PHILIPPINE PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST: Rebuilding the Philippine Political System

by

Ralfhee Blake Barrios

The simple logic in dealing with an ineffectual system is to dump and change it. Adapting a

structure that brings more harm than benefit will only exacerbate the already sorry state of the

society. There is no sense keeping a volatile scheme, one that is prone to explode on the head

of the persons who have engineered the scheme itself. A wrong system breeds poor results and

poor results are manifestations for the need to change.

Philippines has been groping in the dark for far too long, rummaging in drawers and boxes for

the match that would flicker the necessary light. This is apparent in the miserable political,

economic, and social crises that have badgered the nation. To put it succinctly, the Philippines

is a weak state. The Philippine state is a weak state because its apparatus has constantly been

under the control of a powerful family, clan, or prevailing group for the primary purpose of

personal aggrandizement (Banlaoi, n.d). Of the three (politics, economy, society), politics, of

course, is the ultimate cause for the mayhems of the other two--economy and society. It is the

root of the problems. This is true especially because politics is equivocal to power and he who

has power has the ability to control the government system from which all men and institutions

depend. Although the need seems mutual for a government without its people is nothing, still

the people exist at the mercy of the government primarily because power resides in the hands

of those in the government. All government machineries and resources are then open for their

disposal. State apparatus are available for the incumbents disposal. History speaks fairly. In

2004, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was alleged to have sabotaged election results

by ordering then Commission on Elections Commisioner Garcillano to pad and shave the results

and win over her rival by a million votes. The infamous Ferdinand Marcos is known for his wits

and cunning in manipulating the law and government machineries to work in his favour from the

dissolution of the Congress to the empowerment of the military forces and then to turning into

an absolute dictator. A premature and weak Philippine state has produced weak institutions of

governance; thus, it is unable to manage the ethnic, religious and socioeconomic diversities in

its society (Banlaoi, nd.). These historical events being proving facts, it is therefore only

reasonable to alter the political system in order to affect better changes to the Philippine

economy and the society as well. This is the need for a Philippine Perestroika.

The term perestroika is more familiar as a Russian economic policy that intended to increase

mechanization and labour efficiency. However, the etymology of the word perestroika is

reconstruction or reformation. This etymological definition is exactly what the Philippines

needsa reconstruction, a reformation, a renovation in its political arena. A Philippine

perestroika aims to ouster the existing and ineffective political system in order to construct a

new one that will guarantee effective governance and unsoiled political actions. These

reconstructions will provide better safeguards as well as eliminate those that are unnecessary

and prove only to be cumbersome in the performance of executive, legislative, and juridical

functions. Glasnost is a related concept of the Russian perestroika but deals more with

transparency, or its English translation, openness. Glasnosts were Russian policies that dealt

with preventing graft and corruption. Policies on this very premise are what the country needs to

inhibit graft and corrupt practices in the government.

In order to achieve this rebuilding and openness, a set of literature relating to the Philippine

political system and governance by different authors has been reviewed by this writer. It has

been found out that these authors have various opinions as to the ultimate cause of the

countrys impoverish state. Some relate the problem to political dynasties, some to questions of

legitimacy, most to corruption, while still a few others to the electoral system. Each cause will be

analyzed in order to determine the weight and substance that they bring into the problem. The

reviews have been organized in order of political system so that the article on election comes

first, then on good governance and the rule of law and so on. Furthermore, this paper will

identify the ultimate cause of the state's pandemonium through a comparative approach.

A study of the different apparatus of the Philippines shall increase state capacity and even

transform the predatory nature of the state into what can be legitimately classified as

developmental. State capacity was first used by Charles Tilly to refer to the states ability to

raise revenues but this paper uses this to mean the wider range of competencies that the state

acquires in the development process, which includes the power to enforce contracts and

support markets through regulation or otherwise as have been used by Bersley and Persson

(2009) in their paper entitled State Capacity, Conict and Development.

Contrary to popular prejudices regarding the cumbersome nature of third world states and the

presence of predatory governments therein, Peter Evans (1989) attributes the levels of state

developments to state structures and points out that third world states are not necessarily

predatory but may also be classified as developmental. The predatory classification of the state

has been easy with the emergence and popularity of an ideologue that is neoutilitarianism.

Neoutilitarianism assumes that the state (the government) is a rational entity and in being so

would maximize its utility, which are guised in the form of power, security, and welfare so that

the more resources or apparatuses are available for the said maximization of utility, the more

likely would rational entities venture out to claim this utility. This then creates a system of

predation where, when the government is entrusted with a vast power, the easier it is for it to

prey its people and to gain for himself. Evans (1989) points out that the emergence of

neoutilitarianism makes it easier to condone predatory activities as the very barest essentials of

this precept assumes that it is the nature of rational entities such as the state is to maximize its

resources even at the expense of the lives of its people. This maximization may come in the

form of corruption or rent-seeking. Some states may extract such large amounts of otherwise

investable surplus and provide so little in the way of "collective goods" in return that they do

indeed impede economic transformation. It seems reasonable to call these states predatory"

(Evans, 1989).

On the other hand, developmental states are not exactly the opposite of predatory states for the

former is neither a paragon of virtue nor of honesty but the ends are different from those of

predatory states so that even with the existence of corruption and informal networks in the

former, their economic progress, unlike those of predatory states, graph positive slopes. In fact,

in some cases, developmental states may have historically been more predatory than

developmental.

Hutchcroft (1998) classifies the Philippines as a predatory state based primarily on its history of

crony capitalism and rampant corruption which are most manifested in the Marcos, Estrada, and

Arroyo regime. Some political scientists even argue that the Philippines is not only a predatory

state but a predatory regime because the whole state apparatus connive in order to maximize

their utility. It is then the burden of the government to shift the predatory nature of the state to

one that is developmental as have been the case with Japan, Korea (North Korea, and Taiwan).

This paper will operate on both rational and institutionalized approaches.

This paper, Philippine Perestroika and Glasnost, aims to attain the developmental shift by

renovating the political sphere on which all government institutions and the polity exist.

Unless and until the state recognizes the problems and applies curative measures upon the

pandemic hitches that go against development and progress, the nation will remain in the hollow

crater of poverty and discontent.

A study of these articles leads us to the building blocks of the new edifice of this nation, that with

glass facades and solid pillars. These literatures, when amalgamated, shall be the blueprint of

the new political destiny.

On INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE by S. HIX AND M. WHITING

Before this paper argues on the specifics towards the path of a Philippine Perestroika and

Glasnost, it is only proper that a short discussion on political science, on which this paper will

operate, be made.

Political science is not a school work, it is a field of study that involves all aspects of human life

and affects all life form. It is indispensable to reality life because politics itself is indispensable to

the real world. Politics is everywhere and to detach its systematic means to comprehension is

similar to detaching a body from a brain.

The birth of political science could be traced back from Ancient Greek as a brainchild of no less

than Aristotle himself. He was the first featherless biped to relate the different forms of

governments with different state status or political outcomes in a systematic way, hence the

science. Aristotle has then influenced great mind like Cicero, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke,

Montesquieu, and Madison.

