Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 130889 June 6, 2002PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.NORBERTO LORENO, FELIX LEAL, SERAFIN RASCON, JOHN EDWARD LEYSA, and LARRY MOQUERIO,accused.JOHN EDWARD LEYSA,accused-appellant.QUISUMBING,J.:On appeal is the decision1dated February 3, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. 35871,finding appellants John Edward Leysa and Norberto Loreno guilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua,and to pay the heirs of Igmedio Larupay jointly and solidarily the amount ofP48,100 as actual damages andP50,000 as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.The Information filed against Norberto Loreno, Felix Leal, Serafin Rascon, John Edward Leysa and Larry Moquerio reads as follows:That on or about December 26, 1990, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with guns of different make, with treachery and evident premeditation and with a decided purpose to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot one Igmedio Larupay with the weapons they were then provided inflicting upon the latter gunshot wound on the vital part of his body which caused his death.CONTRARY TO LAW.2During their arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.The prosecution presented as witnesses Armando Castor, a CVO member; Dr. Eusebio Magbanua, the Rural Health physician who conducted the necropsy on deceased Igmedio Larupay; Sgt. Isidro Palma, who arrested the accused; Pat. Carlos Pagayon, who identified the police blotter entries; and Marina Larupay, wife of the victim, who testified on the expenses and damages she incurred as a result of her husbands death.ARMANDO CASTOR, testified that he was a member of the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) in charge of peace and order in Lambunao, Iloilo City. On December 25, 1990, he and several others were sent by Sgt. Isidro Palma to patrol the area of Barangay San Gregorio where a dance was to be held to celebrate the eve of the barangay fiesta. Sgt. Palma was the Philippine Army detachment commander at Barangay Tranghawan, Lambunao, Iloilo City.3At about 1:30 A.M. on December 26, 1990, while witness Armando Castor and his companions were about half a kilometer away from the dance floor, he heard a shot coming from the direction of the place where the dance was being held. He and his companions proceeded to the place and there they were informed by one Boding Lesada that it was Serafin Rascon who fired the shot. When they saw Serafin Rascon sitting near the entrance of the dance floor, they approached him. Castors group leader, Igmedio Larupay confiscated Serafin Rascons firearm. On their way back to their detachment at Barangay Tranghawan, Rascon prevailed over Igmedio Larupay to return to the dance hall and to settle the matter among themselves. Rascon and Larupay walked abreast with Castor behind them, about one arm length from Rascon. Upon reaching the dance hail, Castor saw Norberto Loreno and John Edward Leysa. Behind the two were Felix Leal and Larry Moquerio. Loreno was armed with a pistolized .12 gauge short firearm while Leal had a .20 caliber short firearm. Leysa and Moquerio also had short firearms but Castor did not recognize their make. According to Castor, he saw both Loreno and Leysa raise their firearms and shoot at them. Castor dropped to the ground as the shots were fired. He fired back but did not hit anyone. He noticed Igmedio Larupay lying dead on the ground with his face up. He then retrieved Larupays .22 caliber magnum revolver and other personal belongings.DR. EUSEBIO MAGBANUA testified that he conducted the necropsy on the body of the victim, Igmedio Larupay, and found a single gunshot wound, left mid-infra clovecular, 1 1/4 inch by 1 1/4 inch in circumference. There was no exit wound. He described the cause of death of Igmedio Larupay as cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to a gunshot wound.4The suspects were arrested by the local CVO and Sgt. Palma.5In their testimonies, accused NORBERTO LORENO,6FELIX LEAL,7SERAFIN RASCON,8and LARRY MOQUERIO9admitted they were in the dance hall when they heard a gunshot. They then heard from the people around that Igmedio Larupay was shot. They denied they were together at the dance, had firearms, and participated in the shooting.Appellant JOHN EDWARD LEYSA in his testimony denied he was in the dance hall when the incident happened. According to him, at around 5:00 P.M., December 25,1990, he went to Barangay Walang to attend the wake of his aunt. He was there until December 26, 1990. Barangay Walang is about one kilometer away from Barangay San Gregorio.10On February 3, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding Norberto Loreno and John Edward Leysa guilty of murder. Its dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, Norberto Loreno and John Edward Leysa, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentence each of them to suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Further, both accused, jointly and solidarily, are ordered to pay the heirs of Igmedio Larupay the sum of P48,100.00 