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APleaforUnderstanding
GuyLongworth1
WarwickUniversity
April2009
1.Introduction.
ThePhilosophyofLanguageseeksultimatelytoaddresstwoquestions:Whatarethelinguisticfacts,andinparticularthefactsthatdeterminewhatmaybesaid
onoccasionbytheuseoflanguage?Andhowarespeakersinapositiontoexploit
those facts? In a slogan, the first question requests a theory of meaning, the
second a theory ofunderstanding.AsMichaelDummetthas long advocated, a
theoryofmeaningmustengageproperlywithatheoryofunderstandingsothat
the two questions ultimately receive an integrated answer.2 However,
historically,thesecondquestionhasbeenrecessive.Mybriefinthispaperistomakeamildpleainitsfavour,throughapreliminaryexplorationofsomeissues
thatarisewhenitisbroughttoprominence.
In thebackgroundaresomelargequestionsabout theproperdivisionof
labourbetweenthetheoryofmeaningandthetheoryofunderstanding.Should
we view linguistic understanding as a form of propositional knowledge of
independentlydiscerniblemeaningfacts?Orismeaningmoreintimatelyrelated
tounderstandingthanthatpicturewouldrequire,sothatfactsaboutmeaningare partly absorbed into, and so only accessible through, a theory of
understanding? Indeed, is there even a separable question for the theory of
meaning to address, or is understanding an achievement that makes no
independentlyspecifiabledemandsupon thefacts?3Thesearelargequestions,
andIshallnotattempttoforegroundthemhere.Butitisimportanttorecognise
thatasatisfactoryanswertoouropeningquestionsmustengagewiththem.
Ishall begin in 2by distinguishingsome varieties of understanding. 3
sketchesanargumentagainsttheviewthatpropositionalknowledgesufficesfor
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understanding. The aim is not simply to support that conclusion, but also to
suggest that understanding is distinguished from other forms of epistemic
standingbyitsdependenceuponaspecificformofintegrationofothertypesof
epistemic standing. 4 marks a further distinction, between what I shall callintake anduptake. 5discusses the prospects of two accounts ofuptake, and
suggestssomedesiderataona unifiedaccountofintakeanduptake. It ishere
thatthelargeissuesmentionedaboveloomclosesttothesurface.Toreiterate,
myaimhereisnottoprovidedetailedargumentsfororagainstspecificpositions
ordesiderata,but rather to outline some central issues and to indicate some
topicsthatIthinkareworthyoffurtherreflection.
2.Somevarietiesofunderstanding.
Dummettdistinguishestwosensesoftheverbtounderstand:
that in which someone is said to understand a word, phrase or sentence,
consideredasatype,andthatinwhichhemaybesaidtounderstandaparticular
utterance.Wemaycallthesethe dispositionalandtheoccurrentsensesofto
understand.(Dummett,1993:58)
Why is there a need tomark (or to keep track of) this distinction? Dummett
offerstwosortsofreasons.Thefirstadvertstoadistinctionputativelyamongst
theobjectsofunderstanding.Thesecondadvertstoadistinctionamongstmodes
ofunderstanding.
Weneed anoccurrent senseof understand for two reasons: indexicality and
ambiguity.If,forexample,IhearsomeonesayThereisasinistersmellhere,
howmuchdoIneedtoknowaboutwhereheistoknowwhatstatementhewas
makingorwhatthoughthewasexpressing,inthatsenseunderwhich,iftrue,itis
true absolutely? If someone utters an ambiguous sentence, his hearers may
understanditinaparticularway,whetherasheintendedornot;wemayspeak
also,notonlyofhowthespeakermeantit,butofhowhewasunderstandingit.
(1993:60)
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This firstreason resideswithadistinctionbetweenwhata typeofexpression
meanswhatthestandingmeaningoftheexpressiontypeisandwhatissaid
by the use of that expressionwhat thought is expressed by the use of the
expressiononanoccasion.Thesecondreasonresideswithadistinctionbetweenpossession of a capacity to understand expression types or utterances and
properexerciseofthatcapacityonparticularoccasions.Dummettfocusesupon
the latter reason in response towhathe takes tobeWittgensteins refusal to
acknowledgeoccurrentunderstanding:
it is difficult to see how it can be maintained that no occurrent notion of
understandingisrequired:foritispossibletobeperplexedbyasentenceonfirst
hearing,throughafailuretotakeinitsstructure,andtoattainanunderstandingof
itonreflection.(1993:103)4
Whenthetwotypesofreasonaredistinguished,theneedforanatleastfourway
distinction emerges: (i) dispositional understanding of standingmeaning; (ii)
occurrentunderstandingofstandingmeaning;(iii)dispositionalunderstanding
ofwhatissaidinparticularutterances;and(iv)occurrentunderstandingofwhat
issaid.
To see the need for (i)(iv), consider attending to an utterance of the
sentencetypein(1):
(1)Heistoointelligenttoexpectustobeat.
A typical response to an utterance of (1) would be blank incomprehension:
absence of occurrent understanding even of the standing meaning of the
sentence type employed. On reflection, however, one is able to take in its
structure, and to attain understanding. To a good first approximation, the
standingmeaningof(1)isgivenin(2):
(2) A contextually determinedmale is too intelligent for one toexpect a
contextually specified group including the speaker to beat the
contextuallydeterminedmale.
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Sincethisfeatureof(1)isaccessibleonreflection,itisplausiblethatoneanyway
had dispositional understanding of the sentence type. Clearly, occurrent
understandingofthesentencetypedoesnotsufficeforoccurrentunderstandingoftheutterance:forthat,oneneedstograspwhatwassaidintheutterance,in
thesenseinwhichwhatwassaiddeterminestruthconditions.5Andforthat,one
wouldneed tobeinapositiontoascertain (at least) the referents of he and
us.6Inatleastathinsense,thefactthatonewouldordinarilybeabletodothis
supports theappropriateness of attributingdispositionalunderstandingof the
utterancei.e.acapacitytofigureoutwhatwassaidintheutterance.Butone
mighthedgehereifthetransitionfromoccurrentgraspofmeaningtooccurrent
graspofwhatissaidrequiredtheacquisitionofspecificcognitivecapacitiesfor
instance, if, in order to grasp occurrently what the speaker said, one had to
acquireacapacitytothinkabouthimthroughbecomingperceptuallyacquainted
withthemaledemonstratedbythespeaker.7
Afurtherdistinctioncanbedrawnatthispointbetweenthestatethatis
theupshotofonescomingtounderstandaparticularutterance,andtheepisodic
achievementthroughwhichoneentersthatstate.Andoccurrentunderstanding
isnotentirelyappropriateforuseinapplicationtothestateratherthanitsonset,
aswitnesstheoddityofcombinationofoccurrentwithotherverbsforstates,as
in occurrent knowledge, occurrent belief, etc.8 However, emphasis on the
distinction between states and episodes can be suppressed in the present
context. What matters here is the distinction between a mere capacity to
understandonoccasionandtheupshotsofproperexerciseofthatcapacityonan
occasion,whateverthespecifictemporalprofileofthelatter.9
I propose in the remainder to focus upon occurrent understanding, or
grasp, of what is said. And I shall prescind, as far as is practicable, from
consideration of constitutive connections amongst the four categories, except
those that arise due to occurrent understanding involving the exercise of
dispositional understanding.Wewill thus be attending to phenomena at the
interface between understanding language and understanding the users of
language whilst attempting to ignore issues that arise on either side of the
interface.
