Policy Dialogue Nord Stream 2: Assessing the …Possible Ukraine transit post 2020 with NS2 30 bcm...

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Policy Dialogue Nord Stream 2: Assessing the economic and security impact on Central and Eastern Europe Peter Kotek SeniorResearch Associate REKK European Policy Centre 18.10.2017.

Transcript of Policy Dialogue Nord Stream 2: Assessing the …Possible Ukraine transit post 2020 with NS2 30 bcm...

Page 1: Policy Dialogue Nord Stream 2: Assessing the …Possible Ukraine transit post 2020 with NS2 30 bcm 30 bcm Possible Ukraine transit post 2020 without NS2 70 bcm 30 bcm New infrastructure

Policy Dialogue Nord Stream 2:

Assessing the economic and security

impact on Central and Eastern Europe

Peter Kotek

Senior Research Associate

REKK

European Policy Centre

18.10.2017.

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Two modelling studies – opposing

conclusions. What is the reason?

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In English:

http://rekk.hu/downloads/academic_publications/NordStream2_REKK.pdf

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Welfare effects of Nord Stream 2 commissioning

compared to reference case

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2015 OVERNIGHT 2020

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LTC bookings crowd out short-term

trade

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23% LTC

74% LTC

100% LTC

58% LTC 77% LTC 100% LTC

57% Spot

26% Spot

32% Spot

0% Spot

40% Spot 23% Spot

32% Spot0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Ref 2015 NS 2 Ref 2015 NS 2 Ref 2015 NS 2 Ref 2015 NS 2

Német-osztrák Cseh-szlovák Osztrák-magyar Szlovák-magyar

TWh/év

DE-AT CZ-SK AT-HU SK-HU

TWh/year

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Foreclosure threat coming to reality?

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FRn-FRs

ES-PT

CZ-SK

DE-NL

NL-BE

DE-AT

ES-FRs

DE-NL

AT-SI

DE-CHAT-IT

DE-ATDK-SEAT-SKDE-PL

AT-SI

LY-IT

SI-HR

DE-CZ

DE-ATDE-PL

NL-BE

UK-IUK

NO-NL

DE-NL

NO-NL

DE-DE

DZ-IT

CH-IT

0-0

CZ-DE

DE-FR

RU-DEDE-CZ

CZ-SK

FRn-FRs

NL-BE

AT-SI

DE-CH

BE-FR

DE-ATDE-PL

SI-HR

DE-AT

DE-PL

NO-NL

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%

Ma

rke

ted

/te

chn

ica

l (%

)

Booked/technical (%)

2017

2020

2018

• DE-CZ-SK reverse flow capacities

booked by Gazprom. 80% between

2020-30 but some up to 2038

• HAG, SK-HU: Hungarian regulator

intervened; potential downstream

market foreclosureRU-DE: Lubmin II, Greifswald, Greifswald Entry, Vierow,

DE-CZ: Deutschneudorf, Oldbernhau 2, CZ-SK: Lanzhot,

Lanzhot 1, Lanzhot 2

Prisma, March 6, 2017

booking

booking

HEPURA cancelled LT

booking

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Main differences in modelling

EGMM TIGER

Model

assumptions

Perfect

competition, partial

equilibrium

Perfect

competition, partial

equilibrium

Welfare

considered

All stakeholders Consumer surplus

EU-28

consumer effect

Winners and

losers

Everyone wins

Pricing logic TTF LNG + transport

cost

LTC pricing rigid flexible

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Main differences in reference case

assumptions

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EGMM TIGER

Demand 2020 ~7% demand increase

(TYNDP Grey)

PRIMES demand

(stagnant)

EU production 110 bcm in 2020 111 bcm in 2020

LNG imports ~50 bcm in 2016

~100 bcm in 2020

50 bcm in 2020

Possible Ukraine transit

post 2020 with NS2

30 bcm 30 bcm

Possible Ukraine transit

post 2020 without NS2

70 bcm 30 bcm

New infrastructure FID, Nord Stream 2 + EU

internal infra

FID, Nord Stream 2 + EU

internal infra

Other new infrastructure - PCIs, Turkish Stream

string 1, Opal restriction

lifted, HSK and Lanzhot

upgrade as of PRISMA

auction, NEL upgrade,

TAP & TANAP

INVESTMENT NEED TO KEEP UP PRICE CONVERGENCE

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Key findings and messages

• Curtailment of trade via long-term bookings and contractualcongestion is constraining competition

• Access of the CSEE region to Western more liquid markets is curtailed by long-term bookings

• Further infrastructure is needed to offset the effects of theNord Stream 2 pipeline

• Modelling outcomes are always highly affected byassumptions:‣ Ceteris paribus modelling requires that only Nord Stream 2 and its

related infrastructure is assumed

‣ Additional infrastructure assumed by ewi (PCIs, Turkish Stream, etc.) is mixing the Nord Stream 2 effect with the additional infraeffect

‣ Decommissioning of Ukrainian infrastructure if Nord Stream 2 is notbuilt is highly unlikely. Using this as a reference overestimateswelfare effects of Nord Stream 2 highly

‣ Comparing apples to oranges?

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Thank you for your attention

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[email protected]