May 2011

Police Serviceof Northern IrelandCustomer Service

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Police Service of NorthernIreland Customer Service

May 2011

Laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly under Section49(2) of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, as amendedby paragraph 7(2) of Schedule 13 to The Northern Ireland Act1998 (Devolution of Policing and Justice Functions) Order 2010by the Department of Justice.

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Contents

List of abbreviations iv

Chief Inspector’s Foreword v

Executive Summary vi

Recommendations ix

Section 1: Inspection Report

Chapter 1 Introduction 3

Chapter 2 Strategic intent 9

Chapter 3 Management intent 11

Chapter 4 Implementation challenges 17

Chapter 5 Outcomes 29

Section 2: Appendix

Appendix 1 Inspection methodology 38

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List of abbreviations

HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary

NIPB Northern Ireland Policing Board

OPONI Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland

PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland

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Chief Inspector’s Foreword

The way which a police service engages with the local community is a cornerstone of communityconfidence. A negative interaction can create a barrier between the police service and thecommunity it is there to protect and serve. Alternatively, a positive engagement whichencourages problem solving, courtesy, visibility and accessibility can have implications far beyondthe behaviours of individual officers. A focus on improving customer service has been animportant feature in recent years within police forces in England and Wales, and it is particularlyimportant in the context of Northern Ireland.

This inspection report sets out our findings on customer service within the Police Service ofNorthern Ireland (PSNI). The purpose of the inspection was to examine the quality of customerservice provided by the PSNI. It examined the way in which the Police Service understands whatis required from a customer perspective, the accessibility of services, standards for servicedelivery and achievement of better outcomes.

Our overall conclusion is that customer service is taken seriously by PSNI senior managementand we commend the commitment shown to improving how the police engage with the localcommunity by the Chief Constable. Initial steps had been taken within the Service to improvepublic confidence and the nature of the interaction between the police and those who wouldseek to use the services provided. These plans and developments were at an early stage and theService still faced a number of challenges in implementing the Chief Constable’s commitment to‘personal, professional and protective’ policing. Whilst the commitment to customer service fromthe top of the organisation was evident, it was too early to say what the ultimate outcome ofthese plans would be.

In moving the agenda forward it is important there is better co-ordination of projects within thePSNI to ensure greater consistency of service delivery across Northern Ireland. In particularthere is a need to ensure that the values and behaviour of ‘personal, professional and protective‘policing are clear to all officers with evident standards and consistency at the point of servicedelivery. The report also concludes that there is a need to reduce the levels of abstraction ofneighbourhood officers to ensure neighbourhood policing is properly delivered.

This inspection was undertaken by Rachel Lindsay and William Priestley of CJI, with assistancefrom colleagues in Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). I would like to thank allthose involved in the inspection process.

Dr Michael MaguireChief Inspector of Criminal Justicein Northern IrelandMay 2011

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Executive Summary

In recent years there has been a focus in policing on developing a culture where the needs andpriorities of the ‘customer’ as an end user are understood by staff and are always taken intoaccount when designing and delivering policing services. This inspection focused on the way inwhich customers were dealt with by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and how theirneeds were met, particularly in relation to processes and how this will impact on outcomes forcustomers.

The Chief Constable has made clear his strategic intent for the organisation, which was acommitment to deliver ‘personal, professional and protective’ policing in Northern Ireland.This strategic message was beginning to influence the work of the PSNI and at the time of thisinspection the Service was developing their approach to customer service and service delivery.This work was mainly driven by the Service Excellence Programme Board.

In translating the Chief Constable’s strategic aims, the PSNI were working on a number ofprojects under the banner of Policing with the Community using the Confidence Route Map(which outlines what drives public confidence) to improve customer service. PolicingCommitments were being developed to set out the standards of service which the customercould expect to receive. The R4 Project (Right people, in the Right place, at the Right time, doingthe Right job) addressed call handling and data capture processes, and aimed to address issues inrelation to access to services; visibility; response; and updating. The R4 Project was being pilotedat the time of this inspection and plans were being developed to roll it out across the Service.Better co-ordination of this with the other improvement projects within an overall programmeplan is needed to fully realise their aims.

Access for the public was mixed with some excellent use of social networking, the PSNI websiteand improved enquiry office facilities; but there was a lack of consistency in approach across theService. The PSNI should maximise efforts in this area in consultation with customers in order toreach out to the public. Some staff had received valuable training in the area of customer serviceor soft skills, but again there was a lack of consistency in approach. Some examples wereprovided of initiatives which focused on customer needs, for example between neighbourhoodteams and other roles.

Officers and staff spoken to during this inspection demonstrated a high level of commitment inthe main to delivering a good service to the public, albeit they highlighted challenges in being ableto realise this. They perceived these challenges to be the increasing security threat, pressure ofwork and unnecessary bureaucracy. The PSNI senior management therefore faced challenges indisseminating and delivering a customer service ethos throughout the organisation.

Inspectors were advised by many officers and staff that there had been a delay in providing clarityas to what ‘personal, professional and protective’ policing meant in reality, and how it should beoperationalised into service delivery. In the main there were no standards for delivery which

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staff could work to. This had led to some districts and departments developing their ownstrategies around this and therefore the message was in danger of being inconsistently interpretedacross the PSNI. The PSNI were developing a communications plan at the time of inspection inthis area and this is critical to ensuring the Chief Constable’s message is disseminatedconsistently.

The PSNI faced challenges in developing a customer service focus as, at the time of theinspection, organisational culture did not place customers at the centre of service delivery. Thiswas evidenced, for example, by the current approaches to call handling and to updating victims bysome stakeholders. The PSNI had implemented National Call Handling Standards and theadherence to these was monitored by the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB). The approachto call management was inconsistent with a variety of call handling centres dealing withswitchboard calls, emergency calls and non-emergency calls. The PSNI’s R4 Project aimed tostreamline these processes as they did not provide a seamless process for managing calls.Improvements in the use of telephony solutions to enable switchboard operators to direct callsappropriately are needed.

Neighbourhood policing is a critical area of customer service and, where neighbourhood officerswere able to undertake their role appropriately, it led to excellent local initiatives andpartnership working. However abstraction of neighbourhood officers continued to be an issueand Inspectors would recommend that the reintroduction to the Policing Plan of the target forneighbourhood officers to spend 80% of their time on neighbourhood duties is required toaddress this.

Consultations were generally undertaken with District Policing Partnerships, local communitypartnerships or by paper exercise with consultees appropriate for the topic. Stakeholderswelcomed the opportunity to engage with the PSNI but did not always feel the process was fullyeffective in enabling them to have a true influence on policy or strategy. The PSNI had a numberof Independent Advisory Groups to enable them to engage with harder to reach and less visiblegroups, however some members did not feel their group had been fully utilised. The PSNI shoulddevelop a more consistent approach to the use of imaginative ways of undertaking consultation,including better engagement with Independent Advisory Groups.

The PSNI were developing methods to assess performance against the Policing Commitmentsincluding the use of surveys, call backs and mystery shopper exercises. In the absence of thesemeasures already being in place, some districts had introduced victim call back systems. Feedbackprovided to Inspectors in relation to performance of the Service was mixed with positive viewsaround the work of neighbourhood officers, but difficulties were raised with the approach ofother officers such as Response and Tactical Support Group. Officers spoken to from these roleshowever, in the main, illustrated their awareness of the need to provide good customer servicebut cited difficulties in being able to deliver it due to other pressures.

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Call handling systems were used to monitor call volume, answer times, abandonment rates andperformance information. The PSNI did not collect data around non-attendance at calls forsecurity or safety reasons, or provide guidance for officers tasked with making these decisions.This guidance and monitoring should be introduced in order to fully understand the scale of thistype of non-attendance and enable reliable analysis to take place. In order to reduce duplicationof effort supervisors should make better use of Niche Records Management System whenreviewing initial responses to incidents.

The annual performance review process, which is used to manage performance and developstaff, was under review at the time of the inspection. Inspectors welcome the PSNI’s plans tointroduce an individual performance process which recognises the importance of customerservice and focuses not only on performance targets in relation to ‘personal, professional andprotective’ policing but also on how staff perform in relation to the competencies for their role.

The PSNI and the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) were pilotinga process of local resolution where managers would be able to deal with minor complaints anddissatisfaction as soon as an issue was raised with them. This should be beneficial in terms ofreducing the time required to deal with these types of issues and increase satisfaction with theprocess.

The PSNI used a variety of methods to communicate its plans and performance which includedvia the website, leaflets, posters and social media. Chief Officers and local and DistrictCommanders were asked to account for performance at private and public meetings as well asneighbourhood officers outlining results at local meetings.

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Recommendations

Strategic Recommendations

• As part of an overall communications strategy the PSNI should make clear to all officers andstaff what the commitment for ‘personal, professional and protective’ policing means at the pointof service delivery (paragraph 4.4).

• The PSNI should co-ordinate the ongoing Service Excellence Policing with the Communityprojects using project management principles (including dependencies and identification andmanagement of risks) to accomplish the overall objective of Policing with the Communitythrough ‘personal, professional and protective’ policing (paragraph 4.32).

• The PSNI should continue to develop and effectively implement a performance review systemfor all staff that recognises the importance of customer service for the next performancereview cycle (paragraph 5.14).

Operational Recommendations

• The PSNI should develop a corporate approach to maximising attempts to develop andutilise alternative forms of access for members of the public in consultation with customers(paragraph 3.14).

• The PSNI should make better use of telephony solutions to enable switchboard operators todirect callers to the appropriate point of contact for their query (paragraph 4.13).

• CJI recommends the reintroduction to the Policing Plan of the target that neighbourhoodofficers work at least 80% of their duty hours on neighbourhood policing duties to a definitionof abstraction agreed with, and monitored by, the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB)(paragraph 4.19).

• The PSNI should develop a more consistent approach to the use of imaginative ways ofundertaking consultation, including better engagement with Independent Advisory Groups(paragraph 4.31).

• The PSNI should introduce guidance on the non-attendance of calls for security and safetyreasons and implement a monitoring system to enable reliable analysis of such non-attendanceto take place (paragraph 5.10).

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Suggestions for improvement

• It would be beneficial for the PSNI to thoroughly explore the use of alternative locations,such as in retail areas or community centres, as potential locations to interact with the public,which would be utilised by, and benefical to, members of the public (paragraph 3.10).

• Consideration should be given to the views of the customer when determining timescalesfor contact in addition to consideration of the seriousness of the crime (paragraph 4.7).

• A common definition and guidance on dealing with vulnerable callers would be beneficialto assist call handlers in their decision-making (paragraph 4.9).

• In order to ensure information is relevant and useful, neighbourhood profiles need tobe comprehensive, user-friendly, up-to-date and contain details of key partnerships forneighbourhood teams and other district staff (paragraph 4.21).

• There is a need for better explanations to be given to communities as to why the presenceof Tactical Support Groups are necessary in an area (for example to undertake searches) andto publicise successes in the district in order to recognise the role of the units whilst ensuringthat the impact on communities is considered in every operation. In addition, monitoring theway that Tactical Support Groups engage with communities and ensuring it is line with theethos of the Service (paragraph 5.6).