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somethingsimilar.Theimmediatehypothesishastheadvantagethatitinvolves
onlyminimal departure fromwhatwouldordinarily be the casewereone to
understandFlorencesutterance.Butitsuffersfromnumerousdisadvantages.
Thehypothesiscanbeunderstoodinatleastthreeways.First,itcanbeunderstoodasembodyingtheclaimthatonesunderstandingofanutteranceisa
simplematterofonesknowingwhatwassaidinthatutteranceandsoisneutral
with respect to anymore specific account of how one knowswhat was said.
Second,itcanbeunderstoodasembodyingtheclaimthatonesunderstandingof
anutteranceisabrutalmatterofonesknowingwhatwassaidinthatutterance
andsorequiresthatthereisnomorespecificaccountofhowoneknowswhat
was said. Third, it can be understood as embodying the claim that ones
understanding of anutterance is anunspecified matter of ones knowing in a
particularwaywhatwassaid.
Theunspecifiedunderstandingofthehypothesis,withitsuncomfortable
conjunctionofacceptanceof thepossibilityof furtherspecificationwithrefusal
to supply it, can be rejected immediately in the present context. Reasons for
rejectingthesimpleandbrutalunderstandingsarealittlelessstraightforward.
Toafirstapproximation,bothshouldberejectedduetotheirrespectivefailures
appropriately to distinguish understanding from other forms or ways of
knowing,eitherthroughfailingtomarkunderstandingofffromotherformsor
waysofknowing,orthroughmarkingunderstandingoffinawaythatrendersits
standingmysterious. I shallbegin toexplain those failingsby considering the
hypothesisthatunderstandingisasimplematterofknowingwhatwassaid.
Seeingthingscanputoneinapositiontohavepropositionalknowledge
aboutthosethings.Andwethinkofseeingthingsasaspecificwayinwhichone
canbeputinaposition toknowaboutthosethings,awaydistinctfrombeing
putinapositiontoknowthroughunderstanding.Thepointisnot(yet)thatan
accountofunderstandingmustunderwritespecialtreatmentofunderstanding;
butrather,thattheaccountofunderstandingmustnotdisruptspecialtreatment
ofothercases.Yetthesimpleunderstandingofthehypothesisisconsistentwith
casesof knowledge throughsensory perceptionfor instance, seeing that the
game has begun or hearing that the clock has stoppedalso being cases of
understanding. Hence, the simple understanding of the hypothesis fails
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appropriately todistinguishunderstanding fromotherwayswehaveofbeing
(orcomingtobe)inapositiontoknow.
Oneresponseatthispointwouldbetorejectthecomplaintaspremised
onafailuretoexploitalloftheresourcesavailabletothedefenderofthesimplehypothesis.Thehypothesisis,notsimplythatunderstandingofanutterancemay
beanyformofpropositionalknowledgeaboutit,butalso,morespecifically,that
itisamatterofbeinginapositiontohavepropositionalknowledgeofwhatwas
said in the utterance. And, the response continues, the special nature of the
objectsofunderstanding,thattheyarefactsconcerningwhatwassaid,forcesthe
requireddistinctionamongstourwaysofbeingputinapositiontoknow.Forthe
involvementofwhat is not senseperceptiblei.e. contentinwhatwas said
meansthatonecannotinotherspecificwaysi.e.byseeing,hearing,etc.come
byknowledgeconcerningwhatwassaid.AsTylerBurgeputsit,
We do not perceive the contents of attitudes that are conveyed to us; we
understand them. We perceive and have perceptual beliefs about word
occurrences. We may perceive them as having a certain content and subject
matter,butthecontentisunderstood,notperceived.(Burge,1993:478)
Thereisroomfordiscussionatthispointconcerningtheunderstandingofthe
bounds of the (sense) perceptible required by the envisaged defence of the
simpleunderstandingofthehypothesis.Inparticular,thosewhowishtoemploy
thedefenceandwhoalsowishtoendorseaviewofsenseperceptionsasbearers
of propositional contentwill have work to do in ensuring a difference in the
modesofengagementwith content involved inperception and understanding
thatwouldmakeappropriateBurgesdifferentialattitude.Anditisnotobvious
thatmaking out the requireddistinctionwouldnot require goingbeyond the
simplehypothesis.Butamoreimmediateproblemwiththeenvisageddefenceof
thesimplehypothesisisthat,ratherthanevadingtheneedfurthertospecifythe
nature of understanding, it positively invites further specification. For the
distinctionwith senseperception relies, not upon the impossibilityofsensory
engagement with content, but rather upon the impossibility of engagement
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throughunderstandingwith the proper objects of sense. Andmaking out that
impossibilitywouldseemtorequireasubstantiveaccountofunderstanding.
The brutal understanding of the hypothesis has the resources to
distinguishunderstandingfromknowledgegotthroughsenseperception.Onitsbrutalunderstanding,thehypothesisprovidesanegativespecificationoftheway
ofcomingtoknowcharacteristicofunderstanding,accordingtowhichthereis
nomorespecificcharacterisationofthewayofcomingtoknowthatconstitutes
understanding.Onthisview,whatdistinguishesbeinginapositiontoknowon
thebasisofseeing,hearing,etc.,frombeinginapositiontoknowasamatterof
understanding is that in the former cases, by contrast with the latter, it is
possiblefurthertospecifythewayinwhichoneknows.Bycontrastwithcasesof
knowledgegotthroughseeing,hearing,etc.,acompleteanswertothequestion,
how one knows what was said in that utterancewhere the question
presupposesthatwehaveanexhaustiveanswertoallsubquestionspertaining
toperceptualsources,forinstancethequestionofhowyouwereinapositionto
knowaboutthatutteranceratherthanthisonemightbe:Onejustdoes.
Although it is plausible that the brutal hypothesis can underwrite a
distinction between understanding and senseperceptual sources of epistemic
position,itappearsunabletoregisteradistinctionbetweenunderstandingand
othersources.Atleast that issoonthe plausible view thatwith respect toat
least certain basic pieces of ones a priori knowledge, there is no articulate
answertothequestionofhowoneknowsthem.10Onthatviewofbasicapriori
knowledge,thebrutalhypothesisfailstoacknowledgeagenuinedistinction,by
classifying understanding together with any way of having nonperceptual
knowledgeor,atleast,withallwaysofhavingsuchknowledge forwhichno
articulate characterisation is available. And the immediate corollary of that
failure is apt to appear even more pressing. By classifying understanding
together with basic a priori knowledge, it treats understanding as a way of
havingsuchknowledge.Andthatwillseemtomanytocountdecisivelyagainst
thehypothesis.
The consequence will seem decisive against the brutal hypothesis to
manytheorists,thoughnottoall.Foroneprominentexample,Burgeisrendered
immune tothepresentchargebecausehe anyway holdsthat, inat leastsome
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intellection.Althoughsuchanaccountwouldgobeyondthesimpleidentification
ofunderstandingwithknowingwhatwassaid,itwoulddosobydrawingonlyon
specificationsanywayimplicatedincharacterisingitscomponentachievements.
Second thoughts serve to scotch the suggestion. Although the proposedaccount is able to distinguish understanding from the upshots of sense
perceptionorintellection,itisunable,withoutsupplementation,todistinguishit
fromothercasesofknowledge got throughboth.For one example, it appears
unable, absent supplementation, to distinguish understanding from ordinary
cases of knowing on the basis of sense perception, where this involves the
applicationofconceptssointellectiontothedeliverancesofthesenses.For
another example, it appears unable, without further ado, to distinguish
understanding from a posteriori knowledge of necessities, where such
knowledgeistheupshotofintegratedoperationsintypicalcases,inferentially
integratedoperationsofintellectionandperception.
