Policy Implementation Bangladesh

THE ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION VOL 28, NO 1 (JUNE 2006): 41-58

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Central-Local Relations, Inter-OrganisationalCoordination and Policy Implementation in

Urban Bangladesh

Pranab Kumar Panday

What happens to policy implementation when the process suffers from problems ofcoordination? In this article, the focus is on how central-local relations create inter-organisational coordination problems, which in the long run affect the implementation ofpolicies in urban governance. In the case of the Rajshahi City Corporation (RCC) inBangladesh, the central-local relationship is determined by the political identity of the mayor.By virtue of his attachment with the party in power, the RCC receives more favours especiallyin terms of the allocation of resources from the central government. These resources facilitatethe completion of many development projects.

Introduction

Modern societies suffer from various challenges, including environmentalprotection, fighting poverty or reducing unemployment, which pose manydifficulties for a single authority to manage. This is why the concept of"inter organisational coordination" has gained paramount importance inthe implementation research literature (Lund 2005: 3). Several scholarsconsider that coordination between authorities is inherently good. Whathas been learnt from game theory is that coordination among actors willusually lead to the best mutual solutions (Ostrom 1990). This articleaddresses how central-local relationship affect inter-organisationalcoordination, which in the long run affects policy implementation in urbangovernance in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh, which emerged as an independent state in 1971, has notyet developed appropriate strategies, policies, and institutions necessaryto cope with urban governance. The country has typically followed acentralised system of policy making and resource allocation in which inter-governmental transfers are unstable, not well defined, and lack an adequatesystem of incentives. In spite of having a legal-institutional framework of adecentralised system of local government, in reality there has been littledecentralized governance at the local level. Besides, given the lack of fiscalresources and limited decision-making power of local governments, thelevel of decentralised government that exists has been largely ineffectivebecause of a lack of accountability, a concentration of power by the municipalexecutives, obsolete laws and regulatory framework, limited administrative

The Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration

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capacity, a lack of investment in human resources, and weak supervisionby the central government agencies. As a result, deficiencies in urbaninfrastructure and services, including water supply, sanitation, solid wastecollection, drainage and transport range, are severe and at times extreme.

Statement of Problem and Research Questions

Successful implementation of policies is a prerequisite for the establishmentof good urban governance. Policy implementation usually takes place incooperation with other organisations. In the case of urban governance inBangladesh, the City Corporation needs to cooperate with severalgovernment departments and associated agencies, such as the PowerDevelopment Board, the Roads and Highways Department and the LocalGovernment Engineering Department. Therefore, urban governance inBangladesh is highly dependent on fruitful and useful cooperation withdifferent actors.

Coordination is a complex and crucial issue that is needed both at theday-to-day operational level and at the policy level. Problems of coordinationoccur because of the involvement of numerous institutions and theoverlapping nature of their jurisdictions. Research indicates that at least 42institutions are involved in the Dhaka Metropolitan Area1 with differentfacets of urban development activities (Mohit 1992 cited in Khan 1997: 16).Lack of cooperation and coordination between municipal governments, onthe one hand, and special government bodies, special developmentauthorities and special purpose authorities, on the other, is due to the factthat the former are elected bodies while the latter are government agencieswhose nature of operation and system of reporting decisions are different.The acute problem of a lack of coordination has made it difficult for themunicipal governments to implement various policies and to solve theproblems of their clientele (Khan 1997: 16).

A lack of coordination creates a lot of problems, including a failure tomeet project deadlines. As deadlines are not met, the costs of projectsincrease. Accordingly, it becomes problematic for the City Corporationauthority to start new projects and, therefore, citizens are deprived of theopportunity to benefit from good urban governance. It is also evident thatmany of the development projects remain incomplete in the middle stagedue to problems of coordination. Thus:

In 2003, the World Bank withdrew nearly 50 percent of US$220million allocated grants for the development of the transportinfrastructure in Dhaka2 City. That was a clear sign of the donorinstitution being disillusioned with the progress made in itsimplementation. The fund cuts had led to the dropping of two majorcomponents of the plan, the first one having to do with reductionof traffic congestion and the second with pollution control. This

Central-Local Relations, Inter-Organisational Coordination and Policy Implementation in Urban Bangladesh

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happened because of a lack of coordination and understandingbetween Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) and Roads and HighwaysDepartment (R & HD), the two principal agencies involved in theprojects. Both the organizations were blaming each other for theWorld Bank decision to withdraw funds. Obviously, they weretrying to hide behind their failures by passing the buck againsteach other (The Daily Star 12 March 2003).

