Political Crisis in Greece and Italy_ a Comparative Analysis of SYRIZA and 5 Stars Movement

8/11/2019 Political Crisis in Greece and Italy_ a Comparative Analysis of SYRIZA and 5 Stars Movement

1/23

Political Crisis in Greece and Italy: a comparative analysis of

SYRIZA and 5 Stars Movement

Raffaele Borreca

Ph Candidate

!niversity of Peloponnese

Department of Political Science and International Relations

1
https://www.psa.ac.uk/conference/2014-conference/paper/political-crisis-greece-and-italy-comparative-analysis-syriza-andhttps://www.psa.ac.uk/conference/2014-conference/paper/political-crisis-greece-and-italy-comparative-analysis-syriza-andhttps://www.psa.ac.uk/conference/2014-conference/paper/political-crisis-greece-and-italy-comparative-analysis-syriza-andhttps://www.psa.ac.uk/conference/2014-conference/paper/political-crisis-greece-and-italy-comparative-analysis-syriza-and


2/23

A"stractThe spaces opened by the economic and political crisis offered many rooms for manoeuvre to thoseopposition forces able to canalise in electoral terms the protest and translate its claims in specific demandsor a coherent political narrative. Strong of their electoral results, the Greek SYRI! and the Italian "iveStars #ovement $#%S& assumed soon a pivotal role in their political systems. 'o(ever, although thedemands and the ob)ectives of both SYRI! and the #%S are, to a certain e*tent, similar, the t(o parties

differ in terms of political background, ideology and internal organi+ation. The success of the #%S traceits roots in the conte*t of deep distrust against the political system reigning in Italy since the 1-s. In the#%S problematically coe*ist a grassroots direct democracy approach and the charismatic and substantiallyunchallenged leadership of the founder eppe Grillo. The capability of the radical left SYRI! to conveythe anti/#emorandum contestation and its constitution in an unitarian party follo(ing the 0-10 electionsreaffirmed the centrality of the traditional mass party in the Greek democratic representation. 'o(ever, itselectoral drive to(ards the centre poses ma)or ideological challenges. "inally, the scepticism to(ards theuropean governance of both parties cannot be mistaken for anti2europeism. SYRI! and the #%Scanali+ed the protest from the streets to the national 3arliament giving democratic representation to thecontestation and contributing in the politicisation of the uropean polity.

0


3/23

Introd#ction

The European debt crisis constituted a crucial event with important social and political

consequences, notably for the southern European states. In 0-11, Ireland, 3ortugal, Greece, Italy and Spain

changed their governments, before the natural end of the legislature. In Spain the government called for

snap elections, in (hich the governing party suffered a large defeat. Governments resigned in Ireland and

3ortugal and soon after ne( elections (ere held. In Greece and Italy, 4oucas 3apademos and #ario

#onti, t(o non2elected professionals, (ere appointed as caretaker 3rime #inisters after Georgios

3apandreu and Silvio erlusconi decided to step do(n. 3rovisional coalition5unity2government (ere

formed under their supervision. 6e( elections then follo(ed both in Greece $#ay and 7une 0-10& and

Italy $"ebruary 0-18&, that resulted in governments supported by the same centre2left / centre2right grand

coalitions that provided the parliamentary ma)ority to their 9technocratic: predecessors. In these countries,

the elections sa( the electoral e*ploits of ne( ma)or opposition parties, able to convey and e*press the

large discontent to(ards the crisis management and the failures of the national political system.

The se;uence of events that led to the political crisis in all these countries began to unfold (ith the

sudden stop in private capital inflo(s caused by the international financial crisis, as (ell as by the

developments of the uropean sovereign debt crisis $#erler < 3isani2"erry 0-10&. Governments found

refinancing and repaying their debt increasingly difficult. The response (as a first round of austerity

measures that (ere adopted both autonomously and as part of an international bailout agreement.

'o(ever, as the Greek crisis (ent on and the risk of contagion reached other uro+one countries, the

governing parties (ere pressured to take on further cuts, amidst public opinion=s distrust and the pressure

from the parliamentary oppositions. Trade unions, organised interests and ne( social movements took the

streets, the latter calling for a radical change of the political and economic system. "inally, the

governments in charge announced their resignation or promised elections after the vote of a ne(, important

austerity budget and5or the adoption of a bailout deal (ith the > and the I#", as (as the case in Ireland,

3ortugal and Greece. !s a conse;uence of their involvement in the austerity campaigns, most of the

former governing parties under(ent historic electoral backlashes in the general as (ell as in local

elections. !t the same time, the protests against the austerity measures and the ma)or political parties, held

responsible for the economic setback, translated in different political representations and led to the

emergence of ne( organised political actors.

8


4/23

SYRIZA and the Mo$imento 5 Stelle: the electoral rise

The debate over the >5I#" bailout plan for Greece, the #emorandum of "inancial and

conomic 3olicies, monopolised the heated political campaign that led to the snap elections in the

spring 0-10. The #emorandum 5 anti2#emorandum divide proved to be a transversal cleavage,

bringing to the breaking point established balances of po(er inside the Greek party system. This ne(

kind of split generated by the financial collapse of the country divided e;ually the public opinion and

the electorate. The #emorandum became the symbol of the country?s place in urope, of the

po(erlessness of the Greek state, relying on decisions coming from "rankfurt or erlin, and of the

impossibility or inability for the national leaderships to provide a convincing response to the country?s

economic and social crisis. 6o less important, the #emorandum constituted the battleground on (hich

the sho(do(n of the Greek party system, as established since the return of the country to democracy,

(as played. Thus, the months preceding the 0-10 snap elections fi*ed the Greek political forces in t(o

opposed camps. @n the one side those calling for the respect of the agreements and of the ob)ectives set

by the #emorandum in the name of responsibility and Greece?s uropean membership. @n the other,

the parties, flanked by a large part of civil society, that harshly contested the #emorandum and the

uropean governance of the crisis, in the name of the country?s dignity and independence. oth the

camps, highlighted the necessity of a change, be it in terms of socio2economic model and practices

$Ahalari 0-10& or assuming the form of anti2establishment and anti2system contestation.

