Philosophy 190: PlatoFall, 2014Prof. Peter Hadreas

Course website:http://www.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas/courses/Plato

LACHES

Characters in Laches

 

I. Lysimachus and Melesias.

Two elderly men. Lysimachus is the son of Aristeides "the Just" and Melesias is the son of Thucydides the Elder (not the historian). Both fathers were well-known political figures of the previous generation and thought by many as exemplars of virtue.)

 

II. Nicias and Laches.

Two main generals of the Peloponnesian War.

 

Characters in Laches

III. Stesilaus

He never appears in the dialogue itself, but he has just given a demonstration of hoplomachia, or the art of fighting with heavy arms. Perhaps, he’s a teacher, an athlete, technician, actor, and artist. He does not use his skill to actually fight the enemy.

 

IV. Two boys.

The sons of Lysimachus and Melesias.

V. Socrates

In his late 40s, when the dialogue takes place. Socrates is younger than Lysimachus, Melesias, Nicias and Laches.

 

Grandfathers and fathers in the LachesAristides, nicknamed Thucydides (not the historian)

‘The Just’1  led the conservatives in opposition to Pericles during the period preceding

the Peloponnesian War

Lysimachus

Melesias

Aristides, a boy in the Laches

grandson of his namesake Thucydides, also a

Aristides ‘The Just,’ a boy in the Laches

mentioned in who has the namesake Theaetetus, 151A of his grandfather

1. The ancient historian Herodotus cited him as "the best and most honorable man in Athens,” Herodotus, Histories, 8.79

Thematic Question: Are Lysimachus and Melesias suited or unsuited to develop the character and well-being of their sons?

What Lysimachus and Melesias have in common

1. Both quite old men, older than Nicias and Laches. Lysimachus 180D speaks of his advancing years.

 

2. They are undistinguished

“But neither of us has a word to say about his own accomplishments. This is what shames us in front of them [our children]...” 179D, p. 665

 

3. Their fathers were the main Athenian leaders of the early fifth century. They were known as especially virtuous men.

Thematic Question: Are they suited or unsuited to develop the character and well-being of their sons?

What Lysimachus and Melesias have in common

[continued from previous slide]

4. Their fathers were too occupied with public affairs to give them a good education:

Lysimachus: “… and we blame our own fathers for allowing us to take thing easy when we were growing up, while they were busy with other peoples’ affairs.” 179D, p. 665

Laches agrees, 180B: “ …everyone engaged in public affairs, because this is pretty generally what happens to them – that they neglect their private affairs. Children as well as everything else …”

 

 

 

 

The Procedure by which Lysimachus and Melesias Decide How To Teach Their Children to be Courageous

Laches 184D-E

Lysimachus: Well, I do ask your opinion, Socrates, since what might be called our council seems to me to be still in need of someone to cast the deciding vote. If these two [Laches and Nicias] had agreed, there would have been less necessity of such a procedure, but as it is, you perceive that Laches has voted in opposition to Nicias. So we would do well to hear from you too, and find out with which of them you plan to vote.

Socrates: What’s that, Lysimachus? Do you intend to cast your vote for whatever position is approved by the majority of us?

Lysimachus: What else could a person do, Socrates?

Socrates: And do you, Melesias, plan to act in the same way? Suppose there should be a council to decide whether your son ought to practice a particular kind of gymnastic exercise, would you be persuaded by the greater number or by whoever has been educated and exercised under a good trainer?

Melesias: Probably by the latter, Socrates. [added emphasis]

 

 

 

 

Who Was Nicias?

Nicias (c. 470 BC – 413 BC), was an Athenian politician and general and a member of the Athenian aristocracy. He became the main opponent of the demagogue Cleon for leadership of the Athenian state after the death of Pericles in 429 BCE. He was opposed to the imperialist designs of Cleon and the democratic faction. His aim was to achieve peace with Sparta as soon as it could be obtained on terms acceptable to Athens.

The temporary peace that quelled the Peloponnesian War in 421 BCE was known as the Peace of Nicias.

Nicias objected to the resumption of war and the ambitious plans of Alcibiades to invade Sicily. Even so, Nicias was designated to be a leader in the invasion of Sicily. Upon the defeat of the Athenian army in Sicily, Nicias was executed.