In this study, the dependent variable is coordination in the context ofthe work of the Rajshahi City Corporation (RCC). Within the organisationalboundaries of the RCC, there are various departments responsible fordifferent activities. On the other hand, the RCC deals with variousgovernment departments in regard to the implementation of infrastructurepolicy. So, coordination in terms of intra- and inter-organisationalcoordination is inevitable for the effective implementation of any policy.Inter-organisational coordination is influenced by various independentvariables, such as central-local relations, democratic versus bureaucraticaccountability patterns, and so on. The independent variable of the study iscentral-local relations. The aim is to assess to what extent central-localrelations as an external factor affect inter-organisational coordination. Thisis because successful implementation largely depends on the extent ofautonomy that the central government allows to the urban governmentbodies. If the central government tries to exercise more financial andadministrative control over the urban government bodies and localgovernment bodies vie for more autonomy and resources, problems ofcoordination arise among these organisations that might affect policyimplementation. Here, policy implementation specifically concerningthe implementation of infrastructure policy is considered to be theoutcome of interaction between central-local relations and inter-organisational coordination.

In order to analyse the problems of inter-organisational coordinationin this regard, the following questions need to be addressed:

1. Do central-local relations affect inter-organisational coordination in theprocess of policy implementation in urban governance?

2. What is the impact of inter-organisational coordination on policyimplementation in urban governance?

Key Concepts and their Immediate Significance

Inter-organisational Coordination

According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, coordination means "theaction of co-coordinating; harmonious combination of agents and functions


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towards the production of a result" (as quoted in Robinson, et al 2000: 7).The most common notion of coordination is that it is rule-regulated andhierarchically organised. This view of coordination has strong resonancewith traditional views of management in which the role of the manager isseen as being "to plan, to organize, to command, to co-ordinate and tocontrol" (Fayol 1916 as quoted in Robinson, et al 2000: 7). Coordination is away of bringing together disparate agencies to make their efforts morecompatible, in the interests of equity, effectiveness and efficiency. Withoutcoordination, the danger is of lapsing into chaos and inefficiency.

In this study, coordination refers to the working relationships amongvarious departments and agencies within and outside the city corporationthat affect the implementation of policies. Coordination is discussed froman inter-organisational perspective.

When a policy is carried out by several organisations, inter-organisational coordination is important for the success of that policy. Inter-organisational coordination is manifested by the sound workingrelationships among the involved actors, based on rules and standardoperating procedures. Here, sound working relationships mean cordial andhelpful working relationships among involved actors. Van Meter and VanHorn (1975: 465-67) argue that effective implementation requires that thestandards and objectives of a program be understood by those individualswho are responsible for their achievement. Standards and objectives cannotbe achieved unless they are stated with sufficient clarity for implementersto know what is expected of them. Communication within and betweenorganisations is a complex and difficult process. If different sources ofcommunication provide inconsistent interpretations of standards andobjectives, or if the same sources provide conflicting interpretations overtime, implementors will find it even more difficult to carry out the intentionsof policy. However, it is not always possible to ensure effectivecommunication among all involved parties. What happens when there is alack of inter-organisational coordination in policy implementation due to alack of proper rules and regulations?

The most critical problem in urban governance in Bangladesh is thecoordination among development partners, particularly in big cities, wherethere are numerous partner organisations and coordination is extremelyimportant. For example, in Dhaka City, there are more than 16 governmentorganisations directly involved, and nearly 30 other organisations indirectlyinvolved, in urban development activities. Despite having an institutionalarrangement for inter-organisational coordination among the first 16 bodies,real coordination has not yet been possible (Task Force on Urban Governance2001).

