1

What caused the conflict in Bougainville in the 1980s and

1990s, what brought peace and how good are Bougainville’s

prospects for permanent peace? By Daniel Jones 2014

Photo: Damian Baker (2009) copyright.

Photo: Anthony Loewenstein (2012) copyright.

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Contents

Introduction..............................................................................................................5

Causes of the conflict................................................................................................6

The peace process.................................................................................................... 10

Prospects for future peace........................................................................................14

Conclusion................................................................................................................16

Bibliography.............................................................................................................18

List of Appendices

Appendix A: History and Mining................................................................................23

Appendix B: Uprising and Crisis.................................................................................30

Appendix C: Environmental Injuries...........................................................................32

Appendix D: Allegations and Evidence......................................................................33

Abbreviations

ABG Autonomous Bougainville Government

ADF Australian Defence Force

AGA Applied Geology Associates

AGM Annual General Meeting

ASPI Australian Strategic Policy Institute

ATS Alien Tort Statute

BCA Bougainville Copper Agreement

BCL Bougainville Copper Ltd

BCF Bougainville Copper Foundation

BFC Bougainville Finance Corporation

BIG Bougainville Interim Government

BPA Bougainville Peace Agreement

BRA Bougainville Revolutionary Army

BRF Bougainville Resistance Force

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BTG Bougainville Transitional Government

CRA Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia

CRAE Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia Exploration

CSR Corporate Social Responsibility

CZC Consolidated Zinc Company

IJC International Court of Justice

MRA Moral Re-Armament

PLA Panguna Landowners Association

PGK Papua New Guinea Kina

PMG Peace Monitoring Groups

PNGDF Papua New Guinea Defence Force

PNG Papua New Guinea

UN United Nations

RMTLTF Road Mine Tailings Lease Trust Fund

RPNGC Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary

RTZ Rio Tinto Zinc

SPPKF South Pacific Peace Keeping Force

TMG Truce Monitoring Group

UK United Kingdom

UID Unilateral Declaration of Independence

USA United States of America

USAID United States Agency for Intentional Development

UN United Nations

UNEP United Nations Environmental Program

WW2 World War Two

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“We now understand and have seen with our own eyes the

destructive effects of the Bougainville Copper Mine

operations on our land, our environment, our society and

culture. The mine will remain closed for the rest of our lives”.

Resolution passed by the Panguna landowners, 18th of December, 1992 (Gillespie, 1992: 5).

Introduction

Mining caused the conflict. Bougainvilleans were saving their Motherland

Me’ekamui1from further environmental destruction. The Bougainville war was,

initially, a war to reopen the mine. Bougainvillean grievances over the

environmental damages discharged from the mine caused the uprising, and the

responses from stakeholders after the mine was shut down caused the crisis.

After several failed attempts, the peace process began with Melanesian

reunification over the Sandline mercenary crisis. Peace initiatives organised by

Bougainvillean women and reconciliation managed with peace building customs

mobilised peace significantly throughout the crisis. The prospect of future peace

in Bougainville hinges on whether or not the mine is reopened, and whether or

not the outcome of the referendum for Independence is honoured. Bougainville

has many options to sustain its economy where further large scale mining is the

least safe and most costly.

1 Me’ekamui is a Nasioi word from central Bougainville meaning sacred Motherland or holy land.

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Causes of the conflict

The paramount cause of the conflict was Panguna mine2. The mine was

opposed from the beginning3. Debate on whether grievances emerged from

unfair agreement on mine profits4 or environmental injury5 continues. This essay

suggests the latter was most significant. Equally the response from Bougainville

Copper Ltd (BCL), PNG and Australia was causal. Ethnic tension contributed and

secession became a major factor from 1990, however the racial argument is

perhaps at odds with the ‘complex multi-layered internal conflict’ (Tanis, 2012)

involving militant factionalism between Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)

and Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF), that developed from the mid 1990’s.

Experiences of a young Bougainvillean writer are testimony to the confusion of

the civil crisis (Fong Roka, 2013).

Environmental pollution sparked the new Panguna Landowners

Association (PLA) uprising6, led by Perpetua Serero, a young woman landowner7

supported by her cousin Francis Ona. Bougainvilleans with ‘unified support based

on public morality denounced the environmental effects and demanded a fair

2 Stan Starygin (2013: 56) et al., recognise ‘theories on the causes of the conflict abound, there is no credible way of believing a conflict of that scale and intensity would have happened without Panguna mine’ 3 See Appendix A

4 Landowners received 1.25% of 5.36% of BCL’s profits (Regan, 2010: 18, Oliver, 1991: 134-5,

Loewenstein, 2013: 94, et al.)

5 See Appendix C

6 Serero’s letter writing to BCL demanded compensation from mine pollution. Serero died on the

15th

of June 1989 from respiratory illness possibly caused by mine pollution (Havini and John, 2001: 142, Oliver, 1991: 218). See Appendix B 7 Women are the only landowners in Bougainvilles matrilineal societies.

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share of revenue’8 (Oliver 1991: 125). Oliver (1991: 207) claims the

environmental report by Applied Geology Associates Ltd (AGA) from John

Connell et al ‘was biased against BCL, contributing to the conflict, not because it

was critical of BCL, but because the PLA thought it was not critical enough’. Ona

called the survey a “white wash”, and never returned to his truck driving job with

BCL (Oliver 1991: 208, Gillespie 2010, Havini and John 2001: 142, et al.). In a

letter, Ona clearly states that the environmental damages caused by BCL and

their prospective expansion of mining9 is the reason his people continue to fight

(Ona, 1989). BCL ‘encouraged the PLA to soften its demands offering PGK3

million in public works’ (Lasslett, 2009: 147). Ona’s response was; “we are not

worried about money. Money is something nothing...we are determined to close

the mine” (Lasslett, 2009: 147). If it wasn’t justice remedied by money Ona was

pursuing (less than PGK10 billion) then environmental injustice10 must have

caused rebellion11. Until today, ‘local concern for the long-term impacts of

existing environmental degradation’ is reported by USAID (Ipp and Cooper, 2013:

9). A United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) recognised the mines

8 Oliver (1991: 225) suggested ‘the militancy that erupted in November 1988 was at the time solely directed against Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL)’.Tanis (2012) said “it was started with frustration against the mine” see Appendix B 9 Letter; Francis Ona to Bart Kigina from the Justice and Peace Committee, Kieta 29

th of April

1989 wrote; “What I see is that our human race is under a big threat with existence of BCL

through this major factors:-1) The use of dangerous chemicals in its production line. 2) The

environmental damage caused by the Panguna mine an infact that (9) Prospecting authorities

would bring about when mining continued ahead. 3) A fifth of our total area of Bougainville is

already damaged. No creature will ever exist on it again. Another four-fifths when covered will

completely restrict our people from subsistence farming which in return will mean the life of the

entire province” (Ona, 1989).

10 See Appendix C also; Australian Greens Senator Dee Margetts (1996: 32), speaking on

Australia’s involvement in the crisis, reinforced ‘environmental destruction caused by BCL was the source of conflict’ 11 See Appendix B

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environmental remediation will cost billions (Mudd, 2013), proving Ona’s

demands were on the money.