3!S@B and 6ea Cemokratia, the t(o columns of the Greek bipartitism established since the

return to democracy, aligned both on the side of the respect of the bail out conditions, though the

attitude of 6ea Cemokratia to(ards the bailout changed only after its participation to the coalition

government led by 3apademos. 'o(ever, both the 3!S@B and 6C (ere held as responsible for the

country?s economic failure and both parties accused each other of the financial mismanagement of the

country. The fact that the respect of the bail out programme united the t(o ma)or parties (as an

element of further radicalisation of the Greek political divide. "inally, the general elections held on Dth

#ay 0-10 crashed the Greek bipolar system. "or the first time since 1EF the sum of the parliamentary

seats gained by the 3!S@B and 6ea Cemokratia did not cross the threshold of 1%- out of the 8-- seats

of the 'ellenic unicameral 3arliament. This despite the generous ma)ority pri+e of %- seats granted by

the Greek electoral la( to the first party. !fter its electoral fall, the 3!S@B became the third force in

the 3arliament, (ith only F1 seats. 'o(ever, 6ea Cemokratia (as not spared by the anger of the Greek

electorate. The 1- seats obtained by 6C did not correspond to the strong electoral mandate called by

F


5/23

its leader, !ntonis Samaras, during the electoral campaign.

SYRI! (as the political actor that better translated the anti2#emorandum discontent. The

coalition of the radical left became the second political force of the country gaining %0 seats in the

3arliament (ith 1,-D1,1% votes, not even 1--,--- less than 6C. The coalition tripled its preferences

obtained in the general elections of 0-- and largely improved the e*ploit of %%,FF preferences and0 parliamentary seats performed in 1 by Synaspismos, the coalition of the lefts of (hich SYRI!

is the political heir. oth 6C and SYRI! increased their electoral performances by 1-H during the

7une 1E elections, gaining votes mainly from those political forces that in #ay had remained under the

minimum threshold of 8H necessary to enter the 3arliament.1 6ea Cemokratia rose to 0,DDH

obtaining 10 seats, (hile SYRI! (ith 0D,H secured E1 seats. The 3!S@B managed to maintain

88 #3s (ho proved crucial for the ne( coalition government formed (ith Samaras as 3rime minister.

The rise of SYRI! drained an ample share of the constituency from the 3!S@B, overtaking

the socialists even in their traditional strongholds such as the prefectures of !chaia, Ahania $Arete& and,

in 7une, in all the four prefectures of Arete. 'o(ever, the Aoalition of the Radical 4eft represented not

only an ideological redefinition for those voters of the left (ho (ere disappointed by the 3!S@B?s

centrist drift but it (as also seen as a real possibility to unhinge the 3!S@B26C duopoly. The success

of SYRI! (as most evident in the main cities. @n the (hole, it came first in prefectures (ithin the

four ma)or Greek urban centres $!thens, Thessaloniki, that (as eventually recon;uered by 6C in 7une,

3atras and 3ireas& as (ell as in the (hole !ttica, the region of !thens, (here almost a third of the

Greek population lives. >nder the leadership of !le*is Tsipras the Aoalition of the Radical 4eft

campaigned for the unilateral cancellation of the public debt and for the (ithdra(al from the

#emorandum?s engagements. The other parties of the left did not manage to reach the results of SYRI!

or to overta"e the #!S$%. This was due both to the lower appeal of a more pragmatic or moderate profile

held during the electoral campaign, as in the case of &emo"rati"i !ristera', or, on the contrary, as in the

case of the %%E, to an outspo"en Euroscepticism that warded off all those voters, both radical and

moderate, who considered the country(s participation in the European institutions and in the Economic and

)onetary *nion +E)* as an essential conquest. ! deeper reason resides also in the cability of SYRI!

to reach and convey the reasons of the grassroots contestation.

hile SYRI! established itself as the ma)or party on the left, in Italy, the MoVimento 5 Stelle

$"ive Stars #oJement 2 #%S& demonstrated to be more than a protest movement, being able to compete

and (in elections. In fact, during the local elections of #ay and 7une 0-10, involving the administrations

%


6/23

of 1,--E to(ns, among (hich t(enty2eight capital of province and four regional capitals, the #%S

became, on the (hole, the third Italian party in terms of total preferences, after the centre2left Partito

Democratico $3C& and erlusconi?s Il Popolo delle Libert $3d4&. !mong the mayor elected from the

ranks of the movement there is also the 9first citi+en: of the important to(n and provincial capital of

3arma. The electoral results of #ay (ere confirmed during the regional elections of @ctober 0-10 inSicily. The party became the first of the island, his candidate collecting 1,0-H of the preferences.

'o(ever, these elections, characterised by a very lo( voter turnout $only FE,0H of citi+ens entitled to

vote&, sa( the victory of the coalition made up of the 3C and the christian2democratic party Unione di

Centro$>CA&.

The 0-10 local elections imposed the #%S as a serious challenger for upcoming parliamentary

elections of "ebruary 0-18. These elections marked the end of the Italian bipolarism established since

the arrival in politics of erlusconi in 1F. The results sa( an e*tremely tight victory of 3ierluigi

ersani?s centre2left coalition over erlusconi?s centre2right coalition. In the lo(er chamber the centre2left

obtained 0,%FH of the total preferences (hile the centre2right 0,18H. In the senate 81,D-H of the votes

(ent to the centre2left, 8-,DDH to the centre2right. That is the centre2left prevailed (ith a difference of less

than a percentage point in both the houses. 'o(ever, more than the political survival of erlusconi and the

minimal distance bet(een the t(o main coalitions, the most impressive result (as the e*ploit of the #%S.

The party, running outside any coalition, became the first most voted single party in the Ahamber of

Ceputes (ith 0%,%%H of votes and the second most voted in the Senate, (ith 08,EH, behind the 3C. The

#%S even overcame the other coalitions in five regions for the chamber of deputies.

!ccording to the 0--% electoral la( the (inning coalition (as provided (ith %%H of the seats of

the Ahamber of Ceputes, in the case its result is belo( this percentage. Thus, the centre2left obtained 8F-

of the D8- lo(er house seats, that is an absolute ma)ority. In the case of the Senate the ma)ority pri+e is

distributed on a regional level. This means that the (inning coalition in each of the t(enty Italian regions

elected at least %%H of the region?s senators, more populous the region more senatorial seats it assigned.

The centre2left coalition achieved a relative ma)ority in the higher house (ith 11 seats out of 81%, only

t(o more than those gained by the centre2right that (on the ma)ority in some key regions. It should be

mentioned that in the Italian system the t(o houses have the same importance and competences, thus a bill

has to pass in both the branches of the parliament to become la(. The same applies to the confidence vote.

