Planning U.S.General Purpose Forces:OverviewJanuary1977

Congressional Budget OfficeCongress of the United StatesWashington, D.C.

PLANNING U.S. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES:OVERVIEW

The Congress of the United StatesCongressional Budget Office

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PREFACE

As the Congress makes decisions on budget targetsfor the First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget forFiscal Year 1978, the appropriate size of the defensebudget will be one of the most important issues. Themilitary forces that the budget buys can be dividedinto two parts. These are the strategic retaliatoryforces—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers; and thegeneral purpose forces—all the rest of the Navy, Army,Air Force, and Marine Corps. The general purposeforces account for most of the defense budget; deci-sions about their size, location, equipment, and levelof readiness determine much of the defense budget. Inturn, the appropriate character and size of theseforces should be tied to conceptions of how and wherethey would be used, and to assessments of the capabil-ity of likely adversaries.

The series of six Budget Issue Papers on thegeneral purpose forces, of which this is a part, isintended to lay out the most significant assumptionsunderlying current planning of the general purposeforces, to discuss the match between those assumptionsand the current or projected forces, and to suggestwhat might change in defense programs if somewhatdifferent planning assumptions were adopted. The otherpapers in the series are: . The Navy, Army ProcurementI.s_s_u_e_s_, The Tactical Air Forces, The Theater NuclearForces, and Forces Related to Asia. This Overview isintended to establish the context for the other papers,to sketch their major findings, and to draw togetheroptions for the defense budget as a whole rather thanelement by element. The Summary of this paper ispresented as a brief summary of the entire series.

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The Ove£v.ie_w was prepared by John E. Koehlerand Robert B. Pirie, Jr. of the National Security andInternational Affairs Division of the CongressionalBudget Office. The authors are indebted to Dov. S.Zakheim, Nancy J. Bearg, Carl R. Neu, G. PhilipHughes, and Charles A. Sorrels, who wrote the paperson which the Overview draws, and to R. Stephen Brentwho drafted an early version of this paper. Theauthors also gratefully acknowledge the assistance ofPatrick L. Renehan and Stephen A. Thompson of the CBOBudget Analysis Division, David S. Mundel of the HumanResources and Community Development Division, and ofPatricia Johnston, Johanna Zacharias, Nancy Swope,Shirley Hornbuckle, Patricia Edwards, and PatriciaMinton.

Alice M. RivlinDirector

January 1977

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CONTENTS

Preface iii

Summary vii

Chapter I. Introduction: Foreign Policyand Military Forces 1

Chapter II. Planning the General Purpose Forces . 7

Chapter III. Critical NATO Assumptions 13

Chapter IV. Ground Forces and Mobility Forces . . 17

Chapter V. Tactical Air Forces 23

Chapter VI. Naval Forces 29

Chapter VII. Theater Nuclear Forces 35

Chapter VIII. Conclusions and Options 39

Glossary 49

TABLES

1. Option One: Budget Authority in Billions ofFiscal Year 1977 Dollars 45

2. Option Two: Budget Authority in Billions ofFiscal Year 1977 Dollars 46

3. Option Three: Budget Authority in Billions ofFiscal Year 1977 Dollars 47

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SUMMARY

Most of the manpower and budget of the U.S.Department of Defense (DoD) go to maintaining "thegeneral purpose forces." These include all of theground forces; all of the air forces—Navy, Marine,and Air Force—other than strategic bombers andcontinental air defense; all of the Navy except theballistic missile submarine fleet; and the ships andaircraft that transport these forces. Decisionsabout the size and structure of the general purposeforces, and about their future size and structuredetermine most of the defense budget.

This series of papers !_/ describes the scenariosor combat situations for which the general purposeforces are planned, assesses the match betweenthese scenarios and the current and planned forces,and discusses how changes in the planning scenariosor assumptions might affect the size and structure ofthe appropriate forces.

The possible changes in U.S. forces summarizedin this Overview include options that could raise thedefense budget by about $3.2 billion in fiscal year1977 dollars over the next five years or, alterna-tively, options that could reduce the budget by about$15.5 billion over the same period. These arerelated to alternative assumptions about how muchwarning time might precede a major war in which theUnited States was involved, the duration of such awar, and how stringent constraints on the size of thedefense budget are felt to be.

I/ These papers are: The__Nay_y_, Army ProcurementIssues, The Tactical Air Forces, Theater NuclearForces, and Forces Related to Asia.

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Because the forces really are "general purpose,"it is not possible to predict exactly how, or where,or against what adversary they might be used.Nonetheless, it is necessary to make assumptionsabout adversaries and circumstances in order togive coherence to the planning process. The Depart-ment of Defense assumes that an appropriate scenarioagainst which to plan is a worldwide war betweenthe United States and the USSR, along with theirallies on both sides. This war is assumed to beconcentrated in Central Europe, where large NATO andWarsaw Pact forces face each other, and where boththe United States and the Soviet Union have vitalinterests. It is also assumed that some minorcontingency not involving the USSR and its alliesmay require the use of U.S. forces at the sametime as this major war. The forces are planned to beable to deal with such a minor contingency withoutimpairing their capability to fight the major war.The Defense Department assumes that, if U.S. generalpurpose forces are planned to deal with these majorand minor contingencies, they will be adequate forany other uses to which the United States might wishto put them.

Defense Department planning assumptions focuson possible future conflict in Central Europe.If that is the major threat, what do we know aboutit? We know that NATO forces in Europe face anadversary whose force design and tactical doctrine isgeared toward blj zjy jle tactic-s. The Sovietsappear to believe that, if war came, they mightdefeat NATO forces and occupy most of Europe within afew weeks, whether or not nuclear weapons wereused. Whether they are right about this is uncer-tain. There is little agreement among Westernobservers on this point, and the Soviets do not seemto be perfectly certain of the outcome either. Thedeterrent value of U.S. and other NATO forces reststo a significant degree on this Soviet uncertainty.Accordingly, NATO force design should give highpriority to forces that contribute directly andimmediately to stopping and containing an initialWarsaw Pact attack of very great intensity. Also,because success in this depends on organizing acoherent defense rapidly, emphasis should be placed

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on forces that can react very rapidly in case ofattack.

Defense Department force planning scenariosgenerally assume that a few weeks warning time wouldbe available to mobilize and deploy forces and tostart reinforcing NATO from the United States.Recently, some observers have argued that even thisstringent assumption may not lead to proper forcedesign and that we should plan for a war followingeven shorter warning. Even if the assumption ofseveral weeks warning is valid, much of U.S. generalpurpose forces either cannot be moved to Europequickly enough to affect early phases of a war or arenot sufficiently well organized and equipped toengage in the combat there. Thus, while the specificplanning assumptions emphasize the importance ofrapid reaction and combat capability early in a war,the forces themselves appear more appropriate forfighting a longer war. The force-related sections ofthis overview paper, and the papers of the generalpurpose forces planning series, consider how U.S.forces might be affected by a decision to plan for anabrupt war that reaches its initial phase quickly.

Ground Forces

The U.S. Army has the equivalent of five divi-sions in Germany and could bring in the equivalent oftwo more before the fighting starts, assuming severalweeks warning. Prepositioned equipment is planned tobe available in Germany for this force by the end offiscal year 1979. However, seven divisions are lessthan one-third of the Army's total force of sixteenactive and eight guard and reserve divisions.Further, there are three active and one reserve U.S.Marine Corps divisons. Prepositioning more equipmentin Germany, providing high quality armored vehicles,and augmenting the antitank capabilities of forces inGermany would be consistent with the view that theearly, intense phases of a NATO war would be crucial.Planned conversion of two U.S.-based infantry divi-sions to mechanized divisions more suitable for theNATO war may not be appropriate because of thetime required to move the equipment of these divi-

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sions from the United States to Europe. If warningwere short and the NATO defense disorganized, theneed for numerous antitank helicopters to countermassive Warsaw Pact tank attacks might indicatebuying larger numbers of relatively inexpensiveCobra/TOW helicopters, rather than fewer of themore expensive Advanced Attack Helicopter now indevelopment.

Tactical Air Forces

U.S. tactical air forces are a flexible andrapidly reacting means of bringing firepower to theaid of NATO ground forces in case of a Warsaw Pactattack. Further, because of their inherent mobility,the capability of the tactical air forces to supportNATO does not appear to be affected strongly byshorter warning time. Thus, they constitute animportant supplement to NATO ground force capabilityand a hedge against an attack coming before theground forces are ready to fight.

The capability of the tactical air forces maybe limited by darkness or bad weather, by enemy airdefenses, or by preemptive enemy attack againstvulnerable, unsheltered aircraft. Much of the U.S.tactical air forces is designed for operations indaylight and good weather. Since fighting on theground goes on around the clock and in any weather,it might be useful to place more emphasis on aircraftand other systems that can be used at night and inbad weather. This would mean procuring aircraft withspecialized, relatively expensive capabilities,and probably a second seat for an assistant to thepilot. Soviet air defenses over the battlefieldinclude a formidable array of surface-to-air missilesand anti-aircraft artillery. These systems mayinhibit tactical air strikes in support of friendlyground forces. Suppressing enemy air defenses wouldrequire special aircraft and equipment to jam acquisi-tion and tracking radars and to seek out and destroyradars and missile batteries. Finally, vulnerabilityof friendly aircraft to destruction on the groundwould be much reduced by keeping the aircraft inhardened shelters.

Measures to assure that the tactical airforces could perform to full capability, like thosedescribed above, might have more immediate payoffthan simply expanding the total size of the force.This would be particularly true if the limitationsreduce the capability not only of present aircraft,but also of new aircraft being introduced into theforce. Therefore, if resource constraints dictate,improvements to reduce aircraft limitations mightbe paid for by reducing the planned Air Force sizefrom 26 tactical air wings to 25 or 24.

