Pilar Beites- Phenomenology of Being Spatial

7/27/2019 Pilar Beites- Phenomenology of Being Spatial

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UJAK

Pilar Beites: phenomenology

of being spatialPhilosophyFernando Jess Garca Hpola


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Contents1. The phenomenology ............................................................................................................. 2

2. Intentionality ......................................................................................................................... 5

3. The retention ......................................................................................................................... 9

4. Immanent objects. .............................................................................................................. 11

5. The Protention .................................................................................................................... 13

6. The problem of space. The original relationship................................................................. 14

7. Three-dimensionality of the problem and the importance ................................................ 15

8. The problem of solipsism and skepticism ........................................................................... 18


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1. The phenomenologyThe Phenomenology is a project of the great philosopher Edmund

Husserl which is a response to the historical context in which he

developed his philosophy. At that time, science enjoyed a boom. Most

disciplines had the pretension of creating totalizing theories based

only on their discipline. We talk biologicism, trying to explain all

human behavior based only on the theory of evolution, or

psicologicism, trying to explain the human being in terms of his

subconscious, attitudes, etc..

Husserl, who comes from the mathematical discipline, try to create a

philosophical method that results apodictically true knowledge. This

means that knowledge should be undeniable, indubitable, inexorable

affirmation as much as 2 +2 = 4. To do this, makes an approach similar

to Descartes, but with some important nuances. Let's see:

Descartes used the methodical doubt to start questioning how much

was actually in the world. I can not assure you that the computer on

which I write this summary really exists: can my senses deceive me.

With this skeptical questioning, discards doubts the existence of

everything around us. In the end, comes to something that can not be

doubted: the cogito. "Cogito ergo sum" is considered an apodictic truth

can not doubt that I exist while in my thinking and is supposed to exist.

From this unquestionable truth, discards, using the deductive method

(first seen in the other summary that always preserves the truth in the

conclusions) will try to reach unquestionable statements.

Husserl meant the same thing but using an alternative method to the

methodical doubt. This method is what Husserl called the epoche.The


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epoche is not to call into question the reality as we did Descartes. It's

about creating a double standard: on one level the world of what

Husserl calls the natural attitude stands: it's how we live every day,

which I do not question the contingency of things, that may exist or

not. This world of the natural attitude is the transcendental world,

which escapes my conscience, which is (not really exist) outside. On a

second level operates what Husserl calls the transcendental reduction:

it is a level of discourse that reflects on the transcendental world,

"bracketing existence" is not denied or affirmed, allowing us to draw

conclusions about it.

Applying the transcendental reduction in the world, no longer blindly

believe there: it may be, as Descartes said, a delusion of my senses. For

Husserl, there is something more than the EGO of Descartes is

awareness. Indeed, rather than talk about it there, I must speak my

conscience exists. In fact, I may be an illusion of my experience, mymemories, and not be who I be. Only apodictically consciousness is

indubitable. But there is another thing that is apodictically indubitable,

and is the key concept of phenomenology: intentionality of my

consciousness. I can not assure you that the computer on which I write

really exists, because maybe my senses deceive me, but I can not doubt

is that my conscience reference to this alleged computer, there is an

intention that connects to my conscience and that assumption

transcendental computer. The intention, therefore, is indubitable. To

come to a knowledge entirely objective and true, we must analyze how

we live our intentionality.

Another important concept is that of intuition. Intuition is the act by

which something seems indisputably true. When in fact it is


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unquestionably true that some say it is apodictic intuition. For

example, in my natural attitude no doubt that the computer on which I

write there, but I can reflect and see that it can not exist. However, the

truth of the statement "2 +2 = 4" is apodictic evidence.


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2. Intentionality-Imagine that we have a tree. The tree has a appear, (color, shape,

etc..), Which however disappear if I close my eyes, on the other hand,

we have the tree appearedto know that does not go away even if you

close your eyes, but that has its own existence, but not an apodictic

existence: it is the tree that belongs to the transcendental world. Being

what appeared is essentially different from the appear. The act of

appearing is what Husserl called Noesis:the upshot of what appeared,

it appeared becomes as transcendental, whereas appeared as

immanent(that is, as constituting our consciousness, part of it).

The immanent object before the epoche or transcendental reduction is

fully accepted as existing, ie, was an object-in-itself. Said object is

considered as being more than it appears. This computer where I write

now I only see the front,the back part is assumed, but dubitable. After

the transcendental reduction, we have the intentional object of the

computer,which is indubitable. I can not doubt that I'm assuming so

the back of the computer, whether it exists or not.

