1

Police Corruption and Strategies for its Prevention in

the Emirate of Abu Dhabi

School of Justice

Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology

Being a thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement of the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD)

(2008)

Candidate:

Humaid Mohamed Saed Al-Muhairi

Masters of Law, Bond University – Queensland (2004) Masters of Law, Tanta University- Egypt (2000) Diploma of Higher Studies, Tanta University- Egypt (1999) Degree of Law and Police, UAE Police College (1996)

Supervisors:

Principal Supervisor : Dr Mark Craig Associate Supervisor : Dr Sharon Hayes

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Abstract

Police Corruption is a complex widespread phenomenon in many developed and

developing countries though the intensity varies from country to country. The current

study is one of several studies supported by the UAE government will explore the

different ways of police corruption and examine the potential ways of external

mechanisms to control and minimize police corruption in the state of Abu Dhabi,

which is one of the emirates of the United Arab Emirates. The methodology used for

this research was by means of collecting data through a survey method distributed in

the form of a questionnaire among a large population of police personnel and the

public. The collected data was then analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. This

research proved that unacceptable police behaviour existed (64.4%), with traffic,

investigation and the immigration departments being the highest. Favouritism and

nepotism have been identified as the most types of unacceptable behaviour which

exists within the Abu Dhabi police force. Police officers (70%) agree to use violence

and excessive force against suspects and (54%) believed that the public were worried

about repercussions if any complaint was made about corrupt officers. It was

established that unacceptable police behaviour exists in Abu Dhabi police force and

traffic, investigation and the immigration departments have been identified with the

highest levels of unacceptable police behaviour. Police corruption is more often a

local police culture involving favouritism and nepotism that protects and even

encourages unacceptable police behaviour. Finally, the research suggests the

important role of media, public awareness, and training as remedies that should be

adopted for instituting long term reforms. A combination of approaches, as well as

federal supervision, is needed.

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Key Words:

Police, UAE, Corruption, Favoritism, Nepotism, Traffic, Immigration, Investigation.

Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been written without the guidance and assistance of a many

persons and agencies. First the author would like to thank Queensland University of

Technology School of Justice, and especially School Head, Professor Rod Broadhurst

and my Supervisor and Associate Supervisor, Dr. Mark Craig and Dr. Sharon Hayes,

for their tireless guidance and advice. Thanks are also due to his employer (Abu

Dhabi Police and HH Major General Seif Al- Nehayan Minster of Interior for

generous financial assistance and for released time for research. Thanks are also due

to those in Australia Queensland Police Service and Bob Atkinson Commissioner of

Police, Australian Federal Police and Michael Joseph Keelty Commissioner of AFP,

and Independent Commission Against Corruption of NSW, Commonwealth

Ombudsman, NSW Crime Commission, Crime and Misconduct Commission, and

Police Integrity Commission for their warm hospitality and for their willingness to

share their experience in anti-corruption work. Also thanks to United Nations Office

on Drugs and Crime Stuart C. Gilman Head Global Programme Against Corruption

Division for Operations.

Needless to say, all the opinions and judgments expressed here are those of the author

alone and not those of anyone named above.

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5

Table of contents

POLICE CORRUPTION AND STRATEGIES FOR ITS PREVENTION IN THE EMIRATE OF

ABU DHABI ...........................................................................................................................................1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................3

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................5

CHAPTER 1:................................................................................................................. 7 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 7 The UAE and Abu Dhabi: a brief overview .........................................................................................7 The rationale of choosing corruption as the basis for the study..........................................................9 The rationale for choosing police corruption as subject of the study................................................13 Hypothesis and aims of the study.......................................................................................................14 Outline of the thesis ...........................................................................................................................15 Overview............................................................................................................................................16 CHAPTER 2:............................................................................................................... 18 LITERATURE REVIEW, CORRUPTION DEFINED ........................................................... 18 Part 1: defining corruption................................................................................................................18 Definitions of corruption adopted by different official agencies .......................................................25 The current researcher’s definition of corruption:............................................................................28 Part 2: Mechanisms for fighting police corruption ...........................................................................32 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................59 CHAPTER 3................................................................................................................ 61 INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION BODIES .............................................................. 61 PART ONE: the international scene ..................................................................................................62 THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) .................................................................................. 64 PART TOW : THE AUSTRALIAN SCENE ................................................................... 89 ACC Strategic Level Coordination ....................................................................................................99 Concluding remarks.........................................................................................................................105 CHAPTER 4.............................................................................................................. 108 EXTERNAL MECHANISMS IN THE UAE IN FIGHTING POLICE CORRUPTION .............. 108 The Fight Against Corruption in the UAE.......................................................................................108 The local police: ..............................................................................................................................109 The State Security Authority:...........................................................................................................111 1. General Inspector’s office ...........................................................................................................114 CHAPTER 5:............................................................................................................. 123 METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 123 Section 1: stages of the study...........................................................................................................123 Clearances: ethical issues ...............................................................................................................128 Section 2: Data collection ...............................................................................................................130 Survey method: introductory issues:................................................................................................130 Survey method: the procedure .........................................................................................................135 Data analyses: methods used: .........................................................................................................145 Summary and conclusion.................................................................................................................147 CHAPTER 6.............................................................................................................. 149 FINDINGS ................................................................................................................. 149 PART ONE: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE CONDUCT ............................................. 149 PART TWO: ANALYSIS OF ABU DHABI POLICE RESPONSES: ................................................196 PART THREE: COMPARISON BETWEEN PUBLIC AND POLICE SURVEY ..............................236

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CHAPTER 7.............................................................................................................. 242 RESULTS, DISCUSSIONS & CONCLUSIONS ................................................................ 242 Discussion of survey results.............................................................................................................242 Summary ..........................................................................................................................................249 Examining whether the aims have been achieved............................................................................252 The key findings of the study: ..........................................................................................................253 CONCLUSIONS: .............................................................................................................................254 Further research..............................................................................................................................257 Limitations .......................................................................................................................................259 Recommendations............................................................................................................................261 Short Term Recommendations .........................................................................................................261 Long Term Recommendations .........................................................................................................264

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

Police Corruption is ubiquitous in both developed and developing countries.

Although varying in intensity by time and by place, it always affects public

confidence in the police organisation and government accountability. Therefore, the

United Arab Emirates (UAE) authorities have decided to fight corruption in all

government departments but especially in the police. This study will explore police

corruption in Abu Dhabi, one of the emirates affiliated with the UAE, looking both at

the internal and external forces triggering it, and at the counter-measures needed to

resist it.

The UAE and Abu Dhabi: a brief overview

To understand the aims and methods of the study, it is important to have a basic

understanding of some key features of the UAE politico-social history impacting

directly or indirectly on our central concern: police corruption. From 1919 to 1971,

Abu Dhabi was administered as part of the British Empire. Then the UAE was

established as a federation of the seven Emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras al-khaimah,

Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm al-Qaiwain, with Abu Dhabi chosen as the

Federation’s capital city. In 1971 and the country’s total population was only

180,000, living in an area of 83,600 km2 (See the table below) (United Arab Emirates,

1998: 32). Situated in the south-east of the Arabian Peninsula, the UAE is now the

third biggest oil producer in the Gulf after Saudi Arabia and Iran. It has land borders

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with Saudi Arabia in the west, the Sultanate of Oman in the south, and the Arabia

Gulf on the east (Encyclopaedia, 2005).

Table 1.1: Population according to each Emirate per thousand inhabitants

[http://www.tedad.ae/english/about_census/background.html (accessed 18 June 2007)]

Before the discovery of oil in 1962, the UAE’s national income was mainly dependent

on pearl production, fishing, agriculture and herding (Encyclopaedia, 2005). After

the increase in oil prices in 1973, the economy underwent significant growth, and

offered significant investment opportunities to both foreign and local businesses. The

resultant investment boom attracted hundreds of thousands of people seeking work in

the UAE. Population increase was explosively rapid: from 180,000, in 1971, to

3,290,000 in 2001 (Encyclopaedia, 2005).

The UAE lacked strategies to cope with the effects of such rapid social change, one of

which was police corruption. Several factors explain this:

• The short history of the UAE as a state. All the skills for managing a modern

economy and society had to be learned in a single generation.

• Insufficient human resources. The British tightly controlled policing, so UAE

locals did not develop crucial managerial skills and culture.

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• The tribal nature of the local cultural traditions. As in most pre-industrial

societies, social order had relied on moral codes enforced on a face-to-face

basis by neighbourhood or family.

The rationale of choosing corruption as the basis for the study

The UAE is becoming a business centre for the Middle East and Africa, a major

centre for re-exporting good and services to the rest of the world. It is well-known

that corruption can create barriers to foreign investment, or lower its efficiency.

Ultimately, however, high levels of corruption exists and can impede or distort

foreign investment (Rose-Ackeman, 1999: 2-3).1 Consequently, the UAE government

is keen to fight corruption in order to attract investment and to prevent it from

migrating elsewhere. The UAE’s long-term objective is to address the basic causes of

corruption through modern socio-economic policies that will keep it at bay (Albayan

Daily, 24/4/2002). As part of this strategy, the UAE government supports research

into anti-corruption strategies and the current study is one of several studies to build

anti-corruption institutions and to develop relevant strategies for preventing

corruption.

Corruption can frustrate economic development policy by encouraging businesses to

operate in the ‘unofficial sector’. Thus, other things being equal, the Asian economies

could attract more foreign investment if corruption was at lower levels, which would

make their industrial policies more effective (Rose-Ackeman, 1999: 3).

1 Nonetheless, some scholars claim that corruption might be advantageous for developing countries as

it introduces a form of market mechanism that puts goods and services in the hands of people who value them more. Klitgaard argues that in general corruption is harmful to economic, political and organisational development but that corruption involving the reallocation of strictly “private goods” such as one’s personal possessions or consumption of them does not affect other people is less damaging (Klitgaard, 1991).

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Even when corruption and economic growth run parallel to each other, the result is

higher costs and economic distortions. Corrupt officials support too many unfruitful

public investments and under-maintain past investments. Corruption can leave a

poorer country trapped in poverty if corruption is so bad that it discourages legal

business investment (Rose-Ackeman, 1999: 3). However, poor governance extends

well beyond corruption, although poor governance inevitably aggravates it and is

aggravated by it (Schiavo-Campo, 1999: 3). Lack of policies or weak policies against

corruption create a fertile environment where corruption can proliferate (Rose-

Ackeman, 1999: 3).

Mauro demonstrates that highly corrupt countries tend to reduce their spending on

education, because education gives corrupt persons fewer opportunities to profit than

other forms of public spending (Schiavo-Campo,1999: 3).

The UAE government treats the Global Corruption Report of Transparency

International (TI), a non-government body focusing on inter-national corruption as a

valid source of data. The 2003 Report sees corruption in the Middle Eastern and

North African countries as motivated by the lack of infrastructural reforms, by

policies that do not fit the existing programs to a free economy, and by the prevalence

of autocratic regimes, all of which result in lack of transparency and accountability

(Transparency International 2004).

In Middle Eastern and North African countries, including the UAE, the petty

corruption that is increasing in virtually all economic, administrative and political

domains is aggravated by widespread restrictions on freedom of expression, by non-

transparency in government and by lack of judicial independence (Leenders and

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Sfakianakis, 2003). TI’s 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks 133

countries by level of corruption, starting from the least corrupt down to the most by

measuring the perceptions of corruption by businesses, academics and risk analysts.

Each country is graded, from 10 (highly clean) down to 0 (highly corrupt). Australia,

with a CPI of 8.8, was ranked 8th from the top of the countries listed, while the UAE

and Malaysia, with CPIs of 5.2, were tied for 37th place, putting them in the middle

level of corruption in 2003 (Leenders and Sfakianakis, 2003).

According to the government statistics of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, ‘abuse-of-trust

crimes’ 2 increased by 263% from 2001 to 2002 (Al-Belbeesy, 2004: 12-24).

Furthermore, the Directorate-General of Abu Dhabi Police has indicated that

embezzlement3 increased by 300% in 2002, compared to 20014 (Al-Belbeesy, 2004:

12-24). Nevertheless, in the TI’s CPI index for 2004 UAE’s ranked 29th among 146

countries with a CPI score of 6.1, equally on showing an improvement from 2003

(Transparency International 2004).

The Police Commissioner of Dubai, Lieutenant General Dhahy Khalfan, in his

address to the Training Course for Investigating Corruption on 19 April 2002, , had

emphasized that the UAE needed an anti-corruption law and a unified definition of

corruption in order to better identify acts of corruption and their perpetrators. He

noted that those fighting corruption could only use the Federal Criminal Law, which

lacked a specific definition of corruption. He emphasized how important it was to

2Chapter 3, Breach of Trust And Matters Related Thereto: Article 404: "Shall be punishable by confinement or by fine any individual who embezzles, uses or dissipates funs, instruments or any other

movable, in such a manner as to cause prejudice to persons having title thereto, whenever such funds,

instruments or movable such committed to him in a fiduciary character by way of trust, lease,

mortgage, loan for use or proxy." 3 Chapter 6, Embezzlement and Damage to Public Property; Article 224; "Shall be punishable by temporary imprisonment any public officer or any person to whom a public service is assigned and

who embezzles funds which are in his possession due to his office or assignment." 4 This statistics are only for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.

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combat corruption because of the threat it posed to nation’s administrative structure

and to the national economy, and because of the damage it does to public confidence,

security and values. While praising UAE laws protecting foreign investment, at the

same time he called for a special law to fight corruption (Albayan Newspaper,

24/4/2002).

Subsequently the UAE ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption

(Merida, Mexico, 9th-11th of December 2003). That Convention commits member

states to develop, implement or maintain effective and coordinated anti-corruption

policies. In addition, Article 6 provides

Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal

system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate, that prevent

corruption…

Subsection (2) of Article 6, commits the UAE, to develop and establish its own

independent body equipped with the authority to investigate and combat corruption.

(United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003) It is vital for the UAE to

minimize or limit police corruption, with an anti-corruption organisation that has clear

policies and powers capable of materializing its influence. (United Nations

Convention against Corruption, Article 5, 2003) This development makes

cooperation with relevantly experienced nations like Australia highly useful.

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The rationale for choosing police corruption as subject of the study

Within the overall area of corruption, police corruption has a critical role. In

launching the TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2003, Cockcroft observed, “Political

parties, the courts and the police were identified as the three areas most in need of

reform.” (The Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2003). Other

authors spell out the high costs incurred by police corruption:

1. It discourages the public from reporting crime, leading to a more fertile

environment for it to spread. (Pogrebin, M., & Atkins, 'Probable causes for

police corruption', (1976), cited in Ede, 2000: 12 )

2. It weakens public confidence in the law itself (Pogrebin, M., & Atkins,

'Probable causes for police corruption', (1976). cited in Ede, 2000: 12). and

provides a bad al model to the public (Sykes, 1957, cited in Ede 2000: 13).

3. It discourages the public from reporting official misconduct when the police

themselves are perceived as corrupt (Marx, 1992, cited in Ede 2000: 12). This

brings the relationship between the public and police into crisis, impeding the

enforcement of laws and rules (Burnham, 1974, cited in Ede 2000: 12).

4. It imposes extra costs on the public in the form of bribes, lost time, increased

transactions costs and other economic losses (Burnham, 1974, cited in Ede

2000:12).

5. It erodes police officers’ morale, self-confidence, and loyalty to their

organisation (Burnham, 1974, cited in Ede 2000:12), creating an climate of

egoism where police officers are more interested in individual profit than in

their duty to maintain law and order (Pittman, 1990, cited in Ede 2000:12). A

few corrupt officers can trigger the emergence of a group mentality that

encourages their colleagues to follow their example.

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6. It creates extra costs involved in the form of systems to deal with complaints

Ms Patricia Holden, Manager of Risk Analysis and Intelligence Section

(RAIS) of the Queensland Police Service (QPS), states that this department

receives 5-10 complaints against police officers every day (Holden, 2004).

Hypothesis and aims of the study

This research proceeds from a central initial hypothesis: that UAE currently lacks an

effective system for combating police corruption.

If this hypothesis is valid, a policy implication follows directly from it: a need may

exist in the UAE for new external mechanisms to fight police corruption and to ensure

police accountability. Indeed, the ultimate aim of this study is to improve Abu

Dhabi’s anti-corruption performance by providing it with accurate and up to date

empirical data on its current situation. It is comprised of three subordinate

investigations.

1. To document quantitatively and qualitatively the level and the forms of police

corruption in Abu Dhabi. That is, it seeks to go behind the third-party perceptions

compiled by TI for its CPI to examine in detail one crucial arena of corruption, the

police.

2. To analyse in detail the procedures involved in corrupt activities within the Abu

Dhabi Police, i.e., to document the social institutions and codes of social

communication that have evolved to permit corrupt activities to take place.

3. To apply these results to developing external mechanisms to minimise police

corruption in the Abu Dhabi Police. Current strategies used in Abu Dhabi will be

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reviewed in the light of different anti-corruption models used in Australia and

other countries.

Outline of the thesis

Chapter 2: ‘Literature review’: This chapter reviews the relevant literature to

clarify the practical and theoretical foundations of the concept of corruption and to

clarify how this study relates to other academic work within the subject area.

Chapter 3: ‘International anti-corruption bodies’: This chapter, surveys

internationally mechanisms for fighting corruption. Section 1 looks at mechanisms

sub-national (State, Province, Emirate) level mechanisms, like Australia’s ‘Crime and

Misconduct Commission (CMC) (Queensland), ‘Independent Commission Against

Corruption (ICAC)’ and ‘Police Integrity Commission’ (PIC), New South Wales’

(NSW) as well as at State Ombudsman; Section 2 looks at mechanisms used by

national level authorities in federal polities like Australia’s ‘Commonwealth

Ombudsman’; Section 3 looks at international the United Nations (UN) and

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) efforts to keep

national anti-corruption strategies aligned internationally, and to raise awareness of

international efforts in this field.

Chapter 4: ‘External mechanisms in the UAE in fighting police corruption’: This

chapter confronts the strengths and weaknesses of the UAE’s external anti-corruption

mechanisms and strategies at both federal and Abu Dhabi Emirate levels. It discusses

definitions of corruption found in official UAE documents, comparing them to those

adopted by agencies in Australia and Hong Kong. The chapter will provide a full

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comparative analysis of such differences, including probable reasons for their

existence.

Chapter 5: ‘Methodology’: Given the context and the aims of the study, this chapter

describes the methodologies and data collection methods employed here, including

both their ethical and data analysis aspects. It concludes with a discussion of the

methodology’s limitations and the possibilities for further refinement.

Chapter 6: ‘Findings’: This chapter first presents and analyses the data collected in

two questionnaires designed to evoke responses from both the public and police in

Abu Dhabi. It is divided into two sections: the first on public perceptions of police

conduct, while the second on how police personnel themselves perceive their work

practices and their strategies for fighting corruption.

Chapter 7: ‘Results, discussions & Conclusions’: The final chapter pulls together

the implications, practical and theoretical, of these analyses. Its key issue is: what

plausible practical recommendations can be formulated on the basis of our results for

avoiding corruption? And of course it also asks: how could the research be carried to

the next stage.

Overview

This study breaks new ground for the UAE by providing the first solid empirical

research results on police corruption. This had long been lacking. Though official

statistics of the Abu Dhabi Emirate indicate that abuse-of-trust crimes are increasing,

the UAE’s score of 6.1 ranks it 29th among 146 countries on the CPI, a marked

improvement over 2003. The UAE, having ratified the United Nations Convention

17

against corruption, now needs to develop and establish an independent body with

appropriate powers to fight corruption. Hopefully, this work will let us proceed with

the task confident that we now have a firm grasp of our current situation.

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Chapter 2:

Literature Review, Corruption Defined

A review of the technical academic literature is needed to put the topic in its proper

academic context. This chapter sub-divides that exercise into two topics:

• Part 1: How is corruption defined? A review of general definitions.

• Part 2: How can corruption be avoided? A review of anti–corruption strategies.

Part 1: defining corruption

Discussions of the corruption phenomenon inevitably raise the question: how

practically can one define corruption? What exactly is the ‘corruption’ we wish to

fight? This section seeks to extract a workable concept of the corruption by

comparing the varying meanings found among the different technical definitions and

viewpoints followed by legal and police organisations worldwide.

Introduction

‘Corruption’ is not something new nor is it confined to any particular part of the

world. Rather it is among the oldest human phenomena, one that has been ubiquitous

since the social-political-economic changes associated with agriculture began along

with the first urban civilisations in Mesopotamia, some 5,000 years ago. The Indian

Brahman Prime Minister of Chandragupta mentioned forty-odd ways of embezzling

public money in ancient India, while in China, where an anti-corruption authority

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’Yang Lien’ (literally: ‘Nourish Rectitude), was established to minimise corruption

(Klitgaard 1991: 7). In a similar vein, the Arab scholar Abdul-Rahman Ibn Khaldun

identified the root cause of corruption causes in his Muqaddimah (c. 1375), an

important work on the theory of history and society:

[T]he root of the corruption [was] the passion for luxurious living within the

ruling group. It was to meet the expenditure on luxury that the ruling group

resorted to corrupt dealing (Klitgaard, 1991, p7).

According to Tess Newton Cain corruption almost exclusively means what is often

termed 'process corruption' in American literature or 'noble cause corruption' in

United Kingdom and to a lesser extent, Australia. "Process corruption" according to

Tim Prenzler involves the fabrications of evidence or other forms of disrespecting the

justice. Process corruption usually involves lying of witnesses not providing complete

evidence or convincing suspects to make wrong confessions (Prenzler and Ransley,

2002: 5, 6, 146).

Aristotle wrote,

There are three kinds of constitution, or an equal number of deviations, or, as it

were, corruptions of these three kinds. … The deviation or corruption of

kingship is tyranny. Both kingship and tyranny are forms of government by a

single person, but … the tyrant studies his own advantage… the king looks to

that of his subjects (Heidenheimer, Michael, and Victor, 1989: 3).

Corruption and anti-corruption measures, while not new, remain important global

issues, requiring a global action:

[The 1990s] decade is the first to witness the emergence of corruption as a truly

political issue eliciting a global political response (Human Rights and Corruption, Australian National University, 2005: 4).

The end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Block in late 1989 led to a

new world order whose hallmark was a consciousness of the importance of

globalisation and of free-trade through such bodies as World Trade Organisation

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(WTO), and the emergence of new political-economic regional entities, like the

European Union and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), et al. The new

economic order triggered, however, massive increases in financial and other business

transactions that provide fertile soil for the growth of corruption. This in turn

facilitated the spreading awareness of corruption throughout international commercial

and political governance communities (No Longer Business as Usual Fighting Bribery

and Corruption, 2000: 87-89).

The WTO diligently promotes trade liberalisation across borders, without paying

much attention to the potential for corruption that accompanies free trade in goods

and financial assets. Therefore, argues Transparency International, the WTO should

recognise how fighting international corruption is one of its most essential and urgent

responsibilities. Similarly, the newly emerging emphasis on democracy and human

rights (political reform, educational equity, e-government, etc.) and the newly

emerging global economic paradigm (e.g. open competition, e-business, multinational

companies, etc.) drastically increase the world’s concern for creating a corruption-free

spaces for business and government. All these factors have collectively contributed in

advancing awareness of corruption and its negative effects (Human Rights and

Corruption, Australian National University, 2005: 14-15).

But although corruption is as old as it is widespread, a standard definition has not yet

been agreed upon. Definitions evolve over time and vary by country. Thus in the 19th

century, sale of public offices had been common practice in many countries for long

periods of time in Europe, Asia and North America. Selling positions was a source of

revenue for central governments, as was the practice of officials remunerating

themselves from fees or other payments collected from the public (Heidenheimer,

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Michael, and Victor, 1989: 89). These practices were not seen as ‘corrupt’. By the

time of George Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), however, times had begun to change:

he described selling of the government offices as ‘The most barbarous trait of a

people who constitute a state’ (Heidenheimer, Michael, and Victor, 1989: 96).

The ‘Knapp Commission’ in New York City from 1970 to 1972 starts the turning

point in modern day about police misconduct (Knapp 1972). The world became

familiar with the bureaucratic organised corruption in the Police Department which

then was dramatised in books and films for the knowledge of the public (Prenzler and

Ransley, 2002: 7).

The types and forms of the corruption vary in accordance with political, economic and

socio-cultural conditions of a society. Practices considered as corrupt acts in one

society might be normal social activities in another. Moreover, even within the same

society, views and perception towards corruption can differ 5 (Ellie, [n. d.]). In

Middle Eastern societies, for a citizen to reward a government officer with a gift

could be treated as a normal expression of gratitude, not as due to extortion. In short,

with such differences in social perceptions of corruption, defining it has become a

matter of controversy. The sheer diversity of competing definitions of corruption put

forward so far impede practical efforts to lay down a unified, internationally accepted

definition of the word.

This is recognised by international agencies. Thus the World Bank says that ‘…part

of the reason for the difficulty in defining corruption lies in the complexity of the

5 Internal Variables such as ethnic groups, nationality, social, financial, and educational backgrounds. The Egyptian public employee accepts gifts from the public, the gift is perceived as a thanking action.

22

concept’ (World Bank, 1997: p8 citied in Human Rights and Corruption, Australian

National University, 2005: p5). The Council of Europe agrees:

No precise definition can be found which applies to all forms, types and degrees

of corruption, or which would be acceptable universally as covering all acts

which are considered in every jurisdiction as contributing to corruption. (World Bank, 1997: 20).

Despite the definitional problems, the World Bank has no doubt as to its effects:

The single greatest obstacle to economic and social development [which] …

undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the

institutional foundation on which economic growth depends (Anticorruption, 2005: www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm).

While not a formal definition, the clear focus is on economic abuses arising from

interactions between the private economy and the state. (Other institutional

definitions of corruption focussing on damages to the public interest will be examined

later.) Moreover, politically oriented definitions of corruption highlight the effects on

resource and on abuses of power. The UN Convention against Transnational

Organised Crime defined corruption, as:

(i) The promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an

undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity,

in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her

functions; and (ii) the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or

indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another

person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the

exercise of his or her function (UN Guide For Anti-Corruption Policies, 2003: 33).

The Council of the European Union broadens how it defines corruption to include

actions within the private sector:

[T]he deliberate action of a person who, in the course of his business activities,

directly or through an intermediary, requests or receives an undue advantage of

any kind whatsoever, or accepts the promise of such an advantage, for himself or

for a third party, for him to perform or refrain from performing an act, in

breach of his duties (The Compendium of International Legal Instruments on Corruption, 2003: 25).

23

The focus of this study is not, however, on private sector corruption. Rather, it adopts

a definition of corruption emphasising public sector corruption and in particular

corruption with police forces. This being our central focus, the operational definition

adopted here has three elements. These are:

1. Misuse of a public authority is involved: This element, which puts the public

servant’s authority at the centre of the definition of corruption, is echoed by

several authorities. It is, for instance consistent, with Bayley’s definition:

‘corruption [is] … tied particularly to the act of bribery, … a general term

covering misuse of authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which

need not be monetary’ (Friedrich, 1989, cited in Heidenheimer, Michael, and

Victor, 1989: 9).

Similarly, Nye describes it as an act:

[which] deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-

regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates

rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This

includes such acts as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person

in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of inscriptive

relationship rather than merit; and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of

public resources for private-regarding uses) (Friedrich, 1989, cited in Heidenheimer, Michael, and Victor, 1989: 9).

This definition focuses initially on the misuse of the entrusted authority to public

servants for private gains i.e., it embodies the core idea of a violation of public

trust.

24

2. The main motive is personal gain: The basis of this definition is a situation in

which the public servant regards his/her position as a means for personal social6 gain

at the cost of the public interest. Van Klaveren provided a relevant example when he

states:

A corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of

which he will … seek to maximize. The office then becomes a “maximizing unit.”

The size of his income depends … upon the market situation and his talents for

finding the point of maximal gain on the public’s demand curve (Heidenheimer, Michael, and Victor, 1989: 9).

The European Union’s Protocol fundamentally agrees:

The deliberate action of a person who, in the course of his business activities,

directly or through an intermediary, requests or receives an undue advantage of

any kind whatsoever, or accepts the promise of such an advantage, for himself or

for a third party, for him to perform or refrain from performing an act, in

breach of his duties. Active corruption in the private sector is described as the

deliberate action of whosoever promises, offers or gives, directly or through an

intermediary, an undue advantage of any kind whatsoever to a person, for

himself or for a third party, in the course of the business activities of that person

in order that the person should perform or refrain from performing an act, in

breach of his duties (The Compendium of International Legal Instruments On

Corruption, 2003: 25) .

The World Bank and Transparency International define it as the ‘use of one’s

public position for illegitimate private gains’ (What Causes Corruption,

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption.html [accessed May 2004]), while the

UN Global Programme against Corruption (GPAC) defines it as the ‘abuse of

power for private gain’ (What Causes Corruption,

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption.html [accessed May 2004]).

6 We define ‘social gain’ as any valued enhancement of the individual’s personal status within a community that he/she identifies with socially, such as a family or tribe.

25

3. The public interest is damaged by the corrupt actions.

The element of damage to the public interest further narrows the definition of

corruption. It is reflected by Friedrich’s definition, which states that corruption

arises:

…whenever a power holder who is charged with doing certain things, i.e., who is

a responsible functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other rewards not

legally provided for, induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the

rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests” (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, cited in Heidenheimer, Michael, and Victor, 1989: 10).

This definition makes clear that the abuse by public officials of the public interest for

their personal gain.

Definitions of corruption adopted by different official agencies

Scholars’ definitions are generally shaped by long standing theoretical debates;

whereas those of public agencies may reflect short short-term or institutional or

historical considerations, as well as legal/administrative practicalities. Both modes of

definition are useful.

1. New South Wales’ Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW-

ICAC): The New South Wales ICAC Act defines ‘corrupting conduct’ in

Subsections 7, 8 and 9, Part 3 of the Act. Section 8(2) of the Act (Independent

Commission Against Corruption Act 1988). There it specifies twenty-five

criminal offences considered to be ‘corrupting conducts’ for example

embezzlement, prevention of course of justice etc. However, the list of types of

corruption proposed by the ICAC includes other corruption-related crimes like

theft, illegal drug dealings etc.

2. Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (HK-ICAC):

26

Hong Kong’s ICAC defines corruption as a practice that ‘…occurs when an

individual abuses his authority for personal gain at the expense of other people.

Corruption brings unfairness, crookedness and, in its more serious case, puts the

lives and properties of the community at stake’ (Independent Commission Against

Corruption, Hon Kong, http://www.icac.org.hk/eng/prevt/index.html, [accessed

20-8-2003]).

3. The UAE Federal Law: The UAE society being ‘tribal’ in nature, one’s first

loyalty is to one’s family, next to one’s tribe, and only then to the State and to

society at large. Family and tribal loyalties are obligations that transcend all

others. Given the familial-tribal norms and traditions of this society, public

opinion regards ‘favouritism’ and exchanges of gifts among public servants as

morally legitimate. In contrast, these acts eventually affect the credibility of

public institutions that are expected to all persons as equal and independent

individuals.

Understandably, UAE legislators, when creating a legal code for the Federation,

took a different tack, defining corruption in the public sector as ‘Public servant’s

crimes’ that contrast with those adopted by the NSW ICAC. Where the latter

offers a global definition of the various crimes of the corruption in Section 8 of

the Act, the UAE law makers adopted a functional approach: each corrupt act is

considered as a separate type of crime, with its own particular definition. The

following sub-categories of acts are defined as ‘corrupt’ in various sections of the

UAE Federal Criminal Law Code (1987) when committed by public servants or

by persons assigned to work in public agencies:

27

1. Embezzling, and/or misusing public money. (Art. 224.)

2. Appropriating or facilitating the appropriation of, public money. (Art. 225)

3. Requesting or taking money undeservedly. (Art. 226)

4. Strike and cessation of work. (Art. 231- 233)

5. Giving or accepting bribes. (Art. 234, 235 and 236)

7. Deliberately damaging State’s interest for one’s own profit. (Art. 227)

8. Benefiting from work related to state interest for personal profit. (Art.

228)

9. Disclosing defence secrets entrusted to them. (Art. 228)

10. Breaching the confidentiality of correspondence or of other official

information. (Art.159)

11. Unlawfully using violence against a person. (Art. 245)

12. Using one’s position to impede or to disrupt the enforcement of laws, rules

or orders. (Art. 246)

13. Deliberately refusing or failing to enforce decisions or orders issued by a

court of law. (Art. 270)

Thus the UAE, along with other jurisdictions, took a legal-functional approach in its

criminal code. In contrast to New South Wales after the creation of the ICAC, as well

at to some other Australian states, it did not create a separate body with statutory

authority to deal with corruption. At the same time, existing UAE anti-corruption

legislation was seen to have several shortcomings, specifically its failure to

criminalise favouritism/discrimination.

In NSW, however, the Legislature effectively criminalised this form of corruption by

broadly defining corruption to include “…any conduct of a public official or former

28

public official that constitutes or involves a breach of public trust”. (Paragraph C,

Article 8, NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988.)

The experience of the UAE convinced it of the need for a diversified approach to

corruption, like that recommended by the United Nations:

[C]orruption, like cancer, has many manifestations. In the same way that

different types of cancer require different treatments, fighting corruption

requires different initiatives, tools and institutions (UN Guide For Anti-Corruption

Policies, 2003: 27). However, one common denominator remains clear here: corruption involves a conflict

of interest that is either created or is exploited; that is to say a conflict is created

between an official’s lawfully prescribed duty and his/her actual (UN Guide for Anti-

Corruption Policies, 2003: 27). Naim states, ‘corruption’s multiple manifestations do

share many commonalities. In principle, a conflict of interest underlies all acts of

corruption’ (Naim, 1995, p.245- 248, UN Guide For Anti-corruption Policies, 2003:

27).

The current researcher’s definition of corruption:

A detailed review of anti-corruption legislation in Australia, Hong Kong, and of the

recommendations of international organisations (e.g., The UN and EU) crystallised a

particular definition for corruption that suits the UAE’s particular social and political

conditions. We propose that takes a functional approach and highlights acts of public

officials, while practically addressing all relevant angles of the phenomenon:

Any deliberate act or failure to act by a public official in the exercise of

his/her normal official functions that causes damage to the government, to

a natural person, or to a legal person, whether or not the action or the

failure achieved any advantage to himself / herself, or to a third person .

29

Obviously this definition omits corrupt acts by private parties, which would have to

be criminalised by other legislation.

Corrupt acts by police officers acting in an official capacity are obviously covered by

this definition. But it should be noted that ‘police corruption’ is a special case, in that

its impact on the public can be more direct and more dramatic, in that it can, and

sometimes does, involve violence against individuals, as when corrupt police connive

with organised crime. That this is so repugnant to the public makes police corruption

even more destructive of public trust than other forms of official corruption. Reducing

it therefore has an especially high priority in any anti-corruption strategy.

This definition, which focuses on the breach of public servant’s authority, is built up

from six elements:

30

1. Deliberateness: A corrupt action is performed with particular intent that is

associated with full consciousness of the nature of its effects. It involves careful

consideration of factors influencing the choice: the public official must have

weighed up the normal outcomes of the act against its normal consequences,

knowing it to be illegal before deciding to undertake it. Hence, the act is

intentional, not accidental (http://www.answers.com/topic/deliberate, 2007).

Hassan Rabi, ([n. d.]: 177) distinguished between general intent and private intent

thus:

The general intent is the dedication of the offender’s will to commit the

criminal act. Whether act or failure to act, knowing the crime and the

elements related to its nature and knowing the legal principles as a must.

Act 38 of Criminal Law of UAE states that crime has two main components:

intent and violation. To be an ‘intended’ act committed or omitted in conscious

violation of a law forbidding or commanding, that results in a direct harm to a

human being or in damage to public or private property; moreover the ‘act’ can be

an act of omission, negligence, recklessness, heedlessness, carelessness, folly or

levity. A ‘violation’ involves inconsideration of a law forbidding or commanding,

which results in direct harm to a human being or damage to public or private

property, and for which punishment is imposed upon conviction.

The author defines corruption similarly: it is a deliberate act performed in

violation of law, and done with prior intent that can be established by evidence.

2. Act or failure to act: Corruption can include both acts and failures to act. A

corrupt action can occur, whether the action is positive or negative.

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3. Public official: A corrupt act is one performed by a public official. According to

the Australian Legal Dictionary (1997), a public official is...[a]ny individual

having public official duties or acting in a public official capacity”. Article 2 of

the UN Convention against Corruption, on the other hand, defines ‘public

official’ as:

(i) Any person holds a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a State Government, whether appointed or elected, whether

permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of

that person's seniority.

(ii) Any other person who performs a public duty for a public agency or enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic

law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of

legislation of that State Party.

4. Exercise of his/her official duties: The corrupt action is linked with a person’s

official duties in his/her capacity as a pubic official. If an act is not linked to

official duties, than it is not corruption, though it might be another crime. The

criterion deciding if an action is corrupt or non-corrupt is whether it is done in

exercise of official duties.

5. Causes damage: The act, or failure to act, must cause damage, whether direct or

indirect, and whether material or moral. As to moral damage, it can include

favouritism or nepotism, or treating others unequally on grounds of their race,

nationality, colour, religion, or gender.

However, the UN Convention states: (Section 2 of Article 3, UN Convention

against Corruption, 2003)

For the purpose of implementing this Convention, it shall not be

necessary, except as otherwise stated herein, for the offences set forth in

it to result in damage or harm to state property.

32

6. Government, a personal entity, or legal entity: The damage shall be inflicted on

a ‘person’, whether it is a personal, or a legal entity, whether it is in governmental

or in the private sector.

7. Advantage: The act is considered corrupt whether the public official committed

the illegal act to eventually secure benefits for his/her own self or for a third party,

even if that act did not actually result in any advantage or benefit.

Part 2: Mechanisms for fighting police corruption

Increasing emphasis will need to be placed on a mix of institutional anti-corruption

mechanisms, some internal to the police organisation, and others external to it

(Kleinig, 1996: 218). Walker describes such an approach as ‘a mixed system of

accountability [which] includes a variety of internal and external mechanisms’ (In

Samuel, 2001: 185). Klitgaard added his support to the latter concept when he noted

that:

A strong external agency like the ICAC [of Hong Kong] is not sufficient to rid

the government of corruption. Internal measures are needed as well. The case

of Singapore’s Customs and Excise Department is an apt illustration (Klitgaard,

1991: 122).

Although police organisations have internal mechanisms in place to foster

accountability, many of these mechanisms seem only to require obedience to a rigid

list of rules and procedures instead of creating an environment of professional

discretion and personal growth. Thus formal accountability structures, no matter how

strict, do not necessarily ensure the desired effect of accountability.

Several internal mechanisms are in use:

1. Reporting and review.

33

2. Clear organisational structure.

3. Forward planning initiatives.

4. Administrative rule making.

5. Internal espionage.

6. Cultivating of an appropriate police culture and corporate thinking/mentality.

7. Formal Codes of Ethics for police (Kleinig, 1996).

Aside from these internal mechanisms of accountability, there are many external

mechanisms of accountability in policing policy and procedures, ranging from

legislative boards to civilian reviews. According to Kleinig:

What is true of organisational mechanisms of accountability is no less true of

external ones: A mechanism is not likely to function well in the absence of a

commitment to its working well (Kleinig, 1996: 228).

The idea of policing by the community may be a step in the right direction - not only

does it recognize cooperative efforts, but does so in a way designed to incorporate the

community in the policing process, both externally and internally. Thus a police

organisation can begin to internalize more of the outlook of the community which it

serves.

This study focuses on those anti-corruption strategies based on external mechanisms.

External mechanisms for fighting police corruption

In spite of their merits, the intrinsic organisational mechanisms developed by police to

ensure accountability cannot by themselves guarantee that the public will vest its trust

in them. In fact, no occupational group or social institution has ever proved itself

capable of fully adequate self-regulation (Kleinig, 1996: 224). Therefore, applying a

34

system of external mechanisms, together with the internal ones, is required to achieve

adequate police accountability. Examples of external mechanisms are explored in the

following section.