• It is suggested that, in order to reduce bureaucracy, the use of Command and Control toundertake the daily search should cease as soon as possible, and officers should be advisedthat they no longer need to duplicate information into the two systems (paragraph 5.15).

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Inspection Report

1Section

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1.1 Customer service has been describedas being ‘the sum total of what anorganisation does to meet customerexpectations and produce customersatisfaction’ (Institute of CustomerService). Over recent years there hasbeen a focus on the issues surroundingthis area in both public servicesgenerally but also police organisationsmore specifically. This chapter aims toprovide an overview of the approachesand inspection work in this area. It alsoaims to place the issues of customerservice in the PSNI and this inspectionin the context of work undertaken inother jurisdictions. There are manyterms used in relation to this area suchas ‘citizen focus’, ‘public confidence’ and‘customer service’. This inspectionfocused on the way in which customerswere dealt with by the organisation andif their needs were met, particularly inrelation to processes, as this will alsohave an impact on outcomes forcustomers.

1.2 The Customer Service Excellencestandard identifies five criterions asthe areas which research has indicatedare a priority for customers. Theseare customer insight, the culture of theorganisation, information and access,delivery and timeliness and quality ofservice. For the Police Service thistranslates into:

Introduction

CHAPTER 1:

• knowledge of its customers (forexample, victims of crime, witnesses,detainees and others who come intocontact with the police);

• promoting an organisational cultureof customer service;

• how easily accessible services andinformation about services are tocustomers and how the police workin partnership;

• setting standards for service deliveryand achieving outcomes and solvingproblems for customers; and

• achieving outcomes within quality andtimeliness standards.

The standard was developed to offerpublic services a practical tool fordriving customer-focused change intheir organisation. At the time of theinspection, four police forces in Englandand Wales and 17 organisations inNorthern Ireland had been recognisedas achieving Customer ServiceExcellence by being successfully assessedagainst the criteria of the standard. Thestandard is therefore a useful approachin assisting public services, includingpolice organisations, to drive continuousimprovement, develop skills and providean independent validation ofachievement.

1.3 In recent years police forces in Englandand Wales have been encouraged by the

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United Kingdom Government to focuson quality of service issues, particularlyin the form of public confidence andsatisfaction. Outputs of this approachhave included the introduction of thePolicing Pledge (a set of promises fromthe police to the public about theservices it will provide) in December2008 and a public confidence targetin 2009, the Quality of ServiceCommitment 1 and the concept of‘citizen focus’ in policing. Whilst theCoalition Government in 2010 hasannounced the abolition of PublicService Agreement 23.3 and the top-down ‘confidence‘ target, as well as thePolicing Pledge, the question by whichpublic confidence was measured in theBritish Crime Survey still exists (‘howmuch would you agree or disagree thatthe police and local council are dealingwith the anti-social behaviour and crimethat matter in this area?’). It is therefore

clear that confidence and publicsatisfaction in policing will continue tobe a key issue and will be measured at alocal level; albeit the detail of how thiswould be done was unclear at the timeof writing. In Northern Ireland one ofthe Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)for the Comprehensive Spending Review‘Justice for All’ Delivery Agreement was‘to increase the proportion of victims andwitnesses who are satisfied with the contactthey have with the criminal justice system’.The Northern Ireland Victims andWitness Survey assesses performanceagainst this.

1.4 The Northern Ireland Policing Plan for2010-13 included the following targetswhich are relevant to this area andwhich have not been affected by thechanges in England and Wales asoutlined above.

5.1 In partnership with other agencies, to increasethe percentage of people confident in the fairness ofthe criminal justice system to 61% by 31 March 2011*

5.2 In partnership with other agencies, to increasethe percentage of people confident in theeffectiveness of the criminal justice system to 38% by31 March 2011*

3. The percentage of people who agree policeand other agencies are dealing with the anti-social behaviour and crime issues that matter inlocal areas.

Performance Indicator Target

3.1 To increase the number of people who agreepolice and other agencies are dealing with the anti-social behaviour and crime issues that matter in localareas to 60% by March 2012*

1 The Quality of Service Commitment set the over-arching standards which the public could expect when making contact with the police. TheCommitment was developed by the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Office, in agreement with the Association of PoliceAuthorities for implementation by police forces by November 2006.

5. The level of confidence in the fairnessand effectiveness of the criminal justicesystem.

*as measured using data derived from the Northern Ireland Crime Survey.

1.5 The PSNI has previously conductedquality of service surveys in conjunctionwith the Northern Ireland PolicingBoard (NIPB). These monitorvictim/user satisfaction with the qualityof service provided by police in relationto first contact, police actions to dealwith the incident, follow-up, treatmentby police staff and overall service. Thesurveys were conducted with victims ofviolent crime, vehicle crime, domesticburglary, racist incidents and road trafficcollisions. Questionnaires were postedto a random sample of victims/usersfrom these categories. In 2008-09 thequestionnaire was posted to 10,583victims/users and 2,062 were returnedrepresenting a response rate of 19.5%.

1.6 The results of the 2008-09 questionnairecan be summarised as:

• 79% of respondents indicated thatthey were ‘satisfied’ with the overallservice provided by the police for2008-09 (2007-08: 80%);

• 87% of respondents stated that theywere ‘satisfied’ with the ease ofcontacting someone who could assistthem. This was a statisticallysignificant decrease from this level ofsatisfaction in 2007-08 (90%);

• overall, 81% of respondents were‘satisfied’ with the time it took forthe police to arrive. This was astatistically significant decrease fromthis level of satisfaction in 2007-08(85%);

• 74% of respondents stated that theywere ‘satisfied’ with the actions takenby police (2007-08: 76%);

• 69% of respondents who have hadfurther contact with the police were‘satisfied’ with how well they werekept informed of progress (2007-08:70%); and

• 86% of respondents stated that theywere ‘satisfied’ with the way theywere treated by the police officersand staff that dealt with them(2007-08: 88%).

1.7 In August 2010 the NIPB published theresults from its biennial District PolicingPartnership Public Consultation Survey.This was the fifth time the survey hadbeen undertaken by the NorthernIreland Statistics and Research Agencyon behalf of the Board and DistrictPolicing Partnerships. The Surveyprovided the Board and the PSNI withsurvey data at neighbourhood levelfor the first time. 15,765 of thequestionnaires sent to 74,000households were returned (a 21%response rate). As well as askingrespondents about the issues thatmattered most to them the surveyasked about the service received fromthe PSNI. Results indicated:

• 42% of respondents stated that thepolice where they lived did an‘adequate’ job, with 26% stating theydid a ‘poor’ job and 15% a ‘good’ job;

• 51% of respondents stated that theywere ‘dissatisfied’ with the levels ofvisible police patrols where theylived, 31% were ‘neither satisfied nordissatisfied’ and 11% were ‘satisfied’;

• 41% of respondents stated that theywere ‘satisfied’ that the police treateveryone fairly where they live, with26% ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’and 10% ‘dissatisfied’;

• 59% of respondents stated that theyhad ‘some confidence’ in the policewhere they lived, with 17% statingthat they had ‘total confidence’ and15% ‘no confidence’; and

• of those that had been in contactwith the police in the last year, 50%

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stated that they were ‘satisfied’ withhow they were treated by the police,25% that they were ‘dissatisfied’ and22% that they were ‘neither satisfiednor dissatisfied’.

1.8 In addition 80% of respondents statedthat they were not aware aneighbourhood policing team operatedwhere they lived and 93% stated thatthey did not know the names of, orrecognise the officers policing wherethey lived, although 72% stated that theyknew how to contact their local police.The survey also provided details aboutwhat information the public would liketo receive from local police and howthey would like local police to informthem about their work. This researchprovides important information for thePSNI about their engagement with thepublic and provides statistical evidenceof the need for the PSNI to improveperformance in the areas of confidenceand satisfaction. Whilst the statisticsprovide a mixed picture as tosatisfaction levels none of the researchconducted can be said to provide acomprehensive picture; for examplevictims of anti-social behaviour were notincluded in the 2008-09 PSNI researchon quality of service (although they hadbeen in 2006-07) even though anti-socialbehaviour accounts for 40% of calls topolice.

1.9 Policing inspectorates have consideredthe issues around quality of servicedelivery in recent years. In 2008, HerMajesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary(HMIC) published inspection reports onNeighbourhood Policing and Developing

Citizen Focus, and in 2009, inspectionreports on the Policing Pledge acrossall 43 forces in England and Wales.HMIC’s latest method of inspection andreporting, Police Report Card, publishedin March 2010 also features assessmentsof forces in the extent to which theyare meeting the pledge standards,public confidence in the police andlocal authorities (combined), publicconfidence in the police specificallyand satisfaction with service delivery.In 2008, HMIC for Scotland publisheda thematic inspection report on thequality of service and feedback tousers of police services in Scotland.This looked at the way police forces inScotland engaged with, and providedfeedback to, members of the public whocall the police to report something,whether or not it was a crime.

1.10 This inspection took cognisance of workthat has been undertaken, particularlyin England and Wales, where the PSNIhas reference to a most similar forcesgroup2, in relation to citizen focusedpolicing. In citizen focused policing theneeds and expectations of individualsand local communities are alwaysreflected in police decision-making andservice. There are five critical elementsor key workstreams to the citizenfocused policing programme. They are:

• improving the experience of thosewho have contact with the police;

• embedding neighbourhood policinginto local communities;

• effective community engagement -which includes consultation,

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2 For each police force HMIC has determined a set of ‘most similar forces’, which have similar social and geographiccharacteristics to the force in question. During 2006 the Police Standard’s Unit developed a ‘most similar force’ group toassess the performance of the PSNI against peer forces in England and Wales. The PSNI’s comparator forces are GreaterManchester, Northumbria, Nottinghamshire,West Midlands and West Yorkshire.

marketing and communications, andpublic involvement;

• public understanding and localaccountability of policing; and

• organisational and cultural change tobring about increasingly responsiveservices where feedback fromfrontline staff and the public is usedcontinuously.

1.11 This inspection aimed to assess thequality of customer service providedby the PSNI. In general terms theinspection focused on the three mainelements of CJI’s inspection frameworkas they apply to customer service. Thisarea was therefore assessed regardingstrategy and governance, delivery, andoutcomes (or projected outcomes),underpinned by the constants of equalityand fairness; and standards and bestpractice. Compliance with existingguidelines and relevant standards such asthe Customer Service Excellencestandard was used to evaluate this.CJI received assistance from HMIC inundertaking this inspection.

1.12 The PSNI did not have a specificstrategy in relation to customer service.However the Chief Constable had anoverall vision as to how he saw theirapproach and the PSNI were workingon a series of initiatives designed toimprove the service provided tocustomers. This inspection thereforeassessed the PSNI’s approach in thisarea. The PSNI had not implementedthe Customer Service Excellencestandard however it agreed to its useas the assessment tool for the purposesof this inspection. The inspection also

took cognisance of previous CJI reportswhich have included work in thisarea (for example Policing with theCommunity and Police Custody) butavoided duplication of work that hasalready been completed. It alsocovered elements of call handling andmanagement which impact on theservice experienced by customers of thePSNI. However a specific inspection oncall management will be undertaken in2010-11 and this area will be inspectedin greater detail at that point.