If the numbers of tactical aircraft availableto deploy to Europe in wartime are thought to beinsufficient, consideration could be given to usingMarine and Navy tactical air wings from land basesthere. Thirty-one percent of U.S. tactical aircraftbelong to the Navy, and a further twelve percent tothe Marines. Present planning for a NATO war makes ituncertain whether Marine and Navy tactical air wingswould be used, especially in the critical earlystages. Providing equipment to permit land-basedoperation for at least the Navy air wings whoseaircraft carriers are in overhaul might offer aninexpensive way to augment tactical air forces inEurope. The three Marine air wings could also beused in Europe without Marine ground divisions, andwould not require additional equipment to do so.

Naval Forces

Present U.S. naval forces do not appear to beplanned primarily for a NATO/Warsaw Pact war inEurope. The naval mission that contributes most tosuch a war involves keeping the sea lines of communi-cation open, and preventing Soviet use of the sea toattack friendly forces and shipping. The use of this"sea control" mission is controlling the Sovietsubmarine threat and whatever threat Soviet long-range aircraft might pose. Soviet surface ships,while heavily armed and capable of doing great damagein a preemptive first strike, are vulnerable toattack by land- or sea-based aircraft and by subma-rine. Thus, after the first days of a war, it isunlikely that Soviet surface ships will venture out

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from under the protection of Soviet land-basedaircraft.

It would take U.S. and allied forces consider-able time, perhaps several months, to neutralize theSoviet submarine force. In the first month of thewar, Soviet submarines could sink a fairly largenumber, perhaps as much as 25 to 30 percent, ofmilitary and civilian ships, whether under convoy ornot. No feasible additions to allied antisubmarinewarfare (ASW) forces would improve this situationsubstantially. Clearly, the war must go on for sev-eral months before the Navy's sea control contribu-tion has a major impact on the ground war. If thewar reaches a critical phase in a few days orweeks, the Navy may not have time to contributesignificantly.

A Navy mission that is often assumed to play adirect role in a NATO/Warsaw Pact war is "powerprojection." This involves bombardment of and airstrikes at targets ashore, and amphibious landings ofMarine Corps forces. Perhaps the best examples ofwars in which Navy power projection forces, mainlyaircraft carriers, played a significant role are theKorean and Vietnam wars. In those wars, however, theenemy had little ability to menace carrier forces.Even so, it is not clear how much naval air strikesinfluenced the ultimate outcome of either war. Instrikes against the Soviet Union, the Soviet navaland air opposition to U.S. carrier forces would beintense, raising the question of whether the carriersmight not be so busy defending themselves that theywould have little capacity left to attack enemytargets ashore. Further, it is not clear thatattacks by carrier air forces on Soviet bases, oron Soviet forces engaged on NATO's flanks (Norway andthe Eastern Mediterranean), would play a significantrole in halting Warsaw Pact forces in Europe.

Other rationales for Navy aircraft carrierforces have been advanced. One holds that theyare a hedge against a longer war that might ensueeither from a stalemate in Europe or from a NATOdefeat there. In either case the theater of opera-tions would shift to regions where carriers might

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play a more direct role. Other rationales includethe use of the carrier in influencing local crises orin contingency operations not involving the USSR.These rationales, while important, are not theexplicit basis on which naval forces are planned andsized, nor do they help much in deciding how manyaircraft carriers the United States should have.

Present Defense Department plans involve main-taining 12 or 13 aircraft carriers in the Navythrough the end of this century. In fact, with aservice life extension program, 12 aircraft carrierscould be maintained into the 1990s without construc-tion of new ones. Thus the Navy will have veryconsiderable power projection capability whether ornot any more aircraft carriers are built.

Current Defense Department programs includeconstruction of one more Nimitz-class nuclear air-craft carriers and one or more classes of largeescort ships for carrier task forces. These escortships will be equipped with the AEGIS air defensesystem, which is designed to defend against the sortof intense attack to be expected when approaching theUSSR. An alternative to this DoD program wouldemphasize the primacy of the sea control mission infuture Navy budgets. It would procure neither thecarrier nor the AEGIS escorts over the next fiveyears. Savings compared to the DoD program wouldbe more than $7 billion in fiscal year 1977 dollars,which could be used for other sorts of naval ships,or other purposes.

Another alternative to DoD programs wouldbe favored by those who believe that it is importantto maintain a power projection capability evenin the face of heavy Soviet opposition. This viewwould buy more aircraft carriers and AEGIS escortships than currently planned, at a rate mainlyconstrained by U.S. shipbuilding capacity. Thisalternative would cost about $6 billion more infiscal year 1977 dollars than current DoD programsover the next five years.

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Theater Nuclear Forces

U.S. theater nuclear forces located in Europehave two main purposes: (1) to deter Soviet firstuse of nuclear forces in Europe; and (2) to detera massive Soviet conventional attack. When theweapons were first placed in Europe, the Soviets hadfew nuclear forces themselves. These U.S. weaponswere seen then as a means not only to deter Sovietconventional attack, but to defeat it militarily.They also came to be seen by NATO allies as a kind ofguarantee that U.S. power, both theater and strate-gic, would be used in case of Soviet aggression inEurope. As the Soviets' own nuclear forces havegrown, however, it has become apparent that U.S.first use of nuclear weapons to stave off defeat bySoviet conventional forces would likely trigger amassive Soviet nuclear response. Whether or not thisstrike were confined to the theater, it might lead toa situation considerably less favorable to U.S.interests than loss of the battle on the Europeanmainland. Thus, the possible use of nuclear means todefeat a Soviet conventional attack raises substan-tial problems, and the rationale of deterrence ofsuch an attack by this means loses some credibility.

If deterrence of Soviet first use of theaternuclear weapons is the primary objective, our forcesshould reflect it. A prime requirement of suchdeterrence is that the force should not be vulnerableto preemptive destruction by enemy forces. U.S.theater nuclear forces in Europe, except for Poseidonsubmarines allocated to NATO, do not have thisquality of survivability. Thus, if theater nuclearforces are to be improved or modified in the future,improvement in their survivability, and hencedeterrent capability, seems to warrant priority.

Conclusions

Much of the force expansion and modernizationplanned by DoD seems aimed primarily at increasingthe longer-term fighting ability of the forces.However, concern is growing that, because of the sizeand power of Soviet forces in Europe, a NATO/Warsaw

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Pact war might be swiftly concluded in favor of theSoviets before the bulk of U.S. forces could bebrought to bear. Some actions could be taken toimprove this situation, such as increasing stocks ofprepositioned equipment for the U.S. Army in Europe,and providing a night/bad-weather version of the A-10attack aircraft. The cost would be about $3.2billion in fiscal year 1977 dollars over the nextfive years. This sum could be added directly to DoDprogrammed budgets, or it could be offset by re-straining some DoD plans which are associated withlonger war capability, such as expansion of the Armyand Air Force and procurement of new Navy carrierforces. The net effect of these offsets would reducethe DoD budget by $12.3 billion in fiscal year 1977dollars over the next five years. Finally, restraintof DoD longer-war programs without adding the forceimprovements would reduce the DoD budget by $15.5billion fiscal year 1977 dollars over fiscal years1978-1982.

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION: FOREIGN POLICY ANDMILITARY FORCES

The general purpose forces comprise the groundand tactical air forces, all of the Navy except theballistic missile submarine fleet, and the mobilityforces that provide air- and sea-lift. Some of theseforces are capable of delivering nuclear weapons ofvarious kinds. The general purpose forces containmost of the manpower, and are responsible for most ofthe cost, of the U.S. defense establishment.

Major programs to expand and modernize the U.S.general purpose forces are currently underway orcontemplated. U.S. Air Force tactical wings arebeing increased from 22 to 26. Aircraft are beingprocured to equip the new wings, replace agingaircraft, and modernize the reserves. Navy andMarine Corps air wings are receiving new equipment aswell. The Army ground forces are being restructuredfrom 13 to 16 divisions within a constant active-dutymanpower ceiling, and programs are underway toprocure new helicopters and new armored fightingvehicles such as the XM-1 tank and MICV (MechanizedInfantry Combat Vehicle) personnel carrier andto furnish several formerly "light" infantry divi-sions with the tanks and transport required to turnthem into "heavy" mechanized or armored units. Themobility forces may be provided with new short- andlong-range transport aircraft. A program for expan-sion and modernization of the Navy is still takingshape.

The Congress will have to evaluate these pro-grams, decide which of them to carry out, determinehow quickly, and in what numbers.

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This overview paper and the five accompanyingpapers in this series !_/ are intended to help focusdebate on the general purpose forces and on thedefense budget by addressing the following questions:

o What missions are the general purposeforces intended to be able to carry out?What are the scenarios or combat situationsfor which they are planned?

o How do the current and planned forces matchthe assumptions of these scenarios?

o How would changes in the scenarios affect thesize and character of the appropriate forces?

POLICY INTERESTS AND MILITARY OPTIONS

In principle, the U.S. military posture shouldbe designed to reflect a coherent view of foreignpolicy objectives and threats to those objectives. Atpresent, it is difficult to extract such a link fromofficial statements except at the most generallevel. Furthermore, the new Administration may chooseto redefine both our foreign policy objectives andour military posture. It is possible, however, tosketch the broad outlines of a consensus on foreignpolicy that is sufficiently detailed for the purposesof this paper. This consensus is as follows:

The most important foreign relations of theUnited States are with Japan and the Western Europeannations on the one hand and with the Soviet Union andthe People's Republic of China (PRC) on the other.We share with the first group economic ties, commonvalues, analagous political systems, and mutual

!_/ These papers are: Th_e___Na_vy_, A r m y P r o c u r e -ment Issues, The Tactical Air Forces, TheaterNuclear Forces, and Forces Related to Asia.

defense arrangements. With China and the SovietUnion, the United States shares a mixed set ofrelationships, partly competitive and partly coopera-tive. Both the USSR and the United States coulddevastate a substantial portion of each other'shomeland and significant parts of the rest of theworld as well; this ability overshadows all relationsbetween the Soviets and the United States. Because ofthe power both countries possess, neither can riskhurting the other too much because to do so wouldinvite such destructive response.