1. Legislative review: The legislative arm of the Australian Commonwealth

consists of two Houses, the House of Representatives (‘Lower House’) and the

Senate. The former consists of 150 members, each representing a separate

electoral division. The key feature of the House is that the party with a majority

of seats in it is entitled to form a Government, i.e., choose a Prime Minister and a

Cabinet to manage the Executive. House members, who serve three-year terms,

exercise the five main important functions of Parliament:

(http://www.aph.gov.au/parl.htm, 2006)

� to approve, and also to reject, the Executive Government;

� to legislate;

� to approve or disapprove a Government’s annual Budget;

� to serve as a forum for popular representation; and

� to oversee and to critique the actions of government.

Under the Australian Constitution the States are mainly responsible for policing,

although the Commonwealth’s small Australian Federal Police have recently grown in

importance. State systems of government follow the same pattern, although the

terminology for their Legislative Houses varies.

The most important function regarding this study in relation to the House of

Representatives is examining the government by “questioning the minister” on the

floor of Parliament. This tool of the legislative arm is a key mechanism for fighting

35

corruption in democratic countries with Parliamentary systems. (In non-

parliamentary ‘presidential’ systems like the USA, legislatures operate though

investigative Committees that have strong powers to compel testimony. This power of

legislatures derives from the basic principle of the separation of powers. Police are no

exception. They too are accountable to the legislation arm

[http://www.aph.gov.au/parl.htm, (accessed 2006)].

2. Judicial Review: Legislative decisions all have limitations, it being impossible

for legislatures either to anticipate every contingency that will confront an

institution and its agents, or to predict all the actions of citizens. Historically this

gave rise to judicial review, a function that has increasingly operated as an

accountability mechanism (Kleinig, 1996: 228).

Judicial review has emerged as a major tool in terms of anti-corruption strategies,

as the courts play an important role in ensuring that other government bodies

operate both lawfully and effectively. Full judicial independence is naturally

required, as it is a necessary condition for courts if they are to perform an anti-

corruption role effectively. This means they are independent from undue influence

by non-judicial elements of government and independent of all extrinsic

influences(United Nations Guide on Anticorruption Policies, 2003: 52).

There are many ways of defining the independence of the judiciary. Some

scholars adopt a narrow view of the definition, while others produce long lists of

criteria that the judiciary must meet. Most criteria lists include these three

elements:

36

2-1. Impartiality: Judicial decisions in a case may not be affected by personal

interests. The idea is that judges are not selected because of their political

views but on merit (http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/

judicialindependence.htm).

2-2. Enforceability: Judicial decisions must be respected, in that the parties to a

case must act in accordance with a judicial decision. The judiciary must have

power to coerce compliance of the parties to implement its decisions

(http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/judicialindependence.htm).

2-3. Freedom from interference: The judiciary must be free from interference by

the parties to a case or other interests that could affect its outcome; above all it

must also be free from official influence by other branches of government.

This is the core aspect of judicial independence

(http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/judicialindependence.htm).

Furthermore, the judiciary is not just a tribunal to bring corrupt offenders to

justice, but also has other accountability functions, such as civil litigation (e.g.,

case of unsuccessful contracts or job applications) as well as the judicial review of

anti-corruption methods applied by agencies themselves (United Nations Guide

On Anticorruption Policies, 2003: 53).

3. Ombudsman: The term ‘ombudsman’ (a word of Swedish origin) means

protector or defender of citizens’ rights [ Queensland Ombudsman,

http://www.ombudsman.qld.gov.au, (accessed 1June 2006)].

37

Britain’s first Ombudsman was appointed under the Parliamentary Commissioner

Act 1967. Over the next ten years other public sector Ombudsman positions were

created, so that by the end of the 1970s they covered the parliament, the health

system and local government down to the county level of the British Isles. In 1981

the first private sector ombudsman, the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, was

created and over the next few years others were set up. By 2001 the Ombudsman

positions that had been voluntarily established in the British banking, building

societies, and insurance and investment fields were amalgamated in one

Ombudsman office, the “Financial Ombudsman Service”. Local government

Ombudsman were established to handle citizen complaints about public bodies or

private sector services [ England Local Government Ombudsmen,

http://www.lgo.org.uk/index.php, (accessed 1June 2006)].

In Australia Ombudsman offices were set up in each State and Territory from

1972-1979, followed by a Commonwealth Ombudsman in 1977. In 1974 the

Queensland Ombudsman became the first Ombudsman to investigate complaints

and allegations about the actions of government departments [ Queensland

Ombudsman, http://www.ombudsman.qld.gov.au, (accessed 1June 2006)].

An Ombudsman, being an independent investigative authority, is another method

of ensuring accountability of the police as well as other government organs. By

the power of law the Ombudsman officers have sufficient powers to inquire into

the conduct of public authorities, including the police, and their inquiries are

usually made public. In addition, their opinions and recommendations can be

passed on to bodies with powers to review and act on them (Lewis and Prenzler,

1999).

38

4. Media review: The media opens some police conduct and activities to public

view, and though not a statutory review committee, their ability to disclose facts

to the community constitutes a form of public scrutiny of police. At times this

information is distorted or misdirected, whether intentionally or not, with the

result that police and media relations can at times be tense. With greater diversity

and ongoing improvements in technology, the media have become, and will

remain, an ever present third party linking the police and the community (Country

Corruption Assessment Report South Africa, 2003).

Moreover, the media provide an influential and fast mechanism to inform the

public about the nature of police corruption and about practices other corrupt

practices emerging in other public sectors (NSW Independent Commission

Against Corruption, Annual Report, 1989). Therefore, media coverage is a useful

and sometimes highly effective tool in deterring corruption. For example, in

Kenya police corruption was uncovered by the Kenya Television Network (KTN)

when it recorded a traffic policeman collecting money (bribes) at checkpoints

which were later shared with the Police Commissioner (Media Against

Corruption, 2003).

Moreover, in Australia the NSW ICAC uses the media to educate the public about

its activities and to explain the exact nature of the corrupt practices that can arise

within public sector activity (NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption,

Annual Report, 1989).

39

5. Specialist agencies: Another form of external mechanisms is the independent

anti-corruption agency. Differing in many details and known under a variety of

names - ‘Crime and Misconduct Commission’ (CMC) (Queensland, Australia),

‘Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) (Hong Kong SAR and

New South Wales, Australia), etc – as a general rule they have investigative

powers that empower them to seek information from public authorities or officials

(NSW, Independent Commission Against Corruption Act, 1988). In addition such

agencies are usually mandated to educate the public on effective ways to fight

corruption and decrease levels of corruption among public institutions including

the police (NSW, Independent Commission Against Corruption, Annual Report

1992: 51-55).

6. Civilian review bodies: Civilian review bodies allow complaints against police

officers to be investigated by panels composed of persons other than police

officers (Fyfe et al., 1997). Since it is the community that pays the police to

provide a service to the Community, they can on this basis claim that a

community-based board is entitled to review police action.

The strong ‘us and them’ feeling between civilians and police makes civilian

review the most controversial form of external supervision. Civilians are often

generally inclined to complain against members of the police force (Newburn,

1999:22). On the other hand, far from being as antagonistic and naive as many

within police think, some observers panels feel that civilian review boards are all

too ready to accept police claims that, ‘The officers did what they had to do to get

the job done’ (Kleinig, 1996: 227). But the reality remains that:

40

[T]he police provide a community service at a cost to the community.

That is where their authority comes from. And it is only to be expected

that the community should have some say about the service they receive,

both prospectively and retrospectively (Kleinig, 1996: 227). In short, as a mechanism that facilitates both civilian and police judgment this is

likely to help both functions more efficiently than either one on its own, so long as

the integrity of those assigned to the task is untainted.

Walker emphasizes that this cannot be taken for granted is when he cautions that:

[E]ven in the best of circumstances, citizen oversight is only one part of a mixed

multifaceted system of accountability. To put it in another way, citizen oversight

is not a panacea and cannot achieve police accountability by itself. Or, to put it

bluntly, no citizen oversight can save a truly bad police department where the

department itself is not committed to accountability (Walker, 2001: 185).

He recommends an integrated system of accountability that embodies a variety of

internal and external mechanisms (Walker, 2001: 185).

7. Public education to increase public awareness of corruption: It is beyond

dispute that the public awareness is an important strategic measure to support

campaigns against all types of corruption. It plays a crucial role in educating

people through increasing their general knowledge and understanding of the

devastating effects corruption can have on the public’s sense of security and on

business stability. Anti-corruption-oriented public education is therefore a

complementary powerful tool for reducing the scale of corruption in society.

Education covers a wide range of activities whose purpose falls under at least one

of the following areas:

• Enhancing information distribution across the whole of the society

• Supporting the transparency and accountability needed to fight corruption

41

• Promoting awareness that would assist in preventing corruption

• Initiating changes of public perceptions and attitudes towards corruption

• Enabling transfer of new skills and abilities (Keen, 2000).

The Chairperson of Transparency International, Peter Eigen, has shed light on the

importance of public education in fighting corruption:

[F]or dealing with this overwhelming problem of corruption the best position for

civil society is within a broader coalition consisting of three key pillars:

government, the private sector and civil society. All three partners have to be

involved in the fight against corruption to be credible, as well as effective and

sustainable (Eigen, 1997: II).

This statement affirms the significant role of the civil society organisations acting in

their collaboration with governmental agencies to combat corruption phenomena,

given that civil society itself severely suffers when corrupt practices become rampant.

Civil society can, therefore, be a major player in anti-corruption activities, being as

effective as government and law enforcement bodies with regards to its ability to

apply gained knowledge both to detect and monitor corruption and the sources of

corruption. In addition it can exert public pressure to bring corrupt individuals to

account (Keen, 2000). With the ever increasing complexity of civil society and its

activities, civil society organisations should be given greater responsibility for

practically raising the awareness of citizens by means of ongoing public education

programs.

These programs should gather and analyse the relevant information prior to

outreaching to the public. The ultimate goal of the public education program is to

42

equip individuals with the necessary knowledge and information to assist them

effectively to combat corruption. To make these programs more effective, it is

important to consider individual needs when planning any anti-corruption strategy. It

is crucial to motivate individuals to play a serious role in the campaign. Active

participation by the civil society should be highly valued as a way to attract as many

social groups and organisations as possible to add their efforts to the struggle to keep

society free of corruption.

Thus, education has imposed itself as a strategic component for fighting corruption

because it reduces corruption’s area of operation. Moreover, delivering effective anti-

corruption education and awareness campaigns to citizens is the responsibility not

only of the government but of civil society organisations as well. Hence, effective

public education programs by both the private sector and the government should

advocate the same high standards on the part of official conduct and should be

released to the widest possible range of social groups. This would help to modify the

negative public attitudes that see the public sector as the main source of all types of

corruption and replace it with a more positive and valid one (NSW, Independent

Commission Against Corruption, Annual Report, 1992: 51-55).

In general, the primary needs of the civil society are the following:

• Be self-accountable: i.e., identify its own role in the spread of corruption,

and involving itself in combating that spread;

• Be constructive: i.e., help public education and awareness programs;

• Be ‘media-savvy’: i.e., present materials on corruption cases attractively,

so they keep the attention of readers or viewers;

43

• Be empowering: i.e., run workshops and training programs that empower

individuals by providing practical skills for fighting corruption;

• Be voluntary: i.e., involvement of individuals should be voluntary;

• Be a ‘good listener’: i.e., to be effective, government channels must

genuinely reflect the voice and the complaints of real individual citizens.

(NSW, Independent Commission Against Corruption, Annual Report,

1992: 51-55)

An appreciable boundary exists between public awareness programs and public

education programs, since the latter are more ambitious, more specific, and have

measurable and easily achieved goals of supporting education and increasing public

awareness (Keen, 2000). A careful description of all the main relationships and major

mechanisms of the public education and awareness programs within an overall

descriptive plan, is what constitutes a proper Educational Planning Program:

44

Keen Planning Program (Keen, 2000, p36)

45

The most suitable educational level for introducing special anti-corruption

learning programs is at the upper primary and secondary levels, i.e., during years

7-12. The possible subjects to be included relate to basic information on the

causes of corruption and on related business, economic, legal, human rights,

educational, and ethical-moral issues. The New South Wales ICAC Law in

particular requires special concern be given to educating the pubic and raising

public awareness. Sections 13(1)-H, -I, and –J of the Act require the Commission

to:

• Educate and advise public authorities, public officials and the community

on strategies to combat corrupt conduct (Section H)

• Educate and disseminate relevant information to the public on the

detrimental effects of corrupt conducts and on the importance of

maintaining the integrity of public administration (Section I)

• Enlist and foster public support in combating corrupt conduct. (Section J)

(NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption Act, 1988)

In practice, varying strategic approaches were adopted to educate the public.

Among these are:

7-1 . Schools and learning institutions: School is the right educational

environment to raise awareness of young people by supplying them with the

right information about corruption, as well as to encourage them to actively

involve themselves in anti-corruption campaigns (NSW Independent

Commission Against Corruption Annual Report, 1992: 51).

7-2 . Public speaking and Public meetings: Public speeches and meetings

focusing on corruption-related issues can do much to help fight corruption,

using a range of different approaches.

46

7-3. Publications: Publications such as booklets, brochures, handouts, and

posters are effective informative sources to employ in public anti-corruption

education strategy. Such publications should be made readily available for

patrons of libraries, schools, shopping centres, etc.

7-4. Media: The electronic media – radio, TV, the Internet, cellular phone – are

all influential means for providing on-line mass communication. As educational

media, they reach the largest possible percentage of the population. Learning

materials broadcast via the media can successfully change the attitudes and

perceptions of the people towards corruption and even help correct corrupt (NSW

Independent Commission Against Corruption. Annual Report, 1989: 33).

In conclusion, the marrying of public education processes into a comprehensive

anti-corruption strategy and then carrying it out is becoming an urgent issue. This

integration could be realised through:

a. Considering the experiences and efforts that are carried out against

fighting corruption, and, for designing anti-corruption-oriented educational

programs.

b. Public campaign to publicize the objectives of the concerned education

and awareness programs by using different means of mass media.

c. Encouraging collaboration with business and governmental agencies to

participate by producing educational materials to be included in curricula.

d. Designing training programs that encourage volunteers to engage in anti-

corruption, as well as working to support public awareness.

e. Highlighting to the public the efforts and achievements of past educational

programs against corruption so as to attract more volunteers.

47

8. Corruption prevention: Research studies are lacking on the development and

implementation of efficient and reliable integrated anti-corruption policies and

strategies to combat all forms of corruption. However, corruption prevention

drastically alters all organisational features that are susceptible to corruption

developing widely or existing for long unnoticed or unreported periods. The

international community is now significantly more concerned about corruption,

particularly in the government and public sectors that are closely associated with

business and with economic development. The most common potential risk areas of

corruption development are:

• Recruitment: Favouritism, discrimination, nepotism, and conflicts of interest

are the most dubious practices involved in staff employment (Practical guide

to corruption prevention, 1996: 3).

• Tenders, contracts and purchasing: These are being considered fertile ground

for corruption. Organisations should pay special attention to ensure that their

tendering and contracting procedures meet the legislative and regulatory

requirements.

• Licensing and Regulating: Government departments face risks from staff

working the in licensing and regulating fields who have personal relationships

with applicants, including even second jobs with them, resulting in conflict

between one’s official duty and one’s personal self-interest.

Organisations are especially at risk if they lack effective Codes of Conduct or

guidelines that outline their standards, or if they do not keep track of the financial

48

interests of staff, or do not have clear policies on secondary employment (Practical

guide to corruption prevention, 1996: 3).

• Financial systems: Financial systems are by nature fragile, as it is easy to

abuse concessions, licensing or leasing provisions to exact bribes, or other

corrupt benefits.

• Large-scale infrastructure: The huge sums often invested in big infrastructure

projects can easily be misused; therefore strict systems to ensure

accountability and transparency are vital for preventing this type of corruption

(Chan, 2000).

Strategies incorporated in the plan for corruption prevention should appreciate

issues such as accountability, transparency, and efficiency of the administration.

The strategy should focus initially on the administrative systems and procedures

to improve the overall integrity and performance of the organisation. This

improvement process could be supported through changing the attitudes of both

the community and public staff, and increasing their awareness (NSW

Independent Commission Against Corruption Annual Report Annual Report,

1992).

Corruption prevention plans should be developed to suit the needs of the specific

organisational context, because the whole anti-corruption planning process raises

many crucial organisational issues that are directly involved in setting up the

framework, such as organisational restructuring (e.g. budget cutting, staff layoffs,

etc.), political decisions and changes in leadership. Anti-corruption authorities in

different countries have adopted and implemented a variety of strategies and

initiatives for preventing corruption, some of which can be applied elsewhere. For

49

instance, the NSW ICAC identifies four major factors that all play powerful roles

in conceptualizing, developing and implementing a corruption prevention plan

(Annual Report, 1992). These are:

1. Management commitment: The top managers of a body should recognize

the importance of the prevention project plan and involve themselves in the

details of planning; they must take responsibility for implementing it and

participate in openly supporting both its goals and its methods. How top

managers behave, and whether they apply their management skills, can be

decisive for the success or failure of the prevention plan.

2. Staff commitment: The organisation should involve its staff at different

levels while formulating the corruption prevention plan. This would enhance

the credibility to the prevention plan, and motivate the organisation to take it

seriously and pursue it with integrity. Such an approach is especially

appreciated by junior staff because it brings them more responsibility, which

reinforces and supports their commitment to the plan’s goals and to its

implementation process.

3. Resources: Sufficient financial and logistic resources must be made

available. Nevertheless budgeting must be carefully calculated not just to

minimise the money costs of implementing the plan but to also ensure that the

plan is resourced enough to be effective.

4. Networking: The staff involved should work within a collaborative

partnership within the organisation. This network environment would support

direct interpersonal communication and facilitate the open exchange of ideas,

information, knowledge and expertise.

50

Corruption Prevention Plans in the Queensland Police were based on the

recommendations of the PCJC - Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee and the

Crime and Misconduct Act 2001. The Queensland Police Service (Ethical Standards

Command) is basically responsible for police misconduct and the CMC supervises the

QPS actions taken. The CMC then monitors the QPS’s methods of handling

complaints and actions taken and independently investigates public interest cases of

misconduct. (Handling Complaints against Queensland Police Past, Present and

Future. No 2 August 2004, p 8).

The modern day has put numerous pressures and opportunities for corruption in

policing, and the different forms of misconduct within the police departments, which

require constant vigilance to protect democratic liberties and prevent abuses by the

police authorities (Prenzler and Ransley, 2002: 21).

Corruption prevention plans are generally developed to address specific types of

corruption issues that relate to the specific needs of an organisation. This means that

some key goals are considered to be essential elements in any proposed corruption

prevention plan. Moreover, many organisations active in the anti-corruption arena

have developed guidelines to help them to prevent different forms of corrupting from

arising. Again the NSW ICAC offers a useful model for corruption prevention that is

summarized as a set of guidelines , which are summarised below: (NSW, Independent

Commission Against Corruption Annual Report, 1992: 3).

8-1. Develop a detailed prevention policy and strategy: The organisation

should first identify its potential corruption risk areas. A risk assessment is an

essential first stage for developing an effective prevention policy and strategy.

51

The key to an effective policy is that, the organisation should clearly outline its

aims and objectives, along with its current policies and procedures relation to its

corruption prevention strategy.

8-2. Appoint specialized committees to monitor sources of corruption and

oversee stage-by-stage the implementation of the proposed plan: As

preventing corruption is the responsibility of both top managers and working staff,

it is vital to create Steering Committees that include staff members who are

responsible for monitoring corruption sources and for following up the

implementation of different aspects of the plan. The corruption prevention policy

should clearly state who are to be members of the committee and detail their

ranges of authority as well as their missions and responsibilities. These

committees act as consulting bodies whose ultimate goal is to integrate all

corruption prevention initiatives within the organisation.

8-3. Develop an integrated strategy to meet possible risks: The existing

operational procedures and policies should be subject to continuing review so as

to meet the rising corruption risks. Updating and modifying these actions would

help to develop effective corruption prevention principles and new policies.

Moreover, the following factors should all be incorporated into the development

process of an integrated corruption prevention strategy:

• The organisation’s business activities

• Its internal and external environments

• The nature and forms of corruption risks that it might be exposed to.

• The organisation’s Culture: the perceptions and attitudes of its people.

52

The organisation must guarantee the positioning of this strategy into the

organisation-wide policy. Therefore, all the necessary procedures, measures, and

regulations should be considered.

8-4. Plan the development and implementation of the strategy: Finalising of

the development and implementation of the plan should be adapted to fit in with

nature, capabilities, and activities of the organisation. It must allocate the

necessary resources and staff to complete the mission in time, always conscious of

cost-effectiveness. An effective schedule will also allow principles to be updated

and new initiatives to be incorporated as the needs of the organisation change.

8-5. Develop an orientation and awareness programme: All staff should be

acquainted with the aims, regulations, and measures of the organisation’s

corruption prevention policy. Thus, all staff will be expected to act in accordance

with these standards in carrying out their respective responsibilities. Such staff

commitment would help motivate them to promote an ethical workplace culture.

The organisation must, therefore, produce booklets outlining clearly the

corruption prevention guidelines to further orientation, raise awareness, and

promote information flow. The goal of the awareness programme is to persuade

them to reject corruption. The objective is to show that the organisation is

focused on maintaining an honest and ethical approach to its work, that it is active

and serious about preventing corruption.

8-6. Establish an effective internal reporting system: This system is designed

to help to tackle the problem of ensuring that staff members detect corruption

sources. Therefore, the organisation should carefully explain to all its internal

53

reporting system. This system would enhance the preventive capabilities of the

organisation, which will in turn reduce corruption risks. To address misuses of this

system, the organisation must also establish effective policies, standards and

disciplinary procedures to support its corruption prevention strategy. It should also

corroborate all source of information before taking action against anyone

suspected of acting corruptly. Thus, for a reporting system work efficiently, it

must ensure that all staff enjoy full legal protection. To this end, all procedures

should be clearly set out and effectively communicated to every member of staff.

The adoption and acceptance by all of a code of conduct is a key step in setting

the ethical and al standards of the organisation.

8-7. Development of investigative procedures for suspected corruption: Sound

investigative procedures must be instituted at the early stages of a prevention

programme. Investigating corruption is never simple, as corruption takes so many

different forms. Organisations should constantly update and revise all of their

policies and procedures to adapt to complex corruption crimes that make use of

the most advanced methods, such as the Internet and other electronic

communication technologies. Corruption prevention should be particularly

concerned with training staff in new investigative techniques, emphasising the use

of advanced technologies for investigating it. This training will aim to develop

and upgrade the organisation’s investigative capabilities and the professional

skills of all staff entrusted with conducting investigations. In all competent

systems, organisational databases must be totally secure if they are help in the

decision making process and in the management of investigation outcomes.

54

All organisations interested in developing corruption prevention plans must

amalgamate their different approaches and strategies into a plan that can serve as a

model. In general, methods and approaches for evaluating potential corruption risk

must coexist with the disciplinary procedures and preventive measures able to

support the development, implementation, and ongoing improvement of the plan.

9. Corruption investigations

Patterns of corruption vary from society to society and over time, so to be effective

anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to the social environment in which

corruption occurs. This sheer diversity in the patterns of corruption may seem to make

it difficult to evaluate comparatively all the diverse anti-corruption efforts that now

exist. Nevertheless, many experts still advocate a single global strategy to fight

corruption; though varied approaches can be used in particular investigations, they all

involve systematic inquiry (Petter Langseth, [n.d]: 344-350, 391).

According to Tim Prenzler the core profile of a civilian oversight agency is as

follows:-

1. The Police internal affairs do most of the work of investigating complaints and other intelligence of police misconduct and make

disciplinary decisions.

2. This work is scrutinised by the external agency by auditing case files and responding to appeals from dissatisfied complainants.

3. The agency has power to criticise police procedures and might be able to appeal against disciplinary decisions to a judge or magistrate, and

4. The agency may be required to investigate very serious complaints or incidents (such as police shootings or deaths in police custody). (Prenzler

and Ransley, 2002: 187)

Knack and Keefer (1995) focused on the corruption springing up within governmental

setting:

[I]llegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of

government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses,

exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loans (Annual index, International Country Risk Guide, covering 1982–95, cited in Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998: 7).

55

In fact, corruption is rarely detected entirely by internal governmental control

mechanisms, often remaining invisible until exposed by outsiders (e.g., the media) –

though they often rely on the aid of internal ‘whistle-blowers’. The rarity of its

detection internally suggests the ineffectiveness of most internal control mechanisms

and/or collusion within the government (Bac and Bag, 2005). In this section we look

at factors affecting investigations, whether corrupt activity that is just suspected or has

become an open scandal.

9-1. Availability of Information

Ideally perfect monitoring systems do not exist, so investigations will always be

needed to detect foci of corruption as they arise. The problem is that people often

intend to constrain corruption by providing inefficient information. To put this in the

anti-corruption context, government ‘watchdog’ bodies can use investigative means

because they have more of the requisite expertise than ordinary citizens do. All

investigative personnel must be experienced and must combine an in-depth

knowledge of criminal law and of relevant legislation with strong analytical skills and

high levels of personal ethics in order to oversee and regulate investigation processes.

Practical and professional knowledge can equip investigators to make effective and

accountable decisions during investigation. Investigation is, of course, crime-specific,

so that every type of crime will need a particular investigative approach. Therefore, a

number of international organisations have helped to design a bundle of investigative

techniques and mechanisms. In particular the United Nations (UN) has furnished an

enforcement kit purposely designed for corruption investigation.

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The unique feature of corruption is that, unlike most other crimes, it is committed

secretly by the parties who benefit from the revenues of the corruption crime. Within

such relationships the arrangements are configured so that neither party considers

him/herself to be the victim. The involved parties also share the responsibility of

preventing authorities from ever knowing that a corruption crime has occurred. Thus,

the parties will use all possible means to ensure that their crime stays hidden.

Concealment creates serious challenges to conducting an effective investigation. To

crack down on such tightly closed corruption rings, one must utilise a range of

investigation tools targeting different areas or aspects of the crime (DRAFT- United

Nations Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy Global Programme against Corruption,

2001).

Acquiring accurate and timely information is the core element in any investigation

strategy. Among the most important sources of crime-focused information, are:

a. Internal reporting: This function is carried out by designated employees

working in departments that are likely to be infected by corruption, for example

departments involved in tenders, in purchasing, in business and trade licensing,

etc.

b. Transparency: Robust integrated budgeting and auditing systems are vital

elements for enhancing transparency, and consequently for ensuring that

information is available and fully disclosed. Also appropriate ‘arm’s length’

rules can make collusion somewhat harder to arrange.

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d. Complaints system: Encouraging people to submit complaints is a technique

for establishing, or restoring, public confidence in the governmental apparatus.

This helps to provide tips of information on potential sources of corruption

within a department. ‘Whistle-blowing’ is a form of internal complaint that is

usually done anonymously to avoid persecution by one’s superiors or peers.

Laws protecting whistleblowers are seen to be integral to anti-corruption

strategies.

Such mechanisms would assist the investigation of corruption by increasing the

availability of the information needed for pre-emptive actions before corruption

occurs. They are also needed for cracking down on corruption rings (DRAFT- United

Nations Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy Global Programme against Corruption,

2001).

9-2. Deploying anti-corruption forces

A variety of actions can be employed to maximise the chance that an investigation

into corruption will succeed. Among these are:

a. Effective teamwork: Building effective teamwork is crucial to the success of

investigative surveillance. Team members should possess the right personal

characteristics, such as team spirit, sound investigative skills, and adherence to

moral and high ethical standards, knowledge of legal issues, and a keen desire

to be entrusted with the assigned work. Furthermore, their personal back-

grounds should be thoroughly checked, including social and family ties,

lifestyles, and economic statuses.

b. Auditing mechanisms: Auditing is a major tool for detecting and tracking

wrongdoing in government agencies or in large business organisations. It takes

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various forms and has various interfaces and can be configured to accord with

specific types of corruption, and with various investigative strategies. It is

helpful for establishing the actual scope of corruption by identifying all those

involved in a corruption ‘cell’ and determining the specific roles of each party

in committing the crime.

c. Disclosure statutes: Statutes are written laws passed by legislatures, at both

national and provincial/state levels. Statutes set up rules and governmental

organs designed to help society deal with problematic social problems. To

cope with corruption, solid evidence of corrupt practices must be collected that

can be presented to courts. Disclosure statutes have two functions: (1) As an

‘early-warning system’ to detect sudden changes in lifestyle that are

inconsistent with the an official’s salary when that is the person’s sole income

source. (2) As a separate source of evidence in prosecutions, when the origins

of individuals’ income or assets cannot be established.

The Criminal Justice Commission (CMC) conducted the first audit of police interview

tapes in August 1998 because of the result of the introduction of the Police Powers

and Responsibilities Act 1997. The findings of people suspected of committing an

offence in the second audit of police interview audio tapes, compares to the results of

the audit conducted in 1998, which showed some improvement in police compliance

as defined in the police Responsibilities Code 2000 and the Police Powers and

Responsibilities Act 2000. The findings of the audit encouraged a number of areas for

improvement, especially in the rights of suspects. Therefore it was recommended to

continue with the audits of taped records of interview, either by the CMC or in

collaboration with the Ethical Standards Command of the QPS. (Listening In –

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Results from a CMC Audit of police Interview Tapes , Crime and Misconduct

Commission No 1. April 2004, p xi, xv & xvi).

Conclusions

We have looked at some of the mechanisms for fighting corruption, such as, judicial

review, Ombudsman, media review, specialist agencies, civilian review, public

education and increase in public awareness of corruption. An important aspect of all

external mechanisms for corruption prevention is that they must identify and focus on

those areas where the potential for corruption is greatest: recruitment, tenders,

contracts for the purchase of bulk assets, the licensing and regulation of businesses,

financial systems and large scale infrastructure projects. This is where the framing of

a corruption prevention plans must begin.

Forming corruption prevention plans should review in detail the positive and negative

experiences of established organisations, such as the ICACs, CJC, and CMC.

Management commitment, staff commitment, resources and networking are all

important for corruption prevention plans.

Accurate and timely information is crucial to locate and then to investigate corruption.

That sort of information can only be obtained if comprehensive systems for internal

reporting, for transparency and for complaints are in place. To successfully

investigate corruption requires effective teamwork, strict auditing mechanisms and a

forceful disclosure statute.

This study will focus on the external mechanisms for combating corruption, and the

next chapter describes in detail the strategy used by international anti-corruption

60

bodies to fight corruption. It will also use Australia as a model to illustrate the

strategies of anticorruption bodies to fight corruption.

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Chapter 3

International anti-corruption bodies

Introduction

Chapter 2 detailed the literature review about external mechanisms to fight corruption.

It also defines corruption according to the researcher. This chapter looks at various

methods used today to fight police corruption; it asks what lessons, positive or

negative, they contain that Abu Dhabi might incorporate into its anti-corruption

strategy. Part One looks at mechanisms used by major international organisations:

the United Nations (UN); the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD) and European Union (EU); the Word Bank (WB); and

Transparency International (TI). Part Two looks at anti-corruption bodies in

Australia, a federated polity like the UAE with both national and sub-national (i.e.,

State) bodies: the Australian Federal Police (AFP); the Australian Crime Commission

(ACC); and the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption

(ICAC).

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Part one: the international scene

The end of the Cold War in 1989 set off an accelerating process of geo-political and

socio-economic upheaval usually called ‘globalisation’.7 This brought with it one

new and unwelcome dilemma: the co-emergence of international organised crime and

trans-boundary corruption. Traditionally corruption was thought to be a problem in

countries lacking transparency, but strong ‘back draft’ phenomena emerged: places

once relatively free of corruption become infected as if by contagion. This means that

resisting corruption is now seen to be a global responsibility, one whose priority can

only rise. The last few decades saw major international cooperative efforts to devise

comprehensive national and international strategies to fight corruption everywhere.

Ever more governments, international organisations, and NGOs now cooperate

closely in this effort driven by the realisation that of how great a threat it pose to

international security and stability. (Human Rights and Corruption,

http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/research_publications/research_downloads/hrc.rtf

(accessed 8 February June 2005)].

Corruption is painfully obvious in ‘developing’ countries where the social and

economic institutional base for modernity developed late and where governments lack

the fiscal resources to control it. In 1998 President Mbeki of South Africa linked its

pervasiveness to the poverty in these countries (Zvekic, 2000: 7). It is indisputable

that close causal links exist between corruption, organised crime networks and the

social and social disorganisation that is rife in rapidly urbanising societies everywhere

(Langseth et al., [n. d.]).

7 ‘Globalisation’ began in antiquity and never fully ceased. Historically, the post-1989 wave is best seen as the resumption of a process that was partially interrupted by the Great War of 1914-18.

63

In the last decade a fruitful cooperation to fight corruption is spreading, especially in

developing countries. Kofi Anan, former UN Secretary-General, stated at the time of

the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations Convention against

Corruption:

Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for

development, undermining a government's ability to provide basic services,

feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid

(Anan, 2003: 1).

Peter Eigen, Chaiperson of Transparency International, made the same point:

Corruption respects no national boundaries… Across the world, corruption in

large-scale public projects is a daunting obstacle to sustainable development,

tearing at the social fabric and contributing to civil unrest and conflict. It is a

blow to the hopes of millions, one that results in a major loss of public funds

needed for education, healthcare and poverty alleviation, both in developed and

developing countries (Eigen, 2004, 1-2).

Corruption assumes countless forms – bribery, fraud, favouritism, extortion, conflict

of interest…etc., all of which evolve rapidly along with technology. Hence no single

solution can address it; rather a range of preventive strategies are needed to control

each form it takes. Moreover, anti-corruption measures must be carefully attuned to fit

each society’s socio-cultural norms and values. Langseth identifies five key lessons

learned in last decade about the spread of corruption:

1. Economic growth without integrity and good governance does not reduce poverty.

2. There is a need to balance awareness raising and enforcement to avoid cynicism.

3. It takes integrity to curb corruption and it needs more time and resources than expected.

4. It is critical to involve the public as the key victim of corruption. 5. To involve the public requires trust 6. There is clear link between money laundering, organised crime and

corruption.

7. Identifying and recovering stolen assets without serious preventive work is not enough.

8. There is a need for international convention promoting an integrated, dynamic and comprehensive approach that is evidence based, transparent,

inclusive, non-partisan and impact oriented (Langseth, 2002b: III).

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The use of advanced information and communication technologies (ICT) in ever more

areas accelerate the spread of highly networked e-business and e-commerce models,

licit and illicit. While ICT is sometimes said to be turning the world into a ‘global

village’, that image is deceptive: electronic networks are arms-length arenas lacking

face-to-face ‘reality checks’ found in real, as opposed to virtual, villages. Crime

seems to like this anonymous ICT social space, and so may facilitate trans-national

crime and corruption more than it does international policing.

1. The United Nations (UN)

The UN has long since been aware of the harmful effects of the worldwide corruption

plague on social welfare, economic development and political stability. To focus the

international legal counter-measures against corruption, the UN strove to produce an

international anti-corruption convention. General Assembly Resolution (55/188), was

specifically framed to address the prevention of corrupt activities:

[The UN] is [c]oncerned at the seriousness of problems posed by corruption,

which may endanger the stability and security of societies, undermine the values

of democracy and morality and jeopardize social, economic and political

development.

Also concerned about the links between corruption and other forms of crime, in

particular organised crime and economic crime, including money laundering.

Convinced that, since corruption is a phenomenon that currently crosses

national borders and affects all societies and economies, international

cooperation to prevent and control it is essential (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations, 2001b).

The result was the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised

Crime, formally established on 29 September 2003, and approved by the General

Assembly on 31 October 2003 (Resolution 58/4), and followed by a high-level

political signing conference in Merida (Mexico) 9-11 December 2003 of the UN

Convention against Corruption (UN-COC). These conventions greatly enhanced

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international efforts against all types of corruption, whether at state, international, and

even private, levels.

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UN-COC) names corruption

as a general threat that severely damages member states’ economic and political

stability. So international cooperation to control it a pressing necessity. The UN-

COC paves the way for such cooperation by bringing it within the purview of

international law, and in Chapter I its broad purposes are articulated:

1. To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption

more efficiently and effectively;

2. To promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and

technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption,

including in asset recovery;

3. To promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public

affairs and public property (United Nations Convention against

Corruption, 2003: 2).

The Convention’s five chapters include 71 articles. In Chapter II, Articles 5 – 14 are

concerned exclusively with the preventive measures and mechanical approaches

against corruption outlined below. Broadly, the agreed-upon anti-corruption

mechanisms are:

1. Apply preventive anti-corruption policies and practices: State parties are

encouraged to implement effective administrative measures, and policies designed to

sustain an effective internal anti-corruption campaign through the early prediction and

assessment of threats arising from different types of corruption. They should also to

participate in international collaborative undertakings so as to benefit from the sharing

of technical expertise and the exchange of intelligence information.

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2. Develop independent national anti-corruption bodies: The UN-COC argues

that an effective global anti-corruption system requires that many different elements

be managed so that internal national bodies can be integrated into a collective anti-

corruption strategy:

Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its

legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate, that

prevent corruption by such means as: (a) Implementing the policies referred

to in article 5 of this Convention and, where appropriate, overseeing and

coordinating the implementation of those policies (United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003: 5).

Externally, states are urged to participate in the international efforts:

Each State Party shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of

the name and address of the authority or authorities that may assist other

States Parties in developing and implementing specific measures for the

prevention of corruption (United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003: 5).

The UN-COC strongly urges states to ensure the independence of anti-corruption

bodies by keeping them well separated from control and intervention by other

institutional powers:,

Each State Party shall grant the body or bodies referred to in paragraph 1 of

this article the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental

principles of its legal system, to enable the body or bodies to carry out its or

their functions effectively and free from any undue influence. The necessary

material resources and specialized staff, as well as the training that such staff

may require to carry out their functions, should be provided (United Nations

Convention against Corruption, 2003: p5)

Langseth et al., summarise the advantages of keeping the performance and

enforcement aspects of independent anti-corruption bodies administratively separate,

as this would help them in:

1. Achieving their missions in proper ways to yield fruitful works in cracking

down on corruption networks.

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2. Enriching them with highly qualified personnel as mentioned, “The

necessary material resources and specialized staff, as well as the training

that such staff may require to carry out their functions, should be

provided” (Section 2 of Article 6 of the United Nations Convention against

Corruption, 2003: 5).

3. Making their start energetic and free of corruption and other administrative

and bureaucratic irregularities.

4. Increasing their visibility and creditability among the public community

and international partners, as well as reflecting the state’s seriousness in

combating corruption and related crimes.

5. Making their operations cost-effective and easy-to-manage.

3. Strengthen public sector and civil service discipline: The UN-COC advises

states to "adopt, maintain and strengthen systems for the recruitment, hiring, retention,

promotion and retirement of civil servants" (Section 1 of Article 7 of the United

Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003: 5). Both preventive and remedial

measured are recommended to root out civil service corruption, such as bribery in the

awarding of contracts and tenders, as well as favouritism, administrative abuses, etc.

This involves formal Codes of Conduct that prescribe standards of fairness,

impartiality in all dealings with the public, as well as loyalty to the organisation.

Where necessary, traditional socio-cultural norms may have to be resisted in order to

enhance institutional reform, transparency, and accountability to reduce corruption

(Gastrow, 2004:63).

Promoting integrity, honesty and responsibility among public officials begins with an

appropriate code of conduct and work ethics, but also requires measures and systems

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to gather personal information about public officials, such as financial statements,

lists of assets and reports of substantial gifts or benefits. Clearly defined boundaries

between a public servant’s public duties and his/her personal affairs are critical to all

public sector reform initiatives, whether local, regional and international (Hatchard,

2004). One widely recognised model is the International Code of Conduct Public

Officials annexed to UN General Assembly Resolution 51/59 of 12 Dec. 1996.

And, obviously, any serious effort to immunise public officials from corruption will

require states to be ready to impose severe disciplinary penalties on those breaching

their Codes of Conduct.