1.13 During the inspection fieldworkinterviews were conducted with seniorcommand, managers, officers and policestaff across the PSNI, primarily acrossfour Districts (‘A’, ‘C’, ‘E’ and ‘G’)3

(for example, in response andneighbourhood policing, call handlingand enquiry office functions, training,crime investigation and management).In addition, interviews took placewith representatives of headquartersfunctions such as human resources,training, professional standards, crimedepartments and operational supportfunctions. The fieldwork utilised aqualitative approach with Inspectorscarrying out face-to-face individual orfocus group interviews with staff atvarious levels within the organisation.In addition CJI spoke to PSNIstakeholder organisations whorepresented service users includingVictim Support Northern Ireland,representatives from the NorthernIreland Policing Board’s reference groupsfor older persons, younger persons andmembers of minority ethnic groups.Inspectors also spoke to members of

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3 ‘A’ District comprises North and West Belfast; ‘C’ District comprises Ards, Castlereagh, North Down and Down; ‘E’ Districtcomprises Armagh, Craigavon, Banbridge and Newry and Mourne; ‘G’ District comprises Foyle, Limavady, Strabane andMagherafelt.

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the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendercommunity as well as to officers fromthe Board itself, and the Board’sCommunity Engagement Committee.Further details on the methodologycan be found in Appendix 1.

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Strategy and policy

2.1 The PSNI did not have a specific strategyor policy around customer focus orcitizen focus. This is in contrast to itsmost similar force peers which havespecific strategies and programmes, forexample in relation to the NationalQuality of Service Commitment.However, the arrival of the ChiefConstable in September 2009 has ledto a focus in direction at strategic levelin this area.

2.2 The Chief Constable had made clearhis “commitment to deliver personal,professional and protective policing inNorthern Ireland” 4 via media briefings,conference speeches and internalcommunications. This was a consistentmessage which had been reiteratedmany times since his arrival. During thecourse of the inspection fieldworkseveral officers spoken with referred tothese ‘Three P’s’ as they had becomeknown and it was clear that this visionwas beginning to filter through theorganisation, albeit there was a greaterawareness at Inspector ranks and above,and limited knowledge held byConstables working in operational roles.To reinforce his message all staff in the

Strategic intent

CHAPTER 2:

organisation had recently received aletter from the Chief Constable settingout this commitment to ‘personal,professional and protective’ policing andproviding an explanation as to what thismeant in reality for service delivery.This was brief information but moredetail would be required to ensureofficers fully understood what thismeant for their individual roles.

2.3 The PSNI were in a period of transitionduring the inspection. The organisationwas engaged in developing theirapproach to customer service andservice delivery and were formulatingplans to embed the Chief Constable’scommitment to ‘personal, professionaland protective’ policing. The Servicehad adopted the National PolicingImprovement Agency’s ConfidenceRoute Map and were developing thisas their Policing with the CommunityStrategy to be inclusive of communityengagement and contact management.The Route Map was developed to assistpolice forces in England and Wales todeliver against the Public ServiceAgreement public confidence target bysign-posting forces towards whatevidence suggests drive publicconfidence.

4 http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/psni-chief-baggots-vision-for-policing-14725143.html#ixzz0v9xRfcze

2.4 The Confidence Route Map sets out thefive themes of public confidence whichare intrinsically linked. They are to:

• tackle anti-social behaviour andcrime effectively;

• drive effective partnerships;• deliver a high quality local service;• develop an empowered, engaged,

confident team; and• work with, and for, the public.

These five themes were underpinned bythe drivers of confidence (for example,effective community engagement,targeted patrolling, effective jointproblem solving) and by the PolicingCommitments (a series of commitmentsbeing developed which were similarto the Policing Pledge in England andWales) which the PSNI were finalising atthe time of the inspection. These arediscussed in more detail below.

Governance arrangements

2.5 The projects being initiated under thebanner of the Confidence Route Mapwere discussed at the ServiceExcellence Programme Board. This waschaired jointly by the Assistant ChiefConstable Criminal Justice and theAssistant Chief Constable DistrictPolicing Urban, with representatives ofvarious projects together with humanresources, the Police Federation ofNorthern Ireland, media and publicrelations, information andcommunication services, processimprovement unit and the professionalstandards department. Inspectorsexamined the minutes of the sixmeetings that had taken place betweenFebruary and July 2010. The meetingsdid not have a structure with a reviewand update of each stage of the various

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projects as would flow from an overallprogramme plan, albeit general updateswere given. The introduction of such aplan should enable such governance tobe handled effectively.

2.6 In addition a Territorial Commanders’Forum had been set up which broughttogether District Commanders toshare practice and escalate issues toone of the territorial Assistant ChiefConstables, who chaired the Forum.Other forums also existed, for examplefor discipline and youth champions fromeach district and for Community SafetySuperintendents. It is critical that thereis an effective communication flow bothfrom and to the centre of theorganisation to ensure consistency ofapproach and that good practice iscaptured, communicated andimplemented.

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Management intent

CHAPTER 3:

Developing a customer service focus

3.1 The development of the PolicingCommitments formed part of the workaround the Confidence Route Map.These were similar in form to thePolicing Pledge which was still in useby some forces in England and Walesand made commitments to the publicaround areas such as updating victims,contact with local police and visibility.The Commitments were planned forlaunch in April 2011. The details of theCommitments should help to underpinthe delivery of good customer serviceby setting out the standards which thecustomer can expect to receive, forexample, in relation to contact withand access to the PSNI, responsivenessand updating, and the Commitmentsshould enable measurement ofperformance against these standards.

3.2 In addition to developing theCommitments the PSNI were alsoworking on a number of other projectswhich should enable the delivery of‘personal, professional and protective’policing. These included the resource torisk process which aimed to place moreofficers back in front-line roles, criminaljustice streamlining (for example,through a discretion pilot), the redesignof the contact management process(initially termed ‘Target OperatingModel’ but subsequently ‘R4’) and otherlocal crime and justice initiatives such as

developing an integrated offendermanagement programme.

3.3 It was planned that pilot projects wouldbe evaluated and refined in preparationfor full delivery by April 2011. The R4Project had been developed in responseto the PSNI’s identification of the fourkey areas which often led to cause forcomplaint by the public as being:

• access to services;• visibility;• response; and• updating.

This therefore aimed to deliver theRight people, in the Right place, at theRight time, doing the Right job to makea difference. R4 was, at the time of theinspection, being piloted in ‘E’ Districtto support the roll out of theCommitments which were due to becommunicated to the wider public inApril 2011. This aimed to address thekey areas for the public as outlinedabove by developing and delivering anew model for customer contact andmanagement. In addition Project Pumaaimed to support this by providingresponse and neighbourhood officerswith smart-phones which were capableof capturing and accessing data whilstout on patrol, therefore primarilyreducing errors and duplicationsregarding inputting, but also reducingtime spent on administration in stations

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and increasing officer visibility. This alsoprovided officers with a direct numberon which they could be contacted andthey received a reminder to updatevictims at set intervals regarding theprogress of the case. The plans forfurther roll-out of R4 were taken to theChief Constable’s Forum in August 2010and were approved, pending a fullbusiness case being prepared. Thiswould lead to R4 being rolled-out to ‘F’District 5 in December 2010 and otherdistricts during the start of 2011.

3.4 The PSNI, in preparing for the furtherroll-out of R4 had established a reviewteam and a project manager who wasplanning the future stages of theproject. The review team includedrepresentatives from relevant sectionsof the PSNI who could address issuesarising such as human resources,information and communication services,the Process Improvement Unit andlocal managers responsible forimplementation in ‘E’ District. Issueswhich had been identified includedtraining implications, technologicalfixes needed and cultural issues whichhad meant that not all officers werecompliant with the requirements of R4.Action was being taken to address thesematters and learning was being capturedfor use in the roll-out.

3.5 The PSNI’s Process Improvement Unithad also undertaken specific reviewsrelevant to the area of customer service,such as a review of the station enquiryassistant and station duty officerroles, together with a review of callmanagement. These reports made anumber of recommendations whichaimed to address the issues outlined in

relation to workloads of staff in theenquiry office, delays for customers inreceiving a response to their query andthe misdirection of calls. Inspectorswere advised that the PSNI wasaddressing these recommendationsthrough the R4 Project. This shouldresult in a reduction in duplication andstaff workloads and ultimately, a betterservice for customers.

3.6 The neighbourhood policing functionwas seen by most officers as key to thedelivery of good customer service andof delivering a personal policing service,although many officers were clear thatthe whole service had a responsibilityto deliver ‘personal, professional andprotective’ policing. Examples wereprovided of how the critical role ofneighbourhood policing teams was beingused to work in partnership with otherareas of the service. For example, intwo policing districts officers fromCrime Investigation Departments hadbeen co-located with neighbourhoodteams in order to provide betterintelligence and local knowledge tocrime investigations. Tactical SupportGroups spoken to who covered mostPSNI districts had developed an ‘adopt aneighbourhood’ approach where eachunit identified a neighbourhood in theirlocality which they would be connectedwith, for example, in attendingcommunity events and dealing withcommunity problems in consultationwith neighbourhood teams. These aregood examples of the translation of‘personal, professional and protective’policing into service delivery locally.However, the approach was notconsistent across all districts anddepartments as districts were developing

5 ‘F’ District comprises Cookstown, Omagh, Fermanagh, Dungannon and South Tyrone.

13

their own ideas for good practice on anindividual basis with limited sharingacross geographical and departmentalboundaries.

3.7 The focus on delivering a good servicewas also promoted by recognition andpublicity of good work done by policeofficers and staff. Internal awards andcertificates were referred to such aslocal recognition and good policework certificates, the Chief Constable’scommended and highly commendedawards and the annual Policing with theCommunity Awards. In addition, officersprovided examples of recognition andawards being provided by DistrictPolicing Partnerships, local communitiesbeing encouraged to nominate officersfor awards and good police work beingpublicised in the local media.

3.8 Inspectors heard a high level ofcommitment from officers at all levelsto delivering a good service to membersof the public, albeit in many cases theyhighlighted challenges in being able tofully realise this commitment. Moregenerally some officers described thestandards they worked to as beingguided by the Code of Ethics and thetargets set out in the 2010-13 PolicingPlan. The PSNI was moving away from atarget-based culture which focused onquantity rather than quality, and thePolicing Plan outlined the threeobjectives as service excellence, tacklingserious harm and personal policing -dealing with local concerns. Within theobjectives were performance indicatorsand targets. These had been localised inLocal Policing Plans under the threeobjectives.

Access for the public

3.9 The PSNI had made improvements totheir enquiry offices via a refurbishmentprogramme to make them more user-friendly and easy to access. Inspectorsfound the enquiry office areas to begenerally of a good standard ofcleanliness with relevant informationavailable to customers via posters andleaflets, albeit with little information onneighbourhood teams. The PSNI hadalso begun to explore alternativemethods of access for customers in lightof the reluctance of some communitiesto visit police stations and the uninvitingnature of the external view of somestations. The need for such alternativeshad increased with the closure ofstations or the move to limited openinghours in some locations. The DistrictPolicing Partnerships were consultedby the PSNI in relation to such changesto local stations. Some districts hadpurchased mobile police stations orhad set up police surgeries.

