Plato´s emergence in the eutyprho

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PLATO'S EMERGENCE IN THE "EUTHYPHRO"Author(s): Nicholas J. MoutafakisReviewed work(s):Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March, 1971),pp. 23-33Published by: De GruyterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913301 .

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23.

PLATO'S EMERGENCEN THE EUTHYPHRO

The examination

of

popularly

conceived

temperance,

justice,

courage, 6tc,

is

recognized

as the Socratic

influence in

Plato

fs

earliest

writings*

Thus

it is often

assumed

that

plato

does not

inject

his

own views in

these

early

Socratic

investigations*

However,

in the

Euthyphro

there

is

auidence

that

Plato

is

intimating

notions

developed

in

later

dialogues*

Thus

Plato

emerges

on

h£s

own

earlier

than is generally supposed, that is, he clearly appears

first

in

the

Euthyphro*

In

support

of this

latter

thesis the

following

points

will

be noted

about the

dialogue:

(1)

the

dialogue

fs

setting

is

not

biographic

of

a

real

occasion

in

Socrates1

life,

(2)

Sccrates1 allusion

to the

eidos

of

piety

indicates

that

Plato

alrsariy

has

the

needed mode of locution

in-

volved

by

the

theory

of

forms,

and

(3)

the

arguments

against

polytheism are Platonic and contrary to what can be det-

ermined

as Socrates1

own

view on

religion*

The results

of

these

observations are

that first

the

Euthyphro

is

not within the

so-called

trilogy

of

it,

the

Apology

and

Crito*

Secondly,

the

textual

analysis

of

the

dialogue

reveals

that

Plato

has

some

of the

language

of the

theory

of

forms

much

earlier

than

is

generally supposed.

Thirdly,

Plato fs doubt

concerning

religion

is manifest

prior

to the Republic* Thus the new light put on the Euthyphro

results

in

making

it

hardly

a

minor

development.

For

it

is seen

to

contain

distinct

traces of

theamergence

of

Plato's

own

thought*

I.

Outwardly,

the

Euthyphro

exhibits

signs

of

being

bio-

graphical*

Socrates,

the

seeker

of the

meaning

of

piety,

is

like

ths

Socrate3

in

the

Apology,

who

seeks

to

under-

stand tha nature

of

his

supposed transgression*

Yet

examination reveals

the

neglect

of

details,

which

makes

the

dialogue's

setting

a

pretext

for the

discussion*

One omission is the failure to

include

a

witness

to

the

2

conversation*

In

all

dialogues

recognized

as

biographic

of

Socrates,

Plato

make3

an

attempt

to

present

an

authentic

setting

for

the

discussion*

This

is

usually

done

by giving

an account of

who witnessed

Socrates

speaking

at a

part-



24.

icular time. In the Apology his is doneshrewdly yhaving

3

Socrates

recognize

certain

people

as

he

speaks

to the

jury*

In

the

Crito

the

reference

o

a

"trusted11

riend s

more

direct.

Perhaps

ome

would

ay

that

in

the Crito there

are

two

people,

Socrates

and

Crito

and

this

is

the

same s

the

situation

in

the

Euthyphro«

here

ocrates

and

Euthyphro

are

alone.

However,

rom

literary

standpoint,

Euthyphro

is

a

hostile

partner

to

the

discussion,

who

would

not be

expected

to

report

a

conversation

where

e,

Euthyphro,

as

beenexposed s a charlatan. In the Crito. on the other

hand,

one

has an

admiring

isciple

who

would

have

recounted

what

ocrates

said.

Finally,

in the

Phaedo

there is

a

detailed account of

the

historical

setting,

with Phaedon

boing

the

reporter

of

what

happened.

Thus

the lack

of

a

witness n the

Euthyphro

eakens

he

credibility

of the

setting

as

a

real

occasion

in which

ocrates

actually

did

speak.

Another

eason

for

suspecting

the

authenticity

of

the

dialogue's staging is the laconic manner ithwhich lato

refers

to

certain

facts

about

Socrates. For

example

he

brief reference

by

Euthyphro

bout

the

daemonion

hich

ppears

to

Socrates can

hardly

be

understood

nless one

refers

to

the

Apology

or

explication.

