FINAL REPORT TONATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE : THE EXTERNALIZATION OF REFORM :SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS UNDERGORBACHEV

AUTHOR : RONALD H . LINDE N

CONTRACTOR : UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : RONALD H . LINDEN

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 803-1 7

DATE : APRIL

1990

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : "The Externalization of Reform :

Soviet-Romanian Relations Under Gorbachev "

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Ronald H . Linden

The principal aim of this research was to determine i f

the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev was applying th e

same standards and employing the same practices in it s

reactions with the non-reforming East European states, as ha d

previous regimes for different purposes . Specifically, the

investigation sought to determine if the USSR was using it s

hegemonic position to promote change, in the form o f

glasnost, perestroika and reform of regional institutions, i n

the same way earlier regimes had acted to prevent reform .

While an answer to this question can be offered, th e

events of 1989 made this more of a historic than a current

question . A broader approach to which this research wa s

amenable was to look at existing Soviet policies in light o f

the revolutions of 1989 and determine what, if anything ,

remained of post war Soviet policy. The question of how i t

reacted to the recalcitrance of the Ceausescu leadership an d

how it has reacted to the changes in Romania and elsewhere in

the region since the revolutions remains central . The main

context of the research was Soviet-East European relations ;

that context remains but the dynamics changed dramaticall y

enough to extend the research focus in time and breadth .

- 2 -

In sum, 1989 did see the abandonment by the Sovie t

leadership of the main premises of Soviet policy toward Eas t

Europe . These had been Soviet political, economic an d

military investment in : 1) maintenance of the monopoly o f

communist party power in each of the states ; 2) maintenance

of civil peace and ; 3) maintenance of at least minimu m

participation in the Warsaw Pact . During 1989 the USSR made

no move to intervene to prevent the elimination of communis t

party dominance or ensure a "stable" public order . Nor did i t

act to prevent steps which have led to the effective erosio n

of the Warsaw Pact . In fact the changes and the revolution s

of 1989 were verbally encouraged by the Gorbachev policies .

Until 1989 such encouragement had still included caveat s

about "the common interests of socialism ." But during 198 9

Soviet acquiescence to the change of regimes in Poland an d

then in the rapid revolutions in East Germany ,

Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and finally, violently, in Romani a

made it clear that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead .

Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu rejected the principle s

and path of reform underway in the USSR and during 1989 eve n

moved to try to stifle the change in Poland . The Gorbachev

leadership did little to hasten the end of Ceausescu despit e

his clear rejection of reform . It cannot be said that

extensive or even substantial pressure, beyond a few critical

comments, was brought to bear to force Ceausescu into th e

reform camp . But support for the Romanian revolution when i t

occurred was clear and followed quickly by diplomatic an d

economic assistance .

Since the revolution in Romania and East Europe, Sovie t

policy has been both low key and unformed . Reactions are

intermittent and to certain events, such as the banning o f

the communist party in Romania, or possible reunification o f

Germany, but are often ad hoc and even contradictory . Partly

this is a function of the representation of a more divers e

range of views in the Soviet press and partly it is th e

result of Moscow's preoccupation with severe domestic ,

economic and political problems . A clear policy line which i s

continuing, however, is the Soviet desire to improve the

econonomic relationship with the East European states by

placing them on a more realistic and favorable basis .

United States policy of pressing Romania to move as

quickly and directly as possible to a pluralistic, democratic

system has been in evidence since the revolution . Despite

criticism from the new Romanian government and possibl e

temporary losses of economic opportunity, this policy shoul d

be continued .

1

I . PREMISES OF POSTWAR SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE

Since World War II Soviet policy in Eastern Europe has bee n

based on the pursuit of three kinds of security : physical ,

political, and economic . These goals apply to Southeaster n

Europe as part of the East European region and to it s

relationship with Romania . In most recent times the Soviet

view of how best to secure those goals has changed, as this

report will indicate, but it bears reviewing the premises o f

Soviet policy until the momentous changes of 1988 and 1989 ,

stimulated in large part by the change of regime in Moscow .

Physical Security

The USSR has invested immense political, economic, and

military resources to keep its western border free from

potential attack by hostile conventional and, to a lesse r

extent, nuclear forces . This goal has little to do with the

Communist nature of the Soviet government or with the

existence of any actual current threat . The Soviet Unio n

absorbed the brutal lessons of the past and, given the scop e

of the country's destruction and suffering in World War II ,

the maintenance of an adequate buffer in the west took on a

life of its own as a foreign-policy given .

2

The threat emanating from Southeastern Europe, however ,

has clearly been perceived to be much less than the threa t

from Central Europe, a view that accurately reflects at leas t

twentieth-century European history . Soviet troop-stationin g

patterns show a much greater emphasis on the central an d

northern regions of Eastern Europe than on the souther n

region . No Warsaw Pact troops were stationed in Bulgaria ,

and such troops were withdrawn from Romania in 1958 . Outside

the Warsaw Pact, neither Albania nor Yugoslavia has accepte d

Soviet troops .

Political Security

Political security has been a goal dating from the time o f

the Bolshevik Revolution and the period between the world

wars during which the USSR was the only socialist state . The

operative premise has been that the Soviet Union must have i n

this region friendly states which in their domestic an d

international policies will be cognizant of and responsive t o

Soviet interests . This was certainly not the case during th e

interwar period, when large and small powers alike eithe r

ignored Soviet desires or were hostile to them . Politica l

security since the late 1940s had until very recently bee n

guaranteed in Eastern Europe by the dominance of Soviet -

supported Communist parties in these states .

3

At a maximum, such as during Stalin's time, th e

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) sought th e

duplication of its own forms and policies in each of the Eas t

European states . Such an approach both provoked and wa s

reinforced by the split with Yugoslavia of 1948 . After

Stalin's death the policy of the Soviet leadership was t o

press for general adherence to, if not exact mimicking of ,

Soviet domestic and international initiatives . At a minimum ,

political security in this region meant resisting th e

influence of countries seen to be the key Soviet adversaries ,

primarily the United States but also, during the 1960s an d

early 1970s, China . Chinese diplomacy was very active in

Southeastern Europe during the 1970s ; Beijing succeeded i n

attracting a vocal if small ally in Albania and in

maintaining full and supportive ties with Romania .

Since 1948 the Soviet Union has seen greater threats t o

its political security in Central Europe . The challenge in

Southeastern Europe was complicated, however, because of the

varied environment, which included WTO member Bulgaria ,

nonaligned Yugoslavia and hostile Albania . During the 1960' s

and 1970's Romanian pursuit of a distinctive foreign policy

was also problematic but not directly threatening to Sovie t

goals . (See below)

4

Economic Security

The Soviet Union has clearly viewed Eastern Europe as a

region whose resources are available to be used to satisf y

Soviet needs . As a result, for the first fifteen or s o

years after World War II, the Soviets extracted by variou s

measures (reparations, joint stock companies, unequal trad e

relations) immense material resources to build and rebuil d

the Soviet economy .1 During the next twenty years, however ,

the relationship shifted to one in which the Soviet Unio n

provided the raw materials and fuel and received in exchang e

more complex manufactured goods . Owing to declining terms o f

trade and increased involvement of several East Europea n

countries with the West, this relationship turned

increasingly unfavorable for the USSR . The USSR, as Michae l

Marrese and Jan Vanous have shown, subsidized the Eas t

European economies, including those of Southeastern Europe , 2

in order to keep the alliance politically cohesive and, to

the extent possible, to support the ability of some of th e

regimes to buy peace at home with better economi c

performance .

More recently, the Soviets began to call attention t o

the need to "restructure" the trade relationship more t o

their advantage and in a way that serves their greatest need :

better-quality machines, equipment, technology, and

technological know-how to help the Soviet economy . 3

5

Historically,

the Soviet search for economi c

security in particular has provoked greater conflict i n

Southeastern Europe than in other regions . Postwar attempt s

to force Yugoslavia to develop its economy along line s

dictated in Moscow contributed to the 1948 break . Later ,

Khrushchev's move to "perfect" the Council for Mutua l

Economic Assistance (CMEA) -- in a way that would hav e

increased the spcecialization, and thus the advantage, o f

the more industrially developed northern-tier countries - -

drove Romania to search for other economic partners and t o

accompany this search with a foreign-policy reassessment . 4

Bulgaria, in contrast, consistently demonstrated it s

willingness to accommodate itself to the dominant premise o f

Soviet-East European economic relations and generall y

benefited from its extremely close ties with the USSR .

II . PRACTICES OF SOVIET POLICY

After Stalin's death the Soviet Union attempted to keep th e

domestic and international behavior of the East European

states within certain behavioral parameters . Thes e

boundaries were not rigidly applied over time, nor were the y

applied uniformly throughout the region . They were not even

explicitly delineated, although some indicators are derived

from authoritative pronouncements, such as that of September

1968 defining what became known in the West as the Brezhnev

6

Doctrine . 5 In general, by forceful intervention of al l

types Moscow had, until recently, regularly indicated th e

following three boundaries of acceptable behavior : 1 )

Communist party dominance of the political and economi c

system ; 2) at least minimum participation in the Warsaw Pact ;

and 3) maintenance of civil peace .

Communist party dominance of the political and economi c

system meant, in part, Soviet, and usually local regime ,

hostility to and suppression of challenges to the politica l

structure, which ensured that the Communist Party maintaine d

a monopoly on political power . Whether threats to this

monopoly came from outside the political elite, as in th e

case of Solidarity in Poland, or from within the part y

itself, as in Czechoslovakia during 1968, the Soviet reactio n

had been, sooner or later, to brand such movements a s

"anti-Soviet" or "anti-socialist" and to link them to

"counterrevolutionary" support from the West . All challenges

were seen as threats to the goal of political and, in some

instances, physical security, and were either directly o r

indirectly suppressed .

Minimum participation in the Warsaw Pact was enforce d

differentially, as might be expected, given the greater

Soviet emphasis on northern and central Europe . For example ,

Soviet fears about breaching of the alliance b y

Czechoslovakia or Poland have been more pronounced, even

7

exaggerated, than those over Romania's deviance, despite th e

fact that Bucharest's participation in the Warsaw Pact wa s

the least supportive over the past two decades . The USSR

tolerated a low and sometimes declining level of defens e

expenditure by Romania and Bulgaria, consistent Romania n

nonparticipation in maneuvers, and often some distance fro m

Warsaw Pact foreign-policy pronouncements and initiatives .

However, Romania remained a member of the Pact, renewed it s

bilateral and multinational treaties, and proclaimed its

loyalty to the alliance and the necessity of keeping it i n

force .