The question of how much damage is too muchis ambiguous for both nations; no one knows for surewhat would drive the Soviets to massive response, nordo the Soviets know for sure what would similarlyinspire the United States. Thus, although the twocountries are engaged in a long-term political andmilitary competition, both share an interest inlimiting the scope and character of the competition,keeping it within certain bounds, and persuadingallies to do the same. In policy statements, bothsides try to clarify the terms and permissible limitsof the competition without being so explicit as tocede marginal interests or areas. The relationshipbetween the United States and the Soviet Union maynot be symmetric; the Soviets, for example, may bemore willing than the United States to upset thestatus quo if it m_ig_h;t yield them an advantage.Since Moscow views the PRC as a significant militarythreat, the Soviets are sensitive to signs of emerg-ing collaboration between the United States andChina. Therefore, the warmth of U.S. relations withthe Chinese is limited by Soviet interests and fears,as well as by the interests of Japan and Taiwan.Those Soviet fears and the military deployments theyengender have nonetheless tied up resources that theSoviets might otherwise use to threaten the UnitedStates and Europe or to divert to consumption oreconomic growth.

In addition to these two sets of relations,the United States also has a special interest inthe Middle East, both because of our close tieswith Israel, and because of our dependence on oilfrom the countries of the region. The fact that

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our allies have an even greater need for MiddleEastern oil compounds the situation. Because ofthe intense antagonism among Middle Eastern countriesand the importance of the region to the UnitedStates and the USSR, the likelihood of conflictgrowing into direct battle between U.S. and Sovietforces seems relatively high. Hence, the region isthe focus of constant attention, with the result thatsignificant U.S. and Soviet forces are deployed tothe Eastern Mediterranean.

Military forces, both strategic and generalpurpose, provide the United States with options—thatwe may or may not choose to exercise—to persuade,coerce, and defeat adversaries and to persuade orreassure allies. As the forces become larger, morevaried, and more astutely deployed or organized,the range of alternative actions the President mightorder in any particular situation becomes broader.For example, suppose that NATO non-nuclear generalpurpose forces were obviously incapable of withstand-ing a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. IfNATO were then faced with such an attack, the UnitedStates would have only the choices of strategicnuclear action, theater nuclear action, or some formof negotiation and compromise, or surrender. Capablenon-nuclear general purpose forces add to this set ofpossible choices; they provide a possible non-nuclearresponse that is plausibly related to the threat.This was part of the logic of the buildup of conven-tional forces early in the Kennedy adminstration andthe accompanying movement away from reliance onmassive retaliation to respond to even comparativelyminor attacks.

If adversaries perceive that the United Stateshas a broad and useful range of options on which todraw if challenged, they may be deterred from offer-ing such challenges. The corresponding perception onthe part of our allies, that we could in fact helpthem, may provide reassurance and prevent theiracceding to political, economic, and military pres-sures. Reassurance in the military sphere may alsoserve as the basis for agreement with allies on arange of economic and diplomatic matters, such astrade negotiations.

As the likelihood of Soviet-Chinese militarycooperation against the United States and its allieshas been seen to diminish, and as U.S. interest inmajor military operations beyond NATO, NortheastAsia, and the Middle East has declined, Sovietand other Warsaw Pact forces have come to be theadversary against which U.S. general purpose forcesare planned. In such planning, of course, U.S. alliesare counted as well. If the Warsaw Pact is theappropriate adversary against which to plan, and ifconflict between the two alliances would be world-wide, then the details of U.S. foreign policy commit-ments are less important for planning U.S. forcesthan they once were.

The process of adjusting U.S. forces to politi-cal and military changes in Southeast Asia maynot yet be complete. There are some militaryunits and installations in the Pacific that might beeliminated were the United States to focus still moreexclusively on NATO and Northeast Asia, but suchforces and bases account for a relatively small partof the defense budget, and likely reductions wouldnot generate large and continuing savings. Theseissues will be examined in the forthcoming report inthis series, Forces Related to Asia.

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CHAPTER II PLANNING THE GENERAL PURPOSEFORCES

The general purpose forces are of use in arange of contingencies, from terrorist attack orcivil disorder to major war. Because of the diver-sity of capabilities the forces embody, it isimpossible to predict how, where, or against whatadversary they might next be employed. Recentexperience demonstrates the variety of uses to whichthey might be put. In the past five years, generalpurpose force elements engaged in major ground andair combat in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Mili-tary Airlift Command aircraft flew supplies toIsrael during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, whileelements of the Sixth Fleet and other militaryunits demonstrated U.S. support. Air Force, Navy,and Marine units evacuated Americans and othercivilians from Southeast Asian cities and rescuedthe crew of the Mayaguez. Air Force and Navy unitswere deployed to Korea and adjacent waters after themurder of U.S. soldiers in Panmunjom. In each case,U.S. forces were engaged or could have been engagedin combat. None of these uses for the forces couldhave been predicted far in advance.

The President and Secretary of Defense have toprovide clear and explicit guidance to the armedservices in order for them to plan forces. Theguidance cannot be simply to plan forces for useanywhere, against any adversary, in any numbers.Some arbitrary selection of criteria for forceplanning is required, and possible scenarios have tobe specified. The selection of a scenario is notequivalent to a prediction that U.S. forces willcertainly be used in the place and manner specified;a scenario is principally a device to impose orderon the planning of forces, logistics and manpower,and to give content to debates and decisions aboutsuch issues. Forces planned for one set of circum-stances may have great capability in other, unantici-pated events. Planning for a small number of

scenarios, however, does carry a risk that some forcecomponents that are appropriate hedges againstunforeseen threats will be eliminated.

PLANNING SCENARIOS AND OUR STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Thus, the Department of Defense (DoD) makesdetailed assumptions in order to plan future forcessystematically. These assumptions take the form of asmall number of scenarios or situations for which theconventional forces are planned and in terms of whichforce plans are justified to the Congress by theDepartment of Defense. Underlying these scenarios isa "strategic concept", as described in the currentAnnual Defense Department Report. _!/ The conceptderives from four main principles:

o That we support two main centers of strength— in Western Europe and in Northeast Asia;

o That we have the non-nuclear capability, inconjunction with our allies, to deal simul-taneously with one major contingency and oneminor contingency;

o That we have the ability to keep open thelines of communication by sea between WesternEurope and Northeast Asia and the UnitedStates;

o That we allocate our resources in such a waythat our active forces provide an initialdefense capability and our reserve forcessupplement the more costly active units;the reserves also provide a hedge againstnon-nuclear campaigns of substantial duration.

I/ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Report to the Congress onthe Fiscal Year 1977 Budget and its Implicationsfg_r__the Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization Requestand_the Fiscal Year j.977-81 Defense Programs(January 27, 1976), pp. 114-115.

Following these principles the primary emphasisin planning of specific forces is on a hypotheticalNATO conflict. As the Annual Defense DepartmentReport states:

Since the centerpiece of ourstrategic concept is to have theability, in conjunction withour allies, to manage one majorcontingency, we believe that themost prudent way to arrive at thespecific requirement for generalpurpose forces is to considerwhat we would need to establishand maintain a forward defense inCentral Europe. 2_/

The European contingency is viewed as a suitablyrealistic and severe test case because of (1) theimportance of Europe in U.S. international interests;(2) the existence of a concrete military threatdeployed in Eastern Europe that could be reinforcedby other Warsaw Pact forces; and (3) the belief thatif our forces are adequate for NATO, they will alsobe adequate for other contingencies.

Although this strategic concept concentrates onconflict in Europe, it assumes as well that therewould be combat or a threat of combat in NortheastAsia at the same time. The Soviet Union maintainssignificant numbers of submarines and surface war-ships on its eastern coast, and these fleet unitscould threaten shipping in the Pacific and precludemovement of parts of the U.S. fleet to European orAtlantic waters. Thus, U.S. forces deployed in thePacific may have a direct role to play in worldwideconflict with the USSR. In addition, some forces maybe required for the "minor contingency" specifiedabove. It is unlikely that significant forces wouldbe withheld from a major European war to deal withhypothetical minor contingencies elsewhere; however,U.S. forces are intended to be able to deal with a

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minor contingency without substantially reducingtheir capability to deal with a NATO war that breaksout during—or as a consequence of--that minorconflict.

The NATO Scenario

The NATO scenario assumes a large-scale attackon NATO's central region (mainly on Germany). Canadaand all U.S. allies in Europe, including France,are assumed to participate. The Soviet Navy isassumed to attack shipping and naval forces in theAtlantic and Mediterranean. Since a European con-flict could become worldwide, U.S. and allied forceshold a defensive position in Northeast Asia anddefend lines of communication to that area. Lessintense naval conflict is assumed in the Pacific.

Should the war described in the planning sce-nario actually occur, it would cause enormous casual-ties, widespread destruction, and profound disruptionand confusion. All of the options open to the UnitedStates would be miserable alternatives, and all ofthe choices would have uncertain outcomes.

NATO policy stresses forward defense as far eastin Germany as possible. The aim is to hold loss ofNATO territory to a minimum. This emphasis arisesout of political considerations in Europe and out ofthe military fact that it requires more force torecover territory once it is lost than to hold it inthe first place. Because Soviet doctrine and struc-ture of force emphasize rapid offensive movement,"blitzkrieg" tactics, the United States also viewsthe initial stages of a war in Europe as particularlycritical. Accordingly, planning emphasizes initialcombat capability of active forces.

Except for four reserve brigades associated withactive divisions and selected units that providecombat service support to active forces, reserveground units cannot contribute significantly tocombat capability soon after mobilization. The mainpurpose of these forces is to provide a hedge againstthe possibility that a NATO war could draw out over a

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period of months or even years. Recent evidence ofimprovement in Soviet capability to fight a longerwar has reinforced U.S. concern with this possibility.

The roles of the U. S. armed services in a NATOwar are as follows:

o The primary role of the Army is to fightthe land war in Europe. Nearly all Armyforces are devoted to this, although ittakes up to six months after mobilizationfor the Army reserves to be ready to fight.

o The Marines provide amphibious capabil-ity in case it is needed on NATO's southernor northern flanks, and help in the landwar.

o The Air Force's missions are to secureair superiority, provide close air supportfor the land battle, make interdictionattacks, and carry out airlift to Europe.

o The Navy's job is to defend shipping,defeat the Soviet Navy, and possibly toproject airpower ashore on NATO's flanks fromits aircraft carriers.

