Assistant Secretary of Defense forC ommfd, ContfQ6ý.Communications, andI nellgence U) 697-5568

"DOD 5200.8-R

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEAD'-A268 09

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DTIC8ELECTE_

AU I k"

PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM

93-18163 MAY 1991

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

50272-101

REPORT DOCUMENTATION 1. REPORT NO. 3. Reipiefft's Accession No.'*AGE DoD 5200.8-11

4. r'e-andSubtitle 5. neportDate

rnysical Security Program May 19916.

7. Aut~os) L Performing Orgnization ept.

D. Cavileer No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Proiect/Tasl"Wok UnitNo.

Under Secretary of Defense for PolicyWashington, DC 20301

11. Contract(C)or Grant(G) No.(ca(G)

12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address 13. TypeofReporP ert&f dcoveredRegulation

14.

Is. Supplementary Noes

16. Abstract(Limit: 200words)This Regulation describes the DoD Physical Security Proaram including threat statements, assetpriorities, installation requirements, and guidance for tle physical security of weapons systems,POL, communication facilities and sensitive materie!.

17. oocument Analysisa. Desciptors

b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms

c. COSATI Fied/Group

IC. AvalabilityStatement 11. Security Class (This Report) 21. No.ofPagesRelease unlimited for sale by the National Technical UNCLASSIFIEDInformation Service (NTIS)

20. Security Class (This Page) 22. PriceUNCLASSIFIED

(See ANSI-Z39.1) See Instructions on Reverse OPTIONAL FORM 272 (4-77)(Formerly NTIS-35)Department of Commerce

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

POLICY May 13, 1991FOREWORD

This Regulation is issued under the authority of DoD Directive5200.8, "Security of DoD Installations and Resources" (April 25,1991). It prescribes standards and policy relating to thephysical protection of military installations and assets of theDepartment of Defense.

This Regulation applies to the Office of the Secretary ofDefense (OSD); the Military Departments (including theirNational Guard and Reserve components); the Chairman, JointChiefs of Staff and Joint Staff; the Unified and SpecifiedCommands; the Inspector General of the Department of Defense(IG, DoD); and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred tocollectively as "DoD Components").

This Regulation is effective immediately. Implementation within180 days from date of issuance is mandatory for all DoDComponents.

It is understood that the review of existing physical securityplans and operational concepts will take 1 year, with securityupgrades extending through the fiscal year Defense plan inaccordance with the methods in Chapter 2 of this Regulation.

Send recommended changes to this Regulation through channels to:

Director, Security Plans and ProgramsOffice of the Deputy Under Secretary

of Defense (Security Policy)Room 3C278, The PentagonWashington, DC 20301-2200

DoD Components may obtain copies of this Regulation throughtheir own publications channels. Other Federal agencies and thepublic may obtain copies from the Department of Commerce,National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road,Springfield, VA 22161.

PAUL WOLFO TITZ

ii

ip

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAge

Foreword . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . .

Table of Contents .... . . . . . . .iii

Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . * 9.. . . . . . . . v

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... vii

CHAPTER 1-GENERAL INFORMATION

A. Purpose i-I ....."B. ApplicabilityandScope .............. 1C. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

CHAPTER 2-POLICY

A. Physical Security Program .......... . . . . . . 2-1B. Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2C. Security System Performance Goal . . . . . . . . . . 2-3D. Physical Security Threat Matrix . . . . . . 0 . . . 2-3E. Prioritization of Assets . . . . . . . ..•.• . . . 2-5F. Physical Security Planning and System Acuisition . 2-5G. Protective Design and Military Construction . . . . 2-5H. Security of Leased Facilities . . ........ 2-5

CHAPTER 3. INSTALLATION ACCESS AND CIRCULATION CONTROL

A. General ......... 0 0 0..... . .. 0..... 3-1B. Policy ... 3-1

C. Installation Access . . . 31D. Emergency Planning .. .............. 3-2

CHAPTER 4-SECURITY OF WEAPON SYSTEMS AND PLATFORMS

A. General 0. . 0. .. .. .. . ... 0..... .. 4-1B. Policy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 4-1

CHAPTER 5-PROTECTION OF BULK PETROLEUM PRODUCTSA. General .00. . ._ . . . . 00.. 0......... 5-1B. Policy " . . . . . . . i i "a . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . 5-1

