Plato on Democracy and Expertise

8/6/2019 Plato on Democracy and Expertise

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Plato on Democracy and Expertise

Author(s): R. W. SharplesSource: Greece & Rome, Second Series, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Apr., 1994), pp. 49-56Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/643132 .

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Greece& Rome, Vol.xli, No. 1, April1994

PLATO ON DEMOCRACYAND EXPERTISE1By R. W. SHARPLES

IIn the Gorgias(463aff.) Plato makes Socrates say to Polus that rhetoric isnot a skilled art (techne) at all, but one of a number of occupationscollectively described as 'flattery' (kolakeia) and said to be based onexperience. The other examples given are sophistry, cosmetics, andcookery. These practices have no understandingof what they do, or asPlato puts it they can give no account of it (465a).Cooks might well be indignant to be told that there is no skilled art inwhat they do, and on the face of it Socrates' position seems highlyimplausible.But Plato's point becomesclearerfirst fromthe Gorgias tself,and then by comparison with the Republic. In the Gorgias cookery isrepeatedlycontrasted with medicine.Both are concernedwith food, sincediet was an importantpartof ancientGreekmedicine,butwhile the doctoris concerned with the well-beingof the body, the cook is concernedsimplywith gratifyingpeople's desires.Similarlythe rhetorician,or the politicianwho employs rhetoric, gives the people what gratifies them: in ancientAthens,fortifications,dockyards,an empire,andtribute(519a);nowadays,perhaps,tax cuts. The true politician,of whom Socrates at the end of thedialogue claims to be the only example (521d), is concernedwith the well-being of the citizen's souls. As Socratesarguesshortlyafter his remarkstoPolus concerningcookery,there is a difference between what people thinkthey want andwhat they actuallywant, i.e.,what is good for them (467-8).But, we might object, even if we accept the contention of Plato'sSocratesthat cooks are not at all concernedwith people'shealth,onlywithgratifyingtheirdesires,is there not still a greatdealof skillandunderstand-ing involvedin giving people what they thinkthey want? Plato's answer tothat questionis, it seems, a negative one;and the reasonwhy becomes clearfrom the analogy of the Large, Strong Animal in Republic 6. 493a-c. Hetherelikens sophistswho call the opinionsof the general public'wisdom' tothe keepers of a large and strong animalwho think that experienceof thecreature's behaviour, and of what pleases or displeases it, constitutes askilledart. He is I thinksuggestingthat if there is no rhymeor reasonin the


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50 PLATO ON DEMOCRACYAND EXPERTISEcreature'sesires,f theyare otally rbitrarynd rrational,here anbeno art or understandingnvolved.All the keepershave to go on isexperiencefwhatmayormaynothaveworkednthepast;here anbenoguaranteefwhethertwill his ime.There anbenorationalcienceofwhatsintrinsicallyrrational;ndPlatoputspublic pinionnthe attercategory.hegeneral opulacesthebiggestophist fall,anddoesmoreto corruptthe young than any sophistcan (Republic6. 492). What mattersis reasonedargumentrather than majorityopinion (Gorgias 47le-472b),and what is wrong with rhetoricis that it appeals to the latter.Putting itanother way, for Plato an understandingor an attitude is not rationalunless it is basedon rightreasoningandunderstanding;and since for Platoin the Republic everthing derives what reality it has ultimately from theForm of the Good, right reasoning is understandingof what is good andwhat is not, in absolute,objectiveterms.For us, the idea that something as complex and variable as publicopinion can be studied scientificallyis not an altogether strange one. Wehave sophisticatedmethods of analysis, and we have the ability to makemore or less accurate predictions from very small statistical samples, inopinion polls for example.Plato and other ancient thinkersrecognisedthatsome sciences, such as mathematics,were more exact than others, such asmedicine(Philebus56b);but we could hardlyexpect him to be as aware aswe are of the possibilities of handling complex and variable datamathematically.The reasonwhy Plato says that there can be no art orscience in giving people what they think they want is, indeed,not just thatpeople'sbeliefsabout whattheywant arecomplexandfluctuating,but thatthey do not in his view relate to objective reality. However, the formerpoint may encouragehis belief in the latter.The contrast between cookery and medicine, and between rhetoricforwhich cookeryis the analogyandmedicine,pervadesthe Gorgias.Socrateson trial will be like a doctor competingwith a pastry-cookbefore a juryofchildren (464d, 521e), though after death the tables will be turned andCallicleswill be at a loss in the otherworldly awcourt as much as Socratesis in this world (526e, with which cf. 523c). Athenianpoliticianshave fedthe people on dockyardsand revenues, with the result that it is festeringandunhealthy(518-19). The wicked shouldnot seek to escapepunishmentbut hand themselvesover as if to a doctor for cutting and burning(479a).AndPolus shouldhandhimself over to Socrates'argumentas if to a doctor(475 d).Rhetoric, Gorgias boasts, will enable the orator to be more persuasivethan the expert who has knowledge;even when Socrates points out that


