PIL - Cases to Be Submitted

8/3/2019 PIL - Cases to Be Submitted

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GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230

FACTS:

Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice tobe purchased from private sources. Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice

planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed the petitionherein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the

aforementioned respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,because Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly, prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the

Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE:

Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

HELD:

The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in the affirmative by providing in

Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its

jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of erroras the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courtsin all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or

executive order, or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes

the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also,when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma doesnot render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our government not from

entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under theconditions prescribed in said Act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our

Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted

with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may becomplied without importing the said commodity into the Philippines, the proposedimportation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned

laws.

Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam

and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a

certification from the Natl Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals.Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the

detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and CornPlanters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is

without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because RA 3452 prohibits the importationof rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into byMacapagal.

HELD:

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by

Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the

latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactmentsthat have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executiveagreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the

event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shallprevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists


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that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regardsexecutive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting

the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are

fundamental in our constitutional set up.

As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be

invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearlysettled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived "of its jurisdictionto review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law

or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases

in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order orregulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of atreaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter

to an act of Congress.

Petitioner assails respondents authorization of the importation of rice by the government

from private sources on the ground that said act is violative of an Act prohibiting such

importation by the RCA or any government agency. Respondent contends that the status ofpetitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the instant petition.

The SC held that petitioner has standing since in light of the policy of the governmentunderlying the Act, which is to engage in the purchase of basic foods directly from tenants,farmers, growers in the Phil, petitioner is entitled to a chance to sell to the government therice it now seeks to import. Said act of respondent thus deprives petitioner of this

opportunity, amounting to an actual injury to petitioner. Moreover, public funds will be used

to effect the purchase. Petitioner, as taxpayer, has sufficient interest and personality toseek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to

unlawfully disburse said funds.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies: exceptions applicable to case at bar: The principle

requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable:1. Where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or

2. Where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or inexcess of jurisdiction; or

3. where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as alter-ego of thePresident bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by

him or

4. Where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule.

Main function of Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress, not to defeat the same.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted byCongress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the

latter, except in the exercise of the veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments

that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive

agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

Jurisdiction; Power to invalidate treaties:--The Constitution of the Philippines has clearlysettled the question of whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courtsin the affirmative, by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof that the Supreme Court

may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on

appeal, certiorari, or writ or error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, finaljudgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) all cases in which the constitutionality orvalidity of any treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also when it

runs counter to an act of Congress.

ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ

FACTS:

1. The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purposewas to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the

peoples economic life.


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A prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations thecapital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the

retail trade

Aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continuetheir business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or

voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act oruntil the expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of thelaws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws

relating to trade, commerce and industry.

Provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail

business of additional stores or branches of retail business

2. Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations andpartnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff:reasons:

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their

liberty and property without due process

The subject of the Act is not expressed in the title

The Act violates international and treaty obligations The provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru

hereditary succession

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD:

The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equalprotection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences

between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.

RATIONALE:

1. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It

merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and

conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

2. The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treatedalike.

3. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable

classification in the exercise of police power.

4. Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the

retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactmentof the Act.

5. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and thenational as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm forthe Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance orloyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

6. While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of thecountry, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.


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7. The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people onwhom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices,

the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering thenational security in times of crisis and emergency.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni 83 Phil 171

FACTS:

Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army andCommanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines, was charged beforethe Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general

during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting thebrutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civiliansand prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war.

Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because thelaw that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that

using as basis The Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for thewar crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of suchrules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party ofinterest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional.2. Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War CrimesOffice and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is

aligned with Sec 3, Article 2 of the Constitution which states that The Philippines renounceswar as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted principles of

international law include those formed during the Hague Convention, the GenevaConvention and other international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These

include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning,preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in

violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine ofincorporation, the Philippines abide by these principles and therefore have a right to try

persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed against its

citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere

incorporation of such principles in the constitution.

The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have beenequally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is chargedfor. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military

tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of

court but by the very provisions of this special law

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

FACTS:

Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with theCourt of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the Americanoccupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a

proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicialproceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law,lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings

pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government

under the Japanese).