Four arguments are given to show that Edmund Husserl's being

displayed is different than what appeared to be (be intentional):

Argument-existence: imagine a mirage of water in the desert.

Regardless that water actually exists (be water or not water), its

appearance will remain the same (the mirage). In short, being that I

see water in the desert is not the be watching my water because I see

there, and yet, the desert water can not exist.

-Plot of multiplicity: imagine we have a box, to move this box, there are

many different perceptions (related to different positions to be taking


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the box. The transcendental box is the same throughout the process.

Affirm the importance of an object (be the case) is like saying that no

identical acts can have the same intentional object.

-It is possible the appearance of various objects on the basis of the

same feelings: for example, imagine that certain figures and

arabesques have begun to exercise over us a purely aesthetic effect and

suddenly realize that may be symbols or verbal signs. On one hand, we

have seen as an art object: the other, as signs are. The momentous

objects are distinct (Figures while aesthetic work and figures whilesigns). However, for both transcendental objects have only one

associated calving.

-Distinction between the parties essence of the experience and the

object properties: Not the same color lived a target object that the

color of an object. Imagine a lamp whose light is illuminated red ball

that we know is white. We will see the red ball, but we know that is

truly white. Being of appearing and what appeared differ.

Intentionality has forced us to distinguish between what appears

(intentional object) and appearing. The constituent of our

consciousness are the experiences: when they appear intentional

object are indistinguishable, we discuss phenomena when lookdifferent is an intentional object, we call it intentional experience or

act.

In the event we find an unintended component, content brokers

(hyl), which is the unintentional act component, the "building

material" which are animated and endowed with meaning by noesis.

Thus, the hyle, which is unintentional, is animated by the noesis


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referring to intentional objects (whose set is called noema).Thus, the

noesis is the correlate of the noema, which makes it appear in the show

appeared. The noema synthesizes hyl (which may be given not

simultaneously) and refers to the same object.

The noesis or intent provides reference to an object, which can be of

two forms. Matter or quality might say roughly that there is

something in the act that joins the intentional object. Meanwhile, the

quality is more related to the mode of action. For example: I have

before me a car that does not change angle, whose subject is the same,but I can make qualitatively different acts (hate him, I love him, doubt

him). In turn, I can be loving the same car and yet they constantly

change their stuff (that is running, etc..). The acts, according to its

quality, are divided into objectifying (turn on speakers, not

speakers)and not objectifying (and appetitive affective)

Husserl also introduces the concept of "forms of apprehension" are the

ways of joining two components of intentional action: the art and the

representative.

Intentional acts (the form that has the intention to refer to an object)

are classified into intuitive and empty or not intuitive:

-Intuitive are those that provide evidence consists of perceptual and

imaginativeactsand acts.

-Non-intuitive are all signitive acts (eg, the meanings of the words I

read).

These are acts that are constituted as stated above subject, content and

quality representatives (hyl). Husserl's signitive must always be


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supported by an intuitive act, and hyl making this (if I read the word

dog picture I think my mind I constitute hylfrom the word dog).

We see a house just opposite. The back side exactly matches the house,which would be a perceptual act, the sides, which are foreshortened, be

imaginative acts (are also imaginative acts presenters I see on the

television screen, they do not have a material reality associated).

Finally, the interior of the house (furniture, bathroom, etc..) Do not see

it, is supported signitive act in imaginative and intuitive acts, and

taking these hyl.

In turn, imagine a red sphere. For the first Husserl this area is, first, a

red uniform objective (the objective property of that area), and a

heterogeneous and multiple subjective red (actually that red is given

by many shades). Well, not that subjective red uniform partly coincide

with the red target (which would be the act of perception), the rest of

subjective red that is similar to red correspond to objective

imaginative acts: well, there just a glimpse of the form but also of

feeling, and this is how the perception based on equality.


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3. The retentionHow does consciousness become aware of the time? I can remember

that yesterday I was in Prague Castle. Why that intention is equipped

with temporality, what makes it makes me thing of the past? To do this,

Husserl uses a phenomenon called retention. Retention is

intentionality, aiming awareness to something that is no longer,

because it was. My conscience, remembering that yesterday I was in

Prague Castle, I'm recalling images that no longer exist. Not that exist

in my mind, that is a natural attitude that should be discarded in the

transcendental reduction. Retention is contrary to the impression

(which is the immediate present awareness) and protention (which is

the consciousness of the future).