Critical to the Soviet view of events in Hungary in 195 6

and Poland during 1980-1 was the perception that the part y

was losing not just its "leading role" but the political

initiative and the ability to maintain the order on which th e

postwar system - and their regimes - were built . The party

was losing control of events in the streets . 6 Especially

because the original "revolutions" occurred in times of chaos

and upheaval, the increasingly conservative Soviet leadershi p

was sensitive to the appearance of situations that migh t

allow popular disaffection and disruption to threaten eithe r

of the other two parameters .

In this regard the pace of change was an importan t

factor, because a more moderate pace allowed the local regime

to appear to be in charge, to avoid the uncontrolled growth

8

of "antisocialist" forces (and to execute tactical crackdown s

against certain opposition groups), and to demonstrate th e

continued leading role of the party (and to try to reassur e

those who might be nervous in Moscow) .

In establishing and enforcing these behaviora l

boundaries, the Soviets did not insist on uniform practice s

throughout the region . Even before the sensational changes

of the past two years, the Soviet Union had tolerated a rang e

of diverse social and economic phenomena both of a mor e

capitalist nature (such as private agriculture in Poland) an d

a more retrograde character (such as Stalinism in Romania) .

Externally, states such as Poland and Romania pursue d

extensive contacts with Western countries before Moscow an d

other members of the alliance did, while Romania maintaine d

good relations with China as well as a number of countrie s

with whom the USSR had either few or hostile ties . For

Warsaw Pact members, as long as the basic three boundarie s

were respected, the Soviets did not insist on duplication o f

the Soviet system and tolerated some diversity in domesti c

economic and social structure and on international issues .

9

Old Threats

For the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe as a whole, th e

greatest threats were those posed to the dominance of th e

political system by the Communist Party. Such threats were

present in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and carrie d

dangerous implications for other Soviet goals in the region .

The possibility of full-scale overthrow or even radica l

reform of the political system was seen by the pre-Gorbache v

leadership as potentially allowing a more fluid, les s

predictable domestic political situation, or even th e

possibility that antisocialist and anti-Soviet forces woul d

take power . In addition, in Hungary and Poland during

previous episodes the threats of civil disorder were real an d

growing . Foreign-policy adjustments or even major change s

that might have eroded the Soviet power base in the regio n

were not inconceivable .

Before 1989 these threats occurred most often in th e

northern tier . Indeed, in Bulgaria and Romania, except for a

coup attempt in the former in 1965, communist party dominanc e

and domestic tranquility were never really in question . In

ideological terms, Ceausescu's rule in Romania undermined the

role of the party, in that the party was replaced by a n

individual, a return to the days of the cult of personality .

And various aspects of behavior by Romania (e .g ., its

relations with China) clearly provoked displeasure in Moscow .

But neither its domestic deformations nor its various acts

1 0

breaking ranks internationally, such as unilaterally an d

loudly announcing a cut in defense expenditures, wer e

perceived as actionable threats against the three main Sovie t

goals . For its part, Romania was careful not to directl y

challenge Soviet security interests either in the region o rglobally.7

III . SOVIET "NEW THINKING" AND THE REGION

Soviet "new thinking" on Eastern and Southeastern Europe ha s

to be viewed in the context of overall Soviet foreign-polic y

changes . The Gorbachev era has seen demonstrable and

significant revisions in Soviet foreign-policy conception s

about the world and, more important, about actions towar d

that world . Clearly, the Gorbachev leadership team has bee n

striving to reduce Soviet exposure abroad, in order to cu t

the costs and consequences of an overextended foreign policy .

This effort has involved several overtures toward China, th e

most important of which were Soviet withdrawal fro m

Afghanistan, the reduction of troops along the Sino-Sovie t

border, and the withdrawal of troops from Mongolia . Thes e

efforts produced visits to China by Foreign Minister Eduar d

Shevardnadze in 1988 and in 1989 by Gorbachev himself . The

Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan and pressure on Vietna m

to do the same from Cambodia have served both the immediat e

Soviet goal of reducing the costs of those involvements an d

of warming the environment for improving relations with China

1 1

and the United States . Toward the latter, the continuou s

concessions on medium-range missiles followed by th e

intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty were bot h

preceded and followed by pressure for renewed and mor e

vigorous strategic arms control measures -- both marke d

switches from the late Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko perio d

Soviet feelers for improved relations with Israel, as well a s

with a number of Arab states with whom the Soviets did no t

previously have relations, and support for an agreement i n

southwestern Africa have been complemented by a rapid growt h

of interest and opportunity for expanding economic relation s

with the West . This policy has been directed at private

capital (e .g ., through joint ventures), increasing bilatera l

trade, and capitalist global institutions, such as th e

International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement o n

Tariffs and Trade . 8

These moves and numerous others should not b e

interpreted as some kind of Soviet desire to "behave "

according to standards determined in the West . Nor should

they be seen as coming primarily in response t o

Western pressure . These policies stem from the Soviet

leadership's perception of the needs of the country itself ,

its economy, its society, and its socialist system. The

Gorbachev team explicitly recognizes that the Soviet economy

is in desperate straits . Far from competing internationall y

with the advanced West, it is falling behind even the newly

1 2

developing countries of the Pacific rim and cannot eve n

effectively provide what the country itself needs to functio n

properly in manufactured goods, communication and informatio n

technology or computers ; in food production, processing o r

distribution ; in housing, health care or most areas of socia l

welfare . In their discussions of these problems the Soviet s

acknowledge that the question may not be one of production ;

sometimes it is a problem of the application, distribution ,

and utilization of technology, goods, and resources . Thes e

problems are seen to be related to questions of investment ,

prices, and the social/cultural issues of initiative ,

incentive, and labor productivity. Finally, Gorbache v

himself, more than any other of the current leaders, insist s

that without reform of the political system, very little o f

what is needed will be accomplished . 9

On the international plane, Gorbachev has also mad e

clear the link between domestic perestroika and new thinking

in foreign policy . He and his supporters recognize the need

to ease the pressure on the Soviet economy - and in som e

cases on the political system - stemming from globa l

involvement and conflicts . Doing this allows both attention

and resources to be devoted to the compelling domestic tasks .

With respect to Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the ne w

thinking is directly related to a critical assessment of th e

international role of the Soviet Union and to its domestic

1 3

needs . First, there is the question of whether the Sovie t

Union should and will seek to maintain this increasingly

costly sphere of influence, by following the earlier

policies . In their public statements, Gorbachev and othe r

Soviet leaders have gone out of their way to cast out "ol d

thinking" on this score, rejecting the notion that the y

arrogate to themselves a monopoly on truth or that they want

to duplicate Soviet systems in the region . 10 Such statement s

have been cast as rejections of the "Brezhnev Doctrine, "

though at first they were not combined with acknowledgments

of its existence . 11 Long-time heretics such as Yugoslavi a

were assured that the Soviet Union accepts the idea of many

and independent paths of socialist development . 12 Nothing

spoke as loudly on this score as the Soviet toleration of -

and even reportedly granting of permission for - the

installation of a non-Communist government in Poland i n

1989 . 1 3

The significance of this forbearance cannot be

overstated . After more than forty years of insisting an d

insuring that only a Communist-dominated political system

could provide the necessary reassurance, Moscow recognized

the need to see if its goals could be secured through another

arrangement . It was this action which marked the change i n

deed as well as word of Soviet policy in East Europe . It

signified the jettisoning of one of the three key practices

outlined above : the maintenance of communist party monopoly

1 4

of domestic political power . This action -- or nonaction - -

indicated the threshold of new thinking in Soviet polic y

toward East Europe and gave a strong fillip to movements fo r

change, which became revolutions throughout the region .

Even before this, however, Moscow ha d

signaled its desire to reduce its political and economi c

exposure . The troop cuts and withdrawals announced b y

Gorbachev in 1988 included significant reductions in force s

in Central Europe; several of the states then followed wit h

cuts in their troops . 1 4

Soviet new thinking toward the region has also involve d

a rethinking of the role and function of CMEA. It is clear

from Soviet writings on the subject that they are displease d

over what is seen as an unfavorable economic relationship, i n

which the Soviets supply raw materials and fuel at grea t

opportunity costs and sometimes lower than world prices i n

return for more expensive but often poor-quality manufacture d

goods . 15 Aside from the price and cost factors, the benefit s

of such trade - including the ability to improve an d

diversify the national economy and trade profile - are see n

as disproportionately accruing to the East Europea n

countries, especially the more advanced ones . 16

1 5

Under Gorbachev, Moscow also began to push for th e

organization itself to function better, to begin to act mor e

as a genuine economic union, with more effective mechanisms

for price formation, currency exchange, and specialization o f

production . The Soviets began to demonstrate increasin g

impatience with CMEA, particularly compared with the loomin g

counterexample of the European Community . Finally, Soviet

pressure to change CMEA has been driven by the Sovie t

commitment to perestroika, which has taken the form o f

pressure for the member states to restructure their ow n

economies in a way that will allow more direct productio n

ties between Soviet and East European enterprises, thu s

facilitating the spread of advanced science and technolog y

throughout the region . 1 7

But until it was clear that the Soviet Union was indee d

abandoning its hegemony, there was a tension between th e

Soviets' pronouncements and actions ; for example, between a

stated willingness to let each state go its own way and th e

clear desire to get the region to improve its economi c

performance and change its relationship with the USSR . As ha s

been clear since the revolutions of 1989, if in fact all the

states pursue what they see as their own best economi c

interest, they would likely want to continue to rely on cheap

Soviet raw materials and fuel, payable with goods, not hard

currency . For their part, the CMEA junior partners'

1 6

incentives to accommodate the USSR on the issue o f

restructuring the trade relationship and to improve their ow n

domestic situation conflicts with the evident advantages o f

continuing the current system, with their desire not t o

aggravate their already difficult economic situations, an d

with their desire to trade their more complex goods to th e

West . Such conflicting directions were already evident i n

the first post-revolutionary CMEA summit i n Sofia.18

For the Soviet Union, the problem now will be how to ge t

the East European states to satisfy at least some of it s

economic needs without relying on "old thinking" (i .e . ,

hegemonic interference from Moscow) and without pressin g

these states economically so much that their domesti c

situations become even more difficult or as unstable as i s

the case in East Germany .