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ISSUES:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation

were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he

declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines

than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas ofthe Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicialacts and proceedings of the courts;

3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those

courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

RATIONALE:

Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de factogovernment are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of

the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments,

supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.

Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended orchanged by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existenceof a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civilgovernment or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it

would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating

them.

The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processesof any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments

and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.

IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de

facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has beenliberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes,which would be in violation of international law.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to

violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.

Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, orgreat mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that

such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear andunequivocal words.

Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets

and violate international law; therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed tomean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other

governments.

In the case of US vs. Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in

use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts

of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations,laws and courts of Japan.

It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues untilchanged by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF

SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, andthe laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and

laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, itfollows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over casespending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or

the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said

government.


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DECISION:

Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him

to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

THREE KINDS OF A DE FACTO GOVERNMENT

1. In a proper legal sense, a government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, byforce or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself

against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth,

first by Parliament and later by Cromwell the Protector.

2. One that is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a

territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government ofparamount force as the cases of Castine in Maine which was reduced to British possession inthe war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops

of the US.

3. One that is established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country

who rise in insurrection against the parent state such as the government of the SouthernConfederacy.

***But there is another description of government called also by publicists a government de

facto but which might, perhaps be more aptly denominated a government of paramount

force. It is characterized by:

1. That its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and againstthe rightful authority of an established and lawful government

2. That while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private residents who, byacts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or

wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by laws of the rightful government.

Republic of Indonesia vs. James Vinzon

G.R. No.154705. June 26, 2003

FACTS

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995

with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The agreementstated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the

Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence

of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipments covered by the agreement are air

conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motorpumps. The agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself

automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice fromthe date of expiry. Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the saidagreement, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the

discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, who allegedly found respondents work

and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement.Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement. Petitioners claim that they hadearlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement. On the

other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful.Hence, respondent filed a complaint in the (RTC) of Makati. Petitioners filed a Motion toDismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign

immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The saidmotion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim arediplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations andtherefore enjoy diplomatic immunity. In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an

Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waivedits immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the MaintenanceAgreement: Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled

according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines.

Respondents Opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister


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Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortuous actsdone with malice and bad faith. The trial court denied herein petitioners Motion to Dismiss.

It likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration subsequently filed. The trial courts denial

of the Motion to Dismiss was brought upto the Court of Appeals by herein petitioners in apetition for certiorari and prohibition. Said petition alleged that the trial court gravelyabused its discretion in ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and

voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and thatpetitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim waived their immunityfrom suit. On May 30, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision denying the

petition for lack of merit. It denied herein petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision thatpetitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementionedprovision in the Maintenance Agreement.

RULING:

The petition is impressed with merit. International law is founded largely upon the principlesof reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part ofthe law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a Statemay not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of

independence and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v. Viridian II, the practical

justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right againstthe authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States,

the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in themaxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert

jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would unduly vex the peace of nations.

The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change.The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely

connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new conceptof sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the

sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not withregard to private acts or acts juregestionis. In United States v. Ruiz, for instance, we held

that the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station

is an act jure imperii. On the other hand, we considered as an act jure gestionis the hiringof a cook in the recreation center catering to American servicemen and the general public at

the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, as well as the bidding for the operation of barbershops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City. Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a

contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test ofwhether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the

inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign

State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has

not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested byits nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an

act jure imperii. Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that anylegal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of thePhilippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of

sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily

inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meantto apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives itsimmunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to

include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity.Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except todismiss it. Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal.