In

fact

Plato

confuses the

mean-

ing

of

the daemonion

n

the

Euthyphro

y

having

Euthyphro

refer

to

it

as

something

hichhe also

has

some

knowledge

of.

However,

ne

could

scarcely

believe

that a self-

deceiver like

Euthyphroan have the same ort of spiritual

experiences

s

Socrates.

moreover,

o

require

references

*°

^e

Apology

o as to

explain passages

in the

Euthyphro

is

to

fight

the

semblance f historical

continuity

Plato

attempts

o

put

forth.

For

as

the

dialogue

supposedly

occuring

prior

to

Socrates1

defense and

execution,

the

Euthyphro

hould stand alone

in its

own

etting.

Thus

the

background

f the

dialogue again

emerges

s

a

pretext

for

the

dialogue,

ratherthan as

an

authentic

historical

setting.

The

dialogue's backgroundgain

becomes

uspect

where

Sccrates tells

Euthyphro

f the

indictment

rought gainst

him

by

Meletus.

For

Socrates

says

that

Meletus

accuses

him

of

being

a

poet

(poieten)

or

a

maker

f

gods,

and because of

S

this

he

propogates

orruption.

Thus stated the

indictment

is

ambiguous.

For

Socrates was

brought

o

trial for

other

reasons than that

of

being

a

poet.

In

faet,in

light

of

the

account n

the

Apology,

t

is

inconceivable

that

Bleletus,

who

representsthe poets in their charge against Socrates, would



25.

g

condemn

Socrates

for

being

a

poet.

Here

again

one needs

the account in the Apology to understand what Plato is

saying

about Socrates

in

the

Euthyphro.

Thus

once more

the

dialogue's

setting

cannot

stand

alone*

Being

that the

biographical authenticity

of the

dia-

logue

is

unsound,

one can

conclude

that

Plato is

merely

seeking

a

means

or excuse to

initiate the discussion

of

piety.

Thus

the

Euthyphrofs

setting

should not be

a

controlling

factor

in

interpreting

the

dialogue*

In

brief,

the

Euthyphro

is

not

simply

a

report of

a

conver-

sation

Socrates

once had with

Euthyphro. Having granted

this

much,

one

can

go

on to

the

message

of

the

dialogue

without

necessarily

prejudging

the

conclusion

reached

as

Socratic.

II.

Within

the above

setting,

Plato

proceeds

to

have

Socrates

ask

Euthyphro

to

explain

what

piety

is:

"...ekeino auto

to

10

eidos,

o

panta

ta

osia

osia

estin.

...."'

The

question

as

to what

Plato

means

here

by

his use of the

word

eidos

is

basic to

this entire

study.

For if it

can be

shown

that

there is

some

reason

to

believe that

there

is here

some

possibility

for the

manifestion

of

forms,

then

the

thesis

of

Plato

fs

own

emergence

in

the

dialogue

is more

plausible.

In

answering

this

question

one

must heed

the

context

in

which Plato

presents

the

question

to

Euthyphro.

Here it

is seen

that

Socrates is

asking

to

be

told the

nature

of

that which is

(estin)

of

all

(panta)

pious things

(osia)

the

most

pious

(osia estin).

Thus

the

eidos must

be

somehowthe

most

pious

of

all

pious

things.

Of

course

it

would

be

absurd

to

think that

the

question

put

to

Euthyphro

requires

him

to

define or in

some

way

to

explain

what

the

form

of

piety

is. This

would

mean

not

only

that

Plato has

already

developed

his

theory

of

forms,

but

also that

Euthyphro

can

perform

the

impossible

task

of explaining something which is in

principle

indefinable.

Rather,

the

thrust

of

the

question

is

simply

to

expose

the

untenability

of

popular

Athenian

views of

piety,

whose

spokesman

Euthyphro

is

presented

as

being.