In this study, the lack of inter-organisational coordination is used asthe dependent variable to measure its impact on the implementation ofpolicies by the Rajshahi City Corporation. While implementinginfrastructure policy, the RCC deals with at least three government


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organisations which share responsibility for providing better infrastructurefacilities. These organisations are the Rajshahi Development Authority, theRoads and Highways Department, and the Local Government EngineeringDepartment. A lack of inter-organisational coordination means a lack ofcommunication between different agencies that leaves a negative impacton the overall policy implementation process. The following example isrelevant:

In 2003, in Dhaka, the sufferings of the pedestrians and commutersusing Mouchak3 crossing in the city increased as the road betweenMouchak and the Malibagh4 railway crossing became almostunusable due to indiscriminate road digging by different utilityagencies. Traffic jams in the area were worse than ever andsometimes it took hours to pass the crossing. The flooded roadwithout any unusable pavements had worsened the situation toan intolerable level. It sometimes took more than an hour to passonly this 300 to 400 yards of road. The roads were submerged withwater and full potholes, which often caused accidents.

The Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority (DWASA) first cut theroad for development works more than eight months ago but itwas not repaired. The traffic congestion became worse when heavyrainfall lashed the city. Residents of the area made a bamboo bridgeon the road to cross from one side to other, as knee-deep waterremained stagnant for days.

When contacted, one of the high official of DWASA told that thework was pending for last few months as they did not get thepermission of the railway authority to cross DWASA line to theMalibagh rail gate. He also added that the work would becompleted soon if they got the permission within a short time (TheIndependent 9 May 2003).

There are numerous other examples which highlight problems ofcoordination between the city corporation and other governmentorganisations, including:

The Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) builds and maintains roadsand issues riskshaw licenses, but motor vehicle licensing is theresponsibility of the Bangladesh Road and Transport Authority(BRTA). On the other hand, the Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP)issue motor vehicle driver's licenses and manages city traffic andthe Department of Environment monitors the emission of blackgas by motor vehicles. These bodies are never known to sit across


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the table and learn about each other's difficulties (Siddique, et al2000: 196).

It is never known who is supposed to own and manage themanholes in a particular area of Dhaka City, and there is a seriouscoordination problem in this regard between DCC and DWASA.Similarly, while surface drains are the responsibility of the DCC,the sewerage system is manned by DWASA, and owing to thisdual administration, the two organizations constantly get awayby blaming one another for the poor waste disposal in the City,while the citizens continue to suffer (Siddique, et al 2000: 169).

These examples indicate the extent to which urban government bodieshave to deal with various other government organisations in theimplementation of policy. As a result of the interdependencies, problemsof inter-organisational coordination inevitably arise.

Central-Local Relations

Governments exist at the national and sub-national levels. The number andthe structure of sub-national governments depend on the system ofgovernment adopted by a particular country. Generally, under a federalsystem, sub-national governments exist at the state/provincial and locallevels; while under a unitary system, sub-national governments exist at theregional and/or local level (Jenkins, et al 2000: 1).

One way of describing central-local relations is based on the ideas ofcentral and local integration and autonomy. On the one hand, the centralgovernment is concerned with exercising control over local governmentand, on the other, local government seeks to enjoy local autonomy.

According to Kjellberg, changes in central-local governmentrelationships can be analysed from the perspective of an "autonomousmodel" or an "integrational model" (Kjellberg 1995 cited in Montin & Erik2000: 11). The autonomous model reflects the traditional liberal view ofcentral-local government relationships. In this perspective, central and localgovernments constitute two clearly separated spheres of government wherethe centre limits itself to monitoring the activities of local government. Bycontrast, according to the integrational model, the relationship betweencentral and local governments is viewed as a question of functions, not astwo separate political spheres. Local government participates in the entiresocial process, and any questions concerning who should be responsiblefor what should be decided from a pragmatic and flexible point of view(Montin & Erik 2000: 12).

The distinction between an autonomous and an integrational modelreflects two sets of normative ideas about central and local governments interms of which should be the most important political institution within


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the framework of the constitutional state. The first model suggests that localgovernment, because of its closeness to citizens and their problems andneeds, should be highly autonomous. The second model suggests that thestate is the sovereign political institution, but that it can invest differentkinds of subordinated political institutions with delegated power. The clashof these two sets of ideas may be referred to as "localism" versus"integrationism"5 (Montin & Erik 2000: 12).