In an interview12, Sir Paul Lapun continually reiterates that he and fellow

Bougainvilleans had no idea about mining, the environmental destruction and

injustices it would cause their land and people (Lapun interview, 1988). The

author recently interviewed a former BCL manager; Johannes Van Der Linden,

who agreed that irresponsible environmental mitigation caused the conflict13

(Van Der Linden, pers. comm. 15th of February 2014, Jones, 2014). According to a

USAID report; ‘environmental fallout from BCL was the primary catalyst for

conflict’ (Ipp and Cooper, 2013: 2) and suggests ‘environmental degradation was

ignored by the PNG government and BCL’ (Ipp and Cooper, 2013: 5). Even an

Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) special report implies ‘massive social

dislocation and environmental impacts’ (Jennings and Claxton, 2013: 3). A legal

battle over more than 10 years in an American court included ‘environmental

injuries’ (Cortemeglia, 2013). The case was discontinued after changes to the

Alien Tort Statute (ATS) ‘Including Environmental Claims for Justiciability

Reasons’ (Cortemeglia, 2013: 203). Legal affidavits of Joseph Kabui and John

Momis state “It is well understood, if the Panguna mine did not happen, the

Bougainville war and blockade would never have occurred. Everyone on

Bougainville is united in this feeling” (Momis affidavit, 2001, Kabui affidavit,

2001). Last year ‘Momis blamed Rio Tinto and the Australian government for

causing the original conflict’ (Loewenstien 2013: 93, Momis and Garrett, 2013).

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Interview conducted by Gill Andrew with Sir Paul Lapun et al. on the 14th

of April 1988. 13 See Appendix C

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Orders from BCL to ‘reopen the mine by whatever means necessary’

caused the crisis (Momis affidavit, 2001). Without funding from BCL and the

Australian Government supplying the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) with

everything they needed, engaging in and escalating conflict, in fact provoking the

formation of the BRA and subsequent BRF, and committing crimes against

innocent civilian populations, the conflict could never have occurred. Australia’s

involvement has always been targeted as the cause (Havini et al., 1996: 18).

Extensive literature on the subject continues to be ignored by some

commentators involved, while other scholars report on testimony of the

allegations (PNG mine watch, 2013). BCL meeting minutes from 1988-90 show

that the company wanted force to be used to reopen the mine rather than

respecting Bougainvillean mandates for closure. These documents demonstrate

BCL’s participation in PNGDF operations. In fact, they reveal BCL directed military

strategies14, surely not the expertise of a mining board of management. Further

evidence in affidavits from General Jerry Singirok and PNGDF intelligence officer

Yauka Alaumbo Liria reveals significant financial, participatory, service and

logistical assistance to engage in the conflict came from BCL (Gillespie, 2009:

224-5, Singirok Affidavit, 2001, Liria Affidavit, 2001). The blockade suggestion, to

“starve the bastards out” came from BCL and was supported by Australia (Momis

Affidavit, 2001, Kabui Affidavit, 2001)

An interview obtained by Professor of Criminology Dr Kristian Lasslett

with a senior Australian Defence Force (ADF) Officer, substantiates allegations of

Australia’s involvement;

14 See Appendix D

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“I mean the logistic support that we supplied to the PNGDF during that time [1989] was very

large and significant, without our support they couldn’t have done what they did...We’d be

training them at training camps, we’d be supplying them with weapons, we’d be supplying

them with uniforms, everything. And then we’d say these companies are now fit to be used,

let’s send them now to Bougainville. We’d even fly them to Bougainville for god’s sake, so

we would facilitate everything”

(Interview, ADF official, 2006, cited in Lasslett, 2009: 153 and Lasslett, 2012: 714).

The peace process

What brought peace, is viewed in informal (internal resolution) and

formal (foreign Intervention) peace processes terms (Regan 2010: 29-41). As

with the conflict, peace building was complex and cannot be explained in terms

of a single time, event or reason. However, women’s roles, customary

resolutions and reconciliations, ‘stalemate and exhaustion, internal divisions,

foreign intervention and a constitutional settlement in 2001’, were major

‘diminution’ factors (Regan, 2013: 119). Focus on women’s roles in peace

building is significant and reflected in an in-depth forum paper dedicated to

Bougainvillean women’s voices (Havini et al., 1996). Sister Lorraine brought 700

Bougainvillean women together in August 1996 to organise peace, just one of

many examples (Loraine, 1996: 26). Regan (2010: 40-1, 139) acknowledges

women in the peace process, however focuses on women’s exclusion from the

2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) dominated by male politic. A review of

his book reiterates criticism of ‘the glaring lack of mention relative to women’s

roles in organising peace processes’ (Stead, 2012). Regan also fails to mention

Rosemarie ‘Waratah’ Gillespie’s brave contribution to early peace building

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resolutions, medical assistance and media exposure of war atrocities (Gillespie,

1992, 1993, 1999 and 2009). Waratah brought peace in her heart, dedication and

compassion, seldom achieved or recognised by relatively ‘light’ formal peace

processes and academics.

Informal customary peace building was initiated within the BRA and

wider society, ‘building momentum’ from 1990 (Regan, 2010: 29, 2013: 27-8).

Regarding custom, Tanis said; “two things that characterise Bougainville warfare

is the ability to start it and the ability to end it”15. Tanis (2012) mentions being

appointed Minister for Peace from within the BRA, two years before formal

processes began16 building capacity for peace from within the centre of the

conflict 17. Melanesian peace building is about building relationships, sharing,

caring and respect18 (Tanis, 2012). Customary economy is central to

Bougainvillean and wider Melanesian peace processes, involving compensation

and reconciliation ceremony, characterised by shared responsibility and shared

benefit. Chewing Buai or betel nut to resolve ill feelings is a common practice19.

15James Tanis (2012); “traditionally even from the days of our grandfathers, if you start a war you

must make sure you end it within your time so that you do not lose the objectives of the

conflict”.

16 James Tanis (2012); “there was already a small core unit within the BRA that was thinking

peace, talking peace...we already had a grass roots initiative going, in fact some of the

reconciliations we had actually started before the signing of the formal peace process” .

17 James Tanis (2012); “peace can be advocated, peace can be attempted to be enforced but

peace really starts with those in the centre of the conflict who decide to accept peace”

18 James Tanis (2012);“in our Bougainville society what we believe is this; sharing is caring, caring is respect and respect strengthens peace” 19 James Tanis (2012); “there were times when I wondered what could have happened in the

policies and the regulations allowed the Australian army commanders even the civilian monitors

to chew beetle nut because with betel nut we use beetle nut in peace building we use betel nut

in gatherings and we use betel nut to make friendship and to court women to”

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Most significantly peace building involves elaborate Sing Sing Kaul ceremonies or

‘Bel Kol’ in the case of BCL peace building (Lornie, 2014, Momis, 2014).