Political science as it is known today is a product of several theorizing and logical thinking by

the aforementioned people. In ones study of political science, one would notice how much

philosophy the discourse involves. This is primarily because of the empirical nature of politics.

That is, it tends to lean more on experiences rather than on futuristic circumstances. To put it

bluntly, political science is the mistress of history.

This paper will implore the following organization and identification schemes; political behavior,

political institutions and political outcomes. This literature review will work in the context of

identifying the key factor that has affected or that is affecting political actions; whether it is the

behavior, the institution or the culture. At the offset, this writer will also identify which among the

three has contributed greatly to the problems held at status quo.

According to Hix and Whiting (2012), political behavior refers to the beliefs and actions of

political actors, be they citizens, voters, party leaders, members of parliaments, government

ministers, judges, civil servants, or members of interest groups. These actors have political

preferences: their political interests, values and goals. Issues like what the people want

prioritized; education, armed forces, or labor, fall under political behavior. Political institutions

have been defined as the sphere or arena on which political behavior manifests. Later on, this

writer will identify whether a certain issue could be resolved by altering political institutions say

from a presidential government to a parliamentary government or from a bicameral legislature to

a unicameral legislature. Finally, political outcomes cover a broad range of issues, from specific

policy outcomes such as economic growth or higher public spending or better protection of the

environment, to broader political phenomena, such as political and economic equality, social

and ethnic harmony, or satisfaction with democracy and government (Hix and Whiting, 2012).

Succinctly, political outcomes are the results or the sum of behaviors, institutions, and actions.

Hix and Whiting (2012) also discussed several approaches in the study of politics, which the

writer deems pertinent to the analyses to be rendered. The first approach is the rational-choice

approach which considers men as rational beings who will decide in favor of the option that

gives them the highest satisfaction or utility, which is equivocal to saying that rational men

choose options that serve them best. Hence, the rational-choice approach does not mean that

men rationalize decisions through a conscious effort of introspection and deductions, rather this

means that rational being have innate preferences and will choose according to their

preference.

This approach will be utilized in this study as political actors act on the premise of deriving

satisfaction for themselves. The rational-theory approach in this paper will be furthered by

identifying state actions in the context of the re-emerging neoutilitarian paradigm.

Neoutilitarianism assumes that the state (the government) is a rational entity and in being so

would maximize its utility, which are guised in the form of power, security, and welfare so that

the more resources or apparatuses are available for the said maximization of utility, the more

likely would rational entities venture out to claim this utility even at the expense of illicit actions.

A famous illustration of the rational choice approach is the prisoners dilemma.

Another approach is the institutional approach which deals with role of institutions in state

actions. According to Hix and Whiting (2012), there are two types of institutions; formal

institutions and informal institutions. Formal institutions include the various provisions in a

constitution, the rules of procedure in a parliament, an electoral system, campaign finance

regulations, rules governing how a party chooses its leader, and so on. Informal institutions,

meanwhile, encompass social structures (such as class), social norms and cultural practices,

metaphysical beliefs and ideological values, and so on. Both, however, restrict behavior of

political actors such as the guarantee of the laws to penalize corrupt officials restricts the

commission of graft and corrupt practices. To a certain degree, institutions are more important

than behavior in explaining political phenomena because the former could restrict political

behavior licitly so that behaviors may not be carried out.

DEMOCRACY

The Philippines prides itself as not only a Republican but a Democratic country while U.S.

parties contend on both ideologies.

Democracy is a very complex idea. Whether it is even an idea is debatable. Regardless,

democracy has had a bitter history in the hands of philosophers such as Aristotle. The

sentiment of Aristotle was valid. He argued that a democratic state would eventually cause

chaos because state affairs and the decision process are bestowed upon the less educated

gentry. This was the principal characterization given to democracy. That it was the direct rule of

the people, which was composed of the lesser mortals so to speak. He feared that giving

such a group of people power equal to that of the more educated and economically independent

citizens would most likely lead to chaos and populism (Hix and Whiting, 2012) but because

politics is dynamic and ever-changing. Democracy has had a new definition. The famous line

from Gettysburg Address in 1863 exemplifies what democracy is in its new form, a government

of the people, by the people, for the people. This shows that democracy has evolved into a new

form where the needs and aspirations of the people are represented in the government by

electing political actors in their stead. Democracy has become indirect hence avoiding the fear

of Aristotle to what is currently considered as a mobocracy.

Robert Dahl (1971) believes that democracy is about political equality and giving everyone an

equal voice in saying how a state should be governed. Thus the essence of democracy has

been synonymous with political equality.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p.53) and Clark et al. (2012, p.180), in a previous study, found

out that as the countrys wealth increases, it is more likely to become a democracy. Although

the line of correlation has not been established, the fact is that a states economy and its

democratic nature have a bilateral relationship. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) proposed a

modernization theory stating that as a state modernizes, it is bound to tread on only one path,

that is democracy, and he also believed that less modernized state who are automatically of low

level of education are more prone to be ruled by a dictator. These claims have been disproved,

however, by political phenomenon such as the economic development of non-democratic

countries especially those in the Middle East and the non-modernization of democratic countries

such as India.

POLITICAL PREFERENCES AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

The most popular and widely accepted reason behind preferences is the economic determinist

perspective which argues that a persons political preference is determined that persons

economic class. According to this perspective, the way of understanding an individual and his

decisions is by identifying the class he belongs in. Up until this day and age, the primacy of

economic conditions stands to be undisputed.

There are other factors that determine political preferences though, such as gender, religion,

ethnicity, or nationality.

On PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL REFORM by

JOEL ROCAMORA

According to Rocamora (1998), the most important characteristic of Philippine political parties

is that they are parties of the elite1. They do not compose of elite men and women but of men

and women who are retainers or followers of the elite. They are not the elite themselves but

the people who support them and their causes are. In fact, men who run for office are usually

lay people or ordinary men who have been influenced and promised to be supported by wealthy

families. This is not an unusual practice. Wealthy families have been supporting political

candidates for the apparent reason that once seated in the office and vested with powers, these

officials will come in handy in whatsoever political actions the elite family wishes to undertake.

No need even to lobby, everything is an i-Phone away. Obviously, they wouldnt spend money,

time, and effort without meaning to do business. Electoral supports given by elite families are

more or less what one might consider as investments for a business venture.

According to Moscas (1923:9) elite theory, in every society there is always a class that rules

and a class that is ruled. The ruling class is the minority that is composed of individuals who

are capable of performing all political functions and monopolizes power while the rules class is

always the majority that is directed and controlled by the ruling minority. Furthermore, the

minority always triumphs over the other because they are organized and are composed of

superior individuals. As Robert Michels (1977) puts it, there is always the Iron Law of

Oligarchy in all forms of human organization be it a club, a council, or a political party.

However, Rocamora sees the iron law of oligarchy working behind politicians. Instead of them

controlling the government and performing political functions, they have politicos at work to do

that for them.