C. Security Planning and Liaison ........... 5-1

iii

CHAPTER 6-SECURITY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

A. General . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1B. Policy ... 6-1

C. Responsibilities " " s .............. 6-2D. Mobile Communications Systems . . . . . . . ... 6-3

CHAPTER 7-SECURITY OF MATERIEL

A. General o o. .. . . . . *.. .. . . . . . . .. . . 7-1B4 Policy . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 7-1

C. Responsibilities . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1D . Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . 7-2

iv

FIGURES

2-i Physical Security Threat Matrix ........... 2-4

2-2 Resource and Asset Priorities .......... . 2-6

II

VITO QUjTTy iNspEcTED 3

Accession For •

UIS GPA&IDTIC TAB fl

Distribution/Availablilty Codos

'Avail and/or

Dist SpOQia.vLJ

REFERENCES

(a) DoD Directive 5200.8, "Security of DoD Installations andResources" April 25, 1991

(b) DoD Regulation 5200.1-R, "DoD Information SecurityProgram," June 1, 1986, authorized by DoD Directive5200.1, June 9,1982

(c) Director, Central Intelligence Directive 1/21, "PhysicalSecurity Standards for Sensitive Compartmented InformationFacilities (SCIFs)," September 1, 1987

(d) Defense Tntelligence Agency Manual 50-3, "Manual forPhysical Security Standards for Sensitive CompartmentedInformation Facilities,'° February 28, 1990

(e) DoD Manual C-5210.41-M, "Nuclear Weapon SecurityManual(U)," September 1987, authorized by DoD Directive5210.41, September 23, 1938

(f) DoD Directive 5210.65, "Chemical Agent Security Program,"October 15, 1986

(g) DoD Directive 5210.63, "Security of Nucleai Reactors andSpecial Nuclear Materials," April 6, 1990

(h) DoD Manual 5100.76-M, "Physical Security of SensitiveConventional Arms, Ammunition & Explosives," December 28,1988, authorized by DoD Directive 5100.76, February 10,1981

(i) DoD Directive 0-5205.7, "Special Access Program (SAP)Policy," 4 January, 1989

(j) DoD Directive 3224.3, "Physical Security Equipment (PSE):Assipnme'it of Responsibility for Research, Development,Testing, Evaluation, Productioa, Procurement, Deploymentand Support," February 17, 1989

(k) MIL-HNBK-1013i1, "Design Guidelines for Physical Securityof Fixed Land-Based Facilities," October 1987

(1) MIL-STD-1785, "System Security Engineering ProgramManagement Requirements," September 1, 19890

(m) DoD Directive 0-2000.12, "DoD Combatting TerrorismProgram", August 27, 1990

(n) Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 1301.71through 1301.76

(o) Public Law 91-513, "Comprehensive Drug AbusePrevention and Control Act of 1970"

(p) MIL-STD-1388-2A, "DoD Requirement for a Logistic SupportAnalysis Record," March 17, 1981

(q) DoD Regulation 4145.19-R-1, "Storage and MaterialsHandling," September 15, 1979, authorized by DoD Directive4145.19, August 13, 1975

(r) DoD Manual 4100.39-M, "Defense Integrated Data Systems(DIDS) Procedures Manual," Volume 10, Table 61, September11, 1980, authorized by DoD Directive 4100.39. September11, 1980

(s) DLA Joint Regulation 4145.11, "Safeguarding of DLASensitive Inventory Items, Controlled Substances, andPilferable Items of Supply," February 1, 1990

vi

DEFINITIONS

I. Critical Communications Facility. A communications facilitythat is essential to the continuity of operations of theNational Command Authority (NCA) duriný national emergencies,and other nodal points or elements designated as crucial tomission accomplishment.

2. Electronic Security Systems (ESS). That part or physicalsecurity concerned with the safeguarding of personnel andproperty by use of electronic systems. These systems include,but are not limited to, intrusion detection systems (IDS),automated entry control systems (AECS), and video assessmentsystems.

3. Installations. Real DoD properties including bases,stations, forts, depots, arsenals, plants (both contractor andGovernment operated), hospitals, terminals, and other specialmission facilities, as well as those used primarily for militarypurposes.