4. Management of public finances: The UN-COC specifies rigorous fiscal

discipline be implemented for systems to ensure transparency, competitiveness and

accountability in managing public finances. Such measures should include:

(a) Procedures for the adoption of the national budget;

(b) Timely reporting on revenue and expenditure;

(c) A system of accounting and auditing standards and related oversight;

(d) Effective and efficient systems of risk management and internal control; and

(e) Where appropriate, corrective action in the case of failure to comply with the

requirements established in this paragraph (UN Convention Against Corruption, 2003:7).

5. Guarantee public reporting: This proposes effective measures as may be

needed to improve transparency in state’s public administration. Such measures can

include:

1. Implement measures that allow the public access to information on functional systems within organisations and on how decisions are made,

while still protecting private and personal data (United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003).

2. Simplify administrative system to facilitate public access to decision-making authorities.

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3. Publishing information, which may include periodic reports on the risks of corruption in its public administration (Hatchard, 2004: 12).

6. Involve judicial and prosecutory institutions: Attention must be paid to the

whole judiciary apparatus, including both courts and prosecutorial bodies, to ensure

that they remain effective instruments for applying law enforcement to the public

sector:

1. Independent judiciary bodies to deal exclusively with all forms of corruption;

2. Guarantied independence for the judicial sector so that it can play its crucial roles in combating corruption.

3. Judicial decisions to foster an environment that encourages ethical business and discourages corruption.

4. Measures within judiciary institutions to foster honesty and to minimise the chance that corrupt actions could go unnoticed (Hatchard, 2004: 12).

5. Accountable and transparent systems to monitor judicial and public service personnel e.g., supervising the judicial system by non-governmental

organisation or civil society bodies.

6. Coercive laws to protect government machinery and public service administrations.

7. ‘Freedom of Information’ measures to enhance public access to information held by governmental or private organisations.

7. Involve the private sector: The private sector should be made to share the

responsibility for tackling corruption, which means that it must implement accurate

accounting and auditing systems which will set standards and impose severe penalties

against any non-compliance with laws governing business transactions. The private

sector’s vital role in fighting unlawful and corrupt business deals should be embodied

in a Code of Ethics requiring transparent and legal business activities (Eigen, 2001).

Securing anti-corruption in the private sector requires:

1. Collaboration between law enforcement agencies and the private sector

(Hatchard, 2004).

70

2. Codes of Conduct for truthful, honourable and proper performance for

business activities, especially in interactions with government.

3. Regulations to prevent misuses of privileges granted by the state to private

business, e.g. licenses.

4. Strict codes to define, and ban, conflicts of interest.

8. Involve all of society: A positive role is needed for voluntary participation by

civil society in a general anti-corruption campaign. This has to be carried out

through:

1. Transparency combined with meaningful, genuine public participation in decision making;

2. Guaranteed access to information to all the community;

3. Simple, well publicised and confidential access by the public to the anti-

corruption bodies;

4. Freedom to seek, and to publish information on corruption (United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003).

9. Measures to prevent money laundering: All states need frameworks to

facilitate effective measures against money laundering, whether they originate at

home or across the borders. Money laundering is a devastating form of corruption that

directly damages a state’s economy and security. The UN-COC recommends these

measures:

1. Comprehensive regulatory and supervisory mechanisms to control

monetary system activity (bank transactions, money exchange, etc.);

2. Regional, international, bilateral and multilateral cooperation

between law enforcement, judiciary and financial institutions;

5. Procedures to identify and track illegal financial transactions and instruments used in international money transfers. (United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003).

71

The UN-COC legalises international cooperation in Chapter IV Article 43, which

provides that “[s]tate Parties shall cooperate in criminal matters in accordance with

articles 44 to 50 of this Convention…”. This cooperation includes law enforcement

coordination, investigation techniques, extradition and prisoner transfers, and

exchange of criminal proceedings (Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption

a Comparative Study, 2005).

The UN strives to promote international technical cooperation to fight corruption by

collaborative work at the domestic, inter-governmental, and multi-lateral levels. Thus

the UN sponsors a wide range of technical workshops, seminars, and training courses

both to equip the international community technically to fight corruption, and to

educate the public on the damage the corrupt practices cause.

10. Criticisms of the UN-COC: The Convention is much criticised for its

ineffectiveness as an anti-corruption tool. The criticisms, though not fully consistent,

have substance:

1. It lacks a fully agreed-upon definition of corruption.

2. States set their own priorities for fighting different forms of corruption.

3. It lacks mechanisms to follow up on the application of its articles.

4. It allows international or foreign bodies to interfere in the domestic

policies of states

2. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development

(OECD)

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Western Europe’s economy was so badly damaged by World War II that substantial

external funds were needed to rebuild it. The United States of America, having

emerged for war with the strongest economy in the world, initiated the so-called

Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and reduce its economic distress. In a speech at

Harvard University in June 1947 General George C Marshall, US Secretary of State,

launched the concept:

There should be some sort of agreement among the countries of Europe as to the

requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in

order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this

country [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,

http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.ht

ml, (accessed 25 May 2008)].

An April 16, 1948 the Conference of Sixteen (formally, the ’Conference for European

Economic Co-operation’) created the Organisation for the European Economic Co-

operation (OEEC). Its highest authority was to be a Council of Representative OEEC

which was to oversee an Executive Committee that was to be headed by a Secretary-

General assisted by twenty cabinet-like committees entrusted with specific areas of

responsibility (food and agriculture, labour, intra-European payments, etc.). Its main

task was managing Marshall Plan aid flows, but its subsidiary goals included fostering

co-operation in European reconstruction, promoting a European free trade zone by

reducing/eliminating trade barriers, and freeing the movement of workers between

countries. [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,

http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html,

(accessed 25 May 2008)].

73

Once the OEEC’s main goals were achieved, it began to wane until the Cold War

tensions between the western and eastern blocs gave it new life. Priority shifted to

rearming Europe through a new military body, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO), but in time a new formula was laid down at the Ottawa Conference in

September, 1951: the OEEC was to manage European economic issues related to the

NATO alliance, while other autonomous agencies were to carry on its other activities.

So OEEC revived, launching several new programmes, such as the European

Productivity Agency (EPA) to help European agriculture and industry to absorb

American experiences, and the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA), which

produced a European security convention on nuclear power. [Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development,

http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html,

(accessed 25 May 2008)].

Then, in September, 1961, the OEEC was replaced by a new international

organisation, the Organisation for Economic and Development Co-operation (OEDC).

At first it consisted of the OEEC members plus the U.S. and Canada. Today it has 30

member countries, and co-operative links with about 70 non-members. Its scope

expanded accordingly. [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,

http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html,

(accessed 25 May 2008)].

74

1. The OECD Convention for Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials

in International Business Transactions.

Other factors besides the Cold War contributed to the establishment of the OECD and to the ongoing widening of its agenda:

a. Attitudes towards corruption changed Late in the Twentieth Century

corruption scandals provoked public outrage, enhancing its awareness

of the need to combat corruption.

b. The OECD became known as a focus of corruption. Surveys showed

that about 70-75% of bribery allegations involved companies from

OECD members (George et al., 2000: 490-491).

c. International awareness of the damages from corruption rose.

Corruption was recognized to discourage and/or distort domestic and

international investment. Investors avoid to invest in countries that are

known for high corruption (George et al., 2000: 490- 491).

Corruption was seen fragment loyalties and shatter confidence in public institutions,

thereby destabilizing of countries’ political and social systems. Then US President

Bill Clinton summarized the case against corruption when signing amendments to the

Foreign Corrupt Practice Act:

We have long believed bribery is inconsistent with democratic values, such as

good governance and the rule of law. It is also contrary to basic principles of fair

competition and harmful to efforts to promote economic development (Clinton, 1998).

The enactment by the US of its Foreign Corrupt Practice Act put pressure on the

OECD, which in 1994 recommended that its members criminalise the offering of

bribes to foreign public officials related to business transactions. In 1996 the OECD

adopted another resolution recommending members denounce laws allowing tax

deduction for bribes. The OECD members thought that the best way to combat the

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bribery of foreign official was a bidding convention and after lengthy negotiations a

convention for fighting bribery was signed in February 1999.

2. The OECD Anti-bribery Convention. The OECD Convention obligates all

members to enact international laws making the bribery of foreign public officials a

criminal offence. Article 1 states:

[E]ach party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish

that it is a criminal offence under its Law for any person intentionally to

offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, to a

foreign public official, in order that the official act or refrain from acting

in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or

retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of

international business.

Likewise, complicity in any attempt or any conspiracy to bribe a foreign public

official in any form described in Article (1) is also regarded as a Criminal offence. In

the same vein, Article (2) binds member states to affix liability to legal persons for

bribing public official abroad, while Article (3) stresses that sanctions on violators

will be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” It stresses that in jurisdictions

where criminal liability does not apply to legal persons; such persons would be

subjected to sufficient civil penalties to ensure that any proceeds of that are

confiscated. Article (4) discusses jurisdiction issues:

[E]ach party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its

jurisdiction over the bribery of foreign public officials when the offence is

committed in whole or part in its territory and each party which has jurisdiction

to prosecute its nationals for offences committed abroad shall take such

measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction to do so in respect of

the bribery of a foreign public official, according to the same principles.

Article (5) states that the investigation and prosecution of those charged with bribing

foreign officials:

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… shall not be influenced by consideration of national effect upon the relations

with another state, or the identity of the natural or legal person involved.

Article (8), on financial books, records and disclosure reports, prohibits, ‘…the

establishment of off-the-book accounts.’

The Convention stresses the necessity for member states to co-operate in their fight

against bribery of foreign public officials. Mutual obligations for legal assistance and

extradition are treated in Articles 9, 10 and 11. Article 12 mandates full co-operation

by member states in implementing the Convention:

[They] shall co-operate in carrying out a programme of systematic follow-up to

monitor and promote the full implementation of this Convention.

3. Limitations of the OECD Convention: This Convention, despite its successes

in reducing bribery by the state members, has its limitations. Thus Article (1) defines

the act of bribery as ‘… any person intentionally offer[ing] or giv[ing] any undue

pecuniary or other advantage to foreign public official’

a. It ignores passive bribery. The Commentary on the Convention states says that

this Convention deals only with what is in the law of some countries refereed

to as … active corruption. Active corruption involves promising to give a

bribe, in contrast to ‘passive bribery’, the offence committed by the official

‘who receives the bribe.’ The Article (1) definition of bribery is weak, since it

only treats donors and ignores recipients (the bribed officials). Hence, it lacks

a disciplinary action towards the public official who commits bribery in any

form and this may lead to failure in fighting bribery.

b. Its Article (1) definition of ‘foreign public official’ is too narrow. Since it is

limited to persons exercising functions for a foreign country, a public

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enterprise or to officials or agents of public international organisations,

ignoring politicians, political parties and party members. Corruption and

bribery are common among politicians, party officials and political candidates.

This limited definition of bribery also excludes bribes paid to officials of state

owned companies. While Article (1), says that ‘foreign public official’

includes ‘any person exercising a public function for foreign country, for a

public agency or public enterprise’, the Commentary Article (15) to the

Convention states that:

[A]n official of a public enterprise shall be deemed to perform a public

function unless the enterprise operates on a normal economic basis in the

relevant market.

Distinguishing between private and public functions is in practice far from

easy in that the Article leaves much scope for circumvention.

c. It omits the bribery of foreign subsidiaries. Article (2) of the Convention

mentions bribery of subsidiaries but only indirectly, when it states:

[E]ach party shall take any measures necessary to establish that

complicity in, including incitement, aiding and abetting, or

authorization of an act of bribery of a foreign public official shall

be a criminal offence.

Although this provision may be read as prohibiting parent companies in state

members from using foreign subsidiaries as conduits for bribes, it would be

hard to implement, because legally proving the acts of legally distinct

subsidiaries are connected with parent companies would be extremely

difficult.

d. It ignores acts of bribery committed independently by subsidiary bodies and

disguised bribes, such as favouritism shown to relatives of foreign public

officials, both of which facilitate circumvention. So also does the

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Convention’s interpretation of the phrase ‘other improper advantage in the

conduct of international business’ in Article (1). The Commentaries on the

Convention in trying to clarify the meaning of “important advantage” states in

(8):

It is not an offence, however, if the advantage was permitted or required by

the written law or regulation of the foreign public official’s country,

including case law.”

In most developing countries politicians and political parties and dominant

senior public officials can influence or amend existing laws or draft new ones

to serve their interests. Permitting all payments, whether justified or not, so

long as they are allowed in a foreign country, may facilitate bribery and so

defeat the intent of the Convention. Besides, in countries whose ‘culture’

allows such payments, the permission is usually contained in unwritten

traditions rather than written laws.

e. It lacks effective enforcement mechanisms. Determining which corporations

do not comply with its demands and deciding who is bribing whom, are left to

the police forces of state members. They may be lax in discharging this

function, as each country’s police may look to its own interests. The

appropriate solution was to establish a central body entrusted with monitoring

all member countries’ compliance with the Convention.

For all its limitation, the OECD Convention is a step forward, one more serious multi-

national, trans-national effort to free the world from corruption.

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3. The European Union (EU)

The idea of European unity is ancient but did not become a practical reality until

World War II had inflicted huge losses on Europe. Then the need to rebuild the

European economy and to head off renewed German aggression overcame resistance

to this ideal. Winston Churchill’s speech in Zurich on 19 September 1946 marked the

first step towards the EU:

The fighting has stopped but the dangers have not stopped. If we are to form the

United State of Europe or whatever name or form it may take, we must begin

now [Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/DiscoursChurchill.asp (accessed 25 May 2008)].

After this speech several steps were taken towards unifying Europe. The first were

the OEEC and its successor, the OECD, which by 1949 led to the formation of the

Council of Europe whose aims were:

… to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of

safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common

heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress (Article 1 of the Statute of the Council of Europe).

But both the OECD and the Council of Europe were, like NATO, international bodies

incorporating non-European powers. Thus they did not fully express the ideal of

European unity. To further that goal a sectoral strategy was adopted and designed to

build unity one economic sector at a time, avoiding sensitive political issues and

allowing time for the sectors to merge into an integrated whole. The first sector was

heavy industry, with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was set

up in 1951, along with a European Defense Community (ECD). The process

eventuated in the Union of Europe through two Treaties of Rome that formed the

European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy

80

Community (EURATOM), which in time merged with the European Coal and Steel

Community (ECSC) to form the European Community (EC). [Council of Europe,

http://www.coe.int (accessed 25 May 2008)].

European Unity finally arrived in 1987 with the Single European Act, the most

important single step towards integration. The Maastricht Treaty amended the Treaty

of Rome (EC Treaty), transforming it into the Treaty of the European Union (EU) by

including in it Defence, Foreign Affairs and Immigration. The EU’s was thus

Europe’s response to the now global environment resulting from the ending of the

Cold War.

The European Union (EU): A series of treaties were signed to complete the EU,

and although this process still met resistance from members reluctant to surrender all

sovereignty to the new supranational unit, centripetal forces in, and on, Europe

predominated. Though still formally independent, states were increasingly closely

linked by common interests. Walter Hallstein, first EC President described the EU’s

situation:

Europe shares a sense of values: of what is good and bad; of what a man’s rights

should be and what are his duties; of how society should be ordered; of what is

happiness and what is disaster. Europe shares many things such as its memories

that we call history (Joerg and Wessels, 2000: 1-2).

After the wars and competitive empire building of the colonial era, the European

states finally accepted co-operative integration to be crucial to securing common

interests. And as stated in the EU website “It is neither a new State replacing existing

ones nor is it comparable to other international organisations. Its Member States

81

delegate sovereignty to common institutions representing the interests of the Union as

a whole on questions of joint interest" [European Union, http://open-

site.org/Regional/Europe/European_Union, (accessed 25 May 2008)].

As a unique body, EU anti-corruption efforts are unlike those of other inter-state

bodies.

EU Anti-Corruption Efforts: The Amsterdam Treaty was the first example of joint

EU actions against corruption, but they only began in the mid-1990s. The EC’s treaty

on the topic was an amendment to the Amsterdam treaty. It advocates democracy,

human rights and enhancing the rule of law and fundamental freedoms. These

principles are treated in Article XVII (Article XX, as amended) as basic to co-

operation and to the EC goal of fostering co-operations, integration into the global

economy and the elimination of poverty. Corruption is rejected because it hinders

democracy, produces instability and undermines the rule of law.

Article 100 of the EC Treaty provides another legal base for anti-corruption efforts. It

encourages the issuance of directives by the European Council to frame new laws

amend regulations for establishment and functioning of a common market so as to

fight corruption:

The Council shall. acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, issue

directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation

or administrative action in Member States as directly affect the establishment or

functioning of the common market (Article 100 of The Treaty of Rome 1957).

Likewise the core principals of non-discrimination and open competition in

international business provide other legal bases for anti-corruption and anti-bribery

measures by the EU. The principle of transparency, also emphasized in EC directives,

can also be seen as a measure against corruption since transparency is required for a

healthy, non-corrupt economic environment.

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The EC’s anti-corruption drive began in on 26 July 1995 when the signing of its

Convention on the Protection of European Communities Financial Interests. Article 1

defines ‘fraud’ as:

(a) in respect of expenditure, any international act or omission relating to:

• the use or presentation of incorrect or incomplete statements or documents,

which has as its effect on the misappropriation or wrongful retention of

funds from the general budget of the European Communities or budgets

managed by or on behalf of the European Communities;

• non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the

same effect;

• the misapplication of such funds for purposes other than those for which

they were originally granted;

• in respect of revenue, any international act or omission relating to;

o the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents, which has effect on the illegal diminution of the

resources of the general budget of the European Communities or

budgets managed by or on behalf of the European Communities;

o Non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the same effects;

o misapplication of legally obtained benefit with the same effect.

Member states must resist it by comprehensively criminalising it, with ‘effective

proportionate and dissuasive penalties.’ Article 3 says:

Each member state shall take the necessary measures to allow heads of

businesses or any person having power to take decisions or exercise control

within a business to be declared criminally liable in accordance with the

principle defined by its national law in cases of fraud affecting the European

Community financial interests, as referred to in Article 1, by a person under

their authority acting on behalf of the business.

Unlike the OECD Convention, which downplays CEOs and Directors, the EC

Convention makes them criminally liable for company fraud. Member States,

likewise, must implement powerful mechanisms based on territoriality to facilitate

83

extradition, to co-operate and to centralize prosecutions, along with provisions

relating to the Convention’s ratification and implementation.

Protocols I and II of the EU Convention: Protocol I emerged fourteen months after

the Convention was signed. Protocol I focussed on corruption issues related to

national or Community officials who damage, or could damage, EC financial

interests. States must outlaw both the passive and active forms of corruption if they

damage EC financial interests. Article 4 of Protocol I states:

Each State Member shall take the necessary measures to ensure that in its

criminal description of the offences constituting conduct of the type referred to

in article, of the Convention (that is fraud as defined above) committed by its

national officials in the exercise of their functions apply similarly in cases where

such offences are committed by community officials in the exercise of their

duties.

Protocol I improves on the OECD by recognising both forms of corruption, but still

relates corruption only to EC members’ financial interests. Nor is a date set for

enforcement.

Protocol II on the Protection of the European Communities Financial Interest, signed

19 June, 1997, focuses on money laundering, which Member States must all

criminalize in their national laws:

Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal

persons can be held liable for fraud, active corruption and money laundering

committed for their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as part

of an organ of the legal person who has a leading position within the legal

person.

Protocol II requires Member States to seize and confiscate the instrument and

proceeds of these crimes; to co-operate with the Commission and between

themselves; and to facilitate the protection and exchange of data and information.

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Involving similar principles to Protocol I generalises their application beyond EC

financial interests to cover:

(1) Accountability and proper management of public affairs and property.

(2) Transparency and accountability in public finance.

(3) Involvement of non-government organisations and community institutions.

(4) NGOs and other community-organisations and other civil society groups.

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4. The World Bank (WB) and anti-corruption

1. Background: The WB8, set up in 1944, is now owned by 184 member countries.

The industrialised countries – the USA, UK, Japan and Germany – own the majority

of it and together hold five of twenty-four seats on its Board, meaning the other 160

countries are represented by nineteen Directors. The main mission of the Bank is to

wage war against poverty (http://www.worldbank.or, accessed 20 January 2003). The

WB focuses on helping poor nations by providing loans, logistic aid, knowledge and

experience to build their economies. It encourages human resources investments seen

as basic to economic development: health, education, social and institutional

development. It insists on accountability and transparency to promote the

development of the private sector.

2. WB anti-corruption policy: Corruption was originally seen as a political issue,

meaning the WB did not at first address it directly. As public awareness grew of how

inimical corruption is to economic and social development, the Bank eventually saw

corruption as a disease that undermined its core goal: reducing and, if possible

eliminating, poverty. The legal basis for this fighting corruption was Article (3),

Section (b) of the WB Articles of Agreement:

The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are

used only for the purpose for which the loan was granted, with due attention to

considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other

non-economic influences or consideration.

The General Council sees the flow of loans and other investment to countries as

dependent on anti-corruption measures:

8 The inclusive term ‘World Bank System’ is used to cover ancillary bodies like the International Finance Corporation, a body that encourages private sector portfolio and direct investment.

86

The Bank should take all means to help countries to fight corruption. The Bank

provides help to conduct research on the causes and impact of corruption. The World

Bank provides help, by mutual agreement, to enable its borrowing countries to combat

corruption. Thus, the Bank takes into consideration in providing loans and assistance

to its members and clients to the efforts these countries exert in reduction of

corruption. As a consequence, the Bank in 1997 adopted an anti-corruption strategy

which was based on the following (Report No. 29620 Mainstreaming Anti-

Corruption Activities in World Bank Assistance: A Review of Progress Since 1997,

2004).

To avoid corruption in projects it funds the WB took the following actions:

1. It strengthened its internal Audit Department by setting up a special unit to

ensure that all audits meet WB standards.

2. It implanted a Code of Ethics that the Bank closely adheres to.

3. It set up in 1998 an Oversight Committee to investigate fraud and corruption and to oversee all allegations of corruption or fraud within the Bank Group

or related to contracts involving the Bank or Group-finance. The

Committee can protect the confidentially of investigations and decides what

investigations to perform and by whom. Its Secretariat follows up to ensure

Committee instructions are carried out meticulously, and later submits

investigation reports to the Committee. [Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the

Work of the World Bank Senior Vice President and General Counsel, http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/sites/ifiwatchnet.org/files/DaninoLegalOpinion0106.pdf (accessed 25 May 2008)].

The Bank adopted several other measures to improve the efficiency of WB lending by

ensuring funds are used for the intended purposes. These include insurance that the

WB’s recommended procurement guidelines are followed by borrowers. Since 1998

a Sanction Committee has been evaluating investigation into fraud or corruption and

can prohibit Bank-financed contracts from being awarded. Loan agreements allow

the WB to cancel the unpaid portions of loans for projects if corruption was

committed before or during its execution, unless a borrower acts to rectify the

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corruption. The WB also bars firms caught engaging in corruption from competing

for or participating in Bank-financed contracts.

Bank anti-corruption policy is run by the Bank Institute. It aims to enlist various

segments of society into teams to assess its successes and failures of its anti-

corruption efforts. Their participants gain information, knowledge and experience for

formulating anti-corruption programmes. The WB also gives loans to reform or

restructure states’ economic systems or strengthen their institutions. ‘Special

Assistance’ loans are used to research the causes and levels of corruption, its

implications for states, and appropriate counter-measures.

The WB widely co-operates with internationally bodies: with the OECD’s Convention

on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, with Interpol and the

Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), where it has observer

status. It participates in all major international conferences on corruption and actively

disseminates knowledge about it, especially in developing countries.

3. The limitations of WB efforts against corruption: The main reason for

creating the WB, according to Kirshner, was to:

… assist in the reconstruction and development of the territories of members by

facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including…. the

encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less

developed countries (Article I of IBRD Agreement As amended effective February 16, 1989).

The goals evolved somewhat, as the WB became involved in issues such as health,

rate of population growth, protection of the environment, role of women in

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development, concern about human rights, quality of governance and democracy

(http://web.worldbank.org [accessed 21 July 2006]). Its core goal, however, is still to

reduce poverty. But well established causal ties between corruption and poverty give

strong incentives to attack poverty by attacking mismanagement. Success with one is

contingent upon success with the other.

Some analysts deny that the World Bank has fulfilled its goal of reducing poverty in

the less developed countries; indeed its extreme critics even accuse WB policies of

being the main explanation of why poverty continues in under-developed countries.

Worldwide differences in development level are the results of long and complex

histories, so simple explanations are impossible. But the WB’s current opposition to

corruption, even if belated, can help to eliminate it as an impediment to poverty

reduction (Levinsohn, 2003).

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Part two: the Australian scene

This section treats the anti-corruption strategies used in Australia to prevent and to

suppress corruption. It examines both the Federal (or Commonwealth)9 and the State

levels, looking particularly at three bodies: (1) The Australian Federal Police (AFP),

(2) The Australian Crime Commission (ACC), and (3) the State of New South Wales

(NSW) Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)

The aim of examining these Australian systems is to see what Abu Dhabi can learn

from these Australian experiences in combating corruption. These experiences in

anti-corruption are particularly relevant to the UAE because both it and Australia are

federal polities in which political authority is divided between Central/Federal and

State/Emirate levels. Both nations were formed quite recently – Australia in 1901;

UAE in 1971 – from formerly independent polities overseen by London. Federal

Constitutions ‘balance’ their differences and rivalries by allotting functions to

different ‘levels’ of government; in practice differences persist, leading to endless

debates between the localities and the centre over their powers. In Australia, unlike

Canada but like the USA, policing became a State responsibility, creating much

awkwardness.

9 Hereafter ‘Commonwealth’ or ‘Federal’ refers to the central government in Canberra, while ‘local’ or ‘State’ to the six States and the Northern Territory.

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1. The Australian Federal Police (AFP)

The AFP, was established by the Australian Federal Police Act (1979) to enforce

Commonwealth criminal law. Creating a Federal Police had been recommended by

Sir Robert Mark’s report of April 1978 to the Federal Minister for Administrative

Services. (Jon Hunt Sharman. (n.d): 15) The AFP protects Commonwealth and

national interests from crime in Australia and overseas. The AFP is Australia's

international policing and law enforcement representative, and provides the advice on

policing issues to the Australian Federal Government (About the AFP,

http://www.afp.gov.au/afp/page/ [assessed 6 July 2005a]).

1. The main objectives of the AFP: ‘Globalisation’, with its rapid increases in the

flows of people, goods, ideas and money across national borders, affects all areas of

law enforcement in ways that tend to increase the relative role of the AFP. At present

its main roles are to pursue Australia’s interests and security by:

1. Supporting international law enforcement agencies and cooperating with the

international community in the area of criminal intelligence;

2. Working with other agencies to create a more secure regional and global

environment by fighting trans-national organised crime, illicit drug trafficking

and illegal immigration;

3. Protecting the economy and financial system from money laundering, major

crime, tax evasion and fraud;

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4. Maintaining national and international confidence in Australia’s economic,

financial and law enforcement mechanisms (Jon Hunt Sharman. [n.d]: 20-21).

To resist corruption in its own ranks, the AFP has introduced a number of different

new mechanisms:

1. Drug testing for all personnel to ensure a drug-free workforce, whether drugs

are illicit or pharmaceutical in nature;

2. Enhanced powers for the Commissioner to dismiss from the AFP unsuitable

member in whom he has lost confidence;

3. New methods to prevent corruption, such as the declaring of private assets,

and the use of financial auditing when necessary;

4. A new AFP Complaints Act requiring AFP members to submit documents on

request and to answer all questions related to complaints;

5. Bans on AFP personnel making false or misleading statements or circulating

false or misleading information, with criminal penalties applying (Jon Hunt

Sharman. [n.d]: 20-21)

The AFP is, for its part, fully accountable to the Commonwealth through specific

outcomes, outputs and performance indicators. Outcomes were reported for fighting

organised crime, money laundering, corruption, major fraud, illicit drug trafficking,

and trans-national crime. In 1999-00 and 2000-01 the AFP returned through its fraud

and drug investigations a total of $321 million. The sum spent on fraud investigation

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by the AFP in the same period was $63 million, so the AFP fraud investigations

yielded a ‘net profit’ of $258 million to the Australian community, a return of over

$5.10 for every dollar spent, a good financial ‘return’ from fighting crime (Measuring

the costs and benefits of AFP investigations,

http://www.afp.gov.au/afp/raw/publications/ResearchReports/Issue2/RN2.pdf,

[assessed 11 October 2005]).

Fraud is thought to be Australia’s most ‘expensive’ form of crime, with $3 to $3.5

billion lost to fraud in 1997. The Australian National Audit Office’s Survey of Fraud

Control Arrangements in APS Agencies reported that the Commonwealth’s total loss

from in 1998-99 was, by conservative estimate, $146 million (Commonwealth Fraud

Control Guidelines, 2002: iii). Hence the Federal government realised the need to

revise its Fraud Control Policy to reduce losses and to make allowances for changes in

the environment where Commonwealth agencies operate (Commonwealth Fraud

Control Guidelines, 2002: iii). Consequently all agencies ‘…are to refer all instances

of serious or complex fraud involving Commonwealth interests to the AFP.’

(Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, 2002:2-5). The AFP was made

responsible for consulting with other Federal agencies to advise them on internal

fraud control policies. The Commonwealth Fraud Control guidelines define fraud for

its purposes as ‘…dishonestly obtaining a benefit by deception or other mean’ a

definition wide enough to include bribery, corruption or abuse of office

(Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, 2002: 20).

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2. The Australian Crime Commission (ACC)

Introduction: Criminal intelligence is an essential tool of law enforcement, as

decision-makers require timely and accurate information on criminal threats and the

operational environment. A major new development in law enforcement is the

specialized investigative agencies with coercive powers for attacking corruption and

large scale crime. In Australia that body is the Australian Crime Commission (ACC),

formed in January 1993 when three bodies, the Australian Bureau of Criminal

Intelligence (ABCI), the National Crime Authority (NCA), and the Office of Strategic

Crime Assessment (OSCA) merged. Its role was to help law enforcement maximise

their operational and organisational efficiency through strategic intelligence planning.

It grew out of a realisation forced on Australian law enforcement in the 1970s and

1980s by several Royal Commissions: that organised crime, particularly drug

trafficking, was firmly established in the country (Horman, 1993). These Royal

Commissions included, among others:

1. NSW: The Moffit Royal Commission, investigating Licensed Clubs (1973-

74);

2. NSW: The Woodward Royal Commission into Drugs (1977-79);

3. Commonwealth: Williams Australian Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drugs (1977-80);

1. Commonwealth: Costigan Royal Commission into the Federated Ship Painters

and Dockers Union of Australia (1980-84);

2. NSW: The Stewart Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking (1980-1983; 2001-03) (Horman, 1993);

3. Queensland: The Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal

Activities and Associated Police Misconduct (1988-89).

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Faced by wealthy organised crime syndicates servicing widely spread markets, law

enforcement lacked the powers to operate throughout Australia. Accordingly, law

enforcement decision-makers in the 1980s implement policies better suited to acting

against large criminal networks spread nationally and even sometimes internationally

(Horman, 1993).

Australian anti-crime bodies: historical background: Australia’s need to collect

and analyse criminal intelligence had become obvious as soon as it was founded as a

country. Investigative bodies possessing coercive power were needed to counter the

underground cash economy, money laundering and to frustrate profit seeking

organised crime (Horman, 1993). Several important bodies appeared in the earlier

anti-crime systems.

1. The Australian Bureau Of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI) This was proposed after

several early Royal Commissions had noted poor communication between state

police forces and other law enforcement agencies. This led to the

recommendation that Australia set up a central clearing house for criminal

intelligence, and in 1981. The Australian Police Ministers Council (APMC)

founded the ABCI. It was the product of a consensus among experts from the

AFP and each state police force.

The ABCI’s role was to collect information, criminal statistic, examine and

exchange criminal intelligence, but its ability to provide anti-crime information

was constrained by lack of its own intelligence and logistic resources (Parliament

An Overview, http://www.aph.gov.au/parl.htm, [accessed 3 February, 2006]). It

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reported to the Management Committee ‘consisted of the Police Commissioners

throughout Australia’ (William J. Horman, [n.d]: 110).

2. National Criminal Authority (NCA): The problems identified by the Royal

Commissions implied that state-based law enforcement bodies were unable to deal

with Australian organised crime as it had evolved. More effective responses were

needed, so the Commonwealth Parliament passed National Crime Authority Act,

which led to National Crime Authority (NCA) being founded on 1 July 1984

when NCA Act [the Principle Act] was proclaimed. The NCA became Australia's

first national anti-crime agency charged with combating organised crime

(Horman, 1993). The Australian Law Reform Commission described NCA as:

… national law enforcement body whose main role is to counteract organised crime often by working in partnership with other agencies.

The NCA's working definition of organised crime is 'a systematic

conspiracy to commit serious offences.' Generally, the NCA investigates

relevant criminal activities and collects, analyses and disseminates

information and intelligence relating to those activities. Where

appropriate it establishes and co-ordinates task forces with other law

enforcement bodies for the investigation of those matters. It may also

make recommendations for legal and administrative reforms (National Crime Authority Amendment Bill 1999-2000. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/BD/1999-2000/2000bd096.htm#Passage, [accessed 5 Jun. 2007]).

The Principle Act endows it with coercive powers: to compel people to

produce documents and give sworn evidence (National Crime Authority

Amendment Bill 1999-2000. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/BD/1999-

2000/2000bd096.htm#Passage, [accessed 5 Jun. 2007]).

Knowing the international impact of organised crime the NCA established links

with international law enforcement agencies, including all the OECD countries,

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Singapore and Hong Kong, the Financial Action Taskforce, and the international

taskforce on money laundering (FATF) (Horman, 1993: 111).

The Parliamentary Joint Committee (PJC), reviewing all of NCA’s activities in

1998, came to this conclusion:

Changes in the criminal environment have, in fact, made even more necessary a

national collaborative effort, especially in the context of the globalisation of

organised crime which increasingly impacts on this country. The PJC noted the

overwhelming advice that this was a task which still required a national co-

ordinating body, able to transcend the limitations of Commonwealth, State and

Territory jurisdictions, with the resources and powers to make inroads against

sophisticated, multijurisdictional criminality. In the PJC's opinion, no viable

alternative to the NCA has been propounded (The Need for a National Crime Authority,http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/acc_ctte/completed_inquiries/1996-99/3rd-eval/report/c01.htm, [accessed 5 Jun. 2007]).

3. Office of Strategic Crime Assessment (OSCA) Established in 1995 to meet the

need for timely and adequate analysis of criminal intelligence data. OSCA’s primary

objective was to:

… provide the Commonwealth Government with strategic assessments of

significant crime trends and criminal threats to Australia, likely to emerge

within 5 years (Australian Crime Commission Establishment Bill 2002, http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2002-03/03bd054.htm, [accessed 5 Jun. 2007]).

It had seemed that the intelligence analysis conducted by OSCA were not influential

on both operational priority setting and policy orientation (Parliamentary library,

http://www.aph.gov.au/parl.htm, accessed 5 Jun. 2007).

4 The Australian Crime Commission (ACC): The ACC was set up in January 2003 to

rectify its predecessors’ weaknesses so as to intensify the fight against major crime

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committed on Australian territory. The ACC Act lays heavy emphasis on

intelligence. The ACC mission is to focus on:

1. National strategic policy by assessing significant emerging crime trends and

threats to national law enforcement interests.

2. Strategic intelligence and decision making rather than be operational matters.

3. A whole-of-government perspective, rather than individual agency interests.

4. Long-term trends rather than on specific current events.

5. Criminal intelligence cooperation with interested regional and international

partners by promoting intelligence sharing. Proactive approaches (Quarmby,

2003:2).

The ACC was given special coercive powers for intelligence operations and

investigations because police forces using traditional law enforcement methods are

unable to combat sophisticated criminal activities. Its exercise of these powers is

monitored, under the enabling act, by the Board, and they are conducted by

independent statuary officers called Examiners, who are all experienced legal

practitioners (Australian Crime Commission Profile, 2005).

Section 17/1 of ACC Act requires collaboration with other law enforcement agencies

(Australian Crime Commission Profile, 2005). But the ACC’s structuring

arrangements to investigate organised crime was seen as inefficient, and a key

weakness in the strategic principles. The strategic intelligence areas of the ACC are

oriented towards servicing Ministers, senior officers, executives and decision-makers.

This requires a mix of forward-looking strategic assessments and anti-crime early

warning systems (Quarmby, 2003: 3-4).

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To give further support to the ACC’s strategic functions, it established a ‘Strategic

Crime Assessments (SCA) Office’ charged with these tasks:

1. Maintain a national crime database to collect, correlate, analyse and

disseminate criminal information and intelligence;

2. Undertake intelligence operations and investigate matters related to federal

criminal activities, as authorized by the Board.

3. Report to the Board on the outcomes of those operations and investigations.

4. Provide the Board with strategic criminal intelligence assessments, and any

other related criminal information and intelligence.

5. Advise the Board on national criminal intelligence priorities.

SCA analytical programmes cover a wide variety of Australian interests, including

crime threats and strategic national threats posed by the international organised crime

networks. Accordingly its analytical model has four basic analytical processes: (1)

prediction, (2) estimation, (3) conclusion, and (4) hypothesis. The criminal

intelligence model, however, usually employs estimative inference, a methodology

embodying four different common components: (1) the environment (political, social,

economic, threat, and technological); (2) the stakeholders inhabiting that

environment; (3) forces/factors of change; and (4) potential changes over time

(Quarmby, 2003:4).

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ACC Strategic Level Coordination

‘Strategic intelligence’, while often said to be a product suited to a certain level of

decision-making, includes coordinating activity to support priorities management.

This includes (1) ‘packaging’ intelligence support about threat assessment processes

into useable form; (2) liaising with other agencies in intelligence priority setting, and

(3) developing concepts and policies associated with priorities.

3. New South Wales’ Independent Commission Against Corruption

(ICAC)

New South Wales set up its Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) on

13 March 1988 by passing the ICAC Act. Its basic functions are investigative,

preventive and educational. That is, in order to ‘deter…corrupt activity’ (Annual

Report,1989: 10) it should:

1. Expose and investigate allegations or complaints of corruption;

2. Avert corruption of public sector and improve its integrity by giving advice

and help in building resistance to corruption;

3. Educate the community and the public service on the detrimental effects of

corruption (Independent Commission Against Corruption

http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/index.cfm?objectid=DC97AC81-1033-B4BD-

3390730BEC69DB3C, [accessed 20 July 2005])

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The First Approach is Investigation. SECT 3 of Part 4 of ICAC Act states, ‘an

investigation under this Act, and (without limitation) includes a preliminary

investigation referred to in section 20A10’. The Commission may launch

investigations on its own initiative or on the basis of complaints or allegations from

the public or public authorities or of referrals by the NSW Parliament.

Public confidence is seen as a main ICAC tool to fight corruption. So winning

community confidence and convincing politicians that its role is not to do the

Government’s bidding, but to focus on its investigative function. Likewise,

publicising its accomplishments through media is the ICAC's best way to win the trust

of the public, of politicians and of civil libertarians.

On the other hand, investigation alone is self-defeating. If the ICAC is seen only to

be an investigative, i.e., punitive, agency, it generates antagonism, suspicion and lack

of co-operation, which means it cannot achieve its goal of minimizing corruption.

Rather it must also play a constructive role in developing sound management

practices and educating public officers on the detrimental effects of corruption (Barry

O'Keefe – ICAC Commissioner, Corruption Prevention Forum, 1999: 299).

Both public and closed hearings are investigative devices for exposing corruption.

After evidence has been gathered the Commission decides whether to hold closed or

open hearings. If suspects admit everything in closed session, they can avoid a public

hearing which could damage their reputations. Closed hearings have other

10 20A Preliminary investigations: (1) An investigation may be in the nature of a preliminary

investigation. (2) A preliminary examination can be conducted, for example, for the purpose of assisting the Commission: (a) to discover or identify conduct that might be made the subject of a more complete investigation under this Act, or (b) to decide whether to make particular conduct the subject of a more complete investigation under this Act. (3) Nothing in this section affects any other provision of this Act.

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advantages: they offer opportunities to uncover inconsistencies in the evidence of

different witnesses, and besides are considerably cheaper.