3.10 The increased security threat hadimpacted on the ability to deploy mobilestations or hold surgeries in some areas.However, in two districts Inspectorswere given examples where the PSNIcontinued to direct officers at a specifictime and to a designated place despite alack of engagement by the localcommunity; in one case apparently fortwo years. Whilst the District PolicingPartnership had supported the settingup of this, it would appear that therewas insufficient support from the widercommunity. Whilst acknowledging thedifficulties in some areas due to thelevel of security threat, it would bebeneficial for the PSNI to thoroughlyexplore the use of alternativelocations, such as in retail areas or

14

community centres, as potentiallocations to interact with the public,which would be utilised by, andbeneficial to, members of the public.

3.11 The PSNI website provided advice andlegal information for the public (forexample regarding domestic abuse,drugs, firearms and parades), supportinformation (for example reporting acrime, making a complaint) as well asupdates (appeals for information, missingpersons), information on the PSNI itselfand careers within it and a specificsection for young people. The websitealso had individual sections for eachdistrict which were generally keptupdated with district news (such asarrests in the locality) and a welcomemessage from the Commander. ThePSNI were in the process of appointing aPress Officer from the Media and PublicRelations Department to each districtand it would be useful if this individualwere able to update local pages withcurrent information, keeping to thecorporate format, rather than thisneeding to be undertaken centrally byone individual. In addition there was asection for each area of the districttogether with pages for eachneighbourhood sector. Every pagerelating to a sector contained detailsof the neighbourhood officers (forexample the Inspector, Sergeant andNeighbourhood Constables) but therewas variation as to whether namedofficers were listed for each specificward or estate in the sector and thecontact details provided (some sectorsprovided mobile telephone numbersfor each individual officer whilst somesimply provided the 0845 number).

3.12 There was no corporate approachto website content with some areas

and sectors demonstrating an excellentuse of the website with podcasts,photographs and detailed localinformation such as current issues beingaddressed, neighbourhood meetings andcontact details for partner organisations,where others contained a minimumamount of information. Whilst some ofthis could be explained due to differentlevels of security threat across thedistricts there did not appear to beuniformity of information, even of thatwhich would not have required namingindividual officers.

3.13 One example of this is that not allsectors provided an email address tocontact the neighbourhood team. Of apossible 88 sectors only 44 listed anemail address on their section of thewebsite for the neighbourhood team.In order to assess the ability of thepublic to access the PSNI via thismethod, CJI Inspectors contacted theneighbourhood teams by email (using apseudonym to disguise the source of therequest) asking for details of the nextcommunity meeting which a member ofthe public could attend to hear whatpolice were doing in the area. Within amonth an email had been received inresponse to 24 of the 41 emails sent(some areas used a common emailaddress for more than one sector).Where responses were received thesewere useful and informative; in manycases requesting further information onthe specific location of the resident butmany also provided details of localmeetings, named officers, an offer ofdiscussions about issues or sought togain the support of the resident to beinvolved in setting up a local groupwhere none were in existence.

3.14 Some districts and departments

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provided excellent examples of usingsocial networking as a way of connectingwith customers, particularly youngerpeople, such as through Facebook andTwitter pages or via special interestwebsites, for example regarding safe carcustomisation. One Facebook page had5,800 followers in the local area. ThePSNI’s social media activity at the timeof the inspection was a pilot project andon continual assessment with a view toexpanding to other areas. Inspectorsrecommend the PSNI shoulddevelop a corporate approach tomaximising attempts to developand utilise alternative forms ofaccess for members of the publicin consultation with customers.

Staff development and empowerment

3.15 Call handlers had received ‘soft-skillstraining’ which had been delivered priorto the setting up of call managementcentres. Call handlers described thetraining they had received, for examplein dealing with aggressive or suicidalcallers. The training had incorporatedpractical exercises where handlers wereassessed. In addition some staff workingon the main switchboard had attendedtraining for district call handlers toenhance their awareness of the function.Switchboard operators had also receivedtraining from BT to refresh their skills.However, in the main, call handlingtraining was not delivered until aftercall handling had gone live in districts.

3.16 Officers working in response orneighbourhood roles had not, in themain, received training which focused oncustomer service or how a good qualityservice should be delivered. Referencesto this area were mainly incorporatedinto other forms of delivery such as in

briefings to teams of officers (forexample on the need to ensure victimsare kept updated) or in district trainingsessions. One district training team hadprovided customer service training toabout 500 officers in the districtthrough a presentation on the citizenfocus/customer service ‘listen’(Listen, Inspire, Support,Takeownership, Explain,Notify) principles.In developing this workshop, aquestionnaire about the service providedto the community was sent to all staff inthe district. The results were used toidentify misconceptions held by staff,some of which were addressed throughthe ‘listen’ training. Feedback suggestedthat officers found this training usefulalthough, regrettably, the programmeended due to pressure to move ontoother training.

3.17 Some supervisors in another district andin Tactical Support Groups had receivedcustomer service training delivered bytwo retired senior officers from Englandwhich was felt to be useful. Theirdistrict trainers had also provided aninput on the ‘listen’ principles as well asa community-based programme wherepolice officers met with members ofthe community to discuss issues,address misconceptions and enhanceunderstanding from both perspectives.Whilst CJI recognise the initiativedemonstrated by training delivered inthese districts and for the TacticalSupport Groups this underlines the lackof a corporate approach to customerservice training.

3.18 The PSNI had developed aNeighbourhood ManagementProgramme which commenced in 2009for officers involved in neighbourhoodpolicing duties. This was a self-directed

programmes, to fully embed PwC principlesacross the whole service (paragraph 4.14);

and that:

“Inspectors believe that a more overtapproach to Policing with the Communityprinciples throughout the trainingprogramme would assist officers and helpto embed the principles in the wider policeservice” (paragraph 4.19).

These suggestions would help to embedthe customer focus into training forall officers by placing the emphasis onputting the user first. The follow-up ofthese suggestions will be undertaken byCJI in the 2010-11 inspectionprogramme.

learning programme containing eightmodules which was accredited by theChartered Institute of Management.A total of 22 officers had completedthe programme and a further 117 wereenrolled on it. There was a low levelof awareness of this course fromneighbourhood officers spoken to with aprevailing view that new officers had tolearn the requirements on the job. Thisawareness should increase over time asmore officers undertake and completethe course. Station enquiry assistantsalso reported that they had not receivedjob-specific training and most could notdefinitively say who their line managerwas. Stakeholder organisationscommented that the input to trainingprovided by community groups at thePolice College had reduced in recentyears, although these organisations stillstrived to offer training where possible.For example 400 officers had recentlyundertaken Islamic awareness trainingand one children’s and young people’sorganisation had been involved in settingup youth consultation and engagementevents for the College.

3.19 The CJI inspection of Policing with theCommunity

6made suggestions for

improvement in the area of trainingwhich included that:

“skills identified by the Training NeedsAnalysis as being necessary forneighbourhood policing officers such asdeveloping and managing communityrelationships, should be interwoven not justinto initial officer training, but also intoDetective training, Police-Officer Part-Timetraining and other operational training

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6 CJINI, Policing with the Community: An inspection of Policing with the Community in Northern Ireland, March 2009.

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The impact of the operational contexton staff behaviour

4.1 It was clear from interviews with a widerange of officers at the point of servicedelivery that they felt constrained by avariety of issues including perceivedpressure of work, the security threat andunnecessary bureaucracy. The increasingsecurity threat was a constantbackground to the work of PSNI officersand was seen as a major barrier todelivering a good customer service tocommunities. The impact of this waswidespread, for example in relation toofficers’ priorities, the ability to patrolor attend requests for assistance, thecontinuing need to use officers forpublic order policing and the level ofresources required to address thedissident threat. In addition whilst manyofficers stated that individually theirwish was to deliver good customerservice, they stated that in theirestimation they had not been able to doso because of the perceived pressures ofwork and bureaucracy. Supervisors andother leaders spoken to concurred withthese observations and indicated thattheir focus was on what the policecould do with resources available tothem rather than what could beachieved to meet customer needs.Overall there was a fragmentedapproach to many areas of servicedelivery which are discussed below.

Disseminating the ‘Three P’s’

4.2 Despite the leadership from the top ofthe organisation regarding the ChiefConstable’s commitment to the ‘ThreeP’s’ many officers and staff commentedon the delay in providing clarity as towhat the commitment to ‘personal,professional and protective’ policing meantin reality and how this should beoperationalised into day-to-day servicedelivery. They highlighted this delay asbeing between the arrival of the ChiefConstable in September 2009 and thecirculation of the Chief Constable‘sletter in June 2010, which was the firstguidance they had received. In theabsence of a widely understooddirection from the centre of theorganisation some districts haddeveloped their own strategies andapproaches to this; for example onedistrict had introduced the ‘Five P’s’(Pride; Punctual; Polite; Positive stepsof investigation; and Progress updates)and in another an action plan had beendeveloped based on the ‘Three P’s’.

4.3 This meant that the Chief Constable’scommitment was already beinginterpreted in different ways acrosssome of the eight districts and therewas a danger this could spread to otherdistricts and departments. This couldlead to a lack of consistency for thosereceiving a service from the PSNI as the

Implementation challenges

CHAPTER 4:

message was not being fully understoodby staff and may not be interpreted asthe Chief Constable intends in future.In addition these different messages hadled to confusion by officers and staff asto where the priority lay and wasleading to disengagement with theoverall strategic aim of the ChiefConstable.

4.4 The PSNI had considered, in broadterms, the need for communication ofthe Chief Constable’s message but thiswas yet to be formalised. The PSNI wasdeveloping a communications plan at thetime of the inspection fieldwork as tohow the Policing Commitments wouldbe communicated both internally andexternally. This included elements ofactivity as to how ‘personal, professionaland protective’ policing would underpinthe Commitments and becommunicated. Communication of thisneeds to be unambiguous withexplanations as to how this fits with thevision of ‘personal, professional andprotective’ policing, in order that staffreceive clear messages regarding theChief Constable’s ambition. Inspectorswelcome the development of this planand the out-workings of it and suggestthat as part of an overallcommunications strategy the PSNIshould make clear to all officersand staff what the commitment for‘personal, professional andprotective’ policing means at thepoint of service delivery.

The challenge of delivering personal,professional and protective policing

4.5 Whilst the PSNI had recognised theneed to make improvements in the areaof customer service at the time of the

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inspection, organisational culture did notplace customers at the centre of servicedelivery. This was evidenced in theapproach to call handling, the approachto updating victims and by the evidenceof stakeholders. The PSNI received210,693 emergency calls and 2,701,970non-emergency calls in 2009-10. Acontract had been awarded in 2009 tobegin undertaking mystery shopperexercises but this was designed to assesscall handling of the 0845 number inrelation to issues which did not requirea police response (for example, the costof a firearms licence). The PSNI did nothowever have any user groups orarrangements in place to assess theirperformance in relation to call handlingfrom customers who had contacted thePSNI via the 999 or 0845 numbers. ThePSNI had indicated to managers theirintention to civilianise the role of callhandling for emergency calls but did notappear, to interviewees in thesefunctions, to have considered the impactof this change on the service provided.

4.6 Several officers were asked about theissue of updating victims. Specificquestions were asked as to who madedecisions, how often victims are updatedand whether any consideration had beengiven to the victim specifying howfrequently they would like to be updatedon the progress of their case. Mostofficers did not appear to have givenconsideration as to whether victimsshould specify the frequency of update.Whilst most were fairly open-mindedabout it one commented that “it wouldbe dangerous to ask the victims how oftenthey want to be kept updated” and wenton to suggest that some people wouldwant to be kept updated every couple ofdays or so.

4.7 Louise Casey, the first VictimsCommissioner has stated7 ‘Nearly everyvictim of crime wants the system to deliverjustice for their individual case. The vastmajority of victims, however – around 80%– say they don’t want additional help fromthat system. And among those that do, themajority just want information about theircase. However, with very few exceptions,there is no targeting of support for thosewith the most needs – some people indesperate need get no help, while help andsupport are offered to those who do notrequire it’. Inspectors would advise thatconsideration should be given tothe views of the customer whendetermining timescales for contactin addition to consideration of theseriousness of the crime (for example,a homicide case may require severalupdates to be provided in one daywhereas an incident of criminal damageor shoplifting may only require one ortwo updates, particularly if no offenderis detected).

4.8 In addition stakeholder representativesgave examples of how they perceivedofficers did not have the serviceprovided to the customer as theirprimary focus. For example it wassuggested that in cases where membersof a minority ethnic community werethe subject of hate crime that the initialreaction from police officers was thatthe best option for their safety was tomove, rather than dealing with threats ina pro-active manner.

Call management

4.9 The PSNI had issued a ServiceProcedure in relation to call handlingand management, as well as a policy on

call grading. These made reference tothe National Call Handling Standards asintroduced by the Association of ChiefPolice Officers which the PSNI hadimplemented. The standards providedtargets in relation to answeringemergency and non-emergency callsand in grading calls as priority, scheduledand resolution without deployment.The service procedure also set out bestpractice in answering telephone calls,handling calls and use of voicemail.Staff working in call handling functionswere aware of the appropriate standardsin relation to answering calls andwere observed in a standardised manner.The PSNI provided training to callhandlers using examples of callersrequiring different levels of response asrelating to the call grading policy.Training had also been delivered aroundsuicidal callers and this is to bewelcomed. There was however nocommon definition or understandingaround vulnerable callers (for example,in relation to specific categories of calleror repeat victims) or specific actions tobe taken if a caller was determined tobe vulnerable, other than grading thecall as emergency or priority. It issuggested that a common definitionand guidance on dealing withvulnerable callers would bebeneficial to assist call handlers intheir decision-making.

4.10 Call management centres had beenset-up on a district basis. Callers whodialled 999 were directed to BelfastRegional Control if they were callingwithin the Greater Belfast region or totheir local call management centre (ineach district) if outside of GreaterBelfast. All emergency calls were

19

7 Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses 2010, The poor relation - victims in the criminal justice system, 20 July 2010.

answered by police call handlers andthey then dispatched a police crew tothe incident, if appropriate. Calls to thePSNI non-emergency 0845 number weredirected to their local call managementcentre if it was possible to identify thearea in which the call originated from.Calls to the local (028) 90 telephonenumber were directed to the mainswitchboard in PSNI headquarters aswell as internal calls and calls to the0845 number where the call could notbe directed to an appropriate callmanagement centre (for example callsmade from mobile telephones oroutside of Northern Ireland). Manymembers of the public still continuedto use the (028) 90 number, despite thewide publication of the 0845 number,possibly because of a lack of awarenessor concerns around the cost of callcharges to this number. Non-emergencycalls were answered by police staff orpolice officers in call handling but anydispatch of a police crew wasundertaken by a police officer.

4.11 The PSNI’s policy on victims andwitnesses stated that the InvestigatingOfficer should leave a business card withvictims including their contact name. Itstated that the victims should be advisedto make contact with the InvestigatingOfficer as soon as they have any furtherinformation about the crime or if theyneed information on the progress of theinvestigation. The policy also stated thatthe victim should be informed that if theInvestigating Officer is not on duty theOccurrence Case Management Team,which operates 9am - 5pm Monday toFriday, may be able to assist. It wasunclear from the policy, however, whoshould deal with such queries out ofhours when the Investigating Officer wasoff duty. As outlined below the PSNI

were moving towards provision ofindividual contact numbers for officersand Contact Management Centres todeal with such queries when officerswere off duty.

4.12 When passing calls operators did notprovide a ‘warm handover’ whichinvolves explaining to the recipientwho the caller is and what servicethey require. This meant thereforethat callers may have had to statetheir request on several occasions,particularly if they or the operator wereunclear as to who was best placed tohandle their query initially. This wasexacerbated by the limited use of thevoicemail facility, telephone call divertsand ‘hunt’ groups (the ability todistribute phone calls from a singletelephone number to a group of severalphone lines), missing or out-of-dateinformation on the ‘white’ pagestelephone directory along with front-line police officers listing the enquiryoffice number as their personal contactnumber. This led in some areas to longwait times to speak to enquiry officestaff, where many calls were directedfrom switchboard or elsewhere.Although efforts had been made toreduce call volume to enquiry officessome staff still raised this as an issue,particularly in busy stations.

4.13 Inspectors were advised that informalassessment of the call volume toswitchboard by staff from BT hadindicated that a handover where thePSNI switchboard operator explainedthe caller’s requirements whentransferring the call to another PSNIcall handler, specific department orindividual extension would not bepossible due to the high volume of callsreceived. Analysis of a sample of 1,958

20

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calls received by the headquartersswitchboard, undertaken for a internalPSNI report, revealed 14.9% (292) ofcalls were unable to be transferred andwere consequently returned to theswitchboard. The subject of callhandling will be returned to in aspecific inspection by CJI in its 2010-11inspection programme. In the meantimeit is recommended that thePSNI should make better useof telephony solutions to enableswitchboard operators to directcallers to the appropriate pointof contact for their query.

4.14 The issue of directing customers tothe relevant point of contact alsocaused difficulties in the operationalenvironment where the needs of thepolice appeared to be put before theneeds of the service user. One exampleof this was where, on occasions, amember of the public arrived at theenquiry desk to meet with theInvestigating Officer for a pre-arrangedappointment to find that the Officerwas out on patrol or unavailable. Theenquiry assistant would then have tocontact the Investigating Officer oranother response officer out on patroland request that they return to thestation to take a statement despitewarranted officers being in the station.This caused delays and frustrations forthe member of the public as well asfrustration for the PSNI staff involved.In addition the lack of accurate orup-to-date information on officers’locations, contact details or shiftpatterns in internal directories asoutlined above, made it difficult for onepart of the organisation to direct

customers to an appropriate point ofcontact. This emphasises the need forplacing the customer at the heart ofservice delivery.

Neighbourhood policing

4.15 The National Policing ImprovementAgency’s Local Policing and ConfidenceUnit provides a useful outline of thepurpose of neighbourhood policingstating:8

‘Neighbourhood Policing aims to providepeople who live or work in a neighbourhoodwith:

• Access - to local policing servicesthrough a named point of contact;

• Influence - over policing priorities intheir neighbourhood;

• Interventions - joint action withpartners and the public; and

• Answers - sustainable solutions andfeedback on what is being done.

This means that neighbourhood teams:

• publicise how to get in touch with them;• find out what the local issues are that

make people feel unsafe in theirneighbourhood and ask them to putthem in order of priority;

• decide with partners and local peoplewhat should be done to deal with thosepriorities and work with them to deliverthe solutions; and

• let people know what is being doneand find out if they are satisfied withthe results.

Neighbourhood policing is about engagingwith local communities to identify theirconcerns and priorities, increasing police

8 Local Policing and Confidence Unit website: www.neighbourhoodpolicing.co.uk/neighbourhood, National PolicingImprovement Agency.

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visibility but also, and crucially, working withlocal communities to solve problems thatmatter to them.’

It is critical that the PSNI has acorporate understanding ofneighbourhood policing in terms of itsdefinition, how it should be implementedand how it knows that delivery iseffective.

4.16 Neighbourhood policing is therefore acritical area of customer service in thatthe functions of neighbourhood policingare key to engaging with customers,working with communities anddelivering customer-focused solutions.Increasingly neighbourhood policing isproviding a link between communitiesand the police when elements ofinvestigation such as searches are beingcarried out. Under the ServiceExcellence objective of the PolicingPlan two of these targets were:

• to increase the number of policeofficers assigned to neighbourhoodand response policing roles by 600;and

• to increase the percentage of timespent by police officers onoperational duty outside stationsby 6% points.

Inspectors were advised byrepresentatives from the Policing Boardthat the target from the 2009-12Policing Plan ‘to ensure thatNeighbourhood Officers work at least80% of their duty hours on neighbourhoodpolicing duties’ had proved unworkablebecause of the discrepancies aroundwhat constituted ‘neighbourhood policingduties’. The PSNI’s abstraction policycontained a definition of abstraction andlisted activities which would not be

recorded as an abstraction (for example,annual leave or a rest day).

4.17 The continued abstraction of officersfrom neighbourhood policing dutiesundermines the Chief Constable’scommitment to ‘personal, professional andprotective’ policing. Some officers toldInspectors that this continued tobe an issue (as the target was still inoperation in some Local Policing Plans)with neighbourhood officers beingtasked to undertake prison runs,perform security duties for quarryblasting or to provide cover forshortages in response sections. Oneofficer commented “this organisation seesneighbourhood policing as polyfilla; justwaiting to be used on other tasks”. Issuessuch as shortages in response sections,bureaucracy and the delineation of rolesand responsibilities all impact on theabstraction of officers. The PSNI werebeginning to address some of theseissues through the Resource to RiskProject, which aimed to place officersback onto front-line duties.

4.18 When neighbourhood policing was ableto function effectively, Inspectors heardexcellent examples of local initiativesundertaken to address anti-socialbehaviour and local concerns, includingin areas where police would previouslynot have been welcomed. Stakeholdersalso described some excellent projectsin which they were working inpartnership with the PSNI. Exampleswere provided in relation to a‘marginalised youth forum’ in NorthBelfast between youth workers, policeand young people and organisationsworking as a ‘critical friend’ to improveservice delivery. However they alsodescribed barriers which they feltdiluted the efforts police had gone to,

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Working in partnership

4.20 Local initiatives at neighbourhood areaor district level had led to some formaland informal partnership arrangementsbeing developed to deal withneighbourhood issues through localforums or to address specific types ofcrime (for example, the co-location of aWomen’s Aid worker with DomesticAbuse Officers in three districts). Therewas not a strategic approach to joined-up service delivery with partners orstandards relating to how customersof the PSNI could be directed to therelevant partner for the service theyrequired. The CJI inspection of Policingwith the Community recommended theintroduction of legislation, equivalent tothe Crime and Disorder Act 1998, toestablish obligatory partnerships.The introduction of the Act in Englandand Wales established obligatorypartnerships between the police, localauthorities, probation service, healthauthorities, the voluntary sector, as wellas local residents and businesses.The PSNI believe this will bring benefitsin ensuring that all partners have aresponsibility for crime and disorderwhich will lead to better co-ordinationof effort.

4.21 Neighbourhood teams had been askedto develop neighbourhood profilesduring the implementation of Policingwith the Community. These includedsocial, economic and demographicdetails of the community as well asdetails of neighbourhood officers and, insome, key partners and individuals in thecommunity. There was a wide variationin awareness, accessibility, usefulness andcurrency of these profiles. In addition,they did not map out vulnerablecommunities within the neighbourhood

for example the moving of Hate IncidentMinority Liaison Officers to rolesperceived as no longer regularly visiblein the community (although the majorityhad moved to Neighbourhood PolicingTeams it was suggested by somestakeholders that some had moved toless visible response roles), theabandonment of network supportofficers or the use of neighbourhoodofficers to perform public order dutiesat parades. Whilst it is appreciated thatthere are operational requirements forthe use of officers in this way, it isimportant that the potential impact inthe confidence of communities isconsidered when detailing officers toduties which may bring them intoconflict with the public.

4.19 Whilst time spent on neighbourhoodduties was no longer an overall target inthe Policing Plan the difficulties inensuring neighbourhood officers wereable to undertake effective communityengagement in their areas illustrates thedisconnect between the strategic intentof the PSNI and the operational realitiesas experienced by customers. It isclearly critical to the success ofneighbourhood policing that the PSNIutilises the skills and knowledge ofneighbourhood officers to deliverneighbourhood policing in theircommunities and ensures they are notabstracted to provide support to otherparts of the service. CJI recommendsthe reintroduction to the PolicingPlan of the target thatneighbourhood officers work atleast 80% of their duty hours onneighbourhood policing duties to adefinition of abstraction agreedwith, and monitored by, theNorthern Ireland Policing Board(NIPB).

24

sectors and in some areas there was alack of clarity as to who was responsiblefor keeping them updated. In order toensure information is relevant anduseful, neighbourhood profiles needto be comprehensive, user-friendly,up-to-date and contain details of keypartnerships for neighbourhoodteams and other district staff.

Lack of delivery standards

4.22 At the time of the inspection officers didnot have any standards or targets whichfocused on delivering a good customerservice, or which assisted to ensure theorganisation had a customer-focusedculture and attitudes. Other than inrelation to call handling as outlinedabove, other areas of initial contactwith the PSNI did not have associateddelivery standards. For exampleInspectors were told there were nostandards in place regarding responsetimes for letters or emails. There hadbeen no articulation as to how theethos of delivering ‘personal, professionaland protective’ policing providedminimum standards for delivery althoughthe development of the PolicingCommitments aimed to fill this gap.Enquiry office staff described thedifficulties faced in providing a goodservice to customers when balancing thedemand of callers to the station (forexample to sign bail, to make astatement, to speak to an officer or tomake a general enquiry), telephone callsto the office from internal numbers,those forwarded from the switchboardor call handling plus administrativeduties.

4.23 The PSNI had identified issues inrelation to workload of the enquiryoffice, such as those outlined above, and

had put some steps in place to attemptto reduce this, for example by removingone of the two telephone lines intoeach enquiry office, repositioning thecomputer terminal and attempting toavoid the use of the enquiry office as thedefault destination for telephone calls.This should assist in reducing theworkload but the PSNI needs tocontinue to strive to manage this better.

Consultation and strategy development

4.24 Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act1998 requires the PSNI to consultwith the public in a meaningful wayregarding the development of policy.The standards for a proper consultationexercise are known as the SedleyRequirements (having been set out byStephen Sedley, QC in the case R vBrent London Borough Council, exparte Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168).The Sedley Requirements are:

• consultation must be made at a timewhen proposals are at a formativestage; sufficient reasons for theproposal must be provided to allowintelligent consideration andresponse;

• adequate time must be given forresponse; and

• the product of the consultation mustbe conscientiously taken into accountin finalising proposals.

4.25 Consultations on policies and somestrategies were generally undertaken byway of a paper exercise with the PSNIcirculating a drafted document around alist of consultees appropriate to thetopic. The PSNI also had a ‘consultationzone’ on their website whereconsultations could be accessed.Whilst organisations involved in such

25

consultations welcomed the opportunityto provide comment they indicated thatthey did not feel the consultationprocess was always effective in givingthem an opportunity to truly influencethe PSNI’s policy or strategy. Forexample interviewees from two of thePolicing Board’s Reference Groups whowere also members of the PSNI’sIndependent Advisory Groups statedthat PSNI consultations were not alwayswritten in user-friendly language andtherefore it was difficult for them tocomment on things they did notnecessarily understand. A representativefrom one voluntary organisation alsocommented that consultation should beundertaken sooner in the process ofpolicy development. This supports viewsexpressed previously in CJI’s inspectionof Policing with the Community9.

4.26 At a strategic level the NIPB wasresponsible for agreeing and publishingthe Policing Plan and monitoring policeperformance against annual targets. Oneof the major sources of input indeveloping the Policing Plan prioritieswas District Policing Partnerships withwhom both the PSNI and Policing Boardconsult. District Policing Partnershipsalso input to the development processfor Local Policing Plans by engaging withArea and District Commanders. DistrictPolicing Partnerships were highlighted bythe majority of interviewees as theirprimary source of local consultation.

4.27 In most areas there were other groupsor partnerships which providedconsultation mechanisms at differentgeographical levels such as:

• Community Safety Partnerships (atcouncil area level);

• Community Police LiaisonCommittees (at neighbourhoodlevel);

• ‘Partners and Communities Together’meetings and panels (atneighbourhood level) which allprovided the opportunity for policeto engage with communities orpartners to address issues at a locallevel.

Some neighbourhood officers outlinedhow they had been asked to set upPartners and Communities Together intheir neighbourhoods but already hadpre-existing engagement mechanismswhich were working well, for exampleCommunity Police Liaison Committees,and therefore they had continued withthat model. In this respect theterminology that is used is unimportant;it is whether the engagement process iseffective (for all parties) that mattersmost and whether there is appropriateaccountability and governance structuresin place.

4.28 At the time of the inspection the PSNIwas developing a stakeholder strategy,which was considering the ways theservice could engage better with harderto reach and less visible groups.The PSNI set up Independent AdvisoryGroups for the Service in respect ofolder persons, disability andmulticultural communities in 2004, thelesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendercommunity in 2007 and a youthIndependent Advisory Group morerecently. Independent Advisory Groupsare recognised throughout the policeservice, in England,Wales and Scotland,as an effective means of working withmembers of the community to solveproblems, deal effectively with critical

9 CJINI, Policing with the Community: An inspection of Policing with the Community in Northern Ireland, March 2009.

incidents and improve the way thepolice deliver their services. Inspectorsspoke to a youth Independent AdvisoryGroup in one district visited who hadbeen involved in reviewing policies andstrategies which impacted on youngpeople and were highly motivated toprovide a service to the police.Inspectors also spoke to members ofthe Policing Board’s various ReferenceGroups (which perform a similarfunction to Independent AdvisoryGroups), many of whom were alsomembers of the police’s AdvisoryGroups.

4.29 There was a general sense thatmembers of these groups did not feelsufficiently valued by the PSNI andbelieved they could contribute morethan they were presently being enabledto. Members of one group provided anexample where a member of thecommunity who they represented wasbadly assaulted and the group contactedthe PSNI to ask if they should meet (toperform the critical incidents function asoutlined above) but the perception ofthe group was that the police seemeduninterested and they received nofurther feedback as to actions taken.The PSNI had consulted some of theIndependent Advisory Groups onservice procedures although it may havebeen beneficial to provide morefeedback to members on the outcomeof these consultations in order that theyare better informed of the outcomes oftheir contributions. Independent

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Advisory Group members hadcompleted critical incident training.Community Safety Branch had alsodeveloped networks for engaging withyoung people, particularly in specificareas where there was a difficultrelationship between police and youngpeople. Inspectors look forward to thelonger-term impact of this engagement.

4.30 It was also highlighted by onestakeholder that whilst District PolicingPartnerships provide a consultationmechanism for the policing area, it isunlikely that in most locations thefull range of Section 75 groups10 arerepresented. In 2008, 23 of the 26District Policing Partnerships werereconstituted to ensure that the politicalmembership reflected that of the localCouncil. This process triggered therecruitment of independent membersto the 23 affected District PolicingPartnerships to ensure that the overallmembership was representative of thedistrict. The results of this recruitmentexercise indicated that of the 211independent members across the 23Partnerships, 13% stated they had adisability, 2% were from an ethnicminority background and 2% describedthemselves as lesbian, gay, bisexual ortransgender with only 6% being aged 25or under and 16% aged 61 or over11.The Independent Advisory Groups aretherefore well placed to fill these gapsin relation to specific Section 75 groups.In addition, Hate Incident MinorityLiaison Officers could provide a source

10 Section 75 and Schedule 9 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 came into force on the 1 January 2000 and placed a statutoryobligation on public authorities in carrying out their various functions relating to Northern Ireland, to have due regard to theneed to promote equality of opportunity:• between persons of different religious belief, political opinion, racial group, age, marital status or sexual orientation;• between men and women generally;• between persons with a disability and persons without; and• between persons with dependants and persons without.

11 ‘Forming new partnerships’, DPP News, Summer 2007, Northern Ireland Policing Board.

of information obtained from specificcommunity groups but appropriateco-ordination is needed to capture this.

4.31 Inspectors were also advised ofspecific methods of consultation andengagement in different districts wheremechanisms had been set up, ofteninformally, to engage with specificgroups. A group had been set upwhereby ‘Children’s Champions’ fromeach district met with representativesfrom the Policing Board and youthorganisations to discuss issues impactingon children and young people.Inspectors also heard about examplesof engagement with business groups, ayouth council, a community forum(with local churches and organisations)and with local residents via housingassociations. There was no evidencehowever that these examples of goodpractice were shared across theorganisation so that the benefits couldbe fully exploited and a consistentapproach could be developed.Inspectors recommend that thePSNI should develop a moreconsistent approach to the use ofimaginative ways of undertakingconsultation, including betterengagement with IndependentAdvisory Groups.

Project management

4.32 The ongoing projects had individualplans which identified the actions,timescales and owners required forimplementation. However, there wasnot an overall programme plan whichdrew all the strands together indicatingthe dependencies between the projects,the overall risks and assumptions, theoverall schedule showing the sequencingof projects and the monitoring and

control activities. For example thecivilianisation of call handling functionscould potentially lead to an initial dip inthe quality of customer service deliveryif enough staff with the right skills arenot recruited. Therefore plans toimplement this project at the same timeas the introduction of the Commitmentscould be an overall risk which needs tobe escalated and managed appropriately.Whilst the ‘Target Operating Model’(R4) or the Confidence Route Map weresuggested as the way of co-ordinatingall the activities and projects, the PSNIcould not describe to Inspectors howthis would be achieved in practice.Representatives from the Policing Boardalso indicated that they would welcomesuch a plan. The PSNI shouldco-ordinate the ongoing ServiceExcellence Policing with theCommunity projects using projectmanagement principles (includingdependencies and identificationand management of risks) toaccomplish the overall objectiveof Policing with the Communitythrough ‘personal, professional andprotective’ policing.

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Outcomes

CHAPTER 5:

Measuring outcomes

5.1 The remit of the Northern IrelandPolicing Board (NIPB) includesundertaking overall monitoring of thePolicing Plan and holding the ChiefConstable to account. The Boardadvised that it had set up mechanisms bywhich to monitor the target regardingthe number of officers returned tofront-line service delivery roles andwere developing a performanceframework to monitor Policing withthe Community and the PolicingCommitments. They also identified arole for the District PolicingPartnerships to monitor this locally, aswell as to monitor the PSNI’s deliveryof the Policing Commitments locallywhen they are rolled-out.

5.2 The PSNI were also developing amechanism to monitor theirperformance against the PolicingCommitments internally after roll-out.This included a variety of pre-existingmeasurement methods depending on theindividual Commitment including surveydata (for example, from the PolicingBoard’s survey and the Northern IrelandCrime Survey), user satisfaction surveys,call backs at district level and mysteryshopper exercises. The need for andimportance of such measurement wasrecognised at a senior level with plansfor the PSNI chief officer team toundertake call backs during the year.

The PSNI planned to have a ‘watchdog’or inspection team to collate themeasures and disseminate learningacross the organisation. The overviewprovided of the justification forusing these measures, the manner inwhich they would be used to assessperformance and the frequency ofmeasurement appeared to give goodcoverage and ensure regular assessmentof the quality of service delivered.Greater detail however would berequired prior to its implementation.

5.3 The PSNI were planning to undertakeuser satisfaction/public perceptionsurveys on a monthly basis once theCommitments were implemented inApril 2011. These were planned toprovide an assessment of the satisfactionlevels associated with the serviceprovided by the police in an area asreported by victims of:

• offences against the person;• domestic burglary;• hate crime;• anti-social behaviour; and• criminal damage.

These would replace previous surveysundertaken known as the ‘VictimsSurvey’ (the Quality of Service Survey)which provided an assessment ofsatisfaction levels in specific areas (forexample domestic burglary, violentcrimes etc.). An alternative approach

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however could be to add more detailedand specific questions to the NorthernIreland Victims and Witnesses Surveyalready in existence, with the caveat thatthis is a broader survey covering thewhole of the criminal justice system.Whilst these ‘Victims Surveys’ (theQuality of Service Surveys) showed apositive start in seeking feedback fromvictims there was no evidence as to howthe information obtained by thesesurveys was used to inform or improveworking practices. In addition, theinformation obtained was not sufficientlydetailed to enable the PSNI to identifywhere issues regarding dissatisfaction lay.This type of information is important asit enables the PSNI to identify whereimprovements in service delivery can bemade in volume crime areas which cutacross districts. Inspectors look forwardto future outputs of work in this area.

5.4 In the absence of such measures ofservice delivery being in place already,some districts had implemented theirown quality assurance measures.Inspectors were advised byrepresentatives from several districtsand Belfast Regional Control that dip-sampling processes had been introducedto assess the quality of service providedby using a victim call back system. Onedistrict, for example, had introduced thisin relation to victims of burglary as itwas a priority issue for the locality.Some districts had undertakencommunity surveys to assess localconfidence, in some areas supported byDistrict Policing Partnerships. Againthere had been a lack of corporateapproach to such quality assurance ofservice delivery in the past but the workongoing should address this issue andimplement such procedures as standard.The treatment of detainees was assessed

by Independent Custody Visitors, aScheme managed by the Policing Boardwhich oversees the operation of theScheme and provides feedback to thePSNI on issues of concern or requiringremedial action.

5.5 In the absence of quantitative dataInspectors obtained qualitativeinformation from PSNI officers andfrom stakeholders about the qualityof service delivered. The vast majorityof interviewees commented thatneighbourhood officers provided agood quality of service in the main byengaging with customers, supportinglocal community initiatives and dealingwith problems. Difficulties wereoutlined with the service provided byresponse officers; for example oneneighbourhood officer described partof their role as being to “pick up issuesthat Response has dealt with badly”. Allresponse officers spoken to howeverappeared aware of the need to provide agood quality service and focus on thecustomer. The pressure of needing tomove quickly from one incident to thenext was cited as being a barrier tospending more time with victims andbeing able to explain things thoroughly.The increase of officers in responseroles and the focus on delivering‘personal, professional and protective’policing should assist with this issuebut only if the approach is explained toofficers clearly in operational terms.

5.6 In addition officers in Tactical SupportGroups were highlighted bystakeholders as causing concerns inbeing seen by some communities touse heavy handed tactics and pay littleattention to the need for customerengagement. Again officers in these unitsspoken to demonstrated their awareness

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of the need to deliver a good service forcommunities and work in partnershipwith neighbourhood teams. However,they suggested that districts needed tomanage community expectations betterand support their work rather than passresponsibility for action taken to TacticalSupport Groups as ‘outsiders’. There isa need for better explanations to begiven to communities as to why thepresence of Tactical Support Groupsare necessary in an area (for exampleto undertake searches) and topublicise successes in the district inorder to recognise the role of theunits whilst ensuring that the impacton communities is considered in everyoperation. In addition, monitoringthe way that Tactical Support Groupsengage with communities andensuring it is line with the ethos ofthe Service.

5.7 The PSNI utilised technology withinswitchboard and call management whichenabled them to monitor quantitativedata regarding call handling, call volumesper day, overall average answer timesand abandonment rates together withperformance information for operators.Supervisors could use this quantitativeanalysis for performance discussionswith operators. Assessments of thequality of the way in which the operatordealt with the call could be undertakenby the supervisor listening into the call,via a second line provided next to theoperator for that specific purpose.Regular dip-sampling of calls after theirconclusion was not undertakenhowever; although calls were recordedthey were not routinely listened back toby the supervisor. This type of dip-sampling would be beneficial to ensure a

good quality of service is being provided.The Policing Board also monitored thePSNI’s adherence to National CallHandling Standards. In 2009-10 thePSNI received 210,693 999 calls and2,701,970 non-emergency calls. Ofthese the PSNI answered 89.7% ofemergency calls within 10 seconds(against a National Minimum Standard of90%) and 90.4% of non-emergency callswithin 30 seconds (against a NationalMinimum Standard of 90%). Theabandonment rate was 0.5% for 999calls and 2.85% for non-emergency calls.

5.8 An issue that arose during the inspectionwhich CJI considers will have asignificant impact on confidence in thepolice by all communities, was thedelayed or non-deployment to a requestfor police attendance because of fearsfor the safety of officers. This impactson customer service outcomes.The level of security threat againstofficers was highlighted as a constantbackground to decision-making in thePSNI. This is understandable given thesignificant increase in the dissidentrepublican threat and activities whichhas been at ‘severe’ since February 2009and described as a “very real and serioussecurity threat” by the Chief Constable12.Officers and staff were aware of thepotential that a call could be made tothe PSNI to report a hoax incidentdesigned to draw police into an areaand some hoax or false calls had led totragic consequences for some officersin the past. Media reports had beendisapproving of the PSNI for non-attendance at some incidents. Forexample there was wide reporting of anissue in Derry/Londonderry in June 2010where police were criticised for not

12 ‘PSNI Chief Constable Baggott pushes on with normalisation of policing’, Belfast Telegraph, 10 November 2009.

responding to reports that a family wasbeing held at gun point because officerswere concerned it may have been anattempt to lure them into the area.Whilst the safety of the public andofficers is clearly paramount, the PSNIalso has a responsibility to considerthe impact on the community ofnon-attendance and how they canbest manage such situations.

5.9 The decision to delay attendance ornot to attend a call was based on localintelligence and made by the DutyInspector. However there was noguidance to assist them in makingdecisions about deployment andtherefore it was at their discretion andjudgement using the intelligenceavailable and local knowledge. Whilst itis appreciated every scenario cannot becatered for, PSNI officers would benefitfrom guidance on this issue and clarityas to where accountability sits indeciding whether to attend a call ornot. This would be particularly helpfulwhere Inspectors may be lacking in localknowledge, for example if an officerwere to transfer in from another policeservice. In addition the recording of thereasons for such decisions would alloworganisational learning to take place andinform future guidance.

5.10 The PSNI did not have data to fullyunderstand the scale of delayedattendance or non-attendance forsecurity and safety reasons (as opposedto grading of calls as resolved withoutdeployment). Officers from ChiefOfficer to Constables had differentviews on how many calls resulted in thistype of delayed or non-attendance withvarying comments suggesting the scaleof non-attendance was ‘small’, 3% or 4%of calls or approximately two calls in a

six-week period. The Policing Board didnot monitor the scale of this issue. Thelack of understanding about the extentof this issue means that the PSNI isunable to fully consider the impact oncommunities (which is likely to begreater in some areas where the threatis more severe than in others) and takea pro-active approach to managing thesituation so that they are able toreassure the public. The lack of suchinformation also leaves the serviceunable to undertake analysis to lookfor patterns of call types or informguidance regarding deployment.It is recommended that the PSNIshould introduce guidance on thenon-attendance of calls for securityand safety reasons and implementa monitoring system to enablereliable analysis of such non-attendance to take place.

Managing information

5.11 The inspection also considered thePSNI’s approach to confidentiality anddealing with sensitive information aspart of the Customer Service Excellencestandard. The PSNI had a policy inrelation to data protection whichoutlined appropriate procedures inrelation to data access, transfer, sharing,retention and weeding. Inspectors wereadvised that internal audits wereundertaken of data systems and aprotective marking scheme was in place.In respect of confidentiality, officersspoken to demonstrated an awarenessof a privacy need for those who availedof their services. However someconcerns were raised by officers andstaff about the lack of privacy affordedfor members of the public in enquiryoffices (for example at the desk or ininterview rooms just off the enquiry

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office). Whilst interview roomsadjoining enquiry offices were a separateroom and therefore afforded someprivacy enquiry staff raised concernsthat the thin nature of the walls meantthat sometimes conversations couldpotentially be overheard.

Managing performance

5.12 The PSNI had in place a policy regardingthe performance management anddevelopment system (the annualperformance review) for police officersand police staff. The performancemanagement system in place at the timeof the inspection was not well regardedby staff Inspectors spoke to, as it wasconsidered by officers to be bureaucraticand ineffective. The PSNI had recognisedthere was a need for improvements. Inaddition the PSNI had a specific policy inrelation to managing unsatisfactoryperformance of police officers. Thisoutlined the procedures to be usedwhere the standards of a police officer’swork failed to improve by using theannual performance review system andwhere there was a failure to carry outthe role of a police officer to the agreedstandard. The UnsatisfactoryPerformance Procedure could ultimatelylead to a police officer being required toresign, reduced in rank with a writtenwarning or being issued with a writtenwarning to improve performance and/orredeployment to alternative duties. Inthe last three years 16 officers had beendealt with under the unsatisfactoryperformance regulations.

5.13 As outlined above the PSNI wereworking to the 2010-13 Policing Planthat focused on service excellence,tackling serious harm, and personalpolicing - dealing with local concerns.

For the year’s performance reviewprocess however, there was a lack ofcorporate direction as to how theobjectives, performance indicators andtargets fitted with the Chief Constable’scommitment for ‘personal, professionaland protective’ policing. In the absenceof this most supervisors were usingsimilar targets to previous years (such asnumbers of fixed penalty notices issued,number of intelligence reportssubmitted) but with limited assessmentof quality of service delivery.

5.14 In order to emphasise the customerservice focus and fill this gap thePSNI was developing a new individualperformance review which aimed to takea holistic view. This would appraise notonly the officers ability to deliver ontheir performance targets (related to‘personal, professional and protective’policing) but also to consider howofficers performed in relation to thecompetencies relevant to their role andwhat their individual development needswere. It was planned that this would bean on-line tool which would strive toreduce the bureaucracy that staffassociated with previous systems.The PSNI aimed to introduce this forthe start of the April 2011 annualperformance appraisals. This type ofsystem is critical to support the ethoswhere the customer is the main focusfor staff, particularly for those incustomer facing roles. The PSNIshould continue to developand effectively implement aperformance review system forall staff that recognises theimportance of customer service forthe next performance review cycle.

5.15 In addition to the formal performancemanagement procedures, supervisors

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outlined to Inspectors how performancewas monitored on a daily basis.The Command and Control systemwas used on a daily basis by SectorInspectors,Area Commanders and theDistrict Commander to review actionstaken in initial response to incidentsand address any outstanding actions ordeal with any issues of concern.Some officers raised concerns withthis as it led to duplication of effort asinformation was required to be inputtedinto the Niche Records ManagementSystem (which was used for casepreparation) as well as Commandand Control (which was used fordeployment) for the purposes of thesedaily reviews. A presentation deliveredin March 2010 had outlined toCommanders how Niche could beinterrogated to provide this information,leaving Command and Control to beused purely for deployment, andtherefore reduce the need for suchduplication. It is suggested that, inorder to reduce bureaucracy, theuse of Command and Control toundertake the daily search shouldcease as soon as possible, andofficers should be advised that theyno longer need to duplicateinformation into the two systems.

Dealing with mistakes

5.16 The Office of the Police Ombudsmanfor Northern Ireland (OPONI) aims toprovide an independent, impartial policecomplaints system for the people andpolice of Northern Ireland. The PoliceOmbudsman’s duty is to investigatecomplaints about the conduct of policeofficers and, where appropriate, makerecommendations in respect of criminal,disciplinary and misconduct matters.The PSNI must, as set out in legislation,

refer all complaints against policeofficers to the Police Ombudsman.It therefore had, at the time of thisinspection, no scope to address minorcomplaints or dissatisfaction with theactions of police officers internally untilthe conclusion of the investigation. In2009-10 the Police Ombudsmanreceived 3,528 complaints and 6,419allegations. Figures from 2008-09indicate that 38% of these related tofailure in duty, 29% to oppressivebehaviour and 14% to incivility. ThePolice Ombudsman provided the PSNI’sProfessional Standards Department withreports highlighting any officers who hadreceived three or more complaints orallegations in a 12-month period inorder that discipline champions indistricts could monitor potentialperformance issues and discuss thesewith officers at an early stage. During2009-10 376 police officers had beensubject to three or more complaints.Examples were provided of whereofficers who had been highlighted in thismanner and senior managers in thedistrict had held a management meetingwith them to bring the matter to theirattention and discuss any underlyingissues.

5.17 The Police Ombudsman could decidethat some complaints (for exampleincivility or low-level failure in duty)would be suitable for informalresolution by the PSNI. In suchcircumstances the complainant wouldbe invited to meet with a senior PSNIofficer to discuss the complaint and,in consultation with the police officerwho had been complained about,seek a resolution such as an apology,explanation or words of advice beinggiven to the officer. The benefit of thisapproach was that it could enable lower

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level issues of dissatisfaction to beresolved more quickly than byundertaking a formal investigation.In 2009-10 11% of complaints wereinformally resolved by the PSNI. Therehad been a recognition by both thePolice Ombudsman and the PSNI thatthere could be improvements made tothis system to reduce delay andbureaucracy still further in such lowerlevel cases and increase the satisfactionof the complainant. For example, a PSNIInspector showed CJI Inspectors a letterfrom the Police Ombudsman’s officenoting a complaint received on 21March 2010 which had arrived with himfor information resolution on the 9 June2010. Although the issue had beenresolved that same day via the informalresolution process it had taken two andhalf months for a relatively minormatter to be processed fully in orderfor it to be dealt with.

5.18 In June 2010, a six-month pilot hadcommenced in one district between theOffice of the Police Ombudsman andthe PSNI of a process called ‘localresolution’. This devolved responsibilityfor dealing with complaints of incivilityor lower-level cases of failure in duty tofirst line managers. Once a complaintwas received by the Duty Sergeant theapproval of the Office of the PoliceOmbudsman was sought to undertakethe local resolution process, once theagreement of the complainant wasobtained. The local resolution officer(of Sergeant rank) would then aim toresolve the complaint in a similarmanner to that set out for informalresolution above. This would benefit thecomplainant as quality of service issuescould be addressed in a much quickerway at the time of the incident. It wouldalso benefit the Police Ombudsman‘s

office and the PSNI by significantlyreducing the time spent on suchcomplaints.

5.19 In 2009 there had been 504 complaintsreceived from the district selected forthe pilot. Of these, 156 (31%) had beendeemed suitable for informal resolutionand 63 (76%) had been successfullyinformally resolved. As the sameselection criteria was being applied forlocal resolution, this indicates that justunder a fifth of complainants couldbenefit from this process which wouldbe beneficial if it was rolled out acrossthe PSNI. The Office of the PoliceOmbudsman planned to fully evaluatethe pilot at the end of the six-monthperiod. Initial evaluation forms sent tothe complainants after their complaintwas resolved had resulted in positivefeedback. CJI fully supports any processthat delivers a more effective andspeedier response in resolvingcomplaints deemed suitable for localresolution and looks forward to theformal evaluation of this pilot.

5.20 In addition the PSNI had incorporated amechanism for dealing with cases ofdissatisfaction into the PolicingCommitments. The final Commitmentproposed for inclusion was that thePSNI would discuss with and try toreach agreement on a resolution with acustomer who was dissatisfied with theservice they had received but did notwant to formally complain to the PoliceOmbudsman.

Communicating results

5.21 The PSNI website contained informationabout their performance andachievements by way of reports andpublications, latest news updates,

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statistics and the Deputy ChiefConstable’s blog. The statistical reportsfor example provided statistics on crime,anti-social behaviour, stop and search,drugs and quality of service surveys aswell as in-year performance against thePolicing Plan. Local Policing Plans wereavailable to the public in leaflet formatand the PSNI Annual Report wasavailable on the PSNI website.Publications and posters were oftenavailable in a variety of differentlanguages. Other methods to raiseawareness of PSNI work included useof local media publications, leaflets andposters about neighbourhood teams,articles in specialist publications and useof social media and digital technology.

5.22 The PSNI also provided informationon results in person at various forums.The Policing Board held both privateand public meetings where the ChiefConstable and Chief Officers wereasked to account for performance. TheDistrict Policing Partnerships performedsimilar functions with both District andArea Commanders and minutes of thesemeetings were available on-line. Localpolice also provided information aboutaction taken to address local concernsat neighbourhood meetings such asPartners and Communities Together orPolice Community Liaison Committees.

5.23 The Policing Board and District PolicingPartnerships also communicated thework undertaken by the PSNI both onthe websites and through newsletterssuch as ‘DPP News’. These outlinedwork undertaken by the PSNI inpartnership with District PolicingPartnerships and success stories inlocal districts.

Appendix

2Section

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Appendix 1: Inspection methodology

Desktop research and development of inspectionTerms of Reference and questionareasResearch literature and guidance documentation was reviewed in relation to customer service.The Customer Service Excellence standard provided guidance in determining the scope of theinspection and topic areas within which questions were developed. Other relevant documentsincluded guidance documents on issues within this area such as the Quality of ServiceCommitment, the Policing Pledge and guidance documents on Citizen Focus.

Document reviewA review was conducted of documentation and data provided by the PSNI. Copies of all policies,procedures and other documentation relating to customer service issues were requested andreceived as well as organisational reviews and project documentation in this area. A review wasundertaken of this documentation to cross-reference information against the topic areas laterobtained during the fieldwork. This was also used to inform interview questions during thefieldwork phase.

Self-assessmentA self-assessment framework was developed based upon the Customer Service Excellencestandard which the PSNI was requested to complete. This was reviewed prior to the inspectionfieldwork and also used to inform the interview questions and later analysis.

FieldworkThe questions used during the fieldwork for this inspection were informed by the five criteria inthe Customer Service Excellence standard. The criteria and indicators considered were:

Criterion 1: Customer insight:

• 1.1 Customer Identification;• 1.2 engagement and consultation; and• 1.3 customer satisfaction.

Criterion 2:The culture of the organisation:

• 2.1 Leadership, policy and culture; and• 2.2 staff professionalism and attitude.

Criterion 3: Information and access:

• 3.1 Range of information;• 3.2 quality of information;• 3.3 access; and• 3.4 co-operative working with other providers, partners and communities.

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Criterion Four: Delivery:

• 4.1 Delivery standards;• 4.2 achieved delivery and outcomes; and• 4.3 deal effectively with problems.

Criterion Five:Timeliness and quality of service:

• 5.1 Standards for timeliness and quality;• 5.2 timely outcomes; and• 5.3 achieved timely delivery.

One-to-one and focus groups interviews were conducted with a range of personnel within thePSNI. Interviews were also conducted with stakeholders who could provide evidence of theexperience of PSNI customer service from different perspectives.

Representatives from the following were interviewed during the fieldwork:

PSNI:

Headquarters/centralised functions

• Deputy Chief Constable;• Assistant Chief Constable Criminal Justice;• Assistant Chief Constable Urban;• Chief Superintendent Target Operating Model Project;• Detective Superintendent Crime Operations;• Chief Inspector Belfast Regional Control;• Police College trainers;• Superintendent Professional Standards Department;• Switchboard operators and supervisor;• Chief Inspector and Inspector Policing with the Community Department; and• Human Resources.

Districts (‘A’, ‘C’, ‘E’, ‘G’)

• District Commander;• Superintendent Community Safety;• Area Commander;• Crime Manager;• Sector Commanders (focus group);• Neighbourhood Sergeants (focus group);• Neighbourhood Constables (focus group);• Call handlers and Station Duty Assistants (focus groups);• District trainers; and• Detective Constables from Crime Investigation Department (focus group).

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Stakeholders

• Northern Ireland Policing Board officials and Community Engagement Committee;• Northern Ireland Policing Board Reference Groups (older persons; young people; minority

ethnic groups*; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender persons*);• Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland;• Victim Support Northern Ireland; and• Young people’s Independent Advisory Group (in ‘C’ District).

*members of these groups were also on the PSNI’s Independent Advisory Groups.

In addition visits were undertaken to the Contact Management Suite in Ardmore PSNI station inNewry and to the central switchboard in police headquarters.

Testing ease of access to the PSNIA review was undertaken of the PSNI’s website in order to assess the ease of access formembers of the public to neighbourhood policing teams. As a result of this emails were sent tothe 41 email addresses provided (44 of the 88 neighbourhood teams provided an email addressand of these three sectors had a shared same email address) from an email address set up for thepurpose. As a result 24 responses were received either asking for further details of where theemailer lived or providing details of meetings with the police in the local area.

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