Philosophy and the Brain Do we need a Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy? Can Neuroscience and...

Philosophy and the Brain – Do we need a Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy?

Can Neuroscience and Philosophy marry successfully? For that non-reductive neurophilosophy is necessary!!

Concept of neuroscience: Heterogenous amalgam of different disciplines rather than a homogenous purely scientific discipline

Theological concepts

Economic concepts

Philosophical concepts

Sociological concepts

Neuroscientific concepts

Drawing on and stealing concepts from a variety of different disciplines with the subsequent adaptation and integration into neuroscience

Neuroscience as heterogenous amalgam

Methodological reductionism: Intertheoretic reduction (Churchland/Bickle) to the empirical domain

Methodological iterativity: Iterative matching between concepts from different disciplines across their different different domains

Current relationships between philosophy and neuroscience I

Methodological reductionismNarrow reductionism: Unilateral inference of

philosophical concepts from neuroscientific facts (Churchland, Bickle); Wider reductionism: Unilateral

adaptation of the former to the neuroscientific context (Searle), or multilayered model with

empirical basis (Craver)Methodological parallelism

Philosophical concepts and neuroscientific facts are about different domains, natural/truth vs

logical/sense worlds, (Bennett/Hacker), empirical vs epistemic (McGinn, Nagel), making any direct

interaction impossible

Current relationships between philosophy and neuroscience: IIExplanatory mosaic (Craver) Integration between different fields (‘interfields’) and levels (‘interlevels’) by explanation in terms of mechanisms and causality

– Causal mechanisms and explanation as bridge between different levels and fields within

neuroscience: No need for either reductionism or parallelism

Problem: remains within the natural world and presupposes observation as sole and single methodological standard – linkage of different contents within neuroscience but no linkage between different methods and thus between philosophy and neuroscience

Can imaging reveal the neural mechanisms underlying our self? Can philosophy get a grip on what our self is? Or do both neuroscience and philosophy of the self must operate in parallel? Technological/Empirical versus Epistemic Limits?

Development of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy as distinguished from Reductive Neurophilosophy

Against Methodological Reductionism: Method of neurophilosophy can neither be reduced to the logical-argumentative method of philosophy nor to

the observational-experimental method in neuroscience

Against the Metaphysical alternative between mind-brain reductionism/monism and non-

reductionism/dualism: metaphysical dichotomy is not empirically, e.g., naturally plausible

Georg Northoff (2014) Minding the Brain. A Guide to Philosophy and Neuroscience (Palgrave McMillan)

Empirical domain

Method: Observational-experimental investigation

Reductive Neurophilosophy

Phenomenaldomain

Ethical domain

Epistemological domain

Neurophilosophy

Metaphysical domain

Neuropheno-menology Neuroethics Neuroepistemolog

y Neuroontology

Neurophilosophy

Phenomenaldomain

Ethical domain

Epistemological domain

Metaphysical domain

Empirical domain

Spectrum of methods

Conceptual analysis

Phenomenal analysis

Rational arguments

Observation and experiments

Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy

Thesis I: Intrinsic linkage of neuroscience with philosophy: Bilateral and iterative dependence of the facts in neuroscience on the concepts in philosophy

From Facts to Concepts: Concepts enter unavoidably neuroscience since there is no concept-

free neuroscience; Concepts are relevant for neuroscience in testing for conceptual plausibility of

neuroscientific findings

Our concepts like self, consciousness, etc. were originally developped in the context of the logical

world and its logical standard as in philosophy: Need for linkage between logical context of concepts and

natural context of facts

Logical world: Logical conditions

Natural world: Natural conditions

Philosophy

Neuroscience

Neurophilosophy

Border between logical and natural conditions as the ‘location’ of Neurophilosophy

From Concepts to Facts: Facts enter unavoidably philosophy since there is no relevant fact-free

philosophy of the natural world; Facts are relevant for a naturally relevant philosophy in testing for empirical

plausibility of philosophical concepts

If facts are neglected, one would presuppose a purely logical world (as in Logical Positivism or Logical