The second approach used by the ICAC in fighting corruption is Prevention. It

advises public sector bodies, publishes guidelines for them to use, and trains them in

how to resist corruption. The ICAC’s unified Code of Conduct articulates the

principles public officials should follow in performing their duties: These are:

1-Integrity:

Public officials must be free from any financial or other obligations which might have

an impact on the performance of their duties.

2- Leadership:

Public officials must maintain their professional commitments, promote and support

the key principles through ideal ethical standards.

3- Selflessness:

Public officials should make decisions that serve the public interest. They must act

according to this principle and ensure that the benefit of the public is protected.

4-Objectivity:

Impartiality is a corner stone to be kept in line with in professional duties; personal

involvement in any matter related to the public interest is irrelevant.

5-Accountability:

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Public officials are accountable to the public; they must assume their responsibilities

in all decisions and actions carried out while on duties

6- Openness

Effective communication is a platform to achieve clarity and transparency in all

decisions and actions taken towards safeguarding the public interests; disclosing

sensitive information must be authorised.

7- Honesty

Public officials must preserve continuity in their code of conduct based on resolving

any disparity or juxtaposition that might deteriorate their performances and drive

them away from protecting the public interests.

8- Respect

Mutual respect is the key element in the professional environment where tasks and

duties are different in any government area (The Model Code of Conduct for Local

Councils in NSW, 2004: 6-7).

Most agencies have Codes of Conduct regulating conflicts of interest arising from second

jobs where public sector employees do private work part-time, run private businesses, or

act as consultants for private parties. Corruption can occur if they divulge sensitive

information or convert public resources to private uses. Agencies need policies on part

time jobs that suit their needs. They may have to forbid part time jobs that could damage

the entity’s integrity or involve conflicts of interests. The main risks of second jobs are:

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1. The second job may compete with the employee's first job in terms of time and

misuse of public resources such as equipment, vehicles, etc.

2. An employee who accepts a second job may compromise the integrity of the

agency.

3. Conflicts of interest may arise when the employee devotes work time to outside

business interests (The Model Code of Conduct for Local Councils in NSW, 2004:

14).

The ICAC commenced a major research project to identify the corruption risk across

the public sector. The objectives of this research were to identify in the public sector

what corruption risks they face and preventive strategies they already have in place.

They also tried to identify differences among public sector organisations to promote

discussion of the corruption risks faced by the public sector.

The result of this research is that the major risks confronting organisations relate to

misuse of confidential information, and misuse of public assets and agencies.

Therefore, the ICAC invited the public sector agencies to adopt the following steps of

the risk management process:

1- To establish the context which the risk management will take place.

2-To identify the kinds of risks that may occur and how to prevent their occurrence.

3- To analyse risks in terms of possible consequences.

4-To evaluate risks, their seriousness, and their prioritization.

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After first emphasising investigation, the ICAC has adopted what is called a three-

pronged approach that gives more equal weight to investigation, prevention and

education. Nevertheless, investigation remains its most important anti-corruption

tool, as it not only exposes corruption and encourages flows of information, but also

acts as a deterrent and helps maintain public confidence in the integrity of the system.

The third approach of discussion is education. "As part of its statutory role to

educate the community about public sector corruption, the ICAC has produced a

number of audio-visual resources for use in primary and secondary schools.

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Concluding remarks

The UN Convention against Corruption aims at reducing corruption by strengthening

international cooperation and technical assistance. It sees integrity, accountability and

transparency, combined with proper public sector management and effective

enforcement, as the key elements of any anti-corruption strategy (Costa, 2004). It

recommends strongly that countries create independent anti-corruption bodies that are

kept separate from the control and intervention of any other institutional powers, and

advises state parties to ‘…adopt, maintain and strengthen systems for the recruitment,

hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of civil servants’. [Article 7 of Light

Version of the Merida Convention, http://www.business-anti-

corruption.com/Include/ElectosFileStreaming.asp?FileId=31 (accessed 18 June

2007)] Transparency and accountability in public finances are to be promoted by

applying private sector standards of auditing and accounting and by imposing

dissuasive civil, administrative and/or criminal penalties on those who fail to comply

with such measures.

Countries can formulate effective strategies for controlling money laundering that

originates at home or cross their borders. To this end the UN sponsors a wide range

of technical workshops, seminars, and training courses to mobilize international

community participation in resisting corruption and improving general awareness of

the harm corruption-related practices cause. The OECD Convention mandates all

member states to enact laws defining bribery of foreign officials as a criminal offence.

The Convention stresses and emphasizes the necessity of co-operation between the

member states in their fight against bribery of foreign public officials.

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The OECD Convention has made major advances in the fight against bribery of

foreign public officials. It still refers only to active bribery, ignoring passive bribery.

Also it ignores politicians, political parties and political party members. Besides its

narrow definition of bribery, it overlooks bribes committed by officials of state-owned

companies. The OECD Convention is sometimes criticized for not fully addressing

bribery by or through foreign subsidiaries.

The European Union is the most remarkable step towards European Unity. That EC

Treaty advocates democracy, human rights, enhancing the rule of law and

fundamental freedoms is directly related, because corruption corrodes democracy by

producing instability and undermines the Rule of Law. Article 100 of the EC Treaty is

another legal base for EC anti-corruption efforts.

In this spirit the World Bank in 1997 adopted an anti-corruption strategy that aims at

preventing corruption in World Bank funded projects by helping countries to fight

corruption and supporting co-operative international efforts against it. The goals of

the World Bank changed with time as it became concerned with other issues such as

‘health, rate of population growth, protection of the environment, role of women in

development, concern about human rights, quality of governance and democracy.’

The AFP introduced different mechanisms of anti-corruption by introducing a drug

free workforce and policy covering the misuse of pharmaceutical products.

Accordingly, the Australian Federal Government recognizes the requirement to

develop the Commonwealth’s Fraud Control Policy to control fraud.

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The ACC focuses largely on providing national strategic policy for national law

enforcement interests, production of strategic intelligence and decision and long-term

trends.

The SCA analytical programmes cover a wide variety of Australian interests

including crime threats, cross-cutting and emerging issues, and strategic national

threats posed by the international organised crime networks.

The next chapter will describe the external mechanisms existing in the UAE both at

the local and federal levels to fight police corruption.

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Chapter 4

External Mechanisms in the UAE in Fighting Police

Corruption

This chapter will review and highlight the strengths and weaknesses of external

mechanisms in the UAE which is implemented currently to fight police corruption.

The previous chapter discussed how international agencies are applying strategies to

fight police corruption. This chapter will cover relevant strategies adopted at federal

as well as Abu Dhabi levels and a comprehensive comparative analysis of such

differences, including reasons for their existence.

The Fight Against Corruption in the UAE

Agencies that deal with corruption in the UAE

Unlike the situation in some Australian states and Hong Kong, where there are

separate anti-corruption bodies, the UAE does not have a special organisation to deal

with police corruption. The responsibility of fighting corruption rests within two

levels, the local level and the federal level.

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Local level

The local police:

The local police handle all sorts of crime including fraud, theft, corruption, etc, in

their local emirates; unfortunately they are not capable of dealing with such

corruption crimes and they lack the power and authority to do so. Moreover, the

strategy of local police to fight crime is merely receiving complaints from the public

and dealing with them.

At this stage, the researcher will use the Capital Police Directorate CPD) as a case

study to examine the strengths and weaknesses of external mechanisms in the UAE in

fighting police corruption at the local police level.

Public relations

The capital police directorate supervises three police sections: Khalediah, Shabia and

Madina. The CPD has a hotline channel to be used by the public either to report any

unsatisfied police action or to forward complaints to the public relations and the mass

media sections. These two sections are linked to the head of the capital police

directorate and undertake several activities to serve the community. However, there is

a lack of anti-corruption public educational programs, and the scope of these

programs relates to general crime.

In addition, the outcome of the Mass Media Section is only for posting in police

stations and, once a year a mass media campaign is produced for public consumption

to enhance the relationship between the police and the public.

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Investigation Methods

According to the documents of Public Relations and Guidance branch (PRG) there are

no complaints which have been investigated. The main function of the branch is

receiving complaints towards police misuse of power and misconduct, and then the

branch becomes a mediator between the complaint and the officer to solve the

problem.

Moreover, according to PRG documents, the branch has received twelve complaints

in 2005 and none have been investigated.

Complaint Methods

The PRG has a Hotline channel for reporting any complaint against police. This

service is available only for CPD. In addition, Abu Dhabi police general headquarters

has within its website a service dedicated for public complaints in order to detect and

fight any misconduct within its staff. Though these two services are available for the

public they remain ignorant or sceptical of the services. As mentioned earlier just

twelve complaints have been received and no investigations have taken place.

Lodging a complaint is not guaranteed since the procedures require identification of

the complainant and confidentiality is not taken into account.

Moreover, there is no internal body in the Abu Dhabi police general headquarters and

CPD specialized in police misconduct or police corruption. Besides there is a vital

need to set up strong and independent internal investigation units whose primary task

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should be the effective management of police corruption. Experienced personnel and

detectives are an essential key element in this process and a deep understanding of

ethics and work mechanisms within any organisation is necessary to find out how

hidden corrupt activities take place.

Federal level

This part will deal with federal level mechanisms in UAE for fighting police

corruption. The federal level covers two organisations; The State Security Authority

(SSA) and Ministry of Interior. There are two departments within the Ministry of

Interior concerned with corruption: the General Inspector’s office and Preventive

Security Department.

The State Security Authority:

Investigation Methods

According to the federal law of the United Arab Emirates number (2) of 2003, the

SSA is directly affiliated to the supreme power in UAE, i.e., His Highness the

President of the United Arab Emirates. This department has been given great and

stronger powers, which in most cases, exceeds those given to some police

departments, to perform its investigative functions. These powers include the

authority to counter different types of crime that pose a threat to national security,

such as terrorism, espionage and major public official crimes which involve

considerable amounts of money in terms of investigations, control and the prevention

of corruption in general. An evident example of the prevention and control of

corruption is a misconduct action investigated by the SSA in year 2002. There a

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number of employees in the Abu Dhabi Municipality were arrested for corrupt

practices.

The functions, activities and operations of the SSA are not limited to the above

mentioned fields, and they also have the powers to conduct surveillance and intercept

telephones calls without approaching or resorting to UAE courts or judicial

authorities. Indeed to arrest or detain any suspected persons; the SSA depend on

Public Prosecution in UAE and act accordingly.

Public Relations

There appears to be no official conduit between the SSA and the public. However as

will become clear later the police should be trained to have better relations with the

public, especially with respect to anti-corruption measures.

Moreover, no evidence can be found of the SSA utilising education strategies or mass

media to campaigns against corruption.

Preventing Methods

Fighting, controlling, or preventing corruption is not an easy process. Police

corruption is not limited to any country as it is a global issue encountered worldwide

throughout history wherever there are police agencies. Corruption can be controlled

by minimizing the opportunities for corruption. A strategy for preventing corruption

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needs to be developed, and the roles and actions exerted against corruption examined

and analysed.

Thus, there is no clear evidence that the SSA has any resources for public awareness

in terms of combating corruption, such as using the media, news or any other

available means.

Complaint methods

Members of public are not allowed to enter the SSA premises, buildings or offices to

make or lodge their complaints against any police; and the SSA do not have any

method or mechanisms to receive and deal with complaints. In addition, the SSA does

not use any procedures to prevent corruption, although in actuality one major

responsibility of the SSA is to deal with high level of corruption and terrorism crime.

Also, there are no properly defined procedures for complaints, for which the public

should be educated.

Only secret sources (informants) have been used to collect information on corruption.

These sources are very limited and are not open to scrutiny. There are no telephone

hotlines or website to receive complaints, and no office specifically dedicated to

receiving and processing corruption complaints.

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The Ministry of Interior

The Ministry has two departments to fight corruption: the General Inspector’s

Office (GIO) and the Preventive Security Department (PSD):

1. General Inspector’s office

The GIO has under the Ministerial decision no.481 for 1996 directly been

linked and held accountable to the Minster of Interior. This has five

departments, which are as follows:-

1. Inspection department.

2. Complaints and investigation department.

3. Guidance and follow up department.

4. Administration and finance section.

5. General inspector’s office.

The GIO has only seventeen employees who work in the five above mentioned

areas and they have managed to carry out inspections in 153 police stations,

putting into account that there are eighteen general directorates, 146

departments and 482 sections for the GIO to cover.

Additionally, for deterrence purposes, the GIO carried out some mock

inspections at the Emirates level; for example in relation to drugs trafficking.

(a) Inspection department.

This department is responsible for the processes of inspections which are

divided into four types, i.e., annual, periodical, surprise and follow up

inspections. In 2005 the department has carried out forty-five inspections at

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police stations and units covering most part of UAE, including Dubai Emirate.

Specifically, sixteen sites in Al-Ain, fourteen in Dubai, thirty-one in Sharijah,

sixteen in Ajman, eleven in Um Al-Quain, eight in Ras Al-Khaimah, and

eleven sites in Fujairah were inspected,.

(b) Investigation and Complaints Department.

This department’s responsibilities and obligations are investigating violations

and complaints to present investigation results to the concerned authorities and

recommend formation of investigation committees and disciplinary actions.

Although these responsibilities and obligations have been stated by the

Ministerial resolution No. 4811 of 1991, the investigation processes and tasks

were not activated due to insufficient number of specialized employees in this

department.

It is worth mentioning that the Investigation and Complaints Department

(ICD), which is working under the umbrella of the GIO, has received in 2005

sixty- three complaints out of which only fifty-four were considered, while the

rest were excluded. In the same year, fourteen investigation committees were

formed to consider issues related to police misconduct throughout the UAE ,

including the Abu Dhabi Police, but excluding the Dubai Police.

The (ICD) is divided into two sections; the Investigation Section and

Complaints Section.

According to Ministerial Decree no. 481 for 1996, the GIO ICD shall be

responsible for the following:

1. Investigating any violation or infraction that may be referred to it.

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3. Proposing the setting up of investigation committees and referring staff

members to Disciplinary Courts.

4. Submitting reports regarding any failure or negligence that the

investigation would reveal.

6. Receiving and to investigate any complaints against employees working in

different central or regional units of the Ministry of Interior and take

appropriate action.

7. Receiving any complaints regarding police performance weakness of all

UAE and take the appropriate action.

8. Proposing the necessary measures for remedy to the reasons of complaints

and ensure, in coordination with related authorities, that such faults are not

repeated.

9. Identifying security problems and remarks regarding the police

performance at the level of the UAE and prepare reports thereof.

Based on the above mentioned facts, the GIO does not have the legal

framework to enable it to deal with or consider the corruption of the Abu

Dhabi police. However, item number 7 of Ministerial decision no. 481 for

1996 ‘Receiving any complaints regarding police...’ can be useful for the

General Inspector to deal with Abu Dhabi police corruption. The GIO should

receive all complaints as explained in item number 8 of the same decision

‘Proposing the necessary measures for remedy to the reasons of

complaints…’. With the present staff it would be impossible to comply with

all the duties of the GIO.

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Complaint Methods:

The CID is responsible for receiving and dealing with complaints against

police misconduct ‘Receiving any complaints regarding police...’ Under

Ministerial decision the GIO is responsible for receiving complaints against

their employees. A police official with extensive police networks could

theoretically obtain information on the case under investigation and could play

a part in tampering with the evidence.

However, if any member of the public wished to make a complaint against a

police member they would have to pass three security barriers/checkpoints

prior to physically traversing a distance of some 200 meters in order to reach

the GIO. This is very intimidating proposition, and as we will see this

impediment will be validated in the data below.

Moreover, there are no methods of receiving complaints against the police like

a hotline, website or mail for the GIO. In fact, there is a lack of clear policies

on receiving and processing complaints from the public. The public appear

confused about where and how to channel their information or complaints to

the competent authorities.

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(c) Guidance and Follow up Department.

This department is concerned with performing administrative and field

inspections as well as setting up and implementing plans for the same, in

accordance with the laws, regulations and decisions.

This department is also suffering from the lack of proper promotional and

media plans. It has published five page leaflets, however, all contact details

have been omitted.

Prima facie the GIO is suffering from a lack of the human and material

resources.

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2. The Preventive Security Department

The Preventive Security Department (PSD) was established in 1996 under a

Ministerial Decree No 494 of 1996 regarding the organisation and

establishment of the PSD. It is directly linked and accountable to the Assistant

Undersecretary for Security Affairs and is divided into the following sections:

1. Information Section

The main role of the information section is to gather and analyse information

from the media and provide feedback of the same to the senior officers. It

covers all information, which could be linked to the ministry of interior.

2. Preventive Security Section

The main role of Preventive Security Section (PSS) is to insure that the new

police officers have been scrutinized for his history before joining the police

organisation. Moreover, the PSS is responsible for securing ministry

communication.

3. Field Security Section

The main role of the Field Security Section (FSS) is to investigate any corrupt

loyalty by any employees of the Ministry of Interior. In fact, the PSD does not

have any legal powers to receive any complaint against police officer.

Complaint methods:

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So far, there are no methods for receiving information or any complaint

through other facilities like a hotline, website or e-mail. In fact, there is a lack

of clear policies for receiving and processing intelligence information. As we

will see below local individuals appear confused with respect to the method to

channel their information or complaints.

The rules, procedures and regulations adopted by the PSS to fight, minimize

and prevent police corruption are very limited. These are only shown in

posters fixed on walls at police stations and offices of the PSS. There are no

specific policies for educating the public about the corrupt conduct, their

categories and legal consequences.

The Power of the authorities at the Federal Level

The SSA has strong powers to investigate and track the suspects in order to

fight terrorism and corruption. It has very strong powers for the investigation

and use of surveillance. However, the main duties of SSA were to fight and

prevent any terrorism and any crime, which affects the country, not to fight

official public/police corruption. However, the SSA took over this role when

they identified a requirement to fight corruption as part of their official duties.

The GIO according to the Ministerial Decree no, 481 for 1996 is directly

linked to the Minster of Interior. These links give the Office more power over

all departments of police. The GIO has the legal power to investigate any

referred violation or infraction and to establish an investigation into any

suspected police misconduct and refer them to the Disciplinary Courts.

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However, as it appears the GIO has failed in its fight against corruption, the

PSD seems to have taken over this function.

Public Relations

The SSA and the PSD appear to lack a public relations strategy for fighting

corruption. Also, the PSD has limited sources of information and depends

solely on efforts exerted by the staff members or another police department.

Likewise, the GIO also lacks any public relations strategy.

Accountability

According to the federal law number (2) of 2003 regarded the SSA is directly

accountable to the President of the United Arab Emirates, it has been given

great and stronger powers. However, the SSA also is accountable to the

judicial system and cannot arrest without court approval

Although the GIO is accountable to the Minster of Interior, the Office has

been prevented through its powers from receiving any complaints regarding

police performance within of all UAE. In addition, the Office has the legal

power to ensure that such faults are not repeated and to identify any security

problems regarding the police based at all level in the UAE. Therefore an

anomaly exists in that regard.

Limitations of the authorities

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The PSD has no legal frame to deal with police corruption. In fact, there is a

conflict of duty between the PSD and GIO in that they act in the same

direction but with different names. The GIO more appropriately should deal

with police corruption; however it appears to have been frozen, and the PSS

and SSA appear have taken over the GIO functions.

Conclusion

The UAE does not have a special organisation to deal with police corruption

unlike other international organisations. At the federal and local levels no

significant strategies are in place to fight corruption. This chapter has

elaborated on the limitations of the authorities in having a full-fledged system

for fighting police corruption. The next chapter will outline the methodology

used for this research.

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Chapter 5:

Methodology

The earlier chapter explained the different mechanisms adopted in the UAE both at

the local level as well as the federal level to fight corruption. It has also compared

limitations between both the levels of policing. This chapter reviews the methodology

used and inherent limitations of the information developed by it. It has two sections:

Section 1: Stages in the conduct of the study; Section 2: The survey method used.

Section 1: stages of the study

Lack of systematic studies and empirical data on police corruption in Abu Dhabi, plus

its lack of an anti-corruption body, meant that new empirical data on police

corruption were needed to elucidate two issues:

1. Aim 1: Quantitatively how common are various forms of police corruption in

Abu Dhabi and, qualitatively, what are their main features, main perpetrators,

and main victims?

2 Aim 2: What techniques or strategies would seem to be most suited to

eliminating, or at least reducing, such police corruption as is found to exist?

This process was divided into four stages.

Stage One: preliminary qualitative-comparative analysis of Abu Dhabi-UAE and

Australia: A preliminary comparative study of the different types of police

corruption found in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and Australia was undertaken to orient

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the survey design. A period of structured qualitative research activities were

undertaken personally by the author in Abu Dhabi, with the aim of identifing and

assessing the public and the police views of police corruption in Abu Dhabi. When

statistics were collected from the records of the Directorate-General of the Abu Dhabi

Police, it became clear that they were insufficient and the decision was made to use a

survey methodology to gather new quantitative and qualitative information. Two

statistical universes were to be sampled by questionnaires: (1) the Abu Dhabi general

public stratified by professions and social backgrounds; and (2) the Abu Dhabi police

themselves, who would self-assess their own practices and corruption levels. These

data were deemed necessary to address the aforementioned Aims 1 and 2.

Preliminary examination of data sources in the UAE, specifically court house

indicated an additional source of data was required for analysis. In consultation with

my supervisors a survey instrument was designed after reviewing CMC, QPS, and

ICAC survey questions.

The questionnaire designs reflected informal preliminary examinations of available

data on Abu Dhabi police corruption. These included court records the files of the

Central Bank, of the Centre of Strategic Studies, of Al-bayan Newspaper, of the Abu

Dhabi and Dubai Police Colleges and UAE University, of the Dubai Centre for

Support in Policy Decision Making, and of the UAE Federal and Abu Dhabi Police

Forces. This research, besides revealing the inadequacies of existing studies,

provided indispensable guidance in designing what is a pioneering empirical study of

police corruption in Abu Dhabi and the UAE.

Stage Two: review of external anti-corruption models: This study used a

qualitative investigation of Australia’s external mechanism-based strategies for

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fighting police corruption to provide a basis for comparison for approaches applied in

Abu Dhabi. This helped identify potentially effective strategies that might be

transferable Abu Dhabi’s local conditions. An overview of Australia’s situation was

obtained from printed records, from attending Australian training courses and from

visiting several Australian bodies: the Independent Commission Against Corruption

of NSW, the Australian Federal Police Professional Standards Section in Canberra,

the Queensland Police Service, the Commonwealth Ombudsman in Canberra, the

Police Integrity Commission in Sydney, the New South Wales Crime Commission,

the Crime and Misconduct Commission of Queensland. In addition, the author

attended Australian police conferences on other topics that afforded opportunities to

converse with the participants on police corruption. The training workshops attended

were:

1. Course ‘Disciplinary Investigation’, Queensland Police Service (one day)

(2004).

2. Panel Member, ‘Merit-Based Selection Workshop’, Queensland Police

Service (one week) (2004).

3. Workshop ‘Truth about Lying’, University of Queensland (one day) (2004).

4. Course, ‘Breath-Testing Device Operation’, Queensland Police Service (one

day) (2004).

An interview was also conducted: with Steve Pratt, the Liberal Member for

Brindabella in the ACT Legislative Assembly and contributor to the legislative review

of corruption. The aim was to closely study the strategies, successful and

unsuccessful, tried by Australia that might be relevant to those adopted in Abu Dhabi.

Australia’s policies and experience with external mechanism-based, anti-corruption

strategies are fuller than Abu Dhabi’s, and the study must evaluate whether Abu

126

Dhabi could advantageously replicate them by setting up an independent external

organisation similar to the NSW ICAC or to Queensland’s CMC.

For the same general reason, and specifically to see what anti-corruption mechanisms

would satisfy the terms of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the

researcher participated in two UN conferences: (1) the High Level Political

Conference for the Purpose of Signing the United Nations Convention against

Corruption (Merida, Mexico, 9–11 December 2003); and (2) the 15th Session of the

Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice”, (UNODC, Vienna, 24-28

April 2006).

Stage Three: questionnaire design: All the theoretical and historical materials

noted above were reviewed in the light of the researcher’s own practical experience of

police work in Abu Dhabi. Finally they were translated into the specific items for the

two questionnaires. All of these were designed to serve one ultimate goal: given the

resources available, what new knowledge would help most in designing an anti-

corruption strategy that both suits UAE conditions and also embodies world Best

Practice.

Two questionnaires were written in Arabic, and were then tested, refined and finally

administered; (English translations are in Annexes I and II.) The results obtained

were analysed at length.

1. Public Perception of Police Ethics Survey: This survey sampled the views of

the general public on actual police practices in Abu Dhabi Emirate.

2. Police Ethics Survey: This questionnaire, also in Arabic, sampled serving

police on how they assess themselves and their practices.

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Both questionnaires employed closed and open types of questions, and also gave

respondents opportunities for making free comments and for providing any additional

information that they thought might be useful in achieving the aim of the study. An

initial pilot study was conducted to verify the clarity of the questions. Thirty copies

of the questionnaires were distributed to thirty randomly selected members of the Abu

Dhabi police service, and thirty members of the general public. Respondents were

asked to record their own remarks on the questionnaires. Subsequently the author

used their remarks to perfect the linguistic structure of the questionnaires.

Limitation and difficulties: Using questionnaires to collect data has previously been

criticized by Fink because questionnaires can only ask each question once. I.e.,

questionnaires cannot probe for further clarification, and can only ask questions that

the writer anticipates as being possibly important (Fink, 1999). However, the

researcher has dealt with this limitation by giving respondents a chance to add

comments at the end of each questionnaire (see Annex I). The utility of

questionnaires in research is impaired by the problem of response rates: the quality

and quantity of responses cannot be guaranteed. To assure an adequate response, the

total number of questionnaires to be distributed was set at 1000, of which 708, or

slightly more than 60 %, were returned. Everything considered, this response was

quite satisfactory.

Since police corruption in Abu Dhabi or the UAE has not previously attracted the

interest of other researchers, it was necessary to start from scratch to build up a body

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of data on the issue. Like all pioneering studies it both enjoyed special advantages

and had to confront special difficulties.

Clearances: ethical issues

As the project involved research with human subjects, ethical clearances were needed

from several agencies, as well miscellaneous permissions relating to particular

elements in the overall design.

1. QUT Human Research Ethics Committee: Ethical clearance for the design

of the two questionnaires.

2. Abu Dhabi and AL-Ain Police districts: Permission to access records and

ethical clearance to distribute questionnaires and collect responses from

police.

3. Queensland Police Headquarters: Permission to search records and to sit in

on the actual investigation of a police corruption case.

4. New South Wales ICAC: Permission to examine records related to its

mechanisms for fighting corruption.

5. Police Integrity Commission: Sydney: Permission to examine strategies and

mechanisms for fighting corruption.

6. New South Wales Crime Commission: Permission to examine strategies and

mechanisms for fighting corruption.

7. Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission: Permission to examine

strategies and mechanisms for fighting corruption.

8. Australian Federal Police, Canberra: Permission to examine strategies and

mechanisms for fighting corruption.

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9. Commonwealth Ombudsman: Permission to examine strategies and

mechanisms for fighting corruption.

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Section 2: Data collection

Survey method: introductory issues:

This section reviews the data collection procedures used to accomplish the first aim of

the study: to assess qualitatively and quantitatively the level of police corruption in

Abu Dhabi. The data derived from responses to the questionnaires focused on that

topic.

1. The sampling frame: Complete lists of all police force employees in Abu Dhabi

and Al Ain cities were taken as the sample frame. Representative samples were then

drawn from it for each of the two cities. For public sampling a randomized sample

was selected from the total UAE population, meaning both nationals and residents.

2. The sample size: As to accuracy, the larger the sample size, the more reliable the

result. Nevertheless, the actual sample size always involves a compromise between

the accuracy required by the researcher and the funds and time available for research.

In general, the choice of a sample size is governed by four conditions:

1. The margin of error that can be tolerated.

2. Sampling errors associated with differences between the sample and the

underlying population.

3. The type of the analysis that is to be applied to the data.

4. The population size.

Hoinvile et al. (cited in Selecting Samples, 2005) suggests that the four conditions

mentioned above imply that the final sample size is always based on a judgment

rather than on precise calculation. That said, certain standard procedures have come

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to be seen as ‘best practice’. The suitable sample size for nominal data (qualitative

data) can be calculated through the formula (Keller, 2004: 386).

)1(

2

2/ PPE

Zn −∗

= α ,

Where:

P: is the planned proportion (percent) which is assumed to be = 50%.

E: is the maximum allowable error for the estimated proportion, which is

conventionally assumed to be 0.05.

2/αZ : is the normal distribution value associated with the selected confidence level

( α−1 ) %, which is conventionally assumed to be 95%.

This formula gave a guide as to what is an appropriate sample size. In the case of the

general public, where the population being selected from was very large, applying this

formula implies a suitable sample size of 384 respondents. Accordingly 400

questionnaires were distributed to the public and the 358 questionnaires were

accepted for the analysis. Of the police questionnaires, 600 were distributed, 300 each

for Abu Dhabi City and Al Ain City. 350 questionnaires from both cities were used in

the analysis.

Thus the researcher, used a combination of personal judgment and the standard

formula suggested by Hoinvile et al. (cited in Selecting Samples, 2005e), to

determine sample sizes for both police force and public surveys.

3. Data collection: - general: Both primary and secondary data were collected for

this project. Secondary data, having been collected and assembled for other studies

with other objectives, always have limited relevance to the question at hand.

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Moreover, the relevant secondary data were too limited and too badly organised and

recorded to be fully reliable as sources. Therefore primary data had to be gathered and

assembled specifically for the research at hand (Doherty, March 1994).

The appropriate form of primary data for this project was the survey, more precisely,

a self-administered questionnaire. Some researchers prefer personal interviewing as

the best way to secure data from people. There the interviewer (researcher) solicits

information from respondents one-by-one by asking prepared questions. Its advantage

is that it results in higher response rates than other data collection methods, but is so

costly in time, labour and money that it is only feasible when the number of persons

that must be surveyed can be kept small. The self-administered questionnaire,

usually mailed to a sample of selected persons (Moser and Kalton, 1971), is a

relatively inexpensive method of conducting a survey. This makes it attractive when

the number of people to be surveyed is large. The down-side of the self-administered

questionnaires, however, is that they usually have low response rates and may have a

relatively high numbers of invalid responses due to respondents’ misunderstanding

some questions.

Self-administered questionnaires were to collect data from persons in two samples,

professional police and the general public. In each case respondents were requested

to respond to the same set of questions in the same predetermined order. To ensure

the data obtained were useful and reliable, the questionnaire was carefully designed.

So as to maximise response rates, validity and reliability, the following points were

given great attention:

1. Questions were carefully formulated: to avoid confusing, prompting or

misleading the respondents.

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2. The layout, wording and sequence of questions were kept as clear as possible.

3. The underlying purpose was explained to the respondents.

4. The design was pre-tested before being administered to the sample, (Moser

and Kalton, 1971).

The questionnaire was designed to elicit information from respondents that would

give the researcher insight into four underlying variables within the populations

sampled:

• Their attitudes towards corruption.

• Their beliefs about corruption and related values.

• Relevant , both their own and others’, that they knew of.

• Their own relevant ‘demographic’ attributes (age, sex, rank, etc.).

This follows Dillman (1978) (cited in Selecting Samples, 2005e), who regarded these

categories as important for determining the way questions are worded.

3. Data collection: - Administering questionnaires: There are, broadly

speaking, four ways to administer questionnaires: (i) face-to–face, (ii) by telephone,

(iii) by mail (posted) or (iv) sent through the internet. Each method has its advantages

and disadvantages. For the police sample, a mix of methods (i) and (ii) was

employed. Sealed packets of questionnaires were sent to various police stations and

the latter were required to return the completed questionnaires and in closed

envelopes the next day by internal mail. Within each station, the questionnaires were

personally handed to each person in the survey samples. The respondents remained

anonymous, as they were not required to write any personal data.

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The public respondents were similarly handed envelopes and requested to complete

the questionnaires and return to the receptionists of their respective office by the end

of the day and in some cases was collected personally the next day. Similarly the

respondents were not required to depict their name or any sort of identification on the

closed envelopes.

Salant and Dillman argue that higher response rates will be obtained if at the start of a

questionnaire the researcher clearly explains to respondents its objectives and why the

respondent is being asked to complete it (Salant and Dillman,

http://www.sysurvey.com/tips/introduction_to_survey.htm, 1994, [accessed 9 October

2005]). In addition to attaching a cover letter, the questionnaire should carry a clear,

unbiased and engaging title that conveys the topic of the survey. An optional

supplement is a sub-title that elucidates the basic research topic (Selecting Samples,

2005).

Also the researcher included an empty envelope, with the return name and address. To

fulfil the above recommendation the key term ‘unacceptable’11 was defined as follows

to make the issues clearer for the respondents:

11 The unacceptable behaviour, in this context, concerns not only embezzlement, which is requesting or taking undeserved money (bribery), but it also includes deliberately damaging the state interest for their personal or others’ profiteering, breaching confidentiality, using violence against others, deliberate avoidance of enforcing decisions or orders issued by a court of law, applying favouritism or nepotism, and unequally treating others on grounds of race, nationality, colour, religion, or gender.

135

Survey method: the procedure

1. The research instruments:

The two questionnaires were used as research instruments were designed to measure

the level of police corruption in Abu Dhabi, as perceived by the public and by the

police forces of two districts of Abu Dhabi Emirate, the cities of Abu Dhabi City and

Al Ain.

Useful measurement has two characteristics: reliability and validity. Reliability means

that the measurement is consistent, in the sense that repeating a measuring process

over and over should consistently provide the same results. Validity, on the other

hand, means that the items in a questionnaire actually measure what they are supposed

to measure or describe.

2. The pilot study

The reliability and validity of a survey instrument should be confirmed at the stages,

when the questions are designed and the instrument is piloted. Therefore, after the two

questionnaires had been designed with the help of the thesis supervisors, Dr Mark

Craig of Queensland University of Technology (QUT) and Dr Sharon Hayes (QUT),

and after they had been approved by QUT’s Human Research Ethics Committee, they

needed to be tested by actual field work to ensure that the instruments were reliable

and consistent.

The questionnaires’ items were tested in small groups of thirty respondents from both

public and police force samples in order to guarantee that the items were properly

136

stated and easily understood by the respondents. The aim of this piloting was to

improve the quality of the questionnaires by improving their clarity and by removing

any unclear items.

In order to test the reliability and validity of the items at the stage of pilot study, the

internal consistency and reliability of the two questionnaires were computed using the

Cronabch Alpha technique using SPSS software. This technique calculates the

average of all split – half reliability coefficients which divides the items into two

groups and measures the consistency of the internal relationships between the two

parts.

For the public questionnaire, a value of 0.806 was obtained which consisted of 30

randomly selected responses. Reliability coefficient of 0.806 indicates that this

questionnaire is reasonably reliable. For the police force questionnaire, the reliability

coefficient for 30 respondents equalled to 0.772, which results again indicate that the

questionnaire is reasonably reliable.

To test the validity of the questionnaires, experts and professionals in this field from

the Ethical Standards Command of Queensland Police Service were asked to

recommend changes and adjustments. All their recommendations were implemented

on the two questionnaires before the final versions were distributed to the selected

sample.

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3 Sample characteristics:

Copies of the two questionnaires were distributed to the personnel sections of two

districts of the Abu Dhabi Police, Abu Dhabi City and Al-Ain. The personnel section

then randomly distributed the questionnaires in the following numbers:

a) 300 copies went to Al-Ain Police members, of which 220 were returned; 196 of

them had 60% or more of the questions answered, whereas the remaining 24 copies

were either empty or had less than 60% answered. The latter were not considered by

the study.

b) 300 copies went to Abu Dhabi City Police, of which 154 copies were returned

with over 60% of the questions answered. This group was considered by the study.

Thus the total sample size for the police force is 350 respondents from Abu Dhabi city

and Al Ain.

c) The second questionnaire was distributed to members of Abu Dhabi’s public.

400 copies were distributed to departments and businesses that deal with different

sections of the public. These included car rental companies, printing companies, city

councils, ADNOC (an oil company), Abu Dhabi Distribution Company, Al

Khawarizm College, Communications Company, Food Control Centre and hospitals.

Of these, 358 copies were returned with over 60% of the questions answered.

138

4. Police and public sample characteristics:

To select a sample that is both representative and appropriate, the sample must

conform with appropriate demographic characteristics. The following details are

presented for both the police and public samples:

(a) Characteristics of the Police Sample:

(a-1) Geographical distribution: Table 5.1. shows the percentages of the

sample that came from the Abu Dhabi and the Al Ain police forces.

Table 5.1: Police Sample distribution by city Chart 5. 1: Police sample distribution by city

City Frequency Percent

Abu Dhabi 154 44.0%

Al Ain 196 56.0%

Total 350 100.0%

(a-2) Nationality status Distribution:

The police sample consists of 85.1 percent from citizens and 14.9 percent from

residents.

Table 5:2: Police Sample Distribution by nationality status

Abu Dhabi Al Ain Total Status

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent frequency Percent

Citizen 125 81.2% 172 88.2% 297 85.1%

Resident 29 18.8% 23 11.8% 52 14.9%

Total 154 44.1% 195 55.9% 349 100.0%

Police Force Sample Distibution by City

Abu Dhabi;

44.0%

Al Ain; 56.0%

139

(a-3) Age distribution: The age distribution presented in the Table 5. 3 shows

the range of ages covered by the sample.

Table 5. 3: Police Sample distribution by age group

Abu Dhabi Al Ain Total Age group

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

18-24 30 19.7% 46 23.5% 76 21.8%

25-34 80 52.6% 121 61.7% 201 57.8%

35-44 31 20.4% 22 11.2% 53 15.2%

45-54 10 6.6% 7 3.6% 17 4.9%

55 and over 1 0.7% 0 0.0% 1 0.3%

Total 152 43.7% 196 56.3% 348 100.0%

(a-4) Gender distribution

Table 5. 4: Police sample distribution by gender

Abu Dhabi Al Ain Total

Gender

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Male 127 82.5% 164 83.7% 291 83.1%

Female 27 17.5% 32 16.3% 59 16.9%

Total 154 44.0% 196 56.0% 350 100.0%

Chart 5. 2: Police sample distribution by gender

Gender Distribution

Male; 83.1%

Female;

16.9%

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(a-5) Years of Experience Distribution

Table 5. 5: Police sample distribution

Abu Dhabi Al Ain Total Years of experience Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

1-3 45 29.6% 50 25.5% 95 27.3%

4-6 19 12.5% 43 21.9% 62 17.8%

7-9 24 15.8% 41 20.9% 65 18.7%

10-15 32 21.1% 39 19.9% 71 20.4%

16 and above 32 21.1% 23 11.7% 55 15.8%

Total 152 43.7% 196 56.3% 348 100.0%

(a-6) Educational Background Distribution

Table 5. 6: Police sample distribution by educational level

Abu Dhabi Al Ain Total Educational level

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Less than high school 24 15.7% 33 16.8% 57 16.3%

High school 58 37.9% 111 56.6% 169 48.4%

Diploma 20 13.1% 13 6.6% 33 9.5%

Bachelor's Degree 39 25.5% 38 19.4% 77 22.1%

Master's Degree 6 3.9% 0 0.0% 6 1.7%

Other 6 3.9% 1 0.5% 7 2.0%

Total 153 43.8% 196 56.2% 349 100.0%

Chart 5. 3: Police sample distribution by education level

Educational Background

16.3%

48.4%

9.5%

22.1%

1.7% 2.0%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Less than

high

school

High

school

Diploma Bachelor's

Degree

Master's

Degree

Other

141

(a-7) Rank Distribution

Table 5. 7: Police sample distribution by respondents’ rank

Abu Dhabi Al Ain Total Rank

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Civilian 18 11.9% 40 20.4% 58 16.6%

Constable- Corporal 33 21.9% 34 17.3% 67 19.1%

Sergeant - Sergeant Major 62 41.1% 94 48.0% 156 44.6%

Lieutenant - First Lieutenant 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 1 0.3%

Captain- Major 20 13.2% 17 8.7% 37 10.6%

Lieutenant Colonel- Colonel 17 11.3% 10 5.1% 27 7.7%

Brigadier General- Major General - Lieutenant General

1 0.7% 0 0.0% 1 0.3%

Total 151 43.1% 196 56.0% 347 99.1%

Chart 5. 4: Police sample distribution by respondents’ rank

Rank

16.7%19.3%

45.0%

0.3%

10.7%7.8%

0.3%

0.0%5.0%10.0%15.0%20.0%25.0%30.0%35.0%40.0%45.0%50.0%

Civilian

Constable- Corporal

Sergeant - Sergeant Major

Lieutenant - First Lieutenant

Captain- Major

Lieutenant Colonel- Colonel

General

b. Characteristics of Public Sample:

(b-1) Nationality status distribution

In the sample the respondents were clearly distributed roughly equally in the sample between citizens and residents.