It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this case.Respondent concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign function.On the other hand, he argues that the actual physical maintenance of the premises of thediplomatic mission, such as the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment, is no longer a

sovereign function of the State. We disagree. There is no dispute that the establishment ofa diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely establish adiplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission

encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with

private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and


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the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic ofIndonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with

respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air con units, generator sets, electrical

facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the officialresidence of the Indonesian ambassador. The Solicitor General submits that, theMaintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of

its governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived itsimmunity from suit. As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent, theSolicitor General states that it was not a waiver of their immunity from suit but a mere

stipulation that in the event they do waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall govern the

resolution of any legal action arising out of the agreement and the proper court in MakatiCity shall be the agreed venue thereof. On the matter of whether or not petitionersAmbassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private

capacities, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides: 1. adiplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case

of:(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the

receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of themission;(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as

executor, administrator, heir or legatee as private person and not on behalf of the sendingState;(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by thediplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. The act of petitionersAmbassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in terminating the Maintenance

Agreement is not covered by the exceptions provided in the abovementioned provision. The

Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but saidprovision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any

professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein.The petition was GRANTED.

Bank of America, NT vs. American Realty Corporation

G.R. No. 133876, Dec. 29, 1999

When foreign laws, despite having been duly presented and proven, may not be givenapplication

FACTS:

Petitioner Bank of America (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing institutionduly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized and existing under and by virtue of

the laws of the State of California, USA while private respondent American Realty (ARC) is adomestic corporation.

On numerous occasions, BANTSA and Bank of America International Limited (BAIL),

organized under the laws of England, granted US Dollar loans to certain foreign corporateborrowers. These loans were later restructured, the restructured loans secured by two real

estate mortgages with private respondent ARC as third-party mortgagor. When thecorporate borrowers defaulted, BANTSA sued them for collection before foreign courts,without impleading ARC as party-defendant. While these civil suits are still pending before

the foreign courts, BANTSA filed an extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage before

the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines. The properties were sold at publicauction, prompting ARC to file this action for damages against BANTSA.

The trial court ruled in favor of ARC and this was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors forthe recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted waiver of the remedy offoreclosure

Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and exemplary damages in favor ofprivate respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor, is proper

HELD:


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Available Remedies

THEORIES OF PETITIONER:

A waiver of the remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of 2 requisites: an ordinary

civil action for collection should be filed and subsequently a final judgment becorrespondingly rendered therein.

Under English law, which according to petitioner is the governing law with regard to the

principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civilactions for sums of money.

REMEDIES ARE ALTERNATIVE, NOT CUMULATIVE: A mortgage creditor may institute againstthe mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose themortgage.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternativeand not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other.

For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection orupon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to theprovision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure,such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with

any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be

made.

In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages over itsproperties as security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing so, private respondent

subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who

are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their ownproperty.

Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which

makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of anothers obligation by mortgaging hisown property, to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the principal

contractloanremains to be primarily bound. It is only upon default of the latter that the

creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties inlieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan.

In the instant case, petitioners contention that the requisites of filing the action forcollection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur, is untenable.

PHILIPPINE LAW, NOT ENGLISH LAW, SHALL APPLY: In the case at bench, Philippine law

shall apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law on

the matter.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdictionthat there is judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded andproved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our

courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.

This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly

pleaded and proved xxx, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established

public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those whichhave for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered

ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreedupon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our

jurisdiction proscribing the splitting of a single cause of action.


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Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable

injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important

function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates thefundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

Award of Damages

As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is entitled to the awardof actual or compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner BANTSA inextrajudicially foreclosing the real estate mortgages constituted a clear violation of the

rights of herein private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor.

SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Guerrero's Transport Services, Inc. V. Blaylock Transportation Services Employees

Association-Kilusan (Btea-Kilusan), Labor Arbiter Francisco M. De Los Reyes andJose Cruz

FACTS

In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a public bidding for a 5-year

contract for the right to operate and/or manage the transportation services inside the navalbase. This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, owner-operator of Guerreros TransportServices, Inc. (Guerrero), over Concepcion Blayblock, the then incumbent concessionaire

doing business under the name of Blayblock Transport Services Blayblock. Blayblocks 395employees are members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union).

When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to employ the members of the Union.

