Pierre Bourdieu Towards a Sociology of Photography

8/8/2019 Pierre Bourdieu Towards a Sociology of Photography

1/5

Towards a Sociology of Photography'

Pierre Bourdieu

Is it possible and necessary for the practice of photographyand the meaning of the photographic image to provide m aterialfor sociology? Weberian thought has lent credence to the ideathat the value of an object of research is dependent on theinterests of the researcher. This disenchanting relativism atleast allows the illusion of an element of choice in the encounterbetween researchers and the ir objects. In fact, the most rudi-mentary techniques of the sociology of knowledge w ould showthat in every society, and throughout history, there exists ahierarchy of legitimate objects of study. Inheriting a traditionof political philosophy and social action, must sociology abandonthe anthropological project to o ther sciences and, taking as itsexclusive object the study of the most general and abstractconditions of experience and action, can it reject as meaninglesstypes of behavior w hose historical importance is not imm edi-ately apparent?But it takes more than a sociology of sociology to show thatall too often, beneath grand ambitions, it conceals a massiverenunciation. The same fundamental intention is probablyexpressed by banishing from scientific study certain objectsheld to be mean ingless, and excluding from it, under the guiseof objectivity, the experience of those w ho work in it and thosewho are its object.

Efforts to reintroduce the experience of agents into anobjective account are too easily discredited by identifying thismethodological requirement with the question-begging withwhich certain defenders of the sacred rights of subjectivityattack the social sciences, without recognizing that the mostsignificant advances in those sciences have been made thanksto the methodo logical decision to 'treat social facts as things'.

They are also too easily discredited because this regulatory ideais condemned to appear an inaccessible ideal: in fact, one cannever reach the infinitely receding point which might allowsociologists to encom pass, within the unity of a total apprehen-sion, the objective relationships which they can only compre-hend at the cost of an abstract construction and the experiencein which these relationships are rooted and from which theydraw their meaning.The subjectivist intuitionism that seeks a meaning in theimmediacy of lived experience w ould not be worth attending tofor a moment if it did not serve as an excuse for objectivism,which limits itself to establishing regular relationships andtesting their statistical significance without deciphering theirmeaning, and which remains an abstract and formal nominal-ism as far as it is not seen as a necessary but only a purelytemporary moment of the scientific process. If it is true that thisdetour via the establishment of statistical regu larities and for-malization is the price which must be paid if one wishes to breakwith naive familiarity and the illusions of immediate under-standing, it is also the case that the properly anthropologicalproject of reappropriating reified meanings would be negatedby the reification of the reappropriated meanings in the opacityof abstraction.

By its very existence, sociology presupposes the overcom-ing of the false opposition arbitrarily erected by subjectivistsand objectivists. Sociology is possible as an objective sciencebecause of the existence of external relationships which arenecessary and independent of individual wills, and, perhaps,unconscious (in the sense that they are not revealed by simp lereflection), and which can only be grasped by the indirect route

Visual Anthropology Review Volume 7 Number 1 Spring 1991 129


2/5

of observation and objective experimentation; in other words,because subjects are not in possession of the meaning of thewhole of their behavior as immediate conscious data, andbecause their actions always encompass more meanings thanthey know or wish, sociology cannot be a purely introspectivescience attaining absolute certainty simply by turning to sub-jective experience, and, by the same token, it can be an objectivescience of the objective (and the subjective), i.e. an experimentalscience, experimentation being, in the words ofClaude Bernard,'the only mediator between the objective and the subjective',Claude Bernard continues:

The experimenter who is faced with natural phenom -ena is like a spectator watching silent scenes. In asense he is natu re's examining judge; only, instead ofbeing up against those who seek to deceive him w ithlying testimonies or false w itnesses, he is dealing withnatural phenomena which are, as far as he is concerned,characters whose language and customs are unknownto him, who live in circumstances which are unknownto him and yet whose intentions he wishes to know. Tothis end he employs all the means within his power.He observes their actions, their development, theirmanifestations, and he seeks to untangle their causesby using various tests, called experiments. He uses allimaginable artifices and, as is commonly said, oftentells lies to know the truth, and attributes his own ideasto nature. He makes certain presuppositions about thecauses of the actions that pass before him, and, in orderto know if the hypothesis at the basis of his interpre-tation is correct, he sets about bringing to light certainfacts which, in the logical order of things, may confirmor negate the idea that he has conceived. (1984:52)

This description of the procedures of experimenters facedwith the natural world as ethnologists are faced with societieswhose culture they do not know is also broadly true of socio-logical research. W hetherthey attempt to grasp their'inten tions '(in the sense meant by Claude Bernard, i.e. their objectiveintentions) via objective indicators, or whether, telling lies toknow the truth, they attemp t, using indirect questions, to attainthe answers to the questions they are asking themselves andwhich the subjects, having been led to err rather than to deceive,can only answer unawares (and then only indirectly); or even ifthey can decipher the meaning included within the regularitiesprovided by statistics in their raw state, sociologists work tograsp an objectified meaning, the product of the objectificationof subjectivity which is never directly given either to those who

are involved in the practice or to the outside observer.But, unlike natural science, a total anthropology cannotkeep to a construction of objective relationships, because theexperience of meaning is part of the total meaning of experi-ence: the sociology least suspected of subjectivism relies onintermediate concepts and concepts which m ediate between thesubjective and the objective, such as alienation, attitude orethos. The task of this sociology is to construct the system ofrelationships which will encompass both the objective meaningof organized actions according to measurable regularities andthe particular relationships that subjects have to the objectiveconditions of their existence and to the objective meaning oftheir behavior, the meaning w hich possesses them because theyare dispossessed of it.

In other words, the description of objectified subjectivityrefers to the description of the internalization of objectivity.The three moments of the scientific process are thereforeinseparable: immediate lived experience, understood throughexpressions which mask objective meaning as much as theyreveal it, refers to the analysis of objective m eanings and thesocial conditions which make those meanings possible, ananalysis which requires the construction of the relationshipbetween the agents and the objective meaning of their actions.

One exam ple will suffice to show that this is not question-begging but rather a demand for a method with a theoreticalbasis. Statistics can objectively establish the system of life-chances objectively attached to particular social categories,whether these are the chances of attaining permanent employ-ment in the case of an unqualified and uneducated Algerian sub-proletarian, or the chances of entering a faculty of medicine orlaw in the case of a manual w orker's daughter. A statistic suchas this remains abstract and almost unreal unless one knowshow this objective truth (never perceived directly as such) isactualized in the practice of the subjects: even when, at firstglance, action and discourse appear to refute the future objec-tively inscribed in the objective conditions, they only revealtheir entire significance if one observes that they imply apractical reference to this future. Thus, sub-proletarians mayhave magical and fantastic hopes which only apparently con-tradict the objective truth of their cond itions, since they char-acterize the aims for the future appropriate to those without anobjective future; similarly, the manual worker's or peasant'sdaughter, of whom statistics reveal that she has had to pay forher attainment of higher education by being relegated to the artsfaculty, can carry out her studies as the fulfillment of a fullypositive 'v oca tion', although herp ractices be tray, especially bythe mode in w hich they are carried out, a practical reference tothe objective truth of her condition and her future.2 The class

Pierre Bourdieu is Professor of Sociology at the Co llege de France and Director of the C enter for European Sociology at the Ecoledes Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. His recent publications include Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste(1984 (1979) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press) and The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger (1991 (1988)Cambridge: Polity Press).

1 3 0 Spring 1991 Volume 7 Num ber 1 Visual Anthropology Review


3/5

habitus is nothing but this experience (in its most usual sense)which immediately reveals a hope or an ambition as reasonableor unreasonable, a particular commodity as accessible or inac-cessible, a particular action as suitable or unsuitable. In short,a total anthropology would have to culminate in an analysis ofthe process by which objectivity becomes rooted in subjectiveexperience: it must overcome it by encom passing the momentof objectivism and base it in a theory of the externalization ofinteriority and the internalization of exteriority.Everything therefore takes place as if the shadow cast byobjective conditions always extended to consciousness: theinfraconscious reference to objective determinisms which in-fluence practice and always owe som e of their effectiveness tothe complicity of a subjectivity that bears their stamp and isdetermined by the hold they exert. Thus the science of objectiveregularities rem ains abstract as long as it does not encompassthe science of the process of the internalization of objectivityleading to the constitution of those systems of unconscious anddurable dispositions that are the class habitus and the ethos: aslong as it does not endeavor to establish how the myriad 'smallperceptions' of everyday life and the convergent and repeatedsanctions of the economic and social universe imperceptiblyconstitute, from childhood and throughout o ne's life, by meansof constant reminders, this 'unconscious' which becomesparadoxically defined as a practical reference to objectiveconditions.

One might say of photography what Hegel said of phi-losophy: "No other art or science is subjected to this last degreeof scorn, to the supposition that we are masters of it withoutado" (Preface, Principles of the Philosophy of Right). Unlikemore demanding cultural activities such as drawing, painting orplaying a m usical instrument, unlike even going to museums orconcerts, photography presupposes neither academicallycommunicated culture, nor the apprenticeships and the 'pro-fession' which confer their value on the cultural consumptionsand practices ordinarily held to be the most nob le, by withholdingthem from the man in the street.3Nothing is more directly opposed to the ordinary image ofartistic creation than the activity of the amateur photographer,who often demands that his camera should perform the greatestpossible number of operations for him, identifying the degree ofsophistication of the apparatus that he uses with its degree ofautomatism.

4However, even when the production of thepicture is entirely delivered over to the automatism of thecamera, the taking of the picture is still a choice involvingaesthetic and ethical values: if, in the abstract, the nature anddevelopment of photographic technology tend to make every-thing objectively 'photographable', it is still true that, fromamong the theoretically infinite num ber of photographs whichare technically po ssible, each group chooses a finite and welldefined range of subjec ts, genres and com positions . In

Nietzsche's words, "The artist chooses his subjects. It is hisway of praising"( 1974:245). Because it is a 'choice thatpraise s', because it strives to capture, that is, to solemnize andto immortalize, photography can not be delivered over to therandomness of the individual imagination and, via the m edia-tion of the ethos, the internalization of objective and comm onregularities, the group places this practice under its co llectiverule, so that the most trivial photograph expresses, apart fromthe explicit intentions of the photographer, the system ofschemes of perception, thought and appreciation comm on to awhole group.In other words, the range of that which suggests itself asreally photographable for a given social class (that is , the rangeof 'takeable' photographs or photographs 'to be taken', asopposed to the universe of realities which are objectivelyphotographable given the technical possibilities of the cam era)is defined by implicit models which may be understood viaphotographic p ractice and its product, because they objectivelydetermine the meaning which a group confers upon the pho-tographic act as the ontological choice of an object which isperceived as worthy of being photographed, which is captured,stored, comm unicated, shown and admired. The norms whichorganize the photographic valuation of the w orld in terms of theopposition between that which is photographable and thatwhich is not are indissociable from the implicit system of valuesmaintained by a class, profession or artistic coterie, of which thephotographic aesthetic must always be one aspect even if itdesperately claims autonomy. Adequately understanding aphotograph, whether it is taken by a Corsican peasant,a petit-bourgeois from Bologna or a Parisian professional, m eans notonly recovering the meanings which it proclaims, that is, to acertain extent, the explicit intentions of the photographer, it alsomeans deciphering the surplus of meaning w hich it betrays bybeing a part of the symbolism of an age, a class o r an artisticgroup.

Unlike fully consecrated artistic activities, such as paintingor music, photographic practice is considered accessible toeveryone, from both the technical and the economic view points,and those involved in it do not feel they are being measuredagainst an explicit and codified system defining legitimatepractice in terms of its objects, its occasions and its moda lities;hence the analysis of the subjective or objective meaning thatsubjects confer on photography as a practice or as a culturalwork appears as a privileged means of apprehending, in theirmost authentic expression, the aesthe tics (and ethics) of d ifferentgroups or classes and particularly the popular 'a esth etic ' whichcan, exceptionally, be manifested in it.

In fact, while everything would lead one to expect that thisactivity, which has no traditions and m akes no demands, wouldbe delivered over to the anarchy of individual improv isation, itappears that there is nothing m ore regulated and conven tional



4/5

than photographic practice and amateur photographs: in theoccasions which give rise to photography, such as the objects,places and people pho tographed or the very composition of thepictures, everything seems to obey implicit canons which arevery generally imposed and which informed amateurs or aes-thetes notice as such, but only to denounce them as examples ofpoor taste or technical clum siness. If, in these stilted, posed,rigid, contrived photographs, taken in accordance w ith the rulesof a social etiquette which produces photographs of familycelebrations and holiday 'souvenirs', we have been unable torecognize the body of implicit or explicit rules which definethese aesthetics, it is probably because we have not suspendedan overly limited (and socially conditioned) definition of cul-tural legitimacy. The most banal tasks always include actionswhich owe nothing to the pure and simple quest for efficiency,and the actions most directly geared towards practical ends m ayelicit aesthetic judgem ents, inasmuch as the means of attainingthe desired ends can always be the objectof a specific valuation:there are beautiful ways of ploughing or trimm ing a hedge, justas there are beautiful m athematical solutions or beautiful rugbymano euvres. Thu s, most of society can be excluded from theuniverse of legitimate culture w ithout being excluded from theuniverse of aesthetics.

Even when they do not obey the specific logic of anautonomous aesthetic, aesthetic judgements and behavior areorganized in a way that is no less systematic but which starts outfrom a completely different principle, since the aesthetic is onlyone aspect of the system of implicit values, the ethos, associatedwith membership of a class. The feature comm on to all thepopular arts is their subordination of artistic activity to sociallyregulated functions while the elaboration of 'pure' forms,generally considered the most noble, presupposes the disap-pearance of all functional characteristics and all reference topractical or ethical goals. Aesthetes who attempt to liberatephotographic practice from the social functions to which thegreat majority subordinates them , namely and principally therecording and compilation of the 'so uve nirs' of objects, peopleor events socially designated as important, are seeking to makephotography undergo a transformation analogous to that whichaffected popular dances, the bourree, sarabande, allemande orcourante, w hen they were integrated into the scholarly form ofthe suite.5

Having constituted photography as an object of sociologi-cal study, we first had to establish how each group or classregulates and organizes the individual practice by conferringupon it functions attuned to its own interests; but we could nottake as our direct object particular individuals and their rela-tionship to photography as a practice or an object for con-sumption, without risking falling into abstraction. Only themethodological decision to make a study based primarily on'real' groups6 was to allow us to perceive (or prevent us fromforgetting) that the meaning and function conferred upon

photography are directly related to the structure of the group, tothe extent of its differentiation and particularly to its positionwithin the social structure. Thus the relationship of the peasantto photography is, in the final analysis, only one aspect of hisrelationship to urban life, identified with modern life, a rela-tionship which is made apparent in the directly experiencedrelationship between the villager and the holiday-maker: if, indefining his attitude to photography, he calls upon all the valueswhich define the peasant as such, it is because this urbanactivity, the p rerogative of the bourgeois and the city-dweller,is associated with a way of life that questions the peasant wayof life, forcing him into an explicit self-definition.7

Apart from the interests of each class, it is the objectiverelationships, obscurely felt, between the class as such andother classes that are indirectly exp ressed through the attitudesof individuals towards photography. Just as the peasant isexpressing his relationship w ith urban life when he rejects thepractice of photography, a relationship in and through which hesenses the particularity of his condition, the meaning whichpetits bourgeois confer on photographic practice conveys orbetrays the relationship of the petite bourgeoisie to culture, thatis, to the upper classes (bourgeoisie) who retain the privilege ofcultural practices which are held to be superior, and to theworking classes from whom they wish to distinguish themselvesat all costs by manifesting, through the practices which areaccessible to them, their cultural goodwill. It is in this way thatmembers of photographic clubs seek to ennoble themselvesculturally by attempting to ennoble photography, a substitutewithin the ir range and grasp for the higher arts, and to findwithin the disciplines of the sect that body of technical andaesthetic rules of w hich they deprived themselves w hen theyrejected as vulgar the rules that govern popular practice. Therelationship between individuals and photographic practice isessentially a m ediate relationship, because it always includesthe reference to the relationship that the mem bers of other socialclasses have to photography and hence to the whole structure ofrelationships between the classes.

Attempting to overcom e a falsely rigo rous objectivism bytrying to grasp the systems of relationships concealed behindpreconstructed totalities is quite the opposite of succumbing tothe seductions of intuitionism, w hich, conjuring up the blindingevidence of false familiarity, in the individual case merelytransfigure everyday banalities about temporality, eroticismand death into false essentialist analyses. B ecause photography,apparently at least, lends itself very badly to properly sociologi-cal study, it provides the desired opportunity to prove that thesociologist, concerned with deciphering that w hich is only evercommon sense, can deal with images without becoming vi-sionary. And to those w ho expect sociology to provide themwith 'visio ns' what can one say, except, along w ith Max Weber,'that they should go to the cinema '? (Introduction, The Prot-estant Ethic).

132 Spring 1991 Volume 7 Number 1 Visual Anthropology Review


5/5

Notes .1. This essay originally appeared as the Introduction to myUn art moyen: essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie(Les Editions de Minu it: 1965). English translation PolityPress, Cambridge; 1990. It appears here w ith the permission ofthe U.S. publishers, Stanford University Press.2. The same methodological demands are imposed on theethnologist who, at the risk of abstraction, must only see thereconstruction of the system of models as a moment of thesurvey, designed to describe the relationship which unites thesystem of mod els and the system of dispositions. This is not theplace to demonstrate how the logical oppositions which orga-nize a mythic-ritual system are rooted in dispositions (particu-larly in attitudes reg arding tim e) that extend to the body hexis.3. 8,135,000 cam eras in working ord er, at least one camera inhalf of all households, 845,000 cameras sold each year; thesefigures adequately reveal the enormously wide diffusion thatphotographic practice owes to its accessibility.4. Judgments about photography include, on the one hand,the whole popular philosophy with regard to the technicalobject, and, more precisely, the apparatus and, on the otherhand, real spontaneous aesthetic 'theories'; for example, thefrequent refusal to consider pho tography as an art is inspired bya summary definition of the camera as an apparatus, as well asby a highly ethically colored image of artistic activity.5. But efforts to constitute a 'pure' photography with anautonomous aesthetic often lapse into contradiction becau se therefusal to admit and subsume that which creates both thespecificity of the photogra phic act and its accessibility leads tothe borrowing of aesthetic n orms from consecrated arts such aspainting.6. Three mon ograp hs were written in 1960, one on a villagein the Be'arn, the second on Renault factory workers, and thethird on two photographic clubs in the region of Lille. In allcases the studies relied pa rticularly on prolonged observationand free discussion.7. The proportion of practitioners rang es from 39 percent intowns of less than 2,000 inhabitants to 61 percent in towns of2,000 to 5,000 inhabitants.

References.Bernard, Claude1984 Introduction a la midecine experimental.

Flammarion, Paris .Hegel , G.W.F.

1942 Principles of he Philosophy ofRight,transTM. KnoxOxford.

Nietzsche, F.W.1974 The Gay Science. Kaufmann Walter.


Pierre Bourdieu Towards a Sociology of Photography

Documents

Transcript of Pierre Bourdieu Towards a Sociology of Photography