Yet,

though

the

question

put

to

Euthyphro

has a

polemical

purpose,

its

wording

from

a

textual

viewpoint

raises

the

issue of

the

possible

immanency

f

the

forms

in

the

author

fs



25.

phraseology. For there is evidence in this dialogue that

Plato

already

has the

machinery

n

the

form

f

analogies

and

vocabulary

to articulate

a

reference

to the

forms

s

in

later

dialogues.

The

substantiation

of

this

possibility

mould

only

underscore

the

Euthyphrofs

mportance.

By

way

of

clarification

it

should be

pointed

out

that

under

investigation

will

be the

question

of

whether n the

Euthyphro

lato

already

has

the

etymological

tools

required

for

expressing

the

theory

of

forms.

Hou/ever,

t

should

be

noted that resolving this issue does not involve saying that

Plato

actually

does

refer

to a

form

n

the

dialogue. Rather,

as

it turns out the author is in

the

process

of

making

his

idiom

more

precise,

and

it

is in

this

sense

that one finds

Plato

concentrating

upon

basic

notions

presupposedby

the

theory

of

forms.

Yet

this

interest in

precision

does not

presuppose any

definite

allusion

to

forms,

as

manifested

in

later

dialogues.

One of the mostsignificant indications of an already

highly pregnant

mode

of

luction

arises

from

omparing

he

may

he

word

eidos is

introduced in the

Euthyphro

nd

how

it

is

introduced

in the

ffleno.

In the

latter

dialogue

Socrates concludes

that

virtues

must

"partake

of"

or

"have"

a

characteristic

by

which

they

are

determined

o

be

virtues:

11

• •

•

«ti

eidos

apasai

ochousin

de o

eisin

aretai. •

•

The

important

word here is to "have"

or

to

"partake

of"

(echousin)

.

In

the

ffleno

his

term

s

intended

to

explain

the

involvement

of instances of

virtue

in

virtue.

Furthermore,

he

verb

echo

(to

have)

and the

verb metechein

(to

partake)

remain

the

primary

means of

expressing

the

relation

of

things

to

12

forms

until

the Phaedo

and

the

later

dialogues.

Thus

as

the

dialogue

in which

the

forms

first

appear,

the ffleno

provides

a

fine

example

for

showing

how

Plato

would

have

used

language

to

allude

to abstract

entities

in

earlier

works.

Significantly,

in

the

Euthyphro

lato is

presenting

Socrates as wantingto know he nature of that which all

pious

acts

partake

of: "....auto

de

auto

omoion

kal

echon

rr.ian ina

idoan...."

The verb

to

"partake

of"

(echo)

in this

line of the

Euthyphro

as

the

same

grammatic

unction

as echo

in

the

ffleno.

For

the

partaking

expressed

by

echon

in

the

Euthyphro

s

by

pious

things

in

the

one idsa

(idean)

of

piety,

just

as in the

fflenohe

instances of

virtue "have"

or

"partake

of"

virtue.



27*

Thus far it can be said that Plato has thQ phraseology

needed

for

relating

the

general

notion of

a

virtue

with

its

various

manifestations

by

use of the idea

of

"par-

taking"

or

"having" expressed

by

the

verb

echo, More-

over,

the text

of the

dialogue

reveals

that the

term

eidos

is

beginning

to have

a

slightly

more

abstract

sense

than

that of

being

just

a

generalization

from

particulars.

For Socrates

says

that the eidos of

piety

should be

some

sort

of

"standard"

(paradeigma)

to which

one can look

as

a

guide

when

performing

pious

acts: "♦♦.ina eis ekeinen

14

apoblepon

kai

chrom8noseutoi.paradeigmati

.

•

•

•

"

The

above

allusion

to a

paradigm

or standard

of

piety

reveals

an inclination

to

view

piety

in

itself,

and

apart

from

the

particulars

which

in

some

way

possess

it#

Though

this

is

not

a

direct

reference

to a

Platonic

form,

it is

a

step

towards

seeing

a

universal

as

something

definitely

more

than

just

a

grammatical

entity*

For

Plato

is

allud-

ing to piety as if it were something which can be "re-

garded"

or

"looked

upon"

(apoblepon)

in itself

and

employed

as

a

guide.