Although those are the roles of the U.S. armedforces, it is important to realize that they mightnot be successful. The balance of forces betweenNATO and the Warsaw Pact is such that neither can besure of a successful military outcome. The UnitedStates is probably unable to buy general purposeforces large enough to guarantee a NATO victory insuch a situation. An attempt to acquire such largeforces might simply provoke an offsetting Sovietbuildup. Thus, in a major war with the Soviet Union,the outcome would be uncertain because the UnitedStates and its allies are not likely to have theoverwhelming predominance of force required to reduceto zero the role of generalship, circumstances,morale, and luck. Either side can undertake programsthat might shift the odds, but there is no way foreither in the near term to acquire an overwhelmingadvantage.

11

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CHAPTER III CRITICAL NATO ASSUMPTIONS

Under the strategic concept described in thepreceding chapter, planning of conventional forces isbased primarily on NATO, with some consideration forrequirements that might arise in Asia, the MiddleEast, or other areas. Because of the importanceof the NATO scenario, this chapter seeks to identifycritical assumptions for NATO — assumptions DoDplanners make about a NATO conflict that have thegreatest effect on planned force structure.

The relevant assumptions can be divided into twosets: broad strategic premises, and detailed assump-tions about the circumstances in which a war begins.The principal broad premises are three:

o It is assumed that pre-war alliances remaingenerally intact. Both NATO and the WarsawPact nations act together, and South Koreaand Japan also participate on the NATO side.It is also assumed that the forces of ourNATO allies are at least effective enough toavoid U.S. forces being overrun by enemybreakthroughs in weak sectors held byour allies.

o It is assumed that it is possible to have awar that does not rapidly escalate

_ ^ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _we_a£ons_; further, the Warsaw Pact mightbegin such a major war without a preemptivenuclear strike.

o It is assumed that s_i[c_h_a_war_^ _ althoughHPiILZHliSli6-3-!-.? _ wjj l still be fought all-out ,with both sides expending as much effort asthey can to win.

The most important of the detailed scenario assump-tions concern:

13

o How much warning there would be.

o How intense the pace of the war would be.

o How long the war would last.

Because the Warsaw Pact nations can deployadditional divisions quickly, NATO planners haveoften assumed that they would mobilize before launch-ing an attack. I/ If this were so, NATO wouldreceive some warning and could decide to begin acompeting mobilization, alerting and deploying partsof the Western European armies and air forces, andmoving forces from the United States to Europe. Warwould be delayed for a time, and forces available butnot deployed in peacetime could be brought to bearearly in the war. Alternatively, the war might beabrupt, beginning with little or no mobilization bythe Warsaw Pact nations and with little opportunityto augment NATO forces. A Warsaw Pact attack mightbe intense--that is, fast moving and focused onachieving a general military victory quickly.Alternatively, the attack might be restrained andmore tentative, either because Warsaw Pact forceswere not capable at the time and place of the attackof moving forward quickly in large numbers or becauseof political decisions to reduce the risk of adesperate NATO nuclear response. In planning U.S.forces, it has typically been assumed that war wouldbe delayed for a few weeks of mobilization and thatwhen the attack occurred, it would be intense.

If the expected attack is delayed, then forcesthat might be slower to emplace, but that are strong-er, are more useful. For example, armored divisionstake longer to move than airborne divisions and mightnot arrive in time unless the war is delayed; butonce deployed, they have more firepower. If fightingis intense, then provision for large quantities of

I/ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Report to the Congress onthe Fiscal Year 1977 Budget and its Implicationsfor the Fiscal Year 197JS Authorization Requestand the Fiscal Year 1977-81 Defense Programs(January 27, 1976), pp. 117-118.

14

consumables should be made. The implications ofsuch variations in assumptions will be tracedthrough the accompanying discussions of the variousgeneral purpose force components.

The defense planning process leaves the politi-cal scenarios accompanying the outbreak of warlargely undescribed. A bolt-from-the-blue attack inCentral Europe not foreshadowed by a period ofdeteriorating political relations is implausible. Anattack would be a desperate and risky act, courtingpossible failure and even nuclear retaliation. Evenif the political scenario leading to an abrupt attackis implausible, however, it is reasonable to planagainst such an assault because NATO might fail tointerpret correctly or to respond to the warningimplied in a deteriorating political situation.There is, after all, a considerable history offailure to heed such warning.

Whether a war--in its conventional phase--isshort or long is partly under U.S. control. Wecould, for example, ensure that any war would beshort by maintaining forces incapable of effectiveresistance, or by choosing to surrender. We have tosurvive a short war in order to have an opportunityto engage in a long one. But some forces--forexample, some naval forces and reserves--may notcontribute greatly to early capability, so an impor-tant set of policy choices centers on the balancebetween greater immediate capability and greatercapability after a time.

In the five chapters that follow, this paperdiscusses the ground, tactical air, naval, andtheater nuclear forces as they relate to the assumedNATO scenario and indicates the sensitivity of theseforces to changes in the NATO scenario assumptions.Since these chapters summarize more detailed papers,they state their broad conclusions without all of theaccompanying analysis and qualifications. Theanalyses are intended to focus on the NATO scenario—including worldwide war with the Soviets. Thus,some potentially important uses for some of theforces are not considered.

15

CHAPTER IV GROUND FORCES AND MOBILITY FORCES

Current national security policy makes unprece-dented demands on the U.S. Army. From a normalpeacetime posture the Army is expected, with littleor no warning, to be capable of fighting a war ofgreat intensity against a well-equipped and well-trained foe of superior numbers. Further, in thisfight the Army must operate in close coordinationwith the forces of at least five and possibly moreallied nations in the main battle front. How is theArmy to carry out this responsibility? What is theconcept of operations? What force levels, forcestructures, organizations, and doctrines are appro-priate? What are the implications for the futurecosts of raising and supporting armies?

U.S. objectives are, above all, to deter theoutbreak of war in Europe. If deterrence fails, wewant to contain an attack without giving up signifi-cant amounts of territory, then hope to transformthe war from one of movement to one of attrition,thereby convincing the Soviet leadership that nego-tiations and withdrawal from Western Europe are theirbest course of action. If negotiations cannot beachieved, we then want to be able to continue to holdoff continued attacks until full mobilization of thealliance can be achieved.

It should be clear that the first objective—deterrence—depends very much on having what theSoviets perceive as a reasonable capability to attainthe second and third objectives—containing andholding the Warsaw Pact armies. Deterrence alsodepends upon the perceived capability of U.S.strategic nuclear and theater nuclear forces and thechance that they might be used.

What is known of Warsaw Pact doctrine andcapabilities suggests that if there were a warin Europe, Soviet armies would attempt to breakthrough, encircle, and destroy NATO's armies in a

17

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blitzkrieg campaign of very short duration—perhapstwo weeks. If this expectation is correct, only apart of the U.S. Army will participate in the early,and probably crucial, phase of a European war. Theproblem for the Army, then, is to ensure withinconstraints imposed by its resources that the partthat can engage early is adequate to the task facingit, and that reinforcement capabilities are consis-tent with the longer-term holding action.

The equivalent of about five U.S. Army divisionsis deployed to Europe on a permanent basis. I/ Theseare all so-called "heavy divisions" with firepowerand vehicles suitable for intense combat in a war ofmaneuver. In addition to the five divisions inplace, the equivalent of two other divisions,plus a number of non-divisional units required to putthe theater logistics system on a wartime footing,are earmarked for rapid deployment to Europe. Stocksof prepositioned equipment are supposed to be avail-able in theater to equip these units. At present,there are some shortages in these stocks, calledPOMCUS (Prepositioned Material Configured in UnitSets) stocks, but shortages are expected to beeliminated in fiscal year 1979. Thus depending uponwarning time, about five to seven heavy U.S. Armydivisions would be available to assist NATO incountering the initial Warsaw Pact attack. This isout of a total force of sixteen active and eightguard and reserve divisions. The remaining activedivisions (less the division in Korea) can be movedto Europe over the next 45 days and the guard andreserve divisions over the course of the next sixmonths. They would depend mainly on sealift, partic-ularly for the equipment of heavy divisions. Nine ofthe 16 active Army divisions and three of the eightguard and reserve divisions are heavy. The remainderare infantry, airborne, and air assault divisionswhose light equipment makes them less suitable forcombat against the Warsaw Pact ground forces in

!_/ Three U.S. Army divisions have one brigade eachin Europe and the rest of the division in theUnited States.

18

Europe, but more useful for contingency operationsagainst light opposition, and in jungle and mountainwarfare.

In addition to the 24-division Army totalforce, there are four Marine divisions (three active,one reserve). Two active Marine divisions might beavailable for European contingencies, in which theycould be used for amphibious landings or as a theaterground force reserve. All Marine divisions areclassed as light divisions.

Present Department of Defense plans for theground forces for the next five years include thefollowing:

o Building up POMCUS stocks as discussedabove.

o Completing the 13 to 16 division active Armyexpansion.

o Converting two U.S.-based active Armyinfantry divisions to heavy divisions.

o Accelerating tank production and conversionprograms to modernize active forces andto fill shortfalls of war reserve stocks.

o Improving the mobility, firepower, andanti-tank capability of ground forces byacquiring additional attack helicopters,anti-tank guided missile systems, tanks, andarmored personnel carriers.

Further, improvements in mobility forces are contem-plated through such means as:

o Increasing utilization rates of mobilityaircraft.

o Modifying present aircraft to increaseservice life or capacity.

o Modifying commercially-owned aircraft toprovide reserve capacity which could becalled on in an emergency.