Until 1989 there was also the question of whether "ne w

thinking" and "new acting" were really to be applied t o

Eastern Europe . While Soviet declarations and actions seemed

to reject the notion of intervention, a change in leadershi p

in the USSR or in the perceived "security" situation in th e

region could have put this option back on the table . Before

the emergence of the Solidarity government in Poland ,

statements by Soviet leaders made in Eastern Europe wer e

always hedged by admonitions that the leaders of thes e

parties had responsibility not only to their own nations but

1 7

to the "common interests of socialism . " 19 Soviet writing s

did not explicitly reject the basic premise of the Sovie t

invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 . Instead, Moscow

essentially accepted the assessment of that period made by

the regime in Prague, acknowledging mistakes but continuin g

to point to "antisocialist forces" and extensive Western

influence . 2 0

It is unlikely that the Soviet Union, new thinking o r

not, will rapidly, or ever, abandon the desire for physica l

and political security in a region it sees as vital . The

means of achieving these ends, however, clearly has changed

and include a substantial broadening of the Soviet notion o f

what kind of regimes and what kind of region serves these

interests . Even if the Soviet Union were to become a

non-communist country, a scenario less fanciful now than at

any time since the revolution, its great-power imperative s

would continue to operate in this region . A new leadership

in Moscow is still likely to work to protect its nationa l

security, very broadly defined . Moscow would still fret

about and work against any military presence or threat in th e

area, and can be expected to react negatively agains t

political developments in the region that make this threa t

more likely .

1 8

IV . SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS BEFORE THE FALL OF CEAUSESCU

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Romanian-Sovie t

relations cooled . Under Georghiu Georghe-Dej and, after

1965, Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian party began to pursue a

pattern of foreign economic relations quite distinct fro m

those of the Soviet Union . This policy was aimed at securin g

for the country the wherewithal to achieve rapid and broa d

industrial development -- goals which had been enunciated a s

early as the 1950s and never renounced . In 1964 the Romanian s

rejected Nikita Khruschev's attempt to strengthen CMEA' s

international coordination, and argued that relinquishin g

planning and control of the economy would be inconsisten t

with national security - proletarian internationalis m

aside . 2 1

Over the next decade Romania greatly expanded its tie s

with the west, both economic and political . Western trade

grew rapidly and by 1967 constituted 40 percent of Romania n

trade . Nearly three-fifths of its imports of machines and

equipment came from the west . 22 By 1974 the country's trad e

with developed capitalist countries was greater than it s

trade with CMEA states .

Trade relations expanded to broader economic ties suc h

as with the European Econmic Community (1973) and membershi p

in GATT (1971), the IMF and World Bank (1972) . Such ties

1 9

were part of and supported by a growth of distinctive

political relations between Romania and non-East Europea n

countries . In 1967 Romania became the first East Europea n

country to recognize the Federal Republic of Germany and th e

same year refused to break relations with Israel after th e

Six-Day War, something each of its allies, plus Yugoslavia ,

did . In 1968 Bucharest did not take part in and criticized

the pressure on Czechoslovakia during the "Prague spring" an d

condemned the Soviet-led invasion to end that reform i n

August of that year . 2 3

During the 1970's Romanian-Soviet differences were les s

spectacular but Nicolae Ceausescu did continue to follow a

distinct course . He expanded trade ties with the United

States, including acceptance of MFN in 1975 under the terms

of the Jackson-Vanik amendment . US-Romanian trade grew

vigorously as did Romanian trade with West Europe, despit e

the occasional fluctuations due to Western oil price

adjustments and resulting recession in mid-decade . 24 Romania

significantly expanded its ties with third world countrie s

during this period, redefining itself as a "socialis t

developing" country and engaging in active diplomacy with the

Nonaligned Conference Group of 77 .

During this period Bucharest did not directly challeng e

Soviet security interests . Rather it asserted its adherence

2 0

to the general principle of economic and political sovreignt y

and was not above occasionally toning down its differences ,

for example, over Afghanistan, or sending mixed signals, a s

it did during the Solidarity period in Poland . 2 5

Romania's international economic and political tie s

underwent some change in the early and mid-1980s . Belated

recognition and adjustments to increasing energy costs an d

mounting debt led the Ceausescu regime to severely cu t

imports from the West and try to expand exports . The

domestic market was brutally squeezed, especially o f

foodstuffs, in order to satisfy Ceausescu's stated goal o f

rapidly paying off Romania's debt, which by 1981 exceede d

$ 10 billion . Similarly, Romanian trade shifted eastward .

Trade with socialist countries which accounted for one-thir d

of Romania's trade in 1980, counted for three-fifths in 198 6

and fully two-thirds of the country's imports . Trade with

the Soviet Union grew as well, with especially marke d

increases in Romanian imports of Soviet oil (From 350,00 0

tons in 1979 to more than 6 million tons in 1986) .

Romania's political ties with the west eroded as well .

As increasingly severe measures were used to squeeze th e

economy and retain tight political control in the wake o f

developments in Poland, the country's human rights practice s

drew attention and criticism . In particular the annual MFN

hearings in the US congress provided an opportunity for

2 1

broader and sharper attacks on the regime's civil right s

practices and treatment of religious and ethnic minorities .

When in 1987 the congress included in its draft a provisio n

calling for the suspension of MFN the following year, Romani a

unilaterally renounced MFN . 26 In April 1989 the Europea n

Coumunity suspended negotiations with Romania on a

comprehensive trade agreement because of the country's poo r

human rights record .

The Romanian Rejection of Reform

Under Nicolae Ceausescu the Romanian regime categorically and

comprehensively rejected the reforms being implemented i n

the Soviet Union . Romanian rejection took on various forms .

The Ceausescu regime rejected the idea of reform i n

principle on various grounds . First, the RCP denied there wa s

anything wrong with socialism or its tenets, only it s

application . 27 Second, the regime outlined an elaborat e

theoretical argument reiterating the idea that there was n o

single unique model of socialism which would apply in al l

cases . Ilie Ceausescu, the President's brother, for example ,

argued in Era Socialista that

Of course, as the problems of improvement are ,in an objective way, different from country t ocountry and the solution which one party o ranother chooses -- drawing from certai nconcrete conditions -- will carry in their ver ysubstance,

their mark of the specificsituations of respective countries, of th estage of development to which socialist societ yhas come, of the accomplished experience o feach governing party . This makes it necessary

2 2

to act in such a way . However,

so as to nolonger revive harmful practices or "uniqu emodels" dressed in

"new' clothes of someimprovement with pretension

to genera lvalidity . 2 8

This argument complemented the longstanding Romania n

position that the fullest expression of national sovereignt y

did not allow the application of a form of socialism whic h

did not fit Romanian conditions . "Socialism gives the

principle of sovereignty a new and better framework fo r

expression, . . ." the argument ran, "underscoring the right

of each socialist state, of each socialist nation to choos e

its own forms and ways of socialist construction -- socially,

politically, economically, culturally, etc . -- to develop its

own model of socialist society through a creative applicatio n

to the principles of scientific socialism ." 29 As it had

earlier, this aspect of rejection of a "model" of socialis m

was accompanied by vigorous assertions of the need fo r

foreign policy sovereignty in general . 3 0

At the same time, Ceausescu and those around hi m

rejected the very need for reform, since they saw their brand

of socialism as having brought Romania to a "golden era . "

Anyone, friends and - to put it this way - als othose who do

not

find to their

liking thesocialist development of our homeland and thedevelopment of socialism in general,

can seewhat the socialist way of development has mean tto Romania - industrialisation, development o fagriculture, science, education, culture, thesteady raising of the people's living standard ,materially and spiritually, a rationa ldistribution of the productive forces an dharmonious development of all zones of th ecountry, of the counties,

the creation o fseveral economic and social centres in every

2 3

county,

vast socio-economic constructions ,houses,

schools,

hospitals

and otherestablishments that, all together, have adecisive role in raising the degree o fcivilisation and development of our homeland . 3 1

Failings, which were not only acknowledged but attacked unde r

Ceausescu, were laid at the feet of individuals who failed t o

properly execute directives ; they were not the fault of th e

system itself .

Ceausescu's rejection was also specific . That is, he

did not refrain from explicitly disdaining those measures

being urged in the Soviet case by Mikhail Gorbachev .

Speaking of the moves to allow small scale privat e

enterprises in the Soviet economy, Ceausescu sai d

In no way can one speak of improving socialismby looking back, by speaking of the so-calle dmarket socialism, of free enterprise, and al lthis by invoking objective laws . There cannotbe improvement of socialism through th eso-called development of the small privat eproperty . Capitalist property, big or small ,is still capitalist property . One cannot speakof socialist economy without basing it onsocialist ownership of the productive means .This is an objective law, without which on ecannot speak of the building of a better andmore just social system . Our practice hasdemonstrated to the full that socialis townership, as ownership of the whole people, n omatter its form - state or co-operative -, itsconsolidation and development make the only wa yof translating into life the principles ofsocial equity and justice, of powerfu ldevelopment of the productive forces ofensuring

every

nation's

welfare

andindependence . 32

2 4

Increasing the autonomy of state enterprises was rejected . 3 3

Politically, suggestions that the role of the party ; of

planning or of the control of the state be weakened wer e

ruled out . 34 In short, Ceausescu rejected the general nee d

for reform and the specific measues being enacted in th e

USSR .

In some cases, however, while not accepting the need fo r

thorough reform, Ceausescu tried to increase domesti c

pressure to insure better performance . He did this in way s

which were occasionally not that different from thos e

utilized by Gorbachev, for example by urging clos e

association between the party and the people . Speaking to

the Political Executive Committee of the party in Octobe r

1988, Ceausescu said

. . all leaders of social economic units --local and central -- of all economic-socia lsectors must understand that to talk abou tself-management, self-administration, ofimproving and modernizing activity, presuposse sputting into practice a new mode, to put an en dentirely to attitudes of indolence,

o ftolerance, lack of exactingness . It isnecessary to proceed from the necessity thateach one in his area of activity -- both i ncollective arenas and in his own activity --have in mind that he is responsible before th epeople, before the organs of worker srevolutionary democracy, before the party fo rany kind of unfulfilled tasks that come due . 3 5

In practice, the regime's idea of reform was t o

increase rather than reduce state control .

For example ,

restrictions were increased on small scale production ,

production from private plots and use of resources . 36

2 5

Other aspects of reform stimulated by the Gorbachev tea m

were met with silence . This applies especially to the kind

of political behavior which began to emerge in the USSR a s

well as to the greater openness in the press and newer

political forms encouraged by glasnost . Ceausescu did not

shrink from indicating that he held little in common wit h

those who were raising questions about Soviet history . As

Tass reported during Gromyko's visi t

Ceausescu said that the Soviet Union' sachievements are thought highly of in Romania .Over a short time the USSR has become a grea tindustrial power, he noted, pointing also tothe high appreciation in this country for whathe described as the exceptional role played b ythe Soviet Union and the war against Nazis mand in its routing .

"We do not understand those attempting to putthese fact in doubt," Ceausescu continued . 3 7

Rather than abate as in the USSR, pressure continued

and even increased against Romanian dissidents who spoke out ,

such as Mircea Dinescu and Doina Cornea . 38 Access to some

Soviet publications was restricted .