This posits a serious problem on the purity of intention and integrity of the politicos. Do they alot

land A to resettle 200 homeless families or do they allow the wealthy to build commercial

buildings? Do they give away the lands to the dying farmers or do they strategically place

delaying tactics on the plenary and mask them as laws or petitions or motions? Most of the time,

the presence of elite support does not even give room for dilemma. Unsurprisingly, why would

1 During the 17th century, the word elite refers to commodities of special excellence. Later, the word is used to denote superior social groupslike crack military units. In the social sciences, the concept of elite gained prominence through the writings of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaeteno Mosca who were both reacting to Marxs concept of class (Magno, n.d).

politicians create policies that go against the will of the families that funded their campaign, that,

in effect, place them to office?

Furthermore, despite the elite classes towering political parties and candidates who then

become government official, Rocamora (1998) points out that, what has kept the Philippine

state weak is that no one class has been strong enough to bend the state to its will. That is,

despite strong hold of elite families to politicians, the elite class themselves do not have a power

strong enough to bend the state to their will. This is primarily because the elite class have

divided themselves each to their own fancy. Each of them has their own personal agenda. They

are not unified which makes it impossible for the government to create and implement a solid

and coherent economic development strategy or an institution capable of providing a reliable

regulatory agenda for the Philippine economy. However this argument of Rocamora could not

hold water, for even with a unified elite with their shared goals, there is no assurance or

guarantee that policies and legislations will be for the best of the majority if not the entirety of

the Filipinos. For one, the elite class may agree among themselves decisions that are gratuitous

to them but onerous to the working class and the proletariat. Centralizing power on one class

has been one of Marxs greatest struggles. Powerful elite does not automatically accelerate the

social positions of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat to a degree. In fact, direct benefits are

vested only to the elite themselves and everything will occur at elite Canutes behest. This point

of Rocamora also fails to take into account the ability of the masses to establish their own

political destiny via their conscious self-organization.

Anchored on the same premise of elite support, Rocamora identifies yet another problem with

political parties in the Philippines, the shifting character of membership and absence of

ideological or programmatic differences. This problem is actually a combination of two

problems. First is the shifting character of membership and second is the absence of ideological

or programmatic differences. Albeit, the two are related for the shifting character of membership

is usually brought about by the absence of ideological or programmatic differences. This says a

lot about our politicians for not only do they have high tendencies to of being unresisting and

susceptible; they are also without principle or word of honour. The persistence of political

butterflies in the Philippines is a manifestation of the shifting character of membership.

Politicians change from one political party to another every election primarily on the basis of the

partys reputation and popularity and not on the principles by which the party has been founded

or the ideology it advocates. These political butterflies are often considered guest candidates

that can belong to more than one party. In effect, they are playing safe. The more apt term for

this shifting character of membership is political prostitution. In fact, political prostitution has a lot

of similarities with prostitution itself. For one, prostitutes are euphemised as GROs or Guest

Relation Officers, close enough to be guest candidates. And secondly, in both prostitutions,

there is the want of ideologies or principles.

Political ideologies2 are essential in a political party. These are the sets of beliefs or principles

on which all party programs, policies, and decisions must be grounded on. These are the very

basic beliefs that lead politicos to their shared goals. Without ideologies, party policies,

programs, and decisions become arbitrary and personalistic. A party without an ideology or

program does not have a true objective; it runs about the globe aimlessly, pointlessly. It is lost

easily in a grey forest, it is weak and without purpose; a complete cipher, engineered only to

exist in the eyes of the public. Hence, it is a mere facade, a surface, and inside it is hollow.

Without ideological differences, parties do not clash about anything other than the personalities

that represent them. Election then turns into a popularity contest rather than a contest of

leadership, skills, abilities, programs. The purpose of election, which is to put into office

individuals capable of governance, is thus defeated. However, the question of the nature of

ideologies advocated and their role in political life is another question.

According to Grossholtz (1964, p.163), those who have power are expected to use it to

promote their own interest and that of their family. There is no moral contempt for those who

benefit from their power. It is as it should be, and a man would be a fool to ignore his

opportunities. Those who have power lead interesting and eventful lives. And those without

seek to establish close contact with those who do. This is what happens in the Philippine

electoral system, there happens a series of power perpetuity by those who have it and those

who do not struggle to have such by clinging on those who do. This is one of the weaknesses of

Philippine political parties as pointed out by Rocamora; the desperate effort of those who need

power to cling and ride along those that are powerful.

What Rocamora has not mentioned is the non-permanence of parties in the Philippines, which

is a manifestation of the weakness of political parties. They are created in a year and cease to

exist on the next elections unlike the established parties in the United States-the Republicans

and the Democrats. The birth and death of major political parties show that, indeed, parties

2 The word ideology was first used by French Philosopher Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) and originally referred to a

new science of ideas (literally an idea-ology). It was Tracys hope that ideology would eventually be at par in popularity with established sciences as zoology and biology.

have no concrete foundations such as ideologies or programs, or strong membership. These

absences qualify the Philippines as a state that possesses a weak and poor electoral system

and then, of course, administration.

Another electoral problem cited by Hix and Whiting (2012) that Rocamora was not able to

identify is the following;

For example, some citizens would like the government to spend more money on education and

healthcare while others would like the government to reduce taxes. Then, how do these

preferences translate into actions? For example, when voting in elections, do most citizens vote

expressively, for the party whose policies most closely match their political preferences; or do

they vote strategically, for a party which they prefer less but which has a higher chance of

winning? And, how do parties respond to voters? Do they stick with their policies and try to

persuade the voters to support them or do they adapt their policies to try to win as many votes

as possible?

THE PHILIPPINE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

In the Philippine electoral system, nobody loses. Cheating is so rampant, its either you win or

youve been cheated. In 2012, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has been (hospital)

arrested for allegedly committing Electoral Sabotage during the 2004 elections where she won

over famous movie actor Fernando Poe Jr. Allegations of padding and shaving directed to Mrs.

Arroyo have begun when some of her conversations with then Commissioner Garcillano were

wiretapped and recording thereof have been released. After 8 years, and now without

Presidential immunity, Mrs. Arroyo undergoes trial and denies allegations.

During the 1992 election, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago contested before the Commission of

Election and the courts the results of the Presidential election claiming that she has been

cheated by Fidel Ramos who has lagged behind her by a significant margin in the first four days

of the vote-counting. Until today, whether or not cheating did occur, nobody can tell. During the

snap-elections between Marcos and Aquino, the former was alleged to have manipulated the

results of the election in order to stay in the Palace.

During the 2013 midterm election, a display of poor electoral system persisted; from shifting

membership of parties to the lack of ideological differences. For one, the prevalence of guest

candidates such as Loren Legarda, Grace Poe, and Chiz Escudero manifested the shift of

membership in political parties. There may be nothing unconstitutional or immoral in guest

candidates but it allows the electoral system to be perceived as a battle of party colours and

jingles. Another manifestation of the electoral weakness was the existence of a group

organized for electoral ends but did not really exist as a political party but with the functions

thereofthe team Pnoy. Evidently, the team subscribed to what Grossholtz described as the

need of the inferior to cling to those who are in power. The undeniable popularity of President

Benigno Simeon Aquino III who has had impressive trust ratings (compared to his

predecessors) enabled politicians eying government seats to have earned significant numbers

of votes. Those who trust the President have surely chosen whosoever the latter deemed

deserving to the government. The problem that sits with this scenario is the weak party chain it

cuffs among its members who are united solely on the bass of patronage and popularity. They

belong to a team primarily because the team-leader is popular and can harvest them enough

votes to win regardless of their stands and differences during elections3. This incoherent

membership and lack of shared goals (except to win elections) aggravated by the lack of

ideological or programmatic differences nulls the very reason for the existence of political

parties.