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Some of the initiatives described above relatedirectly to the ability of U.S. ground forces tocounter the first, intense phases of an attack byWarsaw Pact forces in Europe. Others are moreappropriately viewed as contributing to a holdingcapability, assuming the initial attack had beenstopped. For example, providing more heavy divisionsbased in the United States would not contributedirectly to initial defense in Europe, since theywould likely not get there in time. On the otherhand, filling out POMCUS stocks and increasing themobility and firepower of forces in Europe clearlydoes improve the Army's ability to stop the firstattack. Whether the mobility forces are more impor-tant for the earlier or later phases of the wardepends upon assumptions about warning time, andwhether the troops airlifted into theater can immedi-ately marry with prepositioned equipment. Movementof people by airlift is relatively fast and effi-cient; because the civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) islarge, such movement is constrained only by the needto organize and prepare the people to move. Movementof large amounts of heavy equipment is constrained bythe availability of cargo aircraft.

The defense budget for fiscal year 1978 willcontain funding requests for improvements to the Armyand Marine Corps. The issues will be whetherthese improvements are the right ones, given thepresent balance of ground force capabilities, toblunt an initial Warsaw Pact attack and to sustain aconventional force buildup and repulse furtherattacks. The early phase of the war is of particularimportance. If a coherent NATO defense cannotbe established without sacrificing too much terri-tory, it may not be possible to bring to bear forcesprocured for sustained operations. Thus, primacybelongs to forces which allow rapid response to theinitial attack. At the same time, it would not bewise to sacrifice all capability to reinforce theinitial defenders. There must be a balance. Thequestion is whether the defense budget will contri-bute to setting the proper balance.

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Much concern has been expressed in the Congressand elsewhere about NATO's initial defense capa-bility, particularly in view of the buildup in sizeand quality of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Oneway to improve the U.S. contribution to NATO'scapability, beyond those measures already in DoDprograms, would be to increase the size of POMCUSstocks to allow more heavy divisions to be rapidlyoutfitted after air deployment. Another would be toincrease the quality and firepower of Army equipmentin theater.2/ Another would be to accelerate replen-ishment of shortfalls in War Reserve Munitions.

All of these actions would be expensive. Ifresource constraints require that such ground forceimprovements must be paid for by adjustments else-where in ground forces, one could reduce the size ofthe guard and reserve and the number of light activeArmy and Marine divisions. The guard and reservescontribute the last part of the reinforcements toarrive in Europe, including a considerable number ofnon-divisional support units; and the light divisionsare configured to fight best somewhere other than inEurope.

Whether improvements are required in groundforce capabilities to meet and stop a sudden, intenseWarsaw Pact attack, whether these should be add-onsto present programs aimed at improvement in longer-term capability or should be traded with them, orwhether ground force modernization and improvement isneeded at all depends not only on the forces them-selves and the assumptions about their use, but alsoon the roles of other U.S. and allied forces in ourplanning.

,2/ See Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces; ArmyProcurement Issues of this series.

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TWIIIIWWT

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CHAPTER V TACTICAL AIR FORCES

U.S. tactical air forces have unique advantagesin supporting NATO's forces. They need not all bekept deployed abroad to have an impact in the earlyphases of a war with the Warsaw Pact nations.Rapid deployment is inherent in the force and doesnot depend upon massive airlift of equipment andsupplies. U.S. tactical air forces could concentraterapidly against Warsaw Pact thrusts in a variety ofcircumstances, including short-warning attacks.Finally, U.S. tactical air forces are superiorin equipment and training to those of the Warsaw Pactnations. Warsaw Pact forces are more numerous, andare improving, but there remains a reasonabledegree of assurance that U.S. tactical air forces cancarry out their assigned missions against Warsaw Pactopposition. This degree of assurance contrasts withthe concern expressed by many knowledgeable observersabout how well NATO's ground forces may be able tocarry out their missions. Thus, U.S. tactical airforces must be viewed as contributing significantlyto the deterrent value of NATO's forces, and to theirability to fight.

The tactical air forces have two main missions:(1) to defeat an enemy's air force and prevent itfrom interfering with our own air and ground opera-tions; and (2) to attack enemy forces and installa-tions in support of the ground forces. Success inthe first mission depends upon, among other things:

o the numbers and quality of U.S. aircraft,weaponry, and pilots;

o the degree to which the air battle can beobserved and controlled by higher commanders;

o the degree of mutual support or interferenceafforded by our own ground-based air defensesystems (missiles and anti-aircraft guns);and

23

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Jill

o the degree to which we and our allies cancoordinate our efforts.

These factors are largely subject to our control;much work and substantial resources have beeninvested in generally assuring that NATO's tacticalair forces can defeat those of the Warsaw Pactnations. Success in the second tactical air mission,attack on enemy ground targets in and behind thebattle area, depends more upon factors beyond ourimmediate control. Weather, and the ability ofallied aircraft to penetrate weather and deliverordnance accurately, are of prime importance,particularly given the incidence of bad weatherin Europe. The enemy air defenses, particularlymissiles and anti-aircraft guns, can seriouslydegrade aircraft attack performance. Pre-emptiveSoviet surprise attack represents considerabledanger to allied aircraft without shelters; pro-grammed shelter improvements stretch out beyond theend of this decade.

How allied air forces deal with these factorshas probably a more significant effect on thetactical air forces' role in the land battle thandoes the overall size of the U.S. tactical airforces. In fact, the limited availability of basesin Europe probably would not permit deployment ofmore than about half of the 215 squadrons of fighter/attack aircraft (5,160 aircraft in all) that pre-sently exist in the Air Force, Navy, and Marineinventory. Some, if not all Navy and Marine Corpsaircraft would be held in reserve or committed toother functions, but if need arose could be used fromland bases in Europe, provided there were room forthem and that appropriate support equipment andtraining had been provided in advance. Thus, themajor constraints in delivering tactical air fire-power in support of NATO ground forces are notnumbers, types, or quality of aircraft, but otherfactors having to do with weather, enemy air de-fenses, adequacy of base facilities, aircraft vulner-ability to surprise attack, and so on. In goodweather, against light enemy air defenses, a U.S.Air Force that has not been greatly damaged candeliver the necessary firepower. The problem is to

24

ensure that bad weather, heavy air defense, andaircraft destroyed on the ground do not unacceptablyreduce that capability. If the aircraft do not work,having a lot of them will not improve matters. Thesolution, then, primarily involves buying additionalcapabilities in munitions, electronic countermea-sures, reconnaissance, base hardening and so on,rather than more aircraft. Within given resourceconstraints it may be prudent to exchange the formerfor the latter.

An important feature of the tactical air forcesis that their contribution to the defense of Europewill probably not vary much as the result of differ-ences between planning assumptions and actualwarning time or duration and intensity of the war.They even provide something of a hedge against theland forces being taken by surprise. The shorter-term contributions of the tactical air forces can bemost important to the crucial early phases of a NATOwar. Here, as in the case of the U.S. Army, the sizeof the total force is not so important as thecapabilities that can be mustered quickly. Unlikethe case of the Army, however, air forces that arenot in Europe when war breaks out may be usefulin an abrupt, short war. If bases are available,some wings can fly to Europe and be in battle in amatter of hours. This flexibility is particularlyimportant given how unlikely it is that U.S. forcespermanently stationed abroad will be increasedsignificantly in the future.

Current Department of Defense plans for thetactical air forces over the next five years include:

o Completion of the 22 to 26 U.S. Air Forcetactical air wing expansion.

o Modernization of present air wings throughreplacement of older F-4 and A-7 aircraftwith new F-15s, A-lOs, and F-16s.

o Deployment of the E-3A AWACS, which willgreatly improve NATO's air surveillancecapability and ability to manage air battles.

25

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o Improved night and all-weather attack capa-bility through use of Loran-D, deployment ofan additional F-lll wing to Europe, and byaircraft modifications to provide forward-looking infrared target location capability.

o Improved defense suppression capabilitythrough modification of 40 F-lllAs withextensive ECM equipment, and replacement ofolder F-105G and F-4C defense suppressionaircraft with more modern F-4G Wild Weasels.

o Continued construction of aircraft shelterson primary and auxiliary air bases inEurope.

o Development of minimal support capability forU.S. aircraft at selected allied air bases,thus decreasing the wartime load on U.S.primary and auxiliary bases.

o Modernization of Navy and Marine Corps airwings by replacement of F-4 aircraft withF-14s and F-18s.

As in the case of the ground forces, some ofthe program described above relates directly toimproved ability to stop an initial, intense WarsawPact attack. These measures include the night andall-weather capability improvements, the building ofshelters, increases in the capacity of Europeanbases, deployment of AWACs, and, to some extent, theforce modernization. The force expansion to 26wings may not be the most effective way to increasethe ability of NATO to fight an abrupt war or to addinitial reinforcement and longer-term holding capa-bility. It appears, however, that the bulk of DoD' sprogrammed improvements in the tactical air forcesare such as to improve NATO's chances of survivingthrough the early days of an attack by Warsaw Pactforces. An exception to this general observationmust be made, however, in the case of Navy and MarineCorps tactical air forces.

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Marine Corps air wings are designed primarilyto support Marine Corps ground forces with close airsupport and interdiction strikes. Navy air wingsare designed to protect naval forces, particularlycarrier, amphibious, and underway replenishmentforces, from enemy aircraft and missile attack.They can also strike enemy naval forces at a dis-tance, and can fly missions against enemy groundforces and installations ashore. The primary func-tions of Navy and Marine Corps aviation are notlikely to support ground force operations in Europedirectly, particularly in the initial stages of aNATO war. As the Annual Defense Department Reportsays:

To the extent that the locationof major conflicts can reasonablybe predicted, and where land-basing rights can be assured(as in Central Europe), land-based tactical aircraft make thegreatest sense. In the event ofa general war with the USSR,although the most likely focuswill be on Central Europe,sea-based tactical air will beneeded to maintain control ofthe seas. For other than Europeanland conflicts this sea-based airmight be required to carry thebrunt of initial operations...I/

In short, to the extent that Naval and MarineCorps tactical air forces are relevant to a war inEurope, they affect principally the later phases—thelonger-term holding capability. The Navy does thisby gaining control of the sea, the Marine Corps byproviding a reserve of tactical air power.

_!/ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Report to the Congress on the.t_§.Il _ its Implications_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ . _

for the Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization Requestand the Fiscal Year 1977-81 Defense Programs(January 27, 1976), p. 180.

27

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Some observers have asked how much sea-basedtactical aviation is required to assure sea controlin a general war against the USSR. The answerclearly depends upon what seas are to be controlled,and under what circumstances. Controlling thenorthern Norwegian Sea with carrier-based tacticalaviation does not appear feasible with reasonablyattainable forces. Nor does it appear to be sonecessary to the critical campaign in Central Europeas ensuring, if the initial Pact thrusts are stalled,that sealift can substantially reinforce NATO armiesthere over the longer term. But the problem ofprotecting sealift is primarily one of anti-submarinewarfare, and thus does not involve sea-based tacticalair nearly so much as it does land-based patrolaircraft, nuclear attack submarines, and convoyescort ships. Thus, to the extent one views a veryintense, short-warning Warsaw Pact land attack onNATO as the principal or most likely case againstwhich to plan, one might wish to consider tradingsea-based tactical air capability for other generalpurpose forces, such as land-based tactical air orground forces, or providing sea-based wings with theability to operate from land bases in Europe andelsewhere.

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CHAPTER VI NAVAL FORCES

The present size and structure of the U.S. Navycannot be fully explained by reference to the DoDprimary planning scenario of a major war with theSoviet Union in which the critical theater of opera-tions is Central Europe. Even if one is prepared toassume that an initial Warsaw Pact attack could bestopped, so that the conflict would reach a phase inwhich reinforcement and resupply of Europe by seawould become a critical factor, the role to be playedthen by a significant part of the U.S. Navy is notclear. Soviet capability to interdict shipping toEurope is primarily dependent on her attack subma-rines. Soviet surface ships lack sufficient defen-sive capability to conduct operations in a hostileenvironment beyond the range of land-based aircover. Even where such air cover is available,U.S. submarines would threaten Soviet surfacefleets. Soviet naval aviation and long-rangeaviation must operate from bases in the USSR, whichrequires them to make long flights to reach the sealanes, and exposes them to interdiction by NATOland- and sea-based tactical aviation. Thus, al-though there are other threats, Soviet submarines arethe dominant sea control problem for the U.S. Navy.

The United States has, over the years, recog-nized the threat posed by Soviet submarines, andspent large amounts on antisubmarine warfare (ASW).The resultant forces, consisting of long-rangepatrol aircraft, nuclear-powered attack submarinesand surface escort ships, plus associated weapons,sensors, and command and control systems, presenta powerful counter to the Soviet submarine fleet.Navy studies of ASW campaigns in the Atlanticgenerally conclude that the Soviet submarine fleetcould be defeated within a few months. But duringthat period the Soviet fleet would probably succeedin sinking on the order of 15 to 20 percent of alliedconvoy ships sailing toward Europe. Two otherimportant points also arise from Navy ASW studies:

29

o The technology of submarine/antisubmarinewarfare has changed profoundly since WorldWar II. Thus, the relevance of ASW experi-ence in that war to future wars should becarefully weighed and tested against moderncapabilities before drawing conclusions aboutthe outcome of an ASW campaign against theSoviets.

o A considerable body of analysis of the ASWproblem tends to the conclusion that largeincrements to U.S. ASW forces would notmaterially affect the rate at which Sovietsubmarines could be destroyed, and thus wouldnot greatly reduce expected shipping losses.

The major part of expenditures on the U.S. Navyis not for ASW. The largest expenditures arefor aircraft carriers, their associated aircraft,escort ships, and logistics train. The carrierscan carry ASW aircraft, which help defend the carriertask force against submarines and might make somecontribution to the more general ASW task as well.Carrier task forces, however, are a very expensiveway to pursue ASW, and because of their small num-bers, their contribution would be limited. They mayalso provide some defense against Soviet long-rangebombers that might reach the Atlantic shippinglanes. As the previous chapter pointed out, thecarriers are not intended to participate directly inthe early European land battle. Since carrier forcesdirectly contribute little to either the ASW campaignor to the land campaign in Europe, one is led to theconclusion that either their indirect contributionsare of great value, or there is some other funda-mental justification for maintaining large andexpensive carrier forces.

It is argued that carrier-based tacticalaviation would provide important support for NATOforces on the northern and southern flanks ofNATO (i.e., Norway and the Eastern Mediterranean).It must be noted, however, that Soviet medium-and short-range defensive systems could make theNorwegian Sea virtually untenable for aircraftcarriers and other surface ships. Thus, evenif the striking power of carrier aircraft were

30

a critical factor in a campaign in northern Norway,which is not in itself certain, there is no guaranteethat any number of U.S. carriers could surviveSoviet defenses to launch the requisite strikes.Since there are bases in Norway from which U.S.tactical air forces can operate, it seems reasonable,if the region is critical to the outcome of thewar, to investigate the feasibility of using thosebases, rather than aircraft carriers, in thatregion. This would accord with the general DoDpolicy noted in the quotation from the fiscal year1977 Annual Defense Department Report cited inChapter V (see page 27).

The case of the Eastern Mediterranean may besomewhat different. NATO does indeed have air basesin Greece and Turkey, but because of an unhappysequence of events in the past few years, it is notclear whether, or under what circumstances, thosebases would be made available to NATO tacticalair forces. On the other hand, if Greece and/orTurkey do not become involved in a NATO war, it ishard to see what NATO tactical air power will berequired to do on the southern flank. In sum, theflanks argument does not establish a compelling casethat sea-based tactical aviation makes an indirectcontribution of great value to the successfuloutcome of a NATO war. Thus, if there is a case formaintaining sizable carrier forces, it must be madeon other grounds. _!/

The central place of the European land war inDoD planning scenarios has, perhaps, tended toobscure the importance of the aircraft carrier.This is in part because, against any opponent but theUSSR, it is difficult to generate a requirement foranything like 12 to 15 carriers. It is important,however, to see carrier forces for what they are,whether or not they fit a particular planningscenario. In peacetime, U.S. Navy carrier forcesrepresent a potent, flexible means of shifting local

!_/ See Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces; TheNavy of this series.

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military balances in sensitive areas to deter theoutbreak of war. If war comes, those forces are animportant hedge against a prolonged war that wouldinvolve a worldwide campaign to assure control ofcritical sea lines of communications, and could alsoinvolve extensive fighting in regions remote from theUnited States, the USSR, and Europe (e.g., thePersian Gulf, Angola). Such a prolonged war mightcome about because of a stalemate in the land fight-ing in Europe, or because NATO forces were defeatedon the European continent, but conflict continued onthe flanks, in the Middle East, in the Pacific, andelsewhere.

Naval forces suficient for direct attack on theUSSR, such as many large carriers, heavily escortedby AEGIS equipped frigates and cruisers, would bevery expensive. They would face very heavy Sovietdefenses. If limited to conventional ordnance, it isdoubtful they could significantly damage the instal-lations and forces within their reach. If nuclearordnance were to be used, present strategic deliverysystems would be more reliable and certainly lessexpensive.

On the other hand, it is essential that the Navyretain the capability to deny the USSR use of thesea, and to permit the United States and its alliesto use the sea to the extent required to support theland and air campaign against the Warsaw Pact. Thiscapability is supported primarily by our ASW forces,but also probably requires some part of existingattack carrier forces, some part of existing amphibi-ous forces, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, andland-based tactical aircraft near choke points andother critical areas. Whether all of the existingattack carrier forces or amphibious forces arerequired for the sea control mission is doubtful.Thus the Navy, as presently configured, may havesurplus resources that might be adapted to otherpurposes, such as contributing directly to counteringa Warsaw Pact attack in Europe. For example, appro-priate support kits could be procured to permitoperation of Navy carrier wings from land basesif required. Navy all-weather aircraft, such as theA-6, might be particularly welcome additions in

32

the early phases of the war. Similarly, Marinedivisions might be equipped and trained to take partdirectly in the European battle.

Much depends upon Soviet naval developments.At present, the Soviet Navy, even though it hasimproved greatly and has made startling technologicalprogress in some areas, cannot challenge the U.S.Navy for control of the sea anywhere of importanceexcept, perhaps, the Eastern Mediterranean. Eventhere, Soviet ascendancy could probably only beachieved by surprise attack, and would in any casebe short-lived. Should the USSR develop the samekind of worldwide naval capability that the UnitedStates has, however, the picture would changedrastically, and countervailing measures, such assizable expansion of attack carrier forces, could beindicated.

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WMmmrr

CHAPTER VII THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

Concern about the ability of NATO forces tocontain a large-scale Warsaw Pact attack raises thequestion whether theater nuclear forces could beused to redress a conventional force imbalance, orto deter the Pact from overrunning Europe if theirblitzkrieg operations proved successful. Theprospects for this kind of use for the theaternuclear forces are not good. As this chapterwill argue, they do not substitute for conventionalforces. They are primarily useful in deterring theoutbreak of war and, specifically, Soviet first useof theater nuclear weapons. However, present U.S.theater nuclear forces lack some important aspectsof good deterrent forces, such as survivability.

For almost twenty years the United States hasmaintained nuclear weapons in Europe as a part ofNATO's defenses against a Warsaw Pact attack. Theseweapons were first introduced into Europe during thetime of the doctrine of "massive retaliation." Thatdoctrine presupposed an overwhelming U.S. superi-ority in nuclear weapons and delivery systems, andhence the capability to fight and win a nuclear warwith the USSR. This allowed nuclear capability tobe substituted for comparatively more expensiveconventional force capabilities. This was viewed asparticularly important in Europe, where, in theperception of the time, there was no real prospectof NATO's matching the massive deployment of Sovietground forces.

Since the mid-1950s the USSR has developedformidable strategic and theater nuclear forces, andthe United States no longer enjoys its former markedsuperiority. Because of the nuclear standoff,neither side can expect to win, in any meaningfulsense, a war in which nuclear weapons are widelyused.