"inally, three antithetical political forces separated by fe( or less than one percentage points in terms of

preferences led to a contradictory situation (here a coalition ma)ority could be formed in the lo(er house

D


7/23

but not in the higher. In the aftermath of the elections Grillo made clear that the #%S (ould have not voted

the confidence to any government proposed by the traditional parties. The #%S (ould have evaluated the

bills presented from time to time in the parliament, giving them a positive vote in case they matched the

#ovement?s program.

Soon after the elections, ersani engaged the #%S proposing to (ork together on bills concerningthe reduction of the costs of politics, tougher norms on corruption, a la( on the conflict of interests, a la(

on the political parties internal democracy and an ethical code for their members, as (ell as on social

legislation. 'o(ever, Grillo refused his support to a centre2left government in e*change of a common

programme focusing on central points of the #%S programme. The opinion polls sho(ed that the #%S

electoral gro(th had not reached its limit. "urthermore, both a centre2left 2 centre2right grand coalition and

a ne( technocratic government (ould have promoted the image of the #%S as a movement fighting the

partitic system and its backroom deals and Grillo?s undifferentiated condemnation of all political parties.

6evertheless, the #%S base proved to be split over the tactical support of the government in e*change of

its commitment to the reali+ation of the movement?s proposals. "inally, as in the Greek case, the parties of

the centre2left and of the centre2right that once competed against each other (ere compelled to form a

coalition government, since they had not the numbers to form stable ma)orities on their o(n and out of

fear that ne( elections (ould further reduce their votes. #oreover, the embrace bet(een the 9old: parties,

accounted for the country?s dire economic situation, reinforced the status of the #%S in Italy and SYRI!

in Greece as the 9ne(: herald of radical changes.

%he 5 Stars Movement: pop#lism or politics &'( )

>nlike the case of other anti2austerity parties and movements that rose to prominence during the

sovereign debt crisis all over urope, the success of the #%S has to be placed in a conte*t of deep distrust

against the political system reigning in Italy since the 1-s. In 10, the investigations that follo(ed

many important corruption scandals $the so called 9Tangentopoli:& crashed the Italian post2(ar political

system giving the (ay to a bipolar coalition system. 'o(ever, (hat is improperly referred as the Italian

9second republic: (as no less rich in scandals, involving almost all the political parties, at any level of

government and administration, let alone erlusconi?s o(n record of legal troubles and scandals. In the last

t(o decades, legality and the morali+ation of public life constituted the central issues of the Italian public

debate. The diverse front of the 9anti2berlusconism: (as mainly federated by the defence of the

Aonstitution and rule of la(, against the attempts of the media tycoon to change the fundamental charter,

E


8/23

notably giving a dominant role to the e*ecutive, or to pass legislation to accommodate his legal issues.

#oreover, the privileges en)oyed by the Italian politicians and the (astes of the public administration

attracted increasing discontents and criticisms. La Casta $9The Aaste. 'o( Italian politicians became

untouchable:&, the book (ritten by t(o )ournalists of the ne(spaper Corriere della Sera in 0--E, became

soon a best seller in 0--E, the term 9caste: becoming of current use (hen referring to the corruption andprivileges of the Italian political elite and its alienation from the citi+ens. It is not a case that the first

statement made by eppe Grillo, the founder of the movement, after the results (as a t(eet announcing

that 9honesty (ill be fashionable:.

The irruption of the #%S in the Italian national politics is (ithout precedent in the electoral history

of contemporary (estern democracies due to the party organisational model, its post2ideological profile

and the magnitude of its electoral e*ploit at the first national elections. !ll the 1- deputes and %F senators

elected (ith the #%S, mostly under forty, had no previous e*perience neither in national nor in local

politics. The #%S refuses any ideological label, stressing its civic nature, and in effect the profile of its

electorate displays an almost perfect balance among voters (hich position themselves on the left 5

centre2left, on the right 5 centre2right and those refusing to place themselves on the left2right spectrum

$ordignon < Aeccarini 0-18&. The story and the rise of the #%S are strictly linked (ith Grillo, a

comedian kno(n for his political satire. #arginalised from the Italian national TJ net(orks Grillo started

a series of theatre?s sho(s in the mid21-s (here he denounced the misgovernment and the political and

economic scandals of the country as (ell as the net(orks of po(er linking politics, media and finance.

These issues, along (ith environment and transport, constitutes the main themes of the blog beppegrillo.it

opened in 0--% (ith the support of Gianroberto Aasaleggio, o(ner of a society of marketing and (eb

strategy and Grillo?s closest collaborator.

vents like the J2Cay $9fuck off day:& definitely consolidated the movement and the media figure

of Grillo. The J2Cay8held on th September 0--E in many Italian s;uares (as a public event (hose aim

(as to promote a bill of popular initiative proposingK i& the ineligibility of any Italian citi+en to the post of

#3 if he5she has been sentenced for any offence ii& the limitation of the number of the parliamentary

mandates to t(o legislatures iii& the modification of the electoral la( by the reintroduction of the direct

preference. Curing the second J2Cay of 0-- Grillo proposed three referendum demanding the abolition

of public funding for ne(spapers, of the order of )ournalists and of a la( regulating radio and television

broadcasting enacted by erlusconi government. 7ournalists, daily ne(spapers and television companies

are e;ually targeted by Grillo, (ho rarely gives intervie(s and openly avoid $and ban to the #%S


9/23

representatives& the participation in TJ political talk sho(.

"inally, theMoVimento 5 Stelle(as founded in @ctober 0--. The five stars represent its original

missionsK the safeguarding of public (ater and the environment, the gro(th of public transport and

connectivity and development. efore the constitution of the movement the five stars (ere granted to any

civic list or local administration promoting or pursuing these ob)ectives. These core ob)ectives coupled(ith the assertion of no ideological affiliation on the left2right spectrum make the #%S a good e*ample of

a political party or movement (hose instances are traceable on the postmodern politics dimension

$Inglehart 1E, pp. 0F820%0&. 'o(ever, it is not so evident on (hich point of the a*is the #%S can be

placed. In fact, if ecology is a key postmodern value standing at the core of the #%S discourse, diverse

sensibilities inside the movement and the contradictions bet(een Grillo statements and the base

orientations emerged on issues like the ius solior the abolition of the crime of illegal immigration, (ith the

leader promoting an e*clusivist discourse contested by the base.