While not acknowledging the Soviet political reforms ,

the Romanian regime frequently asserted that it was already

doing what some other socialist states, now needed to do . Greater

democracy and full participation were already features of th e

Romanian scene, Ceausescu argued . A similar two-sided strategy

-- denying or ignoring reform while asserting that the necessary

improvements were already in place -- had been applied by the

2 6

Romanian regime during the first Solidarity period in Poland i n

1980-1981 . 39 At that time the Romanian government also too k

steps to try to improve the living standards of key sectors o f

the population, such as oil workers .

In this instance als o

nominal quotas for key provisions,

such as meat,

mea t

products, and sugar were raised . 40 This time such actions wer e

even more important because despite their best attempts th e

regime could not keep the population from knowing about change s

and reforms in the USSR and later throughout Eastern Europe .

With regard to external issues, Romania also explicitl y

rejected the Soviet attempts to move CMEA in the direction o f

reform .

Part of this was due to a rejection of the Soviet

externalization of its own reform through CMEA . For example ,

Soviet leadership stressed the need to shift CMEA coordinatio n

from the state level to that of the enterprises, as it had

tried to move the direction of the domestic economy away fro m

the central state level .

The Long-Term Program of Scientifi c

and Technical Cooperation,

presented in 1985,

was the

centerpiece of this aspect of CMEA reform . 4 1

While Romania signed this document,

its views on

implementation were quite distinct from those of its allies . 4 2

In presenting the state plan for 1986 soon after the CMEA

summit, Stefan Birlea, Chairman of the State Planning Committe e

barely mentioned CMEA . Prime Minster Dascalescu's report of the

next year similarly gave only the briefest obligatory

2 7

reference . 43 Compare this with Todor Zhivkov's statement to th e

Bulgarian party congress that "Bulgarian electronics must be

united to maximum degree with the similar industries of the CMEA

member states . "44 In fact, Romania signed very few agreement s

for direct enterprise ties under Ceausescu, though they did sig n

an agreement for long-term scientific and technical cooperatio n

with CMEA member states . 4 5

As they had during the 1960s, the Romanian regime als o

rejected explicitly the notion that CMEA reform should mean

restriction of national prerogatives 46 or specialization .

The improvement of co-operation and specialisationand the establishment whre it seems necessary, ofjoint companies must be based on and must tak einto consideration the independent development o feach national economy . Under no circumstancesshould we follow the example of the multinationa limperialist societies, which as a matter of fact ,have become means of oppressing other people .

Co-operation, I repeat, specialisation, when itseems necessary and is possible, must be based o nthe national property of each country and on thefact that the product or part of the nationalproduct should belong to each country and nation ,in accordance with that country's participation i nthis activity . We cannot establish any kind o fsupra-national companies . 4 7

The RCP view was that the CMEA should do a better job

in assisting the development of those members who were

further behind the others . 4 8

Soviet discussion of reform of CMEA made it clear tha t

reform of CMEA was linked to reform of the economies of it s

member states . Yuri Shiriaev,

the Director of the CMEA

2 8

Institute of International Economic Research,

said,

fo r

example, "However perfect CMEA might become, we canno t

expect to be successful if conditions are not created in eac h

country for enterprises and branch agencies to conside r

participation in the integration as being in their ow n

interest .

This will require the creation of suitabl e

incentives within national economic mechanism . " 49 Gorbachev

himself made it clear during Ceausescu's visit to Moscow tha t

he saw the alliance's common goals achieved through th e

forward movement of each national economy . 5 0

Thus Romania's rejection of this aspect of Soviet

reform was based on a mixture of old and new rejections :

rejecting as they had in the past any form of CMEA organization

which would remove or reduce national prerogatives, such as th e

greater use of direct ties, plus rejecting the kind of domesti c

reforms that the USSR clearly wanted the CMEA member states to

begin implementing .

Romania had no objection to improving and expanding

bilateral ties with CMEA partners,

in particular the Soviet

Union itself ; trade increased substantially for 1986 (23% )

and in 1987 and 1988 was still nearly 15% above the 198 5

level . And, as noted, Bucharest signed long-term bilatera l

agreements on cooperation with both the Soviet Union an d

other CMEA members . The rejection, rather, was directed a t

the CMEA having increased power and/or acting as a vehicle

2 9

for Soviet reforms . In July 1988, when the member state s

pledged as a goal the creation of conditions for a fre e

market of goods and services among themselves and toward a

united market, Romania did not sign the declaration . 5 1

The Problem of Soviet Foreign Policy Action s

Soviet new thinking essentially outflanked Romanian foreig n

policy as Moscow's policy initiatives took shape . Many o f

the issues upon which Romania had based its deviant foreig n

policy were removed by Soviet actions . For example, Romania

had been more receptive to proposals by the United State s

regarding the question of nuclear weapons in Europe . 52 Then

when repeated Soviet concessions culminated in the INF treat y

in 1987, the issue was effectively removed from the Romania n

platform .

Similarly, Bucharest had been consistently more

vocal in support of conventional force cuts,

and

occasionally engaged in oblique

polemics with Moscow . 5 3

Romania announced unilateral reductions in its own defense

budget in 1986 and 1987,

the latter, backed up by a highly

publicized national referendum . 54 But when Gorbachev

announced the unilateral Soviet troop withdrawal in Europe i n

1988, this issue too lost what little play it had for th e

Romanians .

Soviet initiatives to improve relations with Beijing ,

initiatives in the Middle East which included improving

relations with Israel,

the Soviet withdrawal from

3 0

Afghanistan and even its calls to strengthen the Unite d

Nations,

effectively moved Moscow past positions held by

Bucharest and offered as unique . In some cases in apparen t

attempts to retain distinct positions, the Romanians espouse d

increasingly strident views on issues on which there wa s

otherwise international consensus, such as chemical weapon s

and the final document of Vienna's meeting of the CSCE on

human rights . 5 5

But perhaps nowhere was Romania so shouldered out o f

the picture by Soviet initiatives and by its own policies a s

in its relationship with the West . Here Romania had occupied

a favored position for more than a decade as the US tried t o

erode the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe . US-Romanian

trade had greatly increased with the granting of MFN in 1975 ;

US Presidents Nixon and Ford had visited Romania and at

various times the US had gone out of its way to publicl y

support what it saw as an independent state in the region . 5 6

This was of course predicated on a continuous cold,

or a t

least cool,

US-Soviet relationship .

Hence,

when under

Gorbachev that relationship began to improve,

simultaneous

with the serious deterioration of conditions in Romania, it s

"value" to the West declined . This was demonstrated by open

US criticism of Romanian human rights practices voiced b y

administration officials, in the US Congress during MFN

hearings, and the proposed suspension of MFN for Romania for

six months in 1987 . 57

3 1

Bucharest also moved further in a direction opposit e

from that of the USSR by cutting or reducing other ties wit h

Western economic institutions . Ceausescu was increasingl y

critical of Western financial institutions and with the deb t

paid off,

a law prohibiting new foreign credits was

enacted . 58 Romania, once the only East European member o f

the IMF, with special privileges and arrangements with the U S

and the EEC, found itself left behind in a warming East-Wes t

economic atmosphere .

Before the dramatic events of 1989 which swep t

aside the one-party communist regimes in Eastern Europe ,

Soviet attitudes toward Romania and its rejection of refor m

were mixed, but by no means completely negative . As noted ,

trade did increase significantly,

though Soviet-Romanian

trade remained the lowest between the USSR and any CME A

member. In addition, in accordance with Romanian views on

direct enterprise-to-enterprise ties and specialization, few

such arrangements were signed .

After Gorbachev became Soviet party leader he did

visit Romania, but it was last on his tour and occurred more

than two years after he became General Secretary . During

this visit in May 1987, Gorbachev was not shy about offering

criticism .

In his very first speech in Bucharest, whic h

like most Romanian cities was having its old center destroyed

3 2

to make way for gigantic new buildings, he urged th e

Romanians to preserve the historical architecture and sai d

whenever this had not been done in Moscow "we now regret

it ." 59 Gorbachev complained that mutual trade was i n

low-quality products while the best production went to th e

West . 60 Even more pointedly, in reviewing Soviet progress o n

reforms,

he noted the problem of "the removal of those who

are not coping with the matter in hand ; who cannot keep up

with the times ; and furthermore,

who have tarnished

themselves with dishonesty, lack of principles, and

nepotism and who in pursuit of profit have sacrificed the

moral image proper to a party member . We all need to learn

to work in conditions of democracy ." 6 1

Disagreements had evidently emerged also in privat e

sessions between the two as Ceausescu indicated that ther e

was an identity of views only on a "majority of issues " 6 2

Other visitors such as Soviet President Andrei Gromyko an d

Politburo member Mikhail Solmonstev had offered indirect bu t

critical assessment of Soviet-Romanian relations 63 and o f

the unilateral arms policy pursued by Romanians . 64 Pressure

was kept up to develop direct ties between enterprises, i n

accordance with CMEA's new approach . 6 5

The Soviet view, made explicit during Gorbachev' s

visit to Bucharest in May 1987 and Ceausescu's visit to

Moscow in October 1988, was that indeed relations were based

3 3

on mutual respect and sovereignty but also "internationa l

solidarity,

responsibility before the workers of eac h

country and to the common interests of socialism and

peace ." 66 As he had during his own visit to Bucharest ,

Gorbachev stressed to Ceausescu when he came the need to

improve the quality of products in Soviet-Romanian trade . He

also drew attention to the fact that "common ideologica l

achievements become successes for each of us and ,

unfortunately, common loses can turn into failures ." 6 7

During this period occasional slights were offered .

When Ceausescu visited Moscow in October 1988 Gorbachev di d

not meet him at the airport,

though both men were thei r

country's heads of both party and state . The Soviet pres s

gave scant recognition to Elena Ceausescu -- despite he r

position as First Deputy Prime Minister and member of th e

party's permanent bureau -- during their arrival and referred

to the couple simply as Ceausescu "and wife ." The next month

Silviu Brucan, a former party leader and critic of the

Romanian regime who had signed an open letter agains t

Ceausescu in the spring of 1988, visited Moscow . He was not

officially received however .

In general the Soviet press was not especially

critical of Ceausescu or the situation in Romania . Many

articles on the country were positive . 68 Most reportage

either did not report on the country's overall situation or

3 4

attributed any difficulties to the debt burden . 69 In some

discussions the conclusion was drawn that the difficultie s

were derived from Romania's determination to repay the debt

by the end of the decade but this usually was seen a s

necessary and successful . 70 Whatever may have been said abou t

him in private , 71 press treatment of Ceausescu, virtuall y

right up until his overthrow,,

was restrained and, if anything ,

only obliquely critical . 7 2

On a concrete level, Soviet Romanian trade increase d

during the first three years of Gorbachev's rule and woul d

have increased further had Romania been able to pay for al l

the Soviet oil they wanted . Romanian cooperation in Sovie t

energy production grew during this period with Romania n

involvement in the "Progress" gas pipeline . In October 1988 ,

30 new cooperation agreements were signed of which 16 were t o

be enacted in the USSR . 73 At the time of Gorbachev's visit ,

there were more than 140 such projects operating i n

Romania . 74 Before the Romanian revolution there was littl e

evidence of pressure on Romania,

apart from some publi c

chiding,

to

fall

in

line

with

Gorbachev' s

perestroika/glasnost' approach . During 1989 Moscow did

include occasional items which bore on reforms in its

Romanian language broadcasts, but it was hardly a propagand a

campaign . 75 Occasionally Romania would be reminded of th e

Soviet contribution to its well-being, most notably through

its oil exports . 76

3 5

V . THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY

In 1989 Soviet intentions toward Eastern Europe were

tested ; the question was called as to whether or not th e

Brezhnev Doctrine was really dead . Specifically, the Polis h

elections in the spring of 1989 revealed the abject weaknes s

of the communist party there . The inability to form a

government then produced the first noncommunist government i n

Eastern Europe since 1948 .

While some critical comment wa s

evident, the Soviet Union did not intervene to stop th e

process . Indeed, Soviet press comment on the Mazowiecki

government was cautious but supportive . Moscow, in a phone

call to Wojciech Jaruzelski acceded to the communist loss o f

power and the creation of a Solidarity government . 7 7

At this point it could be said that both i n

practice and in rhetoric the Brezhnev Doctrine was relegate d

to the dustbin of history .

Of the goals indicated above a s

being central to Soviet policy in the region,

the

maintenance of the communist monopoly of power,

Moscow

clearly saw,

could no longer be defended in Poland . Nor

evidently could it be saved elsewhere in the region . In the

next few months communist power was destroyed in Hungary ,

East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and ultimately an d

and violently in Romania itself .

In October Gorbachev

3 6

traveled to East Germany to celebrate the 40th anniversary o f

the state and indicated that East Germany's communists to o

might find themselves out if they did not cooperate with "al l

forces in society ." Soviet spokesman, Gennady Gerasimov

reported that Gorbachev warned Erich Honecker that "he who i s

late is punished . " 78 Indeed Honecker found himself out of

power ten days later .

His successor,

Egon Krenz, lasted only long enough to

open the country's borders and start it down the road to

unification with West Germany .

Moscow approved the former

action, supporting the new government and tried to slow the

momentum toward reunification 79 but Gorbachev's evident

acceptance of the inevitable reunification of Germany durin g

a visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Hans Modrow in Januar y

1990 seemed to offer a green light to reunification on Wes t

German rather than on East German terms . 80 Subsequently, th e

Soviet position seemed to be equivocal on whether or not a

united Germany could remain in NATO . 81 In the face of the

rapid movement toward de facto integration, the USSR ha s

displayed a degree of forbearance which borders o n

resignation .

While Moscow was not as visible in the Czechoslovak

"gentle revolution" it was no more inclined to act to preven t

it or the election to the presidency soon after of forme r

dissident, Vaclav Havel .

Eduard Shevardnadze called the

3 7

events of November, which toppled the Czechoslovak part y

leadership, "natural" and a "democratization of society . " 8 2

Nor did the changes in Hungary and Bulgaria bring the kind o f

heightened concern and warnings which had characterize d

Soviet reaction to developments in Eastern Europe at numerou s

times in the last four decades .

In fact, in an ironic reversal of position it wa s

Romania that tried to organize allied action against change .

In a desperate move to try to stop the formation of a

Solidarity government in Poland,

the RCP proposed to it s

Polish and Hungarian counterparts that they take "join t

action" to defend socialism . Both parties rejected thi s

move . 83 Apparently in the Romanian view the doctrine o f

limited sovereignty had some merit after all . As this tacti c

failed and change began to engulf East Europe, the Romania n

party sought allies elsewhere, among those regimes setting

themselves against reform such as Cuba, and sought t o

bolster remaining East European conservatives . 84 The Romanian

press gave scant or selected coverage of developments in th e

region . 8 5

VI . SOVIET REACTION TO THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTIO N

In comparison to the reactions of Poland, Czechoslovakia and

East Germany, all of which had by this time undergone thei r

own revolutions, the Soviet reaction to the revolution wa s

at first distinctly hesitant .

As late as December 17 the

3 8

Romanian service of Radio Moscow was still only indirectl y

calling attention to the lack of changes in Romania b y

offering brief reports of changes in other East Europea n

countries . 86 On December 19 Radio Moscow did go so far as to

report the demonstrations in Timisoara and elsewhere ,

pointing out that no mention of these events was being mad e

in the Romanian media . 87 Meanwhile, other parts of the Soviet

media became very active in reporting the demonstrations i n

Timisoara and Bucharest ; they even reported to the Sovie t

audience Hungarian accounts of death tolls of from 300 to 40 0

in Timisoara . 8 8

Nevertheless, the Soviet government withheld officia l

comments on developments in Romania . Speaking to the second

session of the Congress of People's Deputies on December 2 1

-- after four days of demonstrations -- Mikhail Gorbache v

said information was as yet insufficient to allow comment, a

sentiment echoed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry . Politburo

member Lev Zaikov did make statements about the need for th e

Romanian government to establish a dialogue with its people ;

in comments broadcast by the Romanian service of Radi o

Moscow, the historian Roy Medvedev called the regime

"totalitarian . " 89 On December 22 the congress of People' s

Deputies expressed its "resolute support for the just caus e

of the Romanian people . 90 The congress spontaneously burs t

into applause when Mikhail Gorbachev reported that Nicola e

Ceausescu had been overthrown .

3 9

During the subsequent fighting between Ceausesc u

loyalists and supporters of the revolution, the USSR offere d

humanitarian aid to the new regime but denied report s

circulated on December 23 that it was prepared to support the

government militarily . 91 Moscow did acknowledge that it ha d

discussed with its Warsaw Pact allies the possibility o f

convening an emergency meeting of the pact's foreig n

ministers, but this idea was put aside as events stabilize d

in Romania . The Soviet media continued to provide extensive

coverage of the battles in Romania, especially those i n

Bucharest, and Tass also reported heightened concern over th e

fate of Soviet nationals during some of the fiercest fighting

on December 23 . It said that "The Soviet Union cannot remai n

indifferent to the fate of Soviet citizens and demands tha t

those who have unleashed . . actions endangering the lif e

of the Soviet people should immediately stop them . " 92 The

next day an unidentified "senior Soviet official" said tha t

while a victory for the Romanian people would be "a hundre d

times more valuable" if the people themselves won it, "w e

would definitely act to prevent Ceausescu's return -- by no w

that has been made clear to all ." 9 3

The Soviet Union was assured publicly that military

intervention would have met with very little unfavorabl e

reaction . On December 23 an official in the British Foreign

Ministry said that Soviet intervention in Romania would be

4 0

"understandable ." The next day French Foreign Minister Rolan d

Dumas said explicitly that his government would support suc h

action as well as the use of volunteer brigades in Romania . 9 4

Then, in a complete reversal of post-war US policy toward th e

region, Secretary of State James Baker commented in a

television interview that Washington would be "inclined t o

follow the example of France ." When asked directly whethe r

that meant that the USA would not oppose military

intervention in Romania by members of the Warsaw Pact, Bake r

responded : "That womuld be my view, yes . " 95 While the Bush

administration later sought to diminish the significance o f

these remarks by declaring them "hypothetical," even a

"hypothetical" suggestion by an American administration tha t

it would not oppose the USSR's use of force in Romani a

represents a remarkable about-face in the US view of th e

Soviet role in Eastern Europe .

The overthrow of the Romanian government relieve d

Gorbachev of a recalcitrant ally who publicly criticized

perestroika and even ridiculed Gorbachev's domestic an d

foreign policies . But it also increased pressure on Moscow to

respond to the demands of the well-organized Moldavian

Popular Front, which showed itself highly attentive to

developments in Romania from the beginning of the trouble s

there . Aided by the extensive coverage given the Romania n

developments in the Soviet media and by information from

their own contacts, officials of all types in Moldavia were

4 1

especially critical of Ceausescus' actions .

The Moldavian

party's Central Committee,

Supreme Soviet Presidium, an d

republican government issued their own statements expressin g

solidarity with the Romanian people . 96 Coincidentally, a

resolution passed by the Soviet Congress of People's Deputie s

on December 24 declared that protocols to the 193 9

Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact illegal, although a simila r

resolution had failed to gather enough votes for passage th e

day before . 97 These protocols had opened the way for the USS R

to incorporate the Baltic states and annex parts of what were

then Poland and Romania ; out of the annexed Romanian land wa s

created the Soviet Republic of Moldavia .

4 2

Perhaps in recognition of the sensitivity and complexit y

of Soviet-Romanian ties, Gorbachev went out of his way to

make a good start with the new Romanian leadership .

Recognition was extended on December 25, the same day the

Ceausescus were executed .

Soviet reaction to this event wa s

not even mildly critical . At a regular press briefing a

foreign ministry spokesman said this constituted "part of th e

internal affairs of Romania" and that "the decision t o

execute the President has probably been made, taking into

account the aspirations and will of the Romanian people . " 9 8

On December 27 Gorbachev spoke by telephone with the

President of the National Salvation Front, Ion Iliescu . The

same day he sent his personal congratulations to the ne w

Romanian government, signing the message only "M .

Gorbachev ." This warm message complemented that sent to Prim e

Minister Petre Roman by the Soviet government . 99 Finally ,

on December 31 Moscow announced that Soviet Foreign Minister

Eduard Shevardnadze would visit Romania at the end of th e

first week in January . Shevardnadze did visit on January 6 .

He promised continuing economic and humanitarian aid ,

announced the end of Soviet importation of Romanian food

products and said the USSR would respect the Romanian

people's decision on political parties .10° For its part, th e

new Romanian government strongly affirmed that it would

respect its foreign commitments, including its membership i n

the Warsaw Pact . 101

4 3

VII . SOVIET POLICY IN EAST EUROPE SINCE THE REVOLUTIONS

What is Moscow left with in East Europe and how is it

reacting to the new situation? While the situation itself i s

too new to offer an in-depth analysis, some patterns from the

first months can be discerned .