 

 

 

 

Nicias

Nicias’ advice about the teaching of courageous behavior

Laches 181E-182E

Nicias: . . . I think that knowledge of this branch of study [fighting in armor] is beneficial for the young in all sorts of ways . . . . necessarily improves their bodies . . . . this and horsemanship are forms of exercise especially suited to a free citizen. . . . every man who learns to fight in armor will want to learn the subject that comes next, that is the science of tactics . . . he will press on to the whole art of the general . . . . this knowledge will make every man much bolder and braver in war than he was before. . . .

 

 

 

 

Nicias

Who Was Laches?

Born approx. 470 BCE. In 427 BCE, Laches was the admiral of a fleet sent to Sicily – not the main invasion of Sicily in the Peloponnesian War in which the Athenians were defeated but an earlier and lesser battle. When Laches returned to Athens he was prosecuted by the populist demagogue Cleon, but was acquitted of any wrongdoing.

Laches helped Nicias to negotiate the Peace of Nicias. But in 418 BCE the peace broke down and war was resumed. Laches was again appointed general and was killed in the Battle of Mantinea, 418 BCE, a battle that took place near Argos in the Peloponnese. The battle ended in an extreme defeat of the Athenians and their allies.

 

 

 

 

Location where the Battle of Mantinea took place as it looks in modern times.

Laches’ Thoughts About Teaching Courageous Behavior

Laches 183A-184ELaches: “ . . . The reason I say these things about it [either fighting with armor is not a real study or it is not worth learning] is that I consider that, if there were anything in it, it would have not escaped the attention of the Lacedaemonians [Spartans], who have no other concern in life than to look for and engage in whatever studies and pursuits will increase their superiority in war. . . . Then again, Lysimachus, I have encountered quite a few of these gentleman on the actual field of battle and I have seen what they are like . . . . Not a single practitioner of this art of fighting in armor has ever become renowned in war. . . . For instance this man Stesilaus, whom you and I have witnessed giving a display before such a large crowd and praising himself the way he did . . . In the course of the fight it [Stesilaus’ combination of a scythe and spear] somehow got entangled in the rigging of the other ship and there it stuck. So Stesilaus dragged at the weapon in an attempt to free it, but he could not . . . .For a time he kept running along the deck holding fast to the spear . . . And when somebody hit the deck at his feet with a stone, he let go the shaft, then the men on the trireme could not help from laughing when they saw that remarkable scythe-spear dangling from the transport. . . .”

 

 

 

 

Laches’ Summary Remarks about the value of training in fighting with armor

184B-C Laches: “So, as I said at the beginning, either it [fighting in armor] is an art but has little value, or it is not an art but people say and pretend that it is, but in any case it is not worth trying to learn. And then it seems to me that if a cowardly man should imagine he had mastered the art, he would, because of his increasing rashness, show up more clearly the man he was, whereas in the case of a brave man, everyone would be watching him and if he made the smallest mistake, he would incur a great deal of criticism. The reason for this is that a man who pretends knowledge of this sort is the object of envy, so that unless he is outstandingly superior to the rest, there is no way in which he can possibly avoid becoming a laughingstock when he claims to have this knowledge.”  [added emphasis]

 

 

 

Socrates at the Battle of Delium (or Delion, a city in Boeotia), 424 BC. The Athenians lost the battle. Laches: “He [Socrates] marched with me in the retreat from Delium, and I can tell you that if the rest had been as willing to behave in the same manner, our city would be safe and we would not suffer a disaster of that kind.” 181B

 

 

 

 

FIRST DEFINITION

OF

COURAGE

 

 

Laches: “ Good heavens, Socrates, there is no difficulty about that: if a man is willing to remain at his post and to defend himself against the enemy without running away, then you may rest assured the man has courage.” p. 675, 190E

 

 

 

 

 

SECOND DEFINITION

OF

COURAGE

 

 

Laches: “Well, then I think it is a sort of endurance of the soul, if it is necessary to say what its nature is in all these cases.” p. 677, 192C

 

 

 

 

 

THIRD DEFINITION

OF

COURAGE

 

 

Nicias: “What I say, Laches, is that it is the knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful in war and in every other human situation.”

p. 680, 195A

 

 

 

 

 

Transition from the Third Definition of Courage to the Fourth.1

 

Socrates reminds Nicias of his earlier assertion that

1. Courage is part of virtue. (198A)

Nicias proposes that

2. Courage is knowledge of what is to be feared and hoped for (199B)

Socrates points out that that’s equivalent to saying:

3. Courage is the knowledge of future goods and evils (198B-C)

Socrates points out knowledge applies to past, present and future so:

4. The knowledge of past evils, the knowledge of [present evils, and the knowledge of future evils is the same knowledge (198D-199A)

It follows that:

5. Courage is knowledge of the past, present and future goods and evils (199B-C)

1. adapted from Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Smith, Nicolas D., The Philosophy of Socrates, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 200), pp. 162-3.