Table 5.8: Respondents distribution classified by nationality status

Status Frequency Percent

Citizen 182 50.8%

Resident 176 49.2%

Total 358 100.0%

Chart 5.5: Respondents distribution classified by nationality status

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Nationality status distribution

Citizen, 51%

Resident,

49%

(b-2) Age distribution The sample includes respondents from different age group in order to ensure that it accurately represents all public categories correctly.

Table 5. 9: Respondents distribution classified by age

Age Frequency Percent

18-24 120 33.5%

25-34 168 46.9%

35-44 36 10.1%

45-54 30 8.4%

55 and over 4 1.1%

Total 358 100%

Chart 5. 6: Respondents distribution classified by age

Age group distribution

33.5%

46.9%

10.1%8.4%

1.1%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

50.0%

18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55 and over

(b-3) Gender distribution

The sample consists of roughly equal shares of male and female respondents.

Table 5. 10: Respondents distribution classified by gender

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Gender Frequency Percent

Male 178 49.7%

Female 180 50.3%

Total 358 100.0%

Chart 5 .7: Respondents distribution classified by gender

Gender distribution

Male, 49.7%

Female,

50.3%

(b-4) Educational background

The next table presents respondents’ educational background. The majority of the respondents have diploma; 33.0 percent; and bachelor; 37.4 percent educational level.

Table 5. 11: Respondents distribution classified by educational level

Educational level Frequency Percent

Less than high school 10 2.8%

High school 88 24.6%

Diploma 118 33.0%

Bachelor's Degree 134 37.4%

Master's Degree 4 1.1%

Doctor's Degree 2 0.6%

Other 2 0.6%

Total 358 100.0%

Chart 5. 8: Respondents distribution classified by educational level

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Educational levels

2.8%

24.6%

33.0%

37.4%

1.1% 0.6% 0.6%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

Less than high school

High school

Diploma

Bachelor's Degree

Master's Degree

Doctor's Degree

Other

(b-5) Occupation by Sector

The selected respondents cover different sectors in the UAE. As presented in table (5.12) 40.8 percent of the respondents are from public sector.

Table 5.12: Respondents’ distribution classified by occupational sector

Sector Frequency Percent

Public sector 146 40.8%

Private sector 68 19.0%

Joint public-private sector 66 18.4%

Student 72 20.1%

Other 6 1.7%

Total 358 100.0%

Chart 5.9: Respondents’ distribution classified by occupational sector

Sector distribution

40.8%

19.0% 18.4% 20.1%

1.7%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

Public

sector

Private

sector

Joint public-

private

sector

Student Other

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Data analyses: methods used:

The study used the statistical software SPSS 12.0.1 for Windows, to group and

analyse data collected through the questionnaires.

1. Cross-tabulations: Cross-tabulations were used to analyse data of the

surveyed groups, frequency and percents of answers within the groups against each

kind of police corruption, and its distribution within section of the police force’s

organisational structure. They were also used to reveal the extent of public

acceptance of police corruption. The responses of the public were analysed with

regard to age group, gender, education, employment, and immigration status. Police

personnel responses were analysed in relation to rank, gender, education, age, and

immigration status.

2. Chi square tests: This statistic was used to test the significance of the

relationships between different demographic factors and questionnaires variables. The

statistical analysis would help to create a more realistic assessment of the prevalence

of police corruption and its distribution within the ranks of its police hierarchy. Data

were presented in both graphic and table form. In addition Chi square tests were

implemented to explore the differences between the public and police samples; in

terms of the main items in the questionnaires that measures the level of police

corruption in Abu Dhabi.

The chi square test of a contingency table is designed to satisfy two different problem

objectives (Keller, 2004, p 557).

146

1. To determine whether there is enough evidence to infer that two nominal

variables are related.

2. To validly infer that differences exist among two or more population of nominal

variables.

The null hypothesis specifies that there is no relationship between the two variables,

which means that they are independent, thus implying no difference in respondents'

counts for particular two variables. Accordingly the alternative hypothesis specifies

that one variable affects the other.

SPSS program calculate the chi squared statistic and the associated P- value∗. The

decision based on the P- value is; reject the null hypothesis if P- value is more than

the selected significance level. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that there is a

significant relationship between the two variables and that there are no significant

differences existing in counts or ratings within two nominal variables. In all Chi

squared tests 5% is used as a significance level.

Data Analysis: To analyse the data on respondents’ perceptions about unacceptable

police activity in the UAE, several steps were required:

1. Preparing the data for analysis by computer,

2. Choosing the most appropriate tables and charts to explore and present

the data,

3. Choosing the most appropriate statistics to describe the data,

4. Choosing the most appropriate statistics to examine relationships and

trends in the data.

∗ A p-value is a measure of how much evidence we have against the null hypotheses. The smaller the p-value, the more evidence we have against H0. It is also a measure of how likely we are to get a certain sample result or a result “more extreme,” assuming H0 is true.

147

In preparing the data for computer analysis, the data were put in a format which

allowed them to be analysed by the SPSS software. The data were numerically coded

using a code system that would make subsequent analysis simpler. (The SPSS

software contains facilities for coding.)

The simplest way to summarize data for individual variables so that specific values

can be read is to use a table (frequency distribution) for descriptive data. The table

summarizes the number of cases (normal frequency and relative frequency)

percentage in each category. To illustrate the distribution of values, bar charts, pi

chart and Pareto chart were used to plot frequency or relative frequency of each

variable on the vertical axis, with the variables themselves arrayed on the horizontal

axis.

Summary and conclusion

This chapter described systematically the stages in which this study was conducted.

The method adopted was a survey involving the distribution of two Arabic

questionnaires, one to collect data from police personnel of self-assessments on their

practices, and another to collect data from the Abu Dhabi general public on their

perceptions of police force probity.

The study was conducted in four stages. Stage 1 involved ground work to identify

ways to compare different types of police corruption in Abu Dhabi Emirate and in

Australia. Stage 2 involved a study of the external mechanisms used in Australia to

fight police which might be adapted to Abu Dhabi’s local conditions. The researcher

148

also attended various training workshops in Australia to understand the external

mechanism in detail. Stage 3 included a pilot study as well as the survey method

adopted for this research. The questionnaires were distributed among both the study

groups and those with more than 60% answered questions being accepted for this

study. Stage 4 consisted of formal data analysis where the surveyed answers were

statistically analysed using SPSS 12.01.1 for Windows. The data were then presented

in both graphs and tables. Public responses were analysed in relation to age groups,

gender, education, employment and immigration status, while police personnel

responses were analysed in relation to rank, gender, education, age and immigration

status. The next chapter examines and analyses the collected data questionnaire to

achieve the aims of the study.

149

Chapter 6

Findings

This chapter attempts to achieve the first of the two aims of the study: to investigate

and explore empirically the existence, magnitude and seriousness of police corruption

in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi Police

This statistical data derive from responses to the two questionnaires described in the

previous chapter: one administered to a sample of the public from different sectors,

age groups, nationality and genders; and a second administered to a sample of police

personnel in two Emirates of Abu Dhabi: Abu Dhabi and Al Ain. The perceptions of

the two samples were analysed in three sections.

• Part One: Public perceptions of police conduct.

• Part Two: Analysis of Abu Dhabi police responses.

• Part Three: Comparisons between public and police surveys.

Part one: public perceptions of police conduct

Part One of this section reviews and analyses the public’s responses to individual

questionnaire items, while Part Two examines and interprets variations in how various

demographic groups evaluate their experiences with the Abu Dhabi police.

150

Section 1: questionnaire items analysis: The questionnaire items were

designed to accomplish our first research aim: to secure quantitative and qualitative

data on the level of police corruption. In addition we seek to explore and investigate

the different forms police corruption takes in Abu Dhabi. Demographic variations

among the 358 public respondents were analysed versus their questionnaire responses

to explore possible effects of demographic factors on how respondents perceive police

corruption.

1. Recent contact/no recent contact: Item # 7

‘Have you had contact with police during the last 12 months?’

This item was a key item in the analysis. It is expected that the perceptions of police

by those with recent contact with the police would be most likely to be valid than

those who lacked such contact. The perceptions of those without recent contact with

police might have either been outdated or based on hearsay reflecting other people’s

experiences. Therefore the analysis focuses on the 206 respondents who had contact

with police in the previous 12 months, whose perceptions of police we assume to be

clearer, more reliable and more likely to based on direct personal experience.

151

Table 6.15: Respondents who had contact with the police during the last 12 months

Contact status Frequency Valid Percent

Yes 206 57.9%

No 150 42.1%

Total 356 100.0%

Missing 2 -

Grand total 358

Table 6.1 shows that, among the 206 public respondents, about 58 percent had some

contact with the police in the twelve months before the survey. Police-civilian

interactions is not part of the background of life, but regular occurrences.

2. Recent contact/no recent contact: Item # 7

‘Would you perceive possible unacceptable behaviour in the Abu Dhabi police as:

(i) “major problems”; (ii) “minor problem”; (iii) “not a problem” and (iv) “I don’t

now/not sure”.’

Table 6.2 shows that 79.3 percent12 of the respondents who had a contact with the

police believe that unacceptable police behaviour is ‘a problem’ in Abu Dhabi, apart

from its magnitude. On the other hand, 67.5 of the respondents who didn’t have police

contacts hold basically the same belief.

12 Cumulative percent for the levels major and minor problem.

152

Table 6.2: Respondents’ rating for the magnitude of police corruption in Abu Dhabi

Magnitude of the problem Contact with

police in previous 12 months

No recent contact

Total

Major problem 110 54.5% 56 37.8% 166 47.4%

Minor problem 50 24.8% 44 29.7% 94 26.9%

Not a problem 22 10.9% 20 13.5% 42 12.0%

Do not know/ not sure 20 9.9% 28 18.9% 48 13.7%

Total 20213 100.0% 148 100.0% 350 100.0%

Table 6.2 shows that 54.5 percent of the respondents with contact with police during

the last 12 months rated unacceptable police behaviour as a major problem, while the

rating for the no-contact group is 37.8 percent. Chi square test14 indicates that the

difference in ratings by the two groups of respondents is statistically significant.

Moreover, 24.8 percent of the with-contact respondents saw this problem as ‘minor’,

compared to 29.7 percent of the no-contact group with that perception. About 10

percent of with-contact respondents were ‘not sure’, while nearly twice as many, 19

percent, of the no-contact group were ‘not sure’. This supports our decision to focus

on with-contact respondents.

Chart 6.1: Respondents’ rating for the magnitude of police corruption in Abu Dhabi

54.5%

24.8%

10.9% 9.9%

37.8%

29.7%

13.5%

18.9%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Major problem Minor problem Not a problem Do not know / not

sure

Grouop 1 Group 2

3. Existence/non-existence of unacceptable police : Item # 8

13 Total number of respondents who had a contact with the police during the last 12 months is 206. There are 4 missing values. 14 Chi square value is 11.316 and the associated P-value with 3 degrees of freedom is 0.010.

153

‘Do you think there is unacceptable police behaviour in the Abu Dhabi Emirate?’

Of 358 public respondents, a majority (61.5 percent) agree that Abu Dhabi does have

a problem of unacceptable police behaviour. The responses of the with-contact and

no-contact groups are compared in Table (6.3).

Table 6. 3: Respondents’ perceptions of existence of unacceptable police in Abu Dhabi

Contact with police in previous 12

months No recent contact Total

Responses

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Yes 146 73.0% 64 45.7% 210 61.8%

No 54 27.0% 76 54.3% 130 38.2%

Total 200 100.0% 140 100.0% 340 100.0%

Thus 73 percent and 45.7 percent, respectively, of respondents in the two groups

affirmed that unacceptable police behaviour exists in Abu Dhabi. Direct contact has a

clearly negative impact on respondents’ attitude toward police, as is reflected by the

remarkable difference15 in the two ratings.

The following analyses focuses mainly on the 206 respondents with contacts with

police during the previous 12 months.

4. Loci of unacceptable police : Item # 9

15 Chi square statistic is 25.962 and the associated P- value with one degrees of freedom is 0.000

154

‘If there is unacceptable behaviour in the police force, in which department do you

believe unacceptable most likely to occur?

Our aim of obtaining a rounded quantitative and qualitative picture of police

corruption, means specifying which departments are more and less likely to exhibit it.

These data are presented in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4: Respondents’ perceptions: police departments where unacceptable occurs

Police Department Frequency Percent

Department of Criminal Laboratories 24 11.7%

Illicit Drug Department 2 1.0%

Investigations 66 32.0%

Traffic Police 108 52.4%

Fire Service 4 1.9%

Immigration 54 26.2%

Border Guards 12 5.8%

Do not Know/ Not sure 14 6.8%

Other 8 3.9%

Thus 52.4 percent of the respondents regard Traffic Department police as those most

likely to show unacceptable behaviour, followed by Investigation (32 percent) and

Immigration (26.2 percent). An ascending order Pareto chart 16 (Chart 6.2)

graphically depicts the prominent roles of these top three departments.

16 Pareto charts graphically display the relative importance of the differences between groups of data.

155

Chart 6.1: Pareto Chart: respondents’ rating for police department

52.4%

32.0%

26.2%

11.7%

5.8%1.9% 1.0%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Traffic Police

Investigations

Immigration

Department

of Criminal

Laboratories

Border

Guards

Fire Service

Illicit Drug

Department

5. Forms of unacceptable police : Item # 10

‘Do you think any of the following types of unacceptable behaviour exist in the

UAE police?’

The public’s responses to a list of possible unacceptable behaviour that create an

undesirable impression on the public and lead to a negative impact on them are listed

in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5: Respondents’ rating: common unacceptable police s

Form of Unacceptable Frequency Percent

Embezzlement 18 8.7%

Requisition or taking undeserved money (bribery) 18 8.7%

Police officer deliberately damaging the state interest for personal or others' profit

40 19.4%

Police profiting personally from works related to state interest 74 35.9%

Police breaching of confidentiality 46 22.3%

Police use of excessive violence against others 44 21.4%

Police deliberately failing to enforce decisions or orders by a law court 34 16.5%

Favouritism or nepotism 132 64.1%

Unequal treatment of others on grounds of race, nationality, colour, religion or gender.

108 52.4%

None 46 22.3%

156

Other 16 7.8%

Clearly ‘favouritism or nepotism’ is rated the commonest form of unacceptable police

behaviour, with 64.1 percent of the respondents stating that it exists in the Abu Dhabi

police. The table also shows that 30.1 percent of the respondents stated that ‘None’ or

‘Other’ of the listed responses are exhibited by police. Unfortunately they did not list

the other unacceptable behaviours they had observed. The Pareto Chart depicts

respondents’ ratings for different unacceptable behaviours presented by police

officers.

Chart 6.2: Pareto chart: respondents’ ratings of unacceptable police s

64.1%

52.4%

35.9%

22.3%19.4%

16.5%

8.7% 8.7%

21.4%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Favoritism

Unequal treatment

Benifiting from work

Breachin condidentiality

using violence

Damages the state of interest

avoid enforicng decisions

Embezzlement

Bribery

A cross tabulation between police departments and different unacceptable behaviours

were performed as an attempt to figure out exactly which unacceptable behaviours are

prevalent among police officers and in which departments. Some results are presented

in Table 6.6 17.

17 The answers ‘Do not know’ and ‘None’ were excluded from the table.

157

Table 6.6: Cross–tabulation: police departments & unacceptable s

Department Frequency Percent

Traffic Favouritism 84 38.5%

Investigations Favouritism 52 23.9%

Immigration Favouritism 48 22.0%

Criminal Laboratories Favouritism 18 8.8%

Border guards Benefiting from work 6 4.0%

Other Favouritism 6 2.8%

Fire service Favouritism 4 1.8%

Chart 6.3: Pareto chart: cross tabulation of police department & unacceptable s

38.5%

23.9% 22.0%

8.8%

4.0% 2.8% 1.8%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

Favoritism Favoritism Favoritism Favoritism Benif iting

from w ork

Favoritism Favoritism

Traff ic Investigations immigration Criminal

Laboratories

Border

guards

Others Fire service

‘Favouritism’ is clearly the dominant characteristic as seen by respondents in all

departments except Border Guards, where ‘Benefiting from Work’ is most usual.

6. Impact of unacceptable police s on the Public: Item # 11

‘Do you feel that unacceptable behaviour in the police affects you, or your family,

in any way?’

We would expect that unacceptable police behaviour will have different negative

impacts on the public, on society and on the police force itself. This step in the

analysis tries to examine how it actually does affect the public. Table 6.7 indicates

158

that 56.4 percent of the respondents agreed that unacceptable behaviour did adversely

affect them, while around 24 percent stated that they had experienced no such effects.

The remaining 19.8 percent of the respondents answered ‘Not sure’.

Table 6.7: Respondents’ ratings: effects of unacceptable ’s on them

Responses Frequency Percent

Yes 114 56.4%

No 48 23.8%

Do not know/ not sure 40 19.8%

Total 202 100.0%

7. Nature of effects on public of unacceptable police s: Item # 12

‘In what way could unacceptable behaviour affect you?’

Table 4.8 records public responses to some possible ill effects they experienced from

various unacceptable behaviours. Note that this list includes not only direct effects

experienced by the public; but directly impinging on the police force, with indirect

effects on the public later on.

Table 6.8: Respondents rating: possible ill effects of unacceptable police

In what way could unacceptable police behaviour affect you? Frequency Percent

Detrimental financial impact 22 11%

Lowers quality of police decision-making 74 36%

Lowers level of public confidence in government/ public sector 78 38%

Lowers quality of the police service 86 42%

Makes you or family members feel unsafe 64 31%

Generates increase in crime. 42 20%

Sets bad example to the public. 110 53%

Cause greater employment inequality 62 30%

Do not know/not sure 12 6%

Other 4 2%

159

The Pareto diagram (Chart 6.5) shows that the main effect of unacceptable police

behaviour is seen to be ‘Sets a bad example to the public’. The second-ranked effect

is ‘Police unacceptable behaviour lowers the quality of the police service’. Moreover,

the Pareto chart reveals that the four top-ranked effects of unacceptable behaviours all

relate to adverse effects on qualities that the public thinks a ‘proper’ police force

should possess. Interestingly – and somewhat surprisingly – all the effects that

involve direct, personal effects on the public were ranked below ‘indirect’ effects that

damage the public by damaging police integrity! That said, 31 percent of respondents

still say that unacceptable police behaviour makes them or their families feel unsafe.

Chart 6.4: Pareto chart: respondents’ ratings of possible ill effects of unacceptable

53%

42%38% 36%

31% 30%

20%

11%6%

2%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Sets a bad example to the public

Lowers the quality of police se...

Lowers the level of confidence

Lowers quality of police decis...

Feel unsafe

Employment inequality

Increase in crime

Financial impact

Do not know/not sure

Other

8. Effects on public of unacceptable police s: Items # 13-17

Items # 13 – 17 are Likert Scale questions asking respondents to state on a five point

scale whether they ‘agree/disagree’ with five propositions. These propositions,

together with the responses levels, are presented in Table 6.9. The responses are

analysed separately in the paragraphs below.

Table 6.9: Respondents’ rating: items # 13-18

# Item Strongly Agree

Agree Neither Agree Nor

Disagree Strongly Disagree

Don't Know/Not Sure

160

Disagree

13

‘Unacceptable behaviour in the Abu Dhabi police is seen as good business in the private sector.’

3.1% 8.2% 19.6% 24.7% 32.0% 12.4%

14

‘There is nothing I person-ally can do about unacceptable behaviour in the Abu Dhabi police.’

34.4% 28.0% 7.5% 18.3% 5.4% 6.5%

15 ‘It is not my responsibility to report unacceptable behaviour.’

15.3% 14.3% 15.3% 26.5% 23.5% 5.1%

16 ‘Unacceptable police behaviour is tolerated within the UAE society.’

16.3% 41.8% 25.5% 6.1% 8.2% 2.0%

17 ‘Unacceptable police behaviour can be tolerated if it reduces crime in UAE.’

5.2% 12.5% 11.5% 21.9% 44.8% 4.2%

Only a small minority (11.3 percent) of respondents ‘agree/strongly agree’ that

unacceptable police behaviour was ‘good business in private sector’. Indeed fully

56.7 percent ‘disagree/strongly disagree’ with this statement, with 32 percent lacking

a clear opinion.

Chart 6.5: Respondents’ ratings: Unacceptable police behaviour is good for business in the

private sector.

3.1%

8.2%

19.6%

24.7%

32.0%

12.4%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

Strongly

Agree

Agree Neither

Agree Nor

Disagree

Disagree Strongly

Disagree

Don't

Know/Not

Sure

To specify precisely the effect of sector on responses to this item, cross tabulations

were used. The results are presented in Table 6.10.

Table 6.10: Respondents’ ratings: item # 13 classified by sector

Levels Public Sector

Private Sector

Joint public-private Sector

Agree and strongly agree 13.0% 12.5% 8.7%

Disagree and strongly disagree 43.5% 68.8% 73.9%

161

No clear perception 43.5% 18.8% 17.4%

Chart 6.6 shows that a majority of the respondents in all sectors do not think that

unacceptable police behaviour is ‘good for business in the private sector’. Clearly

public sector respondents were less definite on this question, their ratings being

equally divided equally between disagreement and uncertainty. The chi square test18

showed the differences between the three sectors’ responses to be statistically

significant.

Chart 6.6: Respondents’ ratings classified by sector.

Respondents' ratings classifed by sector

13.0%

43.5% 43.5%

12.5%

68.8%

18.8%

8.7%

73.9%

17.4%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Agree and strongly agree Dissagree and strongly

disagree

No clear perception

Public Private Joint public-private

Two items in Table 6.9, numbers 14 and 15, probe the public’s reaction to

unacceptable police behaviour that they may have encountered. In addition they

explore how the public perceives its own responsibility to report misconduct. Its

responses toward the first question, shown in Chart 6.8, reveal that 62.419 percent of

them ‘agree/strongly agree’ that they personally can do nothing about unacceptable

police behaviour; with only a minority, just 23.7 20 percent, thinking they can

effectively oppose it.

18 Chi square statistic is 47.616 and the associated P-value with 20 degrees of freedom is 0.0005 19 Cumulative percent for the two levels “agree” and “strongly agree”. 20 Cumulative percent for the two levels “disagree” and strongly disagree”.

162

Chart 6.8: Respondents’ ratings: ‘There is nothing I personally can do about unacceptable

police.’

34.4%

28.0%

7.5%

18.3%

5.4% 6.5%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

Strongly

Agree

Agree Neither

Agree Nor

Disagree

Disagree Strongly

Disagree

Don't

Know/Not

Sure

Item # 15 asked respondents to react to the statement, ‘It is not my responsibility to

report unacceptable police behaviour’. Chart (6.9) shows that cumulatively, 50.5%

percent ’disagree/strongly disagree’ with it, meaning they do feel responsible to

report unacceptable police behaviour.

163

Chart 6.7: Respondents’ rating: ‘It is not my responsibility to report unacceptable.’

15.3%14.3%

15.3%

26.5%

23.5%

5.1%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

Strongly

Agree

Agree Neither

Agree Nor

Disagree

Disagree Strongly

Disagree

Don't

Know/Not

Sure

The next item asks whether unacceptable police behaviour is tolerated. We would

expect people to ‘agree’ if unacceptable police behaviour were not widespread in a

society and/or if it had few negative impacts. Chart 6.10 shows that a big majority

(66.7 percent) of respondents react ‘disagree/strongly disagree’.

Chart 6.8: Respondents’ ratings ‘Unacceptable police is tolerated in UAE society.’

5.2%

12.5% 11.5%

21.9%

44.8%

4.2%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

50.0%

Strongly

Agree

Agree Neither

Agree Nor

Disagree

Disagree Strongly

Disagree

Don't

Know/Not

Sure

‘Can unacceptable police behaviour be tolerated if it reduces crime in UAE?’ The

public is clearly unsure. Chart 6.11 shows their responses to be divided almost

equally among all the possible agreement levels.

Chart 6.9: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Unacceptable tolerated if it reduces UAE crime.’

164

14.4%

20.6%

16.5%

28.9%

15.5%

4.1%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

Strongly

Agree

Agree Neither

Agree Nor

Disagree

Disagree Strongly

Disagree

Don't

Know/Not

Sure

9. Public perceptions of its responsibility to report unacceptable police

behaviour: Item # 18

‘If you saw police acting improperly, would you make a complaint to the

authorities?’

Table 6.11 shows that 56.9 percent of the respondents say they would complain if

they observed any unacceptable police behaviour.

Table 6.11: Respondents' ratings: ‘If you saw police acting improperly, would you make

complaint to the authorities?’

Response Frequency Valid Percent

Yes 116 56.9%

No 88 43.1%

Total 204 100.0%

10. Public perceptions of to whom it would report misconduct: Item # 19

‘To whom would you make the complaint?’

Many possible communication channels for complaints exist. Table 6.12 lists these

channels along with respondents’ ratings of the ones most commonly used. A

majority (51.7 percent) of respondents, who would complain, would do so through the

165

office of HH Major General Seif Al- Nehayan. The second rated channel is the local

police.

Table 6.12: Respondents ratings: ‘possible offices complaints could be sent to.’

Department Frequency Percent

Local police 50 43.1%

State Security Department 18 15.5%

Preventive Security Department 6 5.2%

Office of HH Major General Seif Al-Nehyan21 60 51.7%

State Audit Institution 2 1.7%

Other 18 15.5%

A Pareto diagram (Chart 6.12) shows these respondents answers in graphic form.

Chart 6.12 : Pareto chart of respondents’ rating of possible offices to which complaints could be

addressed.

off ices w here the complaints reported

51.7%

43.1%

15.5% 15.5%

5.2%1.7%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

The off ice of

HH Major

General Seif

Al-Nehyan

The local

police

The State

Security

Department

Other The

Preventive

Security

Department

The State

Audit

Institution

11. Public experiences with reporting mis: Item # 20

‘Have you ever reported unacceptable police behaviour to the authorities?’

The findings presented in Table 6.13 reveal how few respondents (9.8 percent) ever

actually reported misconduct to the authorities.

21 His Highness Gen.Sheikh Saif Bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the Minister of Interior and Commander in

Chief of the Abu Dhabi Police.

166

Table 6.13: Respondents’ answers: ‘Have you ever reported unacceptable police behaviour?’

Response Frequency Percent

Yes 20 9.8%

No 184 90.2%

Total 204 100.0%

12. Public perceptions of to whom it would report misconduct: Item # 21

‘To whom did you make a complaint?’

Table 6.14 shows that a majority of respondents (80 percent) sent their complaints to

the local police. Unfortunately this 80 percent came from just 16 respondents!

Table 6.14: Respondents’ reports: ‘where complaints were addressed to.’

Offices Frequency Percent

The local police 16 80.0%

The Preventive Security Department 2 10.0%

The office of HH Major General Seif Al-Nehyan 2 10.0%

Total 20 100.0%

11. Public’s reasons for not reporting misconduct: Item # 23

‘What are the main reasons why people do not complain about unacceptable police

behaviour?’

People are reluctant to complain to the authorities even though they think they should.

Many reasons might affect their willingness, with different levels of importance.

Table 6.15 shows how respondent rated different possible reasons.

Table 6.15: Respondents’ rating: ‘possible reasons for not making official complaints.’

167

# Reasons Frequency Percent

1 Worried about repercussions/fearful of retaliation 122 59.2%

2 Unsure how to file complaints against police 92 44.7%

3 Expect their complaint will not be addressed 90 43.7%

4 Do not know how to make a complaint 88 42.7%

5 Think their complaint will be disbelieved 66 32.0%

6 Complaint processes is too complicated 44 21.4%

7 Complaints are not serious enough 30 14.6%

8 Lack time to make a complaint 16 7.8%

9 Unacceptable police does not affect them 6 2.9%

10 People who complain against police are themselves corrupt 6 2.9%

Fear of retaliation was ranked first by respondents, 59.2 percent of the public stating

this to be the main reason preventing them from reporting unacceptable police

behaviour.

The next most important reason was ‘It is not obvious how to make a complaint

against police’. Interestingly few respondents agreed with the statements

‘Unacceptable police behaviour does not affect them,’ and ‘People who complain

against police are themselves corrupt’. This may suggest an unsatisfied demand for

easier and safer avenues of complaint. The diagram depicts how respondents’ rated

the possible reasons for not complaining against unacceptable police behaviour.

168

Chart 6.13: Pareto chart: respondents’ rankings of possible reasons for not making complaints.

59.2%

44.7% 43.7% 42.7%

32.0%

21.4%

14.6%

7.8%

2.9% 2.9%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

12. Public’s views on how UAE should handle unacceptable police behaviour:

Item # 24

How do you believe unacceptable police behaviour could best be dealt with in the

UAE?

Should unacceptable police behaviour be treated internally or externally? Table

(6.16) listed two main ways on how to deal with this critical issue plus the public

responses toward this item. 39 percent of the responses agreed on an internal body

within the police force and almost the same percentage, 38 percent, of respondents

agreed on an external body outside the police force.

Table 6.16: Respondents’ ratings: ‘alternative ways to handle unacceptable police behaviour’.

‘How do you believe unacceptable could best be dealt with in the UAE?’

Frequency Percent

By an internal body within the police force 78 39%

By an external body outside the police force 76 38%

It does not matter, as it is impossible to deal with 10 5%

Don't know/not sure 26 13%

Other 12 6%

The Pareto diagram shows that large minorities are evenly divided on whether an

internal or external body is the better way to address police problems.

169

Section 2: public responses & demographic factors:

Section 2 aims to identify and to quantify the major explanations related to

unacceptable police behaviour in Abu Dhabi Emirate. To do so, we explore public

and police force impressions on police corruption from different perspectives to see

the extent to which differences in perceptions of unacceptable police behaviour vary

between males and females, between citizens and residents, between different

educational levels, etc. Cross tabulations and chi square independency tests22 are used

to test the strengths of relationships. Below various demographic variables are

discussed one-by-one.

1. Demographic variables & views of the seriousness of unacceptable police

behaviour: Item # 6

’Would you perceive possible unacceptable police behaviour in the Abu Dhabi

police as a: major, minor, etc.…’

a. Nationality status differences

This random sample consisted of 124 citizens and 82 residents, representing 60.2%

and 39.8 % of the respondents respectively. The analysis presented in Table 6.17 and

Chart 6.14 reveals significant differences 23 of perception between citizens and

residents on the seriousness of unacceptable police behaviour in Abu Dhabi, with

62.9 percent of citizens and 42.1 of the residents stating that unacceptable police

22 The significance level "0.05" was used in all chi square tests. The associated P- value was calculated using SPSS. A P- value less than the significance level implies no effect or relationship between the two variables. Moreover, independency between any two variables implies no significant differences exist. 23 Chi square statistic is 9.516, and associated P- value with 3 degrees of freedom is 0.023

170

behaviour is a ‘major problem’. Cumulatively, 72.9 percent and 83.9 percent of

citizens and residents, respectively, rated unacceptable police behaviour as a problem,

whether major or minor.

Table 6.17: Respondents’ Ratings: ‘seriousness of misconduct’, by nationality

Citizen Resident Response

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Major problem 78 62.9% 32 42.1%

Minor problem 26 21.0% 24 30.8%

Not a problem 10 8.1% 12 15.8%

Do not know/ not sure 10 8.1% 10 13.2%

Total 124 62.2% 78 39.8%

Chart 6.14: Bar Chart: respondent’s ratings: ‘seriousness of misconduct’, by nationality

62.9%

21.0%

8.1% 8.1%

41.0%

30.8%

15.4%12.8%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Major problem Minor problem Not a problem Do not know / not

sure

Citizen Resident

Chart 6.14 shows that residents’ ratings are notably higher than the citizens except

when they rated the unacceptable police behaviour as a major problem.24 Yes the

citizens rating of unacceptable police behaviour as a ‘major problem’ is higher than

the residents’ but for other categories (‘minor problem’, ‘not a problem’, ‘I don’t

know’) the residents ratings were higher, indicating that the citizens consider that

problem more seriously.

(b) Gender differences

24 The citizens rating for unacceptable police behaviour as a major problem is higher than the residents’ but for other categories “minor problem, not a problem, I don’t know”, the residents ratings was higher which indicates the citizens consider that problem more seriously.

171

The public sample is comprised of 130 males (63.1 percent of the total) and 67

females (36.9 percent) of the sample. Their rankings of the seriousness of

unacceptable police behaviour, shown in Table 6.18, do not pass the chi square

independency test at the 0.05 significance level25, and no significant relationship or

interdependency seems to exist between gender and responses levels.

Table 6.18: Respondents’ ratings: ‘seriousness of police misconduct’, by gender

Male Female Response

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Major problem 72 57.1% 38 50.0%

Minor problem 30 23.8% 20 26.3%

Not a problem 16 12.7% 6 7.9%

Do not know/ not sure 8 6.3% 12 15.8%

Total 126 62.4% 76 37.6%

Table 6.18 shows that cumulatively, 80.9 percent of male and 76.3 of female

respondents see police corruption as a problem, whether major or minor. No major

difference seems to exist between their ratings. Likewise, 57.1 percent of male and

50 percent of female respondents see police misconduct as a ‘major’ problem,

suggesting their views are basically the same.

Chart 6.10: Bar Chart: respondents’ ratings: ‘seriounsess of misconduct’, by gender

57.1%

23.8%

12.7%

6.3%

50.0%

9.9%

3.0%5.9%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Major problem Minor problem Not a problem Do not know / not

sure

Males Females

(c) Educational level differences

25 Chi square value statistic is 5.836 and associated P – value with three degrees of freedom is 0.120

172

Table 6.19 shows the breakdown of the respondents by education level. It is notable

that a majority of the respondents hold bachelor-level degrees, with those holding

diplomas next.

Table 6.19: Education Background Distribution

Educational background Frequency Percent

Less than high school 4 1.9%

High school 44 21.4%

Diploma 62 30.1%

Bachelor Degree 92 44.7%

Master Degree 4 1.9%

Total 206 100.0%

The chi square26 test of the data in Table (6.20) reveals a significant dependency

between educational level and how seriously they take unacceptable police behaviour.

Those with high school and bachelor-level educations have similar perceptions of the

seriousness of police misconduct, with 60 percent of both groups rating this problem

as ‘major’. The numbers of respondents with ‘less than high school’ or ‘masters’

education levels are too small for valid comparisons, but no big differences stand out.

.

Table 6.20: Respondents’ views: ‘misconduct seriousness’, by educational level

Response Less than high school High school Diploma Bachelor Master

2 26 26 54 2 Major problem

50.0% 59.1% 43.3% 60.0% 50.0%

2 10 14 24 0 Minor problem

50.0% 22.7% 23.3% 26.7% 0.0%

0 2 8 10 2 Not a problem

0.0% 4.5% 13.3% 11.1% 50.0%

0 6 12 2 0 Do not know/not sure

0.0% 13.6% 20.0% 2.2% 0.0%

4 44 60 90 4 Total

2.0% 21.8% 29.7% 44.6% 2.0%

26 Chi square statistic is 25.313 and the associated P-value with 12 degrees of freedom is 0.013

173

2. Demographic variables and views of the existence of police misconduct:

Item# 6

"Do you think there is police unacceptable police behaviour in the Abu Dhabi?"

(a) Nationality status differences

Table 6.21 shows that 78.3 percent of ‘citizens’ regard unacceptable police behaviour

as a present problem, while 65.0 percent of ‘residents’ share that view. Both

percentages are high, as is the difference between the two groups. The chi square

dependency test27 confirms that the ‘citizen’ versus ‘resident’ difference in responses

is significant.

Table 6.21: Respondents’ views: ‘misconduct existence in Abu Dhabi’, by nationality

Citizen Resident Response

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Yes 94 78.3% 52 65.0%

No 26 21.7% 28 35.0%

Total 120 60.0% 80 40.0%

(b) Gender differences

Table (6.22) shows that 71.4 percent of the males believe that unacceptable police

behaviour exists in Abu Dhabi, and 75.7 percent of the females share that perception.

These two percentages are close, and the chi square independency test shows no

interdependency between the genders’ perceptions of the existence of unacceptable

police behaviour in Abu Dhabi at the 0.05 significance level28

Table 6.22: Respondents’ views: ‘police misconduct existence’, by gender

Male Female Response

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

27 Chi square statistic is4.330 and the associated P-value with one degree of freedom =0.0375 28 Chi square statistic is 0.427 and the associated P-value with one degree of freedom is 0.514

174

Yes 90 71.4% 56 75.7%

No 36 28.6% 18 24.3%

Total 126 63.1% 74 36.9%

(b) Educational differences

Majorities of respondents of all educational levels believe police corruption exists in

Abu Dhabi, but especially for bachelors degree holders. A chi square test29 indicates

statistically significant dependency between educational level and perceptions.

Table6.23: Respondents' views: ‘police misconduct existence’, by education

Levels Less than high school

High school

Diploma Bachelor's Degree

Master's Degree

0 32 38 74 2 Yes

0.0% 76.2% 61.3% 84.1% 50.0%

4 10 24 14 2 No

100.0% 23.8% 38.7% 15.9% 50.0%

4 42 62 88 4 Total

2.0% 21.0% 31.0% 44.0% 2.0%

Chart 6.16 Respondents’ views: ‘police misconduct existence’, by education

0.0%

76.2%

61.3%

84.1%

50.0%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

Less than high

school

High school Diploma Bachelor's

Degree

Master's Degree

3. Demographic variables & views on the loci of police mis: Item # 9

‘If there is unacceptable police behaviour in the police force, in which police

departments does it occur?

(a) Status differences

29 Chi square statistic is 21.910 and associated P-value with 4 degrees of freedom is 0.0002

175

Table 6.24 shows an overall consensus among citizens and residents on the police

departments where unacceptable police behaviour is most likely occur. However, chi

square tests showed significant differences between citizens and residents in how they

view two departments; ‘Department of Criminal Laboratories’ and ‘Traffic

Department’.

Table 6.24: Respondents’ views: ‘misconduct in police departments’, by nationality

Citizen Resident Department

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

P-value

Criminal Laboratories 20 16.1% 4 4.9% 0.01

Illicit Drug 2 1.6% 0 0.0% 0.25

Investigations 40 32.3% 26 31.7% 0.93

Traffic Police 76 61.3% 32 39.0% 0.00

Fire Service 2 1.6% 2 2.4% 0.67

Immigration 34 27.4% 20 24.4% 0.63

Border Guards 8 6.5% 4 4.9% 0.64

Do not Know/ not sure 10 8.1% 4 4.9% 0.37

Other 4 3.2% 4 4.9% 0.55

This table shows that a majority of ‘citizens’ (61.3 percent) believe that officers in the

Traffic Department are most prone to misbehave, but only a minority of ‘residents’

(39 percent) view the Traffic Department that way; a statistically significant

difference. ‘Citizens’ and ‘residents’ both regard the Investigations and Immigration

Departments as the two departments where unacceptable police behaviour is next

most common.30

30 Citizen: a UAE National; Resident: an Expatriate residing in UAE. Immigration issues for residents

are dealt by their employers, so their contact with the Immigration Department is relatively few. As for citizens, if they are employers, the PRO is again responsible for the immigration issues, although they might forward problems to them

176

Chart 6.17: Respondents’ ratings: ‘misconduct in police departments’, by nationality

32.3%

61.3%

27.4%31.7%

39.0%

24.4%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Investigations Traff ic Police Immigration

Citizen Resident

(b) Gender differences

Do males and females have different views of particular police departments?

