Phl 5 Morality of Human Action

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PHL 5 / CHRISTIANETHICS / THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTION ForPrivate Use OnlyTeacher: Susan Ong

The Three-Font Principle of (St. Thomas)1

Traditional moral theology has used the three-font principle for determiningthe morality of human action. This principle still serves us well. It is based onan understanding of the relationship of the three aspects of moral action intention, the act-in-itself, and the circumstances.

1. The act- in- itself and intention

The intention (finis operantis) is the internal part or the formal element ofthe moral action. It is also called the end or that which we are after in doingwhat we do, i.e. the whole purpose of our action. The intention gives personal

meaning to our action. The act-in-itself (finis operas), or the means-to-an-end isthe material element of the moral action. This aspect of the moral action is soeasily observed that it would even be photographed.

According to St. Thomas, the act-in-itself cannot be accurately evaluated asmoral or immoral apart from considering the intention of the person acting.

On these grounds two actions may be the same but can have differentmeaning depending on the intention which directs the action. (e.g. a politicianand a volunteer group helping the poor/victims after natural calamities especiallywhen election is forthcoming) The moral quality of an action moves from the

intention, specially the agents intention to be loving or not. For example, makinga donation can be morally good when the intention is to bring relief to a person inneed, but morally bad if intended to satisfy ones vanity and to win praise.

We cannot judge the morality of the physical action without reference tothe meaning of the whole action which includes the intention of the agent.Intention is part of the act taken in its totality; it is constitutive of the meaning ofthe action. Unless we consider the intention and the physical action together, weare not dealing properly with a human action as a moral action.

But can a physical action embody any intention whatever? Or to put it

another way, can the end justify the means? According to St. Thomas, the actioncan be morally justified if it (action) is adequately proportionate to the intention.In the case of self-defense, the use of violence which wounds or even kills theassailant is justifiable when it falls within the limits of what is necessary to saveones own life. However, violence which exceeds the bounds necessary to saveones life is not justifiable because it is no longer properly proportionate to theintention of self-defense. Therefore, in one case the violence which inflicts harm

1 Gula, Richard M. 1989.Reason Informed By Faith. New York, Paulist Press.

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or even death can be justified, but in the other case it cannot. The difference liesin the proportionality of the means to the end.

2. Circumstances

We determine the physical action is properly proportionate to the intentionby considering the action within the circumstances. The end (intention) and themeans (act itself) exist in relational tension to one another and to all the essentialaspects/conditions which make up the circumstances. We can uncover therelevant circumstances by asking those reality-revealing questions who, when,where, why, how, what else, and what if. According to St Thomas, actions aregood or bad according to circumstances. Only by considering the action inreference to the intention within the total context of its qualifying circumstancescan we determine the true moral meaning of the action.

The points of reference for determining the morality of human action, then

are a) the physical act-in-itself (the object of the act, or the means); b) theintention (the end); c) the circumstances (which include the consequences).These three aspects of one composite human action make up the traditionalthree-font principle. A proper moral evaluation of human action according to thisprinciple must take all three into considerations simultaneously. If the evaluationis only focus on the physical action, this will give an act-centered moralitywhich forgets the person acting; or an intention only morality which does nottake seriously enough the act being done; or a situationalism which maintainsthat circumstances make all the difference. But the traditional Catholic moralityof the three-font principle claims that we do not have a true evaluation of ahuman action until all aspects are taken together. This leads to the theory the

theologians called proportionalism. The recent debates on proportionalism aretrying to show that we must understand the relationship of the various aspects ofan act in order to arrive at the total meaning of the act.

Intrinsic Moral Evil

Traditional moralists (and so with the teachings of the Church) haveclaimed that certain actions (such as masturbation, contraception, sterilization,sexual relations outside of marriage, direct killing of the innocents, etc.) areintrinsically morally evil in themselves. These acts are regarded as either being

contrary to nature (following the order of nature interpretation of natural lawwhich later we will discuss) or by defect of right which means that in killing theinnocent, suicide, or divorce, for example, the human person is assumingabsolute dominion over life or marital union which belongs by right only to God.To qualify any action as intrinsically morally evil means that no intention or set ofcircumstances could ever justify the act. Its moral quality is already determinedbefore the person does it in whatever circumstances.

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The understanding of the three-font principle has significant implications forreevaluating intrinsic evil as a moral action which in turn would enlighten orinfluence the present teachings/stance of the Catholic Church.

The Principle of Double-Effect

The premises for this principle can be found in St. Thomas discussion onself-defense but the four condition of t principle finally formulated by Jean PierreGury in the mid-nineteenth century. The four conditions are expressed in avariety of ways, but are basically as follows:

1. the action itself is good or indifferent;2. the good effect is not produced by means of the evil effect;3. the evil effect is not directly intended;4. a proportionate reason support causing or tolerating the evil effect.

The classic example to illustrate this principle is the one of a pregnant womanwith cancerous uterus. If nothing is done, both the mother and the fetus will die.If the uterus is removed, the fetus will die but the mother will live. The principleof double effect allows the uterus to be removed because:

1. removing the uterus is a morally indifferent action;2. saving the life of the mother is not produced by means of the death of the

fetus, but by removing the uterus;3. the direct intention is to save the life of the mother;4. the proportionate reason is the mothers life is at stake.