The formal peace process was officially from 1997-2005 (Regan, 2010),

however it began from mid 1990 with failed talks on a New Zealand Naval

vessel20 (Regan, 2010: 30). Several failed negotiations for ceasefire proceeded

this time (eg. Honiara 1991) including the South Pacific Peace Keeping Force

(SPPKF) conference in Arawa 1994, attended by Theodore Miriung representing

the BRA21. From 1997 the peace process was slow but was unintentionally

helped by ‘the Sandline affair’22 (Dinnen et al., 1997, Dorney et al., 1998). Tanis

(2012) spoke of the Sandline or ‘Executive Outcomes’ incident, saying; “It gave

an immediate sympathy in PNG, sympathy on Bougainville and also sympathy

abroad, it brought a time for us to reunite”. With the help of ‘the international

community’, Bougainvillean factions met in New Zealand from mid 1997, later

joined by PNG officials, monitored by unarmed Truce Monitoring Groups (TMG)

where a truce was agreed (Regan, 2012: 124). Subsequently, on the ground an

‘irrevocable’ ceasefire was operated by Peace Monitoring Groups (PMG) from

mid 1998 who left by 2003 (Regan, 2013: 124). After much deliberation the BPA

20 Interestingly, Sister Lorraine, after paddling a canoe to this NZ ship in Buka passage, was turned away at gunpoint trying to represent women in the initial peace talks (Lorraine, 1996: 27). 21 The late Theodore Miriung was Bougainvillean lawyer and High Court Judge in PNG, elected

Premier of the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) in 1995 (Howley 2002: 216). Miriung

worked with Francis Ona from 1990 and during the SPPKF conference tried to persuade the BRA

to make use of the peace keeping presence (Regan 2010: 31). Sadly, honourable Miriung an

instrumentalist peace negotiator form 1994 (Regan 2010: 31) and described as a martyr (Havini

and John 2001: 130), was assassinated on the 12th

of October 1996 (Dixon 1996).

22 Sandline was a British/South African private mercenary company that was arrested and

extradited by the PNGDF after General Singirok realised further human rights abuses were unacceptable (Singirok affidavit, 2001). This brought a sense of Melanesian reunification and accelerated peace.

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was finalised in 2001, involving a majority of BRA signatories and a weapons

disposal program (Regan, 2010: 90-1). Starygin (2013: 55) suggests the BPA

‘brought a stalemate of lawlessness ‘, concluding ‘the BPA did not bring peace to

Bougainville, rather it bought a weapons containment process which failed by

2006, a weak ABG in 2005 and lawless gangs controlling half the province’

(Starygin, 2013: 71). The ‘light intervention’ peace process and BPA was not

entirely a failure (Regan, 2010). One positive aspect was again, unarmed female

PMG who were strategically used to quell male aggression (Regan, 2010), which

actually worked (Arawa pers. comm. January 2013). The purported gang leaders

as portrayed by Starygin, are perhaps exaggerations of mine security sentiment

and a farcical conman, however arms will always present risk (Regan, 2010).

The peace process did not end with the BPA in 2001 and Rio Tinto was

never a party to the BPA. In 2001 Kabui and Momis both signed affidavits

mentioning Rio Tinto had never been invited to negotiate, additionally implying;

“If the court case can obtain justice for Bougainvilleans against Rio Tinto then it

may in fact strengthen the peace process” (Kabui affidavit, 2001: 2). “It is

important to Bougainvilleans and long-term reconciliation process that Rio

Tinto’s responsibility be addressed...” (Momis affidavit, 2001: 4). The distinct

separation between BCL and the PNG government is ‘astounding’(le Couteur,

2014), seeing their relationship was a joint one during the conflict and

considering PNG owns 19.6% of BCL (BCL Annual Report, 2013). PNG

stakeholders did not vote at this year’s BCL AGM and have a history of not voting

on anything, which is ‘strange’ with respect to strengthening further peace

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building (Garret and le Couteur, 2014). Rio Tinto, who owns 53% of BCL, voted

against resolutions for the appointment of an independent jurist to investigate

BCL’s involvement in the war (Garret and le Couteur, 2014). What is the caveat

to Rio Tinto’s lack of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiative and how can

they ensure future peace towards Bougainvilleans with intentions to reopen the

mine while denying their involvement in war atrocities against them? (Thomson,

2011).

Prospects for lasting peace

Without pressure on the ABG and the ABG’s rhetoric of reopening the

mine (Garrett, 2014, Lasslett, 2013), prospects for lasting peace in Bougainville

are very good. Regan (2013: 130) acknowledges but doesn’t emphasise ‘mining

could contribute to tensions in unpredictable ways’23. Reopening the mine may

not result in peace for three reasons. Firstly, Independence must come first, as

asserted by Bougainvillean citizens and landowners at Panguna (Miriori, 2014).

Secondly, artisanal gold mining is doing well (Momis, 2014: 5) and is preferable

to large-scale mining which is more environmentally damaging and most of the

profits will inevitably go to the company24. The ABG would lose the long-term

wealth potential of the people’s resource. Thirdly, sustainable agriculture, eco-

tourism and retail industries are already in motion but require ABG support

before mining (Porabou, 2008, 2011, 2012, and 2013). Despite unsubstantiated

assertions that the ABG has the support of ‘organisations generally’ representing

23

From the authors experience on the ground from 2012-2013 and with information gleaned from films and online forums presenting Bougainvillean voices, it appears a majority of Bougainvilleans are opposed to the mine reopening. 24 mining companies do not have a record of putting governments and people before profits

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Bougainvilleans at consultative forums (Momis, 2014: 8), documentation of

forums paints a different picture (for example talk of ‘environmental injustice’

and ‘watering down of resolutions’ by Sam Kauona et al. opposing agreement

with Professor Ciaran O'faircheallaigh, see Porabou, 2013).

Moves to reopen the mine are dangerous to Bougainvillean prospects for

a peaceful future. Yet Momis insists that an economic benefit from large-scale

mining outweighs social and environmental risks. He recently stated ‘the

ultimately unsustainable mining sector can provide the basis for a sustainable

economy’ (Momis, 2014: 7) but for how long? Momis has recently been accused

of inciting further bloodshed (Oearupeu, 2014). An undesired outcome in the

referendum for independence from 2015-2020 is another factor impinging on

stability (Regan, 2010: 109). If violence stirs concerning the referendum

outcome, Alexander Downer ought to take some blame for his immorally

deceptive contributions to the BPA25. The ABG views expedient economic

potential from the mine as its only way of achieving recognition of

independence, likely coming from the 22 Australian advisors (Miriori, 2014) or

the ‘international community’(Regan, 2010). Mining is not the way to achieve

economic, social and environmental stability and sustainability. USAID suggests

‘emerging new threats to instability include loss of livelihood caused by

environmental degradation from reopening the mine’ 26(Ipp and Cooper, 2013).

Dr Andrew Smith’s work for ASPI suggests, ‘an intervention to prevent an 25

While negotiating the BPA Downer told the ABG Australia would ‘influence the international community’ (referring to how they helped East Timor) to recognise Bougainvilles Independence come referendum 2015-20, meanwhile telling PNG it had the prerogative to ignore the outcome of the referendum and that the ‘international community would understand’ (Regan, 2010: 90). 26

Further suggesting ‘if plans to reopen the mine do not account for environmental impacts, they may further destabilise the situation’ (Ipp and Cooper, 2013: 9).

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intervention’ and ‘a joint ADF/USA led intervention to dispose of unexploited

ordinances, even to reopen Panguna mine for example’ (Smith, 2014). This

apparent ulterior motive of an unnecessary ‘intervention’ to ‘reopen the mine’

appears to be strategic bullying attempting to incite instability and calculate risk.

