the ideas market. In each case

the logic is as follows:

– MARKET-ORIENTED. In countries with a liberal market economy and a decen-

tralized policy-making regime (the US) the marketplace of ideas is open and

competitive. To affect policies, the actors in the public policy decision-mak-

ing process (especially interest groups) take advantage of specialized knowl-

edge. The dynamic of knowledge is adversarial.

– CONSENSUS-ORIENTED. In countries where capitalism is coordinated and the

policy-making regime is decentralized (Germany), the marketplace of ideas is

less competitive. Therefore, although decentralization fosters the existence of

numerous RUs, few of them are oriented to promoting specific ideas or interests,

and the knowledge they produce is mainly oriented to constructing consensus.

– POLITICALLY TEMPERED. In countries with liberal capitalism and a central-

ized policy-making regime (the UK), the marketplace of ideas is competitive

but there are few opportunities for the actors in public policy design to make

Campbell and Pedersen ’ s Typology of Knowledge Regimes

Type of Capitalism

Liberal Market Coordinated Market

Public policy-making regime

Centralized, closed State POLITICALLY REGULATED

(United Kingdom)

STATIST-TECHNOCRATIC (France)

Decentralized, Open State MARKET-ORIENTED

(United States)

CONSENSUS-ORIENTED (Germany)

Source: Author ’ s elaboration based on table 8.1 of Campbell and Pedersen (2011 : p. 186).


4 Adolfo Garc é

their preferences and interests felt. This situation fosters the existence of

relatively few RUs (both public and private) and leads to a dynamic of knowl-

edge that is predominantly adversarial between partisan positions.

– STATIST-TECHNOCRATIC. In countries with coordinated capitalism and a

centralized policy-making regime (France), the marketplace of ideas is closed.

This does not stimulate the existence of RUs that are partisan or oriented to

promoting specific ideas or interests. RUs embedded in the state predomi-

nate, and the knowledge produced is perceived by society as neutral.

The concept of a knowledge regime, as formulated by Campbell and Pedersen,

is an enormous step forward but it has some limitations. Firstly, by definition, it

only deals with the supply side of research, and therefore the demand side and

also the institutions and actors that mediate between supply and demand are

automatically accorded secondary importance. Secondly, it is too closely tied to

the characteristics of the economy. When studying the dynamic of specialized

knowledge it is important to take into account the relative roles of the State and

the market, but the emphasis on economic structure and its main actors (firms)

means that consideration of political institutions and their key organizations

(political parties) is relegated to a secondary level. Third, the concept is too static.

As the authors themselves acknowledge, it does not take sufficient account of the

possibility that the features of a knowledge regime may change over time ( Camp-

bell and Pedersen 2011 : pp. 188 – 189).

These limitations, particularly the first two, suggest that another concept can

be constructed that is more focused on politics and less inspired in economics.

This would enable us to consider all the dimensions that are important in the

political dynamic of research and not just those that have to do with structures,

actors and other central features of research knowledge supply.

To expedite matters at this point we shall now switch from a deductive to an

inductive approach. Criticism of existing concepts and the construction of new

ones both require an examination of empirical evidence. As Gerring (2007) would

argue, just as comparisons of “ big N ” are suitable for refuting hypotheses, case

studies are eminently suitable for moving forward in constructing theory. In par-

ticular, case studies can generate novel hypotheses about causal relations and

thus construct new concepts. For this reason, in the following section we shall

analyze the role of specialized knowledge in three change events that occurred

during the President Tabar é V á zquez administration (2005 – 2009) in Uruguay.

First, we shall study the Conditional Cash Transfer Programme (PANES) that was

launched in the first year of his presidency, then the founding of the National

Research and Innovation Agency (ANII), and third, we shall review the failed

attempt to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US. These processes have



some features in common but they involved different political actors and differ-

ent epistemic communities.

This methodology, which puts the focus on studying change events, is to a

large extent inspired by the work of Tussie (2009) . She agues that studying policy

changes enables us to better visualize the impact of research on public policies.

“ The choice of policy change is key to this work, as it emphasizes the capacity

of research to modify a status quo and to catalyze the knowledge-based policy

discussion to another level ” (2009: p. 2). However, the role of research is not only

made manifest in episodes in which change occurs, as Tussie seems to suggest,

but can also be perfectly visible in episodes in which attempted reforms are frus-

trated. At any rate, cases of failure are as important in terms of methodology as

cases of success ( Garc é 2011 ).

3 Research and Public Policy in Uruguay: Three Change Events

In describing each of the three change events we shall follow the same sequence.

After putting the change event in context, we apply the classic scheme formu-

lated nearly 30 years ago by Kingdon (1984) , which accounts for how change

was generated in each case and the opportunity for innovation it allowed (policy

window), distinguishing between the three streams (problem stream, policy

stream and political stream), and then summarize of the outcome of the event.

Lastly, we analyze the extent to which Campbell and Pedersen ’ s concept of Knowl-

edge Regimes can help in understanding what happened, and examine what the

concrete event in question could contribute to the construction of a new concept.

3.1 The Conditional Cash Transfer Programme

It has often been said that the flagship of the V á zquez administration was the

Emergency Plan (PANES). This was the Uruguayan version of a Conditional

Cash Transfer Programme (CCT) that was widely applied in Latin America, and

which is a typical case of policy paradigm diffusion. As we shall see, President

V á zquez was the key actor. He had to keep a promise he had been making

since 1999 to implement an “ Emergency Plan ” to fight poverty and indigence,

and for this purpose he set up the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES),

which quickly made an alliance with the (public) University of the Republic

(UDELAR).