as actual damages and a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 by reason of the death of Igmedio Larupay.However, for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt, accused, Felix Leal, Larry Moquerio and Serafin Rascon, are hereby acquitted for the crime charged.In view of herein conviction, the property bond of accused, Norberto Loreno and John Edward Leysa, are cancelled. No bail is available to both accused pending the finality of this judgment. Both shall remain in detention.Since accused, Felix Leal, Larry Moquerio and Serafin Rascon, are acquitted of the crime charged, their respective property bonds are automatically cancelled. The Clerk of Court is ordered to return the property bonds to their bondsmen duly receipted.Cost against the accused, Norberto Loreno and John Edward Leysa.SO ORDERED.11Both Loreno and Leysa appealed their convictions. However, Norberto Loreno died on July 24, 1997. Hence, this appeal now concerns only appellant Leysa.In his Brief, appellant alleges the following errors:I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE LONE TESTIMONY OF ARMANDO CASTOR.II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT JOHN EDWARD LEYSA.Simply, the issues concern is the credibility of the witness for the prosecution and the sufficiency of the evidence to convict appellant beyond reasonable doubt.Appellant argues that the testimony of Armando Castor, the lone eyewitness, should not be given credence since he did not actually see who shot the victim. He also assails Armandos credibility because he did not report the crime to authorities promptly. Appellant points out that the victim suffered only one gunshot wound and that the other witnesses testified that they only heard one shot. But witness Armando Castor claimed that both Norberto Loreno and appellant fired their guns at the victim. Further, appellant asserts that Norberto Loreno admitted sole responsibility for the crime and exonerated appellant of any liability in a statement executed on March 25,1997.12For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the lone eyewitness was credible and his testimony should be accorded full faith and credit. The OSG also claims that the affidavit executed by Norberto Loreno that became the basis for a motion for new trial filed on May 27, 1997,13was not admissible in favor of appellant.The well-settled rule is that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court14since the latter is in a better position to decide this issue.15However, this rule is not absolute. It is subject to exceptions. One concerns a situation where the judge who penned the decision did not personally hear the evidence for the prosecution.16In the present case, Judge David Alfeche, Jr., theponente,only inherited this case from Judge Amelita K. Del Rosario who conducted the trial and heard the witnesses testify.Another exception to the general rule is where substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion or alter the result of the case.17In this case, we find that based on the evidence on record, the trial court misapprehended certain facts and failed to consider significant portions of the testimony of the witnesses.We shall now detail these misapprehended or neglected facts adduced during the trial that are, in our view, favorable to appellants cause. First, the trial court failed to consider Armando Castors testimony that he did not actually see who shot the victim. According to Armando:Q: You did not actually see them fire?A: No, sir. I did not actually see as to who of them hit the victim because I was already on the ground face down.18This at once creates an ambiguity and causes a doubt as to who really killed the victim. This doubt is exacerbated by the physical evidence19showing that the victim suffered only one gunshot wound. This physical evidence reveals that only one shot resulted in the death of Igmedio Larupay. This evidence contradicts the testimony of Armando Castor to the effect that both Loreno and Leysa fired their guns. Moreover, the prosecution failed to show that spent bullets were found near the crime scene that would indicate that more than one shot were fired at the victim. It follows that only one gun and one gunman firing at the victim killed him with one bullet. Who this gunman is - whether it is appellant Leysa or his co-accused Norberto Loreno - has not been ascertained. Nor could it now be determined, beyond a shadow of a doubt.Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence, the physical evidence, being paramount, prevails.20We are unable to give credence to the testimony of Armando Castor that he saw both Loreno and Leysa fire their respective weapons when he himself said he was already face down on the ground when the two were about to fire. Patently, we are persuaded that he did not really see who shot the victim.As the evidence now stands, we are left to surmise whether Norberto Loreno or appellant Leysa fired the bullet that caused the death of the victim, Igmedio Larupay. Unfortunately, nothing on record could help us ascertain who of the two is legally responsible for Larupays death. For while in theory, conspiracy could tie both men to the crime, we find that the trial courts finding of conspiracy is not supported by the evidence on record. Conspiracy must be proved. It cannot be surmised that conspiracy existed just because Norberto Loreno and appellant Leysa were both seen raising their arms and aiming at the victim. Conspiracy as a basis for conviction of appellant should be proved in the same manner as the criminal act.21Althought direct proof is not essential,22conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly as the commission of the offense itself. It is a fundamental rule that a charge of conspiracy must be proven, just like any other criminal accusation, "independently and beyond reasonable doubt."23Mere simultaneous aiming by appellant and his co-accused at the victim with their firearms does not by itself demonstrate concurrence of will or unity of action or purpose that could be a basis for their collective responsibility.24The evidence of the prosecution only proves with certainty that appellant Leysa was present when the victim was killed. It does not prove beyond doubt who killed him. There is paucity of evidence that indicate, beyond a scintilla of a doubt, that appellant and Norberto Loreno shared a common design and a unity of purpose in killing Igmedio so as to make both responsible by reason of a conspiracy. There is even doubt whether both did fire at the victim. For the victim was hit only once; he suffered only one bullet wound. Accordingly, acquittal of John Edward Leysa is in order. His responsibility for the death of Igmedio Larupay has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. 35871, is herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Appellant JOHN EDWARD LEYSA isACQUITTEDfor insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.The Director of Prisons is ordered to release appellant JOHN EDWARD LEYSA, unless there are other lawful reasons for his confinement, and to furnish the Court, within 10 days from notice, proof of compliance with this order.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo*, Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 146635 December 14, 2005MARCELO MACALINAO, Substituted by ESPERANZA MACALINAO and ANTONIO MACALINAO,Petitioners,vs.EDDIE MEDECIELO ONG and GENOVEVO SEBASTIAN,Respondents.D E C I S I O NTinga,J.:Before this Court is aPetition for Review on Certiorariassailing theDecision1andResolution2of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2000 and 7 September 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 52963. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the complaint for damages filed by Marcelo Macalinao (Macalinao) against Eddie Medecielo Ong (Ong) and Genovevo Sebastian (Sebastian) for insufficiency of evidence.The antecedent facts follow.Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver, respectively, at the Genetron International Marketing (Genetron), a single proprietorship owned and operated by Sebastian. On 25 April 1992, Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of machinerya reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to Sebastians manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan. While in the process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong, Genetrons Isuzu Elf truck with plate no. PMP-106 hit and bumped the front portion of a private jeepney with plate no. DAF-922 along Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan at around 11:20 in the morning.3Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a consequence of the collision.4Macalinao incurred the most serious injuriesamong the passengers of the truck. He was initially brought to the Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment but in view of the severity of his condition, he was transferred to the Philippine Orthopedic Center at the instance of Sebastian. He was again moved to the Capitol Medical Center by his parents, petitioners herein, for medical reasons and later to the Philippine General Hospital for financial considerations.5Macalinaos body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down as a result of the accident and per doctors advice, his foot was amputated. He also suffered from bed sores and infection. His immedicable condition, coupled with the doctors recommendation, led his family to bring him home where he died on 7 November 1992.6Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against both Ong and Sebastian before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81.7After his death, Macalinao was substituted by his parents in the action.8A criminal case for reckless imprudenceresulting to serious physical injuries9had also been instituted earlier against Ong but for reasons which do not appear in the records of this case, trial thereon did not ensue.10After trial in the civil action, the RTC held that based on the evidence, Ong drove the Isuzu truck in a reckless and imprudent manner thereby causing the same to hit the private jeepney. It observed that while respondents claimed that Ong was driving cautiously and