Conclusion

Mining developments affect Melanesian livelihoods significantly. One

reason is 80% of Melanesians are completely reliant on subsistence sources of

unpolluted water, gardening land and fish resources for survival. Evidently,

mining legacies from Panguna, Ok Tedi, Porgera and Grasberg are prime

examples of the worst environmental and social catastrophes in the world. If the

ABG improved artisanal mining and existing agricultural industries by working

with the people rather than against them, they could collect enough taxes to

sustain the services they need and still gain international recognition of

independence. They don’t need another unsustainable mega mining project to

achieve that objective (Tagovono, L., pers. comm. February 2014). Value adding

to existing industries and creating direct trade links with valuable boutique

organic (eg. coconut oil, cocoa, vanilla) goods and services worldwide, is not only

economically and environmentally sustainable, but socially stable and does not

risk sustained peace. In relation to Rio Tinto/BCL and Australia’s contribution to

the Bougainville conflict, significant reconciliatory peacemaking ought to take

place. If Australia’s way of reconciling its past wrongs with indigenous peoples is

to apologise, then perhaps that’s a good place to start. Australia ought to be the

first to recognise Bougainville’s independence (referendum outcome permitting),

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after all Bougainville has proved it has the capacity to defend its sovereignty

against all odds which ought to be formally acknowledged. If Rio Tinto/BCL

reconciles injustices it is responsible for with ‘compensation packages’ then they

ought to start environmental remediation at the Panguna mine site as soon as

practicable, as of the original demands that reflect the cost, without causing

further instability and conflict by pressing on with their unwanted exploitation.

Both these initiatives ought to be adapted in conjunction with Bougainvillean

customary reconciliation and compensation processes and strictly at their

request. Respectfully rebuilding a meaningful and trustworthy relationship with

Bougainville into the future, rather than continuing ‘one of the darkest episodes

in Australia’s state history’ (Lasslett, 2012: 720), is of utmost importance to

peace and stability in the region.

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19

Kabui affidavit, J. (2001). United States District Court, Central District of California, Western Division. Sarei, et al. v. Rio Tinto, plc. et al. Case No. 00-11695 MMM AIJx. Declaration of Joseph Kabui, signed 13th of November 2001, Port Moresby

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Boku Sub-District, Bougainville, 14th of April 1988. pp. 1-29.

Lasslett, K. (2009). Winning hearts and mines: the Bougainville crisis, 1988-90.

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Lasslett, K. (2013). AusAID Fuels Bougaiville Mining Tensions, 23rd of April 2013, New Matilda, viewed 26th of May 2013, https://newmatilda.com/2013/04/23/ausaid-fuels-bougainville-mining-tensions

Loewenstein, A. (2013). Profits of Doom: How Vulture Capitalism is Swallowing the World, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic, ISBN 9780522858822 (pbk).

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Mudd, G. (2013).UNEP to help Bougainville manage clean-up of Rio Tinto mine, ABC Radio 4th of September 2013, viewed 19th of May 2014, http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/unep-to-help-bougainville-manage-cleanup-of-rio-tinto-mine/1185729

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21

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22

[NOTE] Reference list for Appendices are within the main Bibliography above.

Appendix A: History and Mining

Determining the cause of the 1980’s-90’s conflict deserves consideration of three pre-

crisis factors. Firstly, autochthonous Bougainvillean culture developed from warrior

kastoms (Oliver, 1973). Secondly, WW2 impacted significantly on Bougainvillians,

familiarising militancy (Mauro-Miraku n.d). Subsequently, dumped weapons stockpiles

contributed to arming rebellion. Thirdly, imposed arbitrary annexations, from a German

colony to a League of Nations (UN) trust territory of Papua New Guinea (PNG)

administered by Australia from 1946-1975, remains contentious. Subsequently,

Bougainville became absorbed into PNG, recognised by Australia in 1975, while

Bougainvillian secession/independence, weeks before, was ignored in a ‘breach of trust’

(Gillespie, 1999: 5).

Despite the Interim Provincial Government of Bougainville initiating secession from May

1975 ‘Leo Hannet and Father John Momis-de facto chairman of the PNG Constitutional

Planning Committee, led the secessionist movement, which was instrumental in

devolving power to the provinces’ (James et al. 2012: 5). The Unilateral Declaration of

Independence (UDI) for the Republic of North Solomon’s was made on the 1st of

September 1975, ‘two weeks before’ (Gillespie 1999: 12) not ‘days before’ (Regan 2010:

15), PNG’s Independence was recognised by Australia on the 16th of September 1975,

while Bougainvilles was not, suggests interference related to mining interests.

Bougainville’s absorption into the sovereign state of PNG (against their will), caused an

aggrieved secessionist movement still prevalent today.

In a further ‘breach of trust ‘the Australian Administration granted Conzinc Rio Tinto

Australia (CRA) prospecting licenses to mine Nasioi land ‘against their will’, determined

illegal with respect to contemporaneous jurisprudence [2](Gillespie 1999: 5). It is illegal

for a trustee to “absorb the property entrusted to him into his own patrimony” (1950)

International Court of Justice (ICJ) 128 at p. 149 (Advisory opinion Internal Status of

South West Africa-Namia (Gillespie 1999: 27). ‘Justice Evatt of the High Court of Australia

stated’; It is quite fallacious to infer from the fact that in pursuance of its international duties

under the mandate, the Commonwealth of Australia exercises full and complete jurisdiction

over territory as though it possessed unlimited sovereignty therein...(or) that the

territory...has ever been assimilated or incorporated within the Commonwealth”(1937) 58

CLR at pp. 581-582 (Gillespie1999: 12).

Theodore Miruing spoke of a ‘breach of faith’ with regard to Australia’s denial of

recognition for Bougainville Independence on the 1st of September 1975. He said;

“As with most cases in which serious armed conflicts of a political nature are involved, there

has been a breach of faith, or a denial of a basic human right at some point of time in history

of the countries or states concerned. Similarly, there has been a breach of faith or a denial of

a basic right in the case of the crisis on Bougainville. At no stage during the [annexation of

Bougainville by Britain and Germany], did we ever yield, concede or accede to any foreign

takeover of any of our right’s, our power or sovereignty as happens in normal cases of a

23

similar nature. We were traded like sheep or cattle without our knowledge and consent. We

therefore, consider this a serious breach of faith or a denial of a basic right of freedom of

choice at the threshold of colonial history of Bougainville. Both the [League of Nations and

UN Trusteeship] entrusted with the care of non-self-governing peoples, failed to take any

action to remedy the situation. Similarly, the Australian Colonial Administration failed to

remedy this problem. Instead, it took every step to ensure that Bougainville remained with

PNG, right through to the eve of PNG’s independence in September 1975” (Miriung 1995,

cited in Havini and John 2001: 130-31).

The late Theodore Miriung was a Bougainvillean lawyer and High Court Judge in PNG. He

was elected Premier of the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) in Buka 1995

and was instrumental in peace negotiations between the BRA the Bougainville Interim

Government (BIG) and the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) (Howley 2002: 216,

Regan, 2010). Miriung worked with Francis Ona from 1990 and during the SPPKF

conference tried to persuade the BRA to make use of the peace keeping presence

(Regan 2010: 31). Sadly, honourable Miriung an instrumentalist peace negotiator from

1994 (Regan 2010: 31) and described as a martyr (Havini and John 2001: 130), was

assassinated on the 12th of October 1996 (Dixon 1996). Miruing vision was; [paraphrased

by Br Patrick Howley]

“The leadership in the villages was first damaged by the money and mobility which came

during the life of the mine. Then it was further destroyed during the crisis. However, the

village leaders are the only real leaders that we have who can gain a following. People will

not listen to them if they go back to the old authoritarian ways of dealing with the problems

or the old ways of protecting their privileged position for their own benefit. What we need is

leaders with ability to listen, facilitate, negotiate and mediate. The people will accept these

leaders and follow them. I want you to continue training with special stress on the village

leaders. We are planning to develop our government on the Council of Chiefs. Chiefs are

very independent individuals and often one or two out of any group will stand out from a

decision through jealous rivalry or to protect their own power. I would like your training to

concentrate on the chiefs. The training that you are offering could be a tool to help them to

reach consensus”.