A TWO PARTY SYSTEM?

One of the comparisons cited in this paper earlier was the Philippine electoral system vis-a-vis

the U.S. electoral system that follows a two party system. With the existing problems raised by

Rocamora in his paper, the next logical step is to identify a solution. That is, will a two party

system counter the flawed political tradition of shifts and lack of ideological differences?

Apparently, a two-party system regulates the roster of candidates who could run for office and a

clearer demarcation between parties and party platforms will be drawn. When there are only two

parties, the difference of one party from the other will be highlighted and it will allow the parties

to select their best contender for election rather than presenting before the pool of voters

different candidates who may prove to be liabilities rather than assets of the nation.

This writer proposes that the major difference between the parties in a two-party system should

be based on the extent of government functions. On one end of the pole, is the socialist

3 However, the point of the Presidents popularity and its ability to influence people was not mentioned by

Rocamora.

perspective that the government should provide for its people and that it must handle major

economic affairs and institutions. On the other hand is the neo-utilitarian perspective of minimal

state intervention where the state intervenes as less as possible leaving most of state and

economic affairs to private individuals or institutions. The former should be called the

Conservatives while the latter the Liberals.

The question then is whether or not a two party-system eliminates the elite power over

politicians or as Rocamora puts it, creates a more coherent goal among the elite. Logically, a

two-party system concentrates elite support so that if a division should occur, division occurs

only on two major parties rather than one that is distributed unequally. Should there be a clash

between elite goals; the clash exists only two-fold. But whether or not total elimination of elite

rule is achieved is a question of ideological preferences and party-platforms of the winning

candidates.

The existence of close ties between a President and a candidate or an appointee which is really

a patron-client relationship is hardly dispensable. This writer argues that choosing kin to run an

office is not so much a detrimental act as long as it is backed up by meritocracy. In fact, the

beauty of having closely bounded people in the government is that there becomes an internal

coherence and a corporate identity. Internal coherence in that the executive is more able to

dispense its duties with people who have parallel perspectives with that of the President, thus a

coherent government goal, and corporate identity in that the government becomes a single

unified entity.

What the country needs is a stronger Omnibus Election Code that will regulate all candidates in

party membership so that stern requirements based on beliefs and philosophies are imposed. It

should also be the directive of the Commission on Elections to prohibit the existence of political

parties without any clear mandate or advocacy and inhibit commercials that are personalistic

and particularistic as may be defined by law.

In a morsel of logic, what Rocamora shows is the importance of political parties in

reconstructing a new political landscape. Elections, afterall, are the outsets of good governance.

On GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW

The prime reason this country has not been able to flourish in the Post-Martial Law era

is because it lacks good governance. The administrations that have held the government after

the Marcos regime have attempted, but in vain, to put the countrys economy back where it had

been before, that was next to Japan. Even the economists and the great minds that have ruled

this nation have faltered what they have overseen although the key is to focus on the countrys

quality of governance. The quality of governance affects the participation of the people; their

reactions and responses, and the political, economical and administrative institutions and

services and so in order to effectively carry out the duties of the government, its shall be rooted

on the basic principles of good governance and the rule of law.

The article on good governance and the rule of law points out that in order to achieve national

development, an amalgamation of good governance and a stable and predictable rule of law

that shall exercise proper justice regardless of social status of political considerations shall

occur. To put it simply, national development equals good governance plus the rule of law. The

question then is how to determine good governance and the rule of law and how does one

achieve both.

The irony that embodies this article is that the Philippine Constitution explicitly states that the

Philippines is a democratic and republican state. As a democratic country, the people expect

good governance in return of the trust they have vested upon the elected candidates and as a

republican state, the rule of law should be strictly implemented without favour or prejudice. This

is apparently lacking in the current political state that the Philippines is in.

One of the beautiful features of the article is its honest assessment of the challenges that

badger this nation and thwarts its development. The first challenge identified was the question

of legitimacy. In a query of power residence, power lies where men believe it resides. That is to

say that in the outset of a legitimacy question, power slips from the hands of those who have

engineered the process of attaining it. During the 2004 elections, former President Gloria

Macapagal Arroyo was accused of sabotaging election results by padding and shaving by a

million votes. This accusation has exacerbated when a wire-taped conversation of the former

President and a former commissioner was released to the public. Although the tape was

inadmissible to the court by the principle of the fruit of the poisonous tree, it has dispersed

enough poison on the pool of people from whom all government power emanates. Perhaps so,

the exacerbation of this legitimacy question is due to the very fact that we are a democratic

state and power comes from the people. It seems only logical that a person whose power

allegedly did not come from the people should be unloved and unpopular. As a point of

digression, a historical approach on the Gloria Chronicle will show the ill-effects of election

engineering, which are the weak support system of the government and the elusive recognition

of authority and legitimacy on the part of government. We can account the legitimacy question

to the downfall of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Another challenge that the country faces is the predatory nature of its government. As a third

world state, the presence of rent seekers becomes acceptable and yet it is primarily because of

rent-seeking that we are left in this lowly state. Corruption is so rampant in the Philippines, it has

become a standard operating procedure, an SOP, in a non-standardized form. Corruption is not

a standardized commodity, it comes in different sizes and shapes and so to think of corruption

as a purely monetary issue is a mistake. According to the World Bank (1997) and the UNDP

(1998), corruption is the misuse or the abuse of public office for private gain. It can come in

various forms and a wide array of illicit behaviour, such as bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism,

graft, speed money, pilferage, theft, embezzlement, falsification of records, kickbacks, influence

peddling, and campaign contributions (Balboa and Medallon, 2006). Incidentally, Balboa and

Medallon (2006) identify political legitimacy for the state through democratic elections and

transfer of power and an effective political opposition and representative government as the

first requisite for good governance.

The Philippine Development Plan of 2011-2012 further identifies lack of accountability as a

major issue concerning good governance. Without the governments assurance that it will be

accountable and transparent in all its decisions and dealings, there will always be an easy

pocket to be thieved, an accessible cheque to be filled out, a poor and ignorant Filipino to be

preyed.

These challenges have brought about several other aftermaths especially on the investment

climate. Thus, these challenges have collectively created a political instability in the country.

Albeit, the main concern of the article is eliminating corruption in all its forms. The Global

Competitiveness Index Report for 2011-2012 listed corruption and inefficient government

bureaucracy as the top most problematic factors for doing business in the Philippines (Philippine

Development Plan, 2011-2006). The article has provided different statistical data that prove

that corruption is one of the major problems of the country such as the Corruption Perception

Index of 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Global Competitive Index, which

all indicate the need of the government to strengthen its anti-corruption campaign and formulate

a more substantial course of action for good governance. This writer believes that this course of

action should be able to eradicate corruption systematically and logically in order for it to attain a

long-term effect.