Behaviorism). That though must fail because logical conditions/sense only overlap in part but are not

identical with natural conditions/truth

Thesis II: Intrinsic linkage of philosophy with science/neuroscience: Bilateral and iterative dependence of the concepts in philosophy on the facts in neuroscience

Kant (Critique of pure reason: A51/B75): “Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions

without concepts are blind” (= “Philosophy without Science is empty, Science without Philosophy is

blind”)

Necessity of the Intrinsic Linkage between Concepts and Facts: Kant and Whitehead

Whitehead (Process and Reality, p.5):“The true method of discovery is like the flight of an

aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation (as in science); it makes a flight in the

thin air of imaginative generalization (as in philosophy); and it again lands for renewed

observation (as in science) rendered acute by rational interpretation”


Economic concepts



Neuroscientific concept

Translation

Pedagogic concepts

Concept-concept conversion

Domain matching

Data-hypothesis –concept matching

Evidence

Methodological iterativity between Concepts and Facts

Falsification

Experimental data

Experimental variable

Hypothesis-Generation

Operationalization

Experimentalization

Neuroscientific hypothesis

Neuroscientific facts

Factualization

Concept-data transformation

Data-fact inference

Predominant philosophical concept of self (Descartes and others)

Example of self: Methodological iterativity between neuroscience and philosophy

Self as entity or substance: Self as mental entity

Self as self-consciousness: Self exists only in and through consciousness

Self-Non-Self distinction: Categorical with All-or-Nothing


Economic concepts



Pedagogic concepts


Translation


Example Self: Conversion of the philosophical concept of self into a neuroscientific concept of self

Example of self: Conversion of philosophical concept into a neuroscientific concept




Self-specific brain regions as distinguished from non-self-specific regions

Distinction between pre-conscious, conscious and reflective self

Self as neural entity within the brain rather than the mind

Distinction between Self and Non-Self: Cortical midline structures and domain independence

Neuroimage 31: 440-457, 2006

Cortical midline structures as neuroscientific facts of the self?

[Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2004, 2008]

Empirical plausibility of the philosophical concept of self as (neural) entity (midline regions), categorically distinguished from Non-self (self-specificity of midline regions), and self as consciousness (Judgment)

Example of self: Generation of a neuroscientific hypothesis of the self

Self as neural entity within the brain rather than the mind

Self-specific brain regions as distinguished from non-self-specific regions

Distinction between pre-conscious, conscious and reflective self

Activation of cortical midline regions during the judgment/awareness of self-specific stimuli when compared to non-self-specific stimuli

But: Our brain is not as simple as our concepts

Neuroimage 31: 440-457, 2006

Doubt about the self-specificity of cortical midline structures: -Familiarity (Gillihan/Farah 2005) or some general evaluation process (Legrand/Ruby 2009) may underlie recruitment of neural activity in midline regions during judgment of self-specific stimuli- Other functions involving non-self-specific stimuli like mindreading also recruit midline regions- Self-specific stimuli also recruit regions other than midline regions like subcortical regions

Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex

Ventral striatum/N.accumbensRight amygdala

Tectum

RR

(A) Self-Relatedness: Positive correlation

High selfMedium selfLow self

What do these findings entail for the neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of self?

Neural activity in midline structures is not specific for self-specific stimuli since they are also recruited during familiar stimuli and resting state activity (DMN)

Are there specific regions for the self in the brain that clearly distinguish self- and non-self-specific stimuli?

Is the self neuronally really categorically distinguished from the Non-Self in an All-or-Nothing way?

Is the philosophical concept of the self as categorically distinguished from Non-Self in an All-or-Nothing way empirically plausible?