(Howley, 2002: 216, notes of author’s interview with Theodore Miriung, August, 1995).

Mineral exploration by Australian geologist Ken Phillips from 1963 sowed the

seeds of the conflict. Subsequently resulting in a ‘Bill, produced in Canberra and

introduced in the House of Assembly from 1964-68, issuing mining rights to Conzinc Rio

Tinto Australia (CRA) (Lapun, 1988: 3). Mining was opposed from the very begging

(Oliver, 1991: 131, Havini and John, 2001: 136), especially by matrilineal landowning

women, the only land owners in Bougainville’s ‘autonomous communities’ (Ogan, 1971:

84, cited in Oliver, 1991: 128-9, Tanis, pers. comm. March 2013). Women led peaceful

protests against mine facilities at Rovovana, which turned violent when the Australian

Administrations newly trained and equipped PNG riot squads, using tear gas and batons,

beat people attempting to remove survey pegs (Gillespie, 2009: 11, Havini and John,

2001: 139, Smales, 1969, also see below). Additionally, compulsorily acquired customary

24

land, under terms and changes to the Mining Ordinance27 (Oliver, 1991: 134-5), forced

relocation of several villages, some twice, starting with the Moroni village on the mine

site (Oliver 1991: 138-40). This was a farcical process met with opposition, anger and

trauma28.

‘In an incestuous relationship...Consolidated Zinc Company Ltd (CZC) of London owned

by Zinc Corporation Ltd of Broken Hill, Australia had a managing interest in New Broken

Hill Consolidated that merged in 1962 with Rio Tinto Company Ltd to form Rio-Tinto Zinc

Corporation Ltd (RTZ). Meanwhile in Australia, Consolidated Zinc Proprietary wholly

owned by CZC merged with Rio Tinto Mining Company of Australia Ltd to form Conzinc

Rio Tinto Australia (CRA) which became CRA Exploration (CRAE) in Bougainville.

Evaluation of its exploration was handed to Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd a subsidiary of

Bougainville Mining Ltd that upon commencement of mining in 1972 became

Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) registered in the Territory of Papua New Guinea’

(Oliver, 1991: 124).

The mine was ultimately forced on Bougainville with various administrative tactics

employed by the Minister for External Territories; Charles Barnes (Havini and John: 134-

9, Gillespie 2009: 12, Oliver 1991: 118-127), despite local efforts issuing a writ against

the administration (see Leo Hannett below) in pursuits of litigation to stop the mine

(Oliver 1991: 125). For example, Sir Paul Lapun29 and Raphael Bele30 flew to Australia to

apply for a High Court injunction to stop the land grab but were met by a purported Jim

Coulter representing Moral Re-Armament (MRA)31, who dissuaded their action by taking

them out to fancy hotels, a home in Mosman and on tour ,while he organised a meeting

with Prime Minister Gorton in Canberra and CRA boss Maurice Mawby (Lapun 1988: 9-

13).They passed the ‘responsibility’ buck on grievances between each other,

disrespected and ignored their land values (Gillespie 2009: 12, Lapun 1988: 9-13).

The Panguna mine became operational from mid 1972. Immigrants from PNG and

Australia, working or looking for work from BCL caused intense changes to Bougainvillian

27 The Mining Ordinance made way for the Bougainville Copper Agreement 28 See Gregory Kopa from Moroni village opposing BCL in an expert from the film; My Valley is

Changing (Commonwealth Film Unit, 1970), viewed 20th

of May 2014,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MYSENPoZv58

29 Sir Paul Lapun was elected Bougainvilles first District Member in the House of Assembly in 1964 (Oliver, 1991: 91, 125). 30 Raphael Bele was elected to the House of Assembly for Central Bougainville District in 1972

(Oliver, 1991: 188).

31 Moral Re-Armament (MRA) an organisation claiming to seek peace in outcomes for corporate

objectives: hired in Australia and the Pacific region (Gillespie 2010: 217), see for example,

Cooper, Nigel (1992)‘The Bougainville Land Crisis of 1969: the role of Moral Re-Armament’

Occasional Paper Number 1, Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies , University of

Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, January 1992, and Driberg, Tom (1964), ‘The Mystery of

Moral Re-Armament’, Secker and Warburg, London

25

societies. Racial tension further developed as a result of the mine, explained well by

Oliver (1991: 223-4). ‘White-skins and red-skins’ became further ‘resented by many

Bougainvillean’s and blamed for an increase in crime’, including squatting, raping of

women and ‘the undermining of customary ways’ (Regan 2010: 13). Crimes committed

against women, revered sacredly in Bougainville’s matrilineal societies, rallied the war

cry during the conflict (Tanis, pers. comm. March 2013). Tanis (2002: 9) describes a

threefold aspect to the uprising involving mining, PNG squatters and the abuse of

women32. Grievances against BCL mounted. One was ‘the dispersal of its workforce’

constituting an average of 80% Nuiginians including 40% Bougainvillians, however locals

still felt excluded, prompting the company’s ‘localisation policy’ and increased ‘training

programmes’, settling things for a time (Oliver 1991: 148-9). Other reactionary benefits

to locals unravelled through various organisations and trusts (see Appendix B).

32 James Tanis (2002: 9) quote; ; “Put three things together, land that CRA dug in Panguna, illegal

squatting on land, and the killing of a mother plus the other violence that was carried out by one

agency of the State, and you have the recipe for full scale retaliation”.

26

Photo by Daniel Jones (2012) village archive

27

Photo by Daniel Jones (2012) village archive

28

Photo by Daniel Jones (2012), village archive

29

Appendix B: Uprising and Crisis

From 1979 certain landowners from mine affected areas formed an organisation called

the Panguna Landowner Association (PLA) (Oliver 1991: 203), who from 1980 won an

improved compensation agreement with BCL under provisions forming the Road Mine

Tailings Lease Trust Fund (RMTLTF) (Lasslett 2009: 146). The funds became divisive as

clan communities saw benefits eaten by those directing the funds, but most felt

excluded. The RMTLTF was invested in corporate shares including the Bougainville

Development Corporation (BDC) (Oliver 1991: 203-4, Wesley-Smith 1990, Lasslett 2012:

707) and BCL invested in the Bougainville Copper Foundation (BCF) (Lasslett 2009: 146),

attempting to appease Bougainvilleans. Both caused ‘predicable’ problems associated

with ‘Melanesian patronage’ (Oliver 991: 204). The majority denied access to benefits,

particularly a growing youth population, found charismatic leadership in Francis Ona and

Perpetua Serero promoting traditional egalitarian values and social and environmental

justice (Oliver 1991: 206-7, Lasslett 2009: 147, Lasslett 2012: 708). These leaders

became elected executives of the PLA on the 21st of August 1987 (Oliver 1991: 205,

Lasslett 2009: 147, Lasslett 2012: 708). The PLA changed entirely from within, serving

BCL at letter informing them of the leadership changes on the 12th of April 1988. The

letter demand 10 billion kina compensation for environmental damages, effectively 50%

of BCL’s future profits, and complete transfer of the company’s ownership to the PLA

after 5 years (PLA 1988, cited in Lasslett 2009: 147, Lasslett 2012: 708). Sir Paul Lapun

(1988: 5) recalls seeing the landowners protesting at Panguna on the 11th of April 1988

shouting “THIS IS OUR LAND”. If the demands were not met, they warned, the mine

would be shut down (PLA 1988, cited in Lasslett 2009: 147, Lasslett 2012: 708). The

National Government ordered an inquiry into the environmental and social impacts of

the mine (Lasslett 2009: 47).