First and most significant is that Moscow's reaction s

seem only to be intermittent . Having let the regions' states

go their own way, the Soviet leadership now seems unwillin g

or unable to articulate a coherent vision of its new

relationship with these states . Partly this is the effect of

the appearance of a broader range of views on all subjects in

the Soviet press . But is also a result of the fact that th e

reforms of glasnost and perestroika have unleashed changes

within the USSR itself of a scope and breadth well beyon d

that which seems to have been anticipated .

Thus the

leadership has all it can do to try to manage internal

change . Indeed it was the very pace and degree of that

change that made Soviet forbearance during 1989 a policy o f

necessity as well as choice .

Now Moscow seems only to react episodically, whe n

developments in the region cause it particular concern . The

most prominent example is its attitude toward Germa n

reunification . This process has sped along faster than any

4 4

of the leaders of the concerned states foresaw,

spurred by

the spectre of economic collapse and virtual desertion o f

East German territory by its own population .

Most states ,

but in particular the USSR,

have been scrambling t o

articulate clear policies and effect the process in way s

favorable to their goals . For Moscow this has meant tryin g

to be firm about what it will accept in a new Germany, e .g .

neutrality, and what it will reject, e .g . NATO membership .

But this has been done in a contradictory form and apparentl y

only when pressed by the immediate onset of negotiations ,

such as unexpectedly at the Ottawa "open skies" meeting .

An example of this with regard to Romania was th e

sharp Soviet reaction to the banning of the communist part y

announced by the Council of National Salvation when faced

with a mob in downtown Bucharest . 102 Though this was promptl y

overturned by the Council after meeting, Radio Moscow wa s

quick to point to the possible negative implications of thi s

act, possibly having in mind the infection of this idea into

the USSR itself . 10 3

Indeed the most significant new aspect of Soviet-Eas t

European relations since the revolutions has been th e

"rebound" affect these changes have had on the USSR . Though

the impetus for reform clearly belongs to Gorbachev and th e

reforms his team unleashed, developments in the region soo n

went beyond reforms to revolution .

The creation of

4 5

noncommunist governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the

prospect of elections throughout East Europe and th e

blossoming of political parties in anticipation of thes e

elections has reverberated through an East European an d

Soviet media now free of most political controls . The Balti c

states have moved most quickly in this respect,

with

Lithuania formally recognizing noncommunist parties an d

holding open elections in March 1990,

which led to a

reassertion of Lithuanian independence . The CPSU and

Gorbachev at the beginning of 1990 similarly supported the

ending of the party's constitutional monopoly and multiple

candidate -- though not multiparty -- local elections bega n

to take place throughout the country .

One way in which the Romanian experience contribute d

to these developments was by negative example . During the

discussion of the removal to the party's guaranteed monoply ,

frequent references were made to the need to avoid a

"Romania" in the Soviet Union : that is, the explosion o f

violence against an unyielding regime leading to a murderou s

struggle and the death of the regime as well as its chie f

actor . 10 4

In a few respects Soviet post-revolutionary polic y

resembles that before 1989 . One of these is a continuing

interest on the part of Moscow for reform in the Eas t

European economies .

The Soviet Union still needs a "better"

4 6

relationship from its point of view ; it still needs to ge t

more value for what it sells to the East European states ,

chiefly raw materials . Thus its apparent willingness to

support the idea that inner-CMEA trade be put on a har d

currency, world price basis . 105 At the same time it needs t o

have the economies of these states operate efficientl y

because it needs more than ever to be relieved of the burde n

they constitute . 106 Evidence of this is seen in announcement s

of reduction in Soviet oil supply to several East Europea n

states.107 More effective economies in East Europe wil l

presumably both improve the quality of supplies to the Sovie t

Union and underpin a stable political environment thus

preventing further turmoil or the emergence of more hostile

governments in the area . In this respect there is a

continuation of Soviet interest in a degree of stability i n

the region and in having the renewed communist parties

continue to play a role.108

But on balance Soviet policy in the region i s

characterized by more reversals than continuities . Sovie t

acquiescence to the changes of course is the most significan t

example.109 Another key component has been Soviet willingnes s

to negotiate and actually begin troop withdrawals from thos e

states

where Soviet

troops

remained :

Hungary ,

Czechoslovakia and Poland .

While developments in the last

case will likely be affected by the pace and effects o f

German reunification,

in the first two instances,

troop

4 7

withdrawals began in early 1990 . Given that these Soviet

troops played a relatively marginal role in defense against a

putative Western attack and that their major role was t o

enforce respect for the existing parameters of behavior i n

the region, Soviet abandonment of those parameters bot h

mandates and is confirmed by these withdrawals .

With regard to Romania, Soviet troops are not the issue ,

but ironically the question of security may be greater no w

than it was under Ceausescu . First, there is the prospec t

that, given changes both in Romania and in the USSR ,

turbulence in Moldavia could lead to clamor for changes i n

that republic's status . This could take the form of pressure

for increased Moldavian sovereignty and reduced centra l

control, full separtion from the USSR, or even union wit h

Romania . There is little evidence that the last is a stron g

factor, but the Moldavian Popular Front is proving a n

effective political actor and Moldavian absorption into th e

USSR,

like Lithuania's,

was a product of the 193 9

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.110 Thus both the legal and politica l

basis for a challenge to Soviet rule are present . It i s

perhaps not accidental that just after the revolution it was

announced that Moldavian party and government leader Peta r

Luschinsky would accompany Eduard Shevardnadze to Bucharest ,

but he did not .

4 8

The second cause for concern, which had been dorman t

previously is the reappearance of the issues of the Hungaria n

minority in Romania and indirectly,

the territory of

Transylvania . Serious tensions continue over the minority

issue and new, more open politics, in both countries allow s

the voicing of various and sometimes more nationalisti c

views, expecially during elections . The possibility exists ,

that this issue could seriously provoke tension in th e

region, and even conflict, and undermine what had been a

relatively secure area for the USSR .

Finally, there is the situation in Romania itself .

The revolution is barely three months past and despite th e

promise of elections, and a transition to greater democracy ,

there is uncertainty and instability in the country . Already

the National Salvation Front has offered itself as a

provisional government, a competing political party and then

as a member -- the most powerful one -- of a new Council o f

National Unity . Numerous political parties have emerged o f

uncertain heritage, program and allegiance . 111 Observer s

cannot be as sanguine about the steady movement towar d

popular democratic rule in Romania as is possible, fo r

example in Czechoslovakia . This very uncertainty and lack o f

movement could provoke further action and possibly violence

by those who feel the revolution has been "hijacked" .

Thi s

would be worrisome to Moscow, especially since this feeling

4 9

is directed at communists who were once powerful in the

Ceausescu regime and who remain in the new government . Thi s

"second stage" of the revolution could thus take on an eve n

more radical and decidedly anti-Soviet character than that o f

December .

VIII . UNITED STATES POLICY

The United States promptly recognized the new government i n

Romania and offered some economic assistance . But the US

quickly became displeased with the pace of democratic

development and began to publicly pressure Bucharest t o

move more effectively and quickly . US concern was

demonstrated both by statements and by visits of US Secretary

of State James Baker and Assistant Secretary of State fo r

Human Rights Richard Schifter . 112 Washington has indicated

that restoration of MFN will not be immediately forthcomin g

unless the rudiments of democratic rule are established i n

the country . 113 This posture, plus what is seen as a lo w

level of US aid, has provoked some criticism in Romania and

relations at the beginning of 1990 could only be described a s

correct .

5 0

Economic constraints and perhaps past practice ha s

caused the US to take a low profile in the Romanian scene .

This is consistent with US policy in the last years o f

Ceausescu as the US tried to distance itself from an odiou s

regime, and moreover conforms to the spirit if not th e

letter of the ammendments to the trade law .

It is in US interest, however, that democracy take root an d

flourish in Romania and US public pressure should continue .

The United States is not the most significant political o r

economic actor in the country, which has strong cultural tie s

to France and economic links to Germany . But it is the mos t

prominent western democracy whose actions are seen as a key

international indicator of the country's acceptance by th e

international community . The US is seen as having the mos t

successful experience with a pluralist society,

popular

political representation, open media and market mechanism .

With this authenticity and a prominence which guarantee s

international attention to whatever it says about Romania o r

any other country, Washington can bring to bear significant

influence on Romania's leaders not to wander too far from th e

path toward democracy .

MFN should eventually be restored, assuming policy maker s

can satisfy themselves that basic human rights, includin g

those for minorities are being observed . At the same time,

5 1

this should be accompanied by extension of protection by the

Overseas Private Investment Corporation,

Export-Import bank

loans and encouragement of private economic activity .

I f

holding off on these policies means that other more eage r

partners will take the field, the economic loss to the U S

will not be great, while the satisfaction of seeing response s

to US desires for the implementation of democratic principle s

will provide compensation .

5 2

NOTES

(1) Paul Marer,

"Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to th eSoviet Union? The Economic Aspect," in Charles Gati, ed . ,The International Politiccs of Eastern Europe,

(New York :Praeger, 1976), pp .59-81 .

(2) Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, Soviet Subsidization o fTrade with Eastern Europe : A Soviet Perspective (Berkeley :University of California, Institute of Internationa lStudies, 1983) .

(3) Iu .

Shiriaev,

"SEV: Kurs na perestroiku mekhanismamnogostroennovo sotrudinchestva" [CMEA :

The Way toRestructure the Mechanism of Multilateral Collaboration] ,Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn, No .12 (1987), pp .21-29 ; L .Yagodovsky, "Reforms call for more reforms," New Times No . 3January 17-23, 1989 .

(4) Ronald H . Linden, Bear and Foxes : The InternationalRelations of the East European States (Boulder, CO : EastEuropean Quarterly, 1979), pp .177-203 .

(5) S .Kovalev, "Suverinitet i internatsional'nye obiazannost isotsialisticheckikh stran" ["Sovereignty and th eInternational Obligations of Socialist Countries"], Pravda ,September 26, 1968, p .4 .

(6) During the 1956 Hungarian revolution one dramati cillustration of this concern was Khrushchev's remark t oTito just before the Soviet invasion : "They are cuttingCommunists' throats there," he said . Reported by VeljkoMicunovic in his Moscow Diary (Garden City,

N .Y . :Doubleday, 1980) cited in Brian McCauley, "Hungary an dSuez, 1956 : the Limits of Soviet and American Power," i nBela Kiraly, Barbara Lotze and Nandor Dreisziger, eds ., TheFirst War Between Socialist States : The HungarianRevolution of 1956 and Its Impact (New York: BrooklynCollege Press, 1984), p .306 .

(7) See Ronald H . Linden, Communist States and InternationalChange (Winchester, Mass : Allen & Unwin,

1987), pp .28-32, 54-60,

76-84 ; and Ronald H .