!ccording to its charter, the Movimento 5 Stelle is not a political party its ob!ective being t"e

realisation o# an e##ective e$c"ange o# opinions and democratic debate outside t"e associational and party

bonds and %it"out t"e mediation o# directive or representative bodies recognising to t"e totality o# t"e

Internet users t"e role o# government normally entrusted to a minority $art. % of the #%S statute&. This

self2definition and identification highlights a typical aspect of the relationship bet(een parties and civil

society. In the case of a social movement becoming a political party or of a political party aiming at

establishing itself into civil society, the term 9movement: and the like is often employed to claim or

reaffirm a political formation?s popular grass2roots or to convey a message of radical change to(ards the

dominant political and economic establishment. The elected members of the #%S lists should act

according to the movement?s principles considering politics like a form of civil service and not as a careerK

they can assume political charges for a ma*imum of t(o mandatesL self2reduce their salariesL re)ect

electoral reimbursementsL submit themselves to the )udgement of the voters through votes on the (eb.

The movement?s 9head;uarters: are, by statute, the Internet blog of eppe Grillo. The role of the

(eb is central in defining the organisational model and a ne( conception of democracy (here the

members of the parliament are supposed to be constantly monitored and re;uired to act according to the

political decisions and preferences discussed and adopted by the citi+ens on the (eb platform. The base of

the #ovement are the 9meetup: groups, pre2dating the launch of the party and organised through the

social media (ith the same name. They constitute local groups $180D as of "ebruary 0-1F for a total of

more than 1%-,--- members, distributed in 1,-% cities&Fthat en)oy considerable independence from the


10/23

centre $that is Grillo and his blog?s collaborators& in undertaking initiatives at the local level. This activist

grassroots dimension and its civic nature have been fatally overlooked by the ma)or parties and media in

dealing (ith the #%S phenomenon, before it entered the 3arliament. Grillo?s aggressive rhetoric (ith its

populist undertones (as accorded more attention than the political engagement of thousands of Italians

and their demands.6onetheless, the role of the former comedian as founder, spokesman and leader constitutes the

biggest contradiction in the grassroots direct democracy approach advocated by the movement. !ccording

to the art.8 of the statute, the name of the movement is combined (ith a symbol (hose only legal o(ner is

eppe Grillo. Grillo o(nership of the movement and the control of the medium of deliberation and

votation constitute the greatest difference (ith other e*periences of direct democracy based on (eb

platforms like the German 3irate 3arty or the Spanish 1%# movement $the Indignados&. #oreover, the

9one man one vote: principle that gives every single militant the same (eight, irrespectively of his or her

political charges or functions inside the movement, is undermined by the absolute po(er of Grillo $and his

closest collaborator& to determine the e*pulsion alone of members e*pressing dissent to the official line.

This eventuality has verified several times so far, leading also to the e*pulsion of several #3s from the

#%S parliamentary group. ordignon and Aeccarini highlight ho( the #%S organisational model, and

notably the relationships bet(een central leadership and meetup groups, can be li&ened to t"e idea o# t"e

party as #ranc"ise organisation and ho( it displays to an e*treme degree the characteristics of the business

firm model of party organisation that erlusconi and his "or+a Italia introduced on the Italian political

scene.

It is interesting to compare Grillo?s charismatic leadership to that of erlusconi and ho( both

reflect their privileged strategies of communication. The personalities of Grillo and erlusconi dominated

and set the pace to the electoral campaign for the 0-18 elections, the former mainly on traditional media

the latter on the ne( media and the s;uares. @n one hand (e have the old media mogul accustomed to the

language of the commercial television and (hose messages are crafted for a passive television audience.

@n the other, the comedian and internet guru (ho calls for the active participation of common citi+ens, of

(hom he declares to be a simple spokesman, although his scenic presence dominates over his follo(ers.

oth Grillo and erlusconi resent the internal dissent and lament that media and )ournalists serve their

opponents? interests. Grillo goes so far to avoid and forbid the elected members of the #%S to speak in

political talk sho(s or to freely give intervie(s to ne(spapers. ! skilful use of the Internet, local actions

and obviously the successes in local and national elections forced the traditional media to give spotlights

1-


11/23

and headlines to Grillo and the #%S, although being deliberately snubbed by them. ventually, the

comedian performances and communication strategy outclassed those of the old TJ tycoon.

SYRIZA* the ret#rn of the left )

The comparison bet(een the Greek protest and the contemporary street mobili+ations and ne(movements in Italy and Spain sho(s ho( the Greek society?s deep disillusion (ith and its anger to(ards

the national political system did not gave birth to 2 nor (as shaped by 2 ne( mass movements stemming

from the society?s grassroots and not referable to traditional social actors, political parties and ideologies.

Curing the uropean debt crisis, the 1%2# movement $the 9 indignados:& (as able to lead the contestation

in Spain, dictating the times, the places and the themes of the protest, through a keen combination of

traditional forms of mobilisation and the use of the Internet and social net(orks. This resulted in the

symbolic $and physical& occupation 5 re2appropriation of the public space by a citi+en2led umbrella

movement ready to further its demands (ithout the mediation of parties or trade unions. Aertainly, this

kind of citi+en mobilisation (as present also in the streets of Greece, as in the case of the movement of the

9'(')'*+,-/)0,: $indignants&, that dre( direct inspiration from the Spanish Indignados. 'o(ever, its

influence in structuring and leading the protest (as limited.

In Greece, the critical mass reached by the street protests (as due essentially to the mobilisation of

traditional social actors like trade unions. The call of a strike by one of the national trade unions, (ith the

!CCY $Aivil Servants? Aonfederation& and the GS $General Aonfederation of Greek orkers& usually

taking action together, constituted the main event that, especially in case of general strikes, attracted to the

streets other actors such as opposition parties, civil society associations, e*tra2parliamentary political

groups and violent rioters. "urthermore, the electoral rise of the anti2#emorandum parties cannot be

likened to the electoral e*ploits of the #%S and its post2ideological profile and citi+en activism. The

anti2#emorandum parties are, for all means and purposes, traditional partiesK their ideological profile,

their collocation on the left2right spectrum and their internal (orking, selection of the personnel and

political e*perience of the leaderships all reflect Mold= parties models.