Perpetua Serero at age 34 wrote several letters to BCL demanding compensation for

pollution (environmental damage) and social impacts. In 1988 Serero told a reporter;

“We don’t grow healthy crops anymore, out traditional customs and values have been

disrupted and we have become mere spectators as our earth is being dug up, taken

away and sold for millions. Our land was taken from us by force. We were blind then,

but we have finally grown to understand what’s going on” (Moody, 1991: 67).

‘The people of Bougainville have experienced one of the worst human-made

environmental catastrophies of modern times’ (Havini and John 2001: 142)

Sadly Perpetua Serero died within two years of starting the uprising which was clearly

based on her experience of environmental injustice and pollution, as she died at 36 of

cardio-respiratory failure in Arawa hospital on the 15th of June 1989 (Oliver, 1991: 218).

‘Two days before her death PLA members recorded her as saying;

“I am only a lady and worse still I am a sick women. I will silently support whatever course

the two of you take to achieve something tangible for our people [from the peace package].

We must get something for our people, otherwise all this fighting will be worthless...There is

no more communications with Francis Ona and we do not know what Damien Damen has

30

done to him. I fear secession and what it might bring. I do not want the whole province to

blame us landowners when and if we do [secede] and the secession does not deliver the

goods to our province. The whole crisis ...has developed into something totally different

from the original demands of the landowners ... Mi poret [I am afraid] because what we

have started has developed into something else...Our uncle Mathew Kove, nobody tells us

what has happened to him. If he is dead, then his death must not be in vain...” (PNG Times,

16th of June 1989, cited in Oliver, 1991: 218).

BCL was unable to pettily pay off the new PLA as they had done with the old. Protests

and road blocks into Panguna ensued. Explosives were expropriated from the mine on

the 22nd of November 1988 by men armed with axes and knives and more explosives

stolen from the Bougainville Limestone Mining Company at Manatai (Oliver 1991: 208).

On the 26th of November a power pylon at Loloho was taken down bringing giant 75,000

watt electric shovels to a halt (Gillespie 2009: 15, Oliver 1991: 209). A unified campaign

of industrial sabotage reigned during these weeks destroying mine property valued

upward of 620,000 kina (Lasslett 2009: 147). Power was restored to the mine on the 4th

of December 1988 but the following day it was shut down again with the dropping of

another pylon, the company decided to close and wait until order was restored (Oliver

1991: 209). Assurance was given by Prime Minister Namalui that it was safe to proceed

and mining resumed again on the 11th of December 1988 (Oliver 1991: 209). PNG

brought in 120 Police which increased to 400 but arrested few saboteurs, by which time

Ona and his followers had gone bush in the Kongara mountains with an infamous cult

secessionist leader Damien Damen purportedly influencing Ona’s ‘anti-BCL sentiment

with anti-PNG secessionism’ (Oliver 1991: 210).

Support across Bougainville for Ona’s initiative grew widely from the grass roots to

official leaders such as Premier Joseph Kabui and many others, while BCL prepared

‘peace packages’ and PNG Police imposed curfews, beatings even rapes and burning

houses occurred in search of Ona but no further sabotage occurred until 1989 (Oliver

1991: 2011). Militancy built in the bush as an Australian trained PNGDF commander Sam

Kauona defected home to Bougainville joining the hidden Kongara base camp (Oliver

1991: 213). This inspired many young Bouaginvilleans into what became the Bougainville

Revolutionary Army (BRA) proliferating throughout the island. Militant attacks emerged

against BCL and on the 21st of May 1989, 2 more pylons were felled, company vehicles

fired upon and the mine would never operate again (Oliver 1991: 215). Australian BCL

employees devised a sweepstake allotting numbers to pylons and whoever drew the

number of the next pylon to topple won the sweep (Gillespie 2009: 160).

The Royal PNG Constabulary (RPNGC) and Defence Force (PNGDF) supplied with

Australian artillery; machine guns, white phosphorus munitions and 5 Iroquois

helicopters used as gunships (Gillespie 2009: 43-6), even Australian Defence Force (ADF)

pilots to fly them, resulted in the most brutal counterinsurgency warfare in the Pacific

since WW2. War crimes committed by the PNGDF, supplied by the ADF, funded by Rio

Tinto and the Australian Government, occurred, and without their support the conflict

could never have happened (see Gillespie 2009, Gillespie, 1992, Gillespie, 1993).

31

Appendix C: Environmental Injuries

The once fertile arable land of the Panguna Valley in the Crown Prince Ranges of central

south Bougainville was destroyed forever by the largest open cut mine in the world at

the time (Oliver 1991: 118- 59, Regan 2013: 119). The crater of death is ‘600 metres

deep 1000 metres wide and 1500 metres long’ (Oliver 1991: 135) in a mining area of 7

square kilometres. Paul Quodling (1991: 29) the general manger of BCL 1956-1987 said;

“this land is lost forever, being replaced most likely by a man made crater lake”. In 1972

it was estimated to contain 900 million tonnes of ore (Oliver 1991: 135), producing

concentrate containing; 3 million tonnes of copper, 304, 412 kilograms of gold and 780,

875 of silver, with a net value of approximately 1900 million kina (Oliver 1991: 121).At

peak production 200,000 tonnes of copper ore a day was extracted 24 hours a day

(Gillespie 2009: 13). Oliver (1991: 136) BCL’s anthropologist acknowledges ‘aside from

local grievances about disproportional wealth distribution, the disposal of mine tailings

was the company’s biggest political headache’. During the ‘17 years of operation 1225

million tonnes of waste and silt’ (Oliver 1991: 137), if not billions, was dumped in the

Kawerong River flowing into the Jaba River system flowing to the west coast amassing in

the Empress Augusta Bay (Gillespie 1999: 9). These heaving metal tailings contain toxic

levels of copper, zinc, cadmium, mercery, molybdenum, sulphur, and arsenic (Moody

1991: 69). Johannes Vander Linden a mine manger for BCL 1972-89 strongly advised the

company against their environmentally irresponsible dumping method, insisting the

planned disposal pipeline to the sea ought to have been implemented from the begging

and went on to say “if the project was done properly the conflict would never have

happened” (pers. comm. February 2014, also see Jones 2014). The pipeline was rejected

early on in sight of profit losses and technical difficulties (Quodling 1991: 29), however

the pipeline was under construction in the 80’s (Oliver 1991: 207) but it was too late, the

damage had been done. Hydro geologist Dr Gavin Mudd mentions the scale of

Panguna’s remediation problem is unprecedented, the acid mine drainage is severe and

extremely toxic to humans, he said “it could cost hundreds of millions, if not billions”

(Mudd, 2013).

32

Appendix D: Allegations and Evidence

BCL;

On 26 November 1988, BCL’s Managing Director asserted one RPNGC Mobile Squad was

inadequate and insisted a second be deployed on Bougainville (BCL meeting minutes,

1988: 1).

Minutes from meeting; 26th of November 1988, Minister of Mines and Energy suggests

announcing a Bougainville Copper Agreement (BCA) review to calm the situation. BCL

rejects the suggestion on the basis of attributing victory to the rebels, condoning their

actions and raising landowner expectations (BCL meeting minutes, 1988).