Empirically, local government can mean different things depending onthe perspective from which it is viewed. In the first perspective, it can bedefined as a politically autonomous sphere with different characteristics,which depend on the particular system of local government. Page (1991),for example, uses the concepts of "legal localism" and "political localism" inorder to contrast different ways in which local government politicians caninfluence local decisions. The first broad method is to use their constitutionalor legal status. The second is to use their political authority as democraticallylegitimated representatives of the locality (Page 1991 cited in Montin & Erik2000: 12).

Another way of defining and measuring different types of autonomy isto use a "resource perspective" in which local government has a greater orlesser degree of control over different critical resources through the use ofconstitutional-legal, financial, political and professional controls (Rhodes1997; Elander & Montin 1990 cited in Montin & Erik 2000: 12). For example,local governments may have at their disposal a number of constitutional-legal resources, but they might not have the political, financial or professionalresources for real policy-making (Montin & Erik 2000: 12). From anintegrational perspective, local government can be described as a semi-autonomous political institution with a greater or lesser capacity for politicalaction. It can be defined, for example, as a "principal agency" or in terms of"partnership" (Kjellberg 1995). Other types of integration of central and localgovernments which can be found in related literature are "dualsubordination" (the former Soviet Union), "dual supervision" (France), "areasubsidiarisation" (Germany) and "functional regulation" (United Kingdom)(Montin & Erik 2000: 13).

It is appropriate here to make a distinction between at least twosituations of central-local government relations. In the first of these, localgovernment is highly subordinated and local authorities may also befunctionally divided into different policy sectors. In the second, central-local government relationships could be defined in terms of a partnershipwhere there is a certain amount of room for negotiation and access to centralstate power. Local government may depend on receiving resources fromcentral government, but the state may in turn depend on local governmentto implement national policies (Sharpe 1970). The central government maytherefore be sensitive to pressure from local governments.

In the context of Bangladesh, central-local relations have always beenan issue. In statutory terms, central-local relationships have historically been


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authoritative in nature. This may be due to the colonial legacy and theabsence of democratic government at the centre for a considerable periodof time. The central government primarily exercises its control over the localgovernments through its field level functionaries such as the local chiefexecutive officers or secretaries and the heads of various offices of districtadministration which are involved in the activities of local governments. Inaddition, local governments are further controlled through a plethora ofintricate and complicated orders and circulars from different ministries andagencies, which very often contradict the underlying legal framework.Under the law, the central government is also empowered to carry outinquiries into the affairs of local governments. After an inquiry, if thegovernment considers that a local government is unable to discharge itsduties, has failed to meet its financial obligations, and/or has exceeded orabused its power, the government may declare the body to be suspendedfor a period as specified by law (Huq 2001: 11-12).

The central government also exercises substantial financial andadministrative control over local governments in different ways. This isespecially the case in the allocation of resources. For the financing ofdevelopment projects, local governments depend fully on centralgovernment grants. In the allocation of grants, the central government hasoften acted beyond its power. The allocation of grants depends on theexisting relationship between a local government and the centralgovernment. The central government, ignoring rules and norms, allocatesmore grants to those local bodies which are administered by mayorsbelonging to the ruling political party. The bodies with mayors from theopposition suffer from various disparities accentuated by the centralgovernment. In such situations, there is possibility of problems ofcoordination among the various organisations involved, which in the longrun affect policy implementation at the local level.

Against this background, the following hypothesis is appropriate: themore the access to central government, the lesser will be the problems ofcoordination in policy implementation at the local level.

Policy Implementation

A policy is a broad guideline of actions designed to achieve some objective(s)or goal(s). A policy can be transformed into several programs or projects inorder to realise the broader objectives as envisaged in the policy. It is saidto be "public" when it is concerned with the public interest and formulatedby legal government machinery. Jenkins (1978 as quoted in Howlett &Ramesh 1995: 5) defines "public policy" as a "set of interrelated decisionstaken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goalsand the means of achieving them within a specified situation where thosedecisions should, in principle, be within the power of those to achieve".

