Political Development Syllabus F2017 · individuals,!12pagesforgroupsoftwo,15forgroupsofthree,...

POSC 450: Political Development Syllabus Fall 2017

Professor Tyson Roberts Course Date/Time: Monday Wednesday 8:30-‐9:50am Course Location: VKC 210 Professor Email Address: [email protected] Professor Office Hours: Monday 1-‐2pm, Friday 11am-‐12noon, or by appointment via email Description of Course Content In this course we will analyze the process of political development, with an emphasis on less-‐industrialized states (e.g., countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia). We will explore the causes and consequences of the state, political institutions, and democracy. Topics will include the origins of the modern state, state failure, revolutions, the role of political parties and legislatures in dictatorships and democracies, and democracy’s social and economic causes and effects. In addition to learning major theories in the literature and examining historical and modern empirical cross-‐national patterns, students will conduct their own research into specific countries for case studies and comparative analysis group papers. Along the way, students will also acquire some skills in game theory, and utilize those skills to analyze the political and economic dynamics associated with political development. Required Textbook

• Clark, Golder and Golder (CG&G). 2013. Principles of Comparative Politics, 3rd Edition (CQ Press). Everyone should own a copy of the textbook – we will rely on it heavily and it will be a good reference for you in the future. (For students who buy the 2nd Edition to save money, I will attempt to scan and post chapters that were updated in the 3rd edition, but the safest approach would be to buy the 3rd Edition.)

• NOTE: Flashcards and self-‐quizzes are available at https://edge.sagepub.com/principlescp3e

Other readings will be available online. Grading Rubric

• Exams (2): 40% • Classroom Assignments/quizzes 5% • Research Assignments 10% • Research Presentations and Memos (3) 15% • Final Presentation and Paper 30%

Exams There will be two exams, the first in Week 7 and the second in Week 14. The exams will emphasize material covered in class and in the homework and research assignments, but may also cover some important material from the reading not covered in class and

assignments (in other words, be sure to do all the reading!). The exams will include multiple choice questions, analytic problems, and short essay questions. Students may have a one page “cheat sheet”, front and back, for each exam. Homework Most weeks I will assign “study questions” on the readings for the week. A report from the online questions should be emailed to the professor before the first day of class each week. These study questions will not be graded, but in some cases I will assign in-‐class assignments that will be very similar to the study questions. In addition, most exam questions will be very similar to the study questions. I therefore strongly recommend that students work on the study questions (individually or in groups) before the class for which they are assigned. . Research Assignments Each student will choose a unique (i.e., no two students should select the same) country to study over the course of the semester. For each research assignment, a hard copy should be brought to class and a digital copy should be posted to the relevant Discussion Board Forum on the class Blackboard before the beginning of class. In most cases, a sample assignment (on Benin) will be posted in the relevant Forum with recommended sources. Limited time may be made available in class to work on some research assignments, but most of this work should be done outside of class (generally the assignment will be less than one page and will take less than an hour, with some exceptions). ALWAYS DOCUMENT YOUR SOURCES and PUT AND DIRECT QUOTES IN QUOTATION MARKS for Research Assignments. Students should be prepared to discuss their research findings in class. Credit will be based on completion and effort. Late work will not be accepted. Research Presentations and Memos Research presentations and memos will be done in groups of 2-‐4 students. These do not need to be highly polished – they are pilot studies (building on the research assignments) to prepare for the final presentation and paper. Memos (1-‐2 pages) should briefly summarize the relevant theory(ies), state the hypothesis(es) being tested, summarize the comparative analysis in table form, and briefly summarize the findings. Presentations should be 5-‐7 minutes long. Powerpoint slides are not necessary (although a slide to present the analytic table may be helpful). Some time will be made available to work on the presentations and memos in class but most of this work should be done outside of class (an hour or two is likely sufficient). Memos are due at midnight after the presentation. Final Presentation and Paper The final project may be done in groups or individually. Identify one or more problems in the country may be either an example or consequence of low political development. Based on readings from class, identify two or more causes of this problem that might be addressed through an intervention by domestic actor (e.g., civic group) or external actor (e.g., the United States). Using relevant theories from class, explain how and why the selected causes may be contributing to the identified problem, then use empirical evidence to assess which of the causes are most important. Finally, recommend action by a domestic or foreign actor that could address the problem. Maximum paper length is 8 pages for