BCL General Managers have confessed to supplying the military with significant logistic

assistance. In an interview with UK scholar, Dr Kristian Lasslett, one company executive

acknowledged:

“The reality was, ‘we can’t do our thing because we haven’t got vehicles’. So we’d give them

vehicles. ‘Ah we haven’t got radios so we can’t communicate’. So we’d give them two way

radios. ‘Ah we can’t support our men over here, we haven’t got enough provisions’. So we’d

put them in the mess, we’d feed them in the mess, we’d provide them with accommodation.

We did everything they asked of us to make their life more comfortable, and better able to

manage through, with transport, communications, provisions, whatever, fuel. You know we

gave them everything, because as a far as we saw it we were hoping that they were going to

solve the situation, so we could start operating again. So we supported them every way we

could” (PNG Mine Watch, 2013).

And..

“We did everything they [the security forces] asked of us to make their life more comfortable, and better able to manage through, with transport, communications, provisions, whatever, fuel as far as we saw it we were hoping that they were going to solve the situation, so we could start operating again”. (BCL Manager, Personal Communication, 26 October 2006, cited in Lasslett, 2009: 152).

A senior BCL manger said;

“There were absolutely no arrangements for accommodation, no arrangements for messing, or transportation, so it was expected that the company was going to feed, and house, and transport these guys ... [The mobile squads said:) 'If you want us to drive around give us some f* •• vehicles [asterisks added]. We are not going to be very effective if we are dying from hunger, we need to be fed '. So what do you do?”

(Personal Communication, 26 October 2006, cited in Lasslett, 2009: 149)

BCL was running out of money in late 1989 so they attempted to invoice the PNGDF for

their logistic support (BCL meeting minutes, 1990).

BCL regularly met with PNGDF officers and PNG government officials including Colonel

Nuia, they ordered further PNGDF offensives and even targeted individual clan leaders

(BCL meeting minutes, 1989).

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BCL’s Managing Director explicitly supported continued PNGDF’s offensive operations,

including in a meeting with the Prime Minister in July 1989, which proceeded the

burning of villages, executions of civilians and the use of mortar bombs targeting

villages. During this meeting, BCL’s Managing Director suggested that the military should

target Damien Dameng (BCL meeting minutes, 1989).

BCL were aware that the PNGDF and Mobile Squads were committing human rights

abuses, and yet continued to provide them with logistic support.

In an interview with Dr Lasslett, a General Manager from BCL confessed:

“We knew the riot squads were heavy handed, that was well known in PNG. That’s how they

worked. If you threw a rock at them you would get ten rocks thrown back. They were very

heavy handed in the way they handled disputes in the Highlands. There was concern that

that wasn’t the right way of doing things in Bougainville, because Bougainvilleans are much

more pacifist minded than Highlanders. For Highlanders fighting is part of their history, and

the way they are brought up. If someone pokes their head over your side of the hill, you

have a fight on your hands. Whereas Bougainvilleans are much more placid people, very

different in their temperament. We knew that the heavy handed thing wouldn’t work if they

were there long term. It was a case, somebody has to come. They were the only ones that

could come, and put a lid on this thing before it got out of hand” (Lasslett, 2009: 148).

BCL meeting minutes 13th of July 1989, meeting with Prime Minister;

R.J Cornelius BCL management; “We have regular discussions with Col. Lima Datoana

and his staff and monitor the events that are occurring”.

“Described the incident at Guava Village which led to the discovery of a extensive

tunnel system. RJC also advised PM of a dairy left behind at Guava by Sam Kauna in

which he kept a very accurate account of events that occurred to the end of May. It is

most important that the ex-Army people and Damien Damen, the charismatic cult leader

must be apprehended”.

“The other point of major concern is that the Milititants are quite freely doubling back

when Security Forces go out on Offensive which means more defensive cover is

immediately required”.

“told PM that security Forces Offensive ok and should continue however, at present

Defensive is lacking-Col. Lima Datoana believes militants have strong bases at Mt.

Kupara area and near Boromai Village”.

PM; “We are really being stretched to our limits and maybe we should now go out and

get them”.

RJC; ‘II don’t know how long it will take to resolve the situation as the key players are

still at large. We are a bit thin on the defensive’.

P. Lowa; “As PM has indicated we want to re-open the mine as soon as possible. May be

your workers should not worry about incidents that happen outside the mine”.

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BCL meeting minutes, 20th of December 1989 indicate ordering military operations and

influence;

“...the outcome of the meeting on Saturday between D.S Carruthers, R.J Cornelius and

Premier where Premier indicated this peace initiative was finished. At the meeting on

the previous Wednesday the militants had indicated they still want secession and they

want all the troops and police withdrawn”.

“...problem will ultimately be solved by the people putting pressure on the militants as

they suffer more and more with mine closure”.

“Col Nuia indicated there were two factions within the militants, one a hard line, and

over the past two weeks the Defence Forces had been trying to put the heat on the

militants and convince the community to turn against the militants...If the growing

sentiment against the militant can be fanned then success will ultimately result”.

“R.J Cornelius indicated the intent was to close Mananau in a controlled way and

appealed for Defence Force presence at Manauau with a minimum of overnight

coverage. Col Nuia indicated that he was very short staffed at the moment but now with

the abandonment of the peace initiative some reinforcements may be coming”.

“R.J Cornelius again asked for night cover only to stop the militants getting access to the

pigs”.

R.J Cornelius expressed concern about the defence of the mine magazine. Graham

Edney indicated he was hoping to have the magazine contents off the island sold to Ok

Tedi or destroyed before the year end. Extra protection at the magazine and for

transport down the hill would be needed till the contents can be moved or exploded. Col

Nuia agreed to boost the protection”.

Meeting continues outside the office;

“Bill Daniels indicated the notebook of Aloysius Minitong captured in Boku had notes

going back to 1987 and specified targets (including the Executive Lodge in Arawa. The

notebook is being investigated by Col Ben Maris”.

“Bill indicated there were some explosives, ball bearings ect. in the kit bag of Vincent

Onari when his belongings were examined following his death”.

BCL meeting minutes 8th of January 1990, meeting at defence headquarters;

“Services at Buin and Boku are to be re-established today. 50 police are to be deployed

compared to the 12 normally stationed there (7 at Buin and 5 at Boku)...After some

training locally recruited urban police will be deployed on Bougainville (100 to urban

areas and 100 to rural areas). They will not be armed, simply have handcuffs and

batons”.

:any official statement on the Aropa incident on Sunday morning where a mother and

child were killed will be released by General Lokimap and Controller Paul Tohian”.

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“some evidence that the people are turning against Ona. After the Laluai meeting,

several approached Col Nuia requesting arms”.

“Defence Forces are trying to make people in the care centres aware of the root causes

of the problems”.

“Restrictions on the movement of goods into the Siwai are having a positive impact”.

“the strategy is to localise and isolate the centre where there is support for the

militants. When this occurs then military action may be possible”.

“R.J Cornelius mentioned that Wayne Cross ex Port Moresby has been offering to solve

the crisis in a 100 to 120 days. Cross’ contacts are telephone 254...”

PNG government and PNGDF officials;

Prime Minister Namaliu informed BCL’s Chairman that his government wanted to send a

peace delegation to Bougainville – as opposed to active deployment of the Mobile

Squads – the Chairman threatened to withdraw Rio Tinto investment from PNG. In a

memorandum to company directors dated 6 December 1988, the Chairman states:

“The PM’s priority was to ‘appease’ the landowners. I expressed the view that CRA would

want to review its assessment of PNG as a place to invest. In all, it was an unsatisfactory

meeting” (Carruthers, 1988: 3).