Thus

piety

here

has

taken

on

a distinct

abstractness

which

closely

resembles

that

of

a

transcending

entity*

Again,

however,

this

intimation

of

a

rich

mode

of

locution

is

a result

of

looking

at the author

fs

phrase-

ology,

rather

than

his

subject

of

discourse.

A

further

indication

of

the

already

mature

mode

of

expression is exhibited by the analogy frommathematics'

Plato

employs

to relate

piety

to virtues

generally.

For

after

many

definitions

have

been

rejected

by

Socrates,

Euthyphro

is

asked

to

define

piety

by

way

of

differentiating

piety

from

virtue,

just

as

the

even (isoskelis)

or

the

odd

(skalinos)

are

differentiated

from

the

genus

number.

The

above

analogy

from

mathematics,

at

this

early

period

in Plato

s

writing,

indicates

that

the

author

is

beginning to choose his terms

in

the

context

of

a

precise

frame

of

reference.

That

is

to

say

that

Plato

apparently

makes

his

language

sensitive

to

a mathematical

model,

so

that

his

means

of

expression

would

be

more

exact.

Of

course

this

early preoccupation

with mathematical

analogies,

and

their

ability

to

clarify

philosophical

term-

inology

is

to

be

expected.

For

as Aristotle

observes,

the

Pythagorean

notion

of

a

numerical

r3ality

underlying

things

was

the

insight

Plato

sought

to refine

when

he first

presented

the

theory

of

forms.

Thus

to see

in

the



28.

Euthyphro mathematicalanalogy being used as a meansof

refining

a

philosophical

idea,

is to

eoo

through

tho author's

mode

of

clarification Plato

developing

his

language

for

further

studies*

Interestingly,

the above

analogy

is

used in

such

a

u;ay

so as

to

suggest

that

the eidos

of

piety

is "like"

the

odd or the even

configuration

referred

to as skalinos

and

isoskelis

respectively.

Thus eidos

again

is

a

term

Plato

is

seeking

to

refine

and

view

ajs

some sort of

abstract-

ion

in

the

mode

of

a

distinct

object

like

a

configuration.

This

in

a

sense underscores

his

previous

attempt

to

view

the

Gidos of

piety

as some

sort

of standard

(paradeigma),

and thus

to

give

it

greater

concreteness

as

a

universal.

Though

he author

s

language

is

undergoing

evident

development,

one

must

see this

change

within the

dialogue

fs

purpose

and

place

among

lato's

writing.

This means

that

it

is in no

way

claimed

that

Plato

is

alluding

to

forms

n

^h8

Euthyphro.

For the fact

this

is

a

very

early

dialogue,

and

that

it

is

chiefly

about

a

moral

issue:

Uihat s

piety?,

precludes

the

possibility

that

Plato

already

has

a

theory

of

forms

to

present,

and

that

he

would confuse

his

moral

message

with

terms

Euthyphrp

ould

not

possibly cope

with,

i.e.

forms,

participation,

etc.

Rather,

the

attempt

to

make

anguage

precise

in

the

Euthyphro

llustrates

the author

fs

sensitivity

to the fact

that in

ordinary

discpurse

there

are certain

important

words

which

require

clarification

if

they

are

going

to

be

used

in

philosophical

investigations.

Furthermore,

hese terms

are

those

which

are

crucial

to

the future

presentation

of

the

theory

of

forms, namely

words ike

eidos,

idea,

echon

and

paradeigma

(standard).

Certainly,

the

theory

in

its

simplest

articulation

requires

some reference

to

an

abstract

entity,

which Plato

calls

"eidos11,

and

which

has

things

standing in a "partaking" relationship to it. The later

relation

is

mostly

expressed

by

the verb

echo.

moreover,

the

allusion

to

a

paradigm

or

standard,

as

well as

the allusion

to

mathematical

examples,

will serve

as

the

means

of

explain-

ing

the

nature

of

forms

n

themselves

and in

their relation

to

sensible

things.

Thus,

in

summary,

ne finds

the

lang-

uage

of

the

Euthyphro

ndergoing

the

necessary

cleansing

for

future

use

in

presenting

the

theory

of forms.