6 Adolfo Garc é

3.1.1 The Problem, The Alternative, The Opportunity and The Outcome

– The problem. In the mid 1990s, poverty was not an important issue in Uru-

guayan politics. The country had managed to combine its structural adjust-

ment to the prevailing economic climate with poverty reduction. The trend for

poverty to fall, which had begun 10 years earlier, went into reverse around 1995

(PNUD 1999) 4 but the main social indicators only started to worsen at the end

of that decade. At the dawn of the 21st century the country went into economic

meltdown with an extraordinary rise in unemployment (which climbed to 20%)

and poverty (which reached 30%). A number of academic studies at the time

helped bringring the question of poverty in general – and child poverty in par-

ticular – at the centre of the debate. The most well known of these was a study

by the IPES of the Catholic University (UDUCAL – Universidad Cat ó lica) under

the leadership of two sociologists, Fernando Filgueira and Ruben Katzman. In

2001 they published their Panorama of Infancy and the Family in Uruguay . It

had a massive impact on public opinion and the political parties because it

laid bare the fact that more than half the children in the country were born into

poor households. The Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Parliament)

echoed public alarm by setting up a special commission to study poverty. The

country ’ s situation got even worse in December 2001 when a financial crisis

began, and the government suspended banking operations in August 2002. In

this context there were more and more reports about the deteriorating social

situation. In August, just when the financial system was collapsing, it emerged

that some children at a public school in Montevideo “ were eating grass. ” 5

Poverty had become a most serious problem in Uruguayan society.

– The alternative . This social emergency sparked a debate not only in Parlia-

ment but among the population about what institutions and social policies

would be best suited to fight poverty, and people discussed whether a “ social

authority ” should be established, as the ECLAC (Economic Commission for

Latin America and the Caribbean) was recommending. In this climate the

Frente Amplio (FA), a “ Broad Front ” coalition of leftist parties which was

favorite to win the forthcoming general election, began to draft more com-

prehensive plans. Their candidate for the presidency was Tabar é V á zquez. In

4 Poverty fell steadily from 1985 to 1994 (from 37% in 1986 to 12.8% in 1994) but it increased

again – albeit only slightly, from 1995 to 1998 (from 14.7% to 15.5%). See UNDP (1999: p. 29).

5 See Hugo Carro ’ s article about Uruguay for BBC World (Thursday 8 August 2002): “ Thousands

of Uruguayans … were shocked by news that stunned the nation: hunger was so widespread in

the country that some children at school number 128 were eating grass. ” See:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/crisis_en_el_sur_/newsid_2181000/2181335.stm .

Accessed on 7 July 2013.



the previous electoral campaign in 1998 and 1999 he had talked about how

necessary it was to implement an emergency plan to tackle poverty, and now,

campaigning in the crisis, he promised to do so. Consideration of other expe-

riences in the region played a decisive role in converting this slogan into a

public policy initiative. Since the mid 1990s governments throughout Latin

America – on the right as well as on the left – had been following in the

pioneering footsteps of Brazil and Mexico and considering relief measures

focalized on the most vulnerable sectors of the population. The distinctive

feature of these programmes was that they were based on money transfers

to poor households conditional upon the head of the family complying

with certain obligations. This system of Conditional Monetary Transfer Pro-

grammes (PTCs) spread rapidly in the region in line with a classic pattern of

policy paradigm diffusion ( Sugiyama 2011 ), and by 2011 CCTs were in opera-

tion in 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and disbursing ben-

efits to some 113 million people (19% of the population). The experience in

Brazil ( Bolsa Familia ), which began in 2003, had a particularly strong influ-

ence in Uruguay because there were close links between the PT (the Brazil-

ian Workers ’ Party) and the FA. In 2004, with support from institutions like

FESUR and the World Bank, FA leaders and poverty specialists acquired

detailed knowledge about how some of these experiences operated.

– The opportunity. Jorge Batlle, who was president during the crisis, did not

consider it necessary to implement a CCT. His priority was to get the economy

moving again and restructure the financial system. The opportunity to

change the policy paradigm to combat poverty came when the FA won the

election and assumed power. Equality is a core value in the FA, as it is in all

leftist parties, and V á zquez, the president-elect, had to visibly emphasize his

commitment to pursue it. A basic pillar in the new government ’ s mandate

was to tackle the social emergency.

– The outcome . As soon as he assumed power, V á zquez went straight into

action. To fulfil his promise to implement an emergency plan he assigned

a ministerial level cabinet place to the Communist Party and established a

Ministry of Social Development (MIDES). This sent a clear signal to the elec-

torate that, unlike previous governments, his administration was most def-

initely concerned with social problems. To carry out the plan and execute

other social policies, the government organized the Ministry of Social Devel-

opment as quickly as possible. Two faculties in the UDELAR (University of

6 Of these two cooperation experiences, the one that involved the Institute of Economics of the

FCE and A, won an international prize as the best practice of collaboration between research and

politics: the PEGnet Best Practice Award of 2009.


8 Adolfo Garc é

the Republic) provided the newborn institution with the technical assistance

essential to designing and implementing the plan. 6 The Faculty of Social Sci-

ences carried out a census of poor households throughout the country to

gather precise information, and the Institute of Economics (Faculty of Eco-

nomic Sciences and Administration) drew up an Index of Critical Needs (ICC)

to determine which of the households in the census would benefit from the

plan ’ s assistance scheme. The BPS (Banco de Previsi ó n Social), the country ’ s

social security administration, used its computerized system to analyze the

ICC and generate a group of households eligible for benefits.

The plan was implemented but, with all due respect to the university spe-

cialists for the role they played, the determining factor was political. At least

three key decisions were not technical but based on politics. First, the PANES

aimed at the lowest 20% of households below the poverty line, which amounted

to 8% of the population. This decision was taken before the UDELAR poverty

researchers became involved and responded to criteria that were strictly politi-

cal ( Rius 2012 ). Second, the mechanism to select households based on the ICC

was also influenced by political considerations. The MIDES authorities decided

to make the initial criteria for inclusion in the plan more flexible to speed up

implementation (as any delay would be politically costly) and they required

that the index be changed to include more households ( Labat 2012 : pp. 69 – 71).