Imagine the following succession of notes in a given melody. DO-SOL -

FA-MI. These notes have the minimum duration must have so that you

can hear. I catch first proto-sun as a feeling: my conscience

intentionate that note in impresion. Then I hear the FA. Now my

impression intention FA but my Retention intentionate DO. It is

producing a very curious phenomenon: the DO now isnt, and however,

the intent remains. Ultimately it is about being conscious of the non-

being DO in the past, to "bring" the past to the present.

Later we move to MI. Now print the MI intentional, and retention to FA.

However, the AF was not seized simply as FA but as FA after a DO.The

DO has disappeared from the primary retention but remains in high

retention. When we pass the SOL in intencionar retention afteran MI

DO FA after.


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Arguably via retention, have an awareness of this widespread in a

range, and not confined solely to the immediately given. Well, thanks to

this ability, I can recall the past. In this case, the content from past to

present is brought, but as being unrelated to the present: as having a

discontinuity that separates this last intention. I remember that

yesterday I saw pictures of the Prague Castle, but remember as fitting

sequentially with the actual present.


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4. Immanent objects.The awareness of time linking the content for what they are is to yield

the experience of proto succession of sensations. No duration, but the

pass before my consciousness, showing her while longer displayed. .

The immanent objects (those constituting this from my

consciousness, though not necessarily in this order), whose main

characteristic is to last in time. Immanent distinguish objects first and

second order. In the first order is the temporal contrast which limits

other: eg OJ tone that lasts is not only the succession of proto-feeling

DO, but its duration, a set of successive past and portions defining it as

such. The second order are constituted by first-immanent objects. EJ.

Mozart Symphony consists of many tones and notes that contrast

between them, ie, the contrast is inherent within the object itself. Not

easy to find a criterion to determine where it ends and ends an

immanent object of second order because in the case of the symphony

would be an aesthetic criterion: the harmony that unifies the

symphony itself.

An immanent object is said to be in the present when one of its parts is

given in the present. The song I hear is said that is now giving all of it,

and yet only a part (the pitch ear now) is what is present now.

In the immanent ground equality is not exact.What counts as the same

is not exactly the same as the transitive law (A = B = C is not met A = C).

Thus, the duration of the sound of a bell to be desvanenciendo,

successive protosensaciones are given as equal (this is equal to the


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next), but the first proto feel, for example, is not the same as the last. Is

not met in this way the law of transitivity.


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5. The Protention

As retention allowed us knowledge of the past, what is the future

protention. Protention is also an intention to something that is not. But

it is a double intention: first an intention to the future, it is not yet.

Moreover, an intentionality toward what we hope will be the future,

what we expect of him.

When we are aware of the future, always expect something from him.

Tomorrow I go to school, and I imagine in my head how they will beclasses. They might be that way or not, but it is essential that the wait

in some way so you can say that it is the future. When a future event to

get to this so please do not expect it to be, we say that is a

disappointment. Disappointment can never be complete, must always

be a certain fulfillment of the intention, that allows us to relate the

intention with disappointment. Because if the two events) there was

nothing in common. It would make no sense to say that this was the

specific intent has been disappointed. In other words, to recognize the

intentional objects of my consciousness, you can not give a complete

disappointment. Imagine that a friend will introduce me to her

boyfriend. In my head I imagined me tan. Seeing it, I see it's blond.

There are a disappointment than I expected, but that disappointment is

not complete: there is some relevance to what I expected, and that

allows me to recognize that guy as my friend's boyfriend.


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6. The problem of space. The original relationship.In space contiguityrelations are given. These relationships are native,

i.e. occur immediately without the consciousness synthesized. Based

on her other two important spatial relationships are: the contrast

ratios and fusion.

Imagine that right now in the black soil is a white spot of paint. I can

imagine it consists of many parts: the left part, some portion in the

right corner, but the first time that is given to consciousness, this spot

is given as being only one (a homogeneous whole) because the other

white parts arefusedby equalrelationship. Meanwhile, the white spot

looks different because the black soil contrast, their colors are

different.Equality and distinticidad are also originating consciousness

because relationships are given immediate evidence.

Now suppose a lot of non-contiguous white spots. They can be seen as

a whole, despite not being able to merge contiguous. The reason given

is that Husserl that distance is eliminated by retaining, and so may

melt. I see that portion of the stain that is separated from the others,

retain in retention: so I can go to see other stains, my conscience can

jump to another spot. Of course this phenomenon is a summary and

not a native dation (e.g. if I search the word "mouse" in an alphabet

soup obviously not ipso facto meeting, but I have to search to find a

process that take your time and effort).