Kcsnce



29.

it is only in this textual sense that it can be said

that the

language

of

the

forms

is

beginning

to be

17

manifested

in

the

dialogue*

This in

turn

demonstrates

Plato fs ou/n

mergence

at a

hitherto

unnoticed

period

in

the

corpus

of his

writing*

Unfortunately,

those

who have

reflected

upon

the

Euthyphro

have

concentrated

upon

the

limiting

question

of

whether or

not

Plato is

actually alluding

to

forms

by

his usa of

the

word

eidos

in the

dialogue*

Those

who

deny

that this

is

a

direct reference

to

a

form

argue

that

the

dialogue

is

essentially

Socratic,

and thus its

language

does not have the

depth

to

allow

any

allusion

13

to

forms.

On the

other

hand,

those who

affirm

a

direct

reference

to

forms

through

the

use of the

word

eidos

do so

only

because

the

said

term is

employed,

and then

they

gp

on

to

interpret

all

early

dialogues

in

terms

of

19

the

theory

of

forms.

However,

both

these

interpretations

neglect the fact that a dialogue could have a potentially

rich

language

as

far

as

later

dialogues

are

concerned,

and

yet

its

philosophical purpose may

be about

an

issue which

does involve

the

full

ramifications

of

its

language*

This

interpretation

would

counter

those who

say

that

because

the

Euthyphro

s

message

is

Socratic,

it

therefore

cannot

contain

any

sort of

further

linguistic

developments*

Also,

the

above

interpretation

counters those

who hold

that

because

of eidos in

the dialogue, one must say that the

Euthyphro

s

theme,

and that

of

all the

early

dialogues,

is

therefore

as

Platonic as in the

later

dialogues*

It is

interesting

to

note that

up

to

the

time

of

this

writing

no

one

considering

the

Euthyphro

has

reflected

upon

the

possibility

that

a

dialogue

fs

message

and

its

potential

in

language

are

separate

domains,

which need

not

reciprocally

determine

one

another.

It is

only

when

this

non-reciprocity

is

seen

that

it can

be

argued

that

though

the

Euthyphro

is an

early

polemic

against

popular

Athenian

views of

piety,

its

language

is

under-

going

development

for

future

references to

forms*

III.

Apart

from

the

manifestation

of

Plato

fs

presence

through

certain

indications

in

his

text,

one

sees

through



th9 Socratic search for the nature of piety aspects of

Plato's later moral

thought*

For

Plato

subjects

to

scrutiny popular

Athenian

piety*

He

has

Socrates

reject

the

belief

that

piety

is

what

is

pleasing

to

the

gods,

since

the

gods

are

often not

agreed,

and

are

themselves

20

guilty

of immoral

acts. Thus the

criterion of

piety

is removed

from

the inconstances of

anthropomorphic

21

behaviour,

as exhibited

by

the

Olympic

deities*

Here

one wonders

who the

above

Socrates is

who divests

the

gods

of their

sanctity,

and

seeks

piety

in

a

non-

polytheistic

context*

This cannot be

the Socrates of

the

Crito,

who

elects

death

rather

than

defy

the

polis,

which

requires

religious

devotion,

as

well

as

political

22

loyalty*

Neither

can this be the

Socrates in the

Apology*

who

avows belief in the

gods

of

Athens

through

23

his

personal

experience

with

the

daemonion*

Ndr

can

this

be the Socrates in

the

Phaedon* who

avows belief in

the gods of Athens at the point of death, and goes on to

ask Crito

to

pay

sacrifice

to

Aesolepius

as

payment

he,

24

Socrates,

owed

to that

god*

Rather,

the doubt

expressed

as

to

the

adequacy

of

popular

religious

ideas

to

provide

an

acceptable

account

of

the

nature

of

piety

is reflective of the

kind

of

thought

Plato himself

would

voice*

For the

noting

of

how the

gods

are

guilty

of

immoral

deeds in the

Euthyphro

is

anticipatory of the Republic, where Socrates advises that

the

young

should

be

spared

the

corrupt

influence

of

myth-

25

ology*

The

same aversion

at

having

the

divine

sus-

ceptible

to weaknesses

as mortals is

expressed

by

Plato

in

the Laws

III,

where

it is

observed

that

the fabrication

of divinities

by

the

poets

contributed

to the lawlessness

26

of thQ

Athenians,

and

ultimately

led

them

to

tyranny*

Further

on,

in

Laws IV

it

is

stated

that

the divine

should

be made

to

represent

that

which it

really

is,

namely

27

justice

and

law.

Plato's

own

thought

is

seen

again

in

the

Euthyphro

where

Socrates

rejects piety

as

ministration

to the

gods*

For

piety

cannot

be

a

form

of barter

wherein

the

gods

are

28

pacified

by

offering

sacrifice

to

them*

This

view

reappears

in

the

Republic,

where Socrates

says

that

the



31.

29

ccds cannot be bribed by offerings. Also in LaujsX,

those

who

think

that

the

gods

can be

propitiated

are to be

cast out

from

he

polis.

Thus even with

respect

to

the

quest

for

the

nature

of

piety,

which

encompasses

the

Socratic

character

of the

dialogue,

the

Euthyphro

xhibits

signs

of

Plato

s own

self-assertion.

Certainly

the

outcome

of the

polemic

against

popular

views

of

piety

does

not

fit

comfortably

with

the

traditional

picture

of

Socrates,

as

the

mystic

who

seeks

to obtain

knowledge

of moral

judgments.

For

what-

ever

ethical issue

Socrates is

portrayed

as

investigating,

he

is

always

within

the

framework

f

the

generally

accepted

religious

views of

his

contemporary

thenians. Thus

Plato's

departure

from uch

views

is

definitely

alien

to the

expected

Socratic

cleavage

of

thought.

The

question

now arises as

to

why

Plato

would

choose

^n9

uuthyphrG

o

begin

expressing

his

own

position

on

certain

issues.

Perhaps

an

answer here

can

be

gleaned

from

onsider-

ing

the

topic

of

discussion

itself. For

the

subject

of

piety

seems

to

be

the

proper

point

at which

Plato,

with

his

intense interest

in the

rational

clarification

of

ideas,

and

Socrates,

the

mystic,

would

differ.

Evidently,

though

Socrates

recognized

the

existence

of

values

beyond

experience,

he

also

believed that

such values

are

knowable

through

type

of

spiritual

awareness. Thus

he

would

not be

ex-

pected to subject to scrutiny or analysis that idea which

underlies

his

epistemology,

namely,

the

spiritual

experience

which nvolves

knowing

he

realm

beyond

experience,

i.e.

piety.

Plato,

however,

would seek

to

clarify

this

type

of

experience

between mortal

and

divine.

Therefore,

it

appears

that the

latter

fs

quest

for

explanation

would account for

the deviation

in

the

Euthyphro

rom

he

expected

Socratic

approach

to

piety.

The

above

remarks

re meant

to

indicate

the unnoticed

importance

of

the

Euthyphro.

For

it

is

the

first

dialogue

in which one

sees

Plato

preparing

his medium

f

expression

for

future

use

in

articulating

the

thsory

of

forms.

Furthermore,

t

is the

first

dialogue

in which Plato

brings

forth

some

of his moral

philosophy,

whila still

remaining

within

the Socratic

context

of

speech.

Finally,

it is the



32.

only dialogue about which it cannot be said that its

setting

does determine

whether

it

is to

be

interpreted

Socratically

or

not*

Thus,

it is

the

combination

of all

these

factors

which indicates that the

Euthyphro

is the

dialogue showing

the

yourtg

lato

beginning

to

emerge

from

the

shadow

of

Socrates.

Nicholas 3.

Moutafakis

The

Cleveland State

University

Notes:

1* F.

Copleston,

A

History

of

Philosophy;

Greece

&

Rome,

Vol.

1,

Part

1,

8th

ed.,

(New

York,

1960),

p.163.

2.

Plato,

Plato *s

Euthyphro, Apology

&

Crito,

John Burnet

ed.,

7th

ed., (London, 1963),

11.

1-2a5.

3. Ibid.

Apology,

John

Burnet

ed.,

11.

33d9-34a1.

4.

Ibid.

Critp,

John

Buroei

ed.,

11* 43a.

5.

Plato,

"Phaedo",

The

Phaedo

of

Plato, P.

Duncan

trans.,

(London, 1928), 11. 57a-b.

6.

Plato,

Apology.

3ohn Burnet

ed.,

11. 4Qa1-40a9.

7.

Ibid.

Euthyphro*

John Barnet

ed.r

11

3b9-c5.

8.

Ibid.

11.

3b1-2.

9. Ibid.

Apology,

11.

23e4-S#

10.

Ibid.

Euthyphrot

11

#.

d11-6ef

(Platd

often

interchanges

the word

eidos

for

the

mord^Qidoa

in the

dialogue.

See

6d11.

However,

both

terms

refer

to the

one

nature

of

piety).

11.

Plato,

"fflenQ11,latQ*

UI.R.m^ Lamb

trans.,

v.IV,

(New

York, 1925),

11. 72c6-c7.

12. Ui.D.

Ross,

Platofs

Theory

of

Ideas

t

Oxford

Press,

(1963),

p.

24.

13.

Plato,

Euthyphro

John Burnet

ed.,

11.

5d1-5.

14. Ibid.

Euthyphro

11.

6e4-6e5.

15. Ibid.

Euthyphro,

11.

12d5-1Q.

16.

Aristotle,

"metaphysics",

The

Basic Works

of

Aristotle,

R. mcKeoned., 8th ed., (New York), 11. 987b1-36.

17.

Paul

Shorey,

What

PlaCo

Said,

The

University

of

Chicago

Press,

3rd

ed.,

(195?)-,

p.57,

(Shorey

fs

position

is

more

extreme

than

the

one

expressed

in

this

paper

since

he

states

that

the

language

in

the

Euthyphro

is

completely

Platonic).

18. E.

Zeller,

Plato

and the

Older

Academy,

S.F.

Alleyene

&

A.

Goodwin

trans.,

Rusieli

JTRySsell

Inc.,

(1962),

p.

120.



19* 3. A. Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, Oxford

Press,

(1909), p.

17.

20.

Plato,

Euthyphro,

3ohn

Durnet

ed.,

11. 12b4-b7.

21

Ibid*

Euthyphro,

11

12c3-12c8.

22. Ibid.

Crito,

3ohn

Burnet

ed.,

49b-51a.

23* Ibid*

Apology,

3*

Burnet

ed*,

11. 27d4-28a.

24*

Plato,

"Phaecio^The

Phaedo

of

Plato.

P.

Duncan

trans.,

(London,

1928),

pp.

119-124.

25.

Plato,

Republic.

A.D.

Lindsay

trans.,

pp.

48-49,

(note

10)

and

pp.

385-388.

26.

Plato, "Laws",

The

Lams of

Plato.

A.E*

Taylor

trans.

.

(London,

1934),

11. 700-701

b.

27. Ibid.

11.

7C9-710.

23.

Plato,

Euthyphro,

3.

Burnet

ed.,

11. 14e9-15a4.

29.

Plato,

Republic,

A.D.

Lindsay

trans.,

pp.

49^50

(note

10).

30.

Plato, "Laws",

The

Lams of

Plato,

A.E#

Taylor trans.,

pp. 888-891.

Book noticed:

Rome,

The

Story

of an

Empire,

by

3.P.V.D.

Balsdon,

IL'eidenfield & Nicolson

1970, Hardback,

35s.

Paperback

16s.

Philosophers

may

be

interested

to

recommend

o

their

students

this

clear

and

brief

synopsis

of the

history

and

composition

of the Roman

Empire,

the

container

of

important

philosophical

movements.

This

book does

not intend

to

outdo

Gibbon

and

in

no

sense does

it

philosophise,

but it

describes

the

monstrous

conglomerate* society

udth the

honest

lucidity

which

one would

expect

from

a

classical

scholar of

fflr.

Balsdon

fs

repute.

It

is

attractively

illustrated.

H.D.

Rankin

33.

Plato´s emergence in the eutyprho

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Transcript of Plato´s emergence in the eutyprho