Thediscussionto thispointhasbeen premisedon theassumptionthat
basic a priori knowledge is not subject to further specification. Perhaps that
assumption is the villain.Lets suppose, then, that basicapriori knowledge is
subjecttofurtherspecificationperhaps,forexample,asknowledgegotthrough
intellection or reflection. Obviously, the supposition is subject to its own
explanatorydemands,inparticularthedemandforanaccountofthepowersof
intellectionandreflection. Buteven supposing those demandsdischarged, the
consequent accountofaprioriknowledgewouldbeunable tosave thebrutal
hypothesis. Understanding would be not only special, by virtue of its simple
distinctionfromotherformsorwaysofknowing,butalsoanoddity,byvirtueof
themannerofthatdistinction.Itwouldbetheonlyformorwayofknowingnot
subject to further specification. And the mystery occasioned by that special
standing is deepened by the observation that it would be a brutal way of
knowingtimeboundcontingencies,e.g.concerningwhosaidwhat,andwhen.By
far the most natural view at this point is that no obvious version of the
hypothesisthatunderstandingofanutteranceisknowledgeofwhatwassaidin
thatutteranceshouldbeaccepted.Rather,ifunderstandingisaformorwayof
knowing,thenitisaspecificformorwayofknowing.
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The conclusion to this point is supported by an observation of
Christopher Peacockes. Peacocke observes that it is possible to know what
someone has said in a particular utterance without understanding their
utterance.Forinstance,someoneintheknowmighttellyouthat,inproducingaparticularutterance, Florencesaidthat Viswanathan is disqualified.Supposing
appropriateconditions aremet, it ispossibletoacquireknowledge fromsuch
testimony. Hence, one might acquire knowledge that Florence said that
Viswanathanisdisqualifiedonthebasisoftestimony,soindependentlyofones
understanding Florences utterance to that effect.13 A similar result can be
achievedbyconsideringthedifferencebetweenmerelycomingtoknow,through
beingtold, thatanutteranceof(1)says that (2) and coming,perhaps through
engagementwith (2), simply tounderstandanutterance of(1). Inaddition to
supplyingimmediatesupporttotheconclusionthatunderstandingisnotsimply
knowledgeofwhatwassaid,Peacockesobservationbolstersaninterveningstep
in the argument. For it indicates thatunderstanding isnot distinguished from
other formsofknowledge simply byvirtue ofbeingknowledge specifically of
whatwassaid.Anditsuggeststhatifunderstandingisaformorwayofknowing
whatwassaid,thenitisapeculiarlyimmediateformorway.
4.Intakeanduptake.
Anaturalhypothesisatthispointwouldbethatunderstandingisaspecificform
ofpropositionalknowledge, oradeterminatewayofhaving thedeterminable,
propositional knowledge, akin to other specific forms, or ways of having,
propositionalknowledge,e.g.seeingthatsuchandsuchandrememberingthat
suchandsuch.However,pursuitofthecomparisonwithotherspecificforms,or
ways,ofknowingsuggestsanalternativehypothesis.
Consider seeing that the game has started. If we accept that this is a
specificform,orway,ofknowingthatthegamehasstartedinparticular,thatit
isadifferentform,orway,ofknowingfromhearingthat,orrememberingthat,
thegamehasstartedthenitispressingtosayinwhatitsspecificitylies.Andan
obviousanswerwouldbethat seeing that the gamehas started isamatter of
knowing, by seeing, that the game has started.14 By parity, then, one would
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naturallypredictthat,ifunderstandingisaspecificformofknowing,thenitisa
matterofknowingbyunderstanding.Andifoneunderstoodthecharacterisation
ofthespecificformsofknowinginvolvedhereasgoingviaappealtoanepisodic
basis for the acquisitionofknowledgefor example,anepisodeofseeing thegame start, or of understanding Florences utterancethen it might appear
natural to view the understanding of an utterance, not as the output of an
epistemicachievement,butratherasitsepisodicinput.
The suggested understanding of the structure of specific forms of
knowledge isnot immediately forced.For onemightview the knowbying
specification as indicating involvementof a specific epistemic capacity, rather
than specific input to a general epistemic capacity. For present purposes, weneedntattempttodecidetheissuebetweenthetwounderstandings,forthereis
reasontothinkthat,whateveritspreciseroleindeterminingepistemicstanding,
exercises of dispositional understanding can leave a mark in consciousness
independent of the achievement of epistemic standing. And itwould then be
naturaltoviewthoseepisodesascasesofunderstanding.
Areasontothinkthatexercisesofdispositionalunderstandingcanmake
apsychologicaldifferenceindependentoftheachievementofepistemicstanding
isprovidedbythepossibilityofrationalwithholdingofbeliefaboutwhatissaid
consistent with exercise of understanding otherwise suitable to underwrite
knowledgeofwhatissaid.15Thestructureofthecaseissimilartoananalogous
case for seeing. Inthat case,we beginwitha situation inwhichone sees that
suchandsuch,for instanceasituation inwhichone sees thatachesspieceis
black.Inthatsituation,oneknowsbyseeingthatthechesspieceisblack.Since
knowing that the chesspiece is black entails believing that the chesspiece is
blackatleastmodulothesubjectsrationalityandtheirabilitytobelievethat
thechesspieceisblackonebelievesthatthechesspieceisblack.Butonemight
be inalmost preciselythe samepositionwith respect toonesperceptual and
epistemic standing towards the chess piecewhilst withholdingbelief that the
chesspieceisblack.Ifonehasapparentlygoodreasonsforwithholdingbelief
perhaps one has, or appears to have, good reason for thinking that one is
undergoingabrainmanipulationthatwouldmakeonlyredchesspiecesappear
black to onethen ones withholding belief might be rationally permissible.
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Hence,onemightrationallywithholdbeliefand,so,failtoknowthatthechess
pieceisblack.Plausibly,onemightnonethelessseethechesspiece,andthechess
pieces colour.Moregenerally, the upshot of exerciseofones seeing capacity
mighthavethesamepotentialtodetermineonesepistemicstandingassuchanupshot would have in a healthy doxastic environment. For instance, if the
apparent reason for withholding belief were extinguished, thenceteris
paribusit isplausiblethatonewouldbe inapositiontoknowthatthechess
pieceisblack.
Inthecaseofunderstanding,wecanbeginwithasituationinwhichone
knowson thebasisofunderstanding thatFlorencehassaidthatthegamehas
started.Inthiscase,itappearsplausiblethatonemightinalmostpreciselythe
samewayundergoanexerciseof onescapacitytounderstand inacontext in
whichonerationallywithholdsbelieffromthepropositionthatFlorencehassaid
thatthegamehasstarted.OnemightstilltakeinFlorencessayingthatthegame
has started even if apparently reasonable doubts about brain manipulation
preventedonefrommakingepistemicuseofwhatonetookin.Moregenerally,
onemightbeinapositionsuchthat,ifonesapparentreasonsforwithholding
beliefwere extinguished,thenceterisparibusonewouldbeinapositionto
knowthatFlorencehadsaidthatthegamehasstarted.16
Isuggestedthat,giventhedistinctionbetweenthenonepistemicupshot
ofexerciseofacapacitytounderstandandknowledgeattainedonthebasisof
that exercise, it would be natural to identify understanding with the upshot
ratherthantheknowledge.Butthedistinctionbetweenupshotandknowledge
doesnotdictateadoptionofthatpositiononthelocationofunderstanding.Given
the distinction, a question arises as to the function of knowledgeand, in
particular,thebeliefrequirementonknowledgegiventhatapparentlyonecan
takeinelementsofonesenvironmentinitsabsence.Andaplausibleanswerto
thatquestionananswer givencredence byreflectiononwhatis lacking ina
subjectwhomistakenlywithholdsbeliefinwhattheytakeinisthatknowledge
of a fact is what allows one to exploit that factto have that fact serve as a
reasonforoneinonestheoreticalandpracticalreasoning.Onthatview,what
ismissing,whenonewithholdswhatwouldotherwisebereasonablebeliefabout
whatonetakesin,isacapacitytohaveonespracticalandtheoreticalposition
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controlledbyhow things are.17 If that is right, then exercisesof a capacity to
understandthatdonotresultinknowledge,likeexercisesofacapacitytoseea
black chess pieces colour that do not result in seeing that the chess piece is
black,mightbethoughttoinvolveaformofcognitiveblindness.18
Andwemightthenratheridentifyunderstandingwithaspecificformofopennesstothefacts
aboutwhathasbeensaid,ratherthanwiththetypeofinputthatdeterminesits
specificform.