Classifying the public’s data by gender respondents reveals interesting differences

between they do perceive some police department. Chi square test indicates

statistically significant gender differences, especially for two departments,

“Investigations” and “Immigration”.

Table 6.25: Respondents’ views: ‘misconduct in police departments’, by gender

Male Female Department

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

P- Value

Department of Criminal Laboratories 14 10.8% 10 13.2% 0.61

Illicit Drug Department 2 1.5% 0 0.0% 0.28

Investigations 48 36.9% 18 23.7% 0.05

Traffic Police 74 56.9% 34 44.7% 0.09

Fire Service 2 1.5% 2 2.6% 0.58

Immigration 40 30.8% 14 18.4% 0.05

Border Guards 10 7.7% 2 2.6% 0.13

Do not Know/ not sure 4 3.1% 10 13.2% 0.01

Other 4 3.1% 4 5.3% 0.43

Chart 6.18 shows that males’ ratings are significantly higher than females’.

Nevertheless, both males and females agree that Traffic, Investigations, and

Immigration are the Departments where unacceptable police behaviour is most likely.

177

Chart 6.18: Respondents’ ‘ratings: three most ‘corrupt’ departments’, by gender

36.9%

56.9%

30.8%

23.68%

44.74%

18.42%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Investigations Traff ic Police Immigration

Male Female

(c) Educational level differences

Table 6.26 and Chart 6.19 reveal significant differences in how respondents with

different educational levels view individual police departments. A majority (63

percent) of the bachelor’s degree holders and high school graduates (54.5 percent) see

the Traffic Department as where unacceptable police behaviour is most likely, while a

large minority (38.7 percent) of diploma holders have the same view. Interestingly,

majorities of respondents of different educational levels rate Traffic, Investigations,

and Immigration as the departments as where unacceptable behaviour is most

prevalent.

Table 6.26: Respondents views: ‘misconduct in police departments’, by education 31

Departments High school

Diploma Bachelor's Degree

Master's Degree

P-value

14 12 38 2 Investigations

31.8% 19.4% 41.3% 50.0% 0.030

24 24 58 2 Traffic Police

54.5% 38.7% 63.0% 50.0% 0.009

16 8 30 0 Immigration

36.4% 12.9% 32.6% 0.0% 0.012

31 The table lists just the highest respondents’ ratings for three police departments; others were omitted because the frequencies were either zero or very small.

178

Chart 6.19: Respondents ratings: ‘three most ‘corrupt’ departments’, by education

31.8%

54.5%

36.4%

19.4%

38.7%

12.9%

41.3%

63.0%

32.6%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Investigations Traff ic Police Immigration

High school Diploma Bachelor's Degree

4. Demographic variables and views on types of police misconduct: Item # 10

‘Do you think any of the following types of unacceptable police behaviour exist in

the Emirates of Abu Dhabi police?’

(a) Nationality status differences

Do ‘citizens’ and ‘residents’ differ on how often various unacceptable s occur in

different police departments? This issue is analysed in Table 6.27 and Chart 6.20.

Table 6.27: Respondents’ views: ‘most common types of unacceptable police behaviour’, by

nationality

Citizen Resident Unacceptable

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent P-value

Embezzlement 16 12.9% 2 2.4% 0.009

Bribery 14 11.3% 4 4.9% 0.111

damages the state interest 28 22.6% 12 14.6% 0.158

Police benefiting from works 54 43.5% 20 24.4% 0.005

Police breaching confidentiality

38 30.6% 8 9.8% 0.000

Using violence against others 28 22.6% 16 19.5% 0.599

Avoid enforcing decisions 20 16.1% 14 17.1% 0.858

Favouritism 74 59.7% 58 70.7% 0.106

Unequal treatment of others 62 50.0% 46 56.1% 0.391

None 28 22.6% 18 22.0% 0.915

Other 10 8.1% 6 7.3% 0.844

179

"Favouritism" is rated on top by both ‘citizens’ and ‘residents’. There are also

significant differences on how ‘citizens’ and ‘residents’ rate three activities:

‘Embezzlement’, ‘Benefiting from Work’32 and ‘Breaching confidentiality’.

Chart 6.20 : Highest ratings: ‘most common types of misconduct’, by nationality

43.5%

59.7%

50.0%

24.4%

70.7%

56.1%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Police benefiting from

w orks

Favoritism or nepotism Unequal treatment of

others

Citizen Resident

Chart 6.20 indicates both basic consensus between ‘citizens’ and ‘residents’ on the

commonest forms of unacceptable behaviour by police, and noticeable differences in

how they evaluate ‘Police Benefiting from Work’ and ‘Favouritism’.33

(b) Gender differences

Table 6.28 reveals consensus between male and female on the unacceptable police

behaviour in various departments. Chi square tests reveal many cases where gender

differences are statistically significant.

Table 6.28: Respondents ratings: ‘most common types of misconduct‘, by gender

Male Female Form of unacceptable

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent P-value

Embezzlement 12 9.2% 6 7.9% 0.74

32 Work: official position. 33 The UAE society being tribal in nature, one swears one’s loyalty first to the family, next to the tribe, and only then to the State. An individual’s loyalty to one’s family and tribe are seen to be obligatory commitments transcending all others. Given the tribal norms and traditions of this society, public opinion regards the favouritism and the exchange of among public servants as morally acceptable.

180

Bribery 12 9.2% 6 7.9% 0.74

Damages the state interest for personal or others' profiteering

32 24.6% 8 10.5% 0.01

Benefiting from works 48 36.9% 26 34.2% 0.70

Breaching confidentiality 32 24.6% 14 0.30

Using violence against others 22 16.9% 22 28.9% 0.04

Deliberately avoid enforcing decisions 26 20.0% 8 10.5% 0.08

Favouritism or nepotism 90 69.2% 42 55.3% 0.04

Unequal treatment of others 76 58.5% 32 42.1% 0.02

None 24 18.5% 22 28.9% 0.08

Other 14 10.8% 2 2.6% 0.04

‘Favouritism’ is rated on top by both males and females, but significant differences

exist between male and female perceptions of the forms of misconduct.

(c) Educational level differences

Table 6.29: Respondents ratings: ‘most common types of misconduct’, by education

Unacceptable Less than high school

High school

Diploma Bachelor's Degree

Master's Degree

P- value

0 18 16 40 0 Benefiting from jobs

0.0% 40.9% 25.8% 43.5% 0.0% 0.040

0 10 4 30 2 Breaching confidentiality

0.0% 22.7% 6.5% 32.6% 50.0% 0.001

2 4 8 28 2 Violence against others

50.0% 9.1% 12.9% 30.4% 50.0% 0.005

4 28 36 62 2 Favouritism or nepotism

100.0% 63.6% 58.1% 67.4% 50.0% 0.406

0 28 30 48 2 Unequally treating others

0.0% 63.6% 48.4% 52.2% 50.0% 0.134

181

Chart 6.21 Highest ratings: ‘most common types of misconduct’, by education

,

40.9%

63.6% 63.6%

25.8%

58.1%

48.4%43.5%

67.4%

52.2%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Benefiting from w orks Favouritism or nepotism Unequal treatment of others

High school Diploma Bachelor's Degree

6. Demographic variables & views on effects of police mis: Item # 11

‘Do you feel that unacceptable police behaviour in the police affects you, or your

family, in any way?’

(a) Nationality status differences About 54 percent of all public respondents reported that unacceptable behaviour by

police affects them or their families. Table 6.30 shows that 63.9 percent of ‘citizens’

report that unacceptable police behaviour affects them or their families, while only

43.6 percent of ‘residents’ share that view. Chi independency test34 shows that this

difference for this item is statistically significant.

Table 6.30: Respondents’ ‘rating of police misconduct affects’, by nationality status

Citizen Resident Response

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

Yes 78 63.9% 34 43.6%

No 24 19.7% 24 30.8%

Do not know/ not sure 20 16.4% 20 25.6%

Total 122 61.0% 78 39.0%

34 Chi square statistic is 7.993 and associated P-value with 2 degrees of freedom is 0.018

182

(b) Gender differences

Table 6.31 shows that 55.4 percent of males and 58.3 percent of females feel that

unacceptable police affects them and/or their families. That little or no difference

exists between how males and females rate this item is confirmed by the chi square

test35 showing independency between the variables.

Table 6.31: Respondents’ ‘rating of police misconduct affects’, by gender

Male Female Response

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

Yes 72 55.4% 42 58.3%

No 30 23.1% 18 25.0%

Do not know/ not sure 28 21.5% 12 16.7%

Total 130 64.4% 72 35.6%

(c) Educational level differences

Table 6.32: Respondents’ ‘rating of police misconduct affects’, by education

Level Less than high school

High school

Diploma Bachelor's Degree

Master's Degree

0 18 30 64 2 Yes

0.0% 42.9% 48.4% 71.1% 50.0%

4 6 20 16 2 No

100.0% 14.3% 32.3% 17.8% 50.0%

0 18 12 10 0 Do not know/ not sure 100.0% 42.86% 19.35% 11.11% 0.0%

4 42 62 90 4 Total

2.0% 20.8% 30.7% 44.6% 2.0%

Chi square test shows that there is a significant difference36 in perception among

respondents who have different educational level on the potential effects resulted

from police corruption on them or their family.

35 Chi square statistic is 0.70 and the associated P-value with one degree of freedom is 0.71 36 Chi square statistic is 39.872 and the associated P- value with eight degrees of freedom is 0.000

183

7. 1q97Demographic variables and views on nature of ill effects of police

misconduct: Item # 12

‘Do you feel that unacceptable behaviour in the police affects you, or your family,

in any way?’

Nationality status differences

This section looks at how the various ill-effects of police misconduct are appraised by

‘citizens’ and ‘residents’ respectively. The results shown in Table 6.33 show that

‘citizens’ rate two effects –, ‘Unacceptable police behaviour lowers the quality of

police decision–making’, and ‘Unacceptable police behaviour lowers the quality of

police service’ – are rated significantly higher than they are by ‘residents’. Namely,

50 percent of ‘citizens’ and 29.3 percent of ‘residents’ regard this behaviour as

adversely affecting them and/or their families.37

Table 6.33: Respondents rating: ‘possible effects of police misconduct’, by nationality

Effects of unacceptable police

Citizen Resident Total P-value

10 12 22 Negative financial impact

8.1% 14.6% 10.7% 0.119

54 20 74 Police misconduct lowers quality of police decision-making 43.5% 24.4% 35.9%

0.007

52 26 78 Police misconduct lowers public trust in government / public sector 41.9% 31.7% 37.9%

0.176

62 24 86 Police misconduct lowers quality of police service 50.0% 29.3% 41.7%

0.005

40 22 62 Police misconduct makes you or family feel unsafe 32.3% 26.8% 30.1%

0.471

30 12 42 Police misconduct leads to rise in crime.

24.2% 14.6% 20.4% 0.113

72 38 110 Police misconduct sets bad example to public. 58.1% 46.3% 53.4%

0.139

40 22 62 0.471 Police misconduct causes employment inequality 32.3% 26.8% 30.1%

4 8 12 Do not know/not sure

3.2% 9.8% 5.8% 0.045

4 0 4 Other

3.2% 0.0% 1.9% 0.105

37 Many of the residents are living without their families where they leave their families in their homeland and come here for work. While the citizens are living here with their families

184

Chart 6.22: Respondents’ ratings: ‘most important ill effects of police misconduct’, by nationality

43.5%

50.0%

24.4%

29.3%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Lowers the quality of police decision-making Low ers the quality of the police service

Citizen Resident

(a) Gender differences

Table 6.34 and Chart 6.23 show how much concern that both male and female

respondents have for how, ‘Unacceptable police behaviour sets a bad example to the

public.’ With one exception, strong gender differences in ratings are not present for

almost all effects. The chi square test indicates a significant gender difference for on

effect; ‘Unacceptable police behaviour lowers the quality of the police service’. It

was assigned a significantly higher rating by males than by females.

Table 6.34: Respondents’ ratings: ‘possible effects of police misconduct’, by gender

Possible effects of unacceptable police Male Female P-value

10 12 Negative financial impact

7.7% 15.8% 0.069

52 22 Lowers quality of police decisions

40.0% 28.9% 0.111

44 34 Lowers public trust in government / public sector

33.8% 44.7% 0.120

62 24 Lowers quality of police service

47.7% 31.6% 0.024

Makes you and family members feel unsafe 36 28 0.171

185

27.7% 36.8%

26 16 Leads to increased crime.

20.0% 21.1% 0.856

72 38 Sets bad example to public.

55.4% 50.0% 0.455

44 18 Causes employment inequality

33.8% 23.7% 0.125

10 2 Do not know/not sure

7.7% 2.6% 0.135

4 Other

3.1% 0.0% 0.123

Chart 6.23: Respondents’ ratings: ‘possible effects of police misconduct’, by gender

Police unacceptable behaviour lowers the quality of the police

service

47.7%

31.6%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Male Female

(a) Educational level differences

For Table 6.35 chi square statistics calculated for a particular corruption effects are

influenced by cells with empty or small frequencies for two educational levels.

Viewed horizontally, however, the table reveals no significant differences especially

for the shaded items in the table.

Table 6.35: Respondents’ ratings: ‘possible effects of police misconduct’, by education

Impacts High school

Diploma Bachelor's Degree

Master's Degree

P- value

20 10 42 2 Lower quality of police decision-making 45.5% 16.1% 45.7% 50.0%

0.001

16 18 42 2 Lower public confidence

36.4% 29.0% 45.7% 50.0% 0.128

24 14 46 2 Lower quality of police service 54.5% 22.6% 50.0% 50.0%

0.001

Makes one feel unsafe 10 18 34 2 0.239

186

22.7% 29.0% 37.0% 50.0%

14 6 20 2 Leads to rise in crime.

31.8% 9.7% 21.7% 50.0% 0.024

24 26 58 2 Bad example to public.

54.5% 41.9% 63.0% 50.0% 0.023

20 14 26 2 More employment inequality 45.5% 22.6% 28.3% 50.0%

0.056

4 6 2 0 Do not know/not sure

9.1% 9.7% 2.2% 0.0% 0.261

0 4 0 0 Other

0.0% 6.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.050

8. Demographic variables & views of social aspects of police misconduct: Items

# 15-19

‘It is not my responsibility to report unacceptable police behaviour, etc.’

(a) Nationality status differences

Table 6.36 records cross tabulations between responses to questionnaire items 15-18

and nationality status. The chi square statistics indicate a general consensus between

citizens and residents with statistically significant differences in responses between

‘citizens’ and ‘residents’ found only for one item: ‘It is not my responsibility to

report unacceptable police behaviour’.

Table 6.36: Respondents’ ratings: Likert scale items on social/personal values and police

misconduct

Nr. Item Chi

Square Statistic

df P-

value

15 ‘Police misconduct is seen as good business in private sector.’ 6.263 5 0.281

16 ‘I can do nothing about misconduct by Abu Dhabi police.’ 7.454 5 0.189

17 ‘It is not my responsibility to report unacceptable police behaviour.’

12.374 5 0.030

18 ‘Police misconduct is tolerated within UAE society.’ 6.923 5 0.226

19 Police misconduct can be tolerated if it lowers crime in UAE.’ 6.703 5 0.244

Table 6.37 and Chart (6.24) compare how ‘citizens’ and ‘residents’ evaluate their duty

to report unacceptable police behaviour: significantly more ‘residents’ (38.9 percent)

187

‘disagree/strongly disagree’ than ‘citizens’ (23 percent)38. (Note: the question has a

‘double negative’, so ‘disagree’ means one agrees with that one should report.)

Table 6.37: Responses to: ‘It is not my responsibility to report police misconduct’, by nationality

‘It is not my responsibility to report police mis’

Citizens Residents

Strongly Agree 12 9.8% 18 25.0%

Agree 16 13.1% 10 13.9%

Neither Agree Nor Disagree 20 16.4% 10 13.9%

Disagree 38 31.1% 14 19.4%

Strongly Disagree 32 26.2% 14 19.4%

Don't Know/Not Sure 4 3.3% 6 8.3%

Total 122 62.9% 72 37.1%

Chart 6.24: Responces: ‘strongly agree/agree’ on personal responsibilty to report, by nationality

23.0%

38.9%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

Citizens Residents

Agree and Strongly Agreey

38 UAE is a multinational country where the variety of cultures impact on the scale and perception of

‘residents’; this difference may be attributable to cultural differences of residents.

188

(b) a. Gender differences

Male and female respondents’ were not in full accord about individuals’ obligation to

report improper police behaviours to the authorities. Table 6.38 shows that for

particular agreement levels there is a difference 39 between males and females

respondents.

Table 6.38: Responces: ‘strongly agree/agree’ on personal responsibilty to report, by gender

Response Male Female

Strongly Agree 12 9.8% 18 24.3%

Agree 16 13.1% 12 16.2%

Neither Agree Nor Disagree 20 16.4% 10 13.5%

Disagree 38 31.1% 14 18.9%

Strongly Disagree 28 23.0% 18 24.3%

Don't Know/Not Sure 8 6.6% 2 2.7%

Total 122 100.0% 74 100.0%

Data on males and females who responded ‘strongly disagree/disagree" and who

believe individuals have a personal duty to act on police misconduct, are presented in

Chart 6.25. It appears that a significant difference exists between the genders’,

though majorities of both groups believe individuals have a duty to report

unacceptable police.40

39 Chi square statistic is 10.851 and the associated p-value with 5 degrees of freedom is 0.054. 40 Might Females are little bit more conservative and they don’t like to involve in problems.

189

Chart 6.25: Responces: ‘strongly agree/agree’ on personal responsibilty to report, by gender

It is not my responsiblity to report unacceptable

behaviour

54.1%

43.2%

0.0%

20.0%

40.0%

60.0%

Male Female

strongly agree & agree

(c) Educational differences

The computation of chi square statistics for Table 6.39 is influenced by cells with

empty or low frequencies in two educational levels. However41, if viewed

horizontally for education, no significant differences will be observed.

Table 6.39: Respondents’ ratings: Liker scale items on social/personal values & police mis, by

education

Levels Strongly Agree

Agree Neither

Agree Nor Disagree

Disagree Strongly Disagree

Don't Know/Not Sure

Total

0 0 0 0 2 2 4 Less than high school 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%

4 4 8 12 12 2 42 High school

9.5% 9.5% 19.0% 28.6% 28.6% 4.8% 100.0%

10 14 8 10 14 0 56 Diploma

17.9% 25.0% 14.3% 17.9% 25.0% 0.0% 100.0%

16 10 14 28 16 6 90 Bachelor's Degree 17.8% 11.1% 15.6% 31.1% 17.8% 6.7% 100.0%

0 0 0 2 2 0 4 Master's Degree 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0%

30 28 30 52 46 10 196 Total

15.3% 14.3% 15.3% 26.5% 23.5% 5.1% 100.0%

41 Chi square statistic is 39.061 and associated P- value with twenty degrees of freedom is 0.007.

190

Data for ‘disagree/strongly disagree’ responses are presented in Chart 6.26 clearly

there is no difference between the respondents having different educational level in

their rating for this item. Majorities in all education categories agreed that they have a

duty to report unacceptable police behaviour.

Chart 6.26: Respondents’ agreement ratings for item # 17

It is not my responsibility to report unacceptable behavior

50.0%57.1%

42.9%48.9%

100.0%

0.0%

20.0%

40.0%

60.0%

80.0%

100.0%

120.0%

Less than

high school

High school Diploma Bachelor's

Degree

Master's

Degree

9. Demographic variables & views of personal aspect of reporting police

misconduct: Item # 18

‘If you saw police acting improperly, would you make a complaint to the

authorities?’

(a) Nationality status differences

Table 6.40 and Chart 6.27 show that differences exist between ‘citizen’ and ‘resident’

attitudes as to whether they would report an improper police action they had seen.

64.5 percent of ‘citizens’ said they would complain to the authorities, while only 46.2

percent of residents said they would compliant. Chi independency test42 confirm that

the difference between these two ratings are statistically significant43. .

42 Chi square statistic is 6.603 and associated P-value with one degrees of freedom is 0.01. 43 Because cultural differences.

191

Table 6.40: Respondents’ ratings: personal willingness to complain of police misconduct,

by nationality.

Citizen Resident

Response

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

Yes 80 64.5% 36 46.2%

No 44 35.5% 42 53.8%

Total 124 61.4% 78 38.6%

Chart 6.27: Bar chart: personal willingness to complain of police misconduct,

by nationality.

If you saw police acting improperly, w ould you make a compalint

to the authorities

64.5%

46.2%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Citizen Resident

(b) Gender differences Table 6.41: Respondents’ ratings: public willingness to complain of police misconduct, by gender

Male Female Response

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

Yes 76 58.46% 40 54.05%

No 54 41.54% 34 45.95%

Total 130 63.73% 74 36.27%

The Table suggest no significant difference in the willingness of males and females to

complain to authorities if they observed police acting improperly. The chi square

test44 confirms independency between gender and responses.

(c) Educational differences

44 Chi square statistic is 0.541 and the associated P-value is 0.373.

192

Table 6.42 reveals no significant differences 45 among respondents with different

educational levels over their willingness to complain if they observe unacceptable

police behaviour. A noticeable difference does, however, exist among respondents

within education categories.

Table 6.42: Respondents’ rating: ‘willingness to complain of police misconduct’, by education

Yes No Educational level

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

Less than high school

2 1.7% 2 2.3%

High school 26 22.4% 18 20.5%

Diploma 32 27.6% 30 34.1%

Bachelor's Degree 54 46.6% 36 40.9%

Master's Degree 2 1.7% 2 2.3%

Total 116 100.0% 88 100.0%

Chart 6.28: Respondents’ ratings:’ willingness to complain of police misconduct’, by education

1.7%

22.4%

27.6%

46.6%

1.7%2.3%

20.5%

34.1%

40.9%

2.3%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

50.0%

Less than high

school

High school Diploma Bachelor's

Degree

Master's Degree

Yes No

45 Chi square value is 1.300 and associated P-value with 4 degrees of freedom is 0.861.

193

10. Demographic variables and reason for non-reporting of police misconduct:

Items # 23

‘What are the main reasons why people do not complain of police misconduct?’

(a) Nationality status differences

As recounted above, 35.5 percent of ‘citizens’ and 53.8 percent of ‘residents’ would

not complain about improper police actions that they themselves had observed. The

reasons for this reluctance are numerous.. Table 6.43 breaks down public responses

to a list of possible reasons by nationality status; it shows significant differences

between ‘citizen’ and ‘resident’ ratings of possible reasons for being unwilling to

complain.

Table 6.43: Respondents’ ratings: ‘main reasons why people do not complain.’

Citizen Resident Reasons for not complaining

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent P- value

Complaint will not be addressed 66 53.2% 24 29.3% 0.001

Not obvious how to complain against police 70 56.5% 22 26.8% 0.000

Complaint processes too complicated 30 24.2% 14 17.1% 0.256

Complaints not serious enough 8 6.5% 22 26.8% 0.000

Complaint will not be believed 48 38.7% 16 19.5% 0.005

Do not know how to make complaints 62 50.0% 26 31.7% 0.014

Police misconduct does not affect them 2 1.6% 4 4.9% 0.162

Worry over repercussions / fear retaliation 76 61.3% 44 53.7% 0.373

Do not have time to make a complaint 14 11.3% 2 2.4% 0.023

People who complain against police are also corrupt

2 1.6% 4 4.9% 0.162

Other 10 8.1% 2 2.4% 0.099

194

(b) Gender differences

Table 6.44 shows no significant difference between male and female ratings of the list

of reasons for not complaining.

Table 6.44: Respondents’ ratings: main reasons why people do not complain, by gender

Male Female Reasons for not make complaints Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

P-value

Complaint will not be addressed 56 43.1% 34 44.7% 0.817

Not obvious how to complain against police

60 46.2% 32 42.1% 0.573

Complaint process too complex 30 23.1% 14 18.4% 0.431

Complaints not serious enough 22 16.9% 8 10.5% 0.209

Complaint will not be believed 46 35.4% 20 26.3% 0.178

Do not know how to complain 56 43.1% 32 42.1% 0.892

Police misconduct does not affect them

2 1.5% 4 5.3% 0.125

Worry over repercussions / fear retaliation

82 63.1% 40 52.6% 0.141

Do not have time to complain 8 6.2% 8 10.5% 0.258

Those complaining against police are also corrupt

2 1.5% 4 5.3% 0.125

Other 8 6.2% 4 5.3% 0.792

(c) Educational level differences

Table 6.45 shows that significant differences exist among how respondents with

different educational levels rate different reasons for not making a complaint.

Table 6.45: Respondents’ ratings: main reasons why people do not complain, by gender

Reasons for not make complaints

Less than high school

High school

Diploma Bachelor's Degree

Master's Degree

P- value

2 24 26 36 2 Complaint will not be addressed 50.0% 54.5% 41.9% 39.1% 50.0%

0.543

4 22 22 42 2 Not obvious how to complain against police 100.0% 50.0% 35.5% 45.7% 50.0%

0.105

0 10 14 20 Complaint process too complex 0.0% 22.7% 22.6% 21.7% 0.0%

0.686

0 6 10 14 Complaints not serious enough 0.0% 13.6% 16.1% 15.2% 0.0%

0.818

0 20 12 32 2 Complaint will not be believed 0.0% 45.5% 19.4% 34.8% 50.0%

0.026

0 18 22 44 4 Do not know how to complain 0.0% 40.9% 35.5% 47.8% 100.0%

0.020

0 2 4 Police misconduct does not affect them 0.0% 0.0% 3.2% 4.3% 0.0%

0.690

195

2 28 34 56 2 Worried over repercussions / fear retaliation 50.0% 63.6% 54.8% 60.9% 50.0%

0.873

0 6 4 6 Do not have time to complain 0.0% 13.6% 6.5% 6.5% 0.0%

0.535

0 6 Those complaining against police are also corrupt 0.0% 0.0% 9.7% 0.0% 0.0%

0.006

Chart 6.29: Respondents’ ratings: ‘main reasons why people do not complain’, by education

45.5%40.9%

19.4%

35.5%34.8%

47.8%50.0%

100.0%

32.0%

42.7%

0.0%

20.0%

40.0%

60.0%

80.0%

100.0%

120.0%

They think their complaint w ill not be

believed

They do not know how to make a

complaint

High school Diploma Bachelor's Degree Master's Degree other

196

Part two: analysis of Abu Dhabi police responses:

Police personnel from two Police Districts; Abu Dhabi and Al Ain Cities, responded

to questions designed to measure police corruption in Abu Dhabi. The following

analysis of their responses focuses on two main areas: first, to furnish data relevant to

answering the research questions; second, to help in diagnosing the influences of

demographic factors on how Abu Dhabi police personnel themselves view police

misconduct.

Section 1: items analysis: Respondents’ ratings of individual questionnaire

items were evaluated in the light of the research questions under study. Then the

responses to each item were broken down by demographic category to highlight

possible explanations of how various respondents view police impropriety.

1. Views of the existence of police misconduct: Item # 7

‘Do you think unacceptable police behaviour exists in the Abu Dhabi Emirate?’

Table 6.46 shows that a majority of respondents in both cities affirm the existence of

improper police behaviour in Abu Dhabi Emirate, with 68.1 percent of respondents

answering ‘yes.’

Table 6.46: Respondents’ ratings: existence of police mis existence in Abu Dhabi

Response Frequency Percent

Yes 231 68.1%

No 108 31.9%

Total 339 100%

197

2. Views of the loci of police misconduct: Item # 8

‘If unacceptable behaviour exists in the police force, in which departments is it

most likely to occur?’

Table 6.47 presents police officers’ appraisals of the police department where they

believe misconduct to be prevalent among police personnel.

Table 6.47: Respondents ratings: police departments where mis mostly occurs

Police Department Frequency Percent

Criminal police 43 12.3%

Illicit Drug Department? 30 8.6%

Investigations 101 28.9%

Traffic Police 154 44.0%

Fire Service 15 4.3%

Immigration 93 26.6%

Border Guards 22 6.3%

Do not Know/ not sure 43 12.3%

Other 29 8.3%

Police respondents clearly see the Traffic Department to be the department where

misconduct is most likely to occur, with 44 percent of them rating it thus. Chart 6.30

is a Pareto diagram that ranks respondents’ ratings by Department in descending

order; it shows Traffic, Investigations and Immigration to be the Departments where

improprieties are most noticeable.

198

Chart 6.30: Pareto chart: police departments where misconduct mostly occurs

44%

29%27%

12%9%

6% 4%

0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%

Traffic Police

Investigations

Immigration

Criminal police

Illicit Drug

Border Guards

Fire Service

3. Views of the forms of police misconduct: Item # 9

‘Do you think any of the following misconduct exists in the Abu Dhabi police

service?’

Respondents were asked to specify what unacceptable behaviours are most common

in different Departments. Their ratings, presented in Table 6.48 reveal ‘Favouritism’

to be the most common type of improper behaviour, having been nominated by 63

percent of respondents.

Table 6.48: Respondents’ ratings: common police miss

Unacceptable Frequency Percent

Embezzlement 57 16.3%

Bribery 46 13.1%

Damages the state interest 51 14.6%

Police benefiting from their work 159 45.4%

Breaching Confidentiality 103 29.4%

Violence against others 74 21.1%

Failure to enforce court decisions 49 14.0%

Favouritism 220 62.9%

Unequal treatment 164 46.9%

None 51 14.6%

Other 19 5.4%

199

Some 20 percent of respondents chose ‘None’ or ‘Other’ from the list of possible

misconducts by police officers. Some specific unacceptable s reported by police

officers include, ‘Police officers do not respect members of the public,’ or ‘People

talk impolitely to the public’.

Chart 6.31: Pareto chart: Respondents’ ratings: common police miss

62.9%

46.9% 45.4%

29.4%

21.1%16.3% 14.6% 14.0% 13.1%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Favouritism

Unequal treatment

Benifiting from work

Breaching Confidentiality

Using violence against others

Embezzlement

Dameges the state interest

Avound enforcing decisions

Bribery

This Pareto chart shows in descending order how respondents rated different

misconducts. The three misconducts with highest ratings are ‘Favouritism’, ‘Unequal

treatment’ and ‘Benefiting from work’. A cross tabulation of Departments and forms

of misconduct was performed to see which forms of the misconducts tend to occur in

which Departments.

200

Chart 6.32: Pareto chart: cross tabulation of responses: police Departments and misconducts

29.1% 29.1%

18.2%

5.9% 5.7% 5.2% 4.7% 3.5% 3.4%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

Favoritism Favoritism Favoritism Favoritism Favoritism Favoritism Favoritism Benefiting

from Work

Favoritism

Traffic Criminal

Police

Immigration Investigation Don't

Know /Not

sure

Other Border

Guard

Illicit Drug Fire Service

Chart (6.11) show the degree to which the ‘Favouritism’ dominates in all

Departments, except Illicit Drugs, where respondents see ‘Benefiting from work’, to

be most prevalent.

5. Views of possible justifications for police misconduct: Items # 10-14

‘State the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements….’

These five Likert Scale statements explore how police officers regard some critical

issues related to possible ‘improper’ police behaviours. They pose a critical question:

Is improper behaviour justified by those who have cited it? Do they occasionally do

such things themselves?

201

Table 6.49: Respondents’ ratings: occurrence of police misconduct, items # 10 – 14

# Item Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never Don't

Know/Not Sure

5 29 136 79 81 18

10 Police may use violence or excessive force to get confessions from suspects 1.4% 8.3% 39.1% 22.7% 23.3% 5.2%

6 10 48 53 204 27

11 Police may break rules to get the job done

1.7% 2.9% 13.8% 15.2% 58.6% 7.8%

199 49 45 22 13 14

12 Police officers should report those breaching rules

58.2% 14.3% 13.2% 6.4% 3.8% 4.1%

43 63 85 43 45 64

13

Officers who report a colleague's misconduct, should not expect support from the police hierarchy 12.5% 18.4% 24.8% 12.5% 13.1% 18.7%

11 25 76 44 182 8

14 Police officers turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers 3.2% 7.2% 22.0% 12.7% 52.6% 2.3%

Table 6.49 shows that 71.546 percent of respondents agree that police officers may use

violence or excessive force to obtain confessions from suspects, but disagree on how

often they may do so. On the other hand, 23.3 percent disagree totally with the

permissibility of violence. The ‘true’ level of opposition to the legitimacy of violence

can estimated by summing the ‘Rarely’ and ‘Never’ responses, which add up to 50

percent.

Chart 6.33 suggests that 39.1 of police respondents believe that they ‘Sometimes’ need

to use violence, whereas 22.7 percent believe it should be used ‘Rarely’.

46 Cumulative percent for levels ‘Always’, ‘Often’, ‘Sometimes’ and ‘Rarely’.

202

Chart 6.33: Respondents’ ratings: police use of force, item # 10

Police off icers should use violence or excessive force to obtain

confessions from suspects

1.4%

8.3%

39.1%

22.7% 23.3%

5.2%

0.0%5.0%

10.0%15.0%

20.0%25.0%

30.0%35.0%

40.0%45.0%

Alw ays Often Sometimes Rarely Never Don't

Know /Not

Sure

Item 2 in Table 6.49 states: ‘Police officers break the rules to get the job done’. Chart

6.34 shows that while a majority (58.6 percent) of respondents disagreed entirely by

selecting ‘Never’, a substantial minority, (33.6 percent47) believe that police officers

may break rules ‘to get the job done’.

Chart 6.34: Respondents’ ratings: ‘getting the job done’, item # 11

Police off icers should break the rules to get the job done

1.7% 2.9%

13.8% 15.2%

58.6%

7.8%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Alw ays Often Sometimes Rarely Never Don't

Know /Not

Sure

47 Cumulative percent for levels ‘Always’, ‘Often’, ‘Sometimes’ and ‘Rarely’.

203

Chart 6.35 shows that all police respondents (95.948 percent) believe that officers

should report other officers breaching rules. Although there was some disagreement

on how frequently the majority agreed that they should ‘Always’ report violations.

Chart 6.35: Respondents’ ratings: reporting other officers, item # 12

Police off icers should report other off icers' breach of the rules

58.2%

14.3% 13.2%6.4% 3.8% 4.1%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Alw ays Often Sometimes Rarely Never Don't

Know /Not

Sure

Item # 13 states: ‘An officer, who reports his colleagues’ misconduct, shall not expect

much support from the police hierarchy’. Respondents’ ratings on this item are

almost equally divided amongst the response levels.

Chart 6.36: Respondents’ ratings: hierarchy support for those reporting others, item # 13

An off icer, w ho reports his colleague's misconduct, shall not expect

much support from the police hierarchy

12.5%

18.4%

24.8%

12.5% 13.1%

18.7%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

Alw ays Often Sometimes Rarely Never Don't

Know /Not

Sure

48 Cumulative percent for levels ‘Always’, ‘Often’, ‘Sometimes’ and ‘Rarely’

204

Most respondents (52.6 percent) disagree entirely with the statement ‘Police officers

turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers’; nevertheless 45.149 percent of

them believe that police officers do disregard other officers’ misconduct.

Chart 6.37: Respondents’ ratings: toleration of others officers’ misconducts, item # 14

Police off icers turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other off icers

3.2%7.2%

22.0%

12.7%

52.6%

2.3%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Alw ays Often Sometimes Rarely Never Don't

Know /Not

Sure

6. Views of cultural ethics of reporting other officers’ misconduct: Items # 15-

18

‘State the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements….’

Many reasons underlie officers’ reluctance to report others’ misconduct. . Items # 15-

17 in Table 6.50 interrogate these issues.

49 Cumulative percent for levels ‘Always’, ‘Often’, ‘Sometimes’ and ‘Rarely’.

205

Table 6.50: Respondents’ ratings: non-reporting of others’ misconduct, items # (15 -18)

# Item Strongly Agree

Agree Neither

Agree Nor Disagree

Disagree Strongly Disagree

Don't Know/Not Sure

77 38 39 68 110 16

15 Reporting other officers for breaching rules violates our culture 22.1% 10.9% 11.2% 19.5% 31.6% 4.6%

70 42 9 62 148 15

16 Reporting other officers for breaching rules violates our religion 20.2% 12.1% 2.6% 17.9% 42.8% 4.3%

19 52 46 93 128 10

17

Reporting other officers for breaching rules shames the reporting officer 5.5% 14.9% 13.2% 26.7% 36.8% 2.9%

200 123 17 3 1 5

18 Reporting other officers for breaching rules should be encouraged 57.3% 35.2% 4.9% 0.9% 0.3% 1.4%

To get a clearer picture of the issues addressed by items 15-18, clear responses

(‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’) and ambiguous

responses (‘neither agree nor disagree’ and ‘don’t know/not sure’) were merged. The

results are reported in Table 6.51.

Table 6.51: Respondents ratings: reasons for not reporting misconduct, items 15-17

Agreement Disagreement # Items

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

15 Contradicts our culture 115 33.0% 178 51.1%

16 Contradicts our religion 112 32.2% 210 60.3%

17 Shames the one reporting 71 20.4% 221 63.5%

This table shows that most police respondents do not believe that reporting another

officer for breaching rule contradicts either their culture or their religion. Even fewer

see it as something that brings shame to the reporting officer.

206

Chart 6.38: Combined percentages, items 15-17

33.0% 32.2%

20.4%

51.1%

60.3%63.5%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Contradicts our culture

Contradicts our religion

Cause of shame

Agreement Disagreement

Item # 18 The majorities of the respondents (92.5 percent) agree or strongly agree

with the statement ‘Reporting other officers for breaching rules should be

encouraged’.

7. Views of actual reporting of fellow officers’ misconduct: Item # 19

Have you ever reported unacceptable police behaviour to authorities?

It appears from Table 6.52 that a majority of the responding officers (80 percent) had

never reported police misconduct to authorities.

Table 6.52: percent of respondents never reporting colleagues’ misconduct to authorities, item 19

Response Frequency Percent

Yes 70 20%

No 272 80%

Total 342 100%

207

8. Views of those informed of fellow officers’ misconduct: Item # 21

To whom did you make a complaint?

Table 6.53 shows that most (76 percent) of the respondents who had made complaints

had addressed those complaints to a senior officer.

Table 6.53: Respondents’ ratings: offices addressed in complaints, item 21

To whom did you make a complaint? Frequency Percent

Senior officer 53 76%

State Security Department 2 3%

Office of HH Major General Seif Al-Nehyan 6 9%

Other 9 13%

Total 70 100%

Chart 6.39: Respondents’ ratings: offices addressed in complaints, item 21

To w hom did you make the complaint

76%

3%9%

13%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

A senior off icer The State Security

Department

The off ice of HH

Major General Feif

Al-Nehyan

Other

11. Views on handling of civilian reports of fellow officers’ misconduct: Item #

22

‘What action would you take if a member of the public wanted to make a complaint

about a corrupt conduct of another police officer?’

208

Table 6.54 shows that 60.5 percent of officers would refer complainants on to a

supervisor, while another 28.5 percent state that they would refer them to the Police

Commissioner.

Table 6.54: Respondents’ ratings: handling of civilian complainants, item 22

Actions toward public complainants Frequency Percent

Take no action 8 2.3%

Report matter to supervisor 208 60.5%

Refer complainant on to Police Commissioner 98 28.5%

Other 30 8.7%

Total 344 100.0%

Chart 6.40: Respondents’ ratings: handling of civilian complainants, item 22

2.3%

60.5%

28.5%

8.7%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Take no action Report the matter to

your supervisor

You w ill ask him to

go to the Police

Commissioner to

make a complaint

Other

209

12. Views on reasons for non-reporting of misconduct: Item # 23

‘What are the main reasons people do not complain against unacceptable police

behaviour?’

The reasons why people hesitate to complain to the authorities when they want to

were reported and ranked by Table 6.55 and Chart 6.41.

Table 6.55: Respondents’ ratings: reasons why people do not complain to authorities, item 23

# Reasons for non-reporting of police misconduct Frequency Percent

R1 Worry about repercussions / fear of retaliation 198 56.6%

R2 Complaint will not be believed 193 55.1%

R3 Do not know how to make any official complaints 156 44.6%

R4 Do not know how to make complaints against police 149 42.6%

R5 Complaint will not be addressed 128 36.6%

R6 Complaint processes is too complicated 55 15.7%

R7 Complaints are not serious enough 52 14.9%

R8 Do not have time to make a complaint 49 14.0%

R9 People complaining against police are themselves corrupt

43 12.3%

R10 Other 17 4.9%

R11 Police misconduct does not affect them 8 2.3%

Among police respondents, 56.6 percent believe the main factor negatively affecting

people’s willingness to complain is worry over repercussions and fear of revenge; the

next most important reason, with nearly the same response rate (55.1 percent), is that

they expect that complaints will not be believed. Chart 6.41 ranks in descending

order the reasons believed to explain why people are unwilling to complain about

police misconduct. The four main reasons receiving the highest rating by police

210

respondents are: ‘fear of retaliation’, ‘complaints will not believed’, and ‘general

ignorance of how to make complaints’ and ‘specific ignorance about police officer

complaints’.

Chart 6.41: Respondents’ ratings for different reasons behind their reluctant to make complaints

against unacceptable police behaviour

Reasons for not make complaint

56.6% 55.1%

44.6%42.6%

36.6%

15.7% 14.9% 14.0%12.3%

4.9%2.3%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11

13. Views on best ways to handle police misconduct: Item # 24

‘ How do you think police misconduct could best be dealt with in the UAE?’

The final item relates to opinions on how best to deal with police corruption

problems. Table 6.56 shows that a big majority (about 62 percent) of police agree

that the best way to deal with this problem is inside the police force. A minority (23.1

percent) believe it should be addressed externally.

211

Table 6.56: Respondents’ ratings: best way to address UAE police corruption, item 24

Best way to deal with police corruption Frequency Percent

Internal body, within police force 216 61.7%

External body, outside police force 81 23.1%

It does not matter as it is impossible to deal with it 11 3.1%

Don't know/not sure 25 7.1%

Other 17 4.9%

Section 2: police responses vs. demographic factors: The questionnaire

items will now be assessed against the background of demographic factors to

highlight any inconsistencies in respondents’ views of unacceptable police behaviour.

1. Views on existence of police misconduct: Item # 7

‘Do you think police unacceptable police behaviour exists in Abu Dhabi?’

(a) Nationality status differences

Table 6.57 shows a clear difference50 between ‘citizen’ and ‘resident’ views on police

misconduct in Abu Dhabi. Some 70.5 percent of ‘citizen’ police, answered ‘yes’,

nearly 15 percent more than the 56 percent of ‘resident’ police. ‘Citizen’ police show

notably more concern than ‘resident’ police over the existence of police corruption.

50 Chi square statistic is 4.132 and associated P- value with one degree of freedom is 0.042.

212

Table 6.57: Respondents’ ratings: ‘existence of police mis in Abu Dhabi’, by nationality

Citizen Resident Total

Levels

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Yes 203 70.5% 28 56.0% 231 68.3%

No 85 29.5% 22 44.0% 107 31.7%

Total 288 100.0% 50 100.0% 338 100.0%

Chart 6.42 shows by how much more ‘citizen’ police rate the existence of corruption

than ‘resident’ police do.

Chart 6.42: Respondents’ ratings: existence of police mis in Abu Dhabi, by nationality

Unacceptable behaviour existance

70.5%

56.0%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Citizen Resident

(b) Gender differences

Male and female officers also disagree at a significant level51 about the existence of

police misconduct in Abu Dhabi. Table 6.58 shows that 71.3 percent of male police

agree that unacceptable behaviour exists, while only 52.6 percents of the females

share that view.

51 Chi square statistic is 7.593 and associated P-value with one degrees of freedom is .005

213

Table 6.58: Respondents’ ratings : ‘existence of police misconduct in Abu Dhabi’, by gender

Male Female Total

Level Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Yes 201 71.3% 30 52.6% 231 68.1%

No 81 28.7% 27 47.4% 108 31.9%

Total 282 100.0% 57 100.0% 339 100.0%

Chart 6.43 compares male and female ratings and illustrates by how much the males’

rating exceeds the females’.

Chart 6.43: Respondents’ ratings : ‘existence of police misconduct in Abu Dhabi’, by nationality

Do you think there is police unacceptable behaviour in the AD?

71.3%

52.6%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Male Female

(c) Years of Experience differences

Table 6.59 summarises respondents’ ratings on this item broken down by differences

in the respondents’ ‘years of (police) experience’. In fact, the ratings show little

connection with ‘years of experience’.

214

Table 6.59: Respondents’ ratings: ‘existence of police misconduct in Abu Dhabi’, by experience

Yes No Years of Police

Experience Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

1-3 52 56.5% 40 43.5%

4-6 43 71.7% 17 28.3%

7-9 50 78.1% 14 21.9%

10-15 45 66.2% 23 33.8%

16 and above 40 75.5% 13 24.5%

Total 230 67.8% 108 31.9%

Chart 6.44 indicates a slight uptrend in ratings, for first three years-of-experience

levels, but the chi square test52 shows that ‘years of experience’ does not significantly

affect respondents’ views on whether police misconduct exists in Abu Dhabi.

Chart 6.44: Respondents’ ratings: ‘existence of police misconduct in Abu Dhabi’, by experience

Respondents Ratings for "yes"

56.5%

71.7%

78.1%

66.2%

75.5%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

1-3 4-6 7-9 10-15 16 and above

Years of Experienc

(d) Rank differences

Table 6.60 analyses respondents’ ratings of the existence of misconduct problems in

terms of responding officers’ ranks. No significant differences53 in how the different

rank categories view this issue.

52 Chi square statistic is 10.740 and associated P- value with five degrees of freedom is .057. 53 Chi square statistic is 8.542 and associated p-value with 7 degrees of freedom is .287.

215

Table 6.60: Respondents’ ratings : existence of police mis in Abu Dhabi, by rank

Yes No Rank Categories

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Civilian 30 54.5% 25 45.5%

Constable- Corporal 44 67.7% 21 32.3%

Sergeant - Sergeant Major 104 68.9% 47 31.1%

Lieutenant - First Lieutenant 1 100.0% 0 0.0%

Captain- Major 28 75.7% 9 24.3%

Lieutenant Colonel- Colonel 21 80.8% 5 19.2%

Brigadier General 1 100.0% 0 0.0%

Total 231 68.1% 108 31.9%

Chart 6.4554 suggests that respondents’ ratings rise in step with respondents’ ranks,

though the chi square test55 reveals these differences not to be statistically significant.

But one general impression remains strong: more than half of all ranks agree that

police misconduct does exist in Abu Dhabi.

Chart 6.45: Respondents’ ratings: ‘existence of police misconduct in Abu Dhabi’, by rank

Respondents' ratings as "Yes"

54.5%

67.7% 68.9%75.7%

80.8%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

Civilian Constable-

Corporal

Sergeant -

Sergeant

Major

Captain-

Major

Lieutenant

Colonel-

Colonel

54 In this chart ratings for two categories with only one response were excluded from the data set. 55 Chi square value is 8.542 and the associated P-value with seven degrees of freedom is 0.287.

216

2. Views on loci of police misconduct: Item # 8

‘If unacceptable behaviour exists in the police force, in which departments is it

most likely to happen?’

(a) Nationality status differences

Table 6.61 looks into how respondents’ ratings of different police departments where

misconduct is most likely vary with respondents’ nationality. In the event ‘citizen’

and ‘resident’ officers view the different Departments quite similarly. Thus, both

identify Traffic as the Department where corruption is most likely, and chi square

results in the last column reveal that any differences in ratings between ‘citizen’ and

‘resident’ responses are statistically insignificant.

Table 6.61: Respondents’ ratings: Departments where misconduct is commonest, by nationality

Citizen Resident Department

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent P- value

Criminal police 37 12.5% 6 11.5% 0.852

Illicit Drug 25 8.4% 5 9.6% 0.776

Investigations 88 29.6% 13 25.0% 0.497

Traffic Police 136 45.8% 18 34.6% 0.134

Fire Service 14 4.7% 1 1.9% 0.360

Immigration 80 26.9% 13 25.0% 0.771

Border Guards 20 6.7% 2 3.8% 0.429

Do not know / Not sure 39 13.1% 4 7.7% 0.271

Other 28 9.4% 1 1.9% 0.071

The following figure shows that the majority of respondents both citizens and

residents rated the Traffic, Investigations and Immigration Departments as the most

corruption-prone police departments. Also ‘citizen’ ratings here too are slightly above

‘resident’ ratings, reflecting some influence of officers’ nationality status on their

evaluations of different police departments.

217

Chart 6.46: Respondents’ ratings: top 3 departments where misbehaivour is likely, by nationality

29.6%

45.8%

26.9%25.0%

34.6%

25.0%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

50.0%

Investigations Traff ic Police Immigration

Citizen Resident

(b) Gender differences

Table 6.62 compares male and female officers’ ratings of ‘Traffic’ ’Investigations”

and ’Immigration’ as the Departments where misconduct is likely, and chi square tests

show the differences in their ratings to be significant. The Traffic Department was

picked by 47.8 percent of male officers, while only 25.4 percent of the female officers

did so. The Investigations department was chosen by 32.6 percent of male

respondents, but only by 10.2 percent of the female respondents. On the whole, male

ratings for all police Departments exceeded female ratings.

Table 6.62: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Departments where misconduct is most prevalent’, by

gender.

Male Female Department

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent P- value

Criminal police 37 12.7% 6 10.2% 0.587

Illicit Drug 27 9.3% 3 5.1% 0.294

Investigations 95 32.6% 6 10.2% 0.001

Traffic Police 139 47.8% 15 25.4% 0.002

Fire Service 13 4.5% 2 3.4% 0.709

Immigration 87 29.9% 6 10.2% 0.002

Border Guards 21 7.2% 1 1.7% 0.111

Do not know / not sure 36 12.4% 7 11.9% 0.914

Other 25 8.6% 4 6.8% 0.645

Chart 6.47 plots respondents’ ratings for the three police departments and shows the

differences in rating between males and females.

218

Chart 6.47: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Three departments where misbehaivour is likely’, by gender

47.8%

32.6%29.9%

25.4%

10.2% 10.2%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Traffic Police Investigations Immigration

Male Female

(c) Years of Experience differences Table 4.63 shows that police officers with different ‘years of experience’ rated

departments similarly: Traffic, Investigations and Immigration” were seen as the three

where misconduct was most likely. This finding can be seen in Chart 6.48, and chi

square tests show no significant variation among respondents with different levels of

experience.

Table 6.63: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Departments where misconduct is most prevalent’, by

experience

Department 1-3 Years

4-6 Years

7-9 Years

10-15 Years

16 Years & above

P-value

14 9 7 7 6 Criminal police

14.7% 14.5% 10.8% 9.9% 10.9% 0.886

6 5 5 7 7 Illicit Drug

6.3% 8.1% 7.7% 9.9% 12.7% 0.813

19 19 24 20 19 Investigations

20.0% 30.6% 36.9% 28.2% 34.5% 0.187

34 32 32 32 24 Traffic Police

35.8% 51.6% 49.2% 45.1% 43.6% 0.270

3 5 4 2 1 Fire Service

3.2% 8.1% 6.2% 2.8% 1.8% 0.509

16 18 21 19 19 Immigration

16.8% 29.0% 32.3% 26.8% 34.5% 0.135

5 4 5 6 2 Border Guards

5.3% 6.5% 7.7% 8.5% 3.6% 0.883

7 7 9 10 9 Do not Know/ not sure 7.4% 11.3% 13.8% 14.1% 16.4%

0.303

7 6 4 7 5 Other

7.4% 9.7% 6.2% 9.9% 9.1% 0.953

219

In Chart 6.48 upward trends in respondents’ ratings of the Immigration and

Investigation Departments appear for the first three ‘years of experience’ levels,

reflecting some effect of experience on respondents' ratings. Curiously, this effect is

inverted for Traffic, with respondents’ ratings falling as ‘years of experience’ rise.

Chart 6.48 Respondents’ ratings: ‘Three departments where misconduct is most prevalent’, by

experience.

35.8%

16.8%20.0%

51.6%

29.0%30.6%

49.2%

32.3%

36.9%

45.1%

26.8% 28.2%

43.6%

34.5% 34.5%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Traffic Police Immigration Investigations

1-3 4-6 7-9 10-15 16 and above

(d) Rank differences

Chi square independency tests on the data in Table 6.64 show no significant

differences in how officer with different ranks select departments where corruption is

most likely. Chart 6.49, however, shows that respondents’ ratings of suspect

departments tend to rise with rank.

220

Table 6.64: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Departments where misconduct is most prevalent’, by rank.

Department Civilian Constable Sergeant Captain- Major

Lieutenant Colonel

P-value

11 8 17 3 4 Criminal Police

19.0% 11.9% 10.9% 8.1% 14.8% 0.763

7 4 10 4 4 Illicit Drug

12.1% 6.0% 6.4% 10.8% 14.8% 0.480

13 16 46 14 10 Investigations

22.4% 23.9% 29.5% 37.8% 37.0% 0.404

18 27 78 15 14 Traffic Police

31.0% 40.3% 50.0% 40.5% 51.9% 0.209

2 5 7 0 0 Fire Service

3.4% 7.5% 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.144

9 22 41 10 9 Immigration

15.5% 32.8% 26.3% 27.0% 33.3% 0.266

4 1 15 1 1 Border Guards

6.9% 1.5% 9.6% 2.7% 3.7% 0.425

8 8 14 6 7 Do not know / not sure 13.8% 11.9% 9.0% 16.2% 25.9%

0.368

3 4 14 3 4 Other

5.2% 6.0% 9.0% 8.1% 14.8% 0.047

Chart 6.49: Respondents’ ratings: 3 Departments where misconduct is commonest, by rank

31.0%

22.4%

15.5%

40.3%

32.8%

50.0%

29.5%26.3%

40.5%37.8%

51.9%

33.3%

23.9% 27.0%

37.0%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Traff ic Police Investigations Immigration

Civilian Constable Sergeant Captain- Major Lieutenant

Colonel

3. Views on types of police misconduct: Item # 9

‘Do you think any of the following types of unacceptable behaviour exist within the

Abu Dhabi police service?’

(a) Nationality status differences

‘Favouritism’, ‘Benefiting from work’ and ‘Breaching confidentiality’ are rated by

majorities of both ‘citizen’ and ‘resident’ respondents as most important three forms

221

of misconduct in the police force, and chi square tests reveal significant differences in

respondents’ ratings of these unacceptable activities.

Table 6.65: Respondents’ ratings: commonest forms of police mis, by nationality

Citizen Resident Unacceptable

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

P-Value

Embezzlement 50 16.8% 7 13.5% 0.544

Bribery 40 13.5% 6 11.5% 0.704

Damaging state interest 46 15.5% 5 9.6% 0.269

Police benefiting from work 143 48.1% 16 30.8% 0.020

Breach of confidentiality 95 32.0% 8 15.4% 0.015

Violence against others 67 22.6% 7 13.5% 0.139

Failure to enforce court decisions 43 14.5% 6 11.5% 0.574

Favouritism / Nepotism 196 66.0% 24 46.2% 0.006

Unequal treatment 141 47.5% 23 44.2% 0.665

None 35 11.8% 15 28.8% 0.001

Other 17 5.7% 2 3.8% 0.582

Table 6.50, reveals some differences between how ‘citizen’ and ‘resident’ respondents

appraise the most likely forms of misconduct, ‘citizen’ rankings notably higher than

‘resident’ rankings.

Chart 6.50: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Four most common forms of police misconduct’, by

nationality.

48.1%

32.0%

66.0%

47.5%

30.8%

15.4%

46.2% 44.2%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Police benefiting

from w orks

Police breaching

confidentiality

Favouritism or

nepotism

Unequal treatment of

others

Citizen Resident

(b) Gender differences

222

Table 6.66 shows no significant male-female difference in perceptions of forms of

misconduct by police with one exception: females rate ‘Violence against others’

significantly higher than males.

Table 6.66: Respondents’ ratings : ‘Commonest forms of police misconduct’, by gender.

Male Female Unacceptable

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent P- value

Embezzlement 51 17.5% 6 10.2% 0.163

Bribery 39 13.4% 7 11.9% 0.750

Damage to state interest 47 16.2% 4 6.8% 0.063

Benefiting from works 135 46.4% 24 40.7% 0.422

Breach of confidentiality 85 29.2% 18 30.5% 0.842

Violence against others 54 18.6% 20 33.9% 0.009

Failure to enforce court decisions 42 14.4% 7 11.9% 0.604

Favouritism / Nepotism 183 62.9% 37 62.7% 0.980

Unequal treatment 133 45.7% 31 52.5% 0.337

None 40 13.7% 11 18.6% 0.331

Other 18 6.2% 1 1.7% 0.165

In Chart 6.51 male and female perceptions of the three top forms of unacceptable

behaviour are distinguished. No clear differences exist between the two groups.

Chart 6.51: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Four most common forms of police misconduct’, by gender.

62.9%

45.7% 46.4%

62.7%

52.5%

40.7%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Favouritism Unequal treatment of

others

Police benefiting from

w orks

Males Females

(c) Years of Experience differences

223

Respondents with different levels of experience rated ‘Favouritism or ‘Nepotism’

‘Unequal treatment’, and ‘Police benefiting from work’ as the three top forms of

misconduct. Table 6.67 shows only non-significant differences among ratings of

respondents with different ‘Levels of experience’, with two exceptions: ‘Breach of

confidentiality" followed by ‘Violence against others’.

Table 6.67: Respondents’ ratings: commonest forms of police mis, by experience

Unacceptable 1-3 Years

4-6 Years

7-9 Years

10-15 Years

16 Years & above

P-value

14 10 13 13 7 Embezzlement

14.7% 16.1% 20.0% 18.3% 12.7% 0.857

7 9 13 12 5 Bribery

7.4% 14.5% 20.0% 16.9% 9.1% 0.184

11 14 12 9 5 Damage to state interest 11.6% 22.6% 18.5% 12.7% 9.1%

0.257

35 36 29 35 23 Benefiting from works

36.8% 58.1% 44.6% 49.3% 41.8% 0.182

21 21 25 27 9 Breach of confidentiality

22.1% 33.9% 38.5% 38.0% 16.4% 0.019

16 16 22 16 3 Violence against others

16.8% 25.8% 33.8% 22.5% 5.5% 0.004

9 7 14 13 6 Failure to enforce court decisions 9.5% 11.3% 21.5% 18.3% 10.9%

0.227

55 46 39 47 32 Favouritism / Nepotism

57.9% 74.2% 60.0% 66.2% 58.2% 0.343

43 27 34 36 23 Unequal treatment

45.3% 43.5% 52.3% 50.7% 41.8% 0.830

21 7 8 10 5 None

22.1% 11.3% 12.3% 14.1% 9.1% 0.235

4 4 3 3 5 Other

4.2% 6.5% 4.6% 4.2% 9.1% 0.816

Chart 6.52 shows that respondents with 4-15 years of police experience ranked

‘Breach of confidentiality’ significantly higher than others.

Chart 6.52: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Breaching of confidentiality’ misconduct, by experience.

224

Police breaching confidentiality

22.1%

33.9%

38.5% 38.0%

16.4%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

1-3 4-6 7-9 10-15 16 and above

Years of Experience

Chart 6.53 shows that the highest ratings for ‘Violence against others’ come from

respondents with 4-15 years of service.

Chart 6.53: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Violence against others’ misconduct, by experience

Using violence against others

16.8%

25.8%

33.8%

22.5%

5.5%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

1-3 4-6 7-9 10-15 16 and above

Years of experience

(d) Rank differences

No significant differences can be found in Table 6.68 in how respondents of different

ranks view ‘Embezzlement’, though Lieutenant Colonels, compared to other ranks,

gave this a higher rating.

225

Table 6.68: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Commonest forms of police misconduct’, by rank

Unacceptable Civilian Constable Sergeant Captain Lieutenant Colonel

P-value

7 13 20 8 8 Embezzlement

12.1% 19.4% 12.8% 21.6% 29.6% 0.076

7 10 18 4 6 Bribery

12.1% 14.9% 11.5% 10.8% 22.2% 0.769

7 8 25 8 3 Damage to state interest

12.1% 11.9% 16.0% 21.6% 11.1% 0.833

24 26 72 18 17 Benefiting from works

41.4% 38.8% 46.2% 48.6% 63.0% 0.397

13 17 48 11 13 Breach of confidentiality

22.4% 25.4% 30.8% 29.7% 48.1% 0.383

11 12 35 11 4 Violence against others

19.0% 17.9% 22.4% 29.7% 14.8% 0.799

9 8 21 4 6 Failure to enforce court decisions 15.5% 11.9% 13.5% 10.8% 22.2%

0.838

36 34 105 22 19 Favouritism / Nepotism

62.1% 50.7% 67.3% 59.5% 70.4% 0.370

28 31 71 16 15 Unequal treatment

48.3% 46.3% 45.5% 43.2% 55.6% 0.817

13 13 17 5 3 None

22.4% 19.4% 10.9% 13.5% 11.1% 0.433

2 3 6 4 2 Other

3.4% 4.5% 3.8% 10.8% 7.4% 0.001

The data in Chart 6.54 reveal no significant difference among ratings of

‘Favouritism/Nepotism’ by officers of different ranks, although Lieutenant Colonels

rated it highest, with 70.4 percent regarding it as the commonest type of police

misconduct.

226

Chart 6.54: Respondents’ ratings: ‘choice ‘favouritism’ as most common misconduct’, by rank.

Favouritism or nepotism

62.1%

50.7%

67.3%

59.5%

70.4%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Civilian Constable Sergeant Captain Lieutenant

Colonel

5. Views on permissibility and actuality of police misconduct: Items # 10-14

‘Tick the box which indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with the

following statements: ….’

Items 10–14 are Likert Scale queries exploring respondents’ value positions on the

permissibility of some common police misconducts, on their views of how common

such practices in fact are. Respondents specify levels of assent or dissent to

challenging propositions by choosing along a 5-point scale from ‘always’ to ‘never’,

plus ‘do not know’.

(a) Nationality status differences Chi square analyses in Table 6.69 shows no significant differences in respondents'

ratings for any of Items # 11-14. All respondents, ‘citizens’ and ‘residents’ alike, had

similar patterns of responses, with only one significant difference, for the item ‘Police

officers should use violence or excessive force to obtain confessions from suspects’.

227

Table 6.69: Chi square tests: relationships between nationality and item # 10 -14 responses

# Item Chi

Squared Statistic

df P- value

10 Police may use violence or excessive force to get suspects to confess

12.923 5 0.024

11 Police may break the rules to get the job done 6.188 5 0.288

12 Police should report other officers' breaches of the rules 3.228 5 0.665

13 Officer who reports a colleague's misconduct, shall not expect much support from the police hierarchy

8.357 5 0.138

14 Police turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers 3.045 5 0.693

Table 6.70 compares ‘citizen’ to ‘resident’ respondents’ attitudes both toward the use

of violence by police officers. Some disagreement in evident on the permissibility of

violence:

Table 6.70: Respondents’ ratings: ‘Police should use violence or excessive force to obtain

confessions from suspects’, by nationality.

Citizen Resident Use violence or excessive force Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

Always 5 1.7% 0 0.0%

Often 28 9.5% 1 2.0%

Sometimes 118 39.9% 18 35.3%

Rarely 71 24.0% 8 15.7%

Never 60 20.3% 20 39.2%

Don't Know/Not Sure 14 4.7% 4 7.8%

Total 296 100.0% 51 100.0%

To compare more closely the two nationality groups’ levels of support/opposition to

police violence, cumulative percentages were computed, taking the sum of ‘always’,

‘often’ and ‘sometimes’ as representing overall support for violence, while the sum of

‘rarely’ and ‘never’ is taken to represent overall opposition to it. The results are in

Table 6.71.

Table 6.71: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Shares of respondents supporting / opposing use of

violence’, by nationality.

Use violence or excessive force Citizen Resident

Support 51.0% 37.3%

Do not support 44.3% 54.9%

‘Citizen’ officers seem more ready to use violence in their work than ‘residents’.

228

Chi square independency tests of other demographic factors with level of agreement

on the use of violence to obtain confessions also showed significant differences. So

we will use this same technique to calculate overall support/opposition to using

violence.

(b) Gender differences

Table 6.72 shows that about 60 percent of female officers, compared to about 47

percent of males, accept that using violence is sometimes ‘necessary’.

Table 6.72: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Shares of respondents supporting / opposing use of

violence’, by gender.

Use violence or excessive force Males Females

Support 47.4% 55.9%

Do not support 48.1% 35.6%

(c) Years of Experience Differences A strong inverse relationship is obvious between ‘years of experience’ and support for

using violence or excessive force in work can be seen in Table 6.73.

Table 6.73: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Shares of respondents supporting / opposing use of violence’, by experience.

Use violence or excessive force 1-3 Years

4-6 Years

7-9 Years

10-15 Years

16 Years or more

Support 62.1% 51.6% 47.7% 42.9% 31.5%

Do not support 30.5% 40.3% 49.2% 54.3% 64.8%

This inverse relationship is strikingly illustrated by Chart 6.55.

229

Chart 6.55: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Shares of respondents supporting / opposing use of violence’, by experience.

62.1%

51.6%47.7%

42.9%

31.5%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

1-3 4-6 7-9 10-15 16 and above

YOE

(d) Rank differences

Data in Table 6.74 show that rank also affects attitudes towards using violence.56

Table 6.74: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Shares of respondents supporting / opposing use of violence’, by rank.

57 Use violence or excessive force Support Do not support

Civilian 56.9% 32.8%

Constable- Corporal 47.0% 45.5%

Sergeant 52.6% 44.2%

Lieutenant 100.0% 0.0%

Captain- Major 44.4% 52.8%

Lieutenant Colonel 18.5% 77.8%

Brigadier General 0.0% 100.0%

Civilian and sergeant level police officers seem much more prone to use violence or

excessive force than higher ranking officers, who oppose such practices.

Chart 4.12: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Shares of respondents supporting / opposing use of violence’, by rank.

56 Given seniority’s role in promotion, ‘rank’ must be correlated with ‘experience’, so this correlation must partially overlap the previous one. 57 The 100 percent ratings represent single respondents.

230

56.9%

47.0%52.6%

44.4%

18.5%

0.0%0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Civilian

Constable- Corporal

Sergeant

Captain- Major

Lieutenant Colonel

Brigadier General

6. Views on handling public complaints about other officers: Item 22.

‘What action would you take if a member of the public wanted to make a complaint

about a corrupt conduct of another police officer?’

(a) Nationality status differences

Most of both ‘citizen’ and ‘resident’ respondents – 61.3 percent and 54.9 percent

respectively – would refer the complaints, or the complainants, to their supervisors;

alternatively they would send them to the Police Commissioner (27.7% and 33.3%

respectively). No big gap58 between them is apparent, though ‘citizens’ slightly favour

supervisors and ‘residents’ the Police Commissioner. Overall, ‘citizens’ refer on 89

percent of complaints/complainants, and ‘residents’ 88.2 percent.

Table 6.75: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Handling of public complaints on other officers’, by

nationality.

Citizens Residents Possible Action

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Take no action 6 2.1% 2 3.9%

Report matter to my supervisor 179 61.3% 28 54.9%

Refer him to Police Commissioner 81 27.7% 17 33.3%

Other 26 8.9% 4 7.8%

Total 292 100.0% 51 100.0%

These preferences are portrayed in Chart 6.57; they are not statistically significant.

58 Chi square statistic is 1.475 and the associated P-value with 3 degrees of freedom is 0.688.

231

Chart 6.57: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Handling of public complaints on other officers’,

by nationality.

2.1%

61.3%

27.7%

8.9%3.9%

54.9%

33.3%

7.8%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Take no action Report the matter to

your supervisor

You w ill ask him to

go to the Police

Commissioner to

make a

Other

Citizen Resident

(b) Gender differences Majorities of both male (59.1 percent) and the female (67.2 percent) respondents

would report public complaints of unacceptable to their supervisor. For females the

rate is higher than for males, but the chi square test showed the difference to be non-

significant59.

Table 6.76: All respondents’ ratings: ’Handling of public complaints on other officers’, by

gender.

Male Female Possible action

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Take no action 6 2.1% 2 3.4%

Report the matter to your supervisor

169 59.1% 39 67.2%

You will ask him to go to the Police Commissioner to make a

83 29.0% 15 25.9%

Other 28 9.8% 2 3.4%

Total 286 100.0% 58 100.0%

(c) Years of experience differences

59 Chi square statistic is 3.301 and the associated P-value with 3 degrees of freedom is 0.348.

232

The data on in Table 6.77 indicate that majorities in all years-of-experience categories

would refer public complaints/complainants to supervisors or to the Commissioner.

Chi square tests show no significant differences60 in ratings among experience groups.

Table 6.77: All respondents’ rating: ‘Handling of public complaints on other officers’, by

experience.

Actions Take no Action

Report to supervisor

Report to Police Commissioner

Other

Years Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

1-3 5 5.3% 59 62.8% 23 24.5% 7 7.4%

4-6 0 0.0% 35 57.4% 22 36.1% 4 6.6%

7-9 1 1.5% 44 67.7% 15 23.1% 5 7.7%

10-15 2 2.9% 42 61.8% 21 30.9% 3 4.4%

16 and above

0 0.0% 26 48.1% 17 31.5% 11 2.0%

Total 8 2.3% 208 60.5% 98 28.5% 30 8.7%

Chart 6.58 illustrates police officers’ preference to refer public complaints/

complainants to their supervisors, as well as the absence of significant differences

among respondents rating due to their years of police experience.

Chart 6.58: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Handling of public complaints on other officers’,

by experience.

Report to supervisor

62.8%

57.4%

67.7%

61.8%

48.1%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

1-3 4-6 7-9 10-15 16 and above

(d) Rank differences

60 Chi squared statistic is 23.172 and associated P-value with 15 degrees of freedom is 0.081.

233

Table 6.78 shows that most respondents, regardless of rank, would refer complaints/

complainants to their supervisors. Chi square tests show that differences in how

respondents would act are not significantly affected by their ranks. 61

Table 6.78: All respondents’ rating: ‘Handling of public complaints on other officers’, by

experience.

Action Civilian Constable Sergeant Lieutenant Captain Lieutenant Colonel

Brigadier General

3 2 3 0 0 0 0

No action 5.2% 3.1% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

39 34 94 0 24 15 0

Refer to supervisor 67.2% 53.1% 61.4% 0.0% 64.9% 55.6% 0.0%

15 23 40 1 9 10 0 Refer to Police Commissioner 25.9% 35.9% 26.1% 100.0% 24.3% 37.0% 0.00%

1 5 16 0 4 2 1

Other 33.3% 166.7% 533.3% 0.0% 133.3% 66.7% 33.3%

The bar graph in Chart 6.59 confirms that the most preferred action on public

complaints is to report to one’s supervisor, and that no significant differences in

respondents’ ranks respondents of different rank. (Recall that a correlation between

experience and rank is probably operative here.)

Chart 6.59: All respondents’ rating: ‘Handling of public complaints on other officers’,

by experience.

Report the matter to your supervisor

67.2%

53.1%

61.4%64.9%

55.6%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Civilian Constable Sergeant Captain Lieutenant

Colonel

61 Chi squared statistic is 27.72 and associated P-value with 21degrees of freedom is 0.143.

234

7. Views on best anti-police corruption policy for UAE: Item 24.

‘How do you believe unacceptable police behaviour could be best dealt with in the

Abu Dhabi?’

The final questionnaire item looks at how police respondents evaluate various policies

for dealing with this critical problem. Most of them agreed on one point: they prefer a

body inside the police force to an external body located outside it.

(a) Nationality status differences

Among ‘citizen’ respondents, 60.6 percent believe that the best way to deal with

police corruption is through an internal body, compared to 67.3 percent of ‘resident’

respondents. Chi square tests62 show that any difference in respondents’ ratings

between ‘citizens’ and ‘residents’ are non-significant.

Table 6.74: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Ways police misconduct could best be dealt with’,

by nationality.

Citizens Residents Possible ways

Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

Internal body 180 60.6% 35 67.3%

External body 73 24.6% 8 15.4%

Impossible to deal with it

10 3.4% 1 1.9%

Don't know/not sure 20 6.7% 5 9.6%

Other 14 4.7% 3 5.8%

Total 297 100.0% 52 100.0%

62 chi square statistic is 2.841 and the associated P-value with 4 degrees of freedom is0.585.

235

Chart 6.60: All respondents’ ratings: ‘How police misconduct could best deal with’, by

nationality.

60.6%

24.6%

3.4%6.7% 4.7%

67.3%

15.4%

1.9%

9.6%5.8%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Internal body External body Impossible to

deal w ith it

Don't know /not

sure

Other

Citizen Resident

236

Part three: comparison between public and police survey

This section compares the public and police officer samples and measures the

consistency of responses in both samples. Its aim is to assess the extent of awareness

of police misconduct. The analysis focuses on comparing how the two sorts of

respondents reacted to items common to both questionnaires.

1. Views on existence of police corruption in UAE: Item 1.

‘Do you think unacceptable police behaviour exists in Abu Dhabi Emirate?’

Public and police appraisals of the existence of police misconduct do not differ

greatly. Table 6.80 and Chart 6.61 show that 68.1 percent police agree that it is a

problem, compared to 73.0 percent of the public. The public’s rating is slightly

higher than the police rating, but chi square tests show this gap not to be statistically

significant.63

Table 6.80: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Existence of police misconduct in UAE’.

Police Public Total Level

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Yes 231 68.1% 146 73.0% 377 70%

No 108 31.9% 54 27.0% 162 30%

Total 339 100.0% 200 100.0% 539 100%

63 Chi square statistic is 1.412 and associated P- value with one degree of freedom is .234.

237

Chart 6.61: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Existence of police misconduct in UAE’.

68.1%

31.9%

73.0%

27.0%

70%

30%

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Yes No

Police Public Total

A clear consensus exists: unacceptable police behaviour in Abu Dhabi is a problem.

2. Views on loci of police corruption in UAE: Item 2.

‘If there is unacceptable behaviour in the police force, in which departments do you

believe it is most likely to occur?’

The next item common to both questionnaires sought to identify the police

departments where police misconduct is worst. Both sets of responses are laid out in

Table 6.81

Table 6.81: All respondents' ratings: ‘Departments where police misconduct is most likely’.

Police Public Total

Department Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent

P- value

Criminal police 43 12.3% 24 11.7% 67 12.1% 0.824

Illicit Drug 30 8.6% 2 1.0% 32 5.8% 0.000

Investigations 101 28.9% 66 32.0% 167 30.0% 0.429

Traffic Police 154 44.0% 108 52.4% 262 47.1% 0.055

Fire Service 15 4.3% 4 1.9% 19 3.4% 0.142

Immigration 93 26.6% 54 26.2% 147 26.4% 0.926

Border Guards 22 6.3% 12 5.8% 34 6.1% 0.827

Do not know/ Not sure 43 12.3% 14 6.8% 57 10.3% 0.039

Other 29 8.3% 8 3.9% 37 6.7% 0.044

238

Respondents’ ratings in both groups are close, and chi square tests found no

statistically significant differences between them.

Both respondents regard the Traffic Department as the one where misconduct is most

common, followed by Investigations. Chart 6.62 summarises all respondents’ views

of the four most corruption-prone departments in bar graph form.

Chart 6.62: All respondents’ ratings: ‘Four departments where police misconduct is most

likely’.

44.00%

28.90%26.60%

12.30%

52.40%

11.70%

32.00%26.20%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

Traff ic Police Investigations Immigration criminal police

Police Public

3. Views on forms of police corruption in UAE: Item 3.

‘Do you think any of the following types of unacceptable behaviour exist in the

UAE?’

The data in Table 6.82 reveal that police and public respondents basically agree on

how they rank of mode of misconduct. Favouritism emerged as the single most

common form of misconduct committed by Abu Dhabi police Personnel.

Table 6.82: All respondents’ ratings: unacceptable s mostly likely to occur

Unacceptable s Police Public Total P- value

57 18 75 Embezzlement

16.3% 8.7% 13.5% 0.012

239

46 18 64 Bribery

13.1% 8.7% 11.5% 0.116

51 40 91 Damaging state interests

14.6% 19.4% 16.4% 0.136

159 74 233 Benefiting from works

45.4% 35.9% 41.9% 0.028

103 46 149 Breaching confidentiality

29.4% 22.3% 26.8% 0.068

74 44 118 Violence against others

21.1% 21.4% 21.2% 0.952

49 34 83 Failure to enforce court decisions

14.0% 16.5% 14.9% 0.423

220 132 352 Favouritism / Nepotism

62.9% 64.1% 63.3% 0.773

164 108 272 Unequal treatment of others

46.9% 52.4% 48.9% 0.204

51 46 97 None

14.6% 22.3% 17.4% 0.020

19 16 35 Other

5.4% 7.8% 6.3% 0.273

Chart 6.63: All respondents’ ratings: five miss mostly likely to occur

62.90%

45.40%

29.40%

21.10%

52.40%46.90%

35.90%

22.30% 21.40%

64.10%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

Favoritism or

nepotism

Unequal

treatment of

others

Benefiting from

works

Breaching

confidentiality

Using violence

against others

Police Public

The above chart demonstrates the absence of significant difference between how both

sets of respondents evaluate which forms of police misconduct occur.

4. Views on failure to report police corruption in UAE: Item 4.

‘What are the main reasons why people do not complain about police misconduct?’

240

In Table 6.83 sets out in descending order how both sets of respondents explain why

the public are reluctant to file complaints against the police. Worry about possible

negative consequence of doing so is rated first by both groups: 56.6 percent of police

and 59.2 of the public as to the second most important reason – that people assume

their complaint will not be disbelieved – Chi square tests shows that the higher ratio

of police who have this view is statistically significant, though both groups rate this

explanation second.

Table 6.83: All respondents’ ratings: reasons why public will not report police misconduct

Reasons Police Public Total P-value

198 122 320 Worry about repercussions / fear retaliation

56.60% 59.20% 57.60% 0.541

193 66 259 Think complaint will not be believed

55.10% 32.00% 46.60% 0.000

156 88 244 Do not know how to make a complaint

44.60% 42.70% 43.90% 0.671

149 92 241 Not obvious how to complain against police

42.60% 44.70% 43.30% 0.631

128 90 218 Complaint will not be addressed

36.60% 43.70% 39.20% 0.097

55 44 99 Complaint processes too complicated

15.70% 21.40% 17.80% 0.093

52 30 82 Complaints are not serious enough

14.90% 14.60% 14.70% 0.925

49 16 65 Do not have time to make complaint

14.00% 7.80% 11.70% 0.027

43 6 49 Those who complain against police are also corrupt

12.30% 2.90% 8.80% 0.000

17 12 29 Other

4.90% 5.80% 5.20% 0.620

241

8 6 14 Police misconduct does not affect them

2.30% 2.90% 2.50% 0.649

Chart 6.64: All respondents’ ratings: Five main reasons why public will not report police

misconduct.

56.60% 55.10%

44.60% 42.60%

36.60%

43.70%44.70%

59.20%

32.00%

42.70%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

fearful of

retaliation

complaint w ill not

be believed

do not know how

to make a

complaint

not obvious how

to make a

complaint

complaint w ill not

be addressed

Police Public

242

Chapter 7

Results, Discussions & Conclusions

This is the final chapter, which will summarise the progress that has been made in

achieving the aims of the study. Within the previous chapters the police misconduct in

Abu Dhabi were analysed based on public and police officers perceptions, and clearly

a critical problem has been identified. Moreover, anticorruption strategies and

mechanisms are currently adopted in UAE both at federal and Abu Dhabi level were

reviewed and discussed. Many weaknesses and shortcomings were highlighted in

these strategies. This chapter will present the final conclusion and list short and long

term recommendations that could be used to manage, control, and reduce the level of

police corruption in Abu Dhabi.

Discussion of survey results

Many interesting, sometime surprising, phenomena were identified through the

surveys. Not all the paradoxes can be explained on the basis of the available data,

highlighting the need for future research. Nevertheless the data do support some

general conclusions.