The effects that corruption has upon good governance are apparent in the gutters and streets of

Manila but there is more to corruption than meets the eye. First of all, corruption, along with

political instability and weak rule of law, has scurried investors away from the country. Because

of this, the country experiences low capital formation, lesser job opportunities, lower household

income, lower household spending, and thus a lower Gross Domestic Product. In an article I

have written in 2011, I pointed out that,

The 5.9 increase in GDP in the 2nd quarter of 2011 was attributed to several conditions

including remittances and employment. However, the ultimate condition (sufficient condition)

that has caused the increase is the increase in household spending. Without this, growth would

have contracted. In the study of economics, the most important determinant of an economic

condition is production and supply. An increase in household spending shows direct relationship

between production and supply such that the greater the demand, the greater the revenues and

incomes generated and a greater supply means maximization of resources and employment at

the elementary level. This ostensibly delivers direct positive results unto the values of goods

produced and services rendered that is the GDP of the country. GDP growth must happen when

household spending increases. This is so because household spending augmentation happens

only when economic stability is significantly increasing. One of the contributing factors for this

augmentation is the high employment rate. Because employment increased, individuals tend to

spend more. In economics, there is a direct relationship between income and normal goods.

This increase in employment then is caused by the increase in public investments. Public

investors create more job opportunities. However, these public investors are swayed into the

Philippines due to the increase in confidence.

This writer along with several other members of the government identifies confidence of public

investors to the government as the prime necessary conditions that brought about the increase

in GDP.

Moreover, public services are not carried out properly when corruption occurs; government

projects do not have the quality they ought to have because funds have been manipulated

amongst the implementing agencies, the suppliers, and the rest of the other who have connive

for a kickback or they have been diversified for other purpose. Poverty-reduction programs have

also been pockets thieved by predators or rent-seekers, hence, if minimal, decrease of poverty

rate of the country. Private investors are not except from the corruptive tendencies of the

government. Most of the private investors shudder to invest in the Philippines primarily because

of the uncertainty of investors whose legitimacy is questioned and secondly because of the

prospect and reality of biased rules and extortive practices4. These second-thoughts are

understandable considering the amount of money that may be lost when all these individuals

really aim to do is serious business. Or as President Benigno Simeon Aquino III puts it, Kung

walang corrupt, walang mahirap.

The ways of eliminating corruption provided in the article could be identified into two; one is

curative while the other one is preventive, which very well proves that indeed corruption may be

eliminated although it has been endemic in the country and that it may indeed cease to exist.

PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

The first solution provided by the article is an effective delivery of public service. A morsel of

logic will show us that the harder the procedures to deliver a public service are, the harder it is

for that service to be delivered. This is one of the reconstructions a Philippine Perestroika must

consider. When in order to deliver service A, steps 1 to 50 must be followed, it is more likely that

service A will not be delivered at all. In fact, fifty steps only provided 50 avenues for corruption

on the part of the implementing agency and the receiver of the service. On the part of the

recipient of the service, in order to avoid the cumbersome process, he/she resorts to illicit

bureaucratic standard operating procedures of paying in money to hasten the delivery of service

without undergoing proper procedure or more commonly called as lagay5 by Filipinos to avoid

the bureaucratic red tape.

The first solution to avoid corruption in this form is to prohibit predators from coming near easy

preys and temptations from nearing victims. That is, government agencies are better off

4 Ibid.

5 The term lagay can be translated as placement or more appropriately as placement fees. Although this is

illegal as it is paid to a government official to skip and not consider proper procedures, this has become permissible in different government institutions in the Philippines.

applying impersonal transactions. This way, corruption can easily be monitored and identified

and bribery is less likely to happen. Reasonably, these forms of corruption such as bribery and

extortion are easier done in a face-to-face transaction rather than impersonal transactions

where procedures are dealt and followed online or via Short Message Services (SMS). By using

online procedures, consideration of not following proper procedures and resorting to illicit

placement-fees or bribery is instantly extinguished. Not only will this prevent corruption, this

will also give ease and convenience to the people since they no longer have to wait for hours in

a file in the Land Transportation Service or Department of Foreign Affairs. The problem with this

system of online transactions is that it goes proportionately with computer literacy. Unless and

until everyone is literate, manual transactions cannot be totally removed and so then is

corruption. Hence, impersonal transactions should come hand in hand with a perestroika of

manual government procedures that shortens but efficiently delivers the process until finally

everyone is literate enough to access online services. Regardless, impersonal services

decrease modes of corruption significantly. The article strongly upholds the implementation of

an Anti-Read Tape Act (ARTA) in order to eliminate corruption in government agencies.

Another solution is the increase in compensation of civil servants, which aims to improve their

economic wellbeing and raise their morale6 but in real terms attempt only to make them

satisfied enough to avoid corrupt practices. In relation to corruption, salary increase may have

insignificant effects. This writer believes that corruption is pervasive and continuous as

opportunities to corrupt are pervasive and continuous. Regardless of the amount that a corrupt

official earns from his salary, as long as there are opportunities to corrupt, these opportunities

will not be allowed to slip off. So this writer believes that salary has little, if not zero, effect upon

corrupt acts. What wage increases does however is that it encourages qualified people to work

for the government thereby increasing the chances of achieving good governance and quality

public service. In this time where the Philippines is allegedly experiencing brain drain with the

migration of experienced and qualified workers to other countries, the need to attract workers to

work in government offices increases. To use salary or wage increase as an incentive to work

for in government offices for the Filipino people is an effective incentive. One of the factors why

the government cannot carry out its duties and obligations properly is because those that are

bound to carry them out are not qualified to do so. In executive services, for instance, 47

percent of the occupied positions are held by non-eligible individuals. This is partly due to the

vast appointive powers of the President who could appoint officials in his discretion even if he

bases his decisions on political accommodations rather than on merit and fitness and partly

6 Ibid.

because those who are qualified to work in government institutions choose to work for private

employers or international companies for the greener pasture. On the point of vast appointive

power of the President, the best regulation not to limit it but to hold the President accountable

for the misgivings of his appointee and to hold the appointee responsible, if not automatically

discharged from office should he be deemed incompetent, and with enough proof of non-

performance of duty.

As a take on Philippine perestroika and glasnost, this writer believes that one way of regulating

government agencies delivery of service thus guaranteeing efficient public service and

eliminating corruption is to hold heads of the offices accountable for the workings in their

departments by discharging the from office should there be a presence of corruption in any kind

and inefficient public service. This writer recommends that an annual human perception survey

on the performance of the different departments of the government be made and the three to be

considered most corrupt or the three least efficient be subjected to investigation by the Office of

the Ombudsman. Should irregularities be found to have occurred in one of these offices (if not in

all), the department head will be immediately removed from his post in place of a new one who

knows his fate should he tolerate corruption and inefficacy under his nose. This writer also

believes that compensation increase should be made alongside a scrap and build policy for

those that are ineligible are in effect given incentives for their incompetence and will then grip

tighter on their seats lest they not enjoy the wage-increases. This has made the clearing and

qualifying process more complicated but a systematic policy of identifying the under-qualified

and encouraging the qualified must be executed.

