Philosophical Consequences Of Knowledge

A Treatise On The Basics Of The Hayekian System

Prepared By:

Mathias Royce [ID3915]

Doctoral Candidate in Political Economy

Swiss Management Center University

Prepared For: Prof. Kurt R. Leube

Swiss Management Center University

March 5th, 2009

Abstract

Knowledge – its attainment by society and its use by social order can be outspokenly

regarded as one of the pillars on which the theoretical basis of the Hayekian System rests

upon. Any theory in general – not excluding the Hayekian System, should be examined in the

literal sense, on the grounds of two fundamentally distinct principles: the understanding that

any theory possesses inherent qualitative capabilities in terms of its meaning, purpose and

content to be considered in the scientific sense vs. the understanding of the same in the

philosophical sense. Intrinsic attributes of theories in the scientific sense are measured in

empiric virtues – objectivity, for instance, being certainly one of these attributes. In contrast,

the intrinsic worth of a theory in the philosophical sense is the outright rejection of

empiricism in favour of digressional argumentation of the thoughts, beliefs and ideas that

revolve around the subject of discussion. The following treatise aims to review and exhibit

consequences that arise due to the interaction of opposing manifestations in cognitive, meta-

psychological science – the recognition of experience under the Hayekian System in terms of

a philosophical pre-sensory manner as opposed to a pure empiricist manner and the limits of

explanation where experience is as much concerned.

Philosophical Consequences

By looking at pre-sensory experiences, von Hayek arrives at logical conclusions that show

evident linkages of connections between mental processes – such as learning routines, and

social systems. Even more so, he postulates that these aforementioned explicit linkages are

structure-giving and evolutionary triggers of these same social systems. In taking ethological

inspiration from Konrad Lorenz, von Hayek claims, that:” there is at present still very little

knowledge available which would enable us to draw such a distinction between the part of

the mental order which for the individual is determined by its inherited constitution and the

part which for it may be regarded as experimental origin” (von Hayek, 1952). This inherited,

constitutional mental order of an individual von Hayek baptises “the apparatus by means of

which we learn about the external world” (von Hayek, Leube, Nishiyama, & Campbell,

1984), and precisely this apparatus he states, would find its utility in the environment of

interpreting previously experienced relations compared to new experiences within the same

or a very similar environment. By eliminating objectivity – or empiricism in its purest form,

von Hayek challenges the traditionalistic view of where experience is composed out of

sensory data correlating with measurable, physical attributes in favour of a theory where an

individual’s intellectual operations would step-in to arrive at the same level of experience.

Knowledge as such then does not become attributed with sensory experience but remains a

matter of taxonomical arrangement. Von Hayek describes this systematic process as (pre-)

defined order of the apparatus of classification “which has been built-up by pre-sensory

linkages”. These linkages, also known as Hayekian Connexionism, “envisage the human

body as an organism essentially defined in terms of a complex set of functionally interrelated

events” (Nadeau, 1997). With this in mind, von Hayek takes liberty in extending Farthing’s

definition of consciousness from being the “subjective experience or awareness or

wakefulness or the executive control system of the mind” (Farthing, 1992) by adding that

consciousness is just one event amongst others which complex organisms may produce. This

belief is picked-up later by Leube, where he mentions that “our mind is limited and sees the

world subjectively only in terms of rules and abstract relations between different things and

previously received sensations” (Leube, 2003). By doing so, Leube once again highlights the

Hayekian Connexionism of interrelated events. Lorenz clearly states, “that conscious

experience, in particular, always refers to events defined in terms of relations to other events

which do not occur in that particular experience” (Lorenz, 1943) – albeit this having being

published in a periodical about animal psychology, von Hayek fully endorses this view as it

manifests the aforementioned linkage of events, giving evidence in the appearance of

classification and reclassification of events through the apparatus that imposes a structured

order. Essentially, von Hayek defines this structured order as a process of categorisation – a

necessary, evolutionary step in experience, and he defends this argument by logically

reasoning that this process of categorisation must come first before any form of perception

can occur. This is quintessentially a dynamic process – Hayek considers the mind to be a

dynamic organism that adjusts itself to the constantly changing environment, recognizing that

“this sorting process itself will develop as the mind recognizes new links or distinctions

between past experiences” (Leube, 2003). Under Hayekian Connexionism, the brain - being a

complex organism, would engage on a convoluted, constantly influenced and changing set of

neural connections, resulting in the manifestation, that “the mind is not a store of data that

reflect (or are correlated with) characteristics of elements in the physical world. Rather,

organisms live in a sensory order that is created by the central nervous system” (Steele,

2004). The inevitable paradox of concluding Hayekian Connexionism at this point in

particular, and, under the consideration of postulating the following limit is the remark, that

there is evidence of knowledge that seems to be the result of experience through one form or

another, but as such is unable to be controlled by its very own or any other experience, as this

knowledge provides the foundation of order in each respective environment of which the

classification of events are considered being derived from it – a quasi super-mind in the

literal sense of the meaning.

In the philosophical sense of perception, the widely-accepted scholastic understanding of

sensual stimuli being of prevalent dominance in the phenomenal world, highlights the

unjustified existence – in precisely this realm and in the realm of epistemology – of physical

objects and favours an approach that clusters aforementioned sense stimuli into ‘bundles’.

Von Hayek argues, that “by saying that there ‘exists’ an ‘objective’ world different from the

phenomenal world we are merely stating that it is possible to construct an order or

classification of events which is different from that which our senses show us and which

enables us to give a more consistent account of the behaviour of the different events in that

world” (von Hayek, Leube, Nishiyama, & Campbell, 1984). The pluralistic view of ‘sense

bundles’ is defended by von Hayek, expressing that the singularity in the context relates to

the sensory characteristic itself, whereas the pluralistic view would rather target the ‘bundle’

of sensory characteristics that cover the composition and nature of an object – “recognising

that comprehension is not limited to the digestion of singular sensory qualities. It instead

includes the activity of grouping sensory qualities with each other” (Dempsey, Hayek’s Terra

Incognita Of The Mind, 1996)”. On this thought, von Hayek addresses the inconstancy not

only of the fundamental apparent order of classification, but also the causal inconstancy of

order of sensory qualities, which are the inherent characteristics and attributes of a

phenomenal world. This inconstancy, so von Hayek, finds a recurring trigger in the constant

and iterative reclassification process which society completes in explaining these sensory

‘bundles’. This leads to the understanding, that fundamentally all phenomena considered by

the mind need to be classified by the brain.

Von Hayek takes a strong stance on the recurring topic of applicability of dualism and he

seems to be rather opposed to the Descartesian idea of partitioning one entity into two

mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive opposing complements – with regards to this mind-

over-body dichotomy, where Descartes’ theory outlines phenomena to be distinct non-

physical occurrences from the body. His (von Hayek’s) view is sort of a more pragmatic, less

contemporary belief in which he postulates that: “an account of mental phenomena which

avoids the conception of a distinct mental substance is ... the opposite of materialistic,

because it does not attribute to mind any property which we derive from our acquaintance

with matter. In being content to regard mind as a peculiar order of events, different from the

order of events which we encounter in the physical world, but determined by the same kind

of forces as those that rule in that world, it is indeed the only theory which is not

materialistic” (von Hayek, 1952). Hence, an adoption of the Hayekian view of dualism allows

no other option as to endorse materialism as a necessity, explained through the inherent

character of the mind and its root, being the brain. Von Hayek explains, that the “mind is...the

order prevailing in a particular part of the physical universe—that part of it which is

ourselves” (von Hayek, 1952) or as Dempsey puts it in context: “For him (von Hayek), there

is no mind-body split. Instead, all our thoughts, memories, and ambitions result from the

operation of matter” (Dempsey, Hayek's Evolutionary Epistemology, Artificial Intelligence,

and the Question of Free Will, 1996) and with such comes the coercive understanding of von

Hayek’s view on materialism, that it (materialism) “begins with the recognition that the locus

of the mind—the human brain—is made up of a vast weave of fibrous cells called neurons”

(Dempsey, Hayek's Evolutionary Epistemology, Artificial Intelligence, and the Question of

Free Will, 1996).

In all probability: the interrelated correlation between knowledge and experience manifests

itself in an almost identical, inherent quality of two different attributes – explanation and

understanding. In other words, the façon in which ‘experience’ correlates to ‘knowledge’,

‘explanation’ would et. seq. correlate to ‘understanding’. Von Hayek does not lead-on to

believe that the understanding of the mind is a limitless affair, but rather argues in a way that

counteracts this belief, which can be also expressed as the existence of “an absolute limit to

what the human brain can ever accomplish by way of explanation, due to the nature of

explanation itself” (Leube, 2003). Consequently, the mind is being considered as an ‘agent’ -

an entity that is limited in explaining itself, and von Hayek explains, that “any explaining

agent must be limited to objects with a structure possessing a degree of complexity lower

than its own” (von Hayek, Leube, Nishiyama, & Campbell, 1984). This inferiority in

explanation is an essential compound in the Hayekian theory, as it outlines the incapacity of

such an ‘explaining agent’ to self-explain itself – either by kind or grade of convoluted

complexity.

Conclusion

Von Hayek’s idea gives enough evidence to the limits of cognitive reasoning, encompassing

his values of philosophy of knowledge, experience and attributes of the mind and by doing

so, it offers a basis for rational and logic reasoning of living organisms’. Whether this would

be humanity expressed through mankind or ulterior does not seem to be of striking

importance, but his idea outlines legitimate and inherited restrictions that concern knowledge.

He emphasises that this limitation of inferiority in explanation is invariably unalterable and

destined to interact with the mind ad perpetuam et ad vitam eternam; hence it exhibits the

aforementioned qualities of the lucid, cogent Hayekian philosophical system and as such

provides invaluable insight on the attainment and use of knowledge by an individual or

within society as a whole.

Works Cited

Dempsey, G. T. (1996). Hayek’s Terra Incognita Of The Mind. CATO Institute - White Paper , 2.

Dempsey, G. T. (1996). Hayek's Evolutionary Epistemology, Artificial Intelligence, and the Question of

Free Will. Evolution and Cognition (Konrad Lorenz Institute, Vienna) , 139 - 150.

Farthing, J. W. (1992). The Psychology Of Consciousness. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Leube, K. R. (2003). Some Remarks On Hayek’s The Sensory Order. Laissez-Faire , 12-22.

Lorenz, K. (1943). Die angeborenen Formen möglicher Erfahrung. Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie , p.

352.

Nadeau, R. (1997). Hayek And The Complex Affair Of The Mind. 67th Annual Conference of the

Southern Economic Association (p. 20). Atlanta: University of Quebec in Montreal - Department of

Philosophy.

Steele, G. R. (2004). Hayek’s Sensory Order. The Journal Of The Hayek Society At The London School

Of Economics , 4-7.

von Hayek, F. A. (1952). The Sensory Order: An Inquiry Into The Foundations Of Theoretical

Psychology. London: G. Routledge and Kegan Paul.

von Hayek, F. A., Leube, K. R., Nishiyama, C., & Campbell, W. G. (1984). The Essence Of Hayek.

Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.