SYRI! reasserted the centrality of the party in Greek democratic representation thanks to its

capability to provide an organised political outlet to the contestation. SYRI! success as (ell as its

primacy among the other anti2#emorandum parties is grounded in its pursuit of linkages in the Greek civil

society and political activism operated before and during the crisis. !s highlighted by Tsakatika and

leftheriou, during the 0---s SYRI! opened up to the involvement of the younger cohorts and

11


12/23

conse;uently of the ne( social movements and activism that emerged in those years. esides, the (eaker

position in unionism, in comparison (ith the other parties of the left and centre2left, urged SYRI! to take

an open stance to(ards the (orld of the associations and movements, trying more to support than to guide

them. This strategy paid off during the debt crisis and can be accounted for the party?s outstanding electoral

rise. SYRI! did not try / and actually had not the po(er / to vertically organise and assume control ofthe street protests. 'o(ever, it fully supported the actions of the !CCY and GS, thus providing a ne(

political ally to the trade unionism disaffected (ith the 3!S@B, and stood as an informal advocate of

street movements like the indignants, embedding them in a political narrative that e*plained and )ustified

their emergence $Tsakatika and leftheriou 0-18, p.1%&.

SYRI!?s political origins, the composition of its constituent groups and ideology (ell

represent the history of the Greek left, the plurality of its ideological stances and their changes.

SYRI! (as formed as a coalition of left and radical left parties bet(een 0--1 and 0--F, (ith the

Aoalition of 4eft, of #ovements and cology $12)'-3,-4 +6 78,-+98: +;)


13/23

and hosting former members of the 3!S@B. Aloser to the SY6 positions are the eurocommunist of the

Rene(ed Aommunist cological 4eft $!B@! 2 WPXPOVZ[\ ]^__^`PZZ[\ [XZ Z[^^Z[\

WZO&. "inally, in the congress of !thens (e also find the patriotic left of the Aiti+en !ssociation

Rigas, the #ovement for the >nity of !ction of the 4eft $BC! 2 ]P ZX P PX N

WZO&, the >nion of the Cemocratic Aentre, the >nitarian #ovement and the #ovement of the!ctive Aiti+ens, led by the prominent figure of #anolis Gle+os.

ith the formation of a single party the constituent members agreed on dissolve their

organisations. SYRI! has been structured (ith at its base the local sections, (hose representatives

elect each t(o years the prefectural committees $art. 11.1 of the founding charter&. SYRI! highest

political organ is the Aentral Aommission (hich is responsible to implement the decisions taken during

the congresses, assuming the political direction of the party. The Aentral Aommission elect the 3olitical

Secretariat and his5her secretary $art. 18.1&. ! general congress is held each three years $art. 18.1& and it

elects the Aentral Aommission and the party?s organ responsible for the economic auditing $art. 18.0&.

The regional steering committees coordinate the activities bet(een the national and local organs. They

are composed by t(o members of each prefecture of the region, the coordinators of the prefectural

committees, the members of parliament elected in the region, the members of the Aentral Aommission

affiliated to the regional local sections and the party members holding an elective charge in the regional

administration $art. 10.1&.

!ccording to the preamble of SYRI! founding charter 9Socialism is a form of organi+ation of

the society based on social o(nership and management of the means of production:. !s a conse;uence,

the main goal set by SYRI! is 9the overthro( of the domination of the forces of the neoliberalism

and of the memoranda, the forces of social destruction, and the emergence of a government of the

united 4eft, embedded in a broad social alliance:. 'o(ever, the ideological pluralism inside SYRI!

poses ma)or dilemmas concerning the future orientations of the party. !fter the electoral breakthrough

SYRI! (as no more a radical left coalition gravitating around %H of preferences. It suddenly became

a political force attracting a massive inflo(s of votes not only from the left but also from large

constituencies of the centre, (ell beyond its previous militant base and the social strata it aspires to

defend against the interests of the capital. The responsibility to take office as a ma)ority party re;uires a

clear and unambiguous government programme, synthesising the internal dialectics and overcoming

the different position of its constituent members. This task e*poses the tensions bet(een a realist

approach, promoted by the party leadership dominated by the former members of SY6, and the

18


14/23

defence of a radical stance true to the socialist idea and its realisation (ithout compromise. !s other

(estern uropean left and centre2left parties, SYRI! critics of the capitalist system (ill be challenged

by its ma)oritarian ambitions and, eventually, by the budgetary constraints imposed by the e*ercise of

government. In his case study on S(eden and the >nited States, lyth $0--%& points out the crucial role

of domestic institutions in the production of social democratic policies and notably the state control ofmonetary authority and credit creation. In this sense, the credentials of SYRI! leftist alternative

depends on the party?s position on the #>, and, ine*orably, on a change in the economic policy

orientations on the uropean institutional level.

A eurosceptic and populist threat to Europe?

The national elections held in the Euro-one member states during the debt crisis highlighted the

politicisation of the European public sphere, along with the increasing Europeanisation of the national

political space.Europeconstantly stood as the main topic in national public debates, following a process

of increasing politicisation. It did not constitute simply a relevant event, but the top issue on the political

agenda of the Euro-one member states. urthermore, Europeans leaders and government officials from

other Euro-one countries became familiar presences in the national debates and media.Europestood as a

cleavage shaping the national political arena and cross/cutting the left/right divide. 0onetheless, the

discourse overEuropeis not simply articulated in terms of support or opposition, along a unidimensional

1Europeism / Euroscepticism2 line. In effect, the contestation against the European governance can target

the Euro or the +current policies / notably the management of the debt crisis / but not the institutions or

the European construction as such +%opec"y 3 )udde '44'.

%rouwel and !bts +'445 propose a framewor" where political support for 6 discontent with

Europeis articulated according to the targets of political support and the degree of refle7ivity. The targets

of political support include European authorities, the European regime +including institutions, performance

and regime principles and the European community. Refle7ivity refers to the extent to which individuals

are able to differentiate evaluations between different actors and institutions in a political system,

generating five types of attitudes8 confidence, distrust, scepticism, cynicism and alienation. ollowing thistypology, the attitudes towards the E* of the )9S and SYRI! can be both qualified of sceptic, in the

sense of a responsible and open/minded criticism, as theyallow for the possibility that the political system

will act on their behalf and take their values and interests into account, although they never assume this

happens as a rule+%rouwel 3 !bts '445, p.:'.