Linden,

"RomanianForeign Policy in the 1980's : Domestic-Foreign PolicyLinkages," in Michael J . Sodaro and Sharon L . Wolchik ,Eds ., Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in th e1980s (London : Macmillan Press, 1983), pp .47-80 .

(8) By the beginning of 1990 over 1200 joint venture agreement shad been signed with western companies, though less than200 were in operation, Financial Times, February 1, 1990 .In March, 1990 the USSR formally applied for observerstatus in GATT .

5 3

(9) In his own explication of the process, Gorbachev writes :

Politics is undoubtedly the most important thing in an yrevolutionary process . This is equally true ofperestroika, therefore we attach priority to politica lmeasures, broad and genuine democratization, theresolute struggle against red tape and violations of law ,and the active involvement of the masses in managing thecountry's affairs . All this is directly linked with themain question of any revolution, the question of power .

M .Gorbachev, Perestroika : New Thinking for our Countryand the World, New York : Harper and Row, 1987, p .54 .

(10) See e .g . Gorbachev's speech on the 70th anniversary of th eSoviet revolution, Moscow TV, March, 1987 [FBIS-Sov, Marc h4, 1987, pp .22-4] ; Izvestia, June 15, 1988, p .5 .

(11) See e .g . the interview with Vyachelsav Dashichev, head o fthe foreign policy department of the Institute of th eEconomics of the World Socialist System, in Der Spiegel ,July 4, 1988 [FBIS-Sov, July 8, 1988, p. 18-21] ;"East-West Relations and Eastern Europe (An American-Sovie tDialogue)" Problems of Communism, XXXVII, 3-4 (May -August), 1988, pp . 55-70 . See also Gorbachev's statement inHelsinki, Finland, and spokesman Gerasimov's suggestio nthat the Brezhnev Doctrine had been replaced by th e"Sinatra doctrine" ; i .e . "Hungary and Poland are doing i ttheir way," New York Times, October 26, 1989 .

(12) Pravda, May 19, 1988, p .l .

(13) See the discussion in Michael Shafir, "Soviet Reaction toPolish Developments : Widened Limits of Tolerated Change "Radio Free Europe Research, September 20, 1989, esp .pp .6-7 .

(14) Data can be found in US Information Agency release ,September 17, 1989 .

(15) See e .g . the statement by Prime Minister Ryzhkov "Strategi auskoreniia," ["The Strategy of Acceleration"] Pravda ,November 4, 1986, pp . 1-4; Yuri Shiriaev, "Mekhanis msotrydinchestva i novie kriterii," ["The Mechanism o fCollaboration and New Criteria"] Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta ,#3, July, 1986, p.20 ; see also the article by Yevgeniy eChernov (a Novosti writer) "About Sad Paradoxes" in th eBratislava journal Nedelna Pravda, #8, February 27, 198 7[FBIS-Sov, March 12, 1987, p.F1-3] . As early as 1986 someSoviet writers explicitly accepted the subsidy argument ofMarrese and Vanous .

See E .Sheynin, "Sotsialisticheskayaekonomicheskaya integratsia ; real'nost'

i vymysli '["Socialist

economic

integration :

reality

andfalsehoods"] . Vneshnaya Torgovlaia, #3, 1986, p . 38-42 .

5 4

(16) See the remarks by Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov at th e44th CMEA session ; "Osnova Sotsialisticheskoiekonomicheskoi integratsii" [The Basis for Socialis tEconomic Integration"] Izvestia, July 7, 1988, p .4 . Seealso Iu. C. Shirayev, "Mekhanizm sotrudinehestva : Novyiekriterii" ["Mechanism of Collaboration : New Criteria"] ,Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta 30 (July) 1986), p . 20 .

(17) See e .g . Gorbachev's statement in October 1987, before th e43rd (extraordinary) session of CMEA, Pravda, October 15 ,1987 ; the statement of the Soviet permanent representativ eto CMEA, Deputy Prime Minister A.K .Antonov, Novoe Vremya ,October 16, 1987, pp .2-3 ; "CEV: po puti intensifikatsi isotrydinchestva" [CMEA : on the path of intensification o fcollaboration] Vneshnaya Torgovlaia,

#2, 1987, p .11-12 ;"CEV :

Nauka,

promyshlennost', - rynok" ["CMEA : science ,industry, market"] Izvestia, June 1, 1987, p . 2

(18) RFE correspondent's Report, June 10, 1990 ; Mark Bernikev ,"COMECON Moving Toward Market-Based System," Journal ofCommerce, January 11, 1990 ; NYT, January 10, 1990 .

(19) See, for example, Gorbachev's statement in Prague, Sovie tTV, April 10, 1987 [Summary of World Broadcasts, April 13 ,1987, p . EE/8541/C/0] . Gorbachev voiced a similar sentimen tto Karoly Grosz when the Hungarian leader visited Moscow inJuly 1988 ; Pravda, July 6, 1988, p .2 . See also the comment sof Aleksandr Yakolev in Hungary, Pravda, November 13, 1988 ,p .4 .

(20) Aleksandr Kondrashov, "Ob antichekhoslovatskoi kampanii naZapade" ["About the Anti-Czechoslovak Campaign in th eWest"], Izvestia, August 22, 1988, p .3 ; Tass, August 19 ,1988 [FBIS, August 22, 1988, p .41] . But somewhat divergen tassessments were offered by the Soviet Ambassador to Ital y(Financial Times, September 12, 1988, p .12) and OlegBogomolov, Director of the Institute for the Study of th eEconomics of the World Socialist System (Financial Times ,June 27, 1988, p .2) .

(21) See the "Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers 'Party Concerning the Problems of the Internationa lCommunist and Working Class Movement," text in William E .Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-65, (Cambridge : MITPress, 1967, pp . 269-96 .

(22) John M . Montias, "Romania's Foreign Trade : An Overview," InJoint Economic Committee, Eastern European EconomiesPost-Helsinki, 95th Cong ., 1st Sess . (Washington, DC : USGovt . Printing Office, 1977) .

(23) Linden, Bear and Foxes, pp .53-197 .

(24) In 1974 developed market economies took 45% of Romania' sexports .

In 1975

that figure fell to under 39% and tounder 33% in 1977, before rebounding . United Nations ,Yearbook of International Trade (New York : United Nations ,1981) p . 80 0

(25) See the discussion

in Linden,

Communist States, pp .81-82 .

5 5

(26) See US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ,The State of Human Rights in Romania, 100th Congress, 2n dSession (Washington, DC : US Govt . Printing Office, 1988) .For Romania's renunciation see Bucharest Home Service ,February 27, 1988 [Summary of World Broadcasts, February29, 1988, p . EE/0087/A1/1] .

(27) See Ceausescu's speech to the CC plenum of October 1989 ,see also Agerpress ,Radio Bucharest,

OctoberNovember 19, 1989 .

24, 1989 ;

(28) Era Socialists,

June 30, 1988 . See117th

anniversary of

Lenin's birth ,Ceausescu's remarks during the visit

(29) Agerpress in English, July 15, 1988 .

(30) Agerpress, September 20, 1989 .

(31) Agerpress, January 26, 1987 [SWB, January 28, 1987, pEE/8477/B/9] .

(32) IBID ; see also Agerpress, September 10, 1989 .

(33) Era Socialists, #2 January 25, 1987 [JPRS, June 30, 1987] .

(34) On the role of the party see Agerpress, September 30 ,1989 ; Cronica, November 13, 1988, pp . 1,2 ; see als oCeausescu's speech to the 14th Party Congress, RadioBucharest, November 20, 1989 ; on planning, Era Socialists ,January 25, 1987 [JPRS, June 30, 1987] ; Era Socialists ,July 10, 1987, [JPRS, December 3, 1987] ; Agerpress ,November 8, 1989 ; on the role of the state, see Ceausescu' sCC plenum speech, Radio Bucharest, October 24, 1989 .

(35) Romania Libera, October 4, 1988, p . 3 .

(36) Revista Economics, #13, March 1987, pp . 1344 [JPRS, June10, 1987, pp . 109-13] ; Radio Free Europe Research, November9, 1988, pp . 21-3 ; Era Socialists, #19, October 15, 1986 ,#20, October 30, 1986, # 21 November 10, 1986 [JPRS, June22, 1987, pp . 34-50] .

(37) TASS, May 10 , 1988 .

(38) AP, September 28, 1989 .

(39) Linden, Communist States, pp .74-75

also Agerpress on theApril 22,

1987 ;of Soviet President

Andrei Gromyko, Tass, May 11, 1988 [FBIS-Sov . May 12, 1988 ,p . 38] .

5 6

(40)Radio Bucharest, September 22, 1989 .

(41) Text in Pravda, December 19, 1985, pp .1,4 .

(42)This can be seen for example by comparing Soviet Premie rRyzhkov's speech to the 43rd CMEA session which emphasize ddirect ties with that of Constantin Dascalescu, th eRomanian premier, who emphasized the role of the party .Both in Pravda, October 14, 1987, pp .4-5 . Compare thestatement by Marion Marinov, a Bulgarian deputy secretaryof CMEA, Tass in English, March 25, 1987 [FBIS-Sov ,March 27, 1987, p .BB14 ]

(43) Scinteia, December 18, 1985 [SWB, December 31, 1985, p .EE/8144/C/l] Agerpress, December 10, 1986 [SWB, Decembe r13, 1986, p . EE/8444/C/2] .

(44)BTA, April 2, 1986 [SWB, April 4, 1986, p . EE/8224/C/7] .

(45)See Ceausescu's statement during Gorbachev's visit as the yboth toured a factory in Bucharest . While he acknowledgedthe need for cooperation in production, Ceausescu stresse dthat "Implementation of these accords should be carried ou tby the workers' councils,

the directors of enterprises ,ministries,

.and - including party organizations .Otherwise,

our accords simply won't be implemented . "[Soviet TV, May 26, 1987 . SWB, p . EE/8580/C/11, May 29 ,1987, emphasis added] See also the favourable discussion ofa bilateral agreement with the GDR, ADN, May 30, 198 8[FBIS, June 3, 1988, p . EE/O/68/A2/1] .

(46)At the last congress of the RCP Ceausescu spoke in favor o f"strengthening collaboration in the framework of CMEA ,which does not affect the national independence of eac hcountry ." Radio Bucharest, November 20, 1989 .

(47)Bucharest Home Service,

September 4,

1980 [SWB,

p .EE/8358/B/4] .

(48)See statement of the Political Executive Committee, Octobe r1987 (Agerpress in English,

October 17,

1987

[SWB ,p . EE/8702/B/6, October 19, 1987]) ; Era Socialista, # 12 ,June 30, 1988, pp . 19-21 .