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Thus, the U.S. perception of the role ofnuclear weapons, both strategic and theater, haschanged from one that permitted defeat of the enemyto one that deters the enemy from using his nucleararsenal.

The effect of this changing perception of therole and usefulness of nuclear weapons on thosedeployed in Europe has been mixed. The numberof weapons was stabilized at about 7,000 in theearly 1960s, as the result of Secretary of DefenseMcNamara's and President Kennedy's understanding theimplications of growing Soviet nuclear capability.The doctrine for the use of such weapons, and theirkinds and numbers have responded much more slowly tothe changing situation, however. In large part,this was due to our allies' perception, based partlyon the underlying logic of massive retaliation,that the United States had offered them a "nuclearguarantee," which assured them that the United Stateswould engage in nuclear war with the USSR in defenseof Europe, if that were required. The nuclearweapons on European soil were viewed as an importantlink between U.S. forces and commitment there and theultimate use of U.S. strategic nuclear forces inEurope's defense. This close association in Europeaneyes between the theater nuclear weapons and U.S.willingness to support the alliance in defense ofEurope has made changes in the weapons stockpile sopolitically sensitive that it has proved difficult tomake any but the most minor marginal adjustments toit, in spite of the very greatly changed environment.

The present rationale for theater nuclearweapons emphasizes their deterrent role: (1) theydeter Soviet first use of nuclear weapons in Europethrough threat of retaliation in kind; and (2)they assist in deterring Warsaw Pact conventionalattack in Europe through the threat of defeat anddestruction of invading armies if NATO's conventionalforces prove inadequate to that task. These twonotions contain serious ambiguities and may, indeed,be inconsistent with one another. Further, thetheater nuclear forces as presently configured

36

may not serve either of these objectives, even ifthe ambiguities or inconsistencies are resolved.

Deterrence of Soviet first use of nuclearweapons in Europe depends on both the strategicnuclear balance and on theater nuclear forces.To the extent that deterrence depends upon U.S.theater nuclear forces, however, a clear requirementmust be that a Soviet first strike cannot remove thepossibility of a serious counter strike by thoseforces. U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil arelocated at about 100 sites, which are easily locat-able and identifiable. These sites are vulnerableto nuclear and conventional attack, and there seemslittle question that a well designed and executedSoviet attack could destroy many of them. An excep-tion to this would be the Poseidon submarines commit-ted to NATO, which would almost certainly be avail-able for retaliation. If, however, deterrence restsin the end with the submarines, why have the weaponson land?

Deterrence of a massive Soviet conventionalattack through threat of escalation to the use ofnuclear weapons also presents some difficulties.Presumably in such a case NATO would attempt torepel the Soviet attack using conventional forces.Only if this failed, and NATO forces were threatenedwith collapse and annihilation, would nuclearweapons be invoked. In such a situation it is hardto see how the weapons would salvage victory out ofdefeat. If NATO forces were in danger of collapse,the conditions for effective battlefield use ofnuclear weapons — such as good knowledge of thelocation and composition of friendly and enemyforces, carefully planned and positively controlledmodes of delivery, good command and control, and soon—would not exist. Also, Soviet ground forces arewell-trained and well-equipped for sustained opera-tions in a nuclear environment. Therefore, ona nuclear battlefield, the Soviets may be relativelybetter off than NATO forces. Finally, if U.S.nuclear forces deter Soviet first use of nuclearweapons, it is hard to see why the presence of anintact Soviet retaliatory capability in Europe wouldnot be a strong deterrent to U.S. first use, even

37

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if the alternative were acceptance of defeat in theEuropean battle. It can be argued that some formof selected use of theater nuclear forces, as asignal of resolve to retaliate for the destructionof NATO armed forces and the occupation of Europemight give the Soviets pause, and lead to negotia-tions. A President confronting such a decisionwould have a difficult choice to make. On the onehand, some use of theater nuclear weapons might bethe least miserable of options in the sense that itwould be the only one offering a chance of preventingthe loss of Europe. On the other hand, breachingthe nuclear barrier might trigger preemptive Sovietstrikes at remaining NATO nuclear facilities;make Britain and Iceland untenable; bring aboutnuclear blackmail or worse of other U.S. allies,such as Japan; and spread nuclear use to the sea,where the U.S. stands to lose substantially morethan the USSR.

That such a choice would be agonizing is plain,and argues strongly for measures to avoid placingany future U.S. President in such a position.Such measures relate primarily to ensuring adequateconventional capability to prevent rapid and decisiveWarsaw Pact operations in Europe. Some changes toU.S. theater nuclear forces may be desirable, suchas enhanced survivability to improve their credi-bility as a deterrent to Soviet nuclear first use.On the other hand, improvements for actual use, suchas better delivery accuracy or greater land-basedmissile range, do not appear to significantlyimprove the miserable alternatives among which aPresident would have to choose in the event of aNATO war. Nor do they seem likely to substantiallyincrease the likelihood of a relatively favorableoutcome from such a war. Thus choices regardingtheater nuclear weapons should focus on improvingtheir value as a deterrent to Soviet first use,rather than a general deterrent against aggressionwith conventional forces. For the latter purposethere is no substitute for NATO conventional capa-bility.

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CHAPTER VIII CONCLUSIONS AND OPTIONS

The ability to maintain a coherent earlydefense without giving up too much ground in theface of a Warsaw Pact attack in Europe is clearlythe sine qua non of our defense strategy. Only ifthat can be done can other forces, existing andplanned, be brought to bear to produce a relativelyfavorable outcome. Thus, priority in defense plan-ning should go first to ensuring initial capabilityto stop an attack, then to sustaining the war for aslong as need be. However, because we can never beperfectly sure, within feasible sets of forces, thatwe have a "stopping" capability, it might be possi-ble to concentrate too heavily on forces for theinitial battle, and provide too little for laterphases. That would be as undesirable as having toolittle initial capability. The deterrent and war-fighting value of NATO's forces depends not onlyon the ability to turn back an initial attack, butalso on being able to resist further buildup andattack until hostilities can be stopped or untilthe full potential of NATO's economies can bemobilized for war.

Although recent DoD reports have pointed outthe importance of the initial battle in Europe, muchof the present Department of Defense force expansionand modernization program is aimed at improving U.S.military forces' capability to fight the longerwar. Expansion of the Army from 13 to 16 activedivisions might not improve its contribution toearly NATO defense, and might even reduce it. !_/

I/ This is primarily because the smaller forcecould mobilize faster and would be less depen-dent on affiliated reserve units. For a moredetailed treatment of this point, see U.S. Army

Alternatives for Fiscal Years. . _ _ _ _1977-1981, a CBO Staff Working Paper, July 16,1976.

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mi _ JL._

Conversion of Army infantry divisions to armoredor mechanized divisions would not bolster initialcapability because the equipment for the new divi-sions would most likely be moved to Europe by sea,and would thus not arrive in time for the earlyphases of the war, even under optimistic assumptionsabout warning time. Navy force expansion proposalsare not as yet well defined or understood. In alllikelihood, however, they, too, will focus on capa-bilities that do not directly affect the outcome ofthe early phases of the land war in Europe. Theexpansion of the U.S. Air Force to 26 tactical airwings is primarily aimed at improving sustainingcapability. Strategic mobility improvements proposedby DoD, such as the airlift enhancement program, arein principle capable of improving NATO's earlyresponses, particularly after current shortfalls inprepositioned stocks are made good.

Present assessments of the NATO/Warsaw Pactbalance tend to point out that the Warsaw Pactnations have increased their military forces some-what in size and quite sharply in quality. NATO,too, has made improvements, but these generally tendto center on modernization and organizational andinfrastructure improvements. There has never been aconsensus among knowledgeable observers of theEuropean balance as to whether NATO has a viableconventional defense option or not. Those whocontend that it does point out that NATO can mobi-lize nearly as many men as the Pact and has qualita-tively superior forces, especially tactical airforces. They go on to say that NATO spends as muchon its forces as the Warsaw Pact nations, perhapsmore. If the resources expended do not produceappropriate forces, in their view, the solution isnot to spend more resources, but more efficient useof what is already being spent. Opponents ofthis view are numerous and tend to point out thatthe Warsaw Pact would probably have the benefit ofsome degree of surprise, that it benefits by havingthe vast bulk of its capabilities in Soviet forcesunified in doctrine, command, language, etc.,and that in key determinants of land warfare, suchas numbers of tanks and artillery pieces, Warsaw Pactforces are greatly superior to NATO's forces.

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This divergence of opinion is not likely to beresolved. But it revolves around the balance ofcapabilities for generating forces rapidly and forreinforcing deployed forces and sustaining thedefensive effort. The arguments of those who sayNATO forces are adequate presuppose that all thoseforces can be brought into play quickly and effec-tively. The arguments of those who say NATO forcesare insufficient point to the possibility of veryshort warning time. They note that Warsaw Pactforces' mobility and firepower give them excellentcapabilities to exploit both initial breakthroughsand any failure of the defenders to present anorganized, coherent front. Running through thesearguments is a theme of concern for the outcome ofthe first engagements of the war. The point hasbeen very directly put by one knowledgeable observer,Senator Nunn:

What I "m saying in essence isthis: We do possess an adequatestrategic nuclear deterrent. Wedo possess an adequate theatern u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t . We dopossess, in our vast industrialmight and manpower resources anadequate deterrent to protractedconventional war.

What we do not possess, and thisis the focus of my remarks to-night, is an adequate deterrentto a short, intense conventionalwar. 2/

If NATO is seen to be deficient in presentcapability for defense against sudden and intenseattack by Warsaw Pact forces, there are a large

Senator Sam Nunn, "Gearing Up to Deter Combat inEurope: The Long and Short of It," address tothe 92nd Annual Conference of the New YorkMilitia Association, quoted in the CongressionalRecord, September 13, 1976, p. S15661.