Third, the decision to terminate the PANES scheme was also eminently politi-

cal. It would have been uncomfortable for the FA to undertake their next elec-

tion campaign admitting that the social emergency was persisting, and so the

PANES was replaced by a scheme called the Equity Plan in 2007. 7

3.1.2 The Case and the Concepts

On a theoretical level, the analysis of the PANES draws the following conclusions:

1. First, although the government adopted a paradigm (the CCT) that was

popular in the region, in order to adapt and implement it they employed the

UDELAR, a university with strong loyalties to the FA.

2. Second, although academics played a very important role, political rationale

was a factor in all the key decisions:

7 In the list of the gaps between design and implementation it is also important to mention that

the conditionalities in education and health required by researchers and funding organizations

(in this case the IDB) were not checked or controlled, as was later admitted by the MIDES authori-

ties themselves ( Amarante and Vigorito 2012 : p. 23). In this case, it may be that the gap was not

due to political considerations but to an institutional lack of ability on the part of the State to

demand fulfilment of the conditioning criteria.



– In setting up the MIDES, the president had to send a clear message to

leftist voters.

– In appointing the MIDES authorities, the president had to bring the Com-

munist Party into his cabinet ( Garc é 2006 : p. 7).

– In the decision to go ahead with the PANES, the president knew that execut-

ing it could increase the FA ’ s political capital, as observed in other countries.

– As regards the timing of the PANES, it had to be put into operation in the

first half of the new administration ’ s first year without fail, and it would

not be able to last more than 2 years.

– As regards the quantitative definition of the target population, it was

decided on the basis of political (and not technical) considerations that

the plan should cover 200,000 beneficiaries.

3. Third, State structures assisted in the policy ’ s rapid implementation. The

MIDES was built up in step with the progress of PANES implementation.

There were not, and there could not have been, institutional restrictions on

the change. The fact that the BPS has a high level of technical capacity made

it possible to apply the ICC and delineate the target population.

3.2 The Establishment of The National Research and Innovation Agency

In 2006, the Presidency introduced a bill to set up the National Research and Inno-

vation Agency (ANII), and parliament passed it. This was a milestone in innovation

policy in Uruguay. To understand this institutional initiative we have to examine

the progress made in the scientific community in the years before the FA ’ s electoral

victory. This was another instance of President V á zquez keeping one of his prom-

ises. During the election campaign he formulated the slogan “ Uruguay Innovator ” to

stress the importance his government would place on innovation, science and tech-

nology. However, the measures proposed in his electoral platform did not include a

specific plan to set up an agency, although they did figure among the recommenda-

tions formulated and widely disseminated by specialists in 2003 and 2004.


– The problem. Uruguay ’ s innovation policies were never particularly sophisti-

cated. For many years domestic industry developed under the protection of

mechanisms in the import substitution industrialization (ISI) model, which

was widespread in Latin America (multiple exchange rates in the 1930s and

1940s; tariff, fiscal and credit instruments in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s).


10 Adolfo Garc é

Before the dictatorship (1973 – 1984), the State University did not have a policy

of cooperating with the business sector. Quite the contrary in fact; its most

active elements prioritized an alliance with the workers that was geared to an

anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist global transformation of society.

In the early 1960s some innovation-promotion policies began to emerge

and the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICYT)

was set up, but it was only after the dictatorship ended that more energetic

initiatives began to appear in this field. In 1985 the Basic Sciences Develop-

ment Plan (PEDECIBA) 8 was established, and in 1989 the Faculty of Science.

In the meantime the UDELAR began to develop policies to connect univer-

sity research processes with the business sector ’ s innovation requirements,

a move inspired in the Triple Helix approach. 9 A key actor in all these ini-

tiatives was the country ’ s scientific community, which consisted basically of

researchers at the UDELAR. During the following decade, until the 1999 – 2002

crisis, some progress was made including important institutional changes

like the reconfiguration of the National Agricultural Research Institute and

the founding of the National Science and Technology Board in the Ministry

of Education and Culture. Support for research increased with initiatives like

the creation of funds to be awarded on the basis of competitions, and the

National Researcher ’ s Fund was established.

However, it was only after the catastrophe of 1999 – 2002 that far-reaching

diagnoses were made of this whole question and the need for a much more

energetic public innovation policy was installed on the public agenda ( Davyt

2011 : pp. 112 – 113). The key step forward took place in 2003 when Friedrich Ebert

Foundation in Uruguay (FESUR) launched the project called CIENTIS (Science,

Technology, Innovation and Society), coordinated by FA Senator Enrique Rubio

(at that time President of the Senate Science and Technology Commission). In

this initiative nearly 300 people including academics, politicians and experts

in innovation took part in a course of seminars and other knowledge-sharing

events that lasted a year and were geared to drafting a programme to develop

science, technology and innovation. The final document had a big impact

( Davyt 2011 : p. 115) and the political parties incorporated its recommendations

into their programming for the 2004 election.

– The alternative. The most important document generated in this context was

produced by a group of UDELAR researchers under the direction of the dean

8 The PEDECIBA was set up in 1995 (as a permanent programme) in the 1995 budget legislation

(Law 16,736, Articles 386 and 387). It covers the following areas: biology, computer science, phys-

ics, mathematics and chemistry.

9 The basics of this approach can be accessed at: http://www.triplehelixconference.org/the-

triple-helix-concept.html .



of the Faculty of Social Sciences at that time, Luis B é rtola. The document was

drafted as part of a series of consultations contracted by the Inter-American

Development Bank (IDB) to offer the new government technical inputs. This

team reported that the country was in a state of “ innovation indigence ” char-

acterized by low R&D expenditures, a scarcity of researchers, a weak demand

for innovation, a supply concentrated in the public sector and problems with

the coordination of supply and demand ( B é rtola et al. 2005 : p. II).