Thus, the Union filed a complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to employ itsmembers, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US Base Agreement. The case was dismissed

by the NLRC upon Guerreros MTD on jurisdictional grounds, there being no employer-

employee relationship between the parties. Upon appeal, the Sec. of Labor remanded thecase to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to absorb all

complainants who filed their applications on or before the deadline set by Guerrero, except

those who may have derogatory records w/ the US Naval Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of

Labor affirmed.

Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision of the Sec. of Labor affirming

the NLRC Resolution, & that any non-compliance was attributable to the individualcomplainants who failed to submit themselves for processing & examination. The Labor

Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals. The Union filed a Motion for Issuanceof Writ of Execution. The order wasnt appealed so it was declared final &executory.

Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to

submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination of members of the Union who shall bereinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final. The agreement is deemed to have

superseded the Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor ordered the absorption of 175

members of the Union subject to 2 conditions.

ISSUE

Whether or not the said members of the Union were entitled to be reinstated by Guerrero.

RULING

YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor Agreement, the US Armed Forcesundertook, consistent w/ military requirements, "to provide security for employment, and,

in the event certain services are contracted out, the US Armed Forces shall require the


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contractor or concessioner to give priority consideration to affected employees foremployment.

A treaty has 2 aspects as an international agreement between states, and as municipallaw for the people of each state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaidprovision of the treaty enters into and forms part of the contract between Guerrero and the

US Naval Base authorities. In view of said stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero) is,therefore, bound to give "priority" to the employment of the qualified employees of theprevious contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in recognition of such obligation that Guerrero

entered into the aforementioned Compromise Agreement.

Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor thedetermination as to who of the members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by

Guerrero, and that such determination shall be considered as final. The Sec. of Labor issuedan Order directing the NLRC, through Labor Arbiter Francisco de los Reyes, to implementthe absorption of the 175 members into Guerrero's Transport Services, subject to the

following conditions:

a) That they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock Transport Service at the time its

concession expired; andb) That they should pass final screening and approval by the appropriate authorities of theU.S. Naval Base concerned.

For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure from the appropriate

authorities of the U.S. naval Base at Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and approval,the names of the members of the Union.

Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract

and has the force and effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the

parties and their privies. For it is settled that a compromise has, upon the parties, the effectand authority of res judicata and is enforceable by execution upon approval by the court.

Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287Facts

FACTS:

On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22

candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3)

Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for thedisqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the

ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations

of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass

disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested thefollowing amendment: Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) ---- requiring the concurrence of five

(5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature ---- is a proviso that wheremore than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute aquorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by

majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the

petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolutionof the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court,whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.

HELD:

The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of theConstitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.


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"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an ElectoralTribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and

qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine

Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by theChief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House ofRepresentatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional

representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered underthe party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shallbe its Chairman."

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC andMembers of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative"components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the

election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot betotally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, withoutdoing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in

saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in

judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as hisconscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely

feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective andimpartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannotlegally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendmentof its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication

of a senatorial election contest.

Mijares v. Ranada

FACTS:

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights

violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estateof the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary

damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. ThisFinal Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement ofthe Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where

the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcoshowever, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati

dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniaryestimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a

definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign

judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.

HELD:

Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for

other actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee

should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of theproperty in litigation. The Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcosbut it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However,

the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimationbecause it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instancewherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign

judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of

B.P.129 refer to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to anassertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is theforeign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of

judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the

RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of


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pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment againstan estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper

computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is

7(b) (3), involving other actions not involving property.

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), was a case decided by the United States Supreme

Court in which the court described the factors to be used when considering the applicationof comity.

Opinion of the Court

No law has any effect beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority isderived. The extent to which one nation shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of

another nation, depends upon the comity of nations. Comity is neither a matter of absoluteobligation, nor of mere courtesy and good will. It is a recognition which one nation allowswithin its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due

regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or

other persons who are under the protection of its laws. The comity thus extended to othernations is no impeachment of sovereignty. It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is

offered, and is inadmissible when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. But itcontributes so largely to promote justice between individuals, and to produce a friendlyintercourse between the sovereignty to which they belong, that courts of justice havecontinually acted upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of nations. It is not the comity of

the courts, but the comity of the nation, which is administered and ascertained in the same

way, and guided by the same reasoning, by which all other principles of municipal law areascertained and guided.