prudently at the time of the mishap, no evidence was presented to substantiate the claim.11It declared Ong negligent and at the same time, it held that Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Ong. Consequently, the trial court pronounced the two of them jointly liable to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil indemnity for Macalinaos death. The trial court subsequently increased the monetary award12upon petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof.On appeal, the appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court. It held that the evidence presented by petitioners was woefully scant to support a verdict of negligence against Ong. And since respondents liability hinged squarely on proof of Ongs negligence, neither of them could be held liable for damages to petitioners.13Aggrieved at the ruling, petitioners elevated the case to this Court. They herein contend that contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, the evidence conclusively establish fault or negligence on the part of Ong and justify the award of damages in their favor.The petition is meritorious.The issue of negligence is factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of damages.14In the case at bar, the crux of the controversy is the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support a finding of negligence against Ong. Given the contradictory conclusions of the trial court and the appellate court on this issue, this Court is impelled to ascertain for itself which court made the correct determination.While as a rule factual findings of the Court of Appeals are deemed conclusive in cases brought to us on appeal, we have also consistently pronounced that we may review its findings of fact in the following instances, among others:(i) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (ii) when the factual findings are conflicting; (iii) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (iv) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.15Said exceptions obtain in this case thus, a departure from the application of the general rule is warranted.In reversing the trial court and absolving respondents from liability, the appellate court made the following pronouncement:The evidence presented is woefully scant. The pictures of the collision afford no basis for concluding that it was the fault of the defendant driver, or that he was driving recklessly. The police report contains no findings as to the road conditions, estimates of the relative speed of the vehicles, or their exact position at the time of the accident. And even so, entries in the police blotter should not be given significance or probative value as they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof. Nor were eyewitnesses presented, not even affidavits or statements to give any indication as to what actually happened. The police investigators findings are sketchy at best, with only the phrase "Isuzu lost control" as his opinion, with no explanation how he reached it. Civil cases require evidence of a lesser degree than criminal cases, but one sentence by one who did not even witness an event, is not conclusive proof.. . .There was only the fact of the collision before the trial court. The attendant circumstances were not established, and no fault could be determined using the evidence, both testimonial and documentary presented.16Contrary to the above conclusion of the appellate court, the evidence on record coupled with the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitursufficiently establishes Ongs negligence.We focus first on the evidence presented before the trial court.The photographs of the accident which the appellate court cavalierly brushed aside as insignificant deserve substantial cogitation. InJose v. Court of Appeals,17we upheld the trial courts reliance on photographs of the accident as opposed to a partys obviously biased testimony. In so doing, we stated:In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez,18where the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail.19Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth which ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.20In this case, while there is a dearth of testimonial evidence to enlighten us about what actually happened, photographs21depicting the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the accident took place do exist. It is well established that photographs, when duly verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful representations of the subject as of the time in question, are, in the discretion of the trial court, admissible in evidence as aids in arriving at an understanding of the evidence, the situation or condition of objects or premises or the circumstances of an accident.22According to American courts, photographs are admissible in evidence in motor vehicle accident cases when they appear to have been accurately taken and are proved to be a faithful and clear representation of the subject, which cannot itself be produced, and are of such nature as to throw light upon a disputed point.23Before a photograph