According to this diagnosis, this “ innovation indigence ” was due to the

national economy ’ s lack of dynamism in the long term. To overcome these

obstacles, three broad objectives were proposed: i) to establish an innovation

culture geared to changing social attitudes by generating measures to stim-

ulate innovation that should be part of a strategic innovation, science and

technology plan; ii) to coordinate the various actors in the system by reform-

ing the design of institutions to allow public policies to be coordinated; and

iii) to increase the number and improve the quality of human resources.

Among other initiatives, the proposed re-engineering of institutions would

include forming an Innovation Cabinet made up of some ministers and other

important figures in the innovation system, and setting up a National Scien-

tific Research, Technology and Innovation Development Agency.

A key point in the plan was its “ relative autonomy ” with respect to

country ’ s scientific community. In other words, these institutions would be

structured in such a way that its policies could be formulated by government

authorities and not scientists. The Innovation Cabinet would coordinate poli-

cies in this area, and the agency would evaluate, select and finance activities

to be executed in the framework of the plans that had been made. This pro-

posal to set up an agency was not completely new as in fact a series of similar

ideas had already been put forward since the end of the 1990s by some of

the UDELAR ’ s most respected experts in innovation like Rodrigo Arocena

and Judith Sutz ( Davyt 2011 : p. 109). In addition, the CIENTIS document had

called for “ new institutional architecture ” (2003: p. 19).

– The opportunity. The window to introduce new innovation policies opened

when the FA won the election. The change of government generated a favora-

ble political climate for two reasons, the first of which has to do with presi-

dential leadership. Tabar é V á zquez gave the issue high priority. In this case,

as was the cas when the PANES was set in motion, ideas and interests con-

verged. First, like the vast majority of the country ’ s political elite following

the 1999 – 2002 economic and social debacle, V á zquez sincerely believed that

innovation was important. He also had to push ahead with ambitious meas-

ures in innovation, science and technology to compensate for other decisions

he had made, like appointing Danilo Astori Minister of the Economy. Many


12 Adolfo Garc é

leftist voters felt that the economic plans Astori had been defending since he

entered the Senate in 1995 were a long way from traditional FA positions and

too close to the neo-liberal policies the other parties were pursuing.

The second reason has to do with the close links between the FA and the

academic world. For the first time in decades, power was in the hands of a

political party with deep roots in the scientific community and the UDELAR

in particular. We cannot say what would have happened if the FA had not won

the election, but it is very likely that either of the other main parties would have

also tried to push ahead with the recommendations of the CIENTIS project and

the B é rtola report. However, it is very difficult to make changes or implement

new policies without support from the social sectors that have a direct interest.

– The outcome . According to the Kingdon model we have been using, there is

no pre-established sequence in the flow of problems, alternatives and politi-

cal viability. Sometimes the necessary political leadership exists and the

problem is a priority on the agenda, however no suitable solutions are avail-

able at the technical level. Other times viable solutions may be available but

cannot be applied either because the problem is not on the agenda or due to

prevailing political conditions.

Something along those lines happened in the case we are examining. The

concrete proposal to set up a specialized State agency to implement innova-

tion policies in the framework of government agenda priorities was formulated

nearly 10 years before the problem of “ innovation indigence ” in general and

the need for institutional changes in particular came to the fore in the politi-

cal arena. The economic crisis and the impending switch to a left-wing gov-

ernment generated a powerful incentive for academics to formulate and make

public their demands for a genuine innovation, science and technology policy.

V á zquez picked up on this demand during the election campaign and incorpo-

rated it into his platform. Once elected, he followed the recommendations in the

IDB consultancy initiative ( B é rtola et al. 2005 ) and convoked a Ministerial Inno-

vation Cabinet (GMI). This body set up an operational team to draft a strategic

plan, and the same team drafted the bill to establish the National Research and

Innovation Agency (ANII). This came before Parliament in August 2006 and was

passed in December of that year.


On the theoretical level, the process of setting up the ANII suggests the following

conclusions:

– First, it is very clear that in the whole process of the “ social construction ” of

the problem of innovation and of formulating alternatives, the country ’ s sci-



entific community and particularly UDELAR researchers played an important

role.

– Second, the case of ANII clearly shows that even if a problem is complex, it

tends to be picked up by the political actors and incorporated as a priority

onto their electoral platforms and government agendas when it is understood

by the general public. Seen from this perspective, even the worst crises can

give rise to good opportunities.

– Third, it is evident that when an issue is strongly installed on the public

agenda, it is possible that the dynamic of political competition may not

impede the formation of consensus. In other words, even in highly competi-

tive political systems (as is the case in Uruguay), specialized knowledge can

be used to construct consensus.

– Fourth, it emerges that international cooperation can play a very important

role in the dynamic of ideas. FESUR ’ s support for the CIENTIS project was

a key factor in developing public opinion about the issue and affecting the

parties ’ programme design processes. In addition, the IDB ’ s support also had

an impact insofar, as some innovation policy proposals that had been in the

process of formulation since the 1990s were quite well developed. This meant

that when Tabar é V á zquez became president a very detailed institutional re-

engineering plan for the National Innovation System was already available.

3.3 The Failure of the Free Trade Agreement with the US

In 2005 and 2006 President V á zquez, with support from the powerful network

of economists that controlled economic policy, pursued a Free Trade Agreement

(FTA) with the USA. Opposed to this initiative was a broad coalition made up of

political sectors of V á zquez ’ s own party, union actors (especially from union

syndicates), and leftist intellectuals and academics, who eventually blocked the

president ’ s initiative. This conflict was a confrontation between two networks

of experts who invoked different bodies of empirical evidence and knowledge.

However, in the end it was not empirical evidence but, yet again, the president ’ s

calculations that swayed the balance and decided the matter.