On the third condition, morally speaking, a person can have only oneintention which gives meaning to the full human act. Traditionally the principle ofdouble-effect used the distinction of the direct and indirect intention because itregarded certain actions as intrinsically evil. Consequently, directness andindirectness became all important in determining morality. An increasing numberof philosophers and theologians do not bind the moral quality of an action to theintention in the way the traditional use of this principle does. Rather, many ofthem agree that the person is responsible for the full range of foreseeableconsequences, directly intended or not. Here, the critical variable in makingassessment is not the intention but the persons foreknowledge (knowledge

beforehand) of effects. The person must be able to justify the risk of causingsome undesirable effects in the light of the undesirability of other options(sometimes known as the least evil option).

According to the present state of the discussion, direct and indirect aremorally relevant to disclose something about the moral agent, rather than thequality of an action. They show the relationship of the persons attitude ofapproval or disapproval of an action.

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B. Tomas is suffering from a severe fracture in one leg; the doctoramputated the leg to save the life of the patient.

Which of the case the doctor exercised proportionate reason in amputatingthe leg of the patient? Why?

Criteria

What criteria would help us decide whether a proper relation exist betweenthe specific value and the other elements of an act? Richard McCormick has theclearest proposal of these criteria. The substances of his criteria are as follows:

1. The means used will not cause more harm than necessaryto achieve thevalue. In other words, the specific value soughtmust be at least equal to the value being sacrificed. For example,in self-defense, the values in conflict are equal the defenders lifeis in conflict with the attackers life. In medical practice, the valuebeing sought may be restoring the patients wellbeing. The values

sacrificed, such as comfort, bodily integrity (e.g. losing a limb) arenot equal to the patients total well-being. The decision to have asurgery or to use medications depends on which of these meanswould cause the least amount of harm to achieve the good of thepatients well-being. Or, if surgery had to be done, this criterionwould demand that the surgeon should not cut out more than whatis necessary to restore health and to save life. Of course, thiscriterion faces difficulty when we are confronted with hierarchy ofvalues and to determine which can be weighed one againstanother.

2. No less harmful way exists at present to protect the value .This criterion demands that we choose the best means available tous at the time, even though this may have to change in the future.In medicine, for example, many people who suffer cancer mayhave to experience the pains of chemotherapy or radiationtreatment now until something is discovered which produces lesspain or discomfort with equal or more effects.

3. The means used to achieve the value will not undermine it.This criterion suggests that in the case of trying to protect life, forexample, we do not engage in indiscriminate killing. The American

bishops reflect on this criterion in their pastoral letter, TheChallenge of Peace (1983), when they call for non-combatantimmunity in war. Their point is that we are not protecting thevalue of life when we attack life indiscriminately.

Perhaps we can appreciate these criteria for a proportionate reason if wesee them at work in a more realistic example. Do we have a proportionatereason to justify smoking? Does smoking cause more harm than necessary to

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achieve its value of relaxation and enjoyment? It appears so, given what weknow about the risks of smoking to ones health. The physical harm one causesby smoking is not equal to the relaxation one achieves when we have other lessrisky ways to achieve the same relaxation such as: a whole array of recreationalactivities, meditation techniques, or non-harmful oral compensations (likechewing sugarless gum) are available. Smoking ultimately undermines the value

it seeks since it causes so much harm to ones health. Proportionalism does notseem to support smoking as a moral action.

The basic rule for an ethics based on love is that in every situation in whichwe have to choose between several possibilities, we ought to do what willcontribute as much as possible to t well-being and development of persons andtheir social relations and to avoid as much as possible what harms or hinderswell-being.

Modes of Knowing

Contemporary theology is increasingly more sensitive to the historicallyconditioned nature of all knowledge (i.e. knowledge is built up through time; thusthere are a lot of things that we know today which were not known or madeavailable during the time of our parents or grandparents or our ancestors). Ourpresent all types of knowledge are the accumulation of knowledge passed on tous from one generation to another. Therefore, anyone who would claim that aproportionate reason exists for doing a particular action is making a modest claimand realizes that this judgment remains open to further clarification and revisionin the future; but at the moment with all the available knowledge andunderstanding we have, this is our best judgment.

Richard McCormick has offered three modes of knowing whether we have a

proportionate reason.

1. Experience

One of the ways we know that a proper relation exist between a specificvalue and all other elements of an act is through experience. For example,experience tells us that private property contributes to the over all well-being ofpersons and their social relations. This makes robbery counterproductive ordisproportionate. With regards to war, we are getting close to the claim thatwaging war especially nuclear war is disproportionate to the value of protectinglife, since in war, we are all losers. Furthermore, experience teaches us that the

meaning of family, sexuality and procreation are best preserved in the context ofstable and permanent marriage. This would make actions which undermines thestability and permanence of marriage disproportionate. Among such actionswould be adultery, divorce, the use of reproductive technologies employing anoutside donor, such as artificial insemination by donor and surrogate motherhood.

2. Sense of Outrage and Intuition

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Another way of knowing whether relation exists is through our sense ofoutrage or intuition that some actions are disproportionate. Torture, massacreand forms of fanatical human experimentation fall under this category.

3. Trial and Error Method

This mode of knowing pertains especially to those areas where we havelittle experience as yet and would proceed cautiously to support technologicaladvancement. Recombinant DNA and stem cell research would be an example.

4. Rational Analysis and Argument (addition by James Walter)

By gathering evidences and formulating logical arguments, we try to givereasons to support our choice for certain values over others which we havealready grasped prior to reasoning. This mode of knowing would be necessarysupplement to McCormicks mode of trial and error and to knowing through asense of outrage or intuition.

The understanding of the proportionate reason thought-pattern justpresented is a relatively recent development in Catholic Moral Theology, throughits roots are well established in the tradition. It began to receive critical attentionshortly after Vatican II Council and has been the focus of ongoing developmentand criticism ever since.

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Phl 5 Morality of Human Action

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