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number of possible solutions. One, which would bedirect and which would have an immediate and measur-able impact, would be for the United States to deploymore forces to Europe. Another would be to subsidizeour European allies to upgrade the equipment andreadiness of their forces in NATO. Both of thesemeasures would clearly raise defense budgets andwould be contrary to a significant trend in U.S.foreign policy that emphasizes encouraging our alliesto take the primary burden of their own defense uponthemselves. Neither seems likely to be consideredseriously except under conditions of a much morethreatening situation in Europe. Thus, these pro-grams will not be further discussed in the optionsconsidered here. Nevertheless, they should not beruled out as possible responses to future exigencies.

Other means of improving the ability of U.S.forces to resist an initial Warsaw Pact attackinvolve improving the forces that can get into theearly battle and the capability to move such forcesrapidly from their peacetime location to the battle.Improvements of this kind, beyond those programmed byDoD, could be simply added to present programs.Willingness to add additional resources to thedefense budget would, however, imply that the pre-sently programmed longer-war capabilities were ofequal importance to achieving our defense objectives.Otherwise, one would be willing to sacrifice the lessimportant improvements to those that were thoughtmore vital. Since resources are scarce, even in thebudget of the United States, it is important toexamine such trades and their results. Thus,various budget options will illuminate the results ofadopting different approaches to meeting nationalobjectives.

An option which would <ad_d_ initial fightingcapability improvements to the present DoD forcemodernization and improvement programs would includethe parts of the current DoD program that are aimedat longer-war capability.

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Those parts of the current program include:

o Expansion of the Army from 13 to16 divisions.

o Conversion of two light infantrydivisions to heavy divisions.

o Expansion of the Air Force from 22 to 26tactical air wings.

o Procurement of further nuclear aircraftcarriers and AEGIS air defense ships forthe Navy.

Additional DoD programs that may improve rapidreaction capabilities in Europe would be funded asthey have been proposed or would be accelerated.These include:

o Base hardening, including shelters foraircraft.

o Airlift enhancement.

o Armored combat vehicles (XM-1 andMICV). V

o Cobra/TOW and infantry ATGM pro-grams. 4/

o Reconnaissance and battle managementimprovements such as AWACS.

Other improvements not presently programmed byDoD would be added, including:

o Increased propositioned (POMCUS) stocksfor Army forces.

_3/ See Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces; ArmyProcurement Issues of this series.

_4/ Ibid.

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•III

o Procurement of additional all-weathertactical aircraft and adaptation ofpresent aircraft, especially theA-10, for night and bad weather mis-sions.

If all of the above initiatives were accepted,the National Defense category of the Budget (050)would grow rapidly, as shown in Table 1.

DoD and the military services have been planningand producing forces aimed at longer-war capabilityfor some time. The capability thus produced andnow existing may be assessed as adequate to providethe required underpinning, either as a deterrent orwar-fighting capability, to forces designed forrapid reaction to Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe.For example, present and programmed ASW capabilitycan defeat the Soviet submarine force over a periodof months. Present Navy aircraft carrier force levelsare adequate to support ASW forces in assertingnecessary control of the sea for resupply and rein-forcement of NATO. Because of the Navy's emphasis onthe power projection support mission in its forceplanning, the United States may now have somewhatlarger carrier forces than are required for such seacontrol. But the power projection mission may not begermane to the war in Europe. It may be prohibi-tively expensive to acquire the capability to attackthe USSR or Soviet forces in nearby countries di-rectly from the sea, and such a capability may havelittle effect upon the outcome of the campaign inCentral Europe, either in the shorter or longerterm. _5/ Thus, programmed Navy force improvementsrelating to the projection mission could be curtailedin order to free resources for rapid reaction capa-bility, as discussed above.

Similarly, the Army's force expansion from 13 to16 divisions could be stopped, both to save the

See P.2L§.n.n_The Navy of this series,

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TABLE 1. OPTION ONE: BUDGET AUTHORITY IN BILLIONSOF FISCAL YEAR 1977 DOLLARS

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

DoD Base-line Pro-gram-7 122.4 131.9 141.6 151.5 160.2

1978-82Add-ons-7 +0.4 +1.0 +1.1 +0.7 0.0

Total 122.8 132.9 142.7 152.2 160.2

— This baseline is taken from the President'sfiscal year 1977 budget submission, and extrapo-lated to fiscal year 1982. It is primarilyderived from the DoD Five-Year Defense Program,and results from the detailed costing out of alarge number of different program elements, whichinclude DoD force improvements noted in the text.It is possible, as was suggested in the CBOReport Budget Options for Fiscal Year 1977, thatthis baseline funding will not be adequate to payfor improvements programmed. However, otherbaselines, such as those used in the CBO report,FjLve^-Year__Budg_et_Pr_oiect_iLons_^ Fiscal YearsIjLTJLzl^A2-' are s imply dol lar p ro j ec t i ons ofc u r r e n t policy and are not based on ac tua l lyestimating the cost of programmed forces. Thus,the P r e s i d e n t ' s submis s ion , a l though i t mayu n d e r s t a t e a c t u a l costs to be i n c u r r e d , i sp re fe r r ed as a baseline f rom which to show theeffect of the cost of incremental forces.

—' Assumes POMCUS for two add i t iona l m e c h a n i z e ddivisions and development of a night/bad weathercapable A-10.

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resources involved in outfitting the additionalthree divisions and also to free manpower to ensurethat those Army divisions that do join the battlein Europe have adequate sustaining capability.Finally, the Air Force expansion could be stopped ata 24-wing force level. If the additional plannedtwo wings were thought to provide a needed reinforce-ment capability or hedge against unexpectedly largeattrition, consideration could be given to equippingMarine Corps or Navy wings to operate from land basesin Europe.

If the improvements that relate to rapid reac-tion capability mentioned in the high option (optionone) are programmed into the present force, alongwith the restraints mentioned above, the NationalDefense category would grow more slowly. Thefollowing table shows the budgetary impact of choos-ing this option.

TABLE 2. OPTION TWO: BUDGET AUTHORITY IN BILLIONSOF FISCAL YEAR 1977 DOLLARS

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

DoD Base-line Pro-gram 122.4 131.9 141.6 151.5 160.2

Less ForceExpansion -2.2 -3.3 -3.0 -4.4 -2.6

1978-82Add-ons +0.4 +1.0 +1.1 +0.7 0.0

Total 120.6 129.6 139.7 147.8 157.6

Other competing needs for national resources maybe found to be more pressing than the need for asubstantial increase in U.S. military capability inEurope. The likelihood of a Warsaw Pact attack may

46

be assessed as very low, given the sizable U.S.commitment already to NATO and the probability ofescalation to nuclear warfare. The overall deterrentcapability of NATO may be seen as adequate, and inany case, it can be argued that U.S. force improve-ments in Europe do not appreciably improve NATOcapabilities as a whole unless our allies follow suitwith commensurate improvements. This line of reason-ing would continue by arguing that, since our allies,with the possible exception of the Federal Republicof Germany, have never taken a conventional forceresponse for NATO seriously enough to have acquiredthe forces and war reserves to support it, there islittle incentive for the United States to do so.

An option that would reflect willingness tocontinue with the deterrent capability represented byforces very similar to our present forces, withoutthe expansion and upgrading described in the high andmiddle options, would imply National Defense categorycosts as shown in the following table.

TABLE 3. OPTION THREE: BUDGET AUTHORITY IN BILLIONSOF FISCAL YEAR 1977 DOLLARS

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

DoD Base-line Pro-gram 122.4 131.9 141.6 151.5 160.2

Less ForceExpansion -2.2 -3.3 -3.0 -4.4 -2.6

Total 120.2 128.6 138.6 147.1 157.6

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mil

II

GLOSSARY

A-6; Navy/Marine Corps night/bad weather attackaircraft.

A-7; Navy and Air Force attack aircraft.

A-10; Air Force attack aircraft designed mainly forclose air support.

AI3GIJ3: A Navy fleet air defense system designedto be effective against enemy cruise missiles.

AIR SUPERIORITY; Denial of enemy use of the air toattack friendly air or ground targets.

ASW; Antisubmarine warfare.

ATGM; Antitank guided missile.

AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System. Anearly warning and battle management aircraft beingprocured by the Air Force.

BASE HARDENING; Improving the resistance of bases toair attack, through concrete aircraft shelters,bunkered command posts, and other facilities.

CL0SE_AI.R_SUPPORT: Air attacks on enemy forcesin contact with friendly forces.

COBRA/TOW: Army AH-1S attack helicopter equippedto launch the TOW ATGM.

CONVENTIONAL; In the sense of, e.g., conventionalwarfare, means non-nuclear.

E-3A; AWACS aircraft.

F-4; Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fighter/attackaircraft.

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F-14; Navy air superiority fighter.

F-15; Air Force air superiority fighter.

F-16: Air Force fighter/attack aircraft (in develop-ment) .

F-18; Navy fighter/attack aircraft (in development).

F-105G; Air Force air defense suppression aircraft.Currently being replaced by F-4G.

F-lll; Air Force night/bad weather attack aircraft.

HEAVY DIVISION: An armored or mechanized division.So called because of the equipment of the division.

INTERDICTION; Air-to-ground attacks on enemy forces,logistics, or facilities behind the battle line.

J5I.P-M : An infantry division, lacking_ .-the heavy equipment of armored or mechanized divi-sions .

LOGJJ>T_ICS: Military supplies and materiel forsupport of combat forces, and the arrangements forsuch.

LORAN^D: A very precise electronic navigationsystem.

MJECV: Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle. AnArmy armored fighting vehicle.

MOBILITY FORCES; The transport, cargo, and tankerships and aircraft used to move U.S. forces abroadand support them where deployed. Also calledairlif t/sealif t forces.

POWER_PRO J ECTI^ON : In naval terms, the launchingof sea-based air and ground force attacks againstenemy targets ashore.

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._CONTROL : Use of naval forces to secure rela-tively uninhibited use of sea areas for shipping oroffensive operations, and to deny enemy forces thesame uses.

TOW; Tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guidedmissile. An Army ATGM.

WILD WEASEL; An Air Force air defense suppressionaircraft.

XM-1: A new Army medium tank (in development).

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