After a public problem has made its way onto the policy agenda, various


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options are or might be proposed to resolve it and a government makes achoice among them. The resulting decision has then to be acted on. This isthe policy implementation stage of the policy process or cycle. The standarddictionary definition of the term implementation is simply "to put into effectaccording to some definite plan or procedure".

McLaughlim (1985 as quoted in Howlettt & Ramesh 1995: 153) definesimplementation as "the process whereby programs or policies are carriedout; it denotes the translation of plans into practice". According to Van Meterand Van Horn (1975), "policy implementation encompasses those actionsby public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at theachievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions". This includesboth one-time efforts to transform decisions into operational terms, as wellas continuing efforts to achieve the large and small changes mandated bypolicy decisions. For present purposes, public policy implementation isregarded as consisting of organised activities by government directedtoward the achievement of goals and objectives articulated in authorisedpolicy statements.

In this study, the focus is on the implementation of infrastructure policiesat the urban level by the Rajashahi City Corporation (RCC). Implementationis what happens after infrastructure policies concerning roads, drains andso on have been passed by the Corporation Parishad, which is the highestdecision-making authority in the RCC. Here, implementation is assessedbroadly in terms of good and bad implementation. Good implementationmeans timely project completion, minimisation of cost, and satisfactorypublic service delivery. Bad implementation means delays in projectcompletion, cost increases, and unsatisfactory public service delivery.

The RCC faces a real challenge of maintaining both intra- and inter-organisational coordination. The engineering department in the RCC hasthe immediate responsibility for the implementation of infrastructure policy.But it requires cooperation from other departments in the RCC, which alsohave to deal with various government departments and agencies beyondthe RCC.

The various concepts and associated matters addressed so far can bebrought together as an analytical framework, as presented in Figure 1.

Research Focus, Data Collection and Findings

This study employs a case-oriented qualitative research strategy. Adescriptive and exploratory case study approach is utilised because specifichow, what and why questions needed to be addressed, with a focus oncontemporary arrangements (Yin 1994: 1).

The Rajshahi City Corporation as the Case Focus

The Rajshahi City Corporation was selected from among six city corporations


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in Bangladesh. Rajshahi is the fourth largest city of Bangladesh. It has areasonable growth rate and a semi cosmopolitan nature which is generallyrepresentative of urban Bangladesh. By contrast, Dhaka, being the largestcity of Bangladesh, is not so representative as a result of being the capitaland having some other special historical features. Rajshahi was also selectedfor a personal reason. It is a city in which I have spent the last 13 years. Iknow the city well and have access to relevant information about theactivities of the RCC.

The RCC started its activities in 1 April 1876 as Rajshahi Pourashava.An eight-member town committee headed by the then Rajshahi CollegePrincipal administered Rajshahi Pourashava. The government nominatedall of the members. The district magistrate, sub-divisional chief and thechief medical officer were the members of the town committee by virtue oftheir positions. Subsequently, provision was made for the election of thechairman and vice-chairman by the taxpayers within the jurisdiction of thePourashava. In 1884, a committee was formed comprising twenty-onecommissioners. Among them fourteen were elected and seven werenominated. For the effective delivery of urban services, eight urbancommittees were formed in 1930 and were responsible for administration,finance, manpower, light, water, sanitation, health and education. Decisionswere taken in the parishad meeting based on the recommendations of thevarious committees. Each committee was formed for a one-year term andthe whole urban area was divided into seven wards. On 5 August 1958, thegovernment dissolved the municipal committees and appointed anadministrator for Rajshahi Pourashava. Until 18 February 1974, governmentofficials acted as the administrator. On 13 August 1987, Rajshahi Pourashavawas upgraded to a "Pour Corporation" and on 11 September 1987 year,"Pour Corporation" was changed to "City Corporation" The first mayoralelection of the RCC was held on 30 January 1994.

Data Collection

The study is based on both primary and secondary data. Primary datarelevant to the research objectives and questions were collected through astructured interview guide with closed and open-ended questions.Secondary data were gathered from the RCC's general administrationdepartment and libraries (including the library of the Department of PublicAdministration, Rajshahi University and the library of the Center for UrbanStudies, Dhaka), various published documents (articles, books, studyreports, etc.), newspapers, unpublished theses, research monographs andthe internet.