John Momis explains the military blockade;

“BCL needed PNG to open the mine in the first place and keep it open because of long-

standing opposition to the mine. In fact, it was BCL that requested the aid of its partner,

PNG, to deploy defence forces to suppress the uprising and reopen the mine. BCL requested

that PNG reopen the mine by whatever means necessary, and later assisted in planning and

the imposition of the blockade. I was aware of the meeting where BCL management

instructed PNG to ‘stave the bastards out’” (Momis affidavit, 2001).

Senior PNGDF officers have signed legal affidavits documenting the support provided to

the military by BCL (Singirock, 2001, Liria, 2001).

For example from the affidavit of Jerry Singirock;

“The PNGDF were the corporation’s personal security force and were ordered by BCL to take

action to reopen the mine by any means necessary...and includes the ordered killing of

individuals where necessary to achieve the objective...BCL actively participated in combat

efforts to quell the uprising and reopen the mine. BCL provided the infrastructure and bases

for the operations, including the command post, battalion headquarters, essential high-

speed and mobile communications, and troop barracks. BCL provided the logistical support

to store and issue combat supplies including ammunition and gear. BCL provided food and

rations. BCL quartered the troops. BCL provided medical facilities. BCL provided troop

transport vehicles for the patrol and combat operations. BCL provided fuel (petrol and

diesel) for the operations. BCL provided one helicopter, which was used as a gunship, the

heli-pad and a few helicopter pilots to assist in combat operations, field reconnaissance,

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casualty evacuation, troop insertion and extraction, and supply of critical supplies (eg

ammunition) to troops in the fields around Panguna. As the actions taken by the PNGDF

were part of its joint operation with BCL, PNG did not pay for BCL’s assistance...it is my

opinion that the PNGDF operations at Panguna would not have occurred without BCL’s

demand that the government take necessary action to reopen the mine...without BCL’s

participation in the execution and planning, no combat operation would have been feasible,

let alone undertaken. BCL is also the reason that the naval blockade around Bougainville

Island was instituted. Without divulging matters that are of a very sensitive nature, the

blockade was initiated and sustained, just as other operations were, as a security measure to

reopen the mine. I was instructed by the Government of the day to engage Sandline-a UK

based Company- to assist in the military operations. PNG hired Sandline because although

the local uprising had been contained, the mine had not yet been reopened. Again, PNG

took this action because the government and its business partner were interested in re-

opening the Panguna mine to reap the profits that the mine produced at the expense of

human lives. The PNGDF refused to increase the arsenal being used against the uprising as

the PNGDF were adequately containing the relative threat on the ground and any increase

would have been disproportionate and resulted in unethical and inappropriate continued

destruction of additional human lives. Indeed, I called off the operations. I realised the

Sandline operations violated fundamental human rights and I decided to forcefully evict

Sandline from the country and opted for a peaceful solution, with a view to resolving the

conflict on Bougainville. My opinions on the immoral nature of Sandline hiring and

involvement in Bougainville are matters of public record. I am presently faced with sedition

charges for voicing these opinions and taking action. What is less well-known is BCL’s

involvement in the Sandline affair” (Singirok, affidavit, 2001).

Example from affidavit of Yauka Aluambo Liria;

“Secretarial work-BCL headquarters at a place called ‘Pink Palace’ at Panguna also provided

secretarial work for the Tactical Headquarters. For example, my intelligence reports were

typed out by the BCL girls in the ‘Pink Palace’. BCL administration managed and gave the

instructions for the secretaries to do our work (secretarial work). Involvement of BCL staff

who were directly involved in the military operations were helicopter pilots and BCL

Panguna hospital staff” (Liria affidavit, 2001).

Australian government and ADF officials;

Australia’s High Commissioner 1989-90 said;

“We were, early on, supporting a stronger PNGDF role than they actually played ... we were pushing them to get more troops over there ... Ben Sabumei was the Minister, and I use to see him all the time saying get your people over there”.

(Personal Communication, 25 August 2006, cited in Lasslett, 2009: 153)

An ADF staff official explains;

“We had good knowledge about what was going on ... they [the PNG security forces] were involved in some pretty awkward situations where there was large losses of life ... [Yet) to step back completely and let them just sink was not really a palatable option”.

(Personal Communication, 1st of September 2006, cited in Lasslett, 2009: 154).

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A senior ADF official explains: “[Would] the country tear itself to pieces in frustration at not being able to deal with the Bougainville problem? Would the army break? We were really worried about that. Would morale totally collapse? It certainly went through some low points. Would there be mutinies? There were a couple of little ones, but not really big and well organised ones. Would the army fight the police, and vice versa? (Interview, DoD official, 2006 A, cited in Lasslett: 2012: 712). Another ADF official explains in the context of Australian expatriate investments; “That was seriously discussed, but dismissed because we took the view that it would be incredibly costly in people, and it would put us in some very complex and ambiguous situations of shooting Bougainvilleans without really knowing whether we were shooting the right Bougainvilleans or not. This was 1990 and not 2006, and we were still very cautious about deployments, you know the post-Vietnam reluctance to deploy forces overseas was

very high” (Interview, DoD official C, 2006, cited in Lasslett, 2012: 712). In the context of Australia’s support of the military blockade, a senior DFAT official explains;

“Every effort was being made to make it plain to Ona and co that they were not viable, that they needed the rest of Papua New Guinea as their support. . . . With secession, looking practically at it, Ona would have had to have thought, ‘where will I get my supplies from, my guns and bullets, who is going to help me’, and the answer is ‘nobody, you will be totally on your own’, and Australia was using its diplomatic leverage to ensure that nobody would

come in there to do it” (Interview, DFAT official A, 2006, cited in Lasslett, 2012: 713). ‘ ADF officers—on loan and stationed within the Australian High Commission—who took charge of matters following the PNGDF retreat and constructed a plan to retake Bougainville. One of the officers involved in this effort claims:’ (Lasslett, 2012: 716).

“I don’t think it is stretching the point too much to say that XXXX [ADF Officer on loan to the PNGDF] and a few others, and we were included in this [ADF staff at the Australian High Commission], started to devise an operation to win back Bougainville. Which was to start by getting back Buka, getting Buka, and then working to expand your bases, thereby winning it [Bougainville] back in a military sense, when it was in total darkness, the case was totally

hopeless”. (Interview, ADF official, 2006, cited in Lasslett, 2012: 716)

‘When asked how ADF officers managed to become so active in a military operation ostensibly under PNGDF command, the respondent observed:’(Lasslett, 2012: 716).

“Well that is always the difficult part, but look with any idea its an ownership thing, they have got to feel ownership, they have to be comfortable with it. So we realised, we stepped back from the fact it was our idea, you have to organise the whole thing so its like the PNGDF have thought it, otherwise it is not going to work. If people don’t have ownership of an approach they are not going to do it. You can see it in everyday life, if you say to your children you know I want you to do it this way, they’re not going to do it. It is only when they have ownership of it that they’ll do it”.

(Interview, ADF official, 2006, cited in Lasslett, 2012: 716)

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‘Australian officials rejected or downplayed allegations of atrocities, however in reality

as another ADF official explains;

“The ADF, we had people in positions in both the constabulary and the PNGDF, so we knew very well what was going on. Let’s not be too cute or naive about it, that’s the reality about life. So we had good knowledge about what was going on”. (Interview, ADF official, 2006, cited in Lasslett, 2012: 716).