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7. Three-dimensionality of the problem and the importancePilar Fernndez Beites especially want to clarify the issue of how our

consciousness manages to construct a three-dimensional objective

world. Part of the conclusion that the three-dimensionality is formed

from a bi-dimensionality. The parts of a whole as constituting that

occur continuously all: however, there can not be infinitely small parts:

our consciousness only manages to reach portions provided with an

extension and minimum (the so-called proto-feelings). Otherwise, the

whole would be nothing: since the whole is constituted by the sum of

its parts, if these parties do not have an extension and minimum

duration, then all would be the sum of parts with extension and zero

duration, then would stretch the entire length and null.

In the sense of sight, objects are given by profiles. Imagine that I stand

before a statue. That statue I only see a profile, an infinitely thin layer

folds in space, which we try to explain, I behind the statue is unknown

to me until I go and look after her. What worries Beites Pilar is how we

recognize objects whose appearance is different as equals. For

example, the image of a truck seen a hundred yards away is smaller

than the same truck seen ten meters. However, our consciousness can

recognize that it is the same truck. It also happens that if we observe

the flight of a dove to identify profiles that give infinite Dove as

belonging to the same dove.

Basing this explanation that "our brain builds that way and that is so"

does not satisfy us. Precisely phenomenology founded by Husserl for

not being based on contingent explanations and hogging of the


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experimental sciences. Phenomenology seeks an unquestionable,

indubitable and universal knowledge. We do not not worth the

explanation may come from disciplines such as Gestalt psychology,

although in this case Pilar Fernndez Beites recognizes that

phenomenology can be inspired.

The dimensionality is for practical purposes the cause of

transcendence (independent of consciousness) in the world. The

theory of how this transcendence is constituted and was given by

Husserl: I perceive an object staying up late going through profiles, asstated above. As time goes on we perceive the object, more profiles are

disclosed. Theoretically at infinity that would completely object to

consciousness, because they would have all the profiles that could

constitute it. Well, for Husserl transcendence is basically this: a

tendency towards infinity by which all profiles are perceived object

would. The problem is that the infinite, by definition, is never reached.The significance, therefore, cannot be reached by consciousness. It is

for this reason that the world gives me as dubitable. But consciousness

can sense the existence of the world as a tendency to the infinite limit,

as an approximation. Thus it is of importance for Husserl. . This

explanation did not satisfy Beites Pilar, who criticized because to her

that given the whole object at infinity is in fact a determination of the

essence not of transcendence; Husserl in his argument confuses

transcendence essence of the object, which is the amount of knowledge

we have of that object.

What explanation give Pilar Beites to explain the significance? The

three-dimensionality of objects is largely due to the phenomenon of

concealment: Imagine a bucket on a white background viewed from


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front: obviously see only a square. Imagine the cube turns left: if the

square of the front face of the cube was actually the side of a sheet of

paper, this would decrease discovering the white background on the

right (the supposed role would go left). But in the case of nature what

is discovered is not the substance but the side face of the cube was

hidden there. It is a face that comes from nowhere, and that was the

boundary separating the front of the line. So it is in fact the background

and depth: by unveiling made of the phenomena from nothingness,

non-awareness.


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8. The problem of solipsism and skepticismThe existence of the world is impossible to establish it as an apodictic

evidence. There is always the possibility that in reality our senses are

deceiving us and the world does not exist as shown. Perhaps the world

is a dream from which one must awaken. This reality has led many

philosophers to relativism, skepticism and solipsism. Solipsism is a

negative stance by which it is stated that the only thing that really

exists is the consciousness that I have of things and not things.

Skepticism argues that we can never get a satisfactory knowledge of

the essence of the world by having doubtfulness. Relativism argues

that, since there is no objective reality (for the reasons already

presented by skepticism or solipsism), any interpretation of reality is

equally valid.

Husserl's phenomenology created largely to address these

philosophical perspectives. However, it failed to demonstrate the

existence of the transcendental world indubitable. Pilar beites

achieved neither. However ensures that even the existence of the

transcendental world can not be assured, the certainty of his existence

is the greatest thing there is. There is no evidence that the world can

not exist: there is simply no evidence of any, so the possibility exists

that there is latent. However, it is a highly unlikely possibility.

Furthermore, as humans we are, we should not think that the world

can not exist.


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Bibliography:

Fernndez Beites, Pilar (1999). Fenomenologa del Ser Espacial.Salamanca: Universidad Pontificia.

Pilar Beites- Phenomenology of Being Spatial

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