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PLATO ON DEMOCRACYAND EXPERTISE 51thisapplies nlywhen heaudiences itself gnorant459b-c),Gorgiasregardsheway nwhich hetoric emovesheneed or tspractitionerohaveexpert nowledgen other ieldsas acommendationather han hereverse. otonlywill hedoctor etherhetorician'slave, ut hebusiness-manwill urnout to bemakingmoneynot for himself utfortheorator(452e),andpresumablyorthepolitician ho stheprime seroforatory.The oratorwillbemorepersuasivehan he doctor456a).Gorgias oeshave hedecencyo add hat heoratorhould otdeprivehedoctor fhisreputationustbecause e hasthepowero(456-7);tis suchhedging isbetson the relation etween hetoric ndmoralityhatturnsout to beGorgias' ndoing.

Theres, however,distinctionobe drawn etweenublic pinionndthosewhomanipulatet.Openomanipulationhough ublic pinionmaybe, t maystill nfactbethe safest udgeheres forcertain uestions.sRenford ambroughointedut nhisanalysisftheshipofstatepassagein Republic,2Plato's nalogies ithcrafts ikenavigationndmedicinebegthequestion y assuminghatpolitical uestionsanbe settledbyexpertsnthe samewayas can heconcerns f thesecrafts. erhapsherearequestionsboutpoliticaloalswhich rom heirverynature rebestsettlednpracticeygeneral iscussionndagreement,otbyarelativelysmall roup fexperts.3

IIPlato,however, oesnot thinkso. It is not indeed ust,or primarily,democracyhatheobjectso.Inthe Gorgiast is Callicles,otSocrates,whodescribesheordinaryeople fAthens s a 'refusemade pofslavesandallsorts fpeople ood ornothingxcept erhapsorphysicalabour'(489c).Plato'sposition,n fact, s not so muchanti-democratics anti-despotic,nthesense hathe seesnothing f value nacceptingpositionbecauset is theviewof thosewhohappeno havepowerand nfluence.However,n democratic thens hatmeant he massof thepeople, rratherhosewhocould ppealo thepeoplewhile,nsome asesat eastnodoubt, rivatelyespisinghemas doesCallicles.latodoesnotquite ayopenlyntheGorgiashathe sees heAthenianeople s atyrant;ut hathe does o isindicatedyacomparisonf Gorgias10b-d,where ocratessays hat heway ogainpowernacityruled yatyrants tomake our-self ike hetyrant,with513b,where esays hat heway ogainpowernAthensstoimitateheAthenianeople. erhaps earemeant oconclude