Another factor is attributed to the poor public service delivery in the country; this is the inability

of Local Government Units (LGUs) to meet the expectations of the public regarding service

delivery. This is what this writer wishes to call the economics of politics where a service

shortage occurs when the service supplied does not meet the services demanded. In order to

achieve service equilibrium, local government units shall have both the ability and the

willingness to dispense public service. As to the question of willingness, this is usually an innate

characteristic that is quantifiable only through actions but ability is another question. One can be

willing and not have the ability or one can have the ability and not be willing. One of the

common impediments for public service delivery by LGUs is their failure to raise sufficient funds

for local developments. LGUs have become unduly dependent on Internal Revenue Allotment

(IRA) transfers from the national government and have failed to manage their financial

resources effectively and sustainably (Philippine Development Plan, 2011-2016). While the

Local Government Code has vested LGUs a semi-local autonomy and administrative powers for

local governance, the national government through its agencies still delivers services that

should have been the LGUs. This overlap and redundancy of functions confuses the system of

accountability for local services and encumbers the national government with more tasks

therefore making it spend more money that should have been allotted for national development

plans.

INTEGRITY

Seemingly, the problem with integrity is that it is non-quantifiable. There are no hard and fast

rules to quantify the degree by which an act or an actor has integrity. But what integrity is is that

it is pure. There are no other shades of integrity, it is monochromatic. The maintenance of the

purity of a persons or an institutions integrity is where the challenge lies and a stained integrity

must be treated with stiff penalties.

As clich as it is, the Constitution explicitly qualifies a public office as a public trust and,

Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with

the utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and

lead modest lives.

In order to keep the integrity of a public office, the integrity of those run it must also be kept.

The law assigns the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) a pivotal role in ensuring integrity and

deterring corruption in the public sector7. The sanction against corruption is the prosecution and

conviction of corrupt government official who although some may have shields of immunity may

be impeached. The problem with the Office of the Ombudsman is that the Ombudsman and the

deputies are appointed by the President. After the administration of President Arroyo, no

investigations were made by former Ombudsman Merceditas Guiterez regarding the anomalous

transactions the former President incurred during her incumbency, reason for the filing of

impeachment case against Guiterez and her resignation during the Aquino incumbency.

Nevertheless, the damage has been done and for several years, the unpopular President was

able to scram from the law. Even during the Aquino Administration, the same effect of

appointment is seen. During the offset of the impeachment trial against former Chief Justice

Renato Corona, opposition groups believed the Office of the Ombudsman was used as an

7 See page 210 of Philippine Development Plan, 2011-2012.

apparatus by the raging President in order to ascertain the oust of the Chief Justice. As long as

the Office of the Ombudsman exists at the appointing power of a political entity such as the

President, this writer believes that the office will never be always immune to bias and political

accommodations. But then again, the office exists as a constitutional commission that assists

the President in his performance of executive functions.

RULE OF LAW

There is a reason why the United States of America is a Republican state and nowhere in their

Constitution could one find their claim to democracy. The reason is simple; their history is a

victim of democracy. When one studies American History, it is seen that once upon a time,

when they followed the precepts of democracy and the liberality it entailed, they turned into a

mobocratic state and the people abused the privileges of democracy. There were times when

the people decided whether a man should be executed or not and how the execution was to be

performed. This has made a lot of people even the government, most specially the government,

unsafe and unsecured and so when the Constitution was drafted, its framers made sure that the

bitter history will not repeat itself by choosing to be a Republican rather than Democratic state.

To this day, US remains to be a Republican state, nothing more and nothing less, although

political parties are either Republicans or Democrats. Republicanism adheres to the rule of law

rather than the rule of majority. It is then on the premise that the rule of law should triumph over

the desires and the actions of the people that Republicanism has been founded.

Article 2, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution identified this nation as both a Democratic

and a Republican. Evidently, the political paradox is extinguished. The Philippines is a

Democratic state in that the key players in the government are elected by the people by a

popular vote and a Republican State in that in all aspects the rule of law should be upheld

regardless of political considerations or popular opinion. The rule of law is essential is

administering justice to the people.

Justice is thought of as the proper administration of law; the proper and perpetual disposition of

legal matters or disputes to render every man his due1. But before it has become what is now

known as a universal hope for victims and prosecutors, it has first been a victim to different

perspectives and a prosecutor to different scholars. Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, and

Aquinas, among others, had something to say about justice, what is just and what is unjust.

Plato identified justice as the universal virtue, the single and greatest good, and injustice as the

universal vice, the single greatest evil2. Aristotles narrower valuation of justice is fair equality

which is to be remembered forever in legal philosophy.

However, one of those whose words truly marked is Glaucon who, although appeared only in

Platos masterpiece that is the Republic, has presented a unique perspective nevertheless.

What makes his idea of justice unique is that it is for him only a lesser evil and not an absolute

good nor a universal virtue as what other philosophers claim. Glaucon believed that to do

injustice is good but to suffer injustice is evil and that justice, being only in the middle, a

compromise, is neither good nor evil but only a lesser evil.

Glaucon presents this idea on an egoistic point of view that sees men as essentially selfish. This

is to say that men only do something from the motive of self-interest. For Glaucon, as for

everyone who adheres to this theory, when a person does something good, it is only because

he intends to benefit from that good. So that, when a person has an opportunity to benefit

unfairly and not be punished in the process, that person will seize the opportunity even at the

expense of violating moral dogmas. It is on this very principle that Glaucon directs his concept

of justice that he expounds with the legend of the Ring of Gyges.

Should Glaucon be right then all the more should a tough rule of law be implemented, that

which could resist the desperate efforts of egoistic individuals to gain incognito.

By upholding the rule of law, corrupt practices are prevented for would-be offenders would see

the consequences in stored for them should they act against the rule of law and should they

challenge the very barest essentials of etiquette and conduct. Corrupt officials act with

discernment. In the process of selecting the most appropriate methods of corruption, the would-

be offender will also consider the penalties to be imposed upon him especially if he sees that

many others like him have been punished severely. He will also have lesser connivances

thereby making corruption degrees more difficult that it was when nobody seemed to care

whether or not corruption takes place.

CITIZENS PARTICIPATION

The active role that the citizens have played in the three People Power Revolutions that

occurred indicates a positive status of citizens participation. In fact, the country prides itself with

citizen participation. According to the Philippine Development Plan (2011:16), Citizens

participation has been one of the strengths of Philippine Governance. This may not be entirely

true as the existence of the other issues in the Philippines could only be attributed to the

citizens apathy such as those issues concerning political dynasties and/or patronage politics.

But the active participation of Civil Society Organizations in aid to the government is one of the

most remarkable political phenomena that the Philippines can be proud of.

In the simplest terms, CSOs, including NGOs, fill in the shortcomings of the government. It is

only apt that the government provide more incentives for CSOs in performance of what should

be an executive function of the government. These CSOs must also be protected from militant

forces that deters peoples participation

POLITICAL PROCESSES AND SYSTEMS

According to the article, the current state of the country can be attributed to the different

historical phenomena that have stormed this nation. These include; (a) the dominance of elite

interests both local and nationalin politics and political contests, this is very similar to what

Rocamora cited as a major problem in the Philippine Electoral System and had thus been

discussed in this paper; (b) the absence of political parties that exact accountability from

individual politicians based on principled party platforms, this too has been identified during the

previous article; (c) the weakness and subservience of the bureaucracy relative to political

class, this subservience can be attributed to the Philippiness culture of patronage and

clientelism which will be discussed further later; (d) the unprecedented power and discretion of

the executive branch that encourages both patronage politics and grand corruption, and finally

(e) the corruption of elections through patronage and money politics.