The RCC and Infrastructure Policy

The RCC works under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural


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Development and Cooperatives (LGRD & C). For the financing of itsdevelopment budget, the RCC depends largely on government grants,although it has the power to levy taxes on people, the income of which isnegligible. All of the policies of the RCC are passed in the CorporationParishad that consists of the Mayor, thirty elected ward commissioners,and ten elected women commissioners. The Corporation Parishad takesdecisions on various projects proposed by various departments. Duringthe later part of each financial year, every department makes their demandsin terms of various projects for the forthcoming financial year. The normalprocess is that each department places its demands before the concernedStanding Committee. Currently, there are eleven Standing Committees inthe RCC. Then, the demands of each department are considered andrecommended in their respective Standing Committee meetings. After thedemands are recommended, they are placed before the Corporation Parishadmeeting for approval. They are finally passed or otherwise by a majorityvote in the Parishad.

The immediate responsibility for infrastructure development rests withthe Engineering Department in the RCC. Every year, this departmentproposes a number of projects relating to the development of infrastructure.Once the projects have been approved, the department is responsible forimplementing them.

The RCC and its Engineering Department cannot independentlyperform all of the construction work required. They need to liaise andcoordinate their activities with various central government organisationswith ownership or other interests concerning roads and drains. The mainorganisations are the Roads and Highways Department (R&HD), the LocalGovernment Engineering Department (LGED), and the RajshahiDevelopment Authority (RDA). The arrangements involved are depictedin Figure 2.

Central-Local Relations and Inter-organisational Coordination

The question of autonomy is an important variable in the study of central-local relations. Although urban local government bodies in Bangladesh enjoya degree of operational autonomy, they are in no way independent of thecentral government in the country's overall administrative system. As aresult, there are a number of areas of interaction between an urban bodyand the government, covering legal, operational and financial mattersinvolving control and supervision by the government. Here, the concern isto consider the types of central-local relations that exist for the RCC andhow these relations affect inter-organisational coordination on the basisof answers from respondents in the RCC.

All but one of the seven respondents referred to there being a positiverelationship between the RCC and the central government. They attributed


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this largely to the Mayor's6 political affiliation with the BangladeshNationalist Party (BNP) which is now the party in power. The Mayor has apowerful position in the party. Along with the position of Mayor, he is alsoa member of parliament and one of the organising secretaries of the party.These factors have been crucial in establishing and maintaining a positiverelationship between the RCC and the central government.

The respondents mentioned that during 1996-2001 the scenario wasdifferent when the now opposition Awami League (AL) ran the government.The RCC experienced many problems, especially in the allocation ofresources and associated time delays, because the Mayor belonged to thethen opposition BNP. The following report is particularly relevant in thisregard:

Rajshahi city has for long been faced with a crisis of drinking water,especially in the dry season. The City Corporation authorities saidextraction capacity of its pumps declined by about 25 percent insummer. With a view to providing city dwellers with safe drinkingwater, the Rajshahi City Corporation opened the first of the threewater treatment plants in September 2003. According to theDepartment of Public Health Engineering, works on the other twowere going on in full swing and were scheduled to be completedby December 2003. The Rajshahi City Corporation water supplydepartment said it would provide city residents with only 45 millionlitres of water a day against the demand for some 103 million litres.

Rajshahi City Mayor said that the construction of these projectswould have been completed five years back if they would havereceived full cooperation from the then AL government. The Mayormentioned that the initiative to install water treatment plans toaddress excessive hardness of water was taken up in 1994. Theministry concerned approved the project in early 1995 and theExecutive Committee of the National Economic Council approvedof a Tk 56-crore (equivalent to US$958,9041) project on December19, 1995. The public health engineering department was entrustedwith the project implementation.

Work on the first phase of the project started on April 1, 1996,scheduled for a June 1998 completion. But it could not beimplemented as per schedule because of a cold shoulder shown bythe then AL government. The project was left half way for fundconstraints. The money was released after the four-party alliancegovernment led by BNP came to power and the work resumedand was completed (Country News, internet edition, 26 September2003).