4. National Defense Area (NDA). An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessionsor territories, for safeguarding classified information, orprotecting DoD equipment and/or materiel. Establishment of aNDA temporarily places such non-Federal lands under effectivecontrol of the Department of Defense and results only from anemergency event. The senior DoD representative at the sceneshall define the boundary, mark all avenues of approach with aphysical barrier, and post warning signs if authorized by theappropriate military commander. The land owner's consent andcooperation should be obtained whenever possible; however,military necessity sha]l dictate the final decision on location,shape, and size of the NDA.

5. Physical Security. That part of security concerned withphysical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to preventunauthorized access to equipment, installations, materiel, anddocuments; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage,damage and theft.

6. Restricted Area. An area to which entry is subject tospecial restrictions or control for security reasons, or tosafeguard property or materiel. This does not include thosedesignated areas restricting or prohibiting overflight byaircraft. Restricted areas may be of different types dependingon the nature and varying degree of importance of the securityinterest, or other matter contained therein. Restricted areasmust be authorized by the installation/activity commander,properly posted, and shall employ physical security measures.

vii

7. Survivability. The ability to withstand or repel attack, orotheý ýhostile actiong to the extent that essential functions cancontinue or be resumed after onset of hostile action.

8. Systems Security Engineering (SSE). An element of system-engineering enýineering princapplies scientific and iplesto identify security vulnerabilities and minimize or containrisks associated with these vulnerabilities. SSE usesmathematicalq physical, and related scientific disciplines, andthe principles and methods of engineering design and analysis tospecify., predictq and evaluate the vulnerability of the systemto security threats.

viii

CHAPm1 R 1

GENERAL INFORMATIONA. PURPOSE

In accordance with the requirements of DoD Directive 5200.8(reference (a)), this Regulation prescribes DoD policies andminimum standards for the physical protection of DoD personnel,installations, operations, and assets.

B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

1. This Regulation addresses the physical security ofpersonnel, installations, operations, and assets of DoDComponents. In overseas areas, combatant commanders may deviatefrom the policies in this regulation where local conditions,treaties, agreements, and other arrangements with foreigngovernments and allied forces require.

2. This repulation is intended to provide general minimumrequirements which are supplemented by specific asset or uniqueprogram-related physical security policies. Detailed andseparate instructions are provided for the following assets thatare normally found on military installations:

a. Classified Information. See DoD 5200.1-R (reference(b)).

b. Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities. SeeDCID 1/21 and DIAM 50-3 (reference (c) and reference (d)).

c. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapon Systems. See DoDC-5210.41-M (reference (e)).

d. Chemical Agents. See DoD Directive 5210.65(reference (fO.

e. Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials. SeeDoD Directive 5210.63 (reference (g)).

f. Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives. SeeDoD 5100.76-M (reference (h)).

g. Special Access Programs. See DoD Directive 0-5205.7(reference (i)).

3. During transition to war and following commencement ofhostilities, Commanders of Unified and Specified Comnands mayprescribe procedures that modify specific provisions of thisRegulation as local conditions and regional threats require.However, security operations and procedures must ensure themaximum protection of Government personnel and property. Underthese conditions, these commanders may delegate that authorityto unit or installation commanders.

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4. This Regulation neither abrogates nor abridges theauthority or responsibility of commands to apply more stringentsecurity standards required by other DoD Directives, duringemergencies, or at any time required to meet the regionalthreat.

C. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this Regulation are to do the following:

1. Establish general policy for the security of personneland installations, military operations, and certain assets.

2. Provide realistic guidance, general procedures, and thenecessary flexibility for commanders to protect personnel,installations, operations, and assets from typical threats.

3. Reduce the loss, theft, or diversion of, and damage to,DoD assets, thereby ensuring that warfighting capability ismaintained.

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CHAPTER 2

POLICY

A. PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM

1. The physical security program is defined as that partof security concerned with active and passive measures designedto prevent unauthorized access to personnel, equipment,installations, materiel and documents, and to safeguard themagainst espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. Physicalsecurity is a primary command responsibility.

2. Physical security programs provide the means to counterthreats during peacetime, transition to war, and in wartime.Physical security threats include the following:

a. Foreign intelligence services.

b. Paramilitary forces.

c. Terrorists and saboteurs.

d. Criminals.

e. Protest groups.

f. Disaffected persons.