(49) Magyar Hirlap, February 21, 1987, [FBIS, March 6, 1987 ,p .BB3] . See also interview with Oleg Bogomolov i nNepszabadsag, September 13, 1986 [FBIS, September 18, 1986 ,p .BB4] .

(50) Pravda, October 6, 1988, p . 2 .

(51) Pravda, July 8, 1988, p .5 .

(52)See, for example, Scinteia, March 22, 1981, p .l .

5 7

(53) See Scinteia, November 25 and 26, 1978 and Pravda, December7, 1978 .

(54) Scinteia, September 7, 1986 [FBIS, September 11, 1986, p .H5-6] ; Scinteia, November 23 and 24, 1986 .

(55) See Vladimir Socor, "Romania Rejects Human Rights Clause sof Final Document Adopted by CSCE," and "Romania an dChemical Weapons," in Radio Free Europe Research, February2, 1989, pp . 19-24, 25-29 .

(56) See the statements by then Deputy Assistant Seretary o fState Mark Palmer before Congress, in Hearing before th eSubcommittee on International Trade of the Committee onFinance, US Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 8 August ,1984, p .4 and Hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade o fthe Committee on Ways and Means, US House ofRepresentatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session, serial 98-22 ,14 July, 1983, p . 56 ; see also Vice President George Bush' sspeech at the Austrian Foreign Policy Association ,September 21, 1983 (Vienna : US Information Service, 1983) .

(57) See, for example, the statements by Deputy Secretary o fState John Whitehead, Washington Post, February 12, 1988 ,Reuter,

October 18, 1988 . AP, October 27, 1988, WashingtonPost,

October 28,

1988,

and by Secretary of State GeorgeShultz to the US Senate, Reuter, June 10, 1988 .

(58) Buletinul Oficial,

April

25,

1989,

p .2 ; Glasul Patriei ,September 30,

1989, Agerpress, October 1, 1989 .

(59) Pravda, May 26, 1987, p .

1 .

(60) Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, # 9, 1987, p .

132 .

(61) Soviet

TV,

May

26,

1987 . [SWB, May 28, 1987 ,p .EE/8579/C1/9, emphasis added] .

(62)

TASS,

May 26,

1987 [SWB, EE/8580/C/7, May 29, 1987] .

Seealso Gorbachev's statement, Soviet TV, May 26, 1987

[SWB,p .EE/8580/C/10, May 29, 1987] .

(63) Tass, May 11, 1988 [FBIS-Sov, May 12, 1988, p .39] ; MoscowTV, September 20,1988 [FBIS, September 21, 1988, p .43] .

(64) Pravda, May 16, 1988, p . 5 .

(65) See Gromyko's statement during his visit, Izvestia, May 1 41988, p . 1 .

(66) Pravda, October 6, 1988, p . 1, emphasis added .

(67) Pravda, October 6, 1988, p . 2 .

(68) See Sotsialisticheskaia Industria,

May 12,

1987, p .3 ;Pravda, August 23, 1986, p .5 .

5 8

(69) See, e .g . Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, # 9, 1987, pp . 128-33 .

(70) See, e .g . Komsomolskaia Pravda,

August 23, 1987 ,p .3 ; Agitator, August 16, 1989, pp .49-51 .

(71) See Sergei Volovets,

"The USSR Had No Illusions AboutCeausescu," Moscow News, January 28, 1990, p .1 3

(72) See,

for example,

the comments by Oleg Bogomolov in aninterview in Komsomolskaia Pravda, July 23, 1988, p .3 ;Albert Pin, "Bucharest's silent music," New Times, #36 ,1989, p .26-7 . Radio Moscow did express some skepticism a tRomanian harvest claims made during the last RCP congress ,pointing out that this was especially encouraging new sconsidering the continuation of domestic shortages . RadioMoscow in Romanian, November 26, 1989 .

(73) Radio Moscow, October 5, 1988 [SWB, October 6, 1988 ]

(74) Pravda, May 25, 1987 .

(75) For example, in September this service reported Polis hparty leader Mieceslaw Rakowski's remarks about thepersistence of support for "socialism of the old type" .Radio Moscow in Romanian, September 25, 1989 . Alsoreported were the demonstrations in Germany, October 29 ,1989, and the replacement of Bulgarian party leaderZhivkov, November 18, 1989 .

(76) Pravda, May 25, 1987, p . 5 ; Krasnaia Zvezda, August 23 ,1987, p . 3 ; Sovietskaia Kultura, August 22, 1987, p . 7 . Infact, Moscow was quick to point to the sacrifice it made tokeep its commitments and that "difficulties in th eprovision of the Romanian economy and population with fue land power" were not its fault . Tass in English, February27, 1987 [FBIS-Sov, May 3, 1987, p .Fl ]

(77) Shafir, "Soviet Reaction to Polish Developments . "

(78) AP, October 7, 1989 . Later both Soviet and East germa nofficials confirmed that Moscow had tried to push Honeckertoward reform . See the statement by Nikolai Portugalov, aCC member and advisor to Gorbachev on German affairs ,Reuter, January 24, 1990 and that by Horst Sindermann ,former speaker of the East German parliament, AP, Decembe r27, 1989 .

(79) See David Remnick, "Moscow Affirms Borders," International `Herald Tribune, November 11-12, 1989, pp . 1-4 ; see alsoShevardnadze's statement at NATO headquarters, WashingtonPost, December 20, 1989 .

(80) Tass, January 30, 1990 .

5 9

(81) Compare statements by various Soviet spokesmen : on February6, 1980, (N . Portugalov, AFP same date) ; February 9, (A .Tolpegin, Reuter, same date) ; (V . Churkin, RFE News an dCurent Affairs, same date) and February 17 (V . Falin, AP,same date) with those of Foreign Minister Shevardnadz ebefore and after the Ottawa "open skies" meeting at whic hreunification was discussed (Reuter, February 7, 1990 ;February 14, 1990 ; February 19, 1990) .

(82) Interview with L'Unita, reported by Reuter, November 28 ,1989 . See also Pravda, November 27, 1989 . On November 24 ,the day that Milos Jakes resigned, the Soviet Union hostedTadeusz Mazowiecki, the Solidarity Prime Minister of Polandin Moscow . For Soviet message of congratulations to Havel ,see Tass in English, December 30, 1989 .

(83) Radio Warsaw, September 29, 1989 ; Radio Budapest, October2, 1989 . The Soviet paper Trud, reported the Hungarianconfirmation of this action, October 6, 1989, p .3 .

(84) See Scinteia, October 6, 1989, p .6, and October 7, 1989 ,p .5 . Radio Bucharest, November 14, 1989 .

(85) See, for example, the report of the last congress of theHungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Scinteia, October 4 ,1989, p.6, and of the resignation of the Bulgarian part yleader Todor Zhivkov and his replacement by Petar Mladenov .Scinteia, November 11 and 12, 1989, p .6 . Coverage alsotypically emphasized the difficulties evident in thos estates already engaged in reform ; for example, inflationand the growing disparity between rich and poor in Polan dwere treated by Scinteia, October 5, 1989, p .6 and Novmeber15, 1989, p .5 (which reprinted an article from The Times ofLondon) . In October Romania Libera ran a front page cartoonfrom le Monde which showed Polish Head of State Wojcec hJaruzelski with a cane and tin cup begging for help for th ePolish economy (Romania Libera, October 18, 1989, p .1) .

(86) Radio Moscow in Romanian, December 17, 1989 .

(87) IBID ., December 19, 1989 .

(88) Izvestia, December 20,

1989 ; Tass, December 21, 1989 ;Baltimore Sun, December 21, 1989 .

(89) Radio Moscow in Romanian, December 21, 1989 .

(90) Tass, December 22, 1989 .

(91) Radio Bucharest,

December 23, 1989 ; Budapest Television ,December 23, 1989 ; Tass, December 25, 1989 . For adiscussion of Moscow's reported involvement with th eNational Salvation Front before the overthrow, see Michael i

6 0

Shafir, "Ceausescu's Overthrow ; Popular Uprising orMoscow-guided Conspiracy?" Report on Eastern Europe, No .3, 19 January 1990, pp . 15-19 .

(92) Tass, 23 December 1989 .

(93) Los Angeles Times, 24 December 1989 .

(94) AFP, 23 December 1989 ; UPI, 24 December 1989 .

(95) The New York Times, 25 December 1989 .

(96) Tass, 23 December 1989 .

(97) Reuter, 24 December 1989 .

(98) AP, 26 December 1989 .

(99) Tass, 26 December 1989 .

(100) Rompres, January 7, 1990 .

(101) See the interview with Minister State Secretary Corneli uBogdan in Izvestia, 1 January 1990 .

(102) Radio Bucharest,

January 12, 1990 ; Rompres, January 13 ,1990 ; Bucharest Domestic Service,

January 13,

199 0[FBIS, January 17, 1990, p . 73 ]

(103) Radio Moscow in Romanian, January 15, 1990 . Whenauthorities began to demolish a statue of Lenin i nBucharest, Moscow called for "more tactfulness in ordernot to hurt the feelings of many people, including thos ein neighboring countries ." Radio Moscow in Romanian ,March, 3, 1990 .

(104) See reports of this in New York Times, February 7, 1990 ;The Independent, February 7, 1990 ; The Times, February7, 1990 .

(105) See Hungary's call for this, MTI in English, October 10 ,1989, and Soviet support at the CMEA summit, Tass ,January 9, 1990 .

(106) On debts owed to the USSR by all socialist countries, se eTass in English, March 2, 1980 . Romania has no debt ,according to these figures .

(107) Reuter, March 2, 1990 .

(108) Tass, December 10, 1989 ; Reuter, December 19, 1989 .

6 1

(109) As a group the Warsaw Pact member states condemned thei rown 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the SovietUnion issued an additional statement calling the act"unfounded" and "erroneous" . See texts in New York Times ,December 5, 1989, p . A14 .

(110) In what can only be seen as a desperate attempt to us enationalism as a pillar of support one more time ,Ceausescu unexpectedly raised the Moldavian issue at th e14th congress of the RCP . He called for the annulment o fall agreements concluded with Nazi Germany and of "al lconsequences of those agreements ." [Radio Bucharest ,November 20, 1989] . Moscow did not respond directly butinstead criticized western media for seeming to suggestthat the border was being challenged .

"No seriouspolitician can raise,

and in reality,

raises thequestion of borders,

including those between the Sovie tUnion and Romania," said Tass (November 23, 1989) .

(111) See Vladimir Socor,

"Political Parties Emerging," Reporton Eastern Europe,

vol .l, No .7, 16 February 1990, pp .28-353 .

(112) See Washington Post, January 31, 1990 .

(113) See the statement of US Secretary of State, James Bake rin Bucharest, Rompres, February 11, 1990 .