Again,we arenotrequiredfor present purposesto take a standon the
precise locationofunderstanding.Wehave seen grounds for requiring, of an
accountofunderstanding,thatitgiveaccountsbothoftheepisodesbywhichone
takes in what is saidwhat I shall refer to as an account of intake
understandingandalsooftheformofopennesstowhatonetherebytakesin
that enables one to exploit facts about what is said in ones theoretical and
practicalreasoningwhatIshallrefertoasanaccountofuptakeunderstanding.
I shall turn, in the next section, to the question of the form of uptake
understanding,inthehopethataddressingthatquestionmightprovidecluesas
tothefurtherspecificationofintake.
5.Uptakeandknowledgeoftruth-conditions.
If openness to what one takes in through understanding is a matter of
understandingthatsuchandsuch,inthewaythatopennesstowhatonetakesin
throughseeingisamatterofseeingthatsuchandsuch,thenitistooamorphous
asubjectmattertowarrantfocussedattention.Foronecanseethatachesspiece
is black without seeing the chess pieces colour, for instance by seeing the
coloursoftheotherchesspiecesinaset.AndonecanunderstandthatFlorence
said, in a demonstrated utterance, that the game has started without
understandinganutteranceofFlorencestotheeffectthatthegamehasstarted,
for instance by understanding testimony from someone other than Florence.
Whatisrequiredisarestrictiontotheepistemicpositionsonecanoccupyjust
through exercise of ones capacity to understand. Put another way, what is
wanted is an account of epistemic standing that would be (with appropriate
modalqualification)bothnecessaryandsufficientforuptake.
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Therequirementforanaccountofepistemicstandingthatwouldbeboth
necessaryandsufficientforuptakehasobviousaffinitieswitharequirementof
Donald Davidsons, according to which a theory of meaning for a particular
languageshouldexplicitlystatesomethingknowledgeofwhichwouldsufficeforinterpreting utterances of speakers of the language to which it applies
(Davidson,1976:171).TherearetworelevantdifferencesbetweenDavidsons
formulationandours.First,Davidsonseeksanaccountoffacts,ortruths,thatare
exploited by thosewho understand utterances, rather than an account of the
way(s) inwhich those facts, or truths, are exploited. That provides sufficient
grounds for Davidsons decision not to join us in requiring an account of
knowledgethatisnecessaryforopennesstowhatoneunderstands,groundsthat
Davidsonseekstobolsterthroughgeneralscepticismconcerningtheprobityof
the more demanding aim.19 Second, and related, Davidson seeks to provide
sufficientconditionsforbeinginapositiontointerpret(hisversionofuptake)
throughastatement of the facts, ortruths,knowledgeofwhichwouldsustain
abilitytointerpret.Bycontrast,ourformulationleavesopenwhetherDavidsons
aim is, in full generality, sustainable, by allowing that understanding might
dependuponsomethingotherthanpropositional(i.e.stateable)knowledge.20
Davidsonsproposalformeetinghisrequirementisthatknowledgeofthe
output theoremofan interpretative truth theory that applies toanutterance,
togetherwithknowledge that itwas a theoremofsuch a truththeory,would
suffice for uptake of that utterance.21 Lets begin by considering whether
Davidsons proposal can be transposed into an answer toour questionabout
uptake.Sounderstood,itbecomesthehypothesisthattheknowledgeinvolvedin
Davidsons proposal is both necessary and sufficient for uptake. For example,
uptakeofFlorencesutteranceof(6)wouldbeamatterofknowingthat(7),as
the theorematic element of an interpretative truth theory coveringFlorences
utterance,u.
(6)Viswanathanwillwin.
(7)uistrueiffViswanathanwillwin.
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Fromtheperspectiveofourrequirement,thehypothesishastwomainbenefits
butsuffersfromatleastonecriticalflaw.
The first main benefit is that the hypothesis sustains an attractive
requirementthatIshallcallthetransparencyofunderstanding.Indiscussingthelogicalstatusofsupposition,Dummettnotesthatitisnotlogicallyanimperative
for,heobserves,
Icould,havingsaid,Thinkofanumber,askHaveyoudonesoyet?,butit
wouldbeajokeifIaskedthatquestionhavingsaid,Supposethewitnessis
tellingthetruth.(Dummett,1973:309)22
As is appropriate, Dummett doesnt explain the joke. One obvious source of
humour is the inappropriate form of the verb. In order for supposition tobe
somethingonecoulddo,sosomethingonecouldbeordereddoto,itwouldneed
tobeabletostandfortheoutcomeofaspecifiedprocess.Andthatwouldrequire
theverbsupposetotake(distinctive23)progressiveform,contrarytofact.24But
a second potential source is brought out more clearly by the imperative,
Entertainthethoughtthatthewitnessistellingthetruth.25Thesecondsource
is that one cant understand the order to entertain the thought, or idly to
suppose, without complying thereby with its demand. The transparency of
understandingisresponsibleforthelattereffect,wherebyonecannotingeneral
understand an utterance without entertaining a thought that it is used to
express.More carefully, thetransparencyofunderstandingis therequirement
thatonewhohasuptakeoftheexpressionofaparticularthoughtistherebyina
positiontotreatreasonsfororagainstacceptingthethoughtitselfasreasonsfor
or against endorsing the thought registered through understanding. For
instance,accordingtotransparency,onewhohasuptakeoftheexpressionofthe
thoughtthatViswanathanwillwinisinapositiontotreatreasonsfordenying
that Viswanathan will win as reasons for denying what they understand as
havingbeenexpressed.Inthatway,whatisimmediatelybeforeonesmind,by
virtue ofonesunderstandingofanutterance, is the (putative) subjectmatter
determinedbythethought,ratherthan,forexample,thethoughtitselfbeingthe
immediateobjectofonesthinking.
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ThetransparencyrequirementiscloselyconnectedwithJohnMcDowells
observationthatourmostbasicengagementswithwhatspeakerssayareways
ofacquiringinformationaboutthesubjectmatterofwhattheysayratherthan
about what the speakers have said or believe.26
It is weaker than therequirement that all thoughtsbe transparently communicable, so that for any
thought of any thinker, it is possible for another thinker to entertain that
thought.Thelatterrequirementfacesobviousdifficultiesarisingfromthespecial
natures of certain indexical thoughts.27 And it may be that similar difficulties
afflict the less demanding requirement for transparency of understanding. In
thatcase,oronother grounds,onemightconsidera furtherweakening tothe
requirementthatunderstandingtheexpressionofathoughtwithsubjectmatter
P involves entertaining a thought with subject matter P.28 Further wrinkles
mighttheninvolvespecificationofadditionalconditionsontherelationbetween
expression and entertaining. The requirement obviously warrants further
articulationanddefence,butitsprovisionalendorsementwillbeharmlessinthe
present,exploratorycontext.