1. A majority of the public view Abu Dhabi police negatively and the closer their

contact with police, the more negative their opinions. Among public

respondents, of the 57.9 percent who had interacted with police over the previous

twelve months, 54.5 per cent saw police misconduct as a ‘major’ problem, with

243

only 24.8 per regarding it ‘minor’. (A mere 10.9 percent saw it as ‘not a

problem’). In contrast, 37.8 per cent of those without contacts saw the problem

as ‘major’, 29.7 per cent saw it as ‘minor’, and 13.5 percent as ‘not a problem’ at

all. The public either has a short memory, or corruption is on the rise. Finally,

most Abu Dhabi police (68.1 per cent) themselves believe misconduct occurs in

the force. Coming from people who work in the police environment and know it

better than citizens do, it is the hardest evidence we have of how prevalent police

misconduct is in the UAE.

2. The Abu Dhabi police force (perhaps most police) strives to present itself to the

public and media in a positive light, even if must cover up misconduct. The

research suggests that most Abu Dhabi police (68.1 per cent) believe misconduct

does occur in the force. As this view emanates from people who live and work in

the police environment, and who know it much better than ordinary citizens do, it

must be seen as the best estimate we have of how prevalent misconduct is among

UAE police. It also indicates the disadvantage of not having effective

mechanisms to monitor police, and suggests strongly that police need to be

trained in public relations in order to reverse the public’s image of them and to

encourage the public to take them into their confidence.

3. The more experienced and the higher the rank of police respondents, the more

negative their view of how serious a problem police misconduct is. As years of

police service rise, they become more negative in how they appraised police

misconduct. The same correlation arises from correlating respondent officers’

misconduct ratings with their ranks. (Of course higher ranking officers normally

have more years of experience). A number of possible interpretations suggest

244

themselves for this worrying relationship, but a detailed understanding will

require further research, which should be undertaken as a matter of urgency.

4. Police and public both rate Traffic, Investigations and Immigration Departments

as the ones most likely to exhibit police misconduct: The figures for the three

Departments (Traffic: 52.4 percent; Investigations: 32 per cent; and Immigration:

26.2 per cent) are odd because the Investigations Department has so little direct

contact with the public. This phenomenon needs detailed analysis.

5. The four most important forms of misconduct identified by the respondents reflect

a range of overlapping causes. Police work raises moral and social dilemmas and

creates divided loyalties. Since attacking corruption requires a deep understanding

of how police officers work through these conflicts, they must be analysed

individually and jointly to ensure that the motivation mechanisms of officers are

properly formulated.

(i) Favouritism-nepotism: This form of misconduct has roots in UAE’s traditional

tribal/familial society where loyalty is owed first to the family, then to one’s tribe,

and lastly to the State. Hence police feel ethically obliged to favour family or

tribe members over others.

(ii) Unequal treatment of people due to race, nationality, colour, religion or

gender: Invidiously discriminatory treatment of people on various grounds is

common, despite being strongly deplored. Unequal treatment is the UAE derives

from to rapid social changes that in a few decades changed a static traditional

society into a complex and highly multi-national society.

245

(iii) Personally profiting from official duties: ‘Financial’ and ‘process’ corruption

motivate much corrupt activity. Bribery is hard to define, as some gifts to police

officers can be a simple ´thank you’ for help provided. But one driver of

misconduct is financial need, even though the UAE’s ability to provide for its

citizens’ and residents’ economic needs means that bribery is less pervasive in the

UAE police force than is many poorer countries. This form of misconduct seems

to be associated with longer service and higher rank, with Captains and Majors

more inclined to abuse power by misappropriating property or embezzling

government funds. This needs further investigation.

(iv) Use of excessive force: Most police, regardless of rank or gender, feel that

they can use violence and excessive power to obtain confessions from suspects,

but here, an inverse correlation exists between years of experience and acceptance

of violence. Case histories in the UAE Preventive Security Department database

show that younger officers (e.g., recently graduated Lieutenants and First

Lieutenants) are more likely to use violence to get confessions. More mature

officers tend to oppose using force, feeling they can get confessions without it.

The need for better training and supervision is clear.

6. The public’s perception of the damage caused by police misconduct is strikingly

generous and ‘statesmanlike’: While 56 percent of the public think police

misconduct harms them, they worry more about the damage done to the prestige

and competence of the force than about personal costs! The most worrying effects

reported are: (i) ‘Bad example to the public’ (53 percent); (ii) ‘loss of quality in

the police service’ (42 percent); and (iii) ‘loss of public confidence in

246

government’. Personal financial issues were seen as ‘important’ by only 11

percent. Police misconduct makes 31 percent of the public unsafe because it

threatens the stability of UAE society. Widespread police corruption puts public

security is at risk. Does this mean that much corruption is hidden from view?

What is so dangerous as to threaten individuals and their families? The dilemma

such an environment creates makes it unlikely that the public will report much

corruption: on the one hand they worry about how corruption threatens society,

but on the other hand they turn a blind eye to it because of fears for their

immediate personal security. Police corruption must be dealt with now, for so

long as people fear complaints will be ignored or – worse – expose them to

retribution, they will not make them.

7. Ethical conflicts and practical worries deter police from reporting colleagues’

misconduct known to them. Nearly all officers (92.5 percent) agree that reporting

colleague’s misdeeds should be encouraged, with 72.5 percent agreeing that

‘police officers should report other officers’ breaches of the rules.’ This indicates

strong consensus among police that unacceptable misconduct should be reported,

but in fact a mere 20 percent actually do report it. The reasons for this seem to be

mixed: on the one hand fear of repercussions -- that they themselves might be

targeted later -- or a reluctance to be alienated from colleagues by being morally

unethical. Among the officers who agreed to report their colleagues – 76 percent

– say they would address complaints to a senior officer, 9 percent to the office of

HH Major General Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and just 3 percent to the State

Security Department. If members of the public report corrupt conduct to a police

officer, only 2.3 percent of the latter say they would take further action. However,

about 28 percent of officers say they would refer complainants on to the Police

247

Commissioner, suggesting that those who do so as a way of politely declining to

act themselves. Is this due to lack of knowledge of the complaint system? To the

absence of such systems? Or to police officers’ desire to distance themselves from

complaint against colleagues’ misdeeds? Officers may well fear that if a

complaint is ever brought against him, he will be victimised by his colleagues in

retribution. Some police say that reporting on colleagues violates the dominant

culture (33 percent) or even religion (32.3 percent), but -- even worse -- 55.7

percent of police doubt the police hierarchy would support them if they report

colleagues’ misconduct!

8 The public feel they should report misconduct, but few do. Of the public 56.9 per

cent say they would complain if they observed police acting improperly, but so far

only twenty people (9.8 percent) did. This small number is due to: (i) fear of

being victimised; (ii) ignorance of procedure; or (iii) expectation they will be

ignored. (Interestingly, police ratings are similar, indicating basic consensus on

why the public does not report it criticisms of police).

(i) Fear of victimisation: Among public respondents, 59.2 percent do not report

misconduct for fear of retaliation. The police themselves worry about retaliation

from other police if they make complaints themselves or act on others’ complaints,

which mean that the public’s fears are quite reasonable.

(ii) Ignorance of reporting procedures: Simple ignorance of how to make

complaints is cited by 44.7 percent of the public. Some would complain to the

office of H. H. Major General Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, others to the local

police, and others to the State Security Department. In fact 80 percent of the

248

twenty complainants went to local police, and the rest either to the Preventive

Security Department or the office of H. H. Major General Saif bin Zayed Al

Nahyan. As the last has no system for receiving complaints, it is clear how little

the public knows of complaint procedures. Such anomalies raise a key point: the

police system lacks clear cut systems for receiving complaints, whether from

public or police. For more people to enter complaints, they must know how to do

so.

(iii) Expectation they will be ignored: Fear that complaints will not be addressed

is cited by 43.7 percent of public respondents. As noted above, most police when

handed a complaint, have strong reasons for avoiding taking action. That, plus the

fact that most public complaints about police are actually made to other police in

the first instance, means the public’s fears of inaction are also well founded.

9. To deal with corruption most police prefer an internal body, one within the police

force, with only a quarter preferring an external one, acting outside it. The internal

body preferred by the majority poses doubts: will that system work when most

officers are reluctant to report colleagues’ misconducts? Will it work if they do

not expect the police hierarchy to support them? As for the public, they are evenly

divided between advocates of an internal body (39 per cent) and advocates of an

external one (38 per cent). While they believe corruption exists in the police and

is ‘serious’, the public respondents still are willing to trust an internal body to

remedy police corruption.

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Summary

Police misconduct is a complicated phenomenon facing countries throughout the

world. Many interrelated factors directly and indirectly impact on its existence and

magnitude: work environments, economic and financial situations, nature of police

work, etc. In the UAE many cultural and religious values exert different influences

that can be summarized thus:

• To some extent they prevent corrupt practices in a society and in its police;

• To some extent they limit such unacceptable behaviour;

• To some extent they mask and/or excuse them.

Most people contact police departments for trivial reasons: to get driver’s licenses

from the Traffic Department, visas from the Immigration Department. These contacts

leave either negative or positive impressions depending on the attitudes police take to

the public and how do they respond to inquires. The survey suggests that such direct

contacts create more negative impressions about Abu Dhabi’s police than they do

positive ones, resulting, often, from negative acts by police officers: favouritism,

violence, breaches of rules, or discrimination based on race, gender, nationality, etc.

This study established a key point: police misconduct is common, serious, and so

deeply rooted in current attitudes and practices that it will not correct itself. This

indicates that the UAE, like many other countries, needs a surveillance body if this

problem is to be resolved. While people do disagree on whether such a body should

operate inside or outside the police force, something is needed.

250

Setting aside the true magnitude of Abu Dhabi’s police misconduct problem, some

public respondents think that, within limits, it can be ‘lived with’. It would be

mistaken to see the difficulty of drawing clear lines between acceptable and

unacceptable conduct as an indication that police corruption is intangible to the

public, that its effects do not directly influence them, or that it is masked by cultural

and religious values. In fact many of the public do think police misconduct impacts

adversely on them and, strikingly, worry more about indirect effects due to the

damage corruption inflicts on the police themselves than they do about its direct

effects on them. This commitment expressed by the public to the welfare of the

community can be seen as ‘social capital’ that can be mobilised in the fight against

police corruption.

About half of public respondents and police officers feel a duty to report misconduct

to the authorities, and large percentages of both say that if they saw officers acting

improperly they would report them. But the fact that few from either group actually

do so highlights a troubling social contradiction. What stops both public and police

from complaining when they feel they should is the same: (i) ‘Fear repercussions and

fear of retaliation’; (ii) ‘Don’t know how to complain against police’; and (iii) ‘Fear

complaints will be ignored’. Police officers do not report colleagues’ misdeeds either

on ethical grounds (violation of professional solidarity) or on practical ones (worry

that if complaints were made against them, they would face revenge by colleagues).

Demography also matters: males and females disagree on misconduct issues, as do

‘citizens’ and ‘residents’ and people with different education levels.

The survey exposes the lack of established complaint systems. Both public and police

officers are unsure of how to make complaints and where to lodge their complaints.

251

Effective systems must be put in place that can investigate fairly and promptly

complaints, whether from the public or from other police. Otherwise police

misconduct threatens society with serious perils.

Awareness must be cultivated among public and police officers on how serious the

misconduct problem is. They must see that ‘in principle’ obligations that do not result

in action are hypocritical. The public must be taught they have rights that society will

protect from violation, even when the violators are police officers. Only then will

they be willing to inform authorities of misconduct. Police officers, too, need

continuous training in public relations to help them treat people respectfully, without

regard for race, nationality, gender, etc. They must also be trained on how to handle

public complaints so that confidentiality is assured to all parties. Police need to be

protected from lapsing into misconduct by providing them with a healthy work

environment, reducing work pressures, and securing for them a life that will motivate

them to focus their loyalty on the state and on the community at large.

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Examining whether the aims have been achieved

Aims of the study

1. To quantify and qualify the level of police corruption in Abu Dhabi.

2. To investigate and analyse ways of police corruption in the Abu Dhabi Police.

3. To examine any potential external mechanisms that can be used to manage,

control and thereby minimize the magnitude of police corruption in Abu

Dhabi Police.

Achievements of the Study

The mean data of this study was conducted by surveys among members of public and

member of the police force officer in the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and the number of

surveys was delivered as follows:

Table 7.1: Delivered and received a number of questionnaires

Name Delivered Received

Abu Dhabi City Police 300 154

Al-Ain Police 300 196

Public 400 358

Total 1000 708

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The key findings of the study:

1. The majority of the respondents (68.1 and 73 percent) of the Police Force of

the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and public respectively believe that there is

unacceptable behaviour in the police force.

2. Traffic, investigation, and the immigration have been identified as the

departments with highest level of unacceptable behaviour by police in the

public and police officers view.

3. ‘Favouritism and nepotism’, unequal treatment on grounds of race, nationality,

colour, religion and gender’, and ‘police benefit from their work’ have been

identified as the most types of unacceptable behaviour which exists within the

Abu Dhabi police force, according to both police and the public.

4. Misusing of authority or misusing of official capacity is one of the corruption

categories, but sometimes this misconduct is justifiable by police officers. The

current study found the following activities are used in different time

frequency by police officers:

•••• Violence or excessive force

•••• Breaking the rules to get the job done

•••• Turning a blind eye to improper conduct by other officer

5. (30.8 per cent) of police officer will take no action if a member of the public

wanted to make a complaint about corrupt conduct of another police officer.

6. (56.6 per cent) of police officer believe that the public are worried about

repercussions if they complain about corrupt of police officer, while 59.2

percent of the public hold the same believe.

7. The public image of the police is affected negatively by contact police.

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8. The survey found that there is no clear complaint system, where both public

and police officers are not aware about the right procedure for complaining or

the correct police office to lodge their complaints.

9. Some demographical factors have an impact on the respondents’ ratings

toward different issues related to the misconduct problem such as gender,

where the females’ ratings were relatively less than males’. Another factor is

the nationality status, where citizens’ ratings were significantly higher than

residents’. And although respondents’ educational levels differed, high school

and bachelor’s degree holders had almost the same perception.

CONCLUSIONS:

Police corruption is worldwide phenomenon; this phenomenon has continued affect us

all, whether we are public or law enforcement officers. There are many interrelated

factors that have direct and indirect impacts on the existence and the magnitude of this

critical problem such as; work environment, financial situation, nature of the police

work, etc. For the UAE there are many cultural and religious values that have

different impacts on the existence and size of this problem. These impacts can be

summarized as:

• Cultural and religious values prevent to some extent unacceptable behaviour in

the society.

• Cultural and religious values limited the number and type of such

unacceptable behaviour, or

• Cultural and religious values hide the police misconduct.

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In this thesis, a definition for corruption using a functional approach has been

proposed. This practically exposes to different angles of the corruption phenomenon:

‘any deliberate act or failure to act by a public official, in the exercise of his/her

official functions, causes damage to the government, natural person, or legal person,

notwithstanding if he did achieve an advantage to himself/herself or for a third person

or did not’.

The public respondents were in agreement with the police respondents that

unacceptable police exists. The TI’s CPI index rated UAE at 6.1 in 2004 up from 5.2

in 2003. Even with the difficulty of access to information the researcher was able to

establish that unacceptable police exists in the police departments.

The respondents’ demographic features such as age, gender, nationality, type of work,

education status, have no effect on their opinion regarding unacceptable behaviour.

Currently, the UAE Government has ratified the United Nations Convention against

corruption (Merida, Mexico, 9-11th of December 2003). According to the convention

the member states should develop, implement or maintain effective and co-ordinate

anti-corruption policies. Hence the UAE will have to develop and establish its own

independent body which needs to be equipped with authority to investigate and

combat corruption.

Public as well as the police respondents believe the traffic department has the highest

level of unacceptable police behaviour, followed by investigation, and immigration

departments. The current survey shows that many of the respondents who had a recent

256

experience with the police mentioned unacceptable behaviour of police officers in

Abu Dhabi.

Favouritism and nepotism have been classified as the highest frequency of police

behaviour followed by unequal treatment and police benefiting from works. Emirate

society being tribal in nature, oaths are usually taken towards the family, the tribe and

then the state. Accordingly, one consequence of this social structure is many cases of

favouritism among the police officers. Though according to the Islamic Law (Shari’a)

corruption is a major threat of the basic human’s needs and rights such as food,

shelter, healthcare, education, work, and security ought to be provided by the state

regardless of one’s sex, race, religion or political views it could be seen that

unacceptable police behaviour persists in this society. Thus the unconventional advise

to the states parties to ‘adopt, maintain, and strengthen systems for the recruitment,

hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of civil servants’ to eradicate the sources

of corruption in the civil service, is an anomaly. In this regard, adopting a code of

standards of conduct, may address issues like fairness and impartiality in dealing with

the public and loyalty to the organisation. Establishing systems of data collection of

personal information regarding their financial statements, assets and substantial gifts

or benefits (pecuniary register) is important to reduce the conflict with respect to their

duty as public officers and in cases of favouritism, so that a transparency can be

established.

The respondents of the police survey agreed that turning a blind eye to a complaint

against another police officer was the norm; however the same respondents disagreed

with the statement that ‘Reporting another police officer for breaching rules

contradicts the UAE cultures’, as well as the statement ‘Reporting another officer for

257

breaching rules contradicts Islam’, and also the statement, ‘Reporting another officer

for breaching rules is shameful for the reporting officers’. The majority of police

respondents agree that a police officer who reported his or her colleagues’ misconduct

should not expect much support from the police hierarchy.

The police force has less knowledge about the complaint system if 28.5% would

direct complaints to the Police Commissioner or to their superior, and 59.2% of the

public fear repercussions, and with 43.7% believing that their complaints will not be

taken seriously; all these findings reveal that serious anomalies with the complaint

system exist.

One - third of police respondents believe that the police officers should break the rules

to get the job done and more than one-third of police respondents in all different ranks

and genders agreed that the police should use violence and excessive force to obtain

confessions from suspects.

The majority of police respondents believe that unacceptable police behaviour should

best be dealt with by an internal body within the police force. However a quarter of

the respondents believe that it should be dealt with by a body external to the police

force.

Further research

1. Transparency is important and a Freedom of Information Act should be

considered. The most important function regarding this study in relation to the

258

political system is examining the government by ‘questioning the ministry’s’

use of its legislative aims.

2. The World Trade Organisation is pursuing trade liberalization across the

borders without paying much attention to the potential corruption

accompanying free trade and circulation of financial assets. So TI argues that

the WHO should recognize the serious fight against international corruption as

an urgent responsibility.

3. The public needs to be educated by harm of corruption within the public as

well as private sectors and severe measures of punishment issued for varying

degrees of corruption. Media plays an important role in influencing and

educating the public. Media can also be a source to uncover police corruption.

The media should highlight the consequences of corruption and how it is

affecting the development of the country and its public.

4. An internal committee should be formed to investigate corruption within the

organisation as well as an external committee should be implemented for

making random checks to see that the internal committee is applying its

capabilities effectively. This should be complimented by an impartial judicial

court which is independent from undue influences by non-judicial elements

from government and independent of affairs from all extrinsic influences.

5. Police Officers should cooperate with internal disciplinary investigation.

Further investigating officers should not be biased in their investigation of

fellow officers.

259

6. Rigid hierarchy and strict separation between seniors and juniors can also

generate double standards in systems in the way of discipline is treated.

Gravity of offence rather than rank should decide how misconduct will be

addressed.

7. No system is perfect but the best system for delivering police accountability

requires external complaints agencies with the expectation that the police will

continue to tackle the majority of disciplinary offences.

Limitations

The limitations of the thesis were a more extensive population of data has to be

surveyed. In this survey the majority of the public respondents were UAE Nationals

(80%) while Non UAE citizens (20%), though the UAE is a multinational country

with more than 75% of the population are non-UAE citizens showed that the

respondents were not satisfied with the police conduct. Though a lot of questionnaires

were distributed to the non-UAE citizens but the response was very poor as most of

these respondents fear reporting or participating in surveys because of retribution

concerns Additionally most of the non-UAE respondents come from backward Arabic

backgrounds where participating in surveys is not within their knowledge. Hence a

more extensive survey involving this large group of non-UAE Citizens should be

included.

260

With the difficulty of access to information the researcher was able to collect the

information from the Preventive Security Department, General Inspector’s Office &

State Security Authority.

In the survey prisoners and other persons with high frequency contact with the police

like drug addicts need to be included. Additionally the survey needs to also include

retiring and resigning officers on an anonymous basis in the hope that these officers

may now be more open to revealing some factors involving police corruption.

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Recommendations

Short Term Recommendations

1. Organised and easily accessible facilities at the federal level, such a

hotline, specialized websites, email, and mail addresses. The outcomes

of such complaints should also be easily accessible. Both the NSW

and Hong Kong ICACs have provided such tools to their citizens

wishing to come forward with intelligence or complaints. Indeed, the

UAE needs to develop a new culture of public scrutiny and a feeling of

collective responsibility.

2. The UAE has no program for educating the citizens about corruption-

related issues such as ways of detection, strategies of contention,

consequences and legal liabilities of corruption. The ICAC in Hong

Kong has a well-developed educational program rich with a variety of

activities (Annual Report2002a: 19). The same was observed in the

NSW ICAC. The UAE has the financial capacity to support a wide

range of effective anti-corruption educational strategies such as having

a hotline, a website, community group meetings, publications, and

radio and television commercials.

3. To consider the employees facilities and privileges, for example review

the salary structure and benefits meet the requirements of leading a

corruption free life.

262

4. Have public sector organisations that are concerned specifically with

corruption and responsible for spreading the awareness among the

public about the risk of corruption. In addition like such organisation

can conduct annual or periodic surveys among all public servants to

get their anonymous anti-corruption views. This will also reflect how

the anti-corruption plan is proceeding and how effective it is.

5. Monitoring the investigation department to find out why there is a

corruption, when there is no direct contact with the public and also to

identify the type of corruption. This issue has been highlighted in this

thesis.

6. Create a sold and active database that is linked with all police

departments. This database should contain different information about

police officers, previous corruption cases, public and police

complaints, etc. All data should be revised and analysed periodically in

order to figure out why such misconduct and complaints occurred.

7. The need for an intensive education programme for the police officers

in different police departments with respect to public relations. This

program should be immediately activated to change the perception of

the public about the police.

263

8. The potential risks areas of corruption development are in (a)

Recruitment of staff employment where favourism, discrimination,

nepotism and conflict of interests could play a major role. (b) Tenders

and contracts and purchase of bulk assets (c) Licensing and Regulating

(d) Financial systems like concessions licensing, lease bribery etc. (e)

Large infrastructure: huge amounts can be misused, thus requiring

accountability and transparency.

9. The public should be assured of rewards and not repercussion when

reporting corruption against a public official.

264

Long Term Recommendations

1. Unlike Australia and Hong Kong, the UAE lacks a separate legal act with

specific corruption provisions, and prohibiting traditions of favouritism

that have a fertile environment within a tribal society.

2. The police should be trained in the procedures to receive complaints from

the public as well as how to report another police officer against

unacceptable police behaviour. Unacceptable police behaviour includes

also suspects as well as corrupted officers.

3. The UAE needs to establish an anti-corruption internal organisation

supervised directly by the minister of interior which is independent from

the influence of the police. The example of Hong Kong ICAC does

provide a better match to this criterion, than the NSW ICAC that deals

only with cases of the public sector. This can be achieved by combining

both the departments of the General Inspectors Office and the Prevention

Security Department and make clear rules for receiving investigation of

any complaints against any police employee.

4. The UAE is in need of introducing modern anti-corruption provisions that

are more effective than the current ones, i.e., relieving the law of any

limitations imposed by the prevalent tribal values. The UAE prospective

265

anti-corruption laws will need to rely on values of social justice and

general public interest rather than narrow traditional family or tribal

values. And also, such laws have to be clear in defining the reasonable

grounds to report suspected corrupt conducts, so as to avoid the possibility

of mis-interpretation and waste of resources.

5. To take a multi-pronged approach to fight corruption and work with other

agencies in the UAE related to public awareness such as the State Security,

Ministry of education etc.

6. The UAE needs to establish a subject in their program in schools and

colleges about anti-corruption addressing the need and harmful effects on

society and the country similarly to the ICAC, which has produced a

number of subjects for use in primary and secondary schools. The ICAC is

a successful commission that devotes its efforts to fighting corruption and

eradicating it from the both public sectors and private sectors.

7. It is very important to create and pervade the awareness among public and

police officers about the seriousness of the misconduct problem and clarify

to them that they are accountable for reporting any unacceptable

behaviour. In addition, the public should know their rights and should

inform the authorities if their rights were abused.

266

8. Police officers need continuous training in public relations to help them in

dealing with people in respectful ways regardless of their race, nationality,

gender, etc. Moreover, police officers need to be trained on how to handle

public complaints.

9. Police officers need to be protected from temptation by provided them

with a healthy work environment, reduction of work pressure, secure life,

trust and any other issues that may motivate them to create the loyalty to

their state and community.

267

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Annex I

Survey of Public Perceptions of Police Ethics

283

Survey of Public

Perceptions of

Police Ethics

Researcher Humaid Almuhairi

Email: h@uaetech.com Phone number: +971 50 582 7777

Principal Supervisor

Dr. Mark Craig. Email: m.craig@qut.edu.au

Associate Supervisor

Dr. Sharon Hayes Email: s.hayes@qut.edu.au

Description- The purposes of this survey is to establish your impression concerning

unacceptable behaviour in the police force.

Definition- The unacceptable behaviour, in this context, concerns not only

embezzlement, which is requesting or taking undeserved money (bribery), but it also

includes deliberately damaging the state interest for their personal or others’

profiteering, breaching confidentiality, using violence against others, deliberate

avoidance of enforcing decisions or orders issued by a court of law, applying

favouritism or nepotism, and unequally treating others on grounds of race, nationality,

colour, religion, or gender.

Purpose and Objectives- This study will attempt to identify and quantify major

issues in relation to police unacceptable behaviour within the police service. The

survey will attempt to find how widely unacceptable behaviour, within the UAE

police, is spread.

284

This survey is part of a Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD) study, which is being

conducted at the Faculty of Law, Justice Studies, Queensland University of

Technology, Australia.

This study is supported by the following UAE institutions:

1. Directorate-General of Abu Dhabi Police.

2. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority.

3. UAE Ministry of the Interior.

4. UAE Embassy in Canberra, Australia.

General Instructions for Completing and Returning the Questionnaire- The

survey needs approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. To answer the questions,

please tick the box next to your preferred response. Please return your completed

survey in the postage-paid and self- addressed envelope.

Expected Benefits- Your participation in this survey has no direct benefits to you.

However, your assistance will help develop higher standards of police ethics.

Personal Risks and Confidentiality- The survey is designed in a way to reduce any

risks that might touch the participant’s personal wellbeing. Therefore, the survey is to

be completed anonymously. Accordingly, please do not include any personal details

that might identify you. As it is anonymous, you are encouraged to provide as much

genuine responses as possible. If you have any concerns, please contact the Research

Ethics Officer on +61 7 3864 2340, by email on ethicscontact@qut.edu.au, or to the

postal address : Research Ethics Officer, Office of Research, O Block Podium, QUT

GP Campus, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane 4001. You can also contact the supervisor of

this study.

285

Voluntary Participation- You are free to withdraw your consent, at any time, from

further participation in the survey, without comment or penalty.

Further Enquiries- Please contact the researcher for further information or any

queries regarding the survey.

Concerns and Complaints- If you have any complaint regarding the survey, please

contact the Research Ethics Officer on +61 7 3864 2340, by email:

ethicscontact@qut.edu.au, or to the postal address: Research Ethics Officer, Office of

Research, O Block Podium, QUT GP Campus, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane 4001. You

can also contact the supervisor of the study.

Feedback- After its completion, this study will be accessible at the Police Library.

286

Survey questions

1. What is your age (in years)?

o 1 18-24 years o 2 25-34 years

o 3 35-44 years

o 4 45-54 years

o 5 55 years and over

2. What is your status in the UAE?

o 1 Citizen

o 2 Resident

3. What is your gender?

o 1 Male

o 2 Female

4. What is your educational background?

o 1 Less than high school o 2 High school o 3 Diploma

o 4 Bachelor’s Degree

o 5 Master’s Degree

o 6 Doctor’s Degree

o 7 Other (Please specify…………………………………………………)

5. In which sector are you currently employed?

o 1 Public sector o 2 Private sector

o 3 Joint public-private sector

o 4 Student

o 5 Unemployed

o 6 Retired/ pensioner

o 7 Other (Please specify……………………………………………...)

6. Would you perceive possible unacceptable behaviour in the Abu Dhabi police

as a:

o 1 Major problem

o 2 Minor problem

o 3 Not a problem

o 4 Do not know/ not sure

287

7. Have you had contact with police during the last 12 months?

o 1 Yes o 2 No

8. Do you think there is police unacceptable behaviour in the UAE?

o 1 Yes

o 2 No (Go to question 10)

9. If there is unacceptable behaviour in the police force, in which department do you believe unacceptable behaviour most likely to occur? You may tick more

than one box.

o 1 Criminal Police

o 2 Illicit Drug Department

o 3 Investigations o 4 Traffic Police o 5 Fire Service o 6 Immigration

o 7 Border Guards o 8 Do not know/ not sure o 9 Other (Please specify……………………………………………)

288

10. Do you think any of the following types of unacceptable behaviour exist in the UAE police? You may tick more than one box.

o 1 Embezzlement

o 2 Requesting or taking undeserved money (Bribery)

o 3 A police officer deliberately damages the state interest for personal or others’ profiteering

o 4 Police benefiting from works, related to state interest, for personal profit

o 5 Police breaching confidentiality

o 6 Using violence against others

o 7 Police deliberately avoid enforcing decisions or orders issued by a court of law

o 8 Favouritism or nepotism

o 9 Unequal treatment of others on grounds of race, nationality, colour or religion or gender.

o 10 None o 11 Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

11. Do you feel that unacceptable behaviour in the police affects you, or your

family, in any way?

o 1 Yes

o 2 No (If “No”, go to Q.13)

o 3 Do not know/ not sure 12. In what way could unacceptable behaviour affect you? You may tick more

than one box.

o 1 Police unacceptable behaviour has a detrimental financial impact

o 2 Police unacceptable behaviour lowers the quality of police decision- making

o 3 Police unacceptable behaviour lowers the level of public confidence in government/ public sector

o 4 Police unacceptable behaviour lowers the quality of the police service

o 5 Police unacceptable behaviour makes you or your family members feel unsafe

o 6 Police unacceptable behaviour generates increase in crime.

o 7 Police unacceptable behaviour sets a bad example to the public.

o 8 Police unacceptable behaviour is a cause of employment inequality

o 9 Do not know/not sure

o 10 Other (Please specify……………………………………………...)

289

Tick the box which indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

18. If you saw police acting improperly, would you make a complaint to the authorities?

o 1 Yes o 2 No (go to Q21)

19. If “YES”, to whom would you make the complaint? You may tick more than

one box.

o 1 The local police o 2 The State Security Department

o 3 The Preventive Security Department

o 4 The office of HH Major General Feif Al-Nehyan

o 5 The State Audit Institution o Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

20. Have you ever reported police unacceptable behaviour to authorities?

o 1 Yes o 2 No (If “No”, go to Q24)

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither Agree Nor

Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Don't Know/Not

Sure

13. “Unacceptable behaviour” in the Abu Dhabi police, is seen as good business in the private sector

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

14. There is nothing I personally can do about unacceptable behaviour in the Abu Dhabi police

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

15. It is not my responsibility to report unacceptable behaviour

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

16. Police unacceptable behaviour is tolerated within the UAE society

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

17. Police unacceptable behaviour can be tolerated if it reduces crime in Abu Dhabi

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

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21. If “YES”, to whom did you make a complaint? You may tick more than one

box.

o 1 The local police o 2 The State Security Department

o 3 The Preventive Security Department

o 4 The office of HH Major General Feif Al-Nehyan

o 5 The State Audit Institution o 6 Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

22. How did you make the complaint? You may tick more than one box.

o 1 By mail

o 2 By phone or fax o 3 Direct visit to authority o 4 Internet o 5 Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

23. What are the main reasons why pubic do not complain about police unacceptable behaviour? You may tick more than one box.

o 1 Their complaint will not be addressed

o c It is not obvious how to make a complaint against police

o 3 The complaint processes is too complicated

o 4 Their complaints are not serious enough

o 5 They think their complaint will not be believed

o 6 They do not know how to make a complaint

o 7 Police unacceptable behaviour does not affect them

o 8 They are worried about repercussions/fearful of retaliation o 9 They do not have time to make a complaint

o 10 People who complain against police are themselves corrupt

o 11 Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

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24. How do you believe unacceptable behaviour could be best deal with in UAE

o 1 By an internal body within the police force o 2 By an external body outside the police force o 3 It does not mater as it is impossible to deal with the unacceptable

behaviour

o 4 Don't know/not sure o 5 Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

Comments: please use this space for making any comment you believe may be relevant to this study

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

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Annex II

A Survey

on

Police Ethics

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A Survey

on

Police Ethics

Researcher Humaid Almuhairi

Email: h@uaetech.com Phone number: +971 50 582 7777

Principal Supervisor

Dr. Mark Craig. Email: m.craig@qut.edu.au

Associate Supervisor

Dr. Sharon Hayes Email: s.hayes@qut.edu.au

Description- This survey aims at establishing police officers’ impressions about

unacceptable behaviour within the police service, and is to be completed by police

officers only.

Definition- The unacceptable behaviour, in this context, concerns not only

embezzlement, which is requesting or taking undeserved money (bribery), but it also

includes deliberately damaging the state interest for their personal or others’

profiteering, breaching confidentiality, using violence against others, deliberate

avoidance of enforcing decisions or orders issued by a court of law, applying

favouritism or nepotism, and unequally treating others on grounds of race, nationality,

colour, religion, or gender.

Purpose and Objectives- This study will attempt to identify and quantify major

issues in relation to police unacceptable behaviour within the police service. The

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survey will attempt to find how widely unacceptable behaviour, within the UAE

police, is spread.

This survey is part of a Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD) study, which is being

conducted at the Faculty of Law, Justice Studies, Queensland University of

Technology, Australia.

This study is supported by the following UAE institutions:

5. Directorate-General of Abu Dhabi Police.

6. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority.

7. UAE Ministry of the Interior.

8. UAE Embassy in Canberra, Australia.

General Instructions for Completing and Returning the Questionnaire- The

survey needs approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. To answer the questions,

please tick the box next to your preferred response. Please return your completed

survey in the postage-paid and self- addressed envelope, or you can put it in a special

box located at the main entrance of the department.

Expected Benefits- Your participation in this survey has no direct benefits to you.

However, your assistance will help develop higher standards of police ethics.

Personal Risks and Confidentiality- The survey is designed in a way to reduce any

risks that might touch the participant’s personal wellbeing. Therefore, the survey is to

be completed anonymously. Accordingly, please do not include any personal details

that might identify you. As it is anonymous, you are encouraged to provide as much

genuine responses as possible. If you have any concerns, please contact the Research

Ethics Officer on +61 7 3864 2340, by email on ethicscontact@qut.edu.au, or to the

postal address : Research Ethics Officer, Office of Research, O Block Podium, QUT

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GP Campus, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane 4001. You can also contact the supervisor of

this study.

Voluntary Participation- You are free to withdraw your consent, at any time, from

further participation in the survey, without comment or penalty.

Further Enquiries- Please contact the researcher for further information or any

queries regarding the survey.

Concerns and Complaints- If you have any complaint regarding the survey, please

contact the Research Ethics Officer on +61 7 3864 2340, by email:

ethicscontact@qut.edu.au, or to the postal address: Research Ethics Officer, Office of

Research, O Block Podium, QUT GP Campus, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane 4001. You

can also contact the supervisor of the study.

Feedback- After its completion, this study will be accessible at the Police Library.

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Survey questions

1. What is your status in the UAE?

o 1 Citizen

o 2 Resident

2. What is your age (in years)?

o 1 18-24 years o 2 25-34 years

o 3 35-44 years

o 4 45-54 years

o 5 55 years and over 3. What is your gender?

o 1 Male

o 2 Female

4. How long have you been serving in the police force (in years)?

o 1 1-3 years o 2 4-6 years o 3 7-9 years o 4 10-15 years o 5 16 years and above

9. What is your educational background?

o 1 Less than high school o 2 High school o 3 Bachelor’s Degree

o 4 Master’s Degree

o 5 Doctor’s Degree

o 6 Other (Please specify………………………………………………………)

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6. What is your rank?

o 1 Civilian o 2 Constable- Corporal o 3 Sergeant – Sergeant Major

o 4 Lieutenant - First Lieutenant o 5 Captain- Major

o 6 Lieutenant Colonel- Colonel o 7 Brigadier General- Major General - Lieutenant General

7. Do you think there is police unacceptable behaviour in the Abu Dhabi?

o 1 Yes

o 2 No (Go to question 8)

8. If there is unacceptable behaviour in the police force, in which department is unacceptable behaviour most likely to happen? You may tick more than one

box.

o 1 Criminal Police

o 2 Illicit Drug Department

o 3 Investigations o 4 Traffic Police o 5 Fire Service o 6 Immigration

o 7 Border Guards o 8 Do not know/ not sure o 9 Other (Please

specify………………………………………………………)

9. Do you think any of the following types of unacceptable behaviour exist within the Abu Dhabi police service? You may tick more than one box.

o 1 Embezzlement

o 2 Requesting or taking undeserved money (bribery)

o 3 A police officer deliberately damages the state interest for personal or others’ profiteering

o 4 Police benefiting from works, related to state interest, for personal profit

o 5 Police breaching confidentiality o 6 Using violence against others o 7 Police deliberately avoid enforcing decisions or orders issued by a court of Law.

o 8 Favouritism or nepotism

o 9 Unequal treatment of others on grounds of race, nationality, colour, religion, or gender.

o 10 None

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o 11 Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

Tick the box which indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements

Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never

Don't Know/Not

Sure

10. Police officers may use violence or excessive force to obtain confessions from suspects

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

11. Police officers may break the rules to get the job done

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

12. Police officers may report other officers’ breach of the rules

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

13. An officer, who reports his colleague’s misconduct, shall not expect much support from the police hierarchy

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

14. Police officers turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

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Tick the box which indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither Agree Nor Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Don't Know/Not

Sure

15. Reporting another officer for breaching rules contradicts our culture

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

16. Reporting another officer for breaching rules contradicts our religion

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

17. Reporting another officer for breaching rules is a cause of shame for the reporting officer

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

18. Reporting another officer for breaching rules should be encouraged

o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5 o 6

19. Have you ever reported police unacceptable behaviour to authorities?

o 1 Yes o 2 No (go to Q21)

20. If “yes” how did you report it? You may tick more than one box.

o 1 By mail

o 2 By phone or fax o 3 Direct visit to an authority (Please specify………………………..…)

o 4 Other (Please specify……………………………………..…………..)

21. To whom did you make a complaint? You may tick more than one box.

o 1 A senior officer o 2 The State Security Department

o 3 The State Audit Institution o 4 The Preventive Security Department

o 5 The office of HH Major General Feif Al-Nehyan

o 6 Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

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22. What action would you take if a member of the public wanted to make a

complaint about a corrupt conduct of another police officer?

o 1 Take no action

o 2 Report the matter to your supervisor

o 3 You will ask him to go to the Police Commissioner to make a complaint

o 4 Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

23. What are the main reasons why public do not complain against police unacceptable behaviour? You may tick more than one box.

o 1 Their complaint will not be addressed

o c It is not obvious how to make a complaint against police

o 3 The complaint processes is too complicated

o 4 Their complaints are not serious enough

o 5 They think their complaint will not be believed

o 6 They do not know how to make a complaint

o 7 Police unacceptable behaviour does not affect them

o 8 They are worried about repercussions/fearful of retaliation o 9 They do not have time to make a complaint

o 10 People who complain against police are themselves corrupt

o 11 Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

24. How do you believe unacceptable police behaviour could be best dealt with in the Abu Dhabi?

o 1 By an internal body within the police force o 2 By an external body outside the police force o 3 It does not matter as it is impossible to deal with the unacceptable behaviour

o 4 Don't know/not sure o 5 Other (Please specify……………………………………………..)

Comments: please use this space for making any comment you believe may be relevant to this study

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION