Project Business Case - Short Form

Beharra Springs SIS Upgrade

Short Form Business Case

DRAFT

Version0.2

ReleasedJan 2015

Document ownerAndrew Lange

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*Please see Document control section for more information

For internal Origin use and distribution only.Subject to employee confidentiality obligations.Once printed, this is an uncontrolled document unless issued and stamped Controlled Copy.

Contents1Executive Summary32Background33Project Objectives34Business Benefits45Technical Overview Approach and Scope45.1Installation of SIS PLC to replace relay logic and ESD override45.2Re-location of existing ESD + PCS control55.3Merging separated safety functions into new SIS PLC55.4Separation of looped functions55.5Upgrade switch elements to transmitters55.6Visibility, control and management of SIS bypasses66HSE67Commercial Overview68Timing69Risks & Opportunities710Project Cost & Budget811Recommendation912Attachment project scope of works913Document Control10

Appendix AProject Implementation Schedule

Executive Summary Capital funding approval of $498,000 is requested from the L11 Joint Venture in order to upgrade site Safety Instrumented System (SIS) installation. This funding will supplement and incorporate existing budgets allocated for partial upgrades to the existing SIS infrastructure, and expand scope of upgrade to include integration with all major site SIS systems. It will also includinge the expansion of existing EER#2 in order to accommodate to house the new SIS PLC control panel under same building.This project aims to improve the site will bring the site SIS safety performance, reliability, maintainability and provide future provisions for improvement and expansion. into compliance with all applicable standards and regulations. It will remove the majority of legacy architectural constraints on the site and make future upgrades significantly simpler. The project would be due for commencement in January 2014.

Background The L11 permit is operated by Origin Energy (67%) in a Joint Venture partnership with AWE (33%). The BSGP was commissioned in 1992 and has been in successful operation for almost 20 years. The plant has operated over the past 20 years, undergoing a number of small and large control system upgrades. Existing safety system relies on relay based series connected individual trip initiating elements (instruments) making it difficult to isolate and troubleshoot individual instruments. Due to hardwired nature of the trip circuits, maintenance overrides can be applied only by installation of temporary physical bridges in SIS system which is not an authorised standard industry practice and are more exposed to SIS failures caused due to system breach by unauthorised changes. Existing master override switch bypass the entire safety system functionality and therefore is an unconventional application of the maintenance overside/system forces. SIS requires routine validation of the individual safety instrument functions a per the site SRS documentation. Safety function validation and instrument calibration can only be carryout only by applying maintenance override. The existing SIS architecture has greater inherent risk while carrying out maintenance activities. Over this time safety system technology and standards have changed, but the facility has failed to keep up with these changes. The bulk of existing control system/safety system Additionally, the bulk of the control system architecture is now is located in the plant area which , effectively making it strandeding from the original site shutdown and control systems (in the old office/accommodation building). The existing safety system/control system architecture and components of these systems doesnt ont provide adequate provisions for lend themselves to easy maintenance, troubleshooting and installation of additional instruments integration ,with the rest of the site. In 2013 a project was initiated to upgrade the office ESD panel, however these funds were not utilised as the scope of the project was identified as being insufficient to suitably meet the site requirements.

Project ObjectivesThis e objective of the project aims is to install new to upgrade and relocate the site SIS infrastructure for improving the system safety and reliability and of Beharra Springs gas plant thereby to making it complyliance with relevant Australian Standards (AS61508/AS61511) and Origin Energys integrity management plans for functional safety instrument systems. This project will facilitate confinement of the plant process control system and safety system to one physical location thereby improving the intercommunication and function coordination between the systems. This project will considerably reduce the risk of system failures due to inter communication and system linkage issues. The new system architecture shall have provision for maintenance override switches on individual safety functions for carrying out maintenance activities on these items while plant is in operation. This will enable site to organise for SIS function validation as per frequency specified SRS and Origin asset integrity management plan. The new system will provide the flexibility for any future SIS logic configuration change that may arise while carrying out HAZOP study, SIL assessment and modification to process which may be required over the period of operation of the plant. Additionally the upgrade will make future upgrades and improvements significantly easier. Purchase and install new SIS PLC in dedicated control panel Relocate all office/accommodation based control equipment to plant switchroom Integrate new SIS PLC with maximum number of plant sub-systems to implement plant cause & effect logic effectively Utilise upcoming LTS replacement shutdown as opportunity to cut-over to new SIS system, while making maximum amount of preparation prior to shutdown. All work to be completed safely, on schedule, within budget and in accordance with Origin HSE management, contracts management and permit to work processes.

Business BenefitsThe project is expected to provide significant improvements to the safety, reliability, availability and maintainability of the plant. will deliver a number of benefits. These are initially mostly related to compliance and integrity rather than financial, however significant savings will be possible during future projects due to the works performed during this project. The improvements delivered by this project are:Additional benefits will be realised by making the future upgrades and improvements significantly easier.

Provide Improvements to overall plant safety by implementing safety integrity level appropriated for each safety instrumented functions. Enhance communication and operational coordination between safety system and process control to improve the plant availability and reliability. Implement MOC functionality for individual safety instrument functions so as to carry out the maintenance /validation of SIF while plant is in operation so as to achieve required safety compliance as per origin AIMPs directive and AS61508/AS61511. Consolidate the process control and safety system to single physical location at the plant thereby avoid complexity in troubleshooting to enable quicker restoration of plant production. Compliance with all applicable national integrity standards relating to functional safety (eg: AS 61508/11) A single safety instrumented control system for 90% of plant safety loops Reduced maintenance requirements on SIS equipment (increased proof test intervals) as result of improved monitoring of SIS elements Improved visibility of process via safety instrumented loops, resulting in operator ability to pre-empt issues prior to plant interruption Reduced nuisance tripping of unrelated systems caused by legacy architecture Ability to bypass functions on a loop-by-loop basis with automated monitoring of active bypasses compliant with Origin integrity management plan for functional safety Significantly reduced complexity of SIS and PCS systems and field wiring, including a full set of drawings to be available subsequent to project (unlike existing system with poor and missing drawings) making maintenance quicker and more efficient.These are initially mostly related to compliance and integrity rather than financial, however significant savings will be possible during future projects due to the works performed during this project. The improvements delivered by this project are:

Technical Overview Approach and ScopeThe project is expected to be carried out in for different phases listed below Design development and review Manufacture The major aspects of the upgrade are discussed below. The approach has the advantage the most of the work can be implemented prior to the shutdown around which it is centered. Additionally, parcels of work can be deferred for later implementation if it is felt this is necessary. Purchase and install new SIS PLC in dedicated control panel Relocate all office/accommodation based control equipment to plant switchroom Integrate new SIS PLC with maximum number of plant sub-systems to implement plant cause & effect logic effectively Utilise upcoming LTS replacement shutdown as opportunity to cut-over to new SIS system, while making maximum amount of preparation prior to shutdown. All work to be completed safely, on schedule, within budget and in accordance with Origin HSE management, contracts management and permit to work processes.The approach has the advantage the most of the work can be implemented prior to the shutdown around which it is centered. Additionally, parcels of work can be deferred for later implementation if it is felt this is necessary.

Installation of SIS PLC to replace relay logic and ESD overrideThe plant safety loops are currently all relay-based. This has a number of distinct issues, but of greatest concern is the single override used to defeat complete plant ESD function when maintenance is required (eg critical function testing), A SIS PLC will be installed to manage plant SIS functions and allow loop-by-loop defeat when required for maintenance and testing, in accordance with AS-61511.

Re-location of existing ESD + PCS controlThe original plant control system was located in the accommodation/office block, however all subsequent upgrades focused control on newer infrastructure located in the plant. As a result the main plant ESD function, and some original control loops are still located outside the plant, away from the bulk of control infrastructure. This project will re-locate all SIS and PCS control functions into the plant. This will be achieved by:1) Installing a new SIS PLC control panel within an existing switchroom (extended)2) Incorporating PCS loops into an existing PLC with significant spare capacity. One PCS PLC to be made redundant 3) Replacing a number of multi-core cables to field function boxes to re-direct I/O including segregation of PCS and SIS cablingThe result of this change will be a single central control centre for all plant functions, significantly reduced complexity to the field wiring.

Merging separated safety functions into new SIS PLCThe plant has a number of cascading safety shutdowns that are all managed in different parts of the plant, many by isolated sub-systems. The new SIS-PLC will act as a central controller for 90% of SIS functions in the plant, including fire & gas system and the sales gas compressors. This will also address some cause & effect disconnects, eg that the fire & gas system is unable to trip the whole plant, only sections thereof. A major headache for the site operations has always been unrelated cause & effects as part of the compressor area ESD, results of poorly thought out modifications in the past. An example is the fact that a high compressor suction pressure results in fuel gas trip to generation units and methanol pumps. With the new SIS PLC in place these issues can be corrected easily.

Separation of looped functionsBecause of space restraints in field wiring a number of functions are looped in the field. Examples are: Emergency stop pushbuttons for 4 different areas are reported together, making it difficult to identify cause of ESD The fusible loop system has 6 initiating areas, but these are all joined in the field, again making it impossible to quickly know which area has reported a fireThese functions will be separated to provide detail.

Upgrade switch elements to transmittersIn the past, switches were used for SIS functions. This was typically related to the relay-based nature of ESD systems. Current best practise for plant integrity is to utilise transmitters for SIS functions, allowing continuous measurement of process variable, resulting in easier analysis of process upset causes and improved maintenance intervals.Approximately 10 transmitters will be upgraded from switch to transmitter based. Future upgrades from switch to transmitter easily achieved.