ThehypothesisderivedfromDavidsonsproposal sustains transparency
inthe followingway.Wehaveit thatFlorencesaid thatViswanathanwillwin
and so gave expression to the thought that Viswanathan will win. Hence,
according to transparency, understanding Florences utterance must involve
entertaining the thought that Viswanathan will win. The required result is
secured by the hypothesis because one cannot know that (7) without
entertaining(7),andsowithoutentertaininga thoughtofitsrighthandside,to
theeffectthatViswanathanwillwin.29
Afirstobviousalternative to the present hypothesisis thatuptakeis a
matterofknowingwhatwassaidinanutteranceforinstance,thatuptakeof
whatFlorencesaidinuisamatterofknowingthatwhatFlorencesaidinuwas
thatViswanathanwillwin.Knowingthatisamatterofknowingwhichthought
Florence expressed rather than a matter of entertaining the thought she
expressed.Toseethedifference,andalsoanaspectofitsimportance,consider
thatitisconsistentwithknowingthatFlorencehassaidthatViswanathanwill
win that one should fail to think in accord with the truth conditions of what
Florencesaid.Forinstance,itisconsistentwithaninabilitytotakereasonsfor
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thinking that Viswanathan did not win as reasons for thinking thatwhat one
took Florence to have said is false. Indeed, it is consistent with apparently
rationalrefusaltotreatwhatFlorencesaidashavingtruthconditions,forone
might have apparent grounds for endorsing a view of expressed thoughtsaccording towhich they do not.30 Notice that, if thepossibility of this type of
blockontheappreciationofreasonsmarksoffknowledgeofwhatwassaidfrom
understandingproper,thenitwouldprovideanatleastpartialexplanationfor
Peacockesobservationthatonecanknowwhatwassaidwithoutunderstanding.
Thepartial explanationwould be thatmere knowledge, unlike understanding,
fails the transparency requirement. Anyway, if we assume the transparency
requirement, then the present hypothesis has a key advantage over the first
obviousalternative.
Asecond,related,benefitofthehypothesisisthatitensureswhatIshall
call appreciation of the expressive connection between an utterance and the
thoughtoneunderstandsittoexpress.Appreciationofexpressiveconnectionisa
matterofappreciatingthatreasonsfororagainstwhatoneunderstandstohave
beenexpressedarereasonsfororagainsttheacceptabilityoftheutterancein
whichitwasexpressed.Appreciationissustainedbythehypothesisbecauseif
onederivesknowledgeof(7)fromknowledgeofaninterpretativetruththeory
coveringu,thenone isinapositiontoknowthatthetruthvalueofuiscoeval
with the truthvalue of the thought that one entertains on the basis of
understanding.Oneisthereforeinapositiontoderivereasonstotake utobe
true(/false)fromreasonstobelieve(/deny)thatViswanathanwillwinand vice
versa.31 In this case, there is room for a gap to open up, on the hypothesis,
betweenuptakeanditsderivationalexploitation,forsomeonemightknow(7)as
atheoremofaninterpretativetruththeoryandyethaveapparentgroundsfor
rejecting the derivability of coeval status for its rightand left hand sides, due
perhapstoanidiosyncraticunderstandingofthebiconditional. 32Followingthe
earlier suggestion about Peacockes observation, the gap here might help to
explainwhytestimonialknowledgeoftruthconditionsappearsnottosufficefor
understanding. But perhaps it could be argued that someone with an
idiosyncraticconceptionofthebiconditionalwouldnonethelessbeinaposition
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toappreciateanexpressiveconnectionbetweenutteranceandcondition,despite
theirnotbeinginapositionproperlytoexploitwhattheyappreciate.
Ontheassumptionthattransparencyistoberespected,asecondobvious
alternativetothepresenthypothesisisaviewaccordingtowhichuptakeofwhatissaidinanutteranceisamattersimplyofentertaininganexpressedthought,
withoutentertainingthethoughtonthebasisofknowingatruththeoremforthe
utterance.Suchaviewwouldobviouslypreservetransparency,butatacost.For
someonemightentertainthethoughtexpressedinanutterancewithout,soto
speak,appreciatingitashavingbeenexpressedintheutterance.Inparticular,
onewhoentertainedthethoughtexpressedinanutterancemightfailtooccupy
an epistemic position in which reasons to reject the expressed thought are
availabletothemasreasonstorejecttheutterance. 33Hence,thehypothesishas
akeyadvantageoverthesecondobviousalternative.
Althoughthehypothesishasimportantadvantagesoverthetwoobvious
alternatives thatwehaveconsidered, italso suffers froma criticalflaw.34The
flawcanbepresentedasadilemma.
The first horn of the dilemma arises from the demands that the
hypothesis imposes upon uptake. In the first place, the hypothesis secures
transparencyonlybysecuringmore than transparencyappearstodemand. In
ordertoentertainthecontentexpressedbyanutterance,theproposalrequires
that subjects entertain a richer content, embedding a concept of truth. And it
mightreasonablybedeniedthatitisanecessaryconditiononasubjectshaving
uptake that they have, or are required to exercise in uptake, facility with a
conceptoftruth.35Moreover,inthesecondplace,theproposal,aspresented,is
yetmoredemandingonsubjects,sinceitrequiressubjectstoappreciatethatthe
truththeorems that they apply to particular utterances are elements in an
interpretativetruththeory.Again,itmightreasonablybedoubtedthatuptakein
generaldependsuponthesortofreflectiveassuranceprovidedbyknowledgeof
theinterpretativestatusofatruththeoremapplyingtoaparticularutterance. 36
Thefirsthornofthedilemma,then,istheclaimthat,aspresented,theproposal
isimplausiblydemandingofthecapacities,andexercisesofcapacities,involved
inuptake.
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Onthesecondhornof thedilemma is the claim that the featuresof the
hypothesisfoundproblematiconthefirsthornarenotoptional.Obviously,the
core component of the proposal, that transparency and appreciation of
expressiveconnectioninvolveknowledgeoftruththeorems,cannotbeshornofitsapparentlyextraneouselement,thatitmakesuptakedependuponexerciseof
a concept of truth. And the hypothesis secures appreciation of expressive
connection only by requiring, not only that subjects know truththeorems
applyingtoparticularutterances,butalsothattheyknowthatthetheoremsare
elements in an interpretative truththeory. Someone who knew only the bi
conditional theorems,withoutalsoknowing theirpedigree,wouldnot be ina
position to treat reasons for rejecting (/accepting) one side of a theorem as
reasons for rejecting (/accepting) the other. For example, someone in that
position might view reasons for rejecting either side of the biconditional as
reasonsforrejectingthebiconditionalitself. 37Thesecondhornofthedilemma,
then, involves a version of John Fosters infamous objection to Davidsons
proposal, according to which knowledge of what is in fact an interpretative
truththeorem covering an utterance does not suffice for appreciation of the
utterancesexpressionofcontent.38
On the assumption that the hypothesis is too demanding to supply a
necessaryconditiononuptake,therequirementsthatwehavediscernedonan
adequateaccountofuptakemightappear tobe impossible tomeet.That is, it
mightappearimpossibletoprovideanaccountthatislessdemandingthanthe
hypothesis, and yet able to ensure both transparency and appreciation of
expressive connection.And inthat case,onemightbe inclined either toreject
one of the requirements, or to take their conjunction to sustain a sort of
transcendental argument to the effect that the demands imposed by the
hypothesis are appropriate. However,we signalled at the outset anadditional
featureof thehypothesis thatisnot obviously amandatory componentofany
accountofuptake:therequirementthatanaccountofuptaketaketheformofan
accountofthecontentofpropositionalknowledge.Weconsidered,andrejected,
one alternative hypothesis that involves rejection of the view, the hypothesis
thatuptakeisamattersimplyofentertaininganexpressedthought.Buthaving
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madetherequirementexplicit,itisclearthattherearefurtheralternativestobe
exploredbeforeweaccedetooneofthehypotheseswehavealreadyconsidered.
Oneimportantalternative,defendedinrecentworkbyIanRumfitt,gives
uptheviewinfavourofatreatmentofuptakeasconstituting,notpropositionalknowledgeaboututterances,butrather,asheputsit,
a secondorder cognitive capacity: [in the case of uptake of assertionlike
sayings]onewho possesses it is in a capacity togain newknowledge fromold
(Rumfitt,2005:444).39
Specifically,
Myunderstandinganutteranceu as [assertionlike] sayingthatPputsmeina
position
(a)toknowthatP,intheeventofmycomingtoknowthatuistrue;
(b)toknowthatuistrue,intheeventofmycomingtoknowthat P;
(c)toknowthatuisfalse,intheeventofmycomingtoknowthatnot P;and
(d)toknowthatnotP,intheeventofmycomingtoknowthatuisfalse.
Understanding a[n assertionlike] saying, in other words, allows knowledge to
spreadbackandforthbetweenthesayingscontentandattributionsoftruthtoit,
and between that contents negation and attributions of falsity to the saying
(Rumfitt,2005:443).40
Rumfittsproposalhastwomainadvantagesover thetruththeoreticproposal.
First,Rumfittsproposaldirectlysustainsappreciationofexpressiveconnection,
ratherthanrunningadoglegthroughpropositionalknowledgeofinterpretative
truth theorems. Or, rather, his proposal makes a single requirement on
understanding do the work we earlier divided between transparency and
appreciationof expressive connection. Second,andclosely related, thetype of
appreciation involved in understanding is, on Rumfitts account, sufficiently
demanding that it apparently removes the need for the sort of reflective
assurance of appreciation of expressive connection supplied, on the truth
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theoreticproposal,byknowledgeoftheinterpretativestatusoftheorems.Both
advantages appear to be consequent upon the transition to a view of
understanding as involving secondorder capacities together with a very
demandingconceptionoftheepistemicstandingofthosecapacities. Atthispoint,anaturalquestionaboutRumfittsproposalconcernsintake.
Whataccountofintakewouldservetheproposal,inparticularinunderwriting
someonescomingtobein thetypeofepistemicpositioncharacterisedthrough
(a)(d)?Evensetting asidethe sortsof issuesarising from the finitudeof our
capacities that give rise toa concernwith compositionality, it isnot plausible
thatwesimplybringtobearonutterancespriorknowledgeofthesortdescribed
in (a)(d). At best, we might have such knowledge about the sentence types
instanced inparticularutterances.And thatappears tobethemodeltowhich
Rumfitt wishes to appeal in accounting for the onsetof the understanding of
particularutterances.Rumfittdescribesappreciationoftheconnectionsin(a)
(d)asakintoknowledgeofderivedrulesofinference,inthiscaseascapacities
derivedfromcapacitieswithrespecttorulesgoverningthecontributionofsub
sentential expressions tosentential level rules.41Whatisrequiredofintakein
suchacontextisthatitshouldaffordknowledgeaboutwhichexpressiontypes
are instanced in a particular utterance. In effect, (a)(d) are to be viewed as
derived from a combination of analogues for (a)(d), or their derivational
sources, governing expression types, rather than utterances, together with
subjects competent exercise of abilities to recognise the instancing of those
expressiontypesinparticularutterances.Itisthereforeplausiblethatthesecond
componentthe exercises of abilities to recognise the instancing of sentence
typesprovides Rumfitts account of intake, his account of the onset of
understandingofparticularutterances.
Although Rumfitt does not explicitly endorse the view of intake as
recognitionoftheinstancingofsentencetypes,itistheviewapparentlymostin
accord with the derivational shape of his proposal. And the appearance is
sustainedbythefactthatheprovidesanexplicitaccountoftherecognitionofthe
instancing of sentence types. According to that account, recognition of the
instancingofsentencetypesisamatterofappreciatingtheintentionswithwhich
speakers make some of the noises that they do, where the relevant range of
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intentions are intentions to be recognised as having produced an utterance
instancingoneoranotherspecifictypeofsentence.42
Rumfitts proposal deserves more discussion than I can afford it here.
Indeed, I think that its core, or something close to that core, can provide anaccountofuptake that isquiteplausible.I shallsimplynoteand set asideone
difficultyandthenalltoobrieflypressasecond.
ThedifficultythatIwishsimplytonoteisthat,asstated,theproposalis
more or less as demanding of conceptual resources as the truththeoretic
accountitisdesignedtosurpass.43Forontheassumptionthatbeinginaposition
toknowthatanutterance is trueorfalse demandspossessionofa conceptof
truth or falsity, understanding will, on Rumfitts account, often depend upon
possessionofthoseconcepts.Moreover,attainmentofutteranceunderstanding
requires, on Rumfitts proposal, the manipulation of rich theoretical
machineryalbeit amachinery, notofpropositions,butratherof connections
amongstpropositions.However,what iscentral totheproposalis that uptake
opens a conduit for the transmission of reasons, however those reasons are
characterised, and however precisely the conduit is opened. And it is not
implausible to suppose that the types of reasons available to a subject will
impactuponthetypeofconnectionsamongstreasonsaccessibletothesubject.If
thatisright,thenitisplausiblethatmoreminimalanaloguesof(a)(d)mightbe
providedtocharacterisetheunderstandingofsubjectswholackfacilitywitha
conceptoftruth.44Andtheconcernaboutthederivationalmachinerythatmust
bemanipulatedinordertoachieveunderstandingisreadilyabsorbedintothe
followingdifficulty.
The difficulty that I wish to press concerns the interaction between
Rumfitts account of uptake and what appears to be his favoured account of
intake.Inthefirstplace,noticethatneitherRumfittsaccountofintake,norhis
accountofuptake,sustainstransparency.Foronemightbeinthepositionthat
Rumfittdescribesasunderstandingandyethavenoviewatallaboutanyofthe
reasonsthatonesunderstandingconnects.Inthatcase,onemightunderstand u
without entertaining a thought that u expresses. As noted, Rumfitt in effect
collapses transparency and appreciation of expressive connection into
appreciation of (a)(d). Accordingly, ones occurrent understanding of an
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utterance need have no impact upon ones firstorder psychology aside from
ones recognition of the instancing of sentences by utterances. That result
anyway appears phenomenologically offkey. But in the present context, it is
especially problematic. For despite ones initial failure to entertain a thoughtexpressed by an utterance, acquiring knowledge that the utterance is true
immediatelyputsoneinapositiontoentertainthatthoughtthroughacquisition
ofknowledgewiththeexpressedthoughtascontent.Itisasifoneengageswith
the thought expressed by an utterance only when, in addition simply to
understandingtheutterance,onealsoacquiresreasontoendorseortorejectit.45
That indicates an oddity of the proposal, though perhaps not yet an
objection. An objection comes into view when one reflects further on the
embeddedaccountofintake.Whatisrequiredisanaccountofwhatputsoneina
position to secure uptake, sowhat enables one toappreciate the connections
specifiedin(a)(d).Accordingtotheaccountofintakethatfitsmostcomfortably
withthederivationalshapeofRumfittsproposal,whatputsoneinthatposition
isacombinationof (i)onesrecognition thatthe speaker istrying todirectan
instanceofasentencetypeatoneandonesknowledgeofwhichsentencetype
thespeakeristryingtodirectatone46and(ii)onesderivationofasentential
analogue of the type of secondorder capacity characterised through (a)(d)
appropriatetotheintendedsentencetype.Theoddityremarkedaboveturned
onthefactthatthisproposalappearstoinvolve lessthanisinvolvedinordinary
understandingofutterances.Buttheproposalalsoseemstoinvolvemorethanis
involvedinordinaryengagementwithutterances.For it isnotmerely offkey,
but false, to claim that speakers typically have sufficiently detailed intentions
concerningthetypesofexpressionsthattheyusetoserveasappropriateinput
tothetypeofderivationthatRumfittenvisages.Whatspeakerstypicallyintend
issimplytosaythatsuchandsuch,andperhapstobeunderstoodinaccordwith
theirintentions,withoutprejudiceastothespecificlinguisticmeansbywhich
they achieve those ends. And competent auditors are typically able to
understand utterances despite failing to recognise the details either of
expressiondirected intentions, or the specifics of the expression types with
whichtheyareconfronted.47
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Whatis,perhaps,themostpressingdifficultyforRumfittsproposalarises
fromtheburdenimposedonuptakeasaconsequenceoftheaccountofintakeas
recognition of the instancing of sentence types. The reasonconnections
discerned through uptake, between sentence types, or their instancing inutterances, and thoughts, are contingent: the sentence types couldhavebeen
reasonconnectedwithdifferentthoughts.Anditisdifficulttoseehowepistemic
standingwithrespecttosuchastructurecouldbeacquiredexceptviasomething
akintoinductionfromcasesinthiscase,inductionovercasesinwhichonewas
inapositiontoknowbothP(/notP)andthatuistrue(/false).Butinthatcase,it
is not clear that being in an epistemic position, so derived, would differ in
significantrespectsfromthepositionofsomeonewhoknew,onsimilarinductive
grounds,anappropriatetruththeorem.Inparticular,itisnotclearthatinduction
couldputoneinapositiontotreatknowledgethatPasputtingoneinaposition
toknowthatuistrue,ratherthanasputtingoneinapositiontoknowthateither
uistrueorthereisacounterexampletotheinductivelybasedgeneralisation.
Moreover,evenifitwerepossibletoachievetherequiredpositiononthebasis
of something akin to induction, it is far from clear that ordinary speakers
typicallyexploitsuchameanstothatend.Forordinaryspeakerstypicallylack
detailedappreciationoftheevidentialbaserequiredforsuchinduction,andthey
wouldtypicallyallowtheirapparentunderstandingtotrumpconclusionsdrawn
fromsuchabase.48
Putanotherway,ifonewereinthecognitivepositiondescribedthrough
(a)(d),thenonewouldbe ina betterpositionthansomeonewhohadmerely
inductive knowledge of a relevant truththeorem.But it is not clearhow one
couldattainthatpositiononthebasisofacombinationofthesortofintakethat
Rumfitt appears to allow and ordinarily ascertained, or ascertainable, facts
concerningthecontingentcorrelationsamongsttheleftandrighthandsidesof
(a)(d). Rumfitt seeks to explain knowledge of the type of reasonconnection
involvedinhisproposalbyacomparisonwithknowledgeofrulesofinferencein
logic.IfIamright,thenthecomparisonlimpsatacriticaljuncture.Whatsustains
thespecialpowersofappreciationofreasonconnectionsinlogicappearstobea
property that those connections have and that the connections involved in
Rumfittsproposallack:aprioriaccessibility.49
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6.Conclusion.
The foregoing constitutes a preliminary explorationof some issues that arisewhenanattemptismadetodevelopanaccountoflinguisticunderstanding.The
upshotisnotyetanaccountofunderstanding,eveninsketchform.ButIbelieve
thatmanyofthepiecesrequiredtodevelopatleastasketcharenowinplace.In
particular, I believe that an account of uptake close to the core of Rumfitts
proposalmaybecorrect.Whatisrequiredisawayofintegratingthatcorewith
anadequateaccountofintake.Ishantattempttomakegoodonthatsuggestion
now.AsIsaidatthestart,myaimhereistomakeamildpleaforattentionto
understanding,byadvertisingsomemajortargetsforreflection.Anditwouldbe
inappropriate,giventhataim,torenderfurtherattentionsuperfluous.
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Williamson,T.(2003)UnderstandingandInference,Proceedingsofthe
AristotelianSociety,supp.vol.77:24993.
1 Thanks for very helpful discussion toBill Brewer, Stephen Butterfill, Naomi
Eilan, ChristophHoerl,HemdatLerman, JohannesRoessler, Sarah Sawyer,and
especiallyMatthewSoteriou.ThispaperisdedicatedtothememoryofNadine
SheldonGreen.
2 Dummett rarely frames the claim in the strong form according to which a
theoryofmeaningshould be a theoryofunderstanding.Hisdiscussionsof the
claim invariably are shaped by the question of proper integrationof theories,
ratherthantheidentityoftheirtargets,andarehighlysensitivetothedifficulty
of adequately specifying the integration requirement. Seee.g.Dummett,1981,
1991.Forgeneraldiscussionoftheintegrationrequirement,seeSmith,1992.
3Seee.g.Moore,1989.Theissuesherearecloserelativesofquestionsaboutthe
integration of knowledge and fact pursued by Peacocke, 1999, and questions
abouttheirseparabilitypursuedbyFine,2005.
4ThequestionwhetherWittgensteinrefusedtorecogniseanoccurrentsenseof
understandisanswerednegativelyinMcDowell,2009.
5 The need for an additional and less demanding notion of what is said is
defendedinTravis,2006.
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6Inaddition,onemightneedtodiscern,notonlythereferentsoftheunspecified
subject of expect and the anaphoric object of beat, but also the specific
contentsoftoo,intelligent,expect,andbeat.Seee.g.Travis,1997.
7SeeMartin,2002,fordiscussionofrelatedissues.
8Occasionedmightbeanimprovementonoccurrentinsuchcontexts.
9Consistentlywithmyunderstandingofwhatittakesforsomethingtobeastate,
IneednttakeissuewithRundle,2001,andBakerandHacker,2005,whoargue
that what we have labelled occurrent understanding is itself a form of
dispositionorability.AlthoughRundleandBakerandHackertakethemselvesto
be in dispute with Dummett with regard to this claim about occurrent
understanding,itisnotclearthatDummetteithertakes,orneedstotake,astand
ontheissueinthediscussionthattheytarget.Andthatwouldbesoevenonthe
episodicunderstandingofoccurrent,fortheonsetofadispositionorabilityis
anepisode.
10 For a discussion and defence of this view of basic a priori knowledge, see
McFetridge,1990.
11Burge,1993,1997,1998,1999.
12 Longworth, 2008b. One reason for the qualification inany straightforward
wayisthatmydisagreementwithBurgeconcernsonlythestatusofcorecases
of human occurrent understanding. And it is consistent with the a posteriori
status of occurrent understanding that it can sustain acquisition (or
transmission)ofapriori knowledgevia testimony, so that it is open tome to
endorseBurgesfurtherclaimthatsuchacquisition(ortransmission)ispossible.