individuals, 12 pages for groups of two, 15 for groups of three, 18 for groups of four. Papers should include a (group) introduction, analysis, and conclusion, and individual sections (roughly 3 pages each) for each country in the body. Papers should demonstrate appropriate knowledge of reading material from class in analyzing how the existing institution is affecting the identified problem, and how the proposed intervention is likely to affect the identified problem as well as side effects. The paper should include a game theoretic model for some aspect of the analysis. The model can be an exact replica of a model from our readings (be sure to cite your source!) or an original/adapted model. The first draft of the paper (which might be incomplete) is due Monday of the last week of class, presentations are Wednesday, and the final paper is due during Finals Week. Academic Integrity Statement All assignments are expected to reflect students’ careful research and original thinking and writing. Citations must be provided for ideas, content, or other materials that originate with another author or authors. Please check SCampus for the University guidelines on academic integrity. If you have any questions about this, please see me or the Office of Student Judicial Affairs and Community Standards (SJACS). Accommodations Statement Any student requesting academic accommodation based on a disability is required to register with Disability Services and Programs (DSP) each semester. A letter of verification for approved accommodations can be obtained from DSP. Please be sure the letter is delivered to me as early in the semester as possible. DSP is located in STU 301 and is open 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The phone number for DSP is (213) 740-0776. COURSE SCHEDULE The professor may make minor adjustments to the schedule throughout the semester. Students are responsible for knowing of changes announced in lecture, on the website, and in online announcements. After the first week, the course is divided into two themes: I. Definition, Origin, and Effects of the State, and II. Definition, Origin, and Effects of Democracy. There will be an exam and one or more presentations and memos at the end of each theme. Readings for the week should always be completed before class starts on Monday (except for Week 1, when readings are due Wednesday). Week 1: Introduction to the comparative method and political development (Aug. 21-‐23) Reading:

• CG&G Chapter 2: What is Science? • Barbara Geddes. 2003. Paradigms and Sandcastles. In Chapter 2, pp. 27-‐30 • Samuel P. Huntington. 1965. “Political Development and Political Decay.” World

Politics, 17(3): 386-‐405 (sections I and II). The rest of the article is optional.

• Watch http://www.ted.com/talks/hans_rosling_shows_the_best_stats_you_ve_ever_seen.html

Study questions: 1. Go through Quiz and Flashcards for Chapter 2 on

https://edge.sagepub.com/principlescp3e and email report to [email protected] . 2. How does Huntington define political development? How can it be measured? 3. How does political development differ from modernization? 4. What question does Huntington seek to answer in this essay? What is his answer to

that question?

Part I: Definition, Origin, and Effects of the State Week 2: Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Aug. 28-‐30) Reading:

§ Listen to http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-‐archives/episode/419/petty-‐tyrant

§ CG& 3: What is Politics? § Hirschman. 1978. “Exit, Voice, and the State.” World Politics 31(1): 90-‐107.


https://edge.sagepub.com/principlescp3e and email report to [email protected] . 2. Read Preparation for the Problems at end of CG&G Chap. 3, then do Problems 1,2 3. How does the Petty Tyrant podcast relate to the EVL game in Chapter 3? 4. How do the various examples in the Hirschman article relate to the EVL game?

Research Assignment 1 (due Wednesday): 1. Identify a unique country to study (no two students should select the same country).

Do not choose an OECD country, and do not choose Benin. 2. What are some major problems that the country you have selected is dealing with?

(Possible examples: civil war, military intervention in politics, corruption, high unemployment, high mortality rates, poverty, inequality, political violence, etc.)

Monday, September 4: Labor Day Week 3: Defining the State (Sept. 6) Reading:

§ Huntington, S. P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 1-‐8.

§ Douglass North. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. Chapter 3: A Neoclassical Theory of the State, sections I-‐III (pp. 20-‐26). The rest of the chapter is optional.

§ CG&G Chapter 4: The Origins of the Modern State § Play pages 0-‐1 (Intro-‐One Game) of http://ncase.me/trust/ § Listen to http://www.radiolab.org/story/104010-‐one-‐good-‐deed-‐deserves-‐

another/ § The Economist. 2016. “Most Failed State.” September 10.

§ Blair and Kalmanovitz. 2017. “When is a warlord better than no warlord?” Washington Post, The Monkey Cage, March 10. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-‐cage/wp/2017/03/10/when-‐is-‐a-‐warlord-‐better-‐than-‐no-‐warlord/?utm_term=.067790d75b42


https://edge.sagepub.com/principlescp3e and email report to [email protected] 2. Answer questions for The Game of Chicken, The Staghunt Game, and the Rock Paper

Scissors Game at the end of Chapter 4. 3. How do the Huntington and North excerpts relate to the State of Nature & Civil

Society games in CGG? 4. How do the examples from the Washington Post and Economist relate to

Huntington, North, and the CGG chapter? Week 4: State Development in Europe and the Origins of Empire (Sept. 11-‐15) Reading:

§ Read Box 4.1 Can Cooperation Occur Without the State in Chapter 4. § Play pages 2-‐5 (Repeated Game-‐Evolution of Distrust) of http://ncase.me/trust/ § Robert Bates. 2001. Prosperity and Violence, Chapter 3: The Formation of States, pp.

34-‐56. § Charles Tilly. 1990, 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-‐1992.

Chapter 3: How War Made States, and Vice Versa, pp. 67-‐95. Study questions:

1. In CGG Chap. 4, answer questions for the Free Trade Game. 2. Why did strong nation states develop in Europe, according to Bates? 3. Why did strong nation states and empires developed in Europe, according to Tilly? 4. How do Bates and Tilly’s accounts of state formation in Europe relate to the EVL

model in CGG Chapter 3, and to the State of Nature and Civil Society models in CGG Chapter 4?

Week 5: Colonialism and Political Development (Sept. 18-‐20) Reading:

• Diamond, Jared. 1999. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The fates of human societies. Chapter 3: Collision at Cajamarca, pp. 67-‐74.

• Sokoloff and Engerman. 2000. “Institutions, factor endowments, and paths of development in the new world.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 217–232.

• Easterly. 2006. The White Man’s Burden. Chapter 8: From Colonialism to Postmodern Imperialism. 269-‐305.

• Englebert. 2000. State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. o Chapter 5: State Legitimacy and Developmental Capacity, pp. 71-‐90 o Chapter 6: Accounting for Africa’s Development Crisis, pp. 125-‐133

• OPTIONAL: o Herbst. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority

and Control. Chapter 3: The Europeans and the African Problem, pp. 58-‐96. o Banerjee and Iyer. 2005. “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance:

The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India.” The American Economic Review, 95(4): 1190-‐1213. (SKIM “Instrumental Variables” section and other technical parts)

o Kohli, Atul. 1994. “Where Do High-‐Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s ‘Developmental State’.” World Politics, 22(9): 1269-‐1293.

Study questions: 1. What are some variations in imperial rule different nation-‐states have experienced? 2. How do different colonial experiences affect post-‐colonial political development? 3. How do these examples relate to the EVL and/or the State of Nature vs. Civil Society

Games? Research Assignment 2 (due Wednesday):

1. When did your country become a unified state? 2. Did your country become a state through a process of war fought by national

leaders, or did it become a state through the process of colonization by, and independence from, an imperial state?

3. Was your country every a subject state of an imperial power (a colony or conquered state)? If so,

a. Who was the imperial power, and over what time period? b. Was your country a state before it became colonized/conquered, or was

central authority established for the first time by the imperial power? Week 6: State Capacity and Failed States (Sept. 25-‐27) Reading:

• Goldstone, Bates, Epstein, Gurr, Marshall, Ulfelder, and Woodward. 2010. “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability.” AJPS, 54(1): 190–208

• Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi. 2011. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 3, pp. 220-‐224. The rest of the article is optional.

• Englebert. 2000. State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. o Chapter 5: State Legitimacy and Developmental Capacity, pp. 90-‐118 o Chapter 6: Accounting for Africa’s Development Crisis, pp. 133-‐137.

• The Economist. 2005. “From chaos, order,” March 3rd. • The Economist. 2008. “A dismal calculus.” May 15th. • The Economist. 2010 “The state of the state.” Nov 22nd.

o Updated chart and data at http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ § OPTIONAL:

o http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/news-‐and-‐events/foreign-‐affairs-‐live-‐the-‐future-‐of-‐state-‐building (you might want to skip ahead to the 8 minute mark)

o Burns, Flournoy, and Lindborg. 2016. “Fragile States and the Next President : What Washington Should Do.” Foreign Affairs, September 11.

o Englebert. 2000. State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. Chapter 2: The Developmental Capacity of States, pp. 17-‐37

Study Questions: 1. According to the Goldstone et al. paper:

a. What are the types of political instability that the model seeks to predict, and how are they measured?

b. What are the four main independent variables the model uses to predict political instability?

c. How do the authors characterize "regime type" to forecast instability? d. Which variable is the most powerful predictor of political instability?

2. According to the Kaufmann et al. paper: a. How do the authors define governance? b. How do the authors measure governance?

Research Assignment 3 (due Monday): 1. What is the measure of Competitiveness of Political Participation (parcom) and

Executive Recruitment (exrec) for your country, according to Polity IV? How has it changed over time?

2. How would the regime in your country be characterized, according to Goldstone et al.? How has the regime changed over time?

3. Based on your country’s regime type, how would Goldstone et al. assess your country’s risk of instability?

4. Has your country experienced any wars or other violence, according to http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm and http://ucdp.uu.se/ ? What types, and in what years?

5. Based on (dis)continuity between pre-‐colonial and post-‐colonial institutions, what is the legitimacy of the state in your country, according to Englebert?

6. What is your country’s developmental capacity, according to Englebert? 7. What is your country’s quality of governance, according to the WBGI?

Research Presentation and Memo 1 (in Groups of 2-‐4, due Wednesday):

• Use the comparative method, with your countries as cases, to evaluate why some countries have better state capacity/stability than others (draw on one or more theories from the readings).

• What are some steps foreign actors (e.g., the US or the World Bank) might take to promote state capacity/stability? Why or why not might this be successful?

Week 7: Review and First Exam (October 2-‐4)

Part II. Definition, Origin, and Effects of Democracy

Week 8: Democracy and Dictatorship: Conceptualization and Measurement (Oct. 9-11) Reading:

• Martin Lipset. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” APSR 53:1, Part I: Introduction, pp. 69-‐74.

• CG&G Chapter 5: Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy • Joseph Schumpeter. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,

o Chapter 21: The Classical Definition of Democracy, pp. 250-‐252; o Chapter 22: Another Theory of Democracy: Competition for Political

Leadership pp. 269-‐73. • Robert Dahl. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Chapter 1:

Democratization and Public Opposition (pp. 1-‐9) Study questions:

1. Go through Quiz and Flashcards for Chapter 5 on https://edge.sagepub.com/principlescp3e and email report to [email protected]

2. CG&G Chap. 5, Problems 1, 2, 3. 3. How does the Classical Definition of Democracy differ from Schumpeter’s theory

based on Competition for Political Leadership? Which of these definition’s is compatible with Dahl’s two dimensions of democratization?

Week 9: Autocratic Regime Types and Durability (Oct. 16-‐20) Reading:

• CG&G Chapter 10: Varieties of Authoritarian Regimes. STOP at SELECTORATE THEORY.

• Gandhi. 2008. Political Institutions Under Dictatorship. 1.3: Who are the dictators? pp. 12-‐34.

• Geddes. 2003. Paradigms and Sandcastles. In Chapter 2, pp. 50-‐88 • OPTIONAL:

o Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014. Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” Perspectives on Politics 12(2)

Study questions: • CGG Chap 10, Problem 1 (Military Intervention Game)

Research Assignment 4 (due Wednesday): 1. According to the most recent data, how democratic is your country according to

Freedom House, Polity IV, and DD? Do these sources agree? (When comparing these measures, use the most recent year available for all three sources.)

2. How many democracy spells have there been in your country since 1800, since independence, or since the start of the dataset (as appropriate)? How long did each one last? (NOTE: Only Polity IV has data going back to 1800.)

3. If there were any authoritarian spells in your country: a. During what years were they military regimes, personalist regimes, (single)

party regimes, or monarchies, according to Geddes? b. How long did each regime (as defined by Geddes) survive? c. During what years were authoritarian governments led by military leaders,

civilian leaders, or monarchs, according to Gandhi? d. How long did each leader survive?

Week 10: Economic Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship (Oct. 23-‐25) Reading:

• Martin Lipset. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” APSR 53:1, Part II: Economic Development and Democracy, pp. 75-‐85.

• CG&G Chapter 6: The Economic Determinants of Democracy • Ross. 2001. “Does oil hinder democracy?” World Politics, 53: 325-‐61 • Leonard and Strauss. 2003. Africa’s Stalled Development. Chapter 1: The

Contemporary Africa State: The Politics of Distorted Incentives (pp. 1-‐20) • The Economist. 2017. “Adiós to Venezuelan democracy.” June 29. • OPTIONAL:

o Boix and Stokes. 2003. “Endogenous democratization.” World Politics 55, 517–549.

o Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby. 2005. “The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth.” World Bank Econ Rev 19 (2): 141-‐163.

