Police Interrogations and Confessions

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Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating Promises and Threats by PragmaticImplicationAuthor(s): Saul M. Kassin and Karlyn McNallReviewed work(s):Source: Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Jun., 1991), pp. 233-251Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1394113 .

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Law and HumanBehavior,Vol. 15, No. 3, 1991

Police Interrogationsand ConfessionsCommunicatingPromises and Threats byPragmatic Implication*

Saul M. Ka.ssin and Karlyn McNallt

The present research examined the possible effects of two methods of police interrogation:maximization,a technique n which the interrogator xaggerates he strengthof the evidenceand themagnitude f the charges,andminimization, technique n which the interrogatormitigates he crimeandplays down the seriousness of the offense. In Experiments1 and 2, subjectsreadinterrogationtranscriptsn which an interrogator sed one of five methodsto try to elicit a confession:a promiseof leniency,threatof punishment,minimization,maximization, r none of the above. As indicatedona subsequentquestionnaire,maximization ommunicatedhigh sentencing expectationsas in an ex-plicitthreatof punishment,while minimizationmplied ow sentencingexpectationsas did an explicitoffer of leniency. Experiment3 demonstrated hat althoughmockjurors discounted a confessionelicitedby a threatof punishment,heirconvictionrate was significantlyncreasedby confessionsthatfollowed from promises or minimization.Taken as a whole, these studies raise serious questionsconcerning he use of minimization nd maximization s methodsof interrogationndthe confessionsthey produceas evidencein court.

In criminallaw, confession evidence is a potent weapon for the prosecution,perhaps so persuasive that "the introduction of a confession makes the otheraspects of a trial superfluous" (McCormick,1972, p. 316). At the same time,confessions are a recurring ource of controversy.Whether a suspect made self-incriminatingtatements,whether these statementswere voluntaryor coerced, orwhetherthe suspect was of sound mindduring he interrogationarejust some ofthe issues that trialjudges andjuries consider on a routinebasis.To guardagainstviolations of due process and to protect againstthe possi-bility that certain police practices might lead innocent persons to confess to* Reprintrequestsshouldbe addressed o SaulKassin,Department f Psychology,BronfmanScienceCenter,WilliamsCollege,Williamstown,MA 01267.t WilliamsCollege.

2330147-7307/91/0600-0233$06.50/01991PlenumPublishingCorporation


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crimes they did not commit, the courts have establishedroughguidelinesto de-terminethe admissibilityof confession evidence at trial. Although "there is nosimple litmus-papertest" (Culombe v. Connecticut, 1961, p. 601), confessionevidence is typicallyexcluded if elicitedby physicalviolence, by a threatof harmor punishment, by a promise of leniency or immunityfrom prosecution, or-barringexceptional circumstances-by failure to notify a suspect of his or herconstitutionalrights to counsel and silence (for reviews, see Grano, 1979;Ka-misar, Lafave, & Israel, 1986;Wigmore,1970).The circumstancesof interrogationhatgive rise to inadmissibleconfessionsare not as easy to determineas it may seem. InBramv. United States (1897),theU.S. SupremeCourt ruledthat to be admittedinto evidence, a confession must"not be extractedby any sort of threat or violence, not obtainedby any directorimpliedpromises, however slight" (pp. 542-543). The Courtlater extended thisrulingto all state courts (Bradyv. United States, 1970).Recent developments,however, suggest that although udges routinelyexclude confessions elicited bypromises and threats that are "direct," they often do not exclude those that aremerely "implied" (Ayling, 1984; Marks, 1989; Sasaki, 1988; Thomas, 1979;White, 1979).In the case of State v. Jackson (1983),for example, murdersuspect JamesJacksonwas falsely told by the police that blood stains fromthe victim were onhis pants, that his shoes matchedfootprintsfound at the crime scene, that hisfingerprintswere on the murderweapon, and that he was spotted by an eyewit-ness. Jackson was also reassured hat if he toldthe truth(i.e., if he confessed), thecourt wouldview him as cooperative.In short, "the case the detectives presentedto Jackson, built on false evidence, secured him as effectively as a pair ofhandcuffs" (Heavner, 1984,p. 268). Telling an implausiblestory, Jackson con-fessed and then retracted he confession on the groundsthat he was coerced. Onappeal,however, the NorthCarolinaSupremeCourtruled that the confession wasvoluntaryand should not be invalidatedby the use of trickery.Afterall, Jacksonwas not physicallyrestrained,promiseda light sentence, or directlythreatened.Informedby recentdevelopmentsin case law, the police try to elicit confes-sions throughthe use of various "noncoercive" methodsof interrogation.Falseevidence, feigned friendship, appealsto God andreligion,and the use of prisoninformants are just a few examples. Indeed, several manuals are available toadvise law enforcement officials on how to get recalcitrant crime suspects toconfess (e.g., Aubry& Caputo,1965;O'Hara& O'Hara,1981).The most popularof these manuals s Inbau, Reid, andBuckley's (1986)Criminal nterrogationandConfessions, first published by Inbau and Reid in 1962, and now in its thirdedition.Inbau et al. (1986) advise interrogators o set aside a bare, soundproofedroomfar removed from the sightsand sounds of the police station, social support,or other forms of distraction. To furtherheightenthe tension, the interrogatorsadvised to sit near the suspect, maintaineye contact, and invade his or herpersonal space. Inbau et al. go on to describe in considerabledetail a nine-stepprocedureconsistingof manyspecificploys. In general,two types of approachesrecommendedby Inbau et al. can be distinguished.One is what we call maximi-zation, a "hard-sell"technique n which the interrogatorries to scare and intim-

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idate the suspect into confessing by makingfalse claims about evidence (e.g.,stagingan eyewitness identificationor a fraudulent ie-detectortest) andexagger-atingthe seriousnessof the offense andthe magnitudeof the charges.This is theapproachtaken in the Jackson case described earlier. The second approachiswhat we call minimization,a "soft-sell" techniquein which the police interroga-tor tries to lull the suspect into a false sense of security by offering sympathy,tolerance,face-savingexcuses, and even moral ustification,by blaminga victimor accomplice, by citing extenuatingcircumstances,or by playingdown the se-riousness of the charges.It is difficultto determine he frequencywith whichthese interrogationech-niquesareused, or their effects on guiltyandinnocentcrimesuspects. Systematicobservationssuggestthatthey arequitecommon(Wald,Ayres, Hess, Schantz, &Whitebread,1967)and that the confessions they produceare admissiblein court(White, 1979; Thomas, 1979). The question is, what are the effects? Do thesetechniques increase the risk that suspects might be coaxed into confessing tocrimesthey did not commit?Althoughmanywrongfulconvictions based on falseconfessions have been documented over the years (e.g., Borchard, 1932; seeRattner, 1988),there is no way to trulyestimate the extent of the problem.As a startingpoint, it is often assumedthat the decision to confess or not isbased, at least in part, on a suspect's expectationsconcerningthe relative con-sequences (i.e., costs andbenefits)of alternativecourses of action and the desireto secure a favorable outcome. This assumption orms a basis for excludingcon-fessions that are blatantlycoerced (Wigmore,1970;Kamisar et al., 1986)and issupportedby role-playingresearch(e.g., Bordens, 1984,found thatunder certainconditions even subjects instructed to play an innocent suspect sometimespleadedguilty in order to cut theirlosses) and interviews with real suspects whohadacceptedguilty pleas in exchangefor penaltyreductions(Bordens& Bassett,1985).The goal of the present research was to identifyfactors in an interrogationthatmightinfluence the sentencingexpectationsandbehaviorof crime suspects.Can Inbau et al.'s (1986)ploys alter sentencingexpectations, much like explicitpromises and threats, techniques that elicit inadmissibleconfession evidence?Cognitiveand languageresearchindicate that listeners often process information"between the lines" andrecallhearingnotjust what was asserted, but what waspragmaticallymplied-as when subjectswho heardsomeone say that "I ranupto the burglaralarm"erroneouslyassumed that the personhad said, "I rang theburglaralarm"(Harris,Teske, &Ginns, 1978; or areview, see Harris&Monaco,1978).Althoughwe were unable to test actualcrimesuspects, we soughtas a firststep to examine the kinds of inferencesthatare drawn(i.e., aboutthe interroga-tor, the coercivenessof interrogation, ndsentencing),at leastby others, from theuse of minimizationand maximization.

EXPERIMENT 1In our first experiment, subjects read transcripts n which an interrogatorused one of five methods to elicit a confession: a promiseof leniency, a threatof

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punishment,minimization,maximization,or noneof the above. Subjectsreportedtheir impressionsof the interrogator, he interrogation ituation, and sentencingexpectations on a subsequent questionnaire.Two hypotheses guidedthis study.The first was that maximization,characterizedby a negative and unforgivingportrayalof the evidence, the crime, and the charges, can lead suspects by im-plicationto expect severe sentencingin the absence of a confession. The secondhypothesiswas thatminimization,characterizedby offers of sympathy,excuses,externalblame,and moral ustification,can lead suspects to expect leniencyuponconfession.MethodSubjects and DesignSeventy-fiveundergraduates32male, 43 female)were randomlyassignedtoreadone of five versions of a criminal nterrogation n = 15per cell). In the fourexperimentalgroups, the interrogatormade statementsthat reflected the use ofminimization,maximization,a promiseof leniency, or a threatof punishment.Ina fifth, controlgroup, no such statementswere made.Procedure

Experimentalsessions were conducted individuallyor in small groups, andtook approximately30 min to complete. Upon their arrival, subjects were in-structedto read a nine-page ranscript,describedas the interrogationof a murdersuspect, andcompletea questionnaire.Subjectswere thendebriefedand thankedfor theirparticipation.Transcripts.The stimulustranscriptwritten for this study was adaptedfroman actual videotapedinterrogationof a New York City woman accused of first-degree murder(for a more detailed description, see Kassin, Reddy, & Tulloch,1990).Therewerefive versions of the transcript, denticalexcept for the inclusionandvariationof five critical remarksmadeby the interrogator.These statementswere inserted in the same locations of each experimentaltranscriptand elicitedthe same denials from the suspect.In the minimizationcondition,the interrogatorprovidedthe suspect with anexcuse, even moraljustificationfor the crime, as modeled after a strategyrec-ommendedin Inbauet al.'s (1986)manual(e.g., "I'll tell you, Pat. Isabelle [thevictim]was no saint. It soundsto me like she was askingfor troubleanddeservedwhat she got. If it wasn't you, it would've been somebodyelse;" "It's clear thatIsabelledidn'texactly treatyou like a friendwhen it comes to Frank.I mean, shetriedto take him from you. That would make me crazy. Man, I don't blameyoufor defendingwhat's yours").In the maximization ondition,the interrogatorused scare tactics to pressurethe suspectby exaggerating he strengthof the evidence andthe seriousness of theoffense. As recommendedby Inbau et al. (1986),the interrogatordid not actuallythreatenthe suspect, buthe cast her case in a negative light (e.g., "Damnit, Pat,fingerprintsdon'tjust appearon a knife out of nowhere.And whatif I tell you that

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your prints were the only ones on the knife? What would you say about that,huh?" "You know what you did was inexcusable. I've never seen such an openand shut case. And I'll tell you somethingelse. Isabelle Warrenwas well liked inthis area, and people are mad").In the explicitpromise condition, the interrogator old the suspect that shewould receive a lightsentenceif she cooperatedby confessingto the murder e.g.,"Look, Pat. We'renot tryingto hang you for whathappened.If you come clean,we'll see to it thatthejudge is nice and easy on you;" "You know Pat. It's clearthat you and Isabelle didn't exactly see eye to eye when it comes to Frank. Imean, she tried to take your man. Why don't you just level with us. If you do,you'll get off easy, maybe no time at all").In the explicit threatcondition, the interrogatorclearly threatened the sus-pect with a severe sentence if she continued to deny the charges (e.g., "Pat, thisis soundingreallybad. You're goingto get yourselfinto prisonfor life unless youcome clean, and I meannow"; "If you don't confess, we're gonnastop being sonice and gentle. Believe me, you'll suffer. I also don't mind telling you, somejudge is gonna hit you with one helluva prison term if you keep wasting ourtime").Questionnaire.All subjectsfilled out a questionnaire n which they reportedtheir beliefs concerningtheirsentencingexpectations, the suspect, the interroga-tor, and the situation in general. First, on separate 10-pointscales (where 1 =minimum,and 10 = maximum),subjects rated the sentence they expected thesuspectto receive if she confessed to the crime,and thenwhatsentence she wouldreceive if found guilty after continuingto deny the charges to the interrogator.Next, subjectsestimated how many truly guiltysuspects out of 100 wouldconfessin the same interrogation ituation, and then how many truly innocent suspectsout of 100 would confess. In additionto these primarymeasures, subjectsratedthe amount of pressure there was on the suspect to confess; the interrogator'seagernessfor the suspectto confess; his sympathy or the suspect;the strengthofthe evidence against her; and how fair, aggressive, and likable they found theinterrogator.Finally, subjects indicatedwhether they thought the suspect wasguilty or not guilty and indicated theirconfidence in thatjudgmenton a 10-pointscale.Results

Subjects separatelyestimatedthe sentence they expected the suspect to re-ceive (1) if she confessed to the charges, and (2) if she continuedto deny thechargesbut was later found guilty. To test the effects of interrogation actics onboth measures as well as the relationshipbetween these measures, a 5 (control,minimization,maximization,promise,threat)x 2 (confession, denial)analysisofvariance was conducted with repeatedmeasures on the last factor.Two significantmain effects were obtained. First, there was a significanteffect for interrogation,F(4,70) = 2.72, p < .05, indicatingthat compared tosubjects in the control group, those who read the maximizationtranscriptex-pected the suspect to receive a harshersentence (M's = 5.40 and 6.67, respec-

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tively, p < .05via Newman-Keuls). Sentencingexpectationsin the minimization,promise, and threatgroupsfell between these two extremes (M's = 5.70, 5.53,and5.83, respectively).Second, subjectsexpected significantlyharshersentencesto follow from continued denial than from confession (M's = 7.36 and 4.31,respectively), F(1,70) = 125.33,p < .001. The interactionbetween factors wasnot significant,F(4,70) = 1.54,p > .50, suggestingthat effects of the interroga-tor's remarkson sentencingexpectationswere independentof the suspect's sub-sequent actions.Recall that subjectsestimated how many guiltyandinnocentsuspects wouldconfess within their transcriptcondition. To test the effects of interrogationoneach of these measures as well as theirinteraction, he datawere analyzedwithina 5 (control, minimization,maximization,promise, threat) x 2 (guilty, innocent)analysis of variance with repeatedmeasureson the last factor. As it turnedout,there were two significantmain effects but no interaction. First, as one mightexpect, subjectsestimatedthatmoreguiltythaninnocentsuspectswouldconfess,F(1,70) = 141.96, p < .001; M's = 40.40 and 11.50, respectively. Second, amarginallysignificanteffect for interrogation,F(4,70) = 2.29, p < .07, revealedthatcomparedto subjectsin the controlgroup(M = 25.50), those in the promisegroupestimatedthatmoresuspectswouldconfess (M = 34.67),while those in theminimizationgroup thought that fewer suspects would confess (M = 19.83).Subjects in the threatand maximizationgroups providedless extreme estimatesoverall (M's = 24.83 and 25.17, respectively). Apparently, subjects viewed theinterrogator's xplicitpromiseas an inducement o confess, while interpretingheminimizationploy as an inducementnot to confess.Two questions assessed the perceivedcoerciveness of the interrogation.Onratingsof how much pressure there was on the suspect to confess, a one-wayANOVA was significant,F(4,70) = 3.42, p < .02, as ratingsof pressure werehigher n both the explicitpromise(M = 9.00)and threat(M = 8.80)groupsthanin the control(M = 7.07)group(bothp's < .05via Newman-Keuls), butwere nothighernot in the minimizationand maximizationgroups (M's = 7.80 and 8.33,respectively). The same patternappearedon perceptions of the interrogator'sdesire to elicit a confession, as ratings were higher in the promise and threatgroups(M's = 9.06 and9.20) than in the threeremainingconditions(M's = 7.93,7.73, and 8.33 in the control, minimization,and maximizationgroups, respec-tively), F(4,70) = 2.55,p < .05.1Theseresultsarethus consistent withthe findingthatsubjectsthoughtrelativelyfew suspects wouldconfess in Inbauet al.'s (1986)situations.

Finally, three additionalresults should be noted. First, ratingsof the inter-rogator's sympathyfor the suspect were highest underminimizationand lowestunderthreat(M's = 3.33and 1.80,compared o 2.33 in the controlgroup),F(4,70)= 2.56, p < .05. Second, althoughwe had predictedthat maximizationwouldinflate perceptions of the strengthof evidence, the effect was not significant,

Significanteffects were not obtained on ratingsof the interrogator's ggressiveness,likability,orfairness.

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F(4,70) = 0.52, p > .50 (M = 6.73 compared to M = 6.13 in the control group).Third, 56 out of 74 subjects believed the suspect was guilty, indicatingthat thecase againstthe defendantwas strong.The convictionrates were .60 in thecontrolgroup, .87 under minimization, .80 under maximizationand promise, and .67under threat, X2(4,N = 75) = 3.80, n.s.To summarize,minimizationand maximizationploys produced interestingresults. Subjects in the maximizationgroup did not view the case against thesuspect as stronger, suggestingthat perhapsthey assumed the interrogatorwasbluffing.Consistentwith the hypothesis that maximizationcommunicatesan im-pliedthreat of punishment,however, these same subjects expected the suspect toreceive a harshersentence. Minimizationproduceda differentbut understandablepatternof effects. In this group, subjects viewed the interrogatoras more sym-patheticto the suspect and less eagerfor a confession, and the situation tself asless coercive. Not surprisingly, hisgroupestimatedthatrelatively ew suspects-especially those who are innocent-would confess in this situation.

EXPERIMENT 2The first study offeredprovocative supportfor the hypothesis that maximi-

zation communicatesa threatof punishmentvia pragmatic mplication.In addi-tion, the results offer mixed supportfor the hypothesis that minimizationmaypragmaticallymplyanofferof leniency. Thatis, subjectsin this conditionviewedthe interrogationas relatively noncoercive and the interrogatoras sympathetic,the kindof relaxed situation n whichrelativelyfew suspects arelikely to confess.Contrary o our hypothesis, however, minimizationdid not lower sentencingex-pectations.In lightof the practical mportanceof these results, a second experimentwasdesigned with two goals in mind:to retest the minimizationhypothesis that le-niencyis inferred rommitigating emarksmadeby aninterrogator nd to examinethe phenomenon across different kinds of cases. In this study, subjects readdifferentinterrogation ranscripts n which the suspect denied the chargeswhilethe interrogatormadeanexplicit promiseof leniency, minimization omments, orneither. Following each transcript, subjects estimated the sentence the suspectwould receive upon confession and the likelihood that he or she had actuallycommitted the crime.MethodSubjects and Design

Thirty-six undergraduates22 male, 14female)read three unrelated nterro-gation transcripts, each concerning a different case (murder, theft, and hit-and-run)and each illustratinga different methodof interrogation promise, min-imization,and control). Cases and conditionswere fully counterbalanced,yield-

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ing six possible combinations.2 Presentation order was then partiallycounterbalanced,yieldinga total of 18 stimuluspackets.ProcedureSubjects participatedndividuallyor in smallgroups. Upon theirarrival,sub-jects received a stimuluspacket consisting of instructionsand three transcripts,each followed by a brief questionnaire.Each session took about 30 min to com-plete, after which subjectswere debriefed and thanked for their participation.Stimulus Transcripts.Three four-pagetranscriptswere writtenfor this ex-periment,and each contained three versions. One transcriptbrieflydepicted theinterrogationof the murdersuspect used in the first experiment. The secondtranscriptdescribedthe interrogationof a handymanaccused of stealinga VCRfromthe apartmentof a wealthy tenant. The thirdtranscriptdescribed the inter-rogationof a motoristunderinvestigationfor a hit-and-runaccident.In the promise conditionof these cases, the interrogatorold suspects twicethat they would receive a relatively light sentence if they cooperatedby confess-ing (e.g., "Your life will be much easier if you just confess. Admitting yourmistakewill get you a muchlightersentence thanif you force this matter nto thecourts").In the minimizationversion of these cases, the interrogator wice tried toexcuse the crime in question and minimize the seriousness of the charges. Thestatementsmade were adapteddirectlyfromInbau et al.'s (1986)manual.In themurdercase, the interrogatorblamedthe victim (e.g., "Listen, Isabelle was nosaint. She was askingfor trouble and deserved what she got. Anybody would'vereacted the way you did"). In the theft case, he excused the temptationanyworkingmanmighthave to stealaninexpensiveitem froman affluentvictim(e.g.,"Arthur,you'rean honestworkingmantryingto makeends meet. Curman, n themeantime,has money to bur, and he spends it foolishly. I probablywould havedone the same thingin yourposition. If you just tell me the truth,we can get thismatterstraightenedout").3 In the hit-and-run ase, the interrogator xcused thesuspect's actions by emphasizingthe accidentalnature of the crime (e.g., "Youknow what, this sounds like a real fluke occurrence, completely accidental.You're a responsibledriverwho had some badluck. If you'll just tell the truthwecan get this matterstraightenedout").42 Counterbalancingases (A,B,C) and conditions(1,2,3) yieldedthe following packetcombinations:AI,B2,C3/ Al,B3,C2/ A2,Bl,C3/ A2,B3,C1/ A3,Bl,C2/ A3,B2,C1.3 Inbauet al. (1986)presenta sample nterrogation f this sortinvolvinga maidsuspectedof stealingheremployer'sfurcoat: "Helen, youremployerhad severalfurcoats and I'll bet she threw themdownall around he house or else treated hem liketheywerecheap pieces of cloth. Manytimesyouprobablyhadto pickthemupandputthemaway yourself.Youprobablygotthe ideashe didn'tmuchcare for the coats and wouldn'teven miss one if it diddisappear.That'sprobablywhatgave you theidea.Then afteryou didthis, maybeyou got to thinkingabout whatyou haddoneand wouldlike tohave brought t back but couldn't"(p. 110).4 Again,this manipulationwas derivedfrom a hit-and-runase presentedby Inbauet al. (1986):"I'msurein my own mind that a manlike you wouldn'tdeliberatelydo a thinglike this. I think I knowwhathappened;yourcarhit something.You were not sure whatit was, but you had some doubts;

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POLICEINTERROGATIONSTable 1. Effect of Interrogation Techniques on Sentencing Expectations in Experiment 2

Interrogation roupCase Control Minimization Promise

Murder 6.08 5.50 5.25Theft 5.67a 3.92b 2.92bHit-and-run 6.25a 5.08ab 4.33bCombined 6.00a 4.83b 4.17bNote. Meansnot sharinga commonsubscriptdifferatp < .05 via Newman-Keuls test.

Dependent Measures. After each case, subjects answered two questions.First, "Considering the circumstances in this case, what kind of sentence do youthink this particular suspect will receive if s/he confesses to the crime?" Re-sponses were made on a 10-point scale (where 1 = lighter than average, and 10= heavier than average). Next, subjects were asked, "What do you think is thelikelihood that this suspect actually committed the crime in question?" Subjectsresponded to this question by circling a number from 0 to 100, marked in 5-pointintervals.Results

Sentencing expectations data provided strong support for the minimizationhypothesis. Combining the three cases, a one-way analysis of variance revealedthat subjects expected more lenient sentencing in both the minimization andpromise conditions than in the control group (M's = 4.83, 4.17, and 6.00, respec-tively), F(2,105) = 10.30, p < .001. Looking at sentencing estimates separately foreach transcript, it can be seen that although the differences in the murder casewere not significant, F(2,33) = 0.66, highly significant effects were obtained inboth the theft, F(2,33) = 12.68, p < .001, and hit-and-run transcripts, F(2,33) =3.94, p < .02. In short, minimization communicated leniency expectations aseffectively as did an explicit promise. These data are presented in Table 1.

To examine the possibility that minimization would lead subjects to infer thatthe suspect was truly guilty, we examined their ratings of the likelihood thesuspects had committed the acts in question. As it turned out, there were nosignificant differences overall, F(2,105) < 1, or in any of the individual cases,F's(2,33) = 1.04, 0.69, and 2.09, in the murder, theft, and hit-and-run cases,respectively.EXPERIMENT 3

Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that two commonly usedtypes of interrogation ploys-what we have called maximization and minimiza-so you got excited and drove away. Now you realize you did wrong. You are no different thananyoneelse and,under he samecircumstances, probablywouldhave done whatyou yourselfdid.Now the shock is over andyou, as a good citizen, shouldtell the truthas to what happened.Youcertainlydid not do this deliberately!" p. 98).

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tion-may well communicateimplicit promises and threats to unwary criminalsuspects. The next questionwe soughtto examine was how confessions elicitedby these ploys are likely to be evaluatedby juries. In practice,trial udges ruleondisputedconfessions at a preliminaryhearingand admitonly those found to bevoluntary. In some states, the jury is then instructed to make a voluntarinessjudgmentof its own before renderinga verdict. In other states, the evidence isaffordedno special treatment. Either way, many questionableconfessions arelikely to get introducedin trial. Affirming ts faith in the jury's ability to treatconfession evidence cautiously,the U.S. SupremeCourt nLego v. Twomy 1972)ruled that pretrial udgmentsof voluntarinessmay be made by a mere "prepon-deranceof the evidence."Accordingto Inbauet al. (1986), confessions elicited by their subtle ploys,unlike those extractedby explicit promisesand threats, are consideredby mostcourtsadmissibleas evidence for evaluationby ajury. As such, it is important ounderstand he impactthis evidence is likely to have onjury verdicts. Arejurorswho are instructed o makeajudgmentof voluntarinessanddisregardconfessionsfound to be coerced adequatelysensitive to situationalpressuresthat precede aconfession? And do they sufficiently discount confessions they believe to becoerced?Research in other contexts suggests they may not. Numerous studies haveshown that social perceiversfall prey to the fundamentalattribution rror(Ross,1977)or correspondencebias (Gilbert& Jones, 1986)-that is, they often acceptthe dispositional mplicationsof anotherperson's actions without sufficientlyac-counting or the effects of situational actors(e.g., Jones & Harris,1967).Appliedto jurordecision making,Kassin and Wrightsman1980, 1981)examined the im-pactof self-incriminatingtatementsmade afterexplicit promisesandthreats. Theresults providedclear and consistent supportfor a limitedversion of the funda-mentalattributionerror. Whenever a defendantconfessed following a threatofharmor punishment,subjects fully rejectedthe information.Thatis, they judgedthe confession to be involuntaryandwere not influencedby that evidence in theirverdicts. Whenever the defendant confessed following a promise of leniency,however, subjects did not fully reject the information. Under these circum-stances, they conceded that the confession was involuntary,but they used thatevidence to vote guilty. This latterpatternof results was termed a positive coer-cion bias and found in studies of individualmockjurors presentedwith varyinginstructionsand with deliberatinggroups as well (for a review, see Kassin &Wrightsman,1985).In lightof this past research,the presentresults inspireda thirdexperimentdesigned to examine the impact of confessions elicited by minimizationon thedecisionmakingof mockjurors. Subjectsin this studyreada transcriptof an autotheft trial in which the defendantconfessed withoutpromptingor aftera promiseof leniency, threat of punishment,minimization,or not at all (there was no dis-pute, as there is in some cases, over whether the defendant had confessed).Subjects then judged the voluntariness of the confession, voted guilty or notguilty, and answeredseveral other case-relatedquestions.

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MethodSubjectsand Design

Seventy-five students (31 male, 44 female) participatedin exchange formoney or course credit. Subjects were randomly assigned either to a no-confession controlgroupor to one of fourgroupsreceivingconfession evidence:unprompted,promise, threat,and minimization n = 15 per cell).Procedure

Subjectsread a transcriptof an auto theft case and filled out a questionnaireindividuallyand without deliberation.All subjectswere then fully debriefed andthanked for participating.StimulusTranscripts.The 25-page transcriptwas derivedfromone that hadbeen previouslyused in mockjuryresearch(cf. Kassin&Wrightsman,1979).Thetrial,entitledUnitedStates v. RonaldOliver,was a criminalcase in which a maledefendantwas chargedwithtransporting stolen car in interstatecommerce.Thegovernment's case was based on the testimony of a used car salesman, whoidentified Ronald Oliver as the person who stole the car from the lot, and thestatementof a highwaypatrolman,who stoppedthe defendantfor speedingandthen made the arrest.The defendantmaintained hat he was drivingan acquain-tance's carand had no knowledgethatthe vehicle had been stolen. The transcriptthus contained testimony from the car salesman, the arrestingofficer, and thedefendant,opening statements,closing arguments,andjudge's instructions.5All five versions of the transcriptwere identical except for a variation inconfession evidence. In the no-confession control group, the arrestingofficertestifiedthatthe defendanthadflatlydeniedhavingstolen the car. In the remain-ingfour groups, the same officer testified that Ron Oliverconfessed uponarrest.In each of these cases, a sentence in the prosecutor's closing argumentwas alsovaried to reflect the circumstancesof the confession.

In the promise group,the officer said to the defendant "that if he confessedto the crime,he wouldbe treatedwell duringhis detention,you know, some of ourholdingfacilitiesareprettydecent, and thatthejudge would surelybe a lot easieron him-maybe even a suspended sentence." Oliver did not respond, so theofficer repeatedthat "a confession would be in his best interestand thatwe andthejudge would be easier and moresympathetic f he cooperated."At thatpoint,Oliver confessed.5The portionof the instructionpertainingo the confessionwas modeledafterexistinginstructionsand usedin previousresearch Kassin&Wrightsman, 981).Init, subjectsaretoldthat"beforeyouaccept this fact that the defendantconfessed, you must consider the circumstancesanddecide foryourselves whetherthe confession was voluntaryand without coercion. If you decide that theconfessionwas involuntary, hen you shoulddisregard his confession entirelyand not allow it toinfluenceyourverdict. On the otherhand, f you areconvincedthat RonOliverconfessedfreelyandwithoutcoercion,thenyou should considerthis fact as evidence in the case against he defendant."

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In the threat group, the officer said to the defendant "that if he did notconfess to the crime,he would be treatedroughlyduringhis detention,you know,not all of ourholdingcells were safe, and that thejudge surelywouldbe very hardon him-probably give him the maximumsentence." As before, Oliver did notresponduntilthe officerrepeated"thatwe andthejudge would not appreciatehislack of cooperationandwould surelymake his life difficult f he didnot confess.I told him I fearedthe kind of treatmenthe would receive if foundguiltywithouta confession."In the minimization ondition,the officer elicited Oliver'sconfessionby say-ing "that I didn't think takingthe car was such a terriblething, that there wasprobably a misunderstanding, and that I really didn't find his actions thatunusual" followedby "it's easy to see how a personcouldbe temptedinto takingthe car. I mean, here's this dealershipwith hundredsof cars on the lot, if I didn'talreadyhave a car, and probablycouldn't affordone, there's no tellingwhat I'ddo, either. Besides, I told him,just as I can see how he mighthave been temptedin the firstplace I can also understandhow hard t wouldbe to return he caronceit's too late."Finally, in the unpromptedconfession group, the officer recounted his con-versation with Oliverandclaimedthatthe defendantadmittedhe stole the car onhis own initiative.Questionnaire.Afterreadingthe transcript,subjectsindicatedwhethertheythoughtOliverhad confessed freely and withoutcoercion (yes or no) and ratedtheirconfidence in thatjudgmenton a 9-pointscale (where0 = not at all, and 8= very confident). These two questions were not includedin the questionnaireadministered o the no-confession controlgroup.All subjects next rendered a verdict (guilty or not guilty) and rated theirconfidence in that decision on the same 9-point scale. Since verdicts are a dualfunctionof the perceived probability hat the defendantcommittedthe crime andthe standardof proof deemed necessary for conviction, subjects then rated thelikelihood that the defendantcommitted the crime (on a 0-100 point scale, inmultiplesof five) andfilledin the sentence, "Thedefendantshouldbe foundguiltyif there is at least a % chance that he committedthe crime."Threequestionsassessed subjects' impressionsof the defendant.On 9-pointscales, they rated how likableand trustworthy hey found Oliver and how muchsympathythey felt for him.In two separatequestions, subjectsthenestimated theseverity of the sentence they expected the defendantto receive if found guilty.The first question called for a 9-pointrating(where0 = minimumpossible sen-tence, and8 = maximumpossible sentence), while the second calledfor endorse-ment of a specific sentencing option (suspendedsentence, probation,1 year, 2-3years, 4-6 years, or 7 or moreyears in prison). Finally, subjectsratedhow muchpressurethere was on Oliver to confess, how suspicious the patrolmanwas thatthe defendanthad stolen the car, andhow much information he patrolmanmusthave had about Oliver's involvement. These latter measures were designed toexamine whetherjurors make inferencesaboutan interrogator's tate of knowl-edge based on his or her statements to the defendant.

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POLICENTERROGATIONSTable2. Voluntarinessudgmentsand ConfidenceScores n the ConfessionConditionsnExperiment

Unprompted Minimize Promise ThreatVoluntary .93a .27b .20b .13bConfidence 5.00 5.20 5.53 5.60V-Cscores 4.60a -2.67b -3.80b -4.27bNote. Meansnotsharing commonubscriptiffer tp < .05viachi-squarer Newman-Keulsest.ResultsVoluntarinessJudgments

Out of the 60 subjectswho readtranscriptscontaininga confession, 23 (38%)considered it voluntary. Significantbetween-groupdifferences, however, indi-catedthatsubjectswho readabout an unprompted onfession were morelikely tojudge it as voluntary(93%)than those in the promise (20%),threat (13%),andminimizationgroups (27%),X2(3,N = 60) = 26.16, p < .001 (separate 2 x 2analyses revealedthat the unpromptedgroupwas significantlydifferentfrom allothers, at p < .01).A more sensitivemeasureof opinionson the voluntariness ssue was obtainedby combiningthe judgments and 0-8 confidence ratings. Specifically, negativeconfidence values were assigned to "not voluntary"judgments, and positivevalues "voluntary" udgments, thus yieldingscores that rangedfrom -8 (maxi-mum confidence in a not-voluntaryopinion) to +8 (maximumconfidence in avoluntaryopinion). An analysis of variance on these scores revealed significantdifferences that closely paralleledthe dichotomousjudgment data, F(3,56) =13.95, p < .001.6 Indeed, the same pattern appearedin ratings of how muchpressure the arrestingofficer had placed on the defendant, as subjects in thecontrol andunprompted onfession groups perceived greaterpressurethanthosein the remainingconditions,F(4,70) = 33.11,p < .001. As shown in Table2, theresults were clear:Subjectsperceivedthe confession as involuntarywheneveritwas promptedby statements madeby the interrogator.Verdicts

Overall, 32 subjects voted guilty, and 43 voted not guilty, for a 43% rate ofconviction. An inspection of the verdicts in the five groups revealed dramaticdifferences, as the conviction rates were .06 in the no-confession control group,.60 with an unprompted onfession, .53 underpromise,and .27 underthreat,and.67 underminimization,X2(4,N= 75) = 15.59,p < .005.As with voluntariness udgments,a scalarvariablewas definedby combiningverdicts and their accompanying 0-8 levels of confidence. Negative values wereassigned to confidence ratingsfollowing not guilty verdicts and positive values

6 Confidenceatings erse didnotvaryacrossconfession roups,F(3,56)< 1.

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were assigned to confidence ratingsthat followed guilty verdicts. Scores couldthus range from -8 (maximumconfidence in an acquittal) to +8 (maximumconfidence in a conviction). An analysis of these scores closely paralleledtheverdict data, F(4,70) = 4.91, p < .002. Post hoc comparisons ndicated that theconviction rate was not affectedby confessions made in response to an explicitthreat. Yet convictions were more frequentwhen the defendantconfessed fol-lowing a promise of leniency (p < .05), and then it increased again when heconfessed without promptingor in response to minimization p's < .05). Theseresults are presentedin Table 3.These verdictdata are informativen a numberof respects. First, as indicatedby the very low conviction rate of .06 in the control group, the case againstthedefendant was extremely weak. Second, the additionof an unpromptedconfes-sion had a powerful impact, as it increasedthe conviction rate to .60. Third,asfound in earlier studies, subjects were not significantlymoved by confessionselicited by a threat of punishment(.27). Fourth, the conviction rate increasedmarkedlywhen the defendant confessed in response to either a promise of le-niency (.53) or minimizationremarks(.67).Sentencing Expectations

An analysisof varianceon subjects'estimates of sentencing severity yieldeda nearlysignificanteffect, F(4,70) = 2.37, p < .06. As expected, subjects in thepromise group estimated that the defendantwould receive the lightest possiblesentence (M = 2.67), and those in the threatgroupestimatedhe would receive theheaviest sentence(M = 4.40). Ratings n the controlgroupand in the unpromptedand minimizationconfession groups fell between these extremes (M's = 3.20,3.47, and 3.10, respectively).On a second measure of sentencingexpectations, subjects selected from agradedseries of specific alternativesranging rom a suspended sentence to 7 ormore years in prison. It turned out that responses on this measure were highlycorrelatedwith the ratings ust described(r = .55, df = 74, p < .001). As such,a similarbut strongerpatternof results was obtained. Thatis, sentencingexpec-tations were lowest in both the promise and minimizationgroups, in which themost frequentpredictionwas probation,and highest in the explicit threatgroup,where the most frequent predictionwas 3-4 years in prison, X2(16,N= 75) =29.85, p < .02.Table 3. Verdictsand ConfidenceScoresas a Functionof Interrogation acticsUsed inExperiment

Control Unprompted Minimize Promise ThreatVerdict .06a .60b .67b .53b .27aConfidence 3.53 4.93 4.53 4.80 5.00V-C scores -3.40a 1.87bc 2.67C 0.07bc -2.47aNote. Means not sharinga commonsubscriptdifferatp < .05 via chi-squareor Newman-Keulstest.

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AdditionalMeasuresSubjects' perceptionsof the defendant(i.e., ratingsof how likable and trust-

worthyhe was, the sympathythey felt for him)were not significantlyaffectedbythe confession manipulation.To examine other inferences urorsmightdraw fromthe police officer's interrogationbehavior, however, subjectswere asked to ratehow suspicious the officer was that the defendant had stolen the car and howmuch informationhe must have had about the defendant's culpability.As pre-sentedin Table4, the resultsproved interestingon both measures.On suspicious-ness ratings,the officer was assumedto be more suspiciouswhenever he tried toelicit a confession (i.e., inpromise,threat,andminimization roups)thanwhen hedid not (i.e., in the controlandunprompted onfession groups,F(4,70) = 9.32, p< .001).A similarresultappearedon the questionof how informed he policemanwas about the defendant's culpability. Specifically, although the ratings weregenerallylow, subjects assumed the interrogator o be the most informed in theminimizationgroupand the least informed n the no-confessioncontrolcondition,F(4,70) = 5.83, p < .001.

DISCUSSIONThe presentresearchdemonstrated he possible dangers nherent n Inbau etal.'s (1986)so-called subtle methods of interrogation.Experiment1suggestedthatmaximization-a techniquein which the interrogatorries to frightenthe suspectinto a confession by exaggerating he strengthof the evidence andthe magnitudeof the charges-communicates by pragmatic mplicationa threat of punishment(i.e., a relatively severe sentence for the suspect who does not confess). Exper-iments 1 and 2 similarlysuggested that minimization-a technique in which theinterrogatorulls the suspect into a false sense of security by mitigating he crime,makingexcuses for the suspect, or blamingthe victim-seems noncoercive, yet

maycommunicatean implicitofferof leniency(i.e., a relatively ightsentence forthe suspect who does confess).Focusing on minimization,we examined the possible impact on juries ofconfessions elicited by this technique when presented in court. In this study,subjects fully discounted confessions broughton by threatsboth in their volun-tariness udgmentsand in theirverdicts. Consistentwith the positive coercion biasinitiallyreported by Kassin and Wrightsman 1980), however, subjectsonly par-Table4. Ratingsof the Interrogator'suspiciousness nd Information boutthe

Defendant'sCulpabilityControl Unprompted Minimize Promise ThreatSuspicious 3.60a 4.20a 6.20b 7.27b 7.07bInformation 1.20a 1.73ab 3.53c 2.13b 2.67b,Note. Meansnot sharinga commonsubscriptdiffer atp < .05 via Newman-Keuls test.

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tially discounted confessions that were promptedby an explicit promise. Thissame bias characterized eactions to a confession broughtaboutby minimization.Indeed, it is interesting o note that47%of the subjectsin this lattergroup udgedthe confession involuntary,but then proceeded to vote guilty. The results pro-videdadditionalsupport or the hypothesisthatminimizationmplies leniencyandeven that it gives rise to the assumptionthat the interrogatormust have had anevidentiarybasis for presumingthe defendant'sguilt. Like the trial lawyer whotarnishesa witness by asking damagingpresumptuousquestions(e.g., "Whendidyou stop beating your wife?"), the interrogatorwho makes mitigatingremarksmay well communicate a presumptionof guilt to jurors presentedwith that evi-dence (Kassin, Williams,& Saunders, 1990).Taken as a whole, these studies raise importantquestions concerning thetreatmentof confessions by the courts. In Bram v. United States (1897),the U.S.SupremeCourt ruledthat to be admitted nto evidence, a confession must not beelicited by threats or by "direct or impliedpromises, however, slight." It nowappears,however, that whilejudges exclude confessions promptedby threatsandpromises that are "direct," they often do not recognizeas coercive confessionselicitedby promisesthat aremerely "implied" (e.g., Heavner, 1984;White, 1979;Sasaki, 1988).In short, althoughthe courts take promisesand threatsmore seri-ously when they are madeexplicitly thanwhen they are implicitin an interroga-tor's remarks,our data indicate that because people often process information"between the lines" (Harris& Monaco, 1978),these differentmeans of commu-nicationare functionallyequivalentin their impact.This functionalequivalence argument an be madeon two grounds.First, theminimizationand maximizationploys have the potentialto coax innocentpeopleinto confessing to crimes they did not commit. Admittedly, this conclusion isspeculative, but to the extent that guilty and innocent crime suspects weigh therelative costs and benefits of confession and denial, our results suggest that thedangers are realistic. Although many instances of false confessions have beendocumented hroughouthistory,it is impossibleto determineor even estimatetherisk undervaryingcircumstances.Ethicalconsiderationsnotwithstanding,what issorely needed is a creative researchparadigm n which subjects are providedanopportunity o commit a "crime"(e.g., cheating)or asked to role-playa suspect.By randomassignment, those who are known to be guilty or innocent, or in-structedas such, could then be questionedusingdifferent echniques.At the veryleast, our datacompelthefollowingconclusion:Justas the criminalustice systemfinds reason to be concernedabout the risks associatedwith confessions coercedby explicitpromisesand threats, it should be equally concerned about the risksassociatedwithother,more subtle means of communicatinghese samemessages.The second way in which there is a functionalequivalencebetween explicitpromises and threats and Inbau et al.'s (1986) techniques is in their possibleimpact on the jury. Previous studies have shown that mock jurors react withambivalenceto confessions elicited by positive forms of inducement.Along thesame lines, those promptedby minimizationoffer prosecutorsa particularlypo-tent weapon in the courtroom.If our subjectsare any indication, urorswho areconfrontedwith this evidence will concede that the confession is "involuntary"

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by law, but they may also view the interrogatoras sympathetic,not particularlyeager for a confession, and suspicious if not actually informed about the defen-dant'sculpability.In short,minimization eads people to view the interrogationasnoncoercive,a situation n whichfew truly nnocentsuspects arelikelyto confess.Inlightof the criticalrolethatconfession evidence playsin the administrationof criminal ustice, additionalresearchis needed to understandboth the interro-gation tactics that lead suspects to make self-incriminating tatements and theeffects these statementshave on trialjudges andjuries. As a startingpoint, wesoughtto addressthe specificquestionof whetherminimizationand maximizationploys contain "hiddenmessages" concerning he sentencing mplicationsof con-fession and denial. However, it remains to be seen what aspects of these tech-niquesare effective. As we operationallydefinedmaximization, t includes tacticsdesigned to alter both the suspect's subjectivelikelihoodof conviction and sen-tencing expectations. Likewise, minimization ncludes tactics designed not onlyto alter sentencingexpectationsbut to establishthe interrogatoras the suspect'sconfidentialally. Further research is thus needed to isolate the effects of thesedifferent components. In addition, further research is needed to evaluate thepossible coercive effects of otherinterrogationechniques, such as the combineduse of minimizationand maximization,the "good cop-bad cop" routine, prom-ises of nonlegalbenefits (e.g., the opportunity o contact a friend, offers of foodor medicaltreatment)and the circumstancesof the settingitself (e.g., numberofpolice interrogatorspresent).More researchis also needed to understand he role thatdisputedconfessionevidence plays in court. For many years, confessions were evaluated on a vol-untarinessstandard.Then in Mirandav. Arizona(1966),the U.S. SupremeCourtestablisheda broad,moreobjectiveguideline:A confession is inadmissible f theaccused was not informed of his or her rights to silence and to counsel. Morerecently, the Courthas limitedthe scope of its 1966rulingby citingexceptions tothe Mirandarequirement e.g., New Yorkv. Quarles, 1984)and has revertedto astandardof voluntariness n questions concerninga suspect's waiver of his or herMirandarights (Moran v. Burbine, 1986;for a review and discussion of recentchanges in confession law, see Dix, 1988). Both judges andjuries will thus becalled upon with increasingfrequencyto makejudgmentsof coercion. To date,researchhas shown that explicit threats are taken more seriously thanpromisesdespite theirequivalencein the eyes of the law (Kassin& Wrightsman,1985)andthat perceptionsof videotapedconfessions are influencedby lawyer argumentsthat accompany the tape (Kassin et al., 1990) and by whether the camera isfocused on the interrogatoror the suspect (Lassiter& Irvine, 1986).The presentstudy furtherreveals that minimization actics may leadjurorsto view the inter-rogator n favorableterms, while havingan adverse effect on theirperceptionsofthe defendant.Again, more research is needed to evaluate the credibilityof con-fession evidencepromptedby these andotherinterrogation echniques commonlyemployed.Finally, it is important o note that because our findingsare based on infer-ences drawnby college students, relativelyuninvolved but highly educated ob-servers, it remainsto be seen whether similar nferencesare drawnby real crime

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suspects-that is, those who are the highlyinvolvedbutoften uneducatedtargetsof these techniques. Additionalresearchis thus needed to evaluate the externalvalidity of our results. As exemplifiedby Bordens's plea-bargaining tudies, arole-playingparadigm Bordens, 1984),perhaps nvolving stagedmock interroga-tions, and live interviews with real crime suspects (Bordens & Bassett, 1985)representpotentiallyuseful approaches.

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