may be admitted in evidence, however, its accuracy or correctness must be proved, and it must be authenticated or verified24first. In the case at bar, the photographer testified in open court and properly identified the pictures as the ones he took at the scene of the accident.25An examination of said photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap occurred is marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left lane. Based on the motorists right of way rule, the Isuzu truck which was headed towards Norzagaray, Bulacan26should have been occupying the left lane while the private jeepney which was traversing the road to the town proper of Sta. Maria, Bulacan27should have been in the right lane. Exhibits "L" and "L-4" among the photographs, however, reveal that in the aftermath of the collision, the Isuzu truck usurped the opposite lane to such an extent that only its right rear wheel remained in the left lane, a few inches from the demarcation line. Its two front wheels and left rear wheel were planted squarely on the private jeepneys lane and the Isuzu truck had rotated such that its front no longer pointed towards Norzagaray but partially faced the town proper of Sta. Maria instead.While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit the private jeepney rather than the other way around. The smashed front of the Isuzu truck is pressed against the private jeepneys left front portion near the drivers side. The private jeepney is positioned diagonally in the right lane; its front at the rightmost corner of the road while its rear remained a few feet from the demarcation line. Based on the angle at which it stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to the right in an unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck. This would support the statement of the police investigator that the Isuzu truck lost control28and hit the left front portion of the private jeepney.29It would also explain why the driver of the private jeepney died immediately after being brought to the hospital,30since in such a scenario, the brunt of the collision logically bore down on him.Moreover, the unequal size and weight of the two vehicles would make it improbable for the relatively lighter private jeepney to have stricken the heavier truck with such force as to push the latter to the formers side of the road. Had that been the case, the two vehicles would have ended up crushed together at the center of the road or at the Isuzu trucks lane instead of rolling to a stop at the private jeepneys lane.Another piece of evidence which supports a finding of negligence against Ong is the police report of the incident denoted as Entry No. 04-229 of the Sta. Maria Police Station. The report states that the Isuzu truck was the one which hit the left front portion of the private jeepney.31This piece of evidence was disregarded by the Court of Appeals on the ground that entries in police blotters should not be given significance or probative value as they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof.While true in most instances, it must still be remembered that although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.32Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law areprima facieevidence of the fact therein stated,33and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.34In this case, the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence and the person who made the entries thereon was likewise presented in court. On the other hand, aside from a blanket allegation that the driver of the other vehicle was the one at fault, respondents did not present any evidence to back up their charge and show that the conclusion of the police investigator was false. Given the paucity of details in the report, the investigators observation could have been easily refuted and overturned by respondents through the simple expedient of supplying the missing facts and showing to the satisfaction of thecourt that the Isuzu truck was blameless in the incident. Ong was driving the truck while the two other truck helpers also survived the accident. Any or all of them could have given their testimony to shed light on what actually transpired, yet not one of them was presented to substantiate the claim that Ong was not negligent.Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police blotter, the statement therein that the Isuzu truck hit the private jeepney and not the other way around is deemed established. Theprima facienature of the police report ensures that if it remains unexplained or uncontradicted, it will be sufficient to establish the facts posited therein.35While not constituting direct proof of Ongs negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application ofres ipsa loquitur,a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself."36Res ipsa loquiturrecognizes that parties may establishprima facienegligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence.37It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part.38The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.39This