Study questions: • CG&G Chap. 6, Problems 1-‐4, 6

Research Assignment 5 (due Wednesday): 1. What is the per capita income level in your country? How has it changed over time? 2. What percentage of your country is literate? How has this changed over time? 3. How many telephones per 1000 persons are in your country? 4. What percentage of your country lives in an urban area? 5. What percentage of employment in your country is in agriculture? 6. Are oil exports an important part of your country’s economy? 7. Does your country rely on “enclave production”? (Recommended source: Isham et

al. 2005 Table A-‐1) Week 11: Cultural Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship (Oct. 30-‐Nov. 3) Reading:

§ Martin Lipset. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” APSR, 53:1, Part III: Legitimacy and Democracy (pp. 86-‐98).

§ CG&G Chapter 7: Cultural Determinants of Democracy § Weingast. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,”

APSR, 91(2): 245-‐263. § Play http://ncase.me/trust/ 6-‐8 (Making Mistaeks-‐Conclusion) § The Economist. 2005. “The glue of society.” July 14th. § The Economist. 2016. “A plan to legalise Vietnam’s private charities and clubs is

shelved.” November 26th. § OPTIONAL:

o Jackman and Miller. 1998. “Social Capital and Politics.” ARPS, 1: 47-‐73. Study questions:

1. Go through Quiz and Flashcards for Chapter 7 on https://edge.sagepub.com/principlescp3e and email report to [email protected]

2. From Weingast: a. How many pure strategy Nash equilibria are there in the Sovereign-‐

Constituency Coordination Game? What are they? b. How many pure strategy Nash equilibria are there in the (single shot)

Sovereign-‐Constituency Transgression Game? What are they?

c. How many pure strategy Nash Equilibria are there in the repeated Sovereign-‐Constituency Transgression Game? What are they?

d. What do these games tell us about culture and constraints on the executive? Research Assignment 6 (due Monday):

1. Is there a majority religion in your country? If so, what is it? 2. What is the effective number of ethnic groups in your country? (Suggested source:

http://stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html ) 3. What is the effective number of religious groups in your country? 4. What is the level of associational activity and/or social (generalized) trust in your

country? (Suggested source: World Values Survey in the QoG dataset). Research Presentation and Memo 2 (in Groups of 2-‐4, due Wednesday):

• Use the comparative method, with your countries as cases, to evaluate whether modernization and/or economic development and/or cultural factors are associated with democratic transition and/or democratic survival.

Week 12: Democratic Transitions (Nov. 6-‐8) Reading:

§ Robert Dahl. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Chapter 1: Democratization and Public Opposition (pp. 10-‐16)

§ CG&G Chapter 8: Democratic Transitions § Boix. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Chapter 1: A theory of political

transitions, pp. 19-‐47 and 65-‐87.1 § The Economist. 2015. “The road less travelled.” Nov. 26. § Optional:

o CG&G Chapter 8, Box 8.7 and Preparation for Problems Dealing with Incomplete Information Games

o Kingsley. 2015. “How Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first elected president, ended up on death row.” The Guardian, June 1.


https://edge.sagepub.com/principlescp3e and email report to [email protected] 2. Based on The Economist article, would you describe Tunisia and Myanmar as having

top-‐down or bottom-‐up democratic transitions? 3. CG&G Chap. 8, Answer question 1 (Collective Action Problem), and questions for the

Democratic Consolidation Game. 4. From Boix Chapter 1, p. 23-‐24:

a. What is a median voter? b. Why is the median voter a poor individual?

1 NOTES: In figure 1.1, there should be a “−𝑤!” for the poor payoff if they revolt against weak wealthy (see page 27). 𝑤! is the individual cost of war 𝜔 for a poor (j=p) or wealthy (j=w) individual, so the subtracted 𝑤 should be 𝑤! for the wealthy. In figure 1.2, 𝛼 is said to be set at 0.2; it should be (1 − 𝛼) = 0.2. According to page 22, 𝛼 > !