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

People vs. PerfectoG.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish

Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any

Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force."public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory theprevious political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used

to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the

sovereign.

FACTS:

This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of

testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaperLa Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that

"the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have,perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through

fraud and robbery."

Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate,

filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of thePenal Code.

The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the

Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUEs:

Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change fromSpanish to American sovereignty

Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel


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HELD:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political

relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominatethe laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the MilitaryCommander, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conqueredterritory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of

crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in so far as they

were compatible with the new order of things.

Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were

the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, anda new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister ofthe Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of

him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles

of the American character and system ofgovernment. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its

authority in the Philippine Islands.

"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishescontempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the

entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a

government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, anagent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people

themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are actingwithin the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is

calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but

never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position bymandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous

remarks."

DECISION:

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although

for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant andappellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

Arsadi Disomangcop & Ramir Dimalotang vs. DPWH Sec. Simeon Datumanong et alNovember 25, 2004; G.R. No. 149848:

FACTS:

Disomangcop and Dimalotang were district engineers of the 1st Engineering District of

DPWH-ARMM. They are assailing the validity of RA 8999 & DO 119. RA 8999 created anengineering district in Lanao and DO 119 created an engineering district in Marawi.Disomangcop and Dimalotang argued that the creation of those engineering districts

undermines the autonomy of ARMM hence the said RA and DO should be declared

inoperative and unconstitutional. Disomangcop and Dimalotang sought to enjoinDatumanong as well as the Secretary of DBM from enforcing and releasing funds pursuantto the law. The Sol-Gen argued that the petitioners lack legal standing and that the said RA

is constitutional pursuant to the undiminished power of Congress to enact laws for ARMM. Inall, Sol-Gen attacks the institution of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Disomangcop and Dimalotang have legal standing.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of Disomangcop and Dimalotang and the SC held the said RA and DO

to be inoperative. The SC noted that Disomangcop and Dimalotang do have the legal

standing to initiate the case. Also, Disomangcop and Dimalotang were able to show the


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requisites of judicial review in order for a court of justice to take cognizance of this case.Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of judicial power: First,

there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review.

Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the personchallenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question ofconstitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the issue of

constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

In sum, the following are the requisites for the exercise of judicial power

1. There must be an actual controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power/review.2. The question before the court must be ripe for judicial adjudication.3. The constitutional question (question of constitutionality) must be raised by the proper

party. Proper party must have the standing to challenge (locus standi).4. The constitutional question (question of constitutionality) must be raised at the earliestpossible opportunity.

5. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota (controversy which has begun)

of the case. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to thedetermination of the case itself.

People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw

27 February 1922 | Ponente: Malcolm

Moros surrounded a boat, took its cargo, took two women and left it for it to sink. Themarauders, Lol-lo and Saraw, who were in Tawi-Tawi, were arrested for piracy. They

questioned the jurisdiction of the Philippines to the case, but the court ruled that piracy is acrime against all mankind, so every court also has jurisdiction to try these cases. In

addition, the Spanish Penal Code is still in force in the Philippines.

FACTS:

On or about 30 June 1920: Two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another

Dutch possession.-Boat 1 had one Dutch subject-Boat 2 had 11 men, women and children,likewise from Holland.-After several days, at 7pm, Boat 2 arrived in Buang and Bukid in the

Dutch East Indies.-Here, the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas, manned by 24 armed

Moros.-The Moros first asked for food, but once in the boat, took all the cargo, attackedsome of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women.-The Moros took the 2 women with

them, placed holes in the ship to let it sink, and left the people there.-After 11 days, theMoros arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession.-The two Moro marauders were identified as

Lol-lo, as the one who raped one of the women, and Saraw.-While in Maruro, the twowomen were able to escape.

One day, Lol-lo and Saraw went home to South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. Here, they were

arrested and charged with piracy at the CFI. The Moros interposed a demurrer, saying thatthe charge was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, nor of any court in the Philippines.

They were saying that the facts did not constitute a public offense under Philippine laws.-The demurrer was overruled, and Lol-lo and Saraw were found guilty, and were bothsentenced to life imprisonment, together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, two other

defendants in another case. In addition to imprisonment, they were ordered to return the

39 sacks of copra they robbed, or to indemnify the offended parties924 rupees, and to payone-half of the costs.

ISSUE:

Did the CFI in the Philippines have jurisdiction over Lol-lo and Saraw? YES.

RATIONALE:

First of all, the facts cant be disputed. All the elements of the crime of piracy were there. -

Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and doneamino furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

The CFI has jurisdiction because pirates are in law hostes humani generis.


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Piracy is a crime against all mankind, therefore, it can be punished in any competenttribunal of any country where the offender may be found.-The jurisdiction of piracy has no

territorial limits. The crime is against all mankind, so it is also punished by all.-It doesntmatter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state.Those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.

ISSUE:

Are the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with piracy still in force? YES.

RATIONALE:

Art. 153 of the Penal Code refers to the crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or

subjects of another nation not war with Spain shall be punished with a penalty ranging fromcadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime is against nonbelligerent subjects of

another nation at war with Spain, it shell be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.-

Since Spain already ceded the Philippines to the US, the rule is that the political law of the

former sovereignty is necessarily changed. But corollary to this rule, laws subsisting at thetime of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are

strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government theyare altered or repealed.-The instructions of President McKinley on May 19, 1989 to GeneralWesley Merrit, Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, was clearthat municipal laws that provide for the punishment of crime, are considered continuing in

force so far as they are compatible with the new order of things until superseded.-

BACKGROUND ON THE LAWS OF PIRACY:

The Spanish Penal Code was applicable to the Philippines because of Art. 156 of the Penal

Code.-Grotius: Piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law.

Piracy in the penal code as similar to the concepts of civil law, especially since the PenalCode found its inspiration from the Novelas, Partidas and Novisima Recopilacion.-The US

Constitution itself defines and punishes piracy that whoever on the high seas, commits thecrime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, shall be imprisoned for life. This definition

rests its conception of piracy on the law of nations. This further shows that the Penal Codeis not inconsistent with the provisions enforced in the US.

Since by the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippines to the US, its logical that theconstruction of the Penal Code be changed simply to substitute Spain to United States,

and Spaniards to citizens of the US and citizens ofthe Philippines.-Therefore, the PenalCode, specifically Art. 153 and 154 of the Penal Code were still in force in the Philippines at

this time.

JUDGMENT

Piracy was committed with offense against chastity and abandonment of persons withoutapparent means of saving themselves. There are three aggravating circumstances the

wrong done was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for itscommission, advantage was taken of superior strength and ignominy. There is onemitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. But due to the horrible nature of the crime

committed, the penalty imposed is the capital punishment. The punishment is unanimous

for Lol-lo, who raped one of the women, but no unanimous as to Saraw. So only Lol-lo issentenced to be hung until dead. As to Kinawalang and Maulanis, they shall indemnify theoffended parties with 924 rupees, and half of the costs of both instances.

Haw Pia vs. The China Banking Corporation

G.R. No. L-554, 9 April 1948

FACTS:

Haw Pia was indebted to the China Banking Corporation in the sum of P5,103.35 by way ofoverdraft. Said loan was secured by a mortgage of property. On different occasions duringthe Japanese occupation, Haw Pia paid the amount with interests to the defendant bank

through the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd that was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as

liquidator of the China Banking Corporation. Haw Pia instituted an action in the Court of


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First Instance of Manila against the China Banking Corporation to compel the latter toexecute a deed of cancellation of the mortgage on the property described in the complaint,

and to deliver to the said plaintiff the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47634 of the Register

of Deeds of Manila, with the mortgage annotated therein already cancelled, as well as topay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 for damages as attorney's fees and to pay the costsof the suit. In its answer, the defendant-appellee China Banking Corporation made a

demand from the plaintiff-appellant forth payment of the sum of P5,103.35 with interestsrepresenting the debt of the said appellant, and in the answer it set up a counter claimagainst the plaintiff-appellant demanding the payment, within 90 days from the latter tithe

former by way of overdraft together with its interests at the rate of 9 additional sum of

P1,500 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suits. After the hearing of the case, the trialcourt rendered a decision holding that, as there was no evidence presented to show that thedefendant China Banking Corporation had authorized the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., to accept the

payment of the plaintiff's debt to the said defendant, and said Bank of Taiwan, as an agencyof the Japanese invading army, was not authorized under the international law to liquidatethe business of the China Banking Corporation, the payment has not extinguished the

indebtedness of the plaintiff to the said defendant under article 1162 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

May the Japanese Military Administration order the liquidation or winding up of the businessof banking institutions of enemies such as the China Banking Corporation?

HELD:

The defendant-appellee, China Banking Corporation, comes within the meaning of the word

"enemy" as used in the Trading with Enemy Act of civilized countries, because not only itwas controlled by Japan's enemies, but it was, besides, incorporated under the laws of a

country with which Japan was at war. It is to be presumed that Japan, in sequestering and

liquidating the China Banking Corporation, must have acted in accordance, either with herown Manual of the Army and Navy and Civil Affairs, or with her Trading with the Enemy Act,

and even if not, it being permitted to the Allied Nations, specially the United states andEngland, to sequestrate, impound, and block enemy properties found within their own

domain or in enemy territories occupied during the war by their armed forces, and it notbeing contrary to the Hague regulations or international law, Japan had also the right to do

the same in the Philippines by virtue of the international law principle that what is

permitted to one belligerent is also allowed to the other.

RECOGNITION

Republic Of The Philippines V. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas

And Elizabeth DimaanoG.R. No. 104768, 21 July 2003, En Banc (Carpio, J.)

The resulting government [from the EDSA Revolution] was a revolutionary government

bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionarygovernment, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the

Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973

Constitution. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or theDeclaration during the interregnum.

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (the PCGG), through the AFP AntiGraft

board (the Board), investigated reports of unexplained wealth involving Major GeneralJosephus Ramas (Ramas), the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during thetime of former President Ferdinand Marcos.

Pursuant to said investigation, the Constabulary raiding team served a search and seizure

warrant on the premises of Ramas alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the

military equipment stated in the warrant, items not included in the warrant, particularly,


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communications equipment, land titles, jewelry, and several thousands of cash in pesos andUS dollars, were also seized.

In its Resolution, the AFP Board reported that (1) Dimaano could not have used the saidequipment without Ramas consent; and (2) Dimaano could not be the owner of the moneybecause she has no visible source of income. The Board then concluded with a

recommendation that Ramas be prosecuted for violation of R.A. 3019, otherwise known asthe Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise known as the Act for theForfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.

Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, in behalf of the Republic of thePhilippines (the Republic or Petitioner) filed a Compla int against Ramas and Dimaano.On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1)

the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private respondents and (2) the search andseizure conducted was illegal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate Ramas and Dimaano; and

2. Whether or not the properties confiscated in Dimaanos house were illegally seized andtherefore inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:

The PCGG, through the AFP Board can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corruptpractices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the 2 categories mentioned in Section 2

of E.O No. 1, i.e.:

AFP personnel who accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former

President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or closeassociate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence; or:

AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns

their cases to the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Petitioner does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to thePCGG. Therefore, the present controversy should fall under the first category of AFPpersonnel before PCGG could have jurisdiction.

In this regard, Petitioner argues that Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos

because he was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, which enabled him toreceive orders directly from his commander-in-chief.

We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense

contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed closeassociation with former President Marcos.

In the case of Republic v. Migrinio, it was held that applying the rule in statutoryconstruction of ejusdem generis, the term subordinate refers to one who enjoys a closeassociation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family

member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate,dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

Applying the foregoing, Ramas position as Commanding General of the Philippine Army withthe rank of Major General does not make him a subordinate of former President Marcosfor purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facieshowing that he was a close associate of the former President, in the same manner that

business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of the former President were close tohim. Such close association is manifested either by his complicity with the former Presidentin the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by the former

Presidents acquiescence in his own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.