1F


15/23

;oming to the narratives shaping the European debate during the sovereign debt crisis, we can

resume them as follow8 a the 1battle2 in defence of the E* and +the permanence in the Euro b the

struggle between a social Europe versus a dominating neo/liberal Europe c the anti/austerity struggle d

anti/Euro positions and e another Europe outside the E* institutions or nationalist stances

+Eurocynicism 6 Euro/alienation. It should be highlighted how the call for a ma


16/23

Euro and the Euro-one2.A=esides the negative characterisation of the opponent(s allies, we see how their

European credentials are dismissed in reason of their negative stance toward the Euro and the Euro-one.

The E* is here defined by what is considered its most far reaching achievement in terms of integration.

or its part, SYRI!(s leadership managed with caution the issue of the country permanence in the E)*,

despite the rereece in the European institutions is not questioned. Instead,

1D


17/23

SYRI! calls for 1another2 Europe, built on solidarity and a masually,

the leader present him5herself as not a professional politician, coming from civil society and (ith no

connection (ith other parties. The populist rhetoric needs a conte$t o# e$traordinary dramatiBation, its aim

being the refounding of democracy from its roots and to give back po(er and political representation to

the people. Thus, the traditional enemies of populism are parties and politicians, bureaucracy and

technocrats, the finance and intellectuals and media. These make up a corrupted and colluded system

detaining the political, economic and cultural po(er $Tarchi 0--8&.

The sovereign debt crisis offered a conte7t of e7traordinary dramati-ation. The radical critics of the

political and economic system and its conflict of interests +1conflitti di interesse#$or interconnected

interests +1%&'()*+*.' /01234.5'2 frequently where charged with a populist rhetoric and

argumentations. Fowever, in the case of SYRI! we can spea" mainly of a style of politics G to which,

inter alia, almost all the political forces involved in the )emorandum G anti/)emorandum manichaean

struggle have more or less resorted. =ut the party(s structured organisational model, its lively internal

debate and, as a consequence, the limitations to which its leadership is subdued do not match the

characteristics of an authentic populist movement. The structured system of representation between central

1E


18/23

organs and regional and local representations prevented the appearance of a leadership without formal

chec"s and balance as in the case of the )9S. In effect, >rillo(s style of leadership and rhetoric are not the

only features that allow to qualify the )9S as a populist party. >rillo(s leadership +and ownership of the

movement, not limited by formal mechanisms of control and accountability, contradicts the real

emancipation and self/organisation of the movement(s base and thus that same model of direct democracyadvocated by his founder.

Concl#sion and final considerations

SYRI! and the #%S are the parties that better e*pressed the protest during the sovereign debt

crisis. oth could aspire to a ma)oritarian role in their respective political systems, by e*panding their

constituencies beyond their militant bases and groups of society more sensitive to their message. The

message of the #%S, refraining from any ideological stance, appeals to all citi+ens to take back politics

from the hands of the corrupted politicians and reali+e a real democracy through the help of the

Internet. @n the contrary, SYRI! affirmed its hegemony on the left after the 0-10 elections and it is

from the left that it pointed to(ards the s(inging electorate of the centre. The ob)ective of Grillo to

con;uer 91--H: of the 3arliament seats, 9the citi+ens becoming the state:, and to clean politics from

the partitocracy state by themselves the populist mission of the #%S. 'o(ever, this ambition cannot

federate alone the diverse electorate of the movement in a stable catch all party. This is, in any case, a

development vehemently re)ected by GrilloK the #%S is first of all a citi+en movement (hose e*istence

is finalised to the dissolution of partitocracy.

The path of SYRI! to become a government party seems to have more solid foundation, due

to its clear ideological stance and policy preferences that can fi* the anti2#emorandum protest in a

long term political pro)ect, supported by different sectors of society. 'o(ever, this ma)oritarian drive

could e*act the moderation of its original radical discourse. !s for other socialist parties in (estern

urope in the past, the eventuality of taking office poses a dilemma in pursuing the struggle against the

forces of neo2liberism. @n one hand SYRI! (ould finally accept the diagnosis of the problems and,

above all, the constraint set by the dominant discourse and claim that it has better solutions. @n the

other hand, it can continue the effort to persuade voters and uropean partners that the solution lies in a

radical change of policy paradigm, redefining both diagnosis and constraints $3r+e(orsky 0--1&. The

sovereign debt crisis and the anti2#emorandum struggle in Greece offered a uni;ue occasion for a

change of paradigm backed by a large popular support. 6evertheless, con;uering the trust of voters,

1


19/23

uropean and international partners and economic players could re;uire an unambiguous departure

from the most radical and uncompromising stances.

! final remark should be made on the politicisation of urope and the role played by the #%S

and SYRI! in the conte*t of the uro+one crisis. The success of the #%S and SYRI! posed a ma)or

political challenge to actors and institutions that managed the uropean political and economic crisis sofar. 'o(ever, both parties cannot be labelled of anti2europeism, even taking in account the discontent

against the > and the uro in a not marginal part of their electoral base. SYRI! and the #%S stand

out in the anti2austerity camp demanding ma)or solidarity at the uropean level, in the form of specific

demands or, as in the case of SYRI!, by upholding a change of policy paradigm. oth the #%S and

SYRI! canali+ed the protest from the streets to the national 3arliament and more than any other

contestation movements or party during the sovereign debt crisis contributed to give a voice and

representation to a malaise other(ise lost in the abstentionism or, (orse, compounding *enophobic or

authoritarian movements. Curing the 0-10 Greek elections the abstention rates reached a record

8F,-H in #ay and 8E,%8H in 7une, (hile around EH of the votes (ent to the *enophobic e*treme

right of Golden Ca(n. "inally, the politicisation, even through policy contestation, o# urope is the

only alternative to the alienation #rom urope. ! ma)or involvement of the citi+ens in the uropean

political debates and a ma)or democratic accountability of the decisional process are the only (ay to

counteract the crisis of social legitimacy suffered by the > and overcomeits economic and political

impasse.

1


20/23

References

!kkerman, T. $0--8&. 93opulism and CemocracyK Ahallenge or 3athology :.cta Politica, 8, 1FE /1%.

lyth, #. $0--%&. 9Comestic Institutions and the 3ossibility of Social Cemocracy:. Comparative

uropean Politics, 8, pp. 8E / F-E.

ordignon ". and Aeccarini A. $0-18&. 9"ive Stars and a Aricket. eppe Grillo Shakes Italian 3olitics:.Sout" uropean Society and Politics, 1 K F, F0E2FF.

