State Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine
Political Accountability and the Room to Maneuver
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Transcript of Political Accountability and the Room to Maneuver
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Political Accountability and the Room to Maneuver
Thomas SattlerETH Zurich
John FreemanUniversity of Minnesota
Patrick T. BrandtUniversity of Texas, Dallas
Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, Princeton, November 17-18, 2006
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Introduction
• Most political scientists now agree that governments retain significant room to maneuver in a globalized economy.
• They assume rather than demonstrate that citizens are satisfied with policy choices and economic outcomes, i.e. political accountability exists in open democracies.
• We examine how much, if any, room to maneuver democratic governments actually retain.
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• Political scientists demonstrate the importance of economic outcomes for political approval.
• Economists analyze effects of economic policy with no provisions of accountability.
• Both ignore the endogenous relationship between the polity and the economy.
Critique
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A Genuine Political Economy Framework
Zur Anzeige wird der QuickTime™ Dekompressor „TIFF (Unkomprimiert)“
benötigt.
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Method: Bayesian Structural VAR
Sample: United Kingdom 1981:11-1997:4, monthly
Variables are in Three Groups
Polity: Vote Intentions (VI); Prime Minister Approval (PA); Personal/Sociotropic Economic Expectations (PE/SE); Exogenous Electoral Counter
Policy: Domestic and Foreign Interest Rates (IR and USIR)
Economy: Domestic and Foreign CPI and Output (CPI and USCPI; IIP and USIIP); $/£ Exchange Rate (XR)
Method and Data
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Posterior Model Fit Summaries for B-SVAR models
Model Fit
Model LogMDD
Bayes factorv.No
Accountability
Bayes factorv.
PolicyResponse
NoAccountability
8419
PolicyResponse
8432 13
Accountability 8478 59 46
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UK Interest Rate Response to Politics
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Political Responses to Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Shocks
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Domestic Real Economy Responses to Policy Shocks
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Political Responses to Real Economic Shocks
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Electoral Counter Densities
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• The accountability mechanism that we found works outside the real economy.
• Government capacity to shape real economic outcomes was limited in Britain from 1981 to 1997.
• Work in Progress: Analysis including British fiscal policy over the longer period to 2005:
- Which role does fiscal policy play for political accountability?
- How does delegation of monetary policy to the Bank of England in 1997 affect the government capacity to cope with globalization?
Conclusion