Of all the areas identified by the article to need mending, this writer believes that priority should

be given to the political process and system.

The dominance of elite interests both local and nationalin politics and political contests.

As have been discussed, the ability of the elite group to support political candidates and the

need of the candidates to be supported equates to the dominance of elite interests during and

even after elections. Unfortunately, these elite interests do not really serve well for the people.

In fact, the interests of the elite are usually contradictory to the interests of the proletariats for

the owners of lands cannot simply divine to doll out their lands to the peasants who have

worked hard for them.

This writer believes that in order to eradicate the dominance of elite interests in the government,

an electoral reform should take place.

The absence of political parties that exact accountability from individual politicians based on

principled party platforms.

From north to west, a platform-based political party is elusive. An average Filipino may not even

know the difference in platform of one political party from another. Usually, its just the difference

in colour, the difference in jingles, and the difference in names that parties highlight and a cross-

cut difference is not really apparent. This is bad already in a university election, what does that

make local and national elections?

This writer believes that the precedence of popularity, name-recall, or physique over ideologies,

platforms, and track-records has been an indispensable part of the Philippines political culture.

Political Culture is the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which

defines the situation in which political action takes place (Verba, 1965). This culture has been

born out of years of practice and custom. So much of the problems that this country faces are

brought about by the political culture we have. The choice, for example, of electing popular

government officials rather than deserving government officials has caused the government to

collapse and threatened this nation to an unredeemable fall.

In order to address this issue, this writer believes that an anti-political dynasty law should be

legislated and that political parties should not be allowed to exist unless clear platforms and

ideologies are in place. This writer does not see why this is hard as it does not even violate any

democratic principle. Furthermore, a two-party system must be adopted in the Philippines in

order to empower political parties and in order for them to not exist at the favour of popular

candidates.

The weakness and subservience of the bureaucracy relative to political class.

Political classes have crossed their borders. But doesnt anything political do? Apart from the

prior recommendations of this writer to establish a clear and stern political system, this writer

also recommends the organization of non-elite individuals into manageable and ordered groups.

The government should encourage the formation of labour unions and other organizations of

similar nature in order to empower and create a group that will ouster political elite.

Moscas (1964:9) elite theory states that, in every society there is always a class that rules and

a class that is ruled. The ruling class is the minority that is composed of individuals who are

capable of performing all political functions and monopolizes power while the rules class is

always the majority that is directed and controlled by the ruling minority. Furthermore, the

minority always triumphs over the other because they are organized and are composed of

superior individuals.

The best counter then is to organize another group that will be ruled by individuals superior to

their class. The very basic principles of simple arithmetic show that an organized many could

easily ouster an organized few, ceteris paribus that is.

The unprecedented power and discretion of the executive branch that encourages both

patronage politics and grand corruption.

This writer agrees that the power and discretion of the executive branch have stretched to an

unreasonable parameter. This vast power has deeply contributed to the downfall of the nation

as different Presidents have abused the powers granted unto them by the constitution and have

even gone as far as making a constitution that is favourable to themselves. Because the

President can easily manipulate the apparatuses of the state, the Philippine has repeatedly

morphed into a Zairan state.

For one, there is the existence of what is seemingly a Philippine version of the Zairian

presidential cliques (especially during elections). Members of this clique usually seek the

favour and approval of the patron who is the President. This culture of patronage is prevalent in

the Philippines and is most likely due to the said vastness of executive power. According to

Kimura (1992), one of the most dominant political cultures is patron-client relationship where

the socio-economic status (patrons) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection

or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by

offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron. Carl Lande

(1965) extends this idea to the Philippine context where he observes that patron-client

relationships exist from great and wealthy political leaders to leaders in each province down to

lesser gentry politicians in the towns, down further to petty leaders in each village, and down

finally to the clients of the latter: the ordinary peasantry According to Evans (1989), because

decisions are eminently up for sale to private elites, the state lacks autonomy.

The persistence of patronage politics has brought about several political phenomena that have

brought this country to shame such as the martial rule of an uber-powerful dictator, the electoral

fraud of then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and even the impeachment of former Chief

Justice Renato Corona who has been prey to the cosmic power of the President to use

government apparatuses in his favour.

Unfortunately, although the Constitution guarantees protection against grave abuse of

discretion, the persistence of patronage politics puts the provision to shame.

The corruption of elections through patronage and money politics.

Politics starts at the moment a political candidate appears on TV. to say Gusto ko happy ka. In

order to carry out good governance, a clean and honest election must take place. Campaigning

period is probably the filthiest time of the year; convoys and families are massacred, people are

paid for their vote, and worst of all, Loren Legarda starts to prostitute herself (if thats even a

valid verb).

On FAMILY AND POLITICS: DYNASTIC PERSISTENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES by Pablo

Querubin

From the age of consciousness, we have been taught that the family is the basic unit of the

society. It is essentially where society begins; even the most essential institution in a polity. This

same belief could not be understated in Political Science especially in the field of Political

Dynamics where the family is qualified as the starting point of influence and power. As Querubin

(2010) puts it, not only can families exercise their power outside formal institutions of

government, but they can also take over these institutions and capture the political system.

Even in the study of the Philippine electoral system, it is clear that candidates aim to affect

families instead of individuals for it is more common for families to have a single decision rather

than the arbitrary desires of individuals. However, this is not just the case in the most political

systems such as in the Philippines where more than 50 percent of the elected

Congressmen8 and governors have had a previous relative in office (Querubin, 2010) and two of

the Presidents are children of former Presidents, Macapagal and Aquino. Here, families play a

larger role and this role aims to centralize power among themselves and distribute it to their

heirs. Instead of candidates simply influencing families, families in the Philippines take on their

political destinies and pass them from one generation to another and sometimes even taking

on government positions simultaneously.

This is a system that has been going on in the Philippines. Politicians who win power seek to

maintain it for generations and even generations not certain. In a dynastic culture, power is

centralized only on one family. We have been born out of a history of political dynasties. In the

pre-colonial times, we were ruled by Datus and Rajas who hold power based on lineage rather

than meritocracy. Traditionally, the first sons of these Rajas or Datus are the direct heirs to the

thrones. During the Spanish colonization which lasted for almost 400 years, political power was

concentrated to a small mestizo elite commonly referred to as principalia[9]9. Instead of

establishing a strong centralized state, power at that time was disseminated among the various

elite families in the provinces. These families have the right to hold land, vote, and serve in

positions of local political power. The most important position at the local level was the

gobernadorcillo (petty governor), elected by the principalia class from its own ranks and put in

charge of collecting taxes and administering justice (Querubin, 2010).

The problem that arises with this system in a time of modernization, globalization, and

McDonalization is that it violates the constitutional provision of equal opportunity to public

service10 which veers away from the precepts of democracy and justice. The framers of the

Constitution have seen to it that the oligarchic feature of a dynastic system is prohibited in the

Philippines. However, despite this constitutional mandate for equal opportunity, the existence of

political dynasties is prevalent for this provision is considered a dead provision, a non-self-

executing provision that is inactive until backed up by a sanctioning law. In fact, the law explicitly

states that the state shall... prohibit political dynasties as may be defined be law11. That means

that this provision of the constitution needs another law to define it and to set its penalties.

Without this law, the provision regarding political dynasties has no teeth and thus cannot

8 Compared to USs 7%.

9 Simbuhan (2005) and Cullinane (2003) claim that principalias were the maharlikas of the pre-colonial

Philippines. When the encomienda system was eliminated, the maharlikas became the principalias. It was a hereditary status. 10

Section 26, Art. 2 of the 1986 Constitution: The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. 11

Ibid.

penalize its offenders. This is why political dynasties have been multiplying at a frequency that

is seemingly faster than the speed of light. There is a persistence of political dynasties in the

Philippines.

According to Moscas (1923:9) elite theory, in every society there is always a class that rules

and a class that is ruled. The ruling class is the minority that is composed of individuals who

are capable of performing all political functions and monopolizes power while the rules class is

always the majority that is directed and controlled by the ruling minority. Furthermore, the

minority always triumphs over the other because they are organized and are composed of

superior individuals. Unfortunately, these minorities refer to the dynastic families in the

Philippines. As Robert Michels (1977) puts it, there is always the Iron Law of Oligarchy in all

forms of human organization be it a club, a council, or a political party. According to Querubin

(2011) a more recent literature by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) emphasize the way by which

elite persistence may undermine attempts to reform institutions, leading to captured

democracies" wherein economic institutions and policies disproportionately benefit the elite12.

It is called a dynasty for its very nature; it entails power, it is driven to ruling, and it is

meticulously designed to stand the tests of time. Because of this and the toothless provision of

the law seeking to eradicate political dynasties is challenged. What makes things worse is that

legislators do not pass the law to back up the provision with its necessary dentures. If you think

about it, no person would annihilate themselves especially if it talks about power, wealth, and

fame. This is the very reason why no law has been stipulated regarding political dynasty since

1986.

According to Timberman (1991), the Philippines exists in a culture of tradition. The masses

prefer to follow the tradition that they have been accustomed to which accounts to why Filipinos

tend to vote based on the popularity of a personality rather than on the bases of ideologies,

beliefs, or philosophies, which is what modern political culture is. Because of this, we see a

problem with the credibility of choice by which Philippine politicians have been elected to office.

This aggravates the problem of political dynasty since the choice of the masses mostly favours

those that come from families that the people are already accustomed to govern them leaving

out those that are new to politics behind the line. In a study conducted by Querubin (2010) in his

thesis entitled Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippine, it has been found

that,

12

Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines by Pablo Querubin.

Non-dynastic candidates who win their first election by a small margin are 4 times more likely to

have a posterior relative in office than those who lost their first election by a small margin and

never serve... Moreover, in 40% of the 79 provinces, the Governor and the Congressmen are

related.

This data show that there is not only the existence but also the persistence of political dynasty in

the Philippines especially in the local levels. This persistence is continued as politicians

perpetuate their bloodline in politics. One of the major concerns of Querubin (2010) is the

tendency of families to use political power to further their own interests and appropriate rents at

the expense of the majority of the population. According to Bertelsmann Transformation Index

(2006), power brokers tend to have the upper hand in manipulating political as well as

economic resources to their advantage. This use of political and economic resources for private

gain is what Balboa and Medalla (2006) call corruption. This is to say that the concentration of

power on one family makes the system prone to corruption or John Dalberg-Acton says it best,

power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. In fact in Robert Klitgaards

Strategies Against Corruption (1998), he identified monopoly of power as a factor that results

to corruption along with discretion and absence of accountability thus the formula C=M+D-A,

where C is corruption, M is monopoly of power, D is discretion, and A is the absence of

accountability. In Alfred McCoys An Anarchy of Family, he shows that in fact it is really just a

few that accounts for this strength and power. Who have shaped its past, who are determining

its present, who are charting its future (De Quiros, 2012)13.

Furthermore, Querubin (2010) notes that the poorest provinces in Cavite are those that have

been ruled by dynastic clans. This literature shows that there is a relationship between the

persistence of political dynasties and the economic status of the province, which will be

measured in this study in terms of GDP and perception surveys. The same literature shows that

incumbents have higher advantages in winning government office, results of Querubins study

shows that incumbents vote share is 36 percentage points larger than that of non-incumbent

opponents.

The inclusion of the anti-dynasty provision itself has been subject to a formidable debate during

the drafting of the constitution. As constitutionalist Joaquin Bernas recalls in his article entitled

Political Dynasties published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2012);

13

Family Bonds by Conrado de Quiros, The Philippine Daily Inquirer

The political dynasty provision was authored by Commissioner Jose N. Nolledo. A similar

provision had already been rejected under the article on local governments, but Nolledo

entertained the hope that the Constitutional Commission might still approve one because, as he

said, It seems to me that the resolution asking for a provision in the Constitution is very popular

outside but does not seem to enjoy the same popularity inside the Constitutional Commission.

He was also faintly hoping that Congress would do what the commission would not do. Hence

his impassioned plea: And so I plead with the members of the Commission to please approve

this provision. . . . [W]e leave it to Congress to determine the circumstances under which

political dynasty is prohibited. The commission will not determine hard and fast rules by which

political dynasty may be condemned. But I think this is a very progressive provision and, in

consulting the people, the people will like this provision. I hope the commission will hear the

plea of the people.

The thrust of the constitutional provision is to impose on the state the obligation of guaranteeing

equal access to public office. Although the provision speaks in terms of service, it is meant to be

a blow in the direction of democratizing political power. Nolledo had the support of

Commissioner (now Comelec Commissioner) Rene Sarmiento, who explained the rationale of

the provision thus:

By including this provision, we widen the opportunities of competent, young and promising poor

candidates to occupy important positions in the government. While it is true we have

government officials who have ascended to power despite accident of birth, they are exceptions

to the general rule. The economic standing of these officials would show that they come from

powerful clans with vast economic fortunes.

But strong contrary views were also expressed. Commissioner Christian Monsods was brief: I

just want to make the motion to delete Section 20 [now 26], first, because it has been argued

and debated fully in the Article on Local Governments and this body has already made a

decision on the same point; and, secondly, for the reasons I have stated, that I do not think we

should curtail the right of the people to a free choice on who their political leader should be.

Commissioner Blas Ople for his part argued that what were called dynasties were in fact not

the causes of social evils but the result of socio-economic imbalances. He concluded that the

commission should address these socioeconomic imbalances instead.

He also noted that even under present conditions, less privileged citizens have succeeded in

establishing themselves politically. He added: In my own province there are no longer any

dynasties. There are other provinces where you find the word dynasty probably misapplied to a

distinguished family, let us say, to the Cojuangco and Aquino family in Tarlac or the Padilla

family in Manila and Pangasinan, or the Rodrigo family in Bulacan, or the Laurel family in

Batangas, and the Sumulong-Cