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Physics

By Aristotle

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Physics

By Aristotle

"ritten &'( B!C!)

*ranslated by R! ! Hardie and R! +! ,aye

*able o# Contents

Book I

Part 1

"hen the ob ects o# an in.uiry$ in any department$ have principles$conditions$ or elements$ it is throu/h ac.uaintance with these thatknowled/e$ that is to say scienti#ic knowled/e$ is attained! 0or we do notthink that we know a thin/ until we are ac.uainted with its primaryconditions or #irst principles$ and have carried our analysis as #ar as itssimplest elements! lainly there#ore in the science o# 1ature$ as in other

branches o# study$ our #irst task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles!
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*he natural way o# doin/ this is to start #rom the thin/s which are moreknowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearerand more knowable by nature2 #or the same thin/s are not 3knowablerelatively to us3 and 3knowable3 without .uali#ication! So in the present

in.uiry we must #ollow this method and advance #rom what is more obscure by nature$ but clearer to us$ towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature!

1ow what is to us plain and obvious at #irst is rather con#used masses$ theelements and principles o# which become known to us later by analysis!*hus we must advance #rom /eneralities to particulars2 #or it is a whole thatis best known to sense-perception$ and a /enerality is a kind o# whole$comprehendin/ many thin/s within it$ like parts! Much the same thin/happens in the relation o# the name to the #ormula! A name$ e!/! 3round3$means va/uely a sort o# whole4 its de#inition analyses this into its particularsenses! Similarly a child be/ins by callin/ all men 3#ather3$ and all women3mother3$ but later on distin/uishes each o# them!

Part 2

*he principles in .uestion must be either 5a6 one or 5b6 more than one! 7# 5a6one$ it must be either 5i6 motionless$ as armenides and Melissus assert$ or5ii6 in motion$ as the physicists hold$ some declarin/ air to be the #irst

principle$ others water! 7# 5b6 more than one$ then either 5i6 a #inite or 5ii6 anin#inite plurality! 7# 5i6 #inite 5but more than one6$ then either two or three or#our or some other number! 7# 5ii6 in#inite$ then either as Democritus

believed one in kind$ but di##erin/ in shape or #orm2 or di##erent in kind andeven contrary!

A similar in.uiry is made by those who in.uire into the number o# e%istents4#or they in.uire whether the ultimate constituents o# e%istin/ thin/s are oneor many$ and i# many$ whether a #inite or an in#inite plurality! So they tooare in.uirin/ whether the principle or element is one or many!

1ow to investi/ate whether Bein/ is one and motionless is not acontribution to the science o# 1ature! 0or ust as the /eometer has nothin/more to say to one who denies the principles o# his science-this bein/ a.uestion #or a di##erent science or #or or common to all-so a maninvesti/atin/ principles cannot ar/ue with one who denies their e%istence!0or i# Bein/ is ust one$ and one in the way mentioned$ there is a principleno lon/er$ since a principle must be the principle o# some thin/ or thin/s!

*o in.uire there#ore whether Bein/ is one in this sense would be likear/uin/ a/ainst any other position maintained #or the sake o# ar/ument 5suchas the Heraclitean thesis$ or such a thesis as that Bein/ is one man6 or likere#utin/ a merely contentious ar/ument-a description which applies to the


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ar/uments both o# Melissus and o# armenides4 their premisses are #alse andtheir conclusions do not #ollow! Or rather the ar/ument o# Melissus is /rossand palpable and o##ers no di##iculty at all4 accept one ridiculous propositionand the rest #ollows-a simple enou/h proceedin/!

"e physicists$ on the other hand$ must take #or /ranted that the thin/s thate%ist by nature are$ either all or some o# them$ in motion which is indeedmade plain by induction! Moreover$ no man o# science is bound to solveevery kind o# di##iculty that may be raised$ but only as many as are drawn#alsely #rom the principles o# the science4 it is not our business to re#utethose that do not arise in this way4 ust as it is the duty o# the /eometer tore#ute the s.uarin/ o# the circle by means o# se/ments$ but it is not his dutyto re#ute Antiphon3s proo#! At the same time the holders o# the theory o#which we are speakin/ do incidentally raise physical .uestions$ thou/h

1ature is not their sub ect4 so it will perhaps be as well to spend a #ew wordson them$ especially as the in.uiry is not without scienti#ic interest!

*he most pertinent .uestion with which to be/in will be this4 7n what senseis it asserted that all thin/s are one8 0or 3is3 is used in many senses! Do theymean that all thin/s 3are3 substance or .uantities or .ualities8 And$ #urther$are all thin/s one substance-one man$ one horse$ or one soul-or .uality andthat one and the same-white or hot or somethin/ o# the kind8 *hese are allvery di##erent doctrines and all impossible to maintain!

0or i# both substance and .uantity and .uality are$ then$ whether these e%istindependently o# each other or not$ Bein/ will be many!

7# on the other hand it is asserted that all thin/s are .uality or .uantity$ then$whether substance e%ists or not$ an absurdity results$ i# the impossible can

properly be called absurd! 0or none o# the others can e%ist independently4substance alone is independent4 #or everythin/ is predicated o# substance assub ect! 1ow Melissus says that Bein/ is in#inite! 7t is then a .uantity! 0orthe in#inite is in the cate/ory o# .uantity$ whereas substance or .uality ora##ection cannot be in#inite e%cept throu/h a concomitant attribute$ that is$ i#at the same time they are also .uantities! 0or to de#ine the in#inite you mustuse .uantity in your #ormula$ but not substance or .uality! 7# then Bein/ is

both substance and .uantity$ it is two$ not one4 i# only substance$ it is notin#inite and has no ma/nitude2 #or to have that it will have to be a .uantity!

A/ain$ 3one3 itsel#$ no less than 3bein/3$ is used in many senses$ so we mustconsider in what sense the word is used when it is said that the All is one!

1ow we say that 5a6 the continuous is one or that 5b6 the indivisible is one$or 5c6 thin/s are said to be 3one3$ when their essence is one and the same$ as3li.uor3 and 3drink3!

7# 5a6 their One is one in the sense o# continuous$ it is many$ #or the


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continuous is divisible ad in#initum!

*here is$ indeed$ a di##iculty about part and whole$ perhaps not relevant tothe present ar/ument$ yet deservin/ consideration on its own account-namely$ whether the part and the whole are one or more than one$ and how

they can be one or many$ and$ i# they are more than one$ in what sense theyare more than one! 5Similarly with the parts o# wholes which are notcontinuous!6 0urther$ i# each o# the two parts is indivisibly one with thewhole$ the di##iculty arises that they will be indivisibly one with each otheralso!

But to proceed4 7# 5b6 their One is one as indivisible$ nothin/ will have.uantity or .uality$ and so the one will not be in#inite$ as Melissus says-nor$indeed$ limited$ as armenides says$ #or thou/h the limit is indivisible$ thelimited is not!

But i# 5c6 all thin/s are one in the sense o# havin/ the same de#inition$ like3raiment3 and 3dress3$ then it turns out that they are maintainin/ theHeraclitean doctrine$ #or it will be the same thin/ 3to be /ood3 and 3to be bad3$and 3to be /ood3 and 3to be not /ood3$ and so the same thin/ will be 3/ood3 and3not /ood3$ and man and horse2 in #act$ their view will be$ not that all thin/sare one$ but that they are nothin/2 and that 3to be o# such-and-such a .uality3is the same as 3to be o# such-and-such a si9e3!

)ven the more recent o# the ancient thinkers were in a pother lest the samethin/ should turn out in their hands both one and many! So some$ like:ycophron$ were led to omit 3is3$ others to chan/e the mode o# e%pressionand say 3the man has been whitened3 instead o# 3is white3$ and 3walks3 insteado# 3is walkin/3$ #or #ear that i# they added the word 3is3 they should be makin/the one to be many-as i# 3one3 and 3bein/3 were always used in one and thesame sense! "hat 3is3 may be many either in de#inition 5#or e%ample 3to bewhite3 is one thin/$ 3to be musical3 another$ yet the same thin/ be both$ so theone is many6 or by division$ as the whole and its parts! On this point$ indeed$they were already /ettin/ into di##iculties and admitted that the one wasmany-as i# there was any di##iculty about the same thin/ bein/ both one andmany$ provided that these are not opposites2 #or 3one3 may mean either3potentially one3 or 3actually one3!

Part 3

7#$ then$ we approach the thesis in this way it seems impossible #or all thin/sto be one! 0urther$ the ar/uments they use to prove their position are notdi##icult to e%pose! 0or both o# them reason contentiously-7 mean bothMelissus and armenides! ;*heir premisses are #alse and their conclusionsdo not #ollow! Or rather the ar/ument o# Melissus is /ross and palpable ando##ers no di##iculty at all4 admit one ridiculous proposition and the rest#ollows-a simple enou/h proceedin/!< *he #allacy o# Melissus is obvious!


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0or he supposes that the assumption 3what has come into bein/ always has a be/innin/3 usti#ies the assumption 3what has not come into bein/ has no be/innin/3! *hen this also is absurd$ that in every case there should be a be/innin/ o# the thin/-not o# the time and not only in the case o# comin/ to be in the #ull sense but also in the case o# comin/ to have a .uality-as i#

chan/e never took place suddenly! A/ain$ does it #ollow that Bein/$ i# one$is motionless8 "hy should it not move$ the whole o# it within itsel#$ as partso# it do which are unities$ e!/! this water8 A/ain$ why is .ualitative chan/eimpossible8 But$ #urther$ Bein/ cannot be one in #orm$ thou/h it may be inwhat it is made o#! 5)ven some o# the physicists hold it to be one in the latterway$ thou/h not in the #ormer!6 Man obviously di##ers #rom horse in #orm$and contraries #rom each other!

*he same kind o# ar/ument holds /ood a/ainst armenides also$ besides anythat may apply specially to his view4 the answer to him bein/ that 3this is nottrue3 and 3that does not #ollow3! His assumption that one is used in a sin/lesense only is #alse$ because it is used in several! His conclusion does not#ollow$ because i# we take only white thin/s$ and i# 3white3 has a sin/lemeanin/$ none the less what is white will be many and not one! 0or what iswhite will not be one either in the sense that it is continuous or in the sensethat it must be de#ined in only one way! 3"hiteness3 will be di##erent #rom3what has whiteness3! 1or does this mean that there is anythin/ that can e%istseparately$ over and above what is white! 0or 3whiteness3 and 3that which iswhite3 di##er in de#inition$ not in the sense that they are thin/s which cane%ist apart #rom each other! But armenides had not come in si/ht o# thisdistinction!

7t is necessary #or him$ then$ to assume not only that 3bein/3 has the samemeanin/$ o# whatever it is predicated$ but #urther that it means 5=6 what ustis and 5>6 what is ust one!

7t must be so$ #or 5=6 an attribute is predicated o# some sub ect$ so that thesub ect to which 3bein/3 is attributed will not be$ as it is somethin/ di##erent#rom 3bein/3! Somethin/$ there#ore$ which is not will be! Hence 3substance3will not be a predicate o# anythin/ else! 0or the sub ect cannot be a bein/$unless 3bein/3 means several thin/s$ in such a way that each is somethin/!But e% hypothesi 3bein/3 means only one thin/!

7#$ then$ 3substance3 is not attributed to anythin/$ but other thin/s areattributed to it$ how does 3substance3 mean what is rather than what is not80or suppose that 3substance3 is also 3white3! Since the de#inition o# the latteris di##erent 5#or bein/ cannot even be attributed to white$ as nothin/ is whichis not 3substance36$ it #ollows that 3white3 is not-bein/--and that not in thesense o# a particular not-bein/$ but in the sense that it is not at all! Hence3substance3 is not2 #or it is true to say that it is white$ which we #ound tomean not-bein/! 7# to avoid this we say that even 3white3 means substance$ it#ollows that 3bein/3 has more than one meanin/!


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7n particular$ then$ Bein/ will not have ma/nitude$ i# it is substance! 0oreach o# the two parts must he in a di##erent sense!

5>6 Substance is plainly divisible into other substances$ i# we consider the

mere nature o# a de#inition! 0or instance$ i# 3man3 is a substance$ 3animal3 and3biped3 must also be substances! 0or i# not substances$ they must beattributes-and i# attributes$ attributes either o# 5a6 man or o# 5b6 some othersub ect! But neither is possible!

5a6 An attribute is either that which may or may not belon/ to the sub ect orthat in whose de#inition the sub ect o# which it is an attribute is involved!*hus 3sittin/3 is an e%ample o# a separable attribute$ while 3snubness3 containsthe de#inition o# 3nose3$ to which we attribute snubness! 0urther$ thede#inition o# the whole is not contained in the de#initions o# the contents orelements o# the de#initory #ormula2 that o# 3man3 #or instance in 3biped3$ orthat o# 3white man3 in 3white3! 7# then this is so$ and i# 3biped3 is supposed to

be an attribute o# 3man3$ it must be either separable$ so that 3man3 mi/ht possibly not be 3biped3$ or the de#inition o# 3man3 must come into thede#inition o# 3biped3-which is impossible$ as the converse is the case!

5b6 7#$ on the other hand$ we suppose that 3biped3 and 3animal3 are attributesnot o# man but o# somethin/ else$ and are not each o# them a substance$ then3man3 too will be an attribute o# somethin/ else! But we must assume thatsubstance is not the attribute o# anythin/$ that the sub ect o# which both3biped3 and 3animal3 and each separately are predicated is the sub ect also o#the comple% 3biped animal3!

Are we then to say that the All is composed o# indivisible substances8 Somethinkers did$ in point o# #act$ /ive way to both ar/uments! *o the ar/umentthat all thin/s are one i# bein/ means one thin/$ they conceded that not-bein/is2 to that #rom bisection$ they yielded by positin/ atomic ma/nitudes! Butobviously it is not true that i# bein/ means one thin/$ and cannot at the sametime mean the contradictory o# this$ there will be nothin/ which is not$ #oreven i# what is not cannot be without .uali#ication$ there is no reason why itshould not be a particular not-bein/! *o say that all thin/s will be one$ i#there is nothin/ besides Bein/ itsel#$ is absurd! 0or who understands 3bein/itsel#3 to be anythin/ but a particular substance8 But i# this is so$ there isnothin/ to prevent there bein/ many bein/s$ as has been said!

7t is$ then$ clearly impossible #or Bein/ to be one in this sense!

Part 4

*he physicists on the other hand have two modes o# e%planation!*he #irst set make the underlyin/ body one either one o# the three orsomethin/ else which is denser than #ire and rarer than air then /enerate


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everythin/ else #rom this$ and obtain multiplicity by condensation andrare#action! 1ow these are contraries$ which may be /enerali9ed into 3e%cessand de#ect3! 5Compare lato3s 3,reat and Small3-e%cept that he make these hismatter$ the one his #orm$ while the others treat the one which underlies asmatter and the contraries as di##erentiae$ i!e! #orms6!

*he second set assert that the contrarieties are contained in the one andemer/e #rom it by se/re/ation$ #or e%ample Ana%imander and also all thosewho assert that 3what is3 is one and many$ like )mpedocles and Ana%a/oras2#or they too produce other thin/s #rom their mi%ture by se/re/ation! *hesedi##er$ however$ #rom each other in that the #ormer ima/ines a cycle o# suchchan/es$ the latter a sin/le series! Ana%a/oras a/ain made both his3homceomerous3 substances and his contraries in#inite in multitude$ whereas)mpedocles posits only the so-called elements!

*he theory o# Ana%a/oras that the principles are in#inite in multitude was probably due to his acceptance o# the common opinion o# the physicists thatnothin/ comes into bein/ #rom not-bein/! 0or this is the reason why they usethe phrase 3all thin/s were to/ether3 and the comin/ into bein/ o# such andsuch a kind o# thin/ is reduced to chan/e o# .uality$ while some spoke o#combination and separation! Moreover$ the #act that the contraries proceed#rom each other led them to the conclusion! *he one$ they reasoned$ musthave already e%isted in the other2 #or since everythin/ that comes into bein/must arise either #rom what is or #rom what is not$ and it is impossible #or itto arise #rom what is not 5on this point all the physicists a/ree6$ they thou/htthat the truth o# the alternative necessarily #ollowed$ namely that thin/scome into bein/ out o# e%istent thin/s$ i!e! out o# thin/s already present$ butimperceptible to our senses because o# the smallness o# their bulk! So theyassert that everythin/ has been mi%ed in every! thin/$ because they saweverythin/ arisin/ out o# everythin/! But thin/s$ as they say$ appear di##erent#rom one another and receive di##erent names accordin/ to the nature o# the

particles which are numerically predominant amon/ the innumerableconstituents o# the mi%ture! 0or nothin/$ they say$ is purely and entirelywhite or black or sweet$ bone or #lesh$ but the nature o# a thin/ is held to bethat o# which it contains the most!

1ow 5=6 the in#inite .ua in#inite is unknowable$ so that what is in#inite inmultitude or si9e is unknowable in .uantity$ and what is in#inite in variety o#kind is unknowable in .uality! But the principles in .uestion are in#inite bothin multitude and in kind! *here#ore it is impossible to know thin/s which arecomposed o# them2 #or it is when we know the nature and .uantity o# itscomponents that we suppose we know a comple%!

0urther 5>6 i# the parts o# a whole may be o# any si9e in the direction eithero# /reatness or o# smallness 5by 3parts3 7 mean components into which awhole can be divided and which are actually present in it6$ it is necessarythat the whole thin/ itsel# may be o# any si9e! Clearly$ there#ore$ since it is


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impossible #or an animal or plant to be inde#initely bi/ or small$ neither canits parts be such$ or the whole will be the same! But #lesh$ bone$ and the likeare the parts o# animals$ and the #ruits are the parts o# plants! Hence it isobvious that neither #lesh$ bone$ nor any such thin/ can be o# inde#inite si9ein the direction either o# the /reater or o# the less!

A/ain 5&6 accordin/ to the theory all such thin/s are already present in oneanother and do not come into bein/ but are constituents which are separatedout$ and a thin/ receives its desi/nation #rom its chie# constituent! 0urther$anythin/ may come out o# anythin/-water by se/re/ation #rom #lesh and#lesh #rom water! Hence$ since every #inite body is e%hausted by the repeatedabstraction o# a #inite body$ it seems obviously to #ollow that everythin/cannot subsist in everythin/ else! 0or let #lesh be e%tracted #rom water anda/ain more #lesh be produced #rom the remainder by repeatin/ the process o#separation4 then$ even thou/h the .uantity separated out will continuallydecrease$ still it will not #all below a certain ma/nitude! 7#$ there#ore$ the

process comes to an end$ everythin/ will not be in everythin/ else 5#or therewill be no #lesh in the remainin/ water62 i# on the other hand it does not$ and#urther e%traction is always possible$ there will be an in#inite multitude o##inite e.ual particles in a #inite .uantity-which is impossible! Another proo#may be added4 Since every body must diminish in si9e when somethin/ istaken #rom it$ and #lesh is .uantitatively de#inite in respect both o# /reatnessand smallness$ it is clear that #rom the minimum .uantity o# #lesh no bodycan be separated out2 #or the #lesh le#t would be less than the minimum o##lesh!

:astly 5?6 in each o# his in#inite bodies there would be already presentin#inite #lesh and blood and brain- havin/ a distinct e%istence$ however$#rom one another$ and no less real than the in#inite bodies$ and each in#inite4which is contrary to reason!

*he statement that complete separation never will take place is correctenou/h$ thou/h Ana%a/oras is not #ully aware o# what it means! 0ora##ections are indeed inseparable! 7# then colours and states had entered intothe mi%ture$ and i# separation took place$ there would be a 3white3 or a3healthy3 which was nothin/ but white or healthy$ i!e! was not the predicateo# a sub ect! So his 3Mind3 is an absurd person aimin/ at the impossible$ i# heis supposed to wish to separate them$ and it is impossible to do so$ both inrespect o# .uantity and o# .uality- o# .uantity$ because there is no minimumma/nitude$ and o# .uality$ because a##ections are inseparable!

1or is Ana%a/oras ri/ht about the comin/ to be o# homo/eneous bodies! 7tis true there is a sense in which clay is divided into pieces o# clay$ but thereis another in which it is not! "ater and air are$ and are /enerated 3#rom3 eachother$ but not in the way in which bricks come 3#rom3 a house and a/ain ahouse 3#rom3 bricks2 and it is better to assume a smaller and #inite number o#

principles$ as )mpedocles does!


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Part 5

All thinkers then a/ree in makin/ the contraries principles$ both those whodescribe the All as one and unmoved 5#or even armenides treats hot and

cold as principles under the names o# #ire and earth6 and those too who usethe rare and the dense! *he same is true o# Democritus also$ with his plenumand void$ both o# which e%ist$ be says$ the one as bein/$ the other as not-

bein/! A/ain he speaks o# di##erences in position$ shape$ and order$ andthese are /enera o# which the species are contraries$ namely$ o# position$above and below$ be#ore and behind2 o# shape$ an/ular and an/le-less$strai/ht and round!

7t is plain then that they all in one way or another identi#y the contraries withthe principles! And with /ood reason! 0or #irst principles must not bederived #rom one another nor #rom anythin/ else$ while everythin/ has to bederived #rom them! But these conditions are #ul#illed by the primarycontraries$ which are not derived #rom anythin/ else because they are

primary$ nor #rom each other because they are contraries!

But we must see how this can be arrived at as a reasoned result$ as well as inthe way ust indicated!

Our #irst presupposition must be that in nature nothin/ acts on$ or is acted on by$ any other thin/ at random$ nor may anythin/ come #rom anythin/ else$unless we mean that it does so in virtue o# a concomitant attribute! 0or howcould 3white3 come #rom 3musical3$ unless 3musical3 happened to be anattribute o# the not-white or o# the black8 1o$ 3white3 comes #rom 3not-white3-and not #rom any 3not-white3$ but #rom black or some intermediate colour!Similarly$ 3musical3 comes to be #rom 3not-musical3$ but not #rom any thin/other than musical$ but #rom 3unmusical3 or any intermediate state there may

be!

1or a/ain do thin/s pass into the #irst chance thin/2 3white3 does not passinto 3musical3 5e%cept$ it may be$ in virtue o# a concomitant attribute6$ butinto 3not-white3-and not into any chance thin/ which is not white$ but into

black or an intermediate colour2 3musical3 passes into 3not-musical3-and notinto any chance thin/ other than musical$ but into 3unmusical3 or anyintermediate state there may be!

*he same holds o# other thin/s also4 even thin/s which are not simple butcomple% #ollow the same principle$ but the opposite state has not received aname$ so we #ail to notice the #act! "hat is in tune must come #rom what isnot in tune$ and vice versa2 the tuned passes into untunedness-and not intoany untunedness$ but into the correspondin/ opposite! 7t does not matterwhether we take attunement$ order$ or composition #or our illustration2 the

principle is obviously the same in all$ and in #act applies e.ually to the


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production o# a house$ a statue$ or any other comple%! A house comes #romcertain thin/s in a certain state o# separation instead o# con unction$ a statue5or any other thin/ that has been shaped6 #rom shapelessness-each o# theseob ects bein/ partly order and partly composition!

7# then this is true$ everythin/ that comes to be or passes away #rom$ or passes into$ its contrary or an intermediate state! But the intermediates arederived #rom the contraries-colours$ #or instance$ #rom black and white!)verythin/$ there#ore$ that comes to be by a natural process is either acontrary or a product o# contraries!

@p to this point we have practically had most o# the other writers on thesub ect with us$ as 7 have said already4 #or all o# them identi#y theirelements$ and what they call their principles$ with the contraries$ /ivin/ noreason indeed #or the theory$ but contrained as it were by the truth itsel#!*hey di##er$ however$ #rom one another in that some assume contrarieswhich are more primary$ others contraries which are less so4 some thosemore knowable in the order o# e%planation$ others those more #amiliar tosense! 0or some make hot and cold$ or a/ain moist and dry$ the conditions o#

becomin/2 while others make odd and even$ or a/ain :ove and Stri#e2 andthese di##er #rom each other in the way mentioned!

Hence their principles are in one sense the same$ in another di##erent2di##erent certainly$ as indeed most people think$ but the same inasmuch asthey are analo/ous2 #or all are taken #rom the same table o# columns$ someo# the pairs bein/ wider$ others narrower in e%tent! 7n this way then theirtheories are both the same and di##erent$ some better$ some worse2 some$ as 7have said$ take as their contraries what is more knowable in the order o#e%planation$ others what is more #amiliar to sense! 5*he universal is moreknowable in the order o# e%planation$ the particular in the order o# sense4 #ore%planation has to do with the universal$ sense with the particular!6 3*he/reat and the small3$ #or e%ample$ belon/ to the #ormer class$ 3the dense andthe rare3 to the latter!

7t is clear then that our principles must be contraries!

Part 6

*he ne%t .uestion is whether the principles are two or three or more innumber!

One they cannot be$ #or there cannot be one contrary! 1or can they beinnumerable$ because$ i# so$ Bein/ will not be knowable4 and in any one/enus there is only one contrariety$ and substance is one /enus4 also a #initenumber is su##icient$ and a #inite number$ such as the principles o#)mpedocles$ is better than an in#inite multitude2 #or )mpedocles pro#esses toobtain #rom his principles all that Ana%a/oras obtains #rom his innumerable


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principles! :astly$ some contraries are more primary than others$ and somearise #rom others-#or e%ample sweet and bitter$ white and black-whereas the

principles must always remain principles!

*his will su##ice to show that the principles are neither one nor innumerable!

,ranted$ then$ that they are a limited number$ it is plausible to suppose themmore than two! 0or it is di##icult to see how either density should be o# sucha nature as to act in any way on rarity or rarity on density! *he same is trueo# any other pair o# contraries2 #or :ove does not /ather Stri#e to/ether andmake thin/s out o# it$ nor does Stri#e make anythin/ out o# :ove$ but bothact on a third thin/ di##erent #rom both! Some indeed assume more than onesuch thin/ #rom which they construct the world o# nature!

Other ob ections to the view that it is not necessary to assume a third principle as a substratum may be added! 5=6 "e do not #ind that thecontraries constitute the substance o# any thin/! But what is a #irst principleou/ht not to be the predicate o# any sub ect! 7# it were$ there would be a

principle o# the supposed principle4 #or the sub ect is a principle$ and prior presumably to what is predicated o# it! A/ain 5>6 we hold that a substance isnot contrary to another substance! How then can substance be derived #romwhat are not substances8 Or how can non-substances be prior to substance8

7# then we accept both the #ormer ar/ument and this one$ we must$ to preserve both$ assume a third somewhat as the substratum o# the contraries$such as is spoken o# by those who describe the All as one nature-water or#ire or what is intermediate between them! "hat is intermediate seems

pre#erable2 #or #ire$ earth$ air$ and water are already involved with pairs o#contraries! *here is$ there#ore$ much to be said #or those who make theunderlyin/ substance di##erent #rom these #our2 o# the rest$ the ne%t bestchoice is air$ as presentin/ sensible di##erences in a less de/ree than theothers2 and a#ter air$ water! All$ however$ a/ree in this$ that they di##erentiatetheir One by means o# the contraries$ such as density and rarity and moreand less$ which may o# course be /enerali9ed$ as has already been said intoe%cess and de#ect! 7ndeed this doctrine too 5that the One and e%cess andde#ect are the principles o# thin/s6 would appear to be o# old standin/$thou/h in di##erent #orms2 #or the early thinkers made the two the active andthe one the passive principle$ whereas some o# the more recent maintain thereverse!

*o suppose then that the elements are three in number would seem$ #romthese and similar considerations$ a plausible view$ as 7 said be#ore! On theother hand$ the view that they are more than three in number would seem to

be untenable!

0or the one substratum is su##icient to be acted on2 but i# we have #our


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contraries$ there will be two contrarieties$ and we shall have to suppose anintermediate nature #or each pair separately! 7#$ on the other hand$ thecontrarieties$ bein/ two$ can /enerate #rom each other$ the secondcontrariety will be super#luous! Moreover$ it is impossible that there should

be more than one primary contrariety! 0or substance is a sin/le /enus o#

bein/$ so that the principles can di##er only as prior and posterior$ not in/enus2 in a sin/le /enus there is always a sin/le contrariety$ all the othercontrarieties in it bein/ held to be reducible to one!

7t is clear then that the number o# elements is neither one nor more than twoor three2 but whether two or three is$ as 7 said$ a .uestion o# considerabledi##iculty!

Part 7

"e will now /ive our own account$ approachin/ the .uestion #irst withre#erence to becomin/ in its widest sense4 #or we shall be #ollowin/ thenatural order o# in.uiry i# we speak #irst o# common characteristics$ and theninvesti/ate the characteristics o# special cases!

"e say that one thin/ comes to be #rom another thin/$ and one sort o# thin/#rom another sort o# thin/$ both in the case o# simple and o# comple% thin/s!7 mean the #ollowin/! "e can say 5=6 3man becomes musical3$ 5>6 what is3not-musical becomes musical3$ or 5&6$ the 3not-musical man becomes amusical man3! 1ow what becomes in 5=6 and 5>6-3man3 and 3not musical3-7call simple$ and what each becomes-3musical3-simple also! But when 5&6 wesay the 3not-musical man becomes a musical man3$ both what becomes andwhat it becomes are comple%!

As re/ards one o# these simple 3thin/s that become3 we say not only 3this becomes so-and-so3$ but also 3#rom bein/ this$ comes to be so-and-so3$ as3#rom bein/ not-musical comes to be musical32 as re/ards the other we do notsay this in all cases$ as we do not say 5=6 3#rom bein/ a man he came to bemusical3 but only 3the man became musical3!

"hen a 3simple3 thin/ is said to become somethin/$ in one case 5=6 itsurvives throu/h the process$ in the other 5>6 it does not! 0or man remains aman and is such even when he becomes musical$ whereas what is notmusical or is unmusical does not continue to e%ist$ either simply orcombined with the sub ect!

*hese distinctions drawn$ one can /ather #rom surveyin/ the various cases o# becomin/ in the way we are describin/ that$ as we say$ there must always bean underlyin/ somethin/$ namely that which becomes$ and that this$ thou/halways one numerically$ in #orm at least is not one! 5By that 7 mean that itcan be described in di##erent ways!6 0or 3to be man3 is not the same as 3to beunmusical3! One part survives$ the other does not4 what is not an opposite


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survives 5#or 3man3 survives6$ but 3not-musical3 or 3unmusical3 does notsurvive$ nor does the compound o# the two$ namely 3unmusical man3!

"e speak o# 3becomin/ that #rom this3 instead o# 3this becomin/ that3 more inthe case o# what does not survive the chan/e-3becomin/ musical #rom

unmusical3$ not 3#rom man3-but there are e%ceptions$ as we sometimes use thelatter #orm o# e%pression even o# what survives2 we speak o# 3a statuecomin/ to be #rom bron9e3$ not o# the 3bron9e becomin/ a statue3! *hechan/e$ however$ #rom an opposite which does not survive is describedindi##erently in both ways$ 3becomin/ that #rom this3 or 3this becomin/ that3!"e say both that 3the unmusical becomes musical3$ and that 3#rom unmusicalhe becomes musical3! And so both #orms are used o# the comple%$ 3becomin/a musical man #rom an unmusical man3$ and unmusical man becomin/ amusical man3!

But there are di##erent senses o# 3comin/ to be3! 7n some cases we do not usethe e%pression 3come to be3$ but 3come to be so-and-so3! Only substances aresaid to 3come to be3 in the un.uali#ied sense!

1ow in all cases other than substance it is plain that there must be somesub ect$ namely$ that which becomes! 0or we know that when a thin/ comesto be o# such a .uantity or .uality or in such a relation$ time$ or place$ asub ect is always presupposed$ since substance alone is not predicated o#another sub ect$ but everythin/ else o# substance!

But that substances too$ and anythin/ else that can be said 3to be3 without.uali#ication$ come to be #rom some substratum$ will appear on e%amination!0or we #ind in every case somethin/ that underlies #rom which proceeds thatwhich comes to be2 #or instance$ animals and plants #rom seed!

,enerally thin/s which come to be$ come to be in di##erent ways4 5=6 bychan/e o# shape$ as a statue2 5>6 by addition$ as thin/s which /row2 5&6 bytakin/ away$ as the Hermes #rom the stone2 5?6 by puttin/ to/ether$ as ahouse2 5'6 by alteration$ as thin/s which 3turn3 in respect o# their materialsubstance!

7t is plain that these are all cases o# comin/ to be #rom a substratum!

*hus$ clearly$ #rom what has been said$ whatever comes to be is alwayscomple%! *here is$ on the one hand$ 5a6 somethin/ which comes intoe%istence$ and a/ain 5b6 somethin/ which becomes that-the latter 5b6 in twosenses$ either the sub ect or the opposite! By the 3opposite3 7 mean the3unmusical3$ by the 3sub ect3 3man3$ and similarly 7 call the absence o# shape or#orm or order the 3opposite3$ and the bron9e or stone or /old the 3sub ect3!

lainly then$ i# there are conditions and principles which constitute naturalob ects and #rom which they primarily are or have come to be-have come to


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be$ 7 mean$ what each is said to be in its essential nature$ not what each is inrespect o# a concomitant attribute-plainly$ 7 say$ everythin/ comes to be#rom both sub ect and #orm! 0or 3musical man3 is composed 5in a way6 o#3man3 and 3musical34 you can analyse it into the de#initions o# its elements! 7tis clear then that what comes to be will come to be #rom these elements!

1ow the sub ect is one numerically$ thou/h it is two in #orm! 50or it is theman$ the /old-the 3matter3 /enerally-that is counted$ #or it is more o# thenature o# a 3this3$ and what comes to be does not come #rom it in virtue o# aconcomitant attribute2 the privation$ on the other hand$ and the contrary areincidental in the process!6 And the positive #orm is one-the order$ theac.uired art o# music$ or any similar predicate!

*here is a sense$ there#ore$ in which we must declare the principles to betwo$ and a sense in which they are three2 a sense in which the contraries arethe principles-say #or e%ample the musical and the unmusical$ the hot andthe cold$ the tuned and the untuned-and a sense in which they are not$ sinceit is impossible #or the contraries to be acted on by each other! But thisdi##iculty also is solved by the #act that the substratum is di##erent #rom thecontraries$ #or it is itsel# not a contrary! *he principles there#ore are$ in away$ not more in number than the contraries$ but as it were two$ nor yet

precisely two$ since there is a di##erence o# essential nature$ but three! 0or 3to be man3 is di##erent #rom 3to be unmusical3$ and 3to be un#ormed3 #rom 3to be bron9e3!

"e have now stated the number o# the principles o# natural ob ects whichare sub ect to /eneration$ and how the number is reached4 and it is clear thatthere must be a substratum #or the contraries$ and that the contraries must betwo! 5 et in another way o# puttin/ it this is not necessary$ as one o# thecontraries will serve to e##ect the chan/e by its successive absence and

presence!6

*he underlyin/ nature is an ob ect o# scienti#ic knowled/e$ by an analo/y!0or as the bron9e is to the statue$ the wood to the bed$ or the matter and the#ormless be#ore receivin/ #orm to any thin/ which has #orm$ so is theunderlyin/ nature to substance$ i!e! the 3this3 or e%istent!

*his then is one principle 5thou/h not one or e%istent in the same sense asthe 3this36$ and the de#inition was one as we a/reed2 then #urther there is itscontrary$ the privation! 7n what sense these are two$ and in what sense more$has been stated above! Brie#ly$ we e%plained #irst that only the contrarieswere principles$ and later that a substratum was indispensable$ and that the

principles were three2 our last statement has elucidated the di##erence between the contraries$ the mutual relation o# the principles$ and the natureo# the substratum! "hether the #orm or the substratum is the essential natureo# a physical ob ect is not yet clear! But that the principles are three$ and inwhat sense$ and the way in which each is a principle$ is clear!


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So much then #or the .uestion o# the number and the nature o# the principles!

Part

"e will now proceed to show that the di##iculty o# the early thinkers$ as wellas our own$ is solved in this way alone!

*he #irst o# those who studied science were misled in their search #or truthand the nature o# thin/s by their ine%perience$ which as it were thrust theminto another path! So they say that none o# the thin/s that are either comes to

be or passes out o# e%istence$ because what comes to be must do so either#rom what is or #rom what is not$ both o# which are impossible! 0or what iscannot come to be 5because it is already6$ and #rom what is not nothin/could have come to be 5because somethin/ must be present as a substratum6!So too they e%a//erated the conse.uence o# this$ and went so #ar as to denyeven the e%istence o# a plurality o# thin/s$ maintainin/ that only Bein/ itsel#is! Such then was their opinion$ and such the reason #or its adoption!

Our e%planation on the other hand is that the phrases 3somethin/ comes to be#rom what is or #rom what is not3$ 3what is not or what is does somethin/ orhas somethin/ done to it or becomes some particular thin/3$ are to be taken5in the #irst way o# puttin/ our e%planation6 in the same sense as 3a doctordoes somethin/ or has somethin/ done to him3$ 3is or becomes somethin/#rom bein/ a doctor!3 *hese e%pressions may be taken in two senses$ and sotoo$ clearly$ may 3#rom bein/3$ and 3bein/ acts or is acted on3! A doctor buildsa house$ not .ua doctor$ but .ua housebuilder$ and turns /ray$ not .uadoctor$ but .ua dark-haired! On the other hand he doctors or #ails to doctor.ua doctor! But we are usin/ words most appropriately when we say that adoctor does somethin/ or under/oes somethin/$ or becomes somethin/ #rom

bein/ a doctor$ i# he does$ under/oes$ or becomes .ua doctor! Clearly thenalso 3to come to be so-and-so #rom not-bein/3 means 3.ua not-bein/3!

7t was throu/h #ailure to make this distinction that those thinkers /ave thematter up$ and throu/h this error that they went so much #arther astray as tosuppose that nothin/ else comes to be or e%ists apart #rom Bein/ itsel#$ thusdoin/ away with all becomin/!

"e ourselves are in a/reement with them in holdin/ that nothin/ can be saidwithout .uali#ication to come #rom what is not! But nevertheless wemaintain that a thin/ may 3come to be #rom what is not3-that is$ in a .uali#iedsense! 0or a thin/ comes to be #rom the privation$ which in its own nature isnot-bein/$-this not survivin/ as a constituent o# the result! et this causessurprise$ and it is thou/ht impossible that somethin/ should come to be inthe way described #rom what is not!


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7n the same way we maintain that nothin/ comes to be #rom bein/$ and that bein/ does not come to be e%cept in a .uali#ied sense! 7n that way$ however$it does$ ust as animal mi/ht come to be #rom animal$ and an animal o# acertain kind #rom an animal o# a certain kind! *hus$ suppose a do/ to cometo be #rom a horse! *he do/ would then$ it is true$ come to be #rom animal

5as well as #rom an animal o# a certain kind6 but not as animal$ #or that isalready there! But i# anythin/ is to become an animal$ not in a .uali#iedsense$ it will not be #rom animal4 and i# bein/$ not #rom bein/-nor #rom not-

bein/ either$ #or it has been e%plained that by 3#rom not bein/3 we mean #romnot-bein/ .ua not-bein/!

1ote #urther that we do not subvert the principle that everythin/ either is oris not!

*his then is one way o# solvin/ the di##iculty! Another consists in pointin/out that the same thin/s can be e%plained in terms o# potentiality andactuality! But this has been done with /reater precision elsewhere! So$ as wesaid$ the di##iculties which constrain people to deny the e%istence o# some o#the thin/s we mentioned are now solved! 0or it was this reason which alsocaused some o# the earlier thinkers to turn so #ar aside #rom the road whichleads to comin/ to be and passin/ away and chan/e /enerally! 7# they hadcome in si/ht o# this nature$ all their i/norance would have been dispelled!

Part !

Others$ indeed$ have apprehended the nature in .uestion$ but not ade.uately!

7n the #irst place they allow that a thin/ may come to be without.uali#ication #rom not bein/$ acceptin/ on this point the statement o#

armenides! Secondly$ they think that i# the substratum is one numerically$it must have also only a sin/le potentiality-which is a very di##erent thin/!

1ow we distin/uish matter and privation$ and hold that one o# these$ namelythe matter$ is not-bein/ only in virtue o# an attribute which it has$ while the

privation in its own nature is not-bein/2 and that the matter is nearly$ in asense is$ substance$ while the privation in no sense is! *hey$ on the otherhand$ identi#y their ,reat and Small alike with not bein/$ and that whetherthey are taken to/ether as one or separately! *heir triad is there#ore o# .uitea di##erent kind #rom ours! 0or they /ot so #ar as to see that there must besome underlyin/ nature$ but they make it one-#or even i# one philosophermakes a dyad o# it$ which he calls ,reat and Small$ the e##ect is the same$#or he overlooked the other nature! 0or the one which persists is a ointcause$ with the #orm$ o# what comes to be-a mother$ as it were! But thene/ative part o# the contrariety may o#ten seem$ i# you concentrate yourattention on it as an evil a/ent$ not to e%ist at all!


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0or admittin/ with them that there is somethin/ divine$ /ood$ and desirable$we hold that there are two other principles$ the one contrary to it$ the othersuch as o# its own nature to desire and yearn #or it! But the conse.uence o#their view is that the contrary desires its wte%tinction! et the #orm cannotdesire itsel#$ #or it is not de#ective2 nor can the contrary desire it$ #or

contraries are mutually destructive! *he truth is that what desires the #orm ismatter$ as the #emale desires the male and the u/ly the beauti#ul-only theu/ly or the #emale not per se but per accidens!

*he matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense$ while in another itdoes not! As that which contains the privation$ it ceases to be in its ownnature$ #or what ceases to be-the privation-is contained within it! But as

potentiality it does not cease to be in its own nature$ but is necessarilyoutside the sphere o# becomin/ and ceasin/ to be! 0or i# it came to be$somethin/ must have e%isted as a primary substratum #rom which it shouldcome and which should persist in it2 but this is its own special nature$ so thatit will be be#ore comin/ to be! 50or my de#inition o# matter is ust this-the

primary substratum o# each thin/$ #rom which it comes to be without.uali#ication$ and which persists in the result!6 And i# it ceases to be it will

pass into that at the last$ so it will have ceased to be be#ore ceasin/ to be!

*he accurate determination o# the #irst principle in respect o# #orm$ whetherit is one or many and what it is or what they are$ is the province o# the

primary type o# science2 so these .uestions may stand over till then! But o#the natural$ i!e! perishable$ #orms we shall speak in the e%positions which#ollow!

*he above$ then$ may be taken as su##icient to establish that there are principles and what they are and how many there are! 1ow let us make a#resh start and proceed!

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principle o# motion and o# stationariness 5in respect o# place$ or o# /rowthand decrease$ or by way o# alteration6! On the other hand$ a bed and a coatand anythin/ else o# that sort$ .ua receivin/ these desi/nations i!e! in so #aras they are products o# art-have no innate impulse to chan/e! But in so #ar asthey happen to be composed o# stone or o# earth or o# a mi%ture o# the two$

they do have such an impulse$ and ust to that e%tent which seems to indicatethat nature is a source or cause o# bein/ moved and o# bein/ at rest in that towhich it belon/s primarily$ in virtue o# itsel# and not in virtue o# aconcomitant attribute!

7 say 3not in virtue o# a concomitant attribute3$ because 5#or instance6 a manwho is a doctor mi/ht cure himsel#! 1evertheless it is not in so #ar as he is a

patient that he possesses the art o# medicine4 it merely has happened that thesame man is doctor and patient-and that is why these attributes are notalways #ound to/ether! So it is with all other arti#icial products! 1one o#them has in itsel# the source o# its own production! But while in some cases5#or instance houses and the other products o# manual labour6 that principleis in somethin/ else e%ternal to the thin/$ in others those which may cause achan/e in themselves in virtue o# a concomitant attribute-it lies in the thin/sthemselves 5but not in virtue o# what they are6!

31ature3 then is what has been stated! *hin/s 3have a nature3which have a principle o# this kind! )ach o# them is a substance2 #or it is a sub ect$ andnature always implies a sub ect in which it inheres!

*he term 3accordin/ to nature3 is applied to all these thin/s and also to theattributes which belon/ to them in virtue o# what they are$ #or instance the

property o# #ire to be carried upwards-which is not a 3nature3 nor 3has anature3 but is 3by nature3 or 3accordin/ to nature3!

"hat nature is$ then$ and the meanin/ o# the terms 3by nature3 and 3accordin/to nature3$ has been stated! *hat nature e%ists$ it would be absurd to try to

prove2 #or it is obvious that there are many thin/s o# this kind$ and to provewhat is obvious by what is not is the mark o# a man who is unable todistin/uish what is sel#-evident #rom what is not! 5*his state o# mind isclearly possible! A man blind #rom birth mi/ht reason about colours!

resumably there#ore such persons must be talkin/ about words without anythou/ht to correspond!6

Some identi#y the nature or substance o# a natural ob ect with that immediateconstituent o# it which taken by itsel# is without arran/ement$ e!/! the woodis the 3nature3 o# the bed$ and the bron9e the 3nature3 o# the statue!

As an indication o# this Antiphon points out that i# you planted a bed and therottin/ wood ac.uired the power o# sendin/ up a shoot$ it would not be a bedthat would come up$ but wood-which shows that the arran/ement inaccordance with the rules o# the art is merely an incidental attribute$ whereas


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the real nature is the other$ which$ #urther$ persists continuously throu/h the process o# makin/!

But i# the material o# each o# these ob ects has itsel# the same relation tosomethin/ else$ say bron9e 5or /old6 to water$ bones 5or wood6 to earth and

so on$ that 5they say6 would be their nature and essence! Conse.uently someassert earth$ others #ire or air or water or some or all o# these$ to be thenature o# the thin/s that are! 0or whatever any one o# them supposed to havethis character-whether one thin/ or more than one thin/-this or these hedeclared to be the whole o# substance$ all else bein/ its a##ections$ states$ ordispositions! )very such thin/ they held to be eternal 5#or it could not passinto anythin/ else6$ but other thin/s to come into bein/ and cease to be timeswithout number!

*his then is one account o# 3nature3$ namely that it is the immediate materialsubstratum o# thin/s which have in themselves a principle o# motion orchan/e!

Another account is that 3nature3 is the shape or #orm which is speci#ied in thede#inition o# the thin/!

0or the word 3nature3 is applied to what is accordin/ to nature and the naturalin the same way as 3art3 is applied to what is artistic or a work o# art! "eshould not say in the latter case that there is anythin/ artistic about a thin/$ i#it is a bed only potentially$ not yet havin/ the #orm o# a bed2 nor should wecall it a work o# art! *he same is true o# natural compounds! "hat is

potentially #lesh or bone has not yet its own 3nature3$ and does not e%ist untilit receives the #orm speci#ied in the de#inition$ which we name in de#inin/what #lesh or bone is! *hus in the second sense o# 3nature3 it would be theshape or #orm 5not separable e%cept in statement6 o# thin/s which have inthemselves a source o# motion! 5*he combination o# the two$ e!/! man$ is not3nature3 but 3by nature3 or 3natural3!6

*he #orm indeed is 3nature3 rather than the matter2 #or a thin/ is more properly said to be what it is when it has attained to #ul#ilment than when ite%ists potentially! A/ain man is born #rom man$ but not bed #rom bed! *hatis why people say that the #i/ure is not the nature o# a bed$ but the wood is-i#the bed sprouted not a bed but wood would come up! But even i# the #i/ureis art$ then on the same principle the shape o# man is his nature! 0or man is

born #rom man!

"e also speak o# a thin/3s nature as bein/ e%hibited in the process o# /rowth by which its nature is attained! *he 3nature3 in this sense is not like3doctorin/3$ which leads not to the art o# doctorin/ but to health! Doctorin/must start #rom the art$ not lead to it! But it is not in this way that nature 5inthe one sense6 is related to nature 5in the other6! "hat /rows .ua /rowin//rows #rom somethin/ into somethin/! 7nto what then does it /row8 1ot into


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that #rom which it arose but into that to which it tends! *he shape then isnature!

3Shape3 and 3nature3$ it should be added$ are in two senses! 0or the privationtoo is in a way #orm! But whether in un.uali#ied comin/ to be there is

privation$ i!e! a contrary to what comes to be$ we must consider later!Part 2

"e have distin/uished$ then$ the di##erent ways in which the term 3nature3 isused!

*he ne%t point to consider is how the mathematician di##ers #rom the physicist! Obviously physical bodies contain sur#aces and volumes$ lines and points$ and these are the sub ect-matter o# mathematics!

0urther$ is astronomy di##erent #rom physics or a department o# it8 7t seemsabsurd that the physicist should be supposed to know the nature o# sun ormoon$ but not to know any o# their essential attributes$ particularly as thewriters on physics obviously do discuss their shape also and whether theearth and the world are spherical or not!

1ow the mathematician$ thou/h he too treats o# these thin/s$ neverthelessdoes not treat o# them as the limits o# a physical body2 nor does he considerthe attributes indicated as the attributes o# such bodies! *hat is why heseparates them2 #or in thou/ht they are separable #rom motion$ and it makesno di##erence$ nor does any #alsity result$ i# they are separated! *he holderso# the theory o# 0orms do the same$ thou/h they are not aware o# it2 #or theyseparate the ob ects o# physics$ which are less separable than those o#mathematics! *his becomes plain i# one tries to state in each o# the two casesthe de#initions o# the thin/s and o# their attributes! 3Odd3 and 3even3$ 3strai/ht3and 3curved3$ and likewise 3number3$ 3line3$ and 3#i/ure3$ do not involvemotion2 not so 3#lesh3 and 3bone3 and 3man3-these are de#ined like 3snub nose3$not like 3curved3!

Similar evidence is supplied by the more physical o# the branches o#mathematics$ such as optics$ harmonics$ and astronomy! *hese are in a waythe converse o# /eometry! "hile /eometry investi/ates physical lines butnot .ua physical$ optics investi/ates mathematical lines$ but .ua physical$not .ua mathematical!

Since 3nature3 has two senses$ the #orm and the matter$ we must investi/ateits ob ects as we would the essence o# snubness! *hat is$ such thin/s areneither independent o# matter nor can be de#ined in terms o# matter only!Here too indeed one mi/ht raise a di##iculty! Since there are two natures$with which is the physicist concerned8 Or should he investi/ate thecombination o# the two8 But i# the combination o# the two$ then also each


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severally! Does it belon/ then to the same or to di##erent sciences to knoweach severally8

7# we look at the ancients$ physics would to be concerned with the matter! 57twas only very sli/htly that )mpedocles and Democritus touched on the

#orms and the essence!6But i# on the other hand art imitates nature$ and it is the part o# the samediscipline to know the #orm and the matter up to a point 5e!/! the doctor hasa knowled/e o# health and also o# bile and phle/m$ in which health isreali9ed$ and the builder both o# the #orm o# the house and o# the matter$namely that it is bricks and beams$ and so #orth64 i# this is so$ it would be the

part o# physics also to know nature in both its senses!

A/ain$ 3that #or the sake o# which3$ or the end$ belon/s to the samedepartment o# knowled/e as the means! But the nature is the end or 3that #orthe sake o# which3! 0or i# a thin/ under/oes a continuous chan/e and there isa sta/e which is last$ this sta/e is the end or 3that #or the sake o# which3!5*hat is why the poet was carried away into makin/ an absurd statementwhen he said 3he has the end #or the sake o# which he was born3! 0or notevery sta/e that is last claims to be an end$ but only that which is best!6

0or the arts make their material 5some simply 3make3 it$ others make itserviceable6$ and we use everythin/ as i# it was there #or our sake! 5"e alsoare in a sense an end! 3*hat #or the sake o# which3 has two senses4 thedistinction is made in our work On hilosophy!6 *he arts$ there#ore$ which/overn the matter and have knowled/e are two$ namely the art which usesthe product and the art which directs the production o# it! *hat is why theusin/ art also is in a sense directive2 but it di##ers in that it knows the #orm$whereas the art which is directive as bein/ concerned with production knowsthe matter! 0or the helmsman knows and prescribes what sort o# #orm a helmshould have$ the other #rom what wood it should be made and by means o#what operations! 7n the products o# art$ however$ we make the material witha view to the #unction$ whereas in the products o# nature the matter is thereall alon/!

A/ain$ matter is a relative term4 to each #orm there corresponds a specialmatter! How #ar then must the physicist know the #orm or essence8 @p to a

point$ perhaps$ as the doctor must know sinew or the smith bron9e 5i!e! untilhe understands the purpose o# each64 and the physicist is concerned onlywith thin/s whose #orms are separable indeed$ but do not e%ist apart #rommatter! Man is be/otten by man and by the sun as well! *he mode o#e%istence and essence o# the separable it is the business o# the primary typeo# philosophy to de#ine!

Part 3


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1ow that we have established these distinctions$ we must proceed toconsider causes$ their character and number! +nowled/e is the ob ect o# ourin.uiry$ and men do not think they know a thin/ till they have /rasped the3why3 o# 5which is to /rasp its primary cause6! So clearly we too must do thisas re/ards both comin/ to be and passin/ away and every kind o# physical

chan/e$ in order that$ knowin/ their principles$ we may try to re#er to these principles each o# our problems!

7n one sense$ then$ 5=6 that out o# which a thin/ comes to be and which persists$ is called 3cause3$ e!/! the bron9e o# the statue$ the silver o# the bowl$and the /enera o# which the bron9e and the silver are species!

7n another sense 5>6 the #orm or the archetype$ i!e! the statement o# theessence$ and its /enera$ are called 3causes3 5e!/! o# the octave the relation o#>4=$ and /enerally number6$ and the parts in the de#inition!

A/ain 5&6 the primary source o# the chan/e or comin/ to rest2 e!/! the manwho /ave advice is a cause$ the #ather is cause o# the child$ and /enerallywhat makes o# what is made and what causes chan/e o# what is chan/ed!

A/ain 5?6 in the sense o# end or 3that #or the sake o# which3 a thin/ is done$e!/! health is the cause o# walkin/ about! 53"hy is he walkin/ about83 wesay! 3*o be healthy3$ and$ havin/ said that$ we think we have assi/ned thecause!6 *he same is true also o# all the intermediate steps which are brou/htabout throu/h the action o# somethin/ else as means towards the end$ e!/!reduction o# #lesh$ pur/in/$ dru/s$ or sur/ical instruments are means towardshealth! All these thin/s are 3#or the sake o#3 the end$ thou/h they di##er #romone another in that some are activities$ others instruments!

*his then perhaps e%hausts the number o# ways in which the term 3cause3 isused!

As the word has several senses$ it #ollows that there are several causes o# thesame thin/ not merely in virtue o# a concomitant attribute6$ e!/! both the arto# the sculptor and the bron9e are causes o# the statue! *hese are causes o#the statue .ua statue$ not in virtue o# anythin/ else that it may be-only not inthe same way$ the one bein/ the material cause$ the other the cause whencethe motion comes! Some thin/s cause each other reciprocally$ e!/! hard workcauses #itness and vice versa$ but a/ain not in the same way$ but the one asend$ the other as the ori/in o# chan/e! 0urther the same thin/ is the cause o#contrary results! 0or that which by its presence brin/s about one result issometimes blamed #or brin/in/ about the contrary by its absence! *hus weascribe the wreck o# a ship to the absence o# the pilot whose presence wasthe cause o# its sa#ety!

All the causes now mentioned #all into #our #amiliar divisions! *he lettersare the causes o# syllables$ the material o# arti#icial products$ #ire$ c!$ o#


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bodies$ the parts o# the whole$ and the premisses o# the conclusion$ in thesense o# 3that #rom which3! O# these pairs the one set are causes in the senseo# substratum$ e!/! the parts$ the other set in the sense o# essence-the wholeand the combination and the #orm! But the seed and the doctor and theadviser$ and /enerally the maker$ are all sources whence the chan/e or

stationariness ori/inates$ while the others are causes in the sense o# the endor the /ood o# the rest2 #or 3that #or the sake o# which3 means what is best andthe end o# the thin/s that lead up to it! 5"hether we say the 3/ood itsel# orthe 3apparent /ood3 makes no di##erence!6

Such then is the number and nature o# the kinds o# cause! 1ow the modes o# causation are many$ thou/h when brou/ht under headsthey too can be reduced in number! 0or 3cause3 is used in many senses andeven within the same kind one may be prior to another 5e!/! the doctor andthe e%pert are causes o# health$ the relation >4= and number o# the octave6$and always what is inclusive to what is particular! Another mode o#causation is the incidental and its /enera$ e!/! in one way 3 olyclitus3$ inanother 3sculptor3 is the cause o# a statue$ because 3bein/ olyclitus3 and3sculptor3 are incidentally con oined! Also the classes in which the incidentalattribute is included2 thus 3a man3 could be said to be the cause o# a statue or$/enerally$ 3a livin/ creature3! An incidental attribute too may be more or lessremote$ e!/! suppose that 3a pale man3 or 3a musical man3 were said to be thecause o# the statue!

All causes$ both proper and incidental$ may be spoken o# either as potentialor as actual2 e!/! the cause o# a house bein/ built is either 3house-builder3 or3house-builder buildin/3!

Similar distinctions can be made in the thin/s o# which the causes arecauses$ e!/! o# 3this statue3 or o# 3statue3 or o# 3ima/e3 /enerally$ o# 3this

bron9e3 or o# 3bron9e3 or o# 3material3 /enerally! So too with the incidentalattributes! A/ain we may use a comple% e%pression #or either and say$ e!/!neither 3 olyclitus3 nor 3sculptor3 but 3 olyclitus$ sculptor3!

All these various uses$ however$ come to si% in number$ under each o# whicha/ain the usa/e is two#old! Cause means either what is particular or a /enus$or an incidental attribute or a /enus o# that$ and these either as a comple% oreach by itsel#2 and all si% either as actual or as potential! *he di##erence isthis much$ that causes which are actually at work and particular e%ist andcease to e%ist simultaneously with their e##ect$ e!/! this healin/ person withthis bein/-healed person and that house-buildin/ man with that bein/-builthouse2 but this is not always true o# potential causes--the house and thehousebuilder do not pass away simultaneously!

7n investi/atin/ the cause o# each thin/ it is always necessary to seek what ismost precise 5as also in other thin/s64 thus man builds because he is a

builder$ and a builder builds in virtue o# his art o# buildin/! *his last cause


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then is prior4 and so /enerally!

0urther$ /eneric e##ects should be assi/ned to /eneric causes$ particulare##ects to particular causes$ e!/! statue to sculptor$ this statue to this sculptor2and powers are relative to possible e##ects$ actually operatin/ causes to

thin/s which are actually bein/ e##ected!*his must su##ice #or our account o# the number o# causes and the modes o#causation!

Part 4

But chance also and spontaneity are reckoned amon/ causes4 many thin/sare said both to be and to come to be as a result o# chance and spontaneity!"e must in.uire there#ore in what manner chance and spontaneity are

present amon/ the causes enumerated$ and whether they are the same ordi##erent$ and /enerally what chance and spontaneity are!

Some people even .uestion whether they are real or not! *hey say thatnothin/ happens by chance$ but that everythin/ which we ascribe to chanceor spontaneity has some de#inite cause$ e!/! comin/ 3by chance3 into themarket and #indin/ there a man whom one wanted but did not e%pect to meetis due to one3s wish to /o and buy in the market! Similarly in other cases o#chance it is always possible$ they maintain$ to #ind somethin/ which is thecause2 but not chance$ #or i# chance were real$ it would seem stran/e indeed$and the .uestion mi/ht be raised$ why on earth none o# the wise men o# oldin speakin/ o# the causes o# /eneration and decay took account o# chance2whence it would seem that they too did not believe that anythin/ is bychance! But there is a #urther circumstance that is surprisin/! Many thin/s

both come to be and are by chance and spontaneity$ and althou/h know thateach o# them can be ascribed to some cause 5as the old ar/ument said whichdenied chance6$ nevertheless they speak o# some o# these thin/s ashappenin/ by chance and others not! 0or this reason also they ou/ht to haveat least re#erred to the matter in some way or other!

Certainly the early physicists #ound no place #or chance amon/ the causeswhich they reco/ni9ed-love$ stri#e$ mind$ #ire$ or the like! *his is stran/e$whether they supposed that there is no such thin/ as chance or whether theythou/ht there is but omitted to mention it-and that too when they sometimesused it$ as )mpedocles does when he says that the air is not always separatedinto the hi/hest re/ion$ but 3as it may chance3! At any rate he says in hiscosmo/ony that 3it happened to run that way at that time$ but it o#ten ranotherwise!3 He tells us also that most o# the parts o# animals came to be bychance!

*here are some too who ascribe this heavenly sphere and all the worlds tospontaneity! *hey say that the vorte% arose spontaneously$ i!e! the motion


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that separated and arran/ed in its present order all that e%ists! *his statementmi/ht well cause surprise! 0or they are assertin/ that chance is notresponsible #or the e%istence or /eneration o# animals and plants$ nature ormind or somethin/ o# the kind bein/ the cause o# them 5#or it is not anychance thin/ that comes #rom a /iven seed but an olive #rom one kind and a

man #rom another62 and yet at the same time they assert that the heavenlysphere and the divinest o# visible thin/s arose spontaneously$ havin/ no suchcause as is assi/ned to animals and plants! et i# this is so$ it is a #act whichdeserves to be dwelt upon$ and somethin/ mi/ht well have been said aboutit! 0or besides the other absurdities o# the statement$ it is the more absurdthat people should make it when they see nothin/ comin/ to bespontaneously in the heavens$ but much happenin/ by chance amon/ thethin/s which as they say are not due to chance2 whereas we should havee%pected e%actly the opposite!

Others there are who$ indeed$ believe that chance is a cause$ but that it isinscrutable to human intelli/ence$ as bein/ a divine thin/ and #ull o#mystery!

*hus we must in.uire what chance and spontaneity are$ whether they are thesame or di##erent$ and how they #it into our division o# causes!

Part 5

0irst then we observe that some thin/s always come to pass in the same way$and others #or the most part! 7t is clearly o# neither o# these that chance issaid to be the cause$ nor can the 3e##ect o# chance3 be identi#ied with any o#the thin/s that come to pass by necessity and always$ or #or the most part!But as there is a third class o# events besides these two-events which all sayare 3by chance3-it is plain that there is such a thin/ as chance andspontaneity2 #or we know that thin/s o# this kind are due to chance and thatthin/s due to chance are o# this kind!

But$ secondly$ some events are #or the sake o# somethin/$ others not! A/ain$some o# the #ormer class are in accordance with deliberate intention$ othersnot$ but both are in the class o# thin/s which are #or the sake o# somethin/!Hence it is clear that even amon/ the thin/s which are outside the necessaryand the normal$ there are some in conne%ion withwhich the phrase 3#or thesake o# somethin/3 is applicable! 5)vents that are #or the sake o# somethin/include whatever may be done as a result o# thou/ht or o# nature!6 *hin/s o#this kind$ then$ when they come to pass incidental are said to be 3by chance3!0or ust as a thin/ is somethin/ either in virtue o# itsel# or incidentally$ somay it be a cause! 0or instance$ the housebuildin/ #aculty is in virtue o# itsel#the cause o# a house$ whereas the pale or the musical is the incidental cause!*hat which is per se cause o# the e##ect is determinate$ but the incidentalcause is indeterminable$ #or the possible attributes o# an individual areinnumerable! *o resume then2 when a thin/ o# this kind comes to pass


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a##irms the essence o# the attribute$ i/norin/ the hair3s breadth o# di##erence!0urther$ it is with reason that /ood #ortune is re/arded as unstable2 #orchance is unstable$ as none o# the thin/s which result #rom it can beinvariable or normal!

Both are then$ as 7 have said$ incidental causes-both chance and spontaneity-in the sphere o# thin/s which are capable o# comin/ to pass not necessarily$nor normally$ and with re#erence to such o# these as mi/ht come to pass #orthe sake o# somethin/!

Part 6

*hey di##er in that 3spontaneity3 is the wider term! )very result o# chance is#rom what is spontaneous$ but not everythin/ that is #rom what isspontaneous is #rom chance!

Chance and what results #rom chance are appropriate to a/ents that arecapable o# /ood #ortune and o# moral action /enerally! *here#ore necessarilychance is in the sphere o# moral actions! *his is indicated by the #act that/ood #ortune is thou/ht to be the same$ or nearly the same$ as happiness$ andhappiness to be a kind o# moral action$ since it is well-doin/! Hence what isnot capable o# moral action cannot do anythin/ by chance! *hus aninanimate thin/ or a lower animal or a child cannot do anythin/ by chance$

because it is incapable o# deliberate intention2 nor can 3/ood #ortune3 or 3ill#ortune3 be ascribed to them$ e%cept metaphorically$ as rotarchus$ #ore%ample$ said that the stones o# which altars are made are #ortunate becausethey are held in honour$ while their #ellows are trodden under #oot! )venthese thin/s$ however$ can in a way be a##ected by chance$ when one who isdealin/ with them does somethin/ to them by chance$ but not otherwise!

*he spontaneous on the other hand is #ound both in the lower animals and inmany inanimate ob ects! "e say$ #or e%ample$ that the horse came3spontaneously3$ because$ thou/h his comin/ saved him$ he did not come #orthe sake o# sa#ety! A/ain$ the tripod #ell 3o# itsel#3$ because$ thou/h when it#ell it stood on its #eet so as to serve #or a seat$ it did not #all #or the sake o#that!

Hence it is clear that events which 5=6 belon/ to the /eneral class o# thin/sthat may come to pass #or the sake o# somethin/$ 5>6 do not come to pass #orthe sake o# what actually results$ and 5&6 have an e%ternal cause$ may bedescribed by the phrase 3#rom spontaneity3! *hese 3spontaneous3 events aresaid to be 3#rom chance3 i# they have the #urther characteristics o# bein/ theob ects o# deliberate intention and due to a/ents capable o# that mode o#action! *his is indicated by the phrase 3in vain3$ which is used when A whichis #or the sake o# B$ does not result in B! 0or instance$ takin/ a walk is #orthe sake o# evacuation o# the bowels2 i# this does not #ollow a#ter walkin/$we say that we have walked 3in vain3 and that the walkin/ was 3vain3! *his


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implies that what is naturally the means to an end is 3in vain3$ when it doesnot e##ect the end towards which it was the natural means-#or it would beabsurd #or a man to say that he had bathed in vain because the sun was noteclipsed$ since the one was not done with a view to the other! *hus thespontaneous is even accordin/ to its derivation the case in which the thin/

itsel# happens in vain! *he stone that struck the man did not #all #or the purpose o# strikin/ him2 there#ore it #ell spontaneously$ because it mi/hthave #allen by the action o# an a/ent and #or the purpose o# strikin/! *hedi##erence between spontaneity and what results by chance is /reatest inthin/s that come to be by nature2 #or when anythin/ comes to be contrary tonature$ we do not say that it came to be by chance$ but by spontaneity! etstrictly this too is di##erent #rom the spontaneous proper2 #or the cause o# thelatter is e%ternal$ that o# the #ormer internal!

"e have now e%plained what chance is and what spontaneity is$ and in whatthey di##er #rom each other! Both belon/ to the mode o# causation 3source o#chan/e3$ #or either some natural or some intelli/ent a/ent is always thecause2 but in this sort o# causation the number o# possible causes is in#inite!

Spontaneity and chance are causes o# e##ects which thou/h they mi/ht result#rom intelli/ence or nature$ have in #act been caused by somethin/incidentally! 1ow since nothin/ which is incidental is prior to what is per se$it is clear that no incidental cause can be prior to a cause per se! Spontaneityand chance$ there#ore$ are posterior to intelli/ence and nature! Hence$however true it may be that the heavens are due to spontaneity$ it will still betrue that intelli/ence and nature will be prior causes o# this All and o# manythin/s in it besides!

Part 7

7t is clear then that there are causes$ and that the number o# them is what wehave stated! *he number is the same as that o# the thin/s comprehendedunder the .uestion 3why3! *he 3why3 is re#erred ultimately either 5=6$ in thin/swhich do not involve motion$ e!/! in mathematics$ to the 3what3 5to thede#inition o# 3strai/ht line3 or 3commensurable3$ c!6$ or 5>6 to what initiateda motion$ e!/! 3why did they /o to war8-because there had been a raid32 or 5&6we are in.uirin/ 3#or the sake o# what83-3that they may rule32 or 5?6$ in thecase o# thin/s that come into bein/$ we are lookin/ #or the matter! *hecauses$ there#ore$ are these and so many in number!

1ow$ the causes bein/ #our$ it is the business o# the physicist to know aboutthem all$ and i# he re#ers his problems back to all o# them$ he will assi/n the3why3 in the way proper to his science-the matter$ the #orm$ the mover$ 3that#or the sake o# which3! *he last three o#ten coincide2 #or the 3what3 and 3that#or the sake o# which3 are one$ while the primary source o# motion is thesame in species as these 5#or man /enerates man6$ and so too$ in /eneral$ areall thin/s which cause movement by bein/ themselves moved2 and such as


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are not o# this kind are no lon/er inside the province o# physics$ #or theycause motion not by possessin/ motion or a source o# motion in themselves$

but bein/ themselves incapable o# motion! Hence there are three branches o#study$ one o# thin/s which are incapable o# motion$ the second o# thin/s inmotion$ but indestructible$ the third o# destructible thin/s!

*he .uestion 3why3$ then$ is answered by re#erence to the matter$ to the #orm$and to the primary movin/ cause! 0or in respect o# comin/ to be it is mostlyin this last way that causes are investi/ated-3what comes to be a#ter what8what was the primary a/ent or patient83 and so at each step o# the series!

1ow the principles which cause motion in a physical way are two$ o# whichone is not physical$ as it has no principle o# motion in itsel#! O# this kind iswhatever causes movement$ not bein/ itsel# moved$ such as 5=6 that which iscompletely unchan/eable$ the primary reality$ and 5>6 the essence o# thatwhich is comin/ to be$ i!e! the #orm2 #or this is the end or 3that #or the sake o#which3! Hence since nature is #or the sake o# somethin/$ we must know thiscause also! "e must e%plain the 3why3 in all the senses o# the term$ namely$5=6 that #rom this that will necessarily result 53#rom this3 either without.uali#ication or in most cases62 5>6 that 3this must be so i# that is to be so3 5asthe conclusion presupposes the premisses62 5&6 that this was the essence o#the thin/2 and 5?6 because it is better thus 5not without .uali#ication$ but withre#erence to the essential nature in each case6!

Part

"e must e%plain then 5=6 that 1ature belon/s to the class o# causes whichact #or the sake o# somethin/2 5>6 about the necessary and its place in

physical problems$ #or all writers ascribe thin/s to this cause$ ar/uin/ thatsince the hot and the cold$ c!$ are o# such and such a kind$ there#ore certainthin/s necessarily are and come to be-and i# they mention any other cause5one his 3#riendship and stri#e3$ another his 3mind36$ it is only to touch on it$and then /ood-bye to it!

A di##iculty presents itsel#4 why should not nature work$ not #or the sake o#somethin/$ nor because it is better so$ but ust as the sky rains$ not in orderto make the corn /row$ but o# necessity8 "hat is drawn up must cool$ andwhat has been cooled must become water and descend$ the result o# this

bein/ that the corn /rows! Similarly i# a man3s crop is spoiled on thethreshin/-#loor$ the rain did not #all #or the sake o# this-in order that the cropmi/ht be spoiled-but that result ust #ollowed! "hy then should it not be thesame with the parts in nature$ e!/! that our teeth should come up o#necessity-the #ront teeth sharp$ #itted #or tearin/$ the molars broad and use#ul#or /rindin/ down the #ood-since they did not arise #or this end$ but it wasmerely a coincident result2 and so with all other parts in which we supposethat there is purpose8 "herever then all the parts came about ust what theywould have been i# they had come be #or an end$ such thin/s survived$ bein/


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or/ani9ed spontaneously in a #ittin/ way2 whereas those which /rewotherwise perished and continue to perish$ as )mpedocles says his 3man-#aced o%-pro/eny3 did!

Such are the ar/uments 5and others o# the kind6 which may cause di##iculty

on this point! et it is impossible that this should be the true view! 0or teethand all other natural thin/s either invariably or normally come about in a/iven way2 but o# not one o# the results o# chance or spontaneity is this true!"e do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence the #re.uency o# rain inwinter$ but #re.uent rain in summer we do2 nor heat in the do/-days$ butonly i# we have it in winter! 7# then$ it is a/reed that thin/s are either theresult o# coincidence or #or an end$ and these cannot be the result o#coincidence or spontaneity$ it #ollows that they must be #or an end2 and thatsuch thin/s are all due to nature even the champions o# the theory which is

be#ore us would a/ree! *here#ore action #or an end is present in thin/s whichcome to be and are by nature!

0urther$ where a series has a completion$ all the precedin/ steps are #or thesake o# that! 1ow surely as in intelli/ent action$ so in nature2 and as innature$ so it is in each action$ i# nothin/ inter#eres! 1ow intelli/ent action is#or the sake o# an end2 there#ore the nature o# thin/s also is so! *hus i# ahouse$ e!/! had been a thin/ made by nature$ it would have been made in thesame way as it is now by art2 and i# thin/s made by nature were made also

by art$ they would come to be in the same way as by nature! )ach step thenin the series is #or the sake o# the ne%t2 and /enerally art partly completeswhat nature cannot brin/ to a #inish$ and partly imitates her! 7#$ there#ore$arti#icial products are #or the sake o# an end$ so clearly also are natural

products! *he relation o# the later to the earlier terms o# the series is thesame in both! *his is most obvious in the animals other than man4 they makethin/s neither by art nor a#ter in.uiry or deliberation! "here#ore peoplediscuss whether it is by intelli/ence or by some other #aculty that thesecreatures work$spiders$ ants$ and the like! By /radual advance in thisdirection we come to see clearly that in plants too that is produced which isconducive to the end-leaves$ e!/! /row to provide shade #or the #ruit! 7# thenit is both by nature and #or an end that the swallow makes its nest and thespider its web$ and plants /row leaves #or the sake o# the #ruit and send theirroots down 5not up6 #or the sake o# nourishment$ it is plain that this kind o#cause is operative in thin/s which come to be and are by nature! And since3nature3 means two thin/s$ the matter and the #orm$ o# which the latter is theend$ and since all the rest is #or the sake o# the end$ the #orm must be thecause in the sense o# 3that #or the sake o# which3!

1ow mistakes come to pass even in the operations o# art4 the /rammarianmakes a mistake in writin/ and the doctor pours out the wron/ dose! Henceclearly mistakes are possible in the operations o# nature also! 7# then in artthere are cases in which what is ri/htly produced serves a purpose$ and i#where mistakes occur there was a purpose in what was attempted$ only it


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was not attained$ so must it be also in natural products$ and monstrositieswill be #ailures in the purposive e##ort! *hus in the ori/inal combinations the3o%-pro/eny3 i# they #ailed to reach a determinate end must have arisenthrou/h the corruption o# some principle correspondin/ to what is now theseed!

0urther$ seed must have come into bein/ #irst$ and not strai/htway theanimals4 the words 3whole-natured #irst!!!3 must have meant seed!

A/ain$ in plants too we #ind the relation o# means to end$ thou/h the de/reeo# or/ani9ation is less! "ere there then in plants also 3olive-headed vine-

pro/eny3$ like the 3man-headed o%-pro/eny3$ or not8 An absurd su//estion2yet there must have been$ i# there were such thin/s amon/ animals!

Moreover$ amon/ the seeds anythin/ must have come to be at random! Butthe person who asserts this entirely does away with 3nature3 and what e%ists3by nature3! 0or those thin/s are natural which$ by a continuous movementori/inated #rom an internal principle$ arrive at some completion4 the samecompletion is not reached #rom every principle2 nor any chance completion$

but always the tendency in each is towards the same end$ i# there is noimpediment!

*he end and the means towards it may come about by chance! "e say$ #orinstance$ that a stran/er has come by chance$ paid the ransom$ and /oneaway$ when he does so as i# he had come #or that purpose$ thou/h it was not#or that that he came! *his is incidental$ #or chance is an incidental cause$ as7 remarked be#ore! But when an event takes place always or #or the most

part$ it is not incidental or by chance! 7n natural products the se.uence isinvariable$ i# there is no impediment!

7t is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not observethe a/ent deliberatin/! Art does not deliberate! 7# the ship-buildin/ art werein the wood$ it would produce the same results by nature! 7#$ there#ore$

purpose is present in art$ it is present also in nature! *he best illustration is adoctor doctorin/ himsel#4 nature is like that!

7t is plain then that nature is a cause$ a cause that operates #or a purpose!

Part !

As re/ards what is 3o# necessity3$ we must ask whether the necessity is3hypothetical3$ or 3simple3 as well! *he current view places what is o#necessity in the process o# production$ ust as i# one were to suppose that thewall o# a house necessarily comes to be because what is heavy is naturallycarried downwards and what is li/ht to the top$ where#ore the stones and#oundations take the lowest place$ with earth above because it is li/hter$ andwood at the top o# all as bein/ the li/htest! "hereas$ thou/h the wall does


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