Ahalari, !. $0-10&. The Aausal 3o(er of Social AhangeK the case of #odern Greek Society.EellenicFbservatory Papers on Greece and Sout"east urope, 6o.DF. 4ondonK The 4ondon School ofconomics and 3olitical Science.httpK55(((.lse.ac.uk5europeanInstitute5research5hellenic@bservatory5A#SH0-pdf53ublications5GreeS5GreeS26oDF.pdf

;onti, 0. +'445. 1&omestic parties and European integration8 the problem of party attitude to the E*,and the Europeanisation of parties2.European 6olitical 7cience, A, pp. CH' G '45.

Geremis, B. and Cinas, . $0-1-&. 9Aonfrontation still *amining parties? policy positions inGreece:. Comparative uropean Politics, K 0, pp. 1E / 0-1.

"aris, S., Italy=s eppe GrilloK #eet the Rogue Aomedian Turned Bingmaker, Hime, -E5-850-18.httpK55(orld.time.com50-185-85-E5italys2beppe2grillo2meet2the2rogue2comedian2turned2kingmaker5

>lyn, !. +Ed. +'44B. 7ocialdemocracy in 8eoliberal 9imes: the ;eft and Economic 6olicy since ?.$7ford8 $7ford *niversity #ress.

Gunther, R. 3., Ciamandouros 6. and Sotiropoulos, C. !. $ds.& $0--D&. Cemocracy and the state in the6e( Southern urope. @*fordK @*ford >niversity 3ress.

'ellenic 3arliament. lectoral ResultshttpK55(((.hellenicparliament.gr5Jouli2ton2llinon5To23olitevma5kloges5klogika2apotelesmata26e(5jI

Inglehart R. $1E&. #oderni+ation and 3ost2#oderni+ation. 3rincetonK 3rinceton >niversity 3ress.

Bopecky, 3. and #udde, A. $0--0&. 9The t(o sides of uroscepticism. 3arty positions on uropeanIntegration in ast Aentral urope:.uropean Union Politics, 8 K 8, 0E/80D.

Brou(el, !. and !bts, B. $0--E&. 9Jarieties of uroscepticism and 3opulist #obili+ationKTransforming !ttitudes from #ild uroscepticism to 'arsh urocynicism:.cta Politica, F0, pp. 0%0 /0E-.

4a+ar, #. $0-18&. 9Testing Italian democracy:. Comparative uropean Politics, 11, pp. 81E / 88D.

0-
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Publications/GreeSE/GreeSE-No64.pdfhttp://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Publications/GreeSE/GreeSE-No64.pdfhttp://world.time.com/2013/03/07/italys-beppe-grillo-meet-the-rogue-comedian-turned-kingmaker/http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/#IEhttp://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/#IEhttp://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Publications/GreeSE/GreeSE-No64.pdfhttp://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Publications/GreeSE/GreeSE-No64.pdfhttp://world.time.com/2013/03/07/italys-beppe-grillo-meet-the-rogue-comedian-turned-kingmaker/http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/#IEhttp://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/#IE


21/23

#arch 4. and #udde A. $0--%&. 9hat?s 4eft of the Radical 4eft The uropean Radical 4eft after1K Cecline and#utation:. Comparative uropean Politics 8, pp. 08 / F.

#erler, S. and 3isani2"erry, 7.3. $0-10&. 9Sudden Stops in the uro !rea:. ruegel Policy Contribution,D. russelsK ruegel.httpK55(((.bruegel.org5publications5publication2detail5publication5E12sudden2stops2in2the2euro2area5

#inistry of Interior $Italy&. !rchivio Storico delle le+ioni httpK55ele+ionistorico.interno.it5inde*.php

#inistry of Interior $Greece&. 3arliamentary lections 0-10httpK55ekloges2prev.singularlogic.eu5v0-10a5public5inde*.htmllangen

#orlino, 4. $0-18&. 9The impossible transition and the instable ne( mi*K Italy 1020-10:.Comparative uropean Politics, 11, pp. 88E / 8%.

#oJimento % Stelle $0--&. non statuto. !vailable on line atKhttpsK55s82eu2(est21.ama+ona(s.com5materiali2bg5Regolamento2#ovimento2%2Stelle.pdf

#oJimento % Stelle. programma. !vailable on line atKhttpK55(((.beppegrillo.it5ini+iative5movimentocin;uestelle53rogramma2#ovimento2%2Stelle.pdf

#oJimento % Stelle $0-1F&. Sette 3unti per l?uropa. !vailable on line atKhttpsK55s82eu2(est21.ama+ona(s.com5materiali2bg5Epunti.pdf

#ou+elis, 6. and 3agoulatos G. $0--0&. 9]^ZPVPX ^ZUP [XZ ZZX ^` ^ _OX^O_Z[\X:.J>>6),*A J3,K986-6 0>,+,*A J3,-+A6, 6.00, pp. %20.

&imitra"opoulos, &. >. +Ed. +'449. 7ocial Democracy and European Integration, 9he 6olitics of6reference !ormation. @ondon8 Routledge, '449.

uropean 4eft $0--%&. !thens Ceclaration of the 1st Aongress of the uropean 4eft 3arty in !thenshttpK55fr.european2left.org5positions5ne(s5athens2declaration21st2congress2european2left2party2athens20--%

uropean 4eft, 9Support the General Strike in Greece on the %thof #ay:, -%5-%50-1-httpK55(((.european2left.org5de5node510%F

3r+e(orsky $0--1&. 9'o( many (ays can be third :. In >lyn, !. +Ed.. 7ocialdemocracy in8eoliberal 9imes: the ;eft and Economic 6olicy since ?. $7ford8 $7ford *niversity #ress.

Risse, T. +'4C4.@ Aommunity of Europeans B 9ransnational Identities and 6ublic 7pheres. Ithaca and@ondon8 ;ornell *niversity #ress.

Risse, T. +'44B. 1The Euro between national and European identity2.Cournal of European 6ublic6olicy, C4 8 :, pp. :5 G 949.