Mismatch between empirical data and philosophical concept of self: Conceptual implausibility




No self-specific brain regions: No clear-cut Self-Non-Self distinction on the neuronal level

Self as conscious: Neural activity during self-related stimuli also in vegetative patients

Self as neural entity within the brain: Brain is involved but the self may not be ‘within’ the brain


Experimental data

Economic concepts






Operationalization

Experimentalization



Factualization

Falsification

Translation

Pedagogic concepts



Data-fact inference


Evidence

Mismatch between facts and philosophical concept

Fact-Concept mismatch

Self as form or mode of neural organisation: Self-related processing as the brain’s relational coding of incoming stimuli

Manifestation of the self in value and emotions

Self as continuous process of neural organisation

Rejection of metaphysical entities

Rejection of higher-order cognitive determination

Concept of the relational self as neural organisation: Self as the brain’s input to constitute relation to the environment

Stimulus-induced activity: Complete and exclusive determination by the stimulus

Extrinsic view of the brain: Brain as Behavioral-Cognitive Reflex Apparatus – ‘Brain itself as “no say” in what happens in the brain’

Textbook: Philosophy and the Brain?

Intrinsic view of the brain: Brain as active players in its own neural activity – ‘Brain itself has a “strong say” in what happens in the brain’

Stimulus-induced activity: Result of Rest-Stimulus Interaction

Textbook:Philosophy and the Brain?

Self and Rest: Self-specific (vs non-self-specific) stimuli and the Default-Mode Network

[Consciousness&Cognition, 2010, Neuroimage, 2011]

Self and Rest: Does our Self consist in a specific Form of Rest-Stimulus Interaction? Novel Territory!

[Trends in Neuroscience, 2010, Progress in Neurobiology 2010)

Trends in Cognitive Sciences July 2012, Vol. 16, No. 7

Structuring and organizing stimulus-induced activity

Practice of such Transdisiplinarity II:

Practice of such Transdisiplinarity III: Kant and the Brain (instead of Kant and the Mind)

Random House/Irisiana, July 2012

The undisciplined Brain. What‘s

now Mister Kant?

Resting state: Decrease in temporal variance (ALFF) and functional connectivity (FC) in midline regions in vegetative patients

[Huang et al, Human Brain Mapping, 2013, Qin et al. 2010, Human Brain Mapping

Neural activity during self-referential > non-self-referential activity


Resting state (ALFF) predicts self-related activity in vegetative patients


Neural activity during self predicts the degree of consciousness in vegetative patients


How are self and consciousness related to each other?

Philosophy: Self as self-consciousness – Reflective self (Descartes, Cognitive) or pre- reflective self (Husserl, Zahavi)

Neuroscience: Dissociation of self from consciousness – Self as structure (Freud: Ego). Predisposition of consciousness by pre-phenomenal self that structures and thus predisposes possible phenomenal consciousness?

Northoff 2013: Unlocking the brain. Volume I: Coding, Volume II: Consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York

Resting State

Self-specificity

External stimuli

Rest-stimulus interaction

Consciousness

Consciousness of external stimuli

Consciousness of self = “Sense of Self”

[Northoff, Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 2013

Does the brain’s intrinsic activity provide an input which first and foremost makes self and consciousness possible?


Experimental data

Economic concepts






Operationalization

Experimentalization



Factualization

Falsification

Translation

Pedagogic concepts



Data-fact inference


Evidence

Mismatch between facts and philosophical concept

Fact-Concept matching

Is this metaphysical reductionism? Reduction of consciousness to the brain’s intrinsic activity? Reductive rather than non-reductive neurophilosophy?

Brain’s intrinsic activity occurs in an ecological context that is within the world – Generation of neural activity by the encoding of the statistical frequency distribution of the stimuli in the respective ecological context – Encoding of the temporal and spatial structure of the world by the brain’s intrinsic activity

Brain’s intrinsic activity is not purely neuronal but rather neuro-ecological – this implies a non-reductive view of the brain and ultimately non-reductive metaphysics of the world-brain problem into which the mind-brain problem is transformed

How is the brain’s intrinsic activity and its input that first and foremost makes consciousness possible generated by itself?