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52 PLATO ON DEMOCRACYAND EXPERTISEthat he attitudesf a Callicles,aluing ower ndgainingheadvantageoverothersaboveall else, aremore conventionalndwidespreadnAthenianocietyhanCallicles imselfwouldike othink.4G.Vlastos,ndeed, asarguedhat he Crito hows hatthehistoricalSocratesccepted thenianemocracy,nd hateven ntheGorgiasheemphasisplacedby Plato'sSocrateson expertises distancedromapparentlyimilar emarksn Xenophonyconcernorthe moralwell-being feverymemberfsociety.5utconcernor hecitizens'moralwell-beingdoes not in itself constitute emocracy.n the Republicoo thephilosopher-rulersdistinguishedrom hesortofpoliticianhrasymachusrecognisesy the fact that he rules n the interests f others,not ofhimself;6nd even if the Gorgiass not as explicit s the Republicnindicatinghat hemajorityfcitizens renotthebest udges fwhatwilllead otheirownwell-being,heseedsoftheattitudesftheRepublicrealreadyresenthere.7What matters or Platois that the correctudgementshouldbereached,nd hatknowledgehould revail. hus nthe deal tateoftheRepublic, here hePhilosopherulersby definitionnowbest,Plato'sview s that heressimply opointnconsultingnyonelse. ftheviewsof others redifferentrom hoseof thePhilosopherulers,heexperts,theymustbydefinition eworse;f theyarethesame, heywillbe lesssoundly ased,and n anycasetherewillbe no need o takethem ntoaccount. hepositionf the rulernrelationo theordinaryitizens likethat of the doctorn relationo hispatient;ndeedPlatoexplicitlyaysthatrulers an ie totheir ubjectsorthesubjects'wngood, houghhesubjectsmustnotlie to therulers, ndsupportshisbytheanalogy fdoctors ottellingpatientshewhole ruthaboutheir llnessesRepublic3.389b-c).

IIIPlato'sarguments,hen,arenotagainst emocracys suchbutagainstignorantemocracy.ebelieveshat herecouldbe rulerswhoseunder-standingfwhatwasgood orthestatewas not usta matter frhetoric,justamatter f what heysaid,butwasatleastassoundlyased sthatofdoctors rnavigators,o thattheywouldbe acceptedstheexpertscf.Republic. 500d-e,wherePlatoseems emarkablyanguinebouthowreadilypeoplewill accepthaving he canvasof societywipedclean).Imagine,then, for a moment,that we couldpersuadePlato that there could


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PLATO ON DEMOCRACYAND EXPERTISE 53be a democracyn whichall the citizenswerewell-informed,ndwereinfluencedyreasonednderstandingatherhanbyopinions roducedyrhetoricalersuasion.8uppose,notherwords,hatwe could howPlatothat principleof the divisionof labourin the Republicdoes not and shouldnot apply to 'ruling' in the way that it does to building and weaving(Republic 2. 369d-e). If we could persuade Plato of this, then indeed hewould have to admit that his likeningin the Gorgiasof popularopinion tochildren'spreferencefor pastry-cooksover doctors does not amount to acriticismof all democracy,but only to a criticismof democracyas he sawand experiencedit.Suppose,then, that we couldindeedpersuadePlato that there could be awell-informed democracy. Suppose that we could persuade him that hemisjudged Athenian democracy, or if not that, at least that we wouldpersuadehim that we arenow better informedandconductourdemocraticpolitics more rationally.Even so, there is I think nothing to suggest thatPlato would actually favour such a ideal democracy over other politicalsystems,unlesswe could show him that it actuallyconstituted the bestwayof arrivingat correctpoliticaldecisions.In Politicus 303a-b the rule of themany is the least good of the good constitutions, but the best of theperverted ones, in each case because of its limited effectiveness; ademocracy cannot achieve much evil, but that is because, for Plato, itcannot achieve much good either.And Plato in the Republicdoes not seethe consultation and involvement of all citizens in decision-makingassomething that could have any value in itself. There may indeed beexplanation intended to win them over, as at Republic 6. 500, or in thepreambles to the laws in the Laws, but that is another matter. Beingprepared to talk to people and justify one's proposals is not in itselfdemocracy - preferable though it may be to dictatorial decrees. Demo-cracy,afterall,has to do withpower(kratos).And,even if suchexplanationis interpretedas the educationof the citizens, it is educationwhich is seenby Plato not in terms of the discoveryof new insights,but in terms of bring-ing those educated to see in their turn truths that have already beenapprehendedby others.This, I fear, is the way in which education is seen throughout theRepublic,andnot justfor the young.9It is not seen as a matter of engagingin discussion so that new insightsmayemerge,butof sendingthe recipientsof education through a curriculum laid down in advance to lead to aforeseen end.The Guardiansare not to be allowed to engage in dialecticalargumentbefore the age of 30, because the young aretoo disputatiousbynature (539b); and judges should not have any experience of wickedness


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54 PLATO ON DEMOCRACY AND EXPERTISEearlyin life but have learned aboutit later,as somethingobserved n othersbut alien to themselves (409a-b). Plato wishes, in other words, to removethe chances of people getting the wrongideas;and forgets that it was onlythe experience of first thinking a wrong answer right, and then realisingthat it was wrong, that made the slave-boyin the Meno readyto perseveretill he saw the right answer.It is a sad ironythat Plato, in the very book inwhich he portrayseducation as a matter of enablingpeople to see the truthfor themselves (Republic 7. 518d; cf. Symposium 175d), can speak ofcompelling the Rulers to apprehend the Good at fifty years of age(Republic 7. 540a), for all the world as if this were a purely mechanicalprocess.He does allow that the philosopher's apprehensionof the Goodmust be such as to withstand refutation(Republic 7. 534b); what he doesnot seem to envisageis that the debatethis involves might lead to new andimportantinsights.10

IVI am not, let me emphasize,wantingto suggest againstPlato that there areno objectivetruths in ethics or politics,or to makedemocracydepend uponthe rejectionof any belief in objectivevalues.What I do want to suggest,following K. R. Popper,11s that historysuggests that those who constructrigidintellectual,politicalor educationalsystems,in a way that only makessense if those truths are fully known, are generallydeluding themselves.Plato at the time of writingthe Republicmay not think that he himself hasas a matter of actual fact achieved complete political and ethical under-standing; he may not even think that his Ideal State would ever berealisablein practice, though this is less clear.12But to the extent that hedoes not think that complete understandingever could be achieved inpractice, to that extent the constructionof a political ideal based on theassumptionthat it could be is at best misguidedand irrelevant,at worstmisguidedandpernicious.Itwouldsurelybe more appropriate o buildintoour discussion of politicalsystemsfromthe outset the assumption hat theywillhave to dealwith the worldas we actuallyexperience t, the limitationsof our understanding ncluded.The question is whether the extent to which our knowledge is pro-visional, the extent to which experience shows that the most confidentknowledge-claimsoften turn out to be erroneous,is such that, as Popperargued, political theorists are better occupied, not in identifying wheresuch knowledge is located,"13ut in ensuring that anyone who claims a


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PLATO ON DEMOCRACY AND EXPERTISE 55monopolyf it is subjecto reasonablehecks.This s certainlyotthesameasdenyinghe existencefobjectiveruthsnsuchmatters;ndeed,theverypossibilityf describingnowledge-claimss erroneousependsonthesuppositionhat hereareobjectiveruths. lato,however,hinksthat here anbeknowledgef theanswerso moral rpoliticaluestionswhich s so certain hatits possessorsreentitled, nd indeedmorallyobliged,opersuadethers o handover hedirectionfpoliticsothem.It neednotbesupposed,ither,hata recognitionf thelimitsof ourunderstandingust eadto an inabilityo act.14 hat s thecomplaintaboutSocratesmadeby I.F. Stone;15lato himselfmayhavegrownsimilarlympatient.utrecognisingur ackof certaintyeed npracticeimplyonlythatpolitical ction houldbeundertakenithduehumilityanddiffidence,hatdivergent ointsof view shouldbe taken eriouslybecause hey may assistus towardsa graspof the truth,and thatdoctrinairettempts y particularroups o restructurehe wholeofsociety n thebasisofparticularogmasresolikelyobemisguidedhattheyarebestavoided.