Schmidt J. and Gualmini . $0-18&. 9The political sources of Italy?s economic problemsK et(een

01
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/718-sudden-stops-in-the-euro-area/http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/718-sudden-stops-in-the-euro-area/http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.phphttp://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012a/public/index.html?lang=enhttps://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/materiali-bg/Regolamento-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdfhttp://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/Programma-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdfhttps://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/materiali-bg/7punti.pdfhttp://fr.european-left.org/positions/news/athens-declaration-1st-congress-european-left-party-athens-2005http://fr.european-left.org/positions/news/athens-declaration-1st-congress-european-left-party-athens-2005http://www.european-left.org/de/node/1254http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/718-sudden-stops-in-the-euro-area/http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.phphttp://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012a/public/index.html?lang=enhttps://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/materiali-bg/Regolamento-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdfhttp://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/Programma-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdfhttps://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/materiali-bg/7punti.pdfhttp://fr.european-left.org/positions/news/athens-declaration-1st-congress-european-left-party-athens-2005http://fr.european-left.org/positions/news/athens-declaration-1st-congress-european-left-party-athens-2005http://www.european-left.org/de/node/1254


22/23

opportunistic leadership and pragmatic, technocratic leadership:. Comparative uropean Politics, 11,pp. 8D- / 80.

SYRI! +'4CB. JKLKMLKLNOP. !vailable on line at8http866www.syri-a.gr6page6"atastati"o.htmlQ.*yp)eodnq

Tarchi, #. $0--8&. 4?Italia 3opulista. olognaK Il #ulino.

Tsakatika, #. and leftheriou, A. $0-18&. 9The Radical 4eft?s Turn to(ard Aivil Society in Greece. @neStrategy, T(o 3aths:. Sout" uropean Society and Politics, 1 K 1, pp. 1 / .

00
http://www.syriza.gr/page/katastatiko.html#.UypMeo_dnQqhttp://www.syriza.gr/page/katastatiko.html#.UypMeo_dnQq


23/23

1 The total percentage of preferences given to the parties (hich did not succeed in securing at least a seat in the

3arliament amounted to 1,-8H of the preferences in #ay and %,H in 7une. !mong these parties (ere theconservative right of the 3opular @rthodo* Rally $from 0,-H in #ay to 1,%H in 7une&, that collapsed electorally after

its contradictory participation into the 3apademos government, the Green cologists $"rom 0,8H to -,H& and the

liberals of Cimiourgia, ana 5 Recreate Greece $from 0,1%H to 1,%H&.0 orn after the split of a reformist (ing of SYRI! $the Rene(al ing platform& in 0-1-, Demo&rati&i ristera

$CI#!R& (as at its first electoral e*perience. 4ed by the mild mannered "otis Bouvelis, (hose figure contrasted (ith

that of Tsipras both in reason of its age and of its political style, CI#!R campaigned against the #emorandum policies,

but proposing a gradual phasing out from the #emorandum programmes or a revision concerted (ith the internationalpartners and institutions, in order to save the country?s permanence in the #>. Given these preconditions, CI#!R(as open to cooperate in a government of national unity unlike SYRI! (hich e*cluded any government of national

unity (hose ob)ectives (ere not the prompt cancellation of the #emorandum. Thus, the #3s elected by CI#!R $1 in

#ay, 1E in 7une, (ith the electoral preferences slightly above 8%-,--- in both electoral rounds& became crucial in the

formation of a coalition government. This (ould not happen in the elections of #ay. 'o(ever, after the electoral roundof 7une CI#!R supported the 6C23!S@B parliamentary ma)ority already numbering a total of 1D0 #3s.

8 The 9J: stands for va##anculo, the Italian inter)ection $9get off:& many time addressed by Grillo to the Italian political

and economic establishment during the event. The letter, capital and in red in the movement logo, take also the shape of

the sign affi*ed to the specific ob)ectives and proposals realised thanks to the action of the movement. "inally, in thecase of the J2Cay, the 9J: (inked also to the popular dystopian movie V #or Vendetta. The mask of Guy "a(kes (orn

by the protagonist, struggling against a future totalitarian regime, has become an icon of the late 0---s social

movements and protests and the symbol of the hacktivist group !nonymous.F

httpK55beppegrillo.meetup.com5% NOP QUPV claims free of charge education, health, public transport, (ater, electricity and all natural goods. The

movement supports (orker?s strikes and forms of civil disobedience, including the non payments of public utilities bills. It

also competed in the national elections in the spring 0-10, collecting %%,DFD votes $-,H& in #ay and 08,E8F $-,8H& in

7une.httpK55denplirono.(ordpress.com5D "k'5' 540 (*3&3F40, '3&/5&+H, 5345/+&/5&+H +'& 1'.'5&+H 5'2.' *.'.5F4. 540 *03J +'& 5KL *03MJ.KL#N JUV.gr 6

UWX,O(F*/K PQ &' 0(4RK1&5K5' S/F(3' /5K. (34*%3F' 5KL T4&/&. - (H.5K/K 540 VWXYZ, 'C6C46'4CB.httpK55(((.skai.gr5ne(s5politics5article50FF8015nd2gia2upopsifiotita2tsipra2stin2proedria2tis2komision2ton2stiri+oun2kom

mata2tou2perithoriou2d5
http://beppegrillo.meetup.com/http://denplirono.wordpress.com/http://denplirono.wordpress.com/http://www.skai.gr/news/politics/article/244321/nd-gia-upopsifiotita-tsipra-stin-proedria-tis-komision-ton-stirizoun-kommata-tou-perithoriou-d/http://www.skai.gr/news/politics/article/244321/nd-gia-upopsifiotita-tsipra-stin-proedria-tis-komision-ton-stirizoun-kommata-tou-perithoriou-d/http://beppegrillo.meetup.com/http://denplirono.wordpress.com/http://www.skai.gr/news/politics/article/244321/nd-gia-upopsifiotita-tsipra-stin-proedria-tis-komision-ton-stirizoun-kommata-tou-perithoriou-d/http://www.skai.gr/news/politics/article/244321/nd-gia-upopsifiotita-tsipra-stin-proedria-tis-komision-ton-stirizoun-kommata-tou-perithoriou-d/

Political Crisis in Greece and Italy_ a Comparative Analysis of SYRIZA and 5 Stars Movement

Documents

Transcript of Political Crisis in Greece and Italy_ a Comparative Analysis of SYRIZA and 5 Stars Movement