If it is possible, and if it also possible for beings other than use.g. infinite
beingstohaveaprioriknowledgeofwhatissaid,thenitmaybepossiblefor
humanstoacquirefromsuchbeingsaprioriknowledgeofwhatissaid.
13Peacocke,1976.SeealsoFricker,2003.
14Seee.g.Williamson,2000.
15SeeHunter,1998;Longworth,2008a.
16 It is plausible to view the possibility of rational withholding of belief as
markinga linebetweenakindofreceptivityand akindofspontaneity,where
thatlinemarksaboundaryaroundthedomainofcognitionforwhichasubjectis
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responsible.Sinceonehasatbestlimitedcontroloverwhatonetakesinthrough
understandingorsenseperception,andsincethecapacitiesthatsubservethat
intake are fallible, allowing intake to encroach on the domain of spontaneity
would have the potential to make one responsible for errors without ones
control.
17Fordiscussionanddefenceofthisviewofa functionofknowledgeinrational
psychology,asanenablingconditionfortheexploitationoffactivereasons,see
Dancy,2000,2008;Hornsby,2008;Hyman,1999,2006;McDowell,1982,1994,
1995;Williamson,2000.
18Itmaybethatthisconditionappliesonlytocreatureswithacapacitytohave
propositionalknowledge,orevencreatureswithacapacitytoknowofthesort
possessed bynormal humans.Perhaps, for example,knowledge wouldnot be
requiredtoplaythisroleincreatureswithaperceptiondesirepsychology.
19Seee.g.Davidson,1984:125,1986.
20 Indeed, our formulation is consistentwith the required epistemic standing
being contentless, as it wouldbe,on some views, if it were a form of purely
practicalknowledge.SeeespeciallyMoore,1997.Formoregeneraldiscussionof
the content of knowledgehow and practical knowledge see Rumfitt, 2003;
Snowdon,2003;StanleyandWilliamson,2001.
21Davidson,1984.
22ThankstoMatthewSoteriouforremindingmeaboutDummettsobservation
andforhelpfuldiscussionofit.
23 Somespeakerswill find acceptable supposing, believing, etc.,butwithout
accordingthemaconstrualdistinctfromsupposes,believes,etc.
24 The closest relevantprocess in the caseofsuppositionwouldbereasoning
underthesupposition.
25HereandthroughoutIuseentertainingasageneric,ordeterminable,forall
specific, or determinate, ways of engagingwith a thought, including thinking,
believing, knowing,etc.AndI shall assume that entertaining logicallycomplex
thoughtsentailsentertainingtheirelementarycomponentthoughts,so that, for
example,entertainingthethoughtthatifViswanathanwillwin,thenhewillnot
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be disqualified, entails entertaining the thought that Viswanathanwill not be
disqualified.
26SeeMcDowell,1980.Forrelateddiscussion,seeBurge,1999;Hornsby,1989;
McDowell,2005.
27 See e.g. Dummett,1981;Frege, 1918/1956;Higginbotham,2002;Peacocke,
1981,1997.
28Twootherpotentialgrounds:(i)Transparencyembodiesacontroversialstand
onthequestionwhetherunderstandinganutterancerequiresengagingaspecific
thought expressed by the utterance, rather than a thought with the same
referenceastheutterance;(ii)Itisimpossibletransparentlytounderstandan
utterance involving the expression of expletive concepts, or thick ethical
concepts,thatonecannot,orwillnot,thinkwith.
29 Transparency is lost on some formulations of Davidsons proposal. For
instance, one of Davidsons formulations has it that whatsomebodyneeds to
know is that some T-theory forL states that (and here thedots are to be
replacedbyaTtheory)(Davidson,1976:174).Ifthatwereallsomebodyknew,
thentheirknowledgewouldnotamounttoentertainingthethoughtexpressed
byatargetutterance.Animprovedformulationwouldaddtherequirementthat
somebody must know that (and here the dots are to be replaced by the
appropriatetheoremofaT-theory).
30Seee.g.McFarlane,2003.
31Thisistoruntogethertwoaspectsofthesituationthatmightotherwisebe
distinguished:(i) appreciationthatuistrueiffthethoughtoneunderstandsto
havebeenexpressed,P,istrueand(ii)appreciation,viatransparency,thatthe
thoughtoneunderstandstohavebeenexpressed,P,istrueiffP.
32Forexample,onemighthaveapparentlyreasonablegroundsforrejectingthe
generalvalidityofmodusponens.Seee.g.McGee,1985,andforrelateddiscussion
Williamson,2003.
33 The concern here is akin to that raised earlier about Burges account of
understanding. A version of the concern is developed in more detail in
Longworth,2008b.
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34Toreiterate,thesearenotdisadvantagesofDavidsonsproposalperse,forthat
proposal concerns themetaphysics of the expression of content and not our
modesofaccesstotheexpressionofcontent.
35Acentralcasefordoubtaboutthenecessityevenoffacilitywithaconceptof
truth derives from reflection on the apparent possibility of uptake by small
childrenwhoplausiblylackfacilitywithsuchaconcept.SeeSoames,1989,2008;
Longworth,2008a.
36Cf.Higginbotham,1992.
37 The most obvious case would be one in which a subject knew the bi
conditionalonthebasisofknowingthetruthofbothsidesofthebiconditional.
38SeeFoster,1976.SeealsoDavidson,1976;Higginbotham,1992;Rumfitt,1995;
Soames,1989,2008;Wiggins,1992.
39 See alsoMoores proposal thatunderstanding is (in general) knowledgeof
howtoprocessknowledge(Moore,1997:189).
40SeealsoRumfitt1995,2001.
41Rumfitt,2005:449451.
42Rumfitt,2005:433437.
43Rumfittisundernoillusionaboutthis:445.
44Onesuggestionherewouldbethatanaloguesof(a)(d)mightbeframedin
termsofacapacitytoexploitconnectionsamongstacceptance(/rejection)ofP
andtrust(/distrust)inu.
45Comparetheearlierdiscussionoftheresidueofwithholdingbeliefinwhatone
takes in through understanding. On Rumfitts view, the residue would be
exhaustedbyawarenessoftheinstancingofsentencetypesinutterances.
46Rumfitt,2005:435.
47Forinstance,itisunlikelythatyouarenowinapositiontoreconstructthe
sentencetowhichthisnoteisappended,despite(Ihope)havingunderstoodmy
useofthatsentence.SeeBurge,1999;Hornsby,2005.
48 Alternatively, if one views the connections between sentence types and
thoughtsasnoncontingent,theburdenwillshifttoexplainingrecognitionofthe
instancingofsentencetypessoconstrued,thatis tothederivationof(a)(d)on
thebasisofknowledgeoftheirnoncontingentsententialanalogues.Noticethat
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thepressureisincreasedwhenoneremovesthesimplifyingassumptionthatthe
reasonconnections made available to one through understanding concern
utterances,rather than thingdonebyspeakers. For it thenbecomes apparent
justhowcontingentthereasonconnectionsare,andhowlittleevidencethatthe
connections hold is typically available to ordinary auditors. For discussion of
issuesinthisarea,seeBurge,1999;McDowell,1994.
49 The tradeoff between austerity of intake and extravagance of resources
requiredforuptakebearscomparisonwithasimilarsituationinthetheoryof
perception. Consider, for example, the demands imposed on ones ability to
attainpropositionalknowledgeaboutordinaryobjectsbyasensedataaccount
ofsensoryintake.