! is the share of the population that is poor, and according to page 36, 20% of the population is

in the wealthy class. In Figure 1.2, the y-‐axis should be 𝑘! , not 𝐾! . According to page 22, as 𝑘!increases, inequality increases.

c. Why does the median voter set the tax rate if the tax rate is set by simple majority rule?

d. The state taxes economic agents (e.g., individuals) a linear tax on their income (e.g., 10% or 50% of their income) (page 23). Why does the median voter set the tax rate higher if there is more inequality (i.e., a higher share of total income is captured by the wealthy)?

e. The tax generates some “welfare losses” (page 23). Why might higher taxes reduce the total production of a society? Why would this lead the median voter choosing a tax rate below 100%?

f. Why is the wealthy person’s after-‐tax income constrained to be equal to or less than the amount of the wealthy person’s income that can be moved abroad (page 24)? Why would this lead the median voter in a country where the rich can move much of their wealth abroad to choose a tax rate lower than the tax rate chosen based on the level of inequality?

Week 13: Political Institutions and Their Effects (Nov. 13-‐17)

• CG&G Chapter 9: Democracy or Dictatorship: Does it make a difference? • CG&G Chapter 10: Varieties of Authoritarian Regimes, SELECTORATE THEORY to

end of chapter. • Listen to “I Know I Am, But What Are You,” Act One in Tribes podcast of This

American Life (2013): http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-‐archives/episode/491/tribes

• Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Institutional Variables section in Chapter 4 (pp. 133-135).

• Boix. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Chapter 6: The State, the Threat of Expropriation, and the Possibility of Development, pp. 204-‐232.

• OPTIONAL: o Geddes. 2005. “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” o Wright. 2008. “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures

Affect Economic Growth and Investment,” AJPS, 52(2): 322-‐343 o Gandhi. 2008. Political Institutions Under Dictatorship. 1.4: Nominally

Democratic Institutions, pp. 34-‐39; Chapter 3: Use of Institutions to Coopt, excerpts: pp. 73-‐82 & 92-‐101; Chapter 5: Institutions and Outcomes under Dictatorship, excerpts: pp. 139-‐150, 160-‐162.

Study Questions: 1. Go through Quiz and Flashcards for Chapter 9 and 10 on

https://edge.sagepub.com/principlescp3e and email report to [email protected]

2. How does the podcast story relate to Selectorate theory? 3. Why, according to Boix, is corruption and expropriation lower in democracies

with high newspaper circulation than in dictatorships or countries with low circulation?

4. Why, according to Boix, do democracies and dictatorships with legislatures have lower corruption and expropriation than dictatorships without legislatures?

Research Assignment 7 (due Monday):

1. Does your country have a legislature? If yes, when was the legislature introduced? If no, if there was previously a legislature, when was it abolished?

2. Are there elections for the executive? 3. Are there elections for the legislature? 4. Is the minimum necessary Winning Coalition in your country small, medium, or large,

according to BdM et al? Research Presentation and Memo 3 (in Groups of 2-‐4, due Thursday):

• Use the comparative method, with your countries as cases, to evaluate whether political institutions (parties, legislatures, winning coalition size, regime type, etc.) affect economic outcomes such as economic growth, public goods provision, and/or corruption.

Week 14: Second Exam (Nov. 20)

§ Second Exam Week 15: Final Project: Promoting Political Development (Nov. 27-‐29) Reading:

• Dietrich and Wright. 2015. “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa.” Journal of Politics, 77(1): 216 -‐234.

• Huffbauer, Schott, Elliot, and Oegg. 2009. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Chapter 6: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations, pp. 155-‐178.

Final Research Presentation and Paper (individual or group): • Identify an important problem (or set of problems) in the country. • Identify two or more potential causes that may be causing or exacerbating the

problem(s), and use empirical analysis to evaluate which cause is most likely to be influential and amenable to change. Explain your diagnosis, and identify potential action by a domestic actor (e.g., civic group) or external actor (e.g., United States or the World Bank) that could address the problem.

• Maximum paper length is 8 pages for individuals, 12 pages for groups of two, 15 pages for groups of three, and 18 pages for groups of four.

• Papers should include a (group) introduction, analysis, and conclusion, and individual sections (roughly 3 pages each) for each country in the body.

• Papers should demonstrate appropriate knowledge of reading material from class in analyzing how the existing institution is affecting the identified problem, and how the proposed intervention is likely to affect the identified problem as well as side effects.

• The paper should include a game theoretic model for some aspect of your analysis. The model can be an exact replica of a model from our readings (be sure to cite your source!) or an original/adapted model.

• First draft of paper is due Monday night; presentations are Wednesday; final paper is due the day of the Final Exam via Turnitin.

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