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This example indicates that central-local relations and a lack ofcoordination have seriously affected the implementation of a significantwater plant project by the RCC. Had the RCC received cooperation fromthe central government in releasing funds, the project would have beencompleted five years earlier to the considerable benefit of the public.

The Rajshahi City Corporation Ordinance 1987 under which the RCCoperates acknowledges the local autonomy of the RCC, while also givingthe central government enormous powers to exercise control over it. Someof the more important arrangements which directly affect central-localrelations and coordination are as follows (Siddique 2000: 156-157):

a. the central government makes laws and rules for all local bodies,including the RCC; and it can also control the RCC through so-calledstanding orders;

b. the Mayor may be removed from office at any time, without assigningany reason; the government may also supersede the entire RCC orsuspend a Department of the RCC;

c. the government may assign any function to the RCC; similarly, it canalso take away any function from the RCC at any time;

d. the RCC budget must be approved by the central government;

e. the government may call for any records of the RCC;

f. the government can inspect the RCC at any time; the RCC has to sendthe central government an annual report on its activities;

g. for forming additional standing committees, the RCC must obtain thepermission of the government;

h. the schedule of posts in the RCC has to be sanctioned by the government,and no appointment beyond the schedule is allowed;

i. the RCC can not directly negotiate with foreign donors or privateinvestors; and

j. the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is appointed by the government, andhe has considerable powers; he is the custodian of all records; he isallowed to take measures during an emergency; he is allowed to bepresent in all Corporation/standing committee meetings; he can hardlybe censured by the RCC, and he is the appointing authority for allsubordinate posts.


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With reference to these arrangements, the respondents were asked theirviews on the nature of autonomy and centralisation in the RCC. In reply,most referred in particular to problems associated with the CEO of the RCC,who belongs to the Bangladesh Civil Service. They indicated that, as a resultof his being a central government official, he perceives himself as superiorto the city corporation officials, which at times creates frustration amongthe officials. This usually has a negative impact on the working environmentand can directly affect the degree to which the affairs of the RCC aresubordinated to the wishes of the central authorities. One official expressedhis opinion in the following way:

As the CEO is deputed by the central government, he suffers froma superiority complexity. He does not bother with the RCC officials.Besides, the Mayor is a very busy person who cannot stay in theCorporation all the time. The absence of the Mayor has made himmore powerful. This type of conflict creates a problematic workingenvironment that hampers the overall development process.

This was a typical view. It confirms the extent to which the positionsand ties of particular individuals, especially the CEO and the Mayor, caninfluence, if not determine, the nature of central-local relations andassociated activities.

Concluding Comments

From the above discussion, it is evident that central-local relations areimportant for inter-organisational coordination. The strength of the relationsis based, in large part, on the political identity of the Mayor, but it is alsoaffected by the CEO being a central government official. If the Mayor belongsto the government party, the RCC receives more favours especially in termsof the allocation of resources (however inadequate they may be) from thecentral government. But if the Mayor belongs to the opposition, the situationis the opposite. Currently, the Mayor has considerable power as he hasgood access to the central leadership. This facilitates a positive relationshipbetween the RCC and the central government, which is also influenced bythe CEO as a central government employee. Overall, the competingpressures and demands of local autonomy and central control are weightedin favour of centralisation at the expense of local autonomy and initiative.

Notes

1. This is the total territory of the Dhaka City Corporation, which is the largestcity corporation in Bangladesh.2. Dhaka is the capital of Bangladesh.


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3. Mauchak is the name of a place in Dhaka city.4. Malibagh is also the name of a place in Dhaka.5. In its extreme form, integrationism may lead to a superior-subordinaterelationship whereby the central government is in complete control over localgovernment in terms of financial, political, legal and functional matters. This is thesituation that may characterise central-local relations in Bangladesh.6. The Mayor, who is the executive and administrative head of the RCC, is electeddirectly by the people for a five-year term.

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Pranab Kumar Panday is a PhD researcher in the Department of Public and Social Administration atthe City University of Hong Kong and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administrationat the University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh.

Policy Implementation Bangladesh

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