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This, the PCGG failed to do.

In fact, while the AFP Board Resolution states that the AFP Board conducted the

investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379, saidResolution ends with a finding of violation of R.A. Nos. 3019 and 1379, without any relationto EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

This absence of relation proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for aspecific and limited purpose, and necessarily, its powers must be construed to address such

specific and limited purpose.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show

that Ramas accumulated the properties in question in his capacity as a subordinate of his

commander-in-chief.

Such omission is fatal. It is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was

accumulated by a subordinate of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG.

EO No. 1 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,

subordinates and close associates.

Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of theforfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim also deserves

no merit.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to

waive.

The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. Unless

given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill -gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the

PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

Petitioner argues that at the time the search and seizure was conducted, a revolutionarygovernment was operative by virtue of Proclamation No. 1, which withheld the operation of

the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. It was done in defiance of theprovisions of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, the resulting government was a revolutionarygovernment bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the

revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under

international law.

Thus, the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the

interregnum. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and theDeclaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the

supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives andorders.

With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was nomunicipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was

neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights.

From the natural law point of view, the right ofrevolution has been defined as an inherentright of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their

system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal andconstitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructedas to be unavailable.


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It has been said that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the

state and from there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alterany existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution.

Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under theCovenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973

Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed

responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the

Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State torespect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the

rights recognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the

revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected toarbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2)

that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories to theDeclaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the

Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles ofinternational law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was alsoobligated under international law to observe the right of individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the

interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all itsobligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue

here.

Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international

law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international lawlaid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the

Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the dejure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the

States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the

directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipallaw that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void.

Thus, during the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and

orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed theauthority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should

not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary

government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did

not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified theitems to be searched and seized.

The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant the

monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles confiscated. The raiding team

had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be thesubject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authoritywhen it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband perse, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seizedthem. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items,

merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withholdthese items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returnedimmediately to Dimaano.

Aniceto Alcantara vs. Director Of Prisons,


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This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of thepetitioner on the ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty

by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) ofthe crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the

Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence (CA- G.R. No. 790)andsentence the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of from four months four months andtwenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, nine months and three days of prison

correccional.

The sentence as modified became final on September 12, 1944, and June 23, 1945,petitioner commenced serving his sentence.

Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of NorthernLuzon, on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of

the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of

Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, andthat only the two Justices constituted the majority which promulgated the decision in

question. The petitioner does not question the validity of said decision on the strength of theProclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944, which according to ourdecision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5 (p. 113,ante), does not refer to judicial processes.

In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court ruled that the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the

Philippines during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by thebelligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and

valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those a political

complexion. In that the same case this Court held that the Court of Appeals which wascontinued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same Court of Appeals existed prior

to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37. The divisionof the Court of Appeals into several District Court of Appeals, and the reduction of the

number of Justices sitting in each division, the regime of the so-called Republic effected nosubstantial change in its nature and jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by thebelligerent occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of such

court, like those of the court which were continued during the Japanese occupation, weregood and valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the

liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have apolitical complexion, as this court held in its decision in the abovementioned case of Co Kim

Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon supra, in accordance with the authorities therein cited.

Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He wascharged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the

Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of FirstInstance of Ilocos Sur, as modified by the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid andenforceable.

A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes either anew act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crimeagainst the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a

new offenses committed against belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war andnecessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of theoccupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend,

directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safetyand security, of the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes against national security ,such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc.,were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised

Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant.


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RIGHTS OF STATES

Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 30SCRA968(1969)FACTS:

A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching implications, is raisedby petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation

providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He woulddispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner ofInternal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of

the United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air

Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legalcontemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our

jurisdictional power to tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore beyond ourjurisdictional function to tax.

HELD:

The Court held that nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent andsovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof

that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands

paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to itsterms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.

It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a

restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is apower plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in

the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has theexclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." 7 A state then, if it

chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.

Its laws may as to some perso

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