Visibility, control and management of SIS bypassesAll SIS elements will be made available on Citect. Authorisation will require use of a keyswitch, and application of Citect based Maintenance Override. Monitoring of SIS override time will be automated and compliance with Origin SIS integrity management plan ensured.

HSEThere are several factors relating to HSE on any works performed on a remote site such as BHSGP. Primarily the personnel utilised must be appropriately skilled for the works and trained in Origins mandatory HSE modules. This will be controlled partly by using approved (pre-qualified) contractors. A detailed risk assessment and JHA will be completed for each activity in the proposed installation and commissioning works with this being supported by further on-the-job assessments based on the use of the 3 Whats HSE tools.The execution of all tasks will be covered under the existing site Permit to Work processes using trained personnel who are experienced in the tasks being performed.

Commercial OverviewThe project has no commercial drivers that act as an incentive to implement, other than the associated financial implications of a failure of the existing system.The project will be planned for installation during the upcoming 12-day shutdown for vessel internal inspections, and LTS installation. For this reason no special shutdowns are expected to be required for the relocation and implementation of the new system, and thus no commercial impact.

TimingThe project is being planned for implementation during the plant shutdown scheduled for early-mid 2015. This shutdown is due to run for approximately 12 days to allow for internal vessel inspections and the LTS replacement. This window provides sufficient time to perform the necessary cut-across to the new system and testing of all systems Missing the 2015 shutdown may result in up to a 2-year wait until the next opportunity to implement this upgrade. Refer to appendix A

Risks & OpportunitiesThe SIS upgrade gives rise to a number of key risks and opportunities. These are manageable and the extent to which we choose to mitigate will depend on the cost v benefit of each. Risks:RisksManagement

Impact to production during pre-installation worksHighly experienced installation team to be utilised for work. Very familiar with site systems. No work on any operational SIS components during pre-installation phase, only

Significant changes to control system may result in in-intended trips to the plant post-restart.All new code will be fully tested and QAd prior to implementation. Project team will remain on standby on site to support restart.

Implementation of upgrade may result in delays to re-start subsequent to shutdown.The work will be rolled out in stages during the shutdown, allowing certain sections of the upgrade to be held back for later implementation if completion timeframes are at risk.

Opportunities:OpportunitiesManagement

Reduced complexity of installed plant equipment will make future upgrades simpler and quicker.Spare capacity to be ensured during upgrade.

Project Timing

Project TimingProject Cost & Budget The costs for the project have been budgeted as follows:DescriptionCost ($A)

EngineeringOrigin project, instrument + control engineer (3months)I&E Construction supervisor & designer (contract) (4months) Control Systems Engineer - SIS (1month)Additional engineer hours, (PHA, management, review) 94,000108,00032,00026,000

EquipmentSIS PLC (HIMA)EER#2 extension (including installation)Supply & construction of SIS-101Supply & construction of SIS-102Multicore cables and all misc materialsInstrument upgrades (7x analog instruments)42,00035,00030,0005,00023,00014,000

I&E InstallationCable tray and installing multicore cables (3men 12days)Multicore termination into new SIS-101 and PLC-101 (3men 12days)Shutdown works (4men, 12days)Expenses based on historical per person per diem of $150 (x140)47,00047,00063,00021,000

Contingency @ 10%58,000

Sub-Total645,000

Minus existing budget (ESD panel replacement = $147,000)(147,000)

TOTAL498,000

An existing ESD upgrade project with a budget of $147k exists thus the required additional funds come to a total of $498,000. This budget will come from existing budgeted items that will not be utilised this financial year:1) Plant PLC & SIS Switch Room (part of this project)2) Accommodation upgrade (reduced)3) APA GC Upgrade C9+ (cancelled)4) Minor Capital

RecommendationIt is recommended that funding approval be granted for capital expenditure to complete this project and utilise the upcoming Beharra shutdown. This will cost $498,000

Attachment project scope of works Attachment Draft Project Scoping Report W-4100-70-SW-009 rev B

Document ControlNote: All relevant business unit and functional parties to sign-off the Business Case. Delegate of Authority to sign-off the CEA, which the Business Case supports

DOCUMENT OWNER

NamePositionSignatureDate

Andrew LangeBeharra IC&E Engineer

FUNCTIONAL REVIEW*

DepartmentName & PositionSignatureDate

Geo ThaliathSenior Projects Engineer

Steve AllanLead ICE Integrity Engineer

BUSINESS UNIT REVIEW**

NamePositionSignatureDate

Gary RooksWA Operations Manager

* Other functions to review and sign-off as required - consider Technical, HSE, Legal, Risk, Tax, Accounting, People & Culture, Insurance, Treasury** BU Commercial sign-off is required on all business case documents

Beharra Springs SIS Upgrade [Business Case]

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Appendix A Implementation Schedule