– The problem. Like other countries in Latin America, Uruguay had very high

levels of protectionism in the first half of the 20th century but it was only in

the mid 1950s, when the country entered into a long period of stagflation,

that this strategy began to be seen as a problem. Little by little this situation


14 Adolfo Garc é

gave rise to a different approach that was instigated by important neo-liberal

figures in Uruguay such as Ram ó n D í az who argued quite early that “ a small

country must be an open country. ” Trade opening became the paradigm at

the start of the 1970s, but the changeover was gradual.

An important step in this process was taken when Uruguay joined the MER-

COSUR in 1991. For nearly 10 years there was a near consensus in political and

academic circles in favor of this pattern of international insertion – which came

to be termed “ open regionalism ” – and regional integration was seen as a plat-

form for trade relations with the rest of the world. This consensus was broken by

the crisis of 1999 – 2002. The country ’ s economy collapsed when demand from

Brazil plummeted (because of devaluation in 1999) and demand from Argentina

fell dramatically (because of the 2001 financial crisis). This shock in the region

came on top of a series of academic studies insisting that Uruguay ’ s main obsta-

cle to achieving an acceptable rate of long term growth was its weak capacity

to guard against adverse external shocks. The V á zquez government ’ s economics

team, which was made up of prestigious economists with high levels of academic

training, was very conscious of this problem.

– The alternative . In the middle of the 2002 crisis, when the whole country was

discussing the problem of how to free people ’ s savings that were trapped

in the bankrupt banks (the so-called “ corralito ” whereby bank accounts

were frozen) President Jorge Batlle let slip a phrase that had a big impact

on public opinion. He said the worst “ corralito , ” the most damaging to

Uruguay … was the MERCOSUR. This view was shared by most economists in

the various political parties. The alternative to a policy of “ open regionalism ”

(the trade insertion pattern coming up to the 2002 crisis) was trade inser-

tion “ the Chilean way ” (a strategy of pursuing multiple bilateral trade agree-

ments), and this option was gaining general acceptance as a legitimate move.

Uruguay already had a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Mexico, which had

been negotiated and signed by President Batlle himself, and this helped to

show the public that this alternative had good potential. Batlle continued to

seek FTAs and he managed to seal a bilateral investment treaty ( Porzecanski

2010 ). The main economists in the Tabar é V á zquez administration favored

this alternative, as became clear when the USA let it be understood that it was

disposed to move towards signing an FTA with Uruguay.

– The opportunity. The window of opportunity to pursue this policy was open

in 2005. President V á zquez announced that he supported the initiative by

Danilo Astori, his Economics Minister, to sign an FTA with the USA. It should

be mentioned that V á zquez is a medical doctor by profession and does not

necessarily have strong convictions on the question of trade integration.

The reason he inclined towards the FTA option was that he had great confi-



dence in Astori ’ s technical ability; in fact Astori was his favorite minister. Like

Astori, he had come to the conclusion that Uruguay should emulate Chile ’ s

trade insertion strategy ( Porzecanski 2010 : pp. 120 – 122).

The political conditions at the time were excellent. First, both V á zquez

and Astori had extraordinarily high approval ratings. Second, public

opinion was strongly favorable (around 60%) to the FTA ( Porzecanski

2010 : p. 130). Third, although V á zquez knew the plan would meet resist-

ance in his own party he trusted in his ability to overcome it. He had done

this several times before on important issues, like in his election campaign

in July 2004 when he made the surprise announcement, without prior

consultation, that if he was elected president he would appoint Astori as

Minister of the Economy. The fourth favorable consideration was that the

opposition parties were clearly in favor of an FTA. All in all, it seemed the

political opportunity could not have been better.

– The outcome . The attempt at obtaining an FTA with the US failed. The plan

provoked widespread opposition on the left and many actors joined together

to try to block it. This coalition was made up of players of considerable weight

including some ministers (among them the Chancellor (Foreign Minister)

Reinaldo Gargano), some factions in the FA (including the one headed by

Jos é Mujica, who had received the most votes in the 2004 election), the union

movement, and a powerful network of leftist academics who were experts in

political change. This network, which was a real epistemic community 10 mainly

made up of researchers at the University of the Republic, played a very impor-

tant part in formulating and spreading a modern argument against free trade.

Their spokespeople claimed that while FTAs might favor economic growth in

the short term, in the long run they ended up working against development

insofar as they inhibited innovation processes. This argument was much more

compatible with the tradition of the left, which since the 1960s had included

proposals of a structuralist (ECLAC) type, than to that of supporters of the FTA

with the USA, who were easily labeled by their opponents as “ neo-liberal. ”

V á zquez had to retreat in order to remain the leader of the coalition of left-wing

parties. In terms of political survival this was the right move. Danilo Astori sub-

sequently lost to Jos é Mujica in the primary election to succeed V á zquez as the

FA candidate for the presidency in July 2009, and one of the main reasons for

his defeat was precisely that he had worked to promote the FTA with the US.

10 An epistemic community is a network of experts with shared values and beliefs about the prob-

lems and challenges in a particular policy field. The developmentalist epistemic community was

made up of a wide range of academics including engineers, specialists in development, economists,

historians, sociologists and political scientists. Most of them were researchers at the UDELAR.


16 Adolfo Garc é


On the theoretical level, the following conclusions can be drawn from the frus-

trated attempt to establish an FTA with the US:

– First, the case of the FTA underlines yet again the importance of academic

institutions, and in particular the UDELAR, in the knowledge regime in

Uruguay. On both sides of the debate – in the coalition that promoted the

FTA and also in the opposition that frustrated it – university experts played

a key role.

– Second, this case illustrates that partisan knowledge and adversarial logic pre-

dominate. Both sides wielded theoretical arguments and empirical evidence.

– Third, it laid bare the marked pluralism of the policy design regime in the

country: not even the most politically powerful president in the history of

modern Uruguay could impose his will over determined opposition.