is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.40The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.41In this case, Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual knowledgeabout the event since they were not present at the crucial moment. The driver of the private jeepney who could have shed light on the circumstances is likewise dead. The only ones left with knowledge about the cause of the mishap are the two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastians previous employee but his co-respondent in this case as well. In the circumstances, evidence as to the true cause of the accident is, for all intents and purposes, accessible to respondents but not to petitioners. The witnesses left are unlikely to divulge to petitioners what they knew about the cause of the accident if the same militates against the interest of their employer. This justifies the invocation of the doctrine.Under local jurisprudence, the following are the requisites for the application ofres ipsa loquitur:(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence;(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.42We are convinced that all the above requisites are present in the case at bar.No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of course unless someone is negligent, thus, the first requisite for the application of the doctrine is present. Ong was driving the Isuzu truck which, from the evidence adduced, appears to have precipitated the collision with the private jeepney. Driving the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it, a fact which shows that the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence could be attributed to Macalinao relative to the happening of the accident since he was merely a passenger in the Isuzu truck. Respondents allegation that Macalinao was guilty of contributory negligence for failing to take the necessary precautions to ensure his safety while onboard the truck43is too specious for belief particularly as respondents did not even present any evidence to prove such allegation. The last requisite is, therefore, likewise present.There exists a fourth requisite under American jurisprudence, that is, that the defendant fails to offer any explanation tending to show that the injury was caused by his or her want of due care.44In this case, while respondents claimed that Ong drove cautiously and prudently during the time in question, no evidence was proffered to substantiate the same. In fact, Ong did not bother to testify to explain his actuations and to show that he exercised due care when the accident happened, so even this requisite is fulfilled.All the requisites for the application of the rule ofres ipsa loquiturare present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of Ongs negligence arises. In consonance with the effect of the doctrine, the burden of proving due care at the time in question shifts to respondents. Unfortunately, as previously discussed, aside from blanket allegations that Ong exercised prudence and due care while driving on the day of the accident, respondents proffered no other proof. As a consequence, theprima faciefinding of negligence against Ong, remaining unexplained and/or uncontradicted, is deemed established. This in turn warrants a finding that Ong is liable for damages to petitioners.Such liability of Ong is solidary with Sebastian pursuant to Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code which provide:Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done . . . .Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.. . .Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.. . .The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumptionjuris tantumthat the employer failed to exercisediligentissimi patris familiesin the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.45To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.46In an attempt to exculpate himself from liability, Sebastian claimed that he exercised due care in selecting Ong as a driver. Before he hired Ong, he allegedly required him to produce police and NBI clearances and he took into account the recommendations of Ongs previous employer and friends.47Sebastian also stressed that he instructed Ong to drive slowly and carefully and to take necessary precautions.48He likewise admonished Ong to be careful after the latter had some minor accidents in the parking area.49However, Sebastians statements are not sufficient to prove that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of Ong. His testimony is self-serving and devoid of corroboration as he did not bother to support the same with document evidence. Moreover, Sebastian could not even remember whether the recommendation from Ongs previous employer was made verbally or in writing.50On the other hand, due diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.51Admonitions to drive carefully without the corresponding guidelines and monitoring of the employee do not satisfy the due diligence required by law either.In short, Sebastians claims fall short of what is required by law to overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of his employee. The trial court therefore correctly held him solidarily liable with Ong to petitioners.In an obvious ploy to relieve himself from liability should the appellate courts decision be reversed, Sebastian averred that Macalinao is not entitled to damages. He anchored his claim on the novel argument that the provisions of Art. 2180 apply only when the injured party is a third person but it has no application to an employee like Macalinao.52He likewise postulated that recovery from the Social Security System, State Insurance Fund, Employees Compensation Commission, and the Philippine Medical Care Act, the government agencies with which petitioners filed a claim in view of Macalinaos injury and subsequent death, preclude pursuing alternate recourse or recovering from other sources until the former claims have been rejected.53Sebastian is grasping at straws. Art. 2180 makes no distinction whatsoever whether the claimant is an employee or a third person relative to the employer.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.54Moreover, petitioners claim against Sebastian is not based upon the fact of Macalinaos previous employment with him but on the solidary liability of the latter for the negligent act of one of his employees. Such is not precluded by prior claims with the government agencies enumerated. One is based on compulsory coverage of government benefits while the other is based on a cause of action provided by law.Additionally, respondents postulated that since it was Macalinao who sustained physical injuries and died, he was the one who suffered pain, not petitioners so moral damages are not recoverable in this case.55The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not proscribed from recovering moral damages in meritorious cases. To hold otherwise would give rise to the ridiculous scenario where a defendant may be compelled to pay moral damages in a quasi-delict causing physical injuries but will be relieved from doing so should those same injuries cause the victims death.In the case ofLambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon,56we held that in quasi-delicts:. . . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritualstatus quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced by therelatives of the victimis proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.57(Emphasis Supplied.)The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount ofP30,000.00 but since prevailing jurisprudence has fixed the same atP50,000.00,58there is a need to increase the award to reflect the recent rulings.Lastly, respondents claim that exemplary damages is not warranted in this case. Under the law, exemplary damages may be granted in quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with gross negligence.59Gross negligence has been defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.60Ongs gross negligence in driving the Isuzu truck precipitated the accident. This is lucidly portrayed in the photographs on record and it justifies the award of exemplary damages in petitioners favor. However, the trial courts award ofP10,000.00 is insufficient, thus the Court deems it proper to increase the award toP25,000.00 under the circumstances.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. TheDecisionof the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2000, as well as itsResolutiondated 7 September 2000, are hereby SET ASIDE. TheDecisionof the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 dated 12 April 1996 as amended by theOrderdated 23 May 1996 is hereby REINSTATED with the modifications that the award for moral damages is increased toP50,000.00 to conform with prevailing jurisprudence andthe award for exemplary damages is increased toP25,000.00. Costs against respondents.SO ORDERED.DANTE O. TINGAAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:REYNATO S. PUNOAssociate JusticeChairmanMA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate Justice Associate JusticeMINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate JusticeATTESTATIONI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.REYNATO S. PUNOAssociate JusticeChairman, Second DivisionCERTIFICATIONPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.Chief Justice

Footnotes1Penned by Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court), concurred in by Associate Justices Bernardo Ll. Salas and Edgardo P. Cruz; Rollo, pp. 104-113.2Id.at 126-127.3RTC Records, pp. 333, 336.4Id.at 336.5Ibid.6Id.at 336-337.7Id.at 7-10.8Id.at 333.9Id.at 182.10TSN, 14 April 1993, pp. 15-17.11RTC Records, p. 338.12Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Eddie Medecielo Ong and Genovevo Sebastian doing business under the name and style Genetron International Marketing to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the following amounts:1. The total amount ofP109,354.33 for medical and hospitalization expenses;2. The amount ofP11,000.00 for funeral and burial expenses;3. The amount ofP91,200.00 for loss of earning capacity;4. The amount ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death;5. The amount ofP30,000.00 as moral damages; and6. The sum ofP10,000.00 as exemplary damages.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.13Rollo, pp. 110-112.14Pleyto and Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, 16 June 2004, 432 SCRA 329.15Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 433 Phil. 258 (2003)citingTwin Towers Condominium Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552, 27 February 2003.16Rollo, pp. 110-111.17379 Phil. 30 (2000).18280 SCRA 160 (1997).19Supranote 17.20SeeAradillos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135619. 15 January 2004, 419 SCRA 514; People v. Bonifacio, 426 Phil. 511 (2002); People v. Marquina, 426 Phil. 46 (2002); Tangan v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 139 (2002); People v. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil. 677 (2001); People v. Ubaldo, 419 Phil. 718 (2001); People v. Palijon, 397 Phil. 545 (2000); People v. Candare, 388 Phil. 1010 (2000); People v. Roche, 386 Phil. 287 (2000); People v. Arafiles, 282 Phil. 59 (2000); Jose v. Court of Appeals,supranote 17.21Exhibits "L" to "L-4", RTC Records, pp. 205-209.22Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. VIIcitingAldanese v. Salutillo, 47 Phil 548.23Andersen v. Bee Line, Inc. 1 N.Y. 2d 169, 151 N.Y. S. 2d 633, 134 N.E. 2d 457 (1956); Hawes v. Atlantic Refining Co., 236 N.C. 643, 74 S.F. 2d 17 (1953), cited in 8 Am Jur 2d 1287.248 Am Jur 2d 1287.25TSN, 16 July 1993, p. 4.26TSN, 19 May 1993, p. 3.27Id.at 2.28Supranote 26.29RTC Records, p. 181.30Supranote 26 at 4.31Supranotes 26 and 28.32Lao v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 140023, 14 August 2003, 409 SCRA 43.33Ibid.Sec. 44, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.34Lao v. Standard Insurance Co. Inc.,supranote 32citingU.S. v. Que Ping, 40 Phil. 17, 19 (1919).35Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1187 (1999)citingPeople v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703, 720 (1998).36Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1198 (1999).37Ludo and Luym Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125483 1 February 2001, 351 SCRA 35.38Ramos v. Court of Appeals,supranote 36.39Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-73998, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 376.40D.M. Consunji v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 249.41Ibid.42Ramos v. Court of Appeals,supranote 36.43Rollo, p. 193.44Supranote 23 at 8.45Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. C & A Construction, Inc. G.R. No. 156034, 1 October 2003, 412 SCRA 524.46LRTA v. Natividad, 445 Phil. 31 (2003); Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 129 (2002)citingPantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, G.R. No. 79050-51, 14 November 1989, 179 SCRA 384; Umali v. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, 30 January 1976, 69 SCRA 263.47TSN, 31 January 1995, pp. 5-6, 10-14.48Idat 6.49Id.at 14.50Id.at 10.51Fabre v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 774 (1996).52Rollo, pp. 193, 200-202.53Id.at 201-202.54Recana v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123850, 5 January 2001, 349 SCRA 24.55Rollo, pp. 202-203.56G.R. No. 160709, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 285.57Ibid citingCesar Sangco, Torts and Damages, 1994 ed., p. 986.58Id.citingPestao v. Sps. Sumayang, G.R. No. 139875, 4 December 2000, 346 SCRA 870, 879.59Art. 2231, Civil Code.60Fernando v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96183, 19 August 1992, 212 SCRA 680citingBallantines Law Dictionary 3rd ed. p. 537.

Footnotes*Acting Chief Justice. Chairman.1Records, pp. 184-193.2Records, pp. 1-2.3TSN, July 18, 1991, pp. 8-30; August 7, 1991, pp. 2-10.4TSN, July 17, 1991, pp. 5-6.5TSN, November 6, 1991, pp. 5-28.6TSN, October 25, 1991, pp. 3-16.7TSN, August 28, 1991, pp. 17-26.8TSN, September 19, 1991, pp. 18-35.9TSN, August 28, 1991, pp. 2-16.10Supra, note 8 at 3-17.11Records, pp. 192-193.12Rollo, p. 38. The statement was written in the Ilonggo dialect and was translated to English in an affidavit dated April 10, 1997 (See Rollo, p. 39). It was not among the evidence presented during the trial as it was executed only after Norberto Loreno and appellant John Edward Leysa had already been convicted and started serving their prison sentence.13This was denied by this Court in an order dated September 1, 1997.14People vs. Balano, et al.,G.R. No. 116721, 272 SCRA 782, 787 (1997).15People vs. Maalat,G.R. No. 109814, 275 SCRA 206, 214 (1997).16People vs. Llaguno, et al., G.R. No. 91262, 285 SCRA 124, 136 (1998).17People vs. Pacina,G.R. No. 123150, 338 SCRA 195, 207 (2000);People vs. Ortiz,G.R. No. 111713, 266 SCRA 641, 653 (1997).18TSN, August 7, 1991, p. 3.19Records, p. 5.20People vs. Uycoque,G.R. No. 107495, 246 SCRA 769, 779 (1995).21People vs. Ferras, et al., G.R. No. 119495, 289 SCRA 94, 107 (1998).22People vs. Maluenda, et al., G.R. No. 115351, 288 SCRA 225, 251 (1998).23Dans, Jr. vs. People,G.R. No. 127073, 285 SCRA 504, 533 (1998).24People vs. Quitlong, et al., G.R. No. 121562, 292 SCRA 360, 381 (1998).