Statistically-based virtual spatiotemporal structure: Phenomenal features of consciousness (unity, intentionality, self-perspectival, qualia, phenomenal time) are virtual spatiotemporal features between brain, body and organism that are instantiated during changes of the intrinsic activity (variability) induced either internally (dreams) or externally (usual)

Neuro-ecological/phenomenal view on consciousness: Encoding of the temporal and spatial structure of the world by by intrinsic activity of the brain – Brain as Predisposition rather than Correlate

Georg Northoff 2014: Unlocking the Brain, Vol I Coding; Vol II, Consciousness, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford

Number of stimuli

Number of active neurons

Relationship between stimuli and neurons

Many-to-one (sparse)

Sparse Coding

One-to-many (dense)

Dense Coding

One-to-one (local)

Local Coding

Figure 2 Different strategies of encoding stimuli into the brain‘s neural activity

Assignment of value: Natural statistics of exteroceptive target stimulus

Social context: Social statistics of co-occurring exteroceptive stimuli, e.g., persons, etc.

Cultural context Cultural statistics of associated stimuli, e.g., tasks, beliefs, etc.

Actual neural activity: Matching and comparison between natural,cultural, and social statistics determines neural activity in the reward system

Neural activity in reward system, i.e., Ventral tegmental area (VTA, lower/small voxel) and ventral striatum (VS, upper, bigger voxel)

Figure 3 Encoding of different statistics into neural activity

World and Culture

Brain: Neural activity

Psychological tendencies

Cultural tasks

Values and Beliefs ‘Enculturation of brain’

Explicit

Implicit

Necessary

Learning

Encoding

Affective/Sensorimotor functions

Cognitive functions

‘Embrainment of culture’

Transformation of the metaphysical mind-brain problem in philosophy (logical world) into a metaphysical world-brain problem within neurophilosophy and the natural world

Statistically-based virtual spatiotemporal structure between world and brain: Environment-Brain Unity as statistically-based – Neuro-Ecological Approach to the Brain (rather than a neuro-empirical approach to the brain)

Environment-Brain Unity: Statistically- and difference-based virtual spatiotemporal structure that accounts for a point of view (Nagel) and biophysically-based subjectivity as distinguished from phenomenally-based subjectivity

Natural World

World-Brain Interface: Encoding

Brain’s Intrinsic activity

Brain-World-Interface: Cognition

Lived Body

Intentionality and Consciousness

Encoding strategy

Neuro-ecological concept of brain

Necessary condition of possible consciousness

Intrinsic activity

Neuro-transcendental concept of brainSufficient condition of possible consciousness

Sensory, Cognitive Functions

Neuro-empirical concept of brain

Necessary condition of actual consciousness

Distinction from objective body

Neuro-phenomenal concept of body

Sufficient condition of actual consciousness

Figure 1 World, Brain, and Consciousness - Different concepts of Brain

Lived World


Experimental data

Economic concepts






Operationalization

Experimentalization



Factualization

Falsification

Translation

Pedagogic concepts



Data-fact inference


Evidence

Fact-Concept matching

World and Culture

Brain: Neural activity

Psychological tendencies

Cultural tasks

Values and Beliefs ‘Enculturation of brain’

Explicit

Implicit

Necessary

Learning

Encoding

Affective/Sensorimotor functions

Cognitive functions

‘Embrainment of culture’

Match between facts and concepts = Match between world and brain = Match between Method and Metaphysics: Avoid mismatch between methodological strategy and metaphysical target

Therefore: we need to consider the brain and its relation to the natural world rather than the concept of mind and its roots in the logical world

Minding the Brain

Georg Northoff (2014) Minding the Brain. A Guide to Philosophy and Neuroscience. Palgrave MacMillan

Example of self: Neural activity in midline regions during the own name in vegetative patients

[Qin et al 2010, in press, Human Brain Mapping

How is the self related to consciousness?

[Qin et al 2010, Human Brain Mapping

How are self and consciousness related to each other?

Philosophy: Self as self-consciousness – Reflective self (Descartes, Cognitive) or pre- reflective self (Husserl, Zahavi)

Neuroscience: Dissociation of self from consciousness – Self as structure (Freud: Ego). Predisposition of consciousness by pre-phenomenal self that structures and thus predisposes possible phenomenal consciousness?

Northoff 2013: Unlocking the brain. Volume I: Coding, Volume II: Consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York

Philosophy and the Brain Do we need a Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy? Can Neuroscience and...

Documents

Transcript of Philosophy and the Brain Do we need a Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy? Can Neuroscience and...