– Fourth, it reminds us that State structures in Uruguay are technically weak. In

the polemical debate that broke out, not one office in the public administra-

tion played an important role, not even the Chancellery (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs) bureaucracy.

– Fifth, it makes clear how important the political parties and their ideologies

are. The technical arguments that were most powerful politically ended up

being those that fitted best with the government party ’ s ideological traditions.

– Sixth, it provides support for the hypothesis that political calculation is the

prime factor. In the end V á zquez retreated when it became evident that he did

have enough support within the FA. If he had pressed on he could have ended

up paying a big political price in terms of jeopardizing his own leadership.

3.4 Similarities and Differences in the Three Change Events Analyzed

The table below gives a summary of the information analyzed.

4 Towards a New Concept The above analysis of the three change events helps to show the limitations of the

concept of Knowledge Regime as formulated by Campbell and Pedersen. First, it

clearly demonstrates the importance of studying the demand side very thoroughly.

Second, it suggests that the dynamic of social research may not depend so much



Si

mila

ritie

s Di

ffere

nces

Pro

ble

ms

Aca

de

mic

in

sti

tuti

on

s a

nd

un

ive

rsit

y

ne

two

rks

pla

yed

a k

ey

role

in

th

e “

so

cia

l

con

str

uct

ion

” o

f th

e t

hre

e p

rob

lem

s.

Bo

th i

n t

he

ca

se

of

ide

nti

fyin

g t

he

pro

ble

m o

f “ i

nn

ova

tio

n i

nd

ige

nce

”

an

d i

n t

ha

t o

f th

e v

uln

era

bil

itie

s i

nvo

lve

d i

n “

op

en

re

gio

na

lis

m, ”

UD

ELA

R a

cad

em

ic n

etw

ork

s p

laye

d a

de

cis

ive

ro

le.

On

th

e o

the

r h

an

d,

in t

he

“ s

oci

al

con

str

uct

ion

” o

f th

e p

rob

lem

of

po

vert

y th

e I

PE

S/U

CU

DA

L (C

ath

oli

c U

niv

ers

ity)

pla

yed

a v

ery

imp

ort

an

t ro

le.

Alt

ern

ati

ves

The

un

ive

rsit

ies

(pu

bli

c o

r p

riva

te)

an

d t

he

ir

rese

arc

he

rs w

ere

als

o k

ey

in d

esi

gn

ing

an

d/o

r im

ple

me

nti

ng

th

e i

nn

ova

tio

ns.

UD

ELA

R a

cad

em

ics

did

a lo

t o

f w

ork

tha

t le

d t

o t

he

fo

un

din

g o

f th

e A

NII

, th

e

imp

lem

en

tati

on

of

the

PA

NE

S,

an

d p

rovi

din

g

the

th

eo

reti

cal b

asi

s fo

r b

lock

ing

th

e F

TA.

So

me

tra

ns

na

tio

na

l in

sti

tuti

on

s (

lik

e t

he

IDB

an

d t

he

Eb

ert

Fo

un

da

tio

n)

he

lpe

d t

o

de

sig

n o

r im

ple

me

nt

cha

ng

es

.

The

re w

ere

big

dif

fere

nce

s i

n t

he

am

ou

nt

of

do

me

sti

c d

es

ign

in

the

alt

ern

ati

ves

. In

th

e c

as

e o

f th

e P

AN

ES

, a

mo

de

l th

at

wa

s v

ery

wid

es

pre

ad

in

th

e r

eg

ion

wa

s i

mp

ort

ed

in

acc

ord

an

ce w

ith

th

e

cla

ss

ic p

att

ern

of

po

licy

dif

fus

ion

. In

th

e c

as

e o

f th

e A

NII

, d

om

es

tic

gro

un

dw

ork

se

em

s t

o h

ave

be

en

mu

ch m

ore

co

ns

iste

nt

an

d d

eci

siv

e.

The

re a

re a

lso

dif

fere

nce

s i

n t

he

kin

ds

of

kn

ow

led

ge

in

volv

ed

. In

th

e

cas

e o

f th

e s

ett

ing

up

of

the

AN

II,

acc

um

ula

ted

re

se

arc

h c

on

trib

ute

d

to b

uil

din

g c

on

se

ns

us

. In

th

e c

as

e o

f th

e F

TA,

res

ea

rch

ha

d a

n

ad

vers

ari

al

dyn

am

ic a

nd

wa

s u

se

d b

y th

os

e i

n f

avo

r a

s w

ell

as

by

tho

se

ag

ain

st

the

Pre

sid

en

t ’ s

in

itia

tive

.

Po

liti

cal

op

po

rtu

nit

ies

Th

e c

ha

ng

e o

f g

ove

rnm

en

t a

nd

as

su

mp

tio

n

of

po

we

r b

y a

n o

pp

os

itio

n p

art

y w

as

de

cis

ive

in

ho

w e

ach

op

po

rtu

nit

y fo

r

cha

ng

e w

as

cre

ate

d.

The

pre

sid

en

t ’ s

le

ad

ers

hip

wa

s a

ke

y fa

cto

r

in p

rom

oti

ng

th

e t

hre

e c

ha

ng

es

an

d i

n

su

bs

eq

ue

ntl

y p

utt

ing

th

e b

rak

e o

n o

ne

of

the

m (

the

FTA

).

In t

he

tw

o s

ucc

es

sfu

l ca

se

s t

he

pre

sid

en

t h

ad

ma

de

fir

m p

oli

tica

l

com

mit

me

nts

. H

e h

ad

be

en

pro

mis

ing

an

“ e

me

rge

ncy

pla

n ”

sin

ce

the

19

99

ele

ctio

n c

am

pa

ign

, a

nd

he

ha

d m

ad

e i

nn

ova

tio

n o

ne

of

the

ma

in p

illa

rs o

f h

is p

latf

orm

in

20

04

. In

co

ntr

as

t, i

n t

he

fa

ile

d

att

em

pt

to e

sta

bli

sh

an

FTA

ne

ith

er

his

co

nvi

ctio

ns

no

r h

is p

oli

tica

l

com

mit

me

nt

wa

s a

s s

tro

ng

. P

oli

tica

l p

lura

lis

m d

id n

ot

imp

ed

e c

ha

ng

e

in t

wo

of

the

th

ree

ch

an

ge

-eve

nts

stu

die

d.

So

urc

e:

au

tho

r ’ s

ela

bo

rati

on

.


18 Adolfo Garc é

on the political economy factors that these authors emphasize because, if that

were so, the knowledge regime in Uruguay would be similar to that in Germany

(for reasons that are explained below) but this is most manifestly not the case.

4.1 The Demand for Research and Its Actors as Decisive Factors

The three processes analyzed above show that demand is a decisive factor in

the use of social research. There is no way to understand the introduction of the

PANES, the founding of the ANII and the problematic FTA episode without focus-

ing on the role the president ’ s leadership played in all three initiatives. Similarly,

in all three cases it is essential to take account of the FA ’ s ideological and insti-

tutional features and of that party ’ s links with networks of university academics.

The FA has a very strong ideological commitment to equality as a key value, and

the fact that the PANES was introduced so quickly can be traced directly to this

tradition. The FA also has an equally strong anti-imperialist tradition, and this is

a factor in understanding why the plan for an FTA with the USA was blocked. In

addition, the party ’ s internal factionalism is a key institutional factor in under-

standing why the president was forced to abandon that initiative. Lastly, the fact

that the FA has deep roots in the UDELAR is crucial to understanding why the FA

government was able to so easily utilize the contributions from the university net-

works that served to lay the foundations for the two changes (PANES and ANII)

that were successfully made.

Campbell and Pedersen ’ s concept of Knowledge Regime is a very important

contribution in this field but it does not shed light on two crucial dimensions of

the dynamic of specialized knowledge. Neither the demand for research nor the

actors involved in this aspect (leaders and political parties) are adequately con-

sidered. To understand how any market works – and this applies equally to the

market for ideas – the features of the demand side have to be studied to the same

depth as the features of the supply.

4.2 Uruguay is not Germany

According to Campbell and Pedersen ’ s typology, Uruguay should be similar to

Germany insofar as it has the same kind of capitalism (coordinated market) and

the same kind of policy making regime (pluralist). These authors maintain that

this combination, which prevails in Germany, generates a knowledge regime ori-

ented to consensus. In these cases the idea market is, at least in theory, relatively

uncompetitive, and there are few research units oriented to promoting specific



interests. The knowledge they generate should be geared to constructing a con-

sensus and be perceived by society as neutral. However, none of these features

apply to Uruguay.

It is true that, like Germany, Uruguay has few research units oriented to promot-

ing specific interests. As it became clear in our examination of the change events

during the V á zquez administration, the research units in the universities in general

and the UDELAR in particular, are very important actors in the policy design process.

But specialized knowledge, even when the underlying intention is most decidedly to

be neutral, ends up being widely used by the parties and their factions in the battle

for political power. Technical rationality is firmly subordinate to political rationality,

and this too was clearly demonstrated in the three cases analyzed above.

The truth is that the dynamic of specialized knowledge in Uruguay is much

more like the North American model than the German. In Uruguay, like in the US,

specialized knowledge is a formidable weapon in the struggle for power. The big

difference between the two countries is that while the main actors in the USA are

interest groups that employ think tanks in their battles for influence, in Uruguay

the main protagonists are political parties. Note that the type of capitalism in

these countries makes no important difference when it comes to understanding

the main factors that underlie the dynamics of social research. In fact, to under-

stand what kind of specialized knowledge is in play and its political dynamic, it

is less important to understand how the economic market is regulated (or not, as

the case may be) than to ascertain what factors structure the policy market.

4.3 The Status of Science in a Given Society and Political System

In Uruguay, the US and Germany the policy design regime is pluralist. But while in

the first two countries the knowledge market is open and research tends to be used

in an adversarial and partisan way, in Germany the prevailing perception is that

knowledge is neutral and is used to build a consensus. Why is Uruguay like the US

rather than Germany ? In this section we shall argue that the crucial difference could

be traced to the value society and the political system place on social research .

Campbell and Pedersen assert that a coordinated economy will generate

knowledge oriented to consensus. However, there are good reasons to think that

the causal relation may be reversed. If a society tends to confer a special status

to scientific knowledge it will probably regard as legitimate the use of scientific

research as a basis for building consensus about public policies. For this very

reason it will tend to construct institutions capable of producing this knowl-

edge to regulate the market “ rationally. ” Similarly, it is probable that the more


20 Adolfo Garc é

representative of society (and less elitist) the political parties are, the greater will

be their distrust of the role that more learned minorities play and of the special-

ized knowledge that distinguishes them.

It is not only State structures that tend to reflect the extent to which society

trusts science. Political parties, insofar as they express predominant values, tend

to reproduce these patterns. The more enlightened a society is, the more the polit-

ical parties will regard intellectuals with reverence and tend to trust in the social

utility and neutrality of science. On the other hand, the more anti-intellectual a

society is, the more intensely the political parties will use specialized knowledge

as an instrument to achieve their goals.

4.4 Sketching a New Concept: Political-Knowledge Regimes

We can construct a new concept on the basis of the features of the policy design

regime and the value society places on science. We shall call this the Political-

Knowledge Regime . The policy design regime has a big effect not only on the char-

acteristics of the supply of specialized knowledge but also on the demand for

it. As Campbell and Pedersen show, pluralism favors the formation of an open

idea market and intense competition among different strands of knowledge. On

the other hand, a centralized policy design environment generates a more closed

idea market.

The value that society puts on science also has a big influence on the supply

of and demand for research. In countries where the predominant culture is more

rationalist, the demand for research tends to be greater and there is general accept-

ance that science can be neutral. On the other hand, in countries with a politi-

cal culture that is suspicious of expert knowledge, there will be less demand for

Typology of Political-Knowledge Regimes

General valuation of science in the political system (Predominant cultural tradition)

Rationalism Enlightenment Pragmatism Anti-intellectualism

Policy design regime

Centralized I III

TECNOCRACY PLEBIAN MAJORITARISM

Decentralized II IV

TECHNOCRATIC PLURALISM PLEBIAN PLURALISM

Source: author ’ s elaboration.



scientific knowledge, and science will tend to be used instrumentally as a means

to an end. Based on these two variables, the following typology can be sketched

out:

Before continuing, we should make it clear that no normative bias should be

sought in this discussion. With that in mind, let us examine in greater depth each

of the quadrants in the table above.

– TYPE I. TECNOCRACY. The combination of centralization and rationalism

generates a State-driven intense use of social research. The political parties

frequently appeal to experts and tend to delegate considerable responsibili-

ties to them in the definition of public policies. Academic knowledge is very

important as a trampoline for people ’ s political careers and a sine qua non

condition for them to attain positions in the government. A good example of

this type in Latin America is Chile, which seems to have inherited a German

influence and a positivist influence in which science is highly valued.

– TYPE II. TECHNOCRATIC PLURALISM. The combination of pluralism and

rationalism generates an open market for ideas in which alternative policy

paradigms compete. Science is highly valued and this generates consider-

able development in the social sciences and in research applied to public

policies. Like in type I (technocracy), there are State structures that favor the

use of knowledge in policies. University education and academic merit are

important to attain a position in the government. A good example of this type

is Brazil.

– TYPE III. PLEBIAN MAJORITARISM. The combination of centralization and

anti-intellectualism do not favor the formation of a competitive or demand-

ing market for ideas. The use of research need not be of low intensity but it is

strictly subordinate to the strategies of the leading actors, who mainly resort

to experts when they want to give their decisions legitimacy and strengthen

their hegemony. Argentina would be an example of this type.

– TYPE IV. PLEBIAN PLURALISM. The combination of pluralism and anti-intel-

lectualism generates a comparatively low level of specialized knowledge use,

which basically serves as an instrumental function in public policies. Plural-

ism favors an idea market that is open and competitive, but politics clearly

dominate technical rationality. Specialized knowledge is essentially a weapon

in the power struggle among the main political actors. Like in a type III system

(plebian majoritarism), State structures clearly show the stamp of the pre-

dominance of political rationality. A good example of this type is Uruguay.

Needless to say, this is no more than a first attempt at constructing this

concept, and as such it needs to be debated. From a theoretical perspective,

it is open to the same criticism as any other attempt to generalize. First, it

is not so easy to define a country ’ s public policy production regime, or the


22 Adolfo Garc é

predominant discourse about “ reason ” and science in a society or a political

system. 11 And, as always when a discussion is raised to such a high level of

abstraction, the question is inevitably asked: surely, within the same country,

aren ’ t there big differences between different regions and sectors ? Secondly,

like the concept of Knowledge Regime from which it is derived, this new

concept is overly static. As noted above, the time factor has not been incor-

porated into the discussion. The question arises: might it not be impossible

to find empirical evidence of important change processes in either of the two

variables that make up the Political-Knowledge Regime ?

In any case, it is evident that the only way to evaluate the specific contri-

bution a new typology might make is to try to apply it in a variety of contexts.

I hope that this article may help to stimulate not only case studies but also

comparisons between countries.

Acknowledgments: I drafted the first version of this text at the Institute of Politi-

cal Science in the first semester of 2013 with support from Politics & Ideas: a think

net ( http://www.politicsandideas.org/ ), and I would like to give special thanks

to Andrea Ord ó ñ ez, Enrique Mendiz á bal and Vanesa Weyrauch with whom I dis-

cussed the main ideas in this article. I would also like to thank Am í lcar Davyt

(Faculty of Sciences) and Camilo L ó pez (ICP – Faculty of Social Sciences).

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Vigorito, eds.) Investigaci ó n y pol í ticas sociales. La colaboraci ó n entre la Udelar y el Mides para la implementaci ó n del PANES. Montevideo: CSIC-UDELAR, pp. 21 – 26.

B é rtola, Luis, Carlos Bianchi, Pablo Darscht, Amilcar Davyt, Lucía Pittaluga, Nicolás Reig,

Carolina Román, Michele Snoeck and Henry Willebald (2005) Ciencia, tecnolog í a e innovaci ó n en Uruguay: diagn ó stico, prospectiva y pol í ticas. Washington D.C.: Inter-

American Development Bank.

Campbell, John L. and Ove Pedersen (2011) “ Knowledge Regimes and Comparative Political

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11 The online analysis of responses to the question “ Having experts make decisions ” (E115) in the

World Survey of Values shows significant differences. Contrary to what might have been expected,

the political culture in Uruguay is only slightly less technocratic than that in Chile: 44% of Chileans

and 40% of Uruguayans have a positive opinion of a “ government of experts ” (data from the 1996

“ wave ” ). But German political culture is considerably more technocratic than the American variety:

55.6% of Germans and 40% of US citizens have a positive opinion of experts. The data for Germany

and the USA are from a combination of different “ waves: ” Germany: 1981, 1990, 1997 and 1999. USA:

1982, 1990, 1995 and 1999. See: http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeQuestion.jsp



Campbell, John L. and Ove Pedersen (2014) The National Origins of Policy Ideas: Knowledge Regimes in the United States, France, Germany and Denmark. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Carden, Fred (2009) Del conocimiento a la pol í tica. M á ximo aprovechamiento de la investigaci ó n para el desarrollo. Barcelona: IDRC-ICARIA.

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