3. Physical security planning includes the following:

a. Using electronic security systems to reduce bothvulnerability to the threat and reliance on fixed securityforces.

b. Integration of physical security into contingency,mobilization, and wartime plans, and testing of physicalsecurity procedures and measures during the exercise of theseplans.

c. Coordinating with installation operations security,crime prevention, information security, personnel security,communications security, automated information security andphysical security programs to provide an integrated and coherenteffort.

d. Training security forces at facilities or sites intactical defense against, and response to, attemptedpenetrations.

e. Creating and sustaining physical security awareness.

f. Identifying resource requirements to apply adequatemeasures.

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4. Physical security measures are a combination of activeor passive systems, devices, and security personnelused to protect a security interest from possible threats.These measures include:

a. Security forces and owner or user personnel.

b. Military working dogs.

c. Physical barriers, facility hardening and activedelay or denial systems.

d. Secure locking systems, containers, and vaults.

e. Intrusion detection systems.

f. Assessment or surveillance systems (i.e., closed-circuit television or thermal imagers).

g. Protective lighting.

h. Badging systems, access control devices, materiel orasset tagging systems, and contraband detection equipment.

B. RESPONSIBILITIES

The DoD Component shall designate a point of contact to overseethe physical security program. The oversight function includesthe following:

1. Develop necessary standard policies and procedures tosupplement the provisions of this regulation to meet specificnceds, including joint supplementation, when possible.

2. Coordinate and maintain liaison with the otherDepartments and Agencies on physical security matters.

3. Estaolish procedures for sharing threat informationexpeditiously through law enforcement and intelligence channels.

4. Formalize security procedures for joint response toterrorist incidents.

5. Develop specific physical security threat assessmentsand update them annually or as needed.

6. Coordinate the acquisition of physical securityequipment and establish procedures to identify requirements forrelated research as described in DoD Directive 3224.3 (reference(j)).

7. Develop training, qualification, and suitabilityrequirements for dedicated security forces (including contract

2-2

security forces where riot prohibited), security technicians andphysical security specialists.

C. SECURITY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE GOAL

1. The goal of the security system for an asset or facilityis to deploy security resources so as to preclude or reduce thepotential for sabotage, theft, trespass, terrorism, espionage orother criminal activity. To achieve this goal a security systemprovides the capability to detect, assess, communicate, delayand respond to an unauthorized attempt at entry.

2. The components of a security system each have a functionand related measures which provide an integrated capability forthe following:

a. Detection, accomplished through human, animal orelectronic means, alerts security personnel to possible threatsand attempts at unauthorized entry at or shortly after time ofoccurrence;

b. Assessment, through use of video subsystems, patrolsor fixed posts, assists in localizing and determining the sizeand intention of an unauthorized intrusion or activity;

c. Command and control, through diverse and securecommunications to ensure that all countermeasures contribute topreventing or containing sabotage, theft or other criminalactivity;

d. Delay, through the use of active and passivesecurity measures, including barriers, impedes intruders intheir efforts to reach their objective;

e. Response, through the use of designated, trained andproperly equipped security forces. Detection, and delay mustprovide sufficient warning and protection to the asset until theresponse force can be expected to arrive at the scene.

D. PHYSICAL SECURITY THREAT MATRIX

At Figure 2-1 is a description of the DoD generic threattypes developed for the physical security program. Using thesethreat types as a guide, commanders shall develop program,system, command or installation threat statements which assesspotential security threats to critical assets. Using both lawenforcement and intelligence information, these assessmentsshould categorize opportunity (when possible) and capabilitiesof potential adversaries. Physical security threat statementswill be used for the development of security systems tailored tothe protection of assets and items of security interest.

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THREAT TYPE THREAT DESCRIPTION THREAT EXAMPLE

INDIVIDUALS INORGANIZED AND TERRORISTS ANDTRAINED GROUPS SPECIAL PURPOSEALONE OR WITH FORCES; HIGHLY

MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE FROM AN TRAINED INTELLIGENCEINSIDER; SKILLED AGENTS

ARMED AND EQUIPPEDINTRUDERS WITH

PENETRATION AIDS

INDIVIDUAL(S) HIGHLY ORGANIZEDWORKING ALONE OR IN CRIMINAL ELEMENTS;

COLLUSION WITH AN TERRORISTS ORADVANCED INSIDER; SKILLED OR PARAMILITARY FORCES;SEMISKILLED WITHOUT FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

PENETRATION AIDS AGENTS WITH ACCESS

CAREERINDIVIDUAL(S) OR CRIMINALS;ORGANIZED

INSIDER(S) WORKING CRIME;WHITE COLLARINTERMEDIATE ALONE OR IN SMALL CRIMINALS; ACTIVE

GROUPS; SOME DEMONSTRATORS;KNOWLEDGE OR COVERT INTELLIGENCEFAMILIARITY OF COLLECTORS; SOME

SECURITY SYSTEM TERRORIST GROUPS

INDIVIDUAL(S) OR CASUAL INTRUDERS;INSIDER(S) WORKING PILFERERS AND

ALONE OR IN A SMALL THIEVES; OVERTLOW GROUP INTELLIGENCE

COLLECTORS; PASSIVEDEMONSTRATORS

Figure 2-1. Physical Security Threat Matrix

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E. PRIORITIZATION OF ASSETS

At Figure 2-2 is a description of the DoD resource and assetprioritization scheme with examples of typical assets, acriticality definition, and an example of a typical securitysystem for each level. DoD Components shall develop appropriateoperational concepts or security standards to meet theperformance goal of paragraph C against the type of threatsdefined in paragraph D for critical assets designated by theComponent under each security system level. Security systemlevels are assigned to critical assets or major systems insecurity planning documents to ensure that minimum securitystandards are met. Commanders are responsible for higher levelsof security afforded personnel, equipment and assets within thecommand depending on regional threat.

F. PHYSICAL SECURITY PLANNING AND SYSTEM ACQUISITION

DoD Components shall establish procedures to ensure thatphysical security planning for the acquisition of major systemsis appropriate, and in accordance with paragraph E above. Onemanagement solution is provided by MIL-STD-1785 (reference (1)).

G. PROTECTIVE DWSIGN AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

DoD Components shall establish procedures to ensure that allmilitary construction projects are reviewed at the conceptualstage and throughout the process so that appropriate physicalsecurity, antiterrorist or protective design features areincorporated into the design. Use MIL-HNBK-1013/1 (reference(k)) or other approved security engineering guidance forinformation.

H. SECURITY OF LEASED FACILITIES

DoD Components shall, establish procedures to ensure thatleases for DoD activities resident within commercial facilitiesinclude provisions for positive physical security of DoDoccupied areas.

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II

SECURITY SYSTEM ASSET ASSET EXAMPLELEVEL DEFINIT!ON

NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL

WEAPONS AND

ALERT/MATED DELIVERYSYSTEMS

A CRITICAL COMMAND,CONTROL AND

COMMUNICATIONSINTEGRATED THE LOSS, THEFT, FACILITIES AND SYSTEMS

ELECTRONIC SECURITY DESTRUCTION OR

SYSTEMS, ENTRY AND MISUSE OF THIS CRITICAL INTELLIGENCECIRCULATION RESOURCE WILL RESULT GATHERING FACILITIES AND

CONTROL, BARRIER IN GREAT HARM TO THE SYSTEMSSYSTEMS, ACCESS STRATEGIC CAPABILITY

DELAY AND DENIAL OF THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL TRANSPORTSYSTEMS, DEDICATED SYSTEMS

SECURITY FORCES, NUCLEAR REACTORS ANDDESIGNATED CAEGR I AND

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE CATEGORY MAND T1 SPECIAL

FORCES NUCLEAR MATERIALS

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT

AND TEST ASSETS

SECURITY SYSTEM ASSET ASSET EXAMPLELEVEL DEFINITION

ALERT SYSTEMS, FORCES,

AND FACILITIES

B ESSENTIAL COMMAND,CONTROL, AND

ELECTRONIC SECURITY THE LOSS, THEFT, COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEMS, ENTRY AND DESTRUCTION OR FACILITIES AND SYSTEMS

CIRCULATION MISUSE OF THIS CATEGORY I ARMS,CONTROL, BARRIER RESOURCE COULD BE AMMUNITION, AND

SYSTEMS, DEDICATED EXPECTED TO GRAVELY EXPLOSIVESSECURITY FORCES, HARM THE

DESIGNATED RESPONSE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENTFORCES CAPABILITY OFTHE ANDTESTASSETS

UNITED STATES

Figure 2-2. Resource and Asset Priorities

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II

SECURITY SYSTEM ASSET ASSET EXAMPLELEVEL DEFINITION

NONALERT RESOURCES ANDASSETS

C PRECISION GUIDEDMUNITIONS

COMMAND, CONTROL,AND COMMUNICATIONS

ELECTRONIC SECURITY THE LOSS, THEFT, FACILITIES AND SYSTEMS

SYSTEMS, ENTRY AND DESTRUCTION OR

CIRCULATION MISUSE OF THIS CATEGORY II ARMS,CONTROL, BARRIERS, RESOURCE COULD AMMUNITION ANDSECURITY PATROLS, IMPACT UPON THE EXPLOSIVES

DESIGNATED RESPONSE TACTICAL CAPABILITYFORCES OF THE UNITED STATES POL/POWER/ WATER /SUPPLY

STORAGE FACILITIES

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENTAND TEST ASSETS

0

SECURITY SYSTEM ASSET ASSET EXAMPLELEVEL DEFINITION

ARMS, AMMUNITION, ANDEXPLOSIVES

D EXCHANGES ANDCOMMISSARIES, FUND

THE LOSS, THEFT, ACTIVITIES

DESTRUCTION OR CONTROLLED DRUGS ANDMISUSE OF THIS PRECIOUS METALS

ELECTRONIC SECURITY RESOURCE COULDSYSTEMS, ACCESS COMPROMISE THE TRAINING ASSETS

CONTROLS, BARRIERS, DEFENSEDESIGNATED RESPONSE INFRASTRUCTURE OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT

FORCES THE UNITED STATES ANDTESTASSETS

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CHAPTER 3

INSTALLATION ACCESS AND CIRCULATION CONTROL

A. GENERAL

This Chapter prescribes ;eneral policies for controllingentry into and exit from military installations. Access controlis an integral part of the installation physical securityprogram. Each installation commander must clearly define theaccess control measures (tailored to local conditions) requiredto safeguard facilities and ensure accomplishment of themission.

B. POLICY

It is DoD policy that DoD Components shall develop,establish, and maintain policies and procedures to controlaccess to installations, including the following:

1. Using a defense-in-depth concept to provide gradatedlevels of protection from the installation perimeter to criticalassets.

2. Determining the degree of control required overpersonnel and equipment entering or leaving the installation.

3. Prescribing procedures for inspecting persons, theirproperty and vehicles at entry and exit points of installationsor at designated secure areas within an installation, and forsearch of persons and their possessions while on theinstallation.

(a) This shall include determination of whethersearches or inspections are randomly conducted or mandatory forall. See DoD Regulation 5200.1-R, Chapter 5, Section 3(reference (b)) prescribing inspection procedures for thesafeguarding of classified information.

(b) Examinations of individuals and their possessionswhile on the installation for the primary purpose of obtainingevidence is classified as a "search" under the Fourth Amendmentand separate guidance regarding the conduct of these searcheswill be issued.

(c) All procedures shall be reviewed for legalsufficiency by the appropriate.General Counsel or Legal Advisorto the DoD Component prior to issuance. The procedures shallrequire Commanders to consult with their servicing JudgeAdvocate or other legal advisor before authorizing gateinspections.

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4. Enforcing the removal of, or denying access to, personswho are a threat to order, security and the discipline of theinstallation.

5. Designating Restricted Areas to safeguard property ormateriel for which the commander is responsible.

6. Using randomized antiterrorism measures within existingsecurity operations to reduce patterns, change schedules andvisibly enhance the security profile of an installation. Thisreduces the effectiveness of preoperational surveillance byhostile elements.

C. INSTALLATION ACCESS

DoD Components shall:

1. Determine necessary access controls based on theconsiderations in Chapter 2 of this Regulation. This willinclude the evaluation of automated entry control systems oraccess devices, where necessary.

2. Allocate resources necessary to enforce the establishedcontrols. These controls will be monitored and evaluated toensure adequate protection is maintained.

D. EMERGENCY PLANNING

1. DoD Components shall require commanders to plan forincreasing vigilance and restricting access at installationsunder the following situations:

a. National emergency.

b. Disaster.

c. Terrorist threat conditions (See DoD Directive2000.12 (reference (W)) for further information).

d. Significant criminal activity.

e. Civil disturbance.

f. Other contingencies that would seriously affect theability of installation personnel to perform their mission.

2. Planning should include the following:

a. Coordination with local, state, federal, or hostcountry officials to ensure integrity of restricted access tothe installation and reduce the effect on surrounding civiliancommunities;

3-2

p

b. Establishmeat of a system for positiveidentification of personnel and equipment authorized to enterand exit the installation;

c. Maintenance of adequate physical barriers that willbe installed to control access to the installation;

d. Predesignation of personnel, equipment, and otherresources to enforce restricted access and respond to incidents;

e. Exercising contingency plans to validate theireffectiveness.

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CHAPTER 4

SECURITY OF WEAPON SYSTEMS AND PLATFORMS

A. GENERAL

This Chapter establishes policy and responsibility forsecurity of weapon systems, including platforms, such as armoredfighting vehicles, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and ships inport. DoD Components have a responsibility to protect weaponsystems, particularly those in operational roles during aconflict, regardless of location.

B. POLICY

1. Commanders are responsible for the security of assigned,or transient weapon systems while these systems are resident ontheir installations. Commanders shall develop security plans tomeet this responsibility.

2. Each DoD Component shall issue instructions governingthe security of its weapon systems and describing the securityconcept for each class of platform, in accordance with Chapter 2of this Regulation. The priority for security placed on similarsystems or platforms within each DoD Component inventory mayvary due to differences in the following:

a. Mission;

b. Location and vulnerability;

c. Operational readiness;

d. Value, classification, and replacement costs.

3. Before operations, the owning DoD Component shouldrequest special security support from the host installation, ifnecessary, as far in advance as possible. Economic andlogistical considerations dictate that every reasonable effortbe made by the host installation to provide the necessarysecurity without resort to external support from the owning DoDComponent. The owning DoD Component should provide materiel andpersonnel fc- extraordinary security measures (extrdordinarysecurity measures are those that require heavy expenditures offunds, equipment, or manpower; or unique or unusual technology)to the host installation.

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CHAPTER 5

PROTECTION OF BULK PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

A. GENERAL

This Chapter prescribes general policies for security ofGovernment-owned, Government-operated (GOGO) and Government-owned, Contractor-operated (GOCO) fuel support points, pipelinepumping stations, and piers.

B. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

1. Commanders of GOGO and GOCO fuel support points,pipeline pumpin* stations, and piers shall designate and postthese instaliations as Restricted Areas.

2. Access to these facilities shall be controlled and onlyauthorized personnel shall be permitted to enter. Commandersshall determine the means required to enforce access control(i.e., security forces, barriers, lighting, and security badges)based on the considerations in Chapter 3 of this Regulation.

3. Security force personnel shall be equipped with aprimary and an alternate means of communications to alert othermilitary or civilian law enforcement agencies, as appropriate,in event of an intrusion, fire, or other emergency.

C. SECURITY PLANNING AND LIAISON

Commanders shall take the following actions to protect theirfuel facilities:

1. Establish liaison and coordinate contingency plans andinspection requirements with the nearest US. militaryinstallation to provide manpower and equipment resources to thefacility in the event of emergencies and increased threatconditions.

2. Establish liaison with supporting, local, State, andFederal law enforcement agencies and host nation officials; andsupport agreements, if appropriate.

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CHAPTER 6

SECURITY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

A. GENERAL

1. This Chapter describes concepts for physical security ofcommunications facilities located on and off militaryinstallations, to include mobile systems. Specific securitysupport for facilities that require special security measuresshall be coordinated between the concerned Components.

2. Because of the difference in location, physical layoutand equipment, security considerations must be thoroughlyassessed for each communications system. The physical securityprogram shall be tailored to that particular facility or system.

B. POLICY

1. It is DoD policy that the protection provided to DoDcommunication facilities and systems shall be sufficient toensure continuity of operations of critical users and thefacilities they support. These include nuclear weapon deliveryunits and storage facilities, main operating bases (for alliedair forces), and primary command and control elements. Thedeterminations on strategic importance, both to the UnitedStates and its allies, shall be based upon whether or not eachmobile system or facility processes, transmits, or receives,telecommunications traffic considered crucial by the NationalCommand Authorities (NCA), the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,or the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and SpecifiedCommands.

2. Communications systems play a major role in support ofeach DoD Component's mission, providing operationalcommunications in both peacetime and wartime. These areattractive targets due to limited staffing, isolated locationand mission. Therefore, security for these systems must be animportant part of each command's physical security program.

3. The DoD Component must review the host installation'simplementation of physical security measures during inspections,oversight, and staff visits.

4. Access shall be controlled at all communicationsfacilities; only authorized personnel shall be allowed to enter.Facilities should be designated and posted as Restricted Areas.

5. Depending on regional conditions, commanders shouldconsider locating enough weapons and ammunition atcommunications facilities to arm designated onsite personnel.If arms are stored at the facilities, appropriate securitymeasures and procedures shall be employed in accordance with DoD5100.76-M (reference (h)).

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6. Existing essential structures should be hardened againstattacks. This includes large antenna support legs, antennahorns, operations building and cable trays. Future constructionprograms for communications facilities should includeappropriate hardening of essential structures.

C. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. DoD Components shall have each major command identifycritical communications facilities and mobile systems.

2. DoD Components shall have each commander of a majorcommand ensure that a security plan is developed for eachcommunications facility and mobile system under his or hercommand. The plan shall include emergency security actions andprocedures for emerqency destruction of sensitive equipment andclassified information. The plan may be an annex to an existinghost installation security plan; only the applicable parts ofthe total plan shall be distributed to personnel at the facilityor mobile system.

3. The owning DoD Component shall arrange for security ofoff-installation facilities and mobile systems with the closestU.S. military installation. This includes contingency plans formanpower and equipment resources during emergencies. Thesearrangements can be made by establishing a formal agreement,such as an interservice support agreement. Whether thefacilities are located on or off the installation, or mobile,installation commanders are responsible for security ofcommunications facilities for which they provide host support.

4. Operations, maintenance, and communications personnel atthe facility or mobile system are the most important factor insecurity. DoD Components shall have each commander of a majorcommand ensure implementation of a training program to ensurethat assigned personnel understand their day-to-day securityresponsibilities, are familiar with the vulnerabilities of thefacility, and are.prepared to implement emergency securityactions. The training program shall include the following:

a. Security procedures and personal protection skillsfor assigned personnel.

b. The use of weapons and communications equipment forprotecting the facility or mobile system.

c. Awareness of local terrorist threats and otheractivity in the area.

5. DoD Components may issue additional instructionsgoverning security of the communications facilities.

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D. MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

In accordance with Chapter 2 of this Regulation, a securityoperational concept or standards shall be developed for mobilesystems to describe the minimum level of security for the systemin the expected operational environment.

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CHAPTER 7

SECURITY OF MATERIEL

A. GENERAL

1. This Chapter provides security policy and procedures forsafeguarding controlled inventory items, including drugs, drugabuse items, as identified under 21 CFR 1301.71 through 1301.76and P.L. 91-513 (references (n) and (o)), and precious metals

2. DoD materiel assigned a code indicating the securityclassification and/or security risk or pilferage -ontrols forstorage and transportation in accordance with MIL-STD-1388-2A,(reference (p)) shall be afforded special attention, as in DoD4145.19-R-1 (referenze (q)). Controlled Inventory Item Codes(CIIC) are in DoD 4100.39-M (reference (r)).

B. POLICY

1. The security of controlled inventory items is of specialconcern to The Department of Defense. Consequently, these itemsshall have characteristics so that they can be identified,accounted for, secured or segregated to ensure their protectionand integrity.

2. DoD Components shall pay special attention to thesafeguarding of inventory items by judiciously implementing andmonitoring physical security measures. This shall includeanalysis of loss rates through inventories, reports of surveys,and criminal incident reports, to establish whether repetitivelosses indicate criminal or negligent activity.

3. These requirements apply to stocks at depot, base, andinstallation supply level. Small unit or individual suppliesbelow the base or installation level shall be affordedprotection, as determined by the commander.

C. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. DoD Components shall:

a. Establish physical security measures to protectinventory items at depot, base and installation level.

b. Monitor the effective implementation of securityrequirements through scheduled inspections of and staff oroversight visits to affected activities.

c. Ensure that adequate safety and healthconsiderations are incorporated into the construction of asecurity area for controlled inventory items.

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2. Commanders shall ensure that security measures areestablished and are functioning to reduce the incentive andopportunity for theft.

D. PROCEDURES

1. Commanders will ensure that storage facilities andprocedures for operation adequately safeguard controlledinventory items.

2. Security requirements for inventory items in storage areas follows:

a. General security requirements for classified,sensitive, and pilferable items are in DoD 4145.19-R-1,(reference (q)).

b. Specialized storage requirements for arms,ammunition and explosives are in DoD 5100.76-M, (reference (h)).

c. Additional guidance for the secure storage ofsensitive inventory items, controlled substances and pilferableitems is in DLAR 4145.11 (reference (s)).

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