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOURTH DEFINITION

OF

COURAGE

 

 

Socrates: “Nicias, whereas we asked you what the whole of courage was. And now it appears, according to your view, that courage is the knowledge not just of the fearful and the hopeful, but in your own opinion, it would be the knowledge of practically all goods and evils put together. Do you agree to this new change, Nicias, or what do you say?”

p. 684, 199C

 

 

 

 

 

Reduction of Fourth Definition to an ‘elenchus’ or contradiction.  

 

1. Anyone who has knowledge of all goods and evils – past, present and future – has complete virtue. (199D)

2. Courage is not part of virtue but the whole of virtue (199E) which contradicts Nicias’ earlier affirmation:

Socrates: And didn’t you [Nicias] give your answer supposing that it [courage] was a part, and, as such, one among a number of other parts, all of which taken together were called virtue?”

(198A).

 

 

 

 

 

Unity of the VirtuesThe Equivalence thesis:

 

Each individual virtue names and there are five -- courage, self-control, justice, piety, and wisdom – refers to different types of moral knowledge. They each have their own definition and the knowledge of one does not imply the knowledge of another. There is a unity of the virtues, but that is because one of the virtues, wisdom, is a necessary condition of all the virtues. Most influential proponent of the ‘equivalence thesis’ is Gregory Vlastos.1

1. Vlastos, Gregory, Platonic Studies, 2nd ed. , (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 221-269; 418-423.

Example: Euthyphro, 12C-D

Socrates: “This is the kind of thing I was asking before, whether there is piety there is also justice but where there is justice there is not always piety, for the pious is part of the just. Shall we say that or do you think otherwise.”

 

 

 

 

 

Unity of the VirtuesIdentity thesis:

 

The individual virtues refer to one power and function so that one cannot have one virtue without the others.1,2,3 1. Penner, T., “The Unity of Virtue, “ Philosophical Review, 82, 1973, pp. 35-68.

2. Irwin, Terence, Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 86-90

3. Woodruff, Paul, “Socrates on the Parts of Virtue,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1976, supplement to vol.2, 101-106.

Example: Protagoras 349A-D

Socrates:

“So right now I want to remind you to remind me of some the of questions I first started from the beginning . . . I believe the first question was this: Wisdom, temperance, justice, courage and piety—are these five names for the same thing, or is there underlying each of the names a unique thing, a thing that has its own power and function, each one unlike any of the others?

Unity of the VirtuesIdentity Thesis [continued from previous slide]:

 

The individual virtues refer to one power and function so that one cannot have one virtue without the others.

Example: Protagoras 349A-D [continued

Socrates: “You said that they are not names for the same thing, that each of these names refer to a unique thing, and that these are all parts of virtue, not like parts of gold which are similar and to the whole of which they are parts, but like parts of a face, dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts and to each other, and each one having its own unique power or function. If this is still your view, say so; if it’s changed in any way, make you new position clear, for I am certainly not going to hold you accountable for what you said before if you want to say something different now.”

 

 

 

 

Euthyphro

Proposed definitions of piety 1. “Well then, what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious,” (7A) Refutation: i) Different gods consider different things to be right, honorable, base, good, and bad, (7E-8B)ii) Depending on which gods are considered, something can be both pious and impious.iii) Something cannot be both “A” and “not A”.

Euthyphro Proposed definitions of piety 2. “. . . the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is impious.” (9D) Refutation: i) Socrates inquires into the immediate reasons for something being loved or something being pious.a) Something is loved (or carried or seen) because someone loves (or carries or sees) it, (10A-C). Thus it’s determined the action of the agent.b) But Euthyphro agrees that something is pious, not because the gods love it, but because, simply enough, it is pious, (10D). Or, in other words, something is pious because of an object’s pious properties

Euthyphro Proposed definitions of piety 2. “. . . the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is impious.” (9D) [continued] Refutation [continued]: ii) But if what all the gods love defines the pious, then certain substitutions follow, (10E). Like, piety, what is loved by the gods should be so because of properties of the beloved object. But this contradicts ‘i a’). On the other hand, what is pious then should be pious just because of the agents’ pleasure. But this contradicts ‘I b’). We arrive at a double contradiction (11A). So Euthyphro’s second attempt at definition must be rejected.