NOTES1. This is a revised versionof a paperdelivered asone of four contributions o a panelon 'Plato inhis Community'at the annualmeetingof the ClassicalAssociation in Oxford on 8th April1992 - as itturnedout, the day beforea General Election(somethingnot irrelevantto the issuesin the paper).Mythanks are due for comments and advice to the otherspeakers(AngelaHobbs, Dominic Scott, andChristopherGill who organizedthe panel) and to others who participatedin discussionduring themeetingand after it, especially LindsayJudson, ChristopherRowe, and MalcolmSchofield.Originallyintended as a contributionto a debate,the paper emphasizesone particularview of Plato;butI donotthink it misrepresentshim.2. 'Plato's Political Analogies' in his own (ed.), Plato, Popperand Politics (Cambridge,1967),ch. 12, reprinted n G. Vlastos(ed.),Plato, Vol.II (GardenCity, 1971), ch. 3.3. That judgementsare best made by the manyis assertedby the democraticspeakerAthenagorasat Thucydides 6.39.1 (whateverThucydides'own attitude to the democraticargument).4. CharlesKahn, 'Drama andDialectic in Plato's Gorgias',OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy 1(1983), pp. 75-121, at 100, rightly emphasizes the divergence between Callicles' involvement indemocraticpoliticsand his own personalviews.My suggestionis that perhapsPlatosawdemocracytooas simply the strugglefor advantage, contrastingit with the order andharmonyhe himselfdesires.Itdoes not follow that Plato's understandingof democracywas correct.5. 'Socrates and Athenian Democracy', Political Theory11 (1983), 495-516, especially 506-7;reprintedin M.Burnyeat(ed.), G. Vlastos,SocraticStudies(Cambridge,1994), and in R. W. Sharples(ed.),ModernThinkers nd Ancient Thinkers:TheStanleyVictorKeelingMemorialLectures1981-1991(London, 1993), pp.66-89, especially78-80.6. Cf. also the emphasison the need for wisdomandtemperance n the ruler as thecrucialpoliticalrequirementat Laws 4. 712a.7. Cf. Kahn, op.cit.,pp. 100-1. In the Republicthe unerringknowledgethat gives the Philosopher

Rulers theirauthorityis basedon the Theory of Forms. In the GorgiasSocrates'attemptto convinceCallicles is based, not on appealsto another world to which only philosophershave access, but on achallenge to Callicles' understandingof this world; where Callicles sees competition, the strongergainingthe advantageover the weaker andrightlyso, as the law of nature(483d), Plato's Socratesin


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56 PLATO ON DEMOCRACY AND EXPERTISEthis dialogue sees nature as Pythagorean order and harmony(508a). Callicles is not convinced, ofcourse.8. This understanding,be it noted,wouldhaveto bemore than the trueopinionthat the lower classin the Republic achievesunder the guidanceof the superior understandingof the philosophers; or inPlato's view, as soon as we admitthe existenceof such a superiorclass,we removeany justificationforconsultingthe majorityof the citizens.9. It is indeed with the young, especially with the Guardian young, that Books 2 and 3 areconcerned.But one can hardlysupposethat the educationof the ordinarycitizensin the Republic s anymore open-ended- or if it is, it will only be so becausepreciseaccuracyin their opinions is both lessattainableand less necessary.10. If Plato thinks that the Rulers have achievedcomplete understanding,the possibilityof newinsights appearingin the dialecticalprocess is indeed logically excluded.(I am grateful to LindsayJudson for emphasizingthis point.)But in that case the Republicseems to have no relevanceto anyeducational context in the world of our experience (see ?IV below).It may be that Plato allows thatsome new insights may be achieved,though not such as to imply significant changes in the overallstructure of the state, andnot such as to call into questionthe authorityof the PhilosopherRulers. Butis he entitled to assume that new insights,if there are any at all,will be so limitedin scope?11. Cf. TheOpenSocietyand its EnemiesI, Plato (London, 5th ed. 1965), especiallypp. 167-8; also134-5.12. The key passagesare Republic6. 499c-e on the one hand and Republic9. 592a-b on the other.13. Popper (above n. 11), pp. 120-1. Aristotle's rather different approach to political theory,emphasizing as Malcolm Schofieldpointedout to me)rulingandbeingruled n turn,maybe connectedwith his generallack of epistemologicalanxieties.14. I am gratefulto LindsayJudson for raisingthis question.15. The Trial of Socrates (London, 1988). Cf. Sharples, 'On Socratic Reasoning and PracticalActivity' in H. D. Jocelyn (ed.), Tria Lustra, Festschriftor John Pinsent (Liverpool, forthcoming),pp.43-52.

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