Euthyphro

Proposed definitions of piety

 3. “I think, Socrates, that the godly and the pious is the part of justice that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice.” (12E)

 

Refutation:

A) analysis of “care of the gods” includes the notion of “making better.” But the gods cannot be made better, (13C).

 

Euthyphro Proposed definitions of piety Refutation of Euthyphro’s third definition continued  B) Euthyphro changes “care of the gods” to “service of the gods,” (13D).i) “service of the gods” includes the notion, according to Euthyphro of “knowing how to sacrifice and pray,” (14C).ii) sacrifice is analyzed into “giving to the gods” and praying into “begging from the gods, “ (14D). iii) But from ‘Bii’ “service to the gods” entails “a sort of trading skill between gods and men” (14E).iv) The benefit that the gods receive is our honor, reverence and gratitude, (15B).v) But we have come again to the notion that the pious is what is dear to the gods which was refuted in elenchus #2.

A section from the very well-known Analogy of the Divided Line passage in The Republic:

Republic, Book VI, 510B-511D

Socrates: “Consider now how the intelligible is to be divided.”

Glaucon: How?

S: As follows: In one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is forced to investigate from hypothesis, not to a first principle but to a conclusion. In the other subsection, however it makes its way to a first principle that is not a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but without the images used in the previous subsection, using forms themselves and making its investigation through them.

G: I don’t fully understand what you mean.

 

 

A section from the very well-known Analogy of the Divided Line passage in The Republic:

Republic, Book VI, 510B-511D

[continued]

S: Let’s try again. You’ll understand it more easily after the following preamble. I think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize the odd and even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their investigations, as if they knew them. They make their hypotheses and don’t think it necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or others, as if they were clear to everyone. And going from these first principles through the remaining steps, they arrive in full agreement.

G: I certainly know that much

 

 

 

 

A section from the very well-known Analogy of the Divided Line passage in The Republic:

Republic, Book VI, 510B-511D

[continued]

S: Then you also know that, although they use visible figures and make claims about them, their thought isn’t directed to them but to those other things that they are like. They make their claims for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they draw, and similarly with the others. These figures that they make and draw, of which shadows and reflection in water are images, they now turn in use as images, in seeking to see those others themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought.

G: That’s true.

 

 

 

 

A section from the very well-known Analogy of the Divided Line passage in The Republic:

Republic, Book VI, 510B-511D

[continued]

S: This, then, is the kind of thing that, on the one hand, I said is intelligible, and, on the other, is such that the soul is forced to use hypotheses in the investigation of it, not traveling up to a first principle, since it cannot reach beyond its hypotheses, but using as images those very things of which images were made in the section below, and which, by comparison to their images, were thought to be clear and valued as such.

G: I understand that you mean what happens in geometry and related sciences.

 

 

 

 

A section from the very well-known Analogy of the Divided Line passage in The Republic: Republic, Book VI, 510B-511D

[continued]S: Then also understand that, by the other section of the intelligible, I mean that which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. It does not consider these hypotheses as first principles but truly as hypotheses – but as stepping stones top take off from, enabling it to reach the unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having grasped this principle, it reverses itself, and keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms, and ending in forms.

G: I understand, if not yet adequately (for in my opinion you’re speaking of an enormous task), that you want to distinguish the intelligible part of that which is, the part studied by the science of dialectic, as clearer than the part studied by the so-called sciences, for which their hypotheses are first principles. . . .”

 

 

 

 

References to pictures used in this powerpoint

slide #2, bust of Plato: http://www.ancientgreece.com/s/People/Plato/Slide # 10, field where battle of Mantinea took place: http://www.livius.org/a/greece/mantineia/mantinea_battlefield_jvv.JPGslide# 13& 14, bust of Nicias http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicias#mediaviewer/File:Nicias,_p_105_(World%27s_Famous_Orations_Vol_1).jpgslide #15, map of alliances on the Peloponne4sian War: http://www.ranker.com/pics/L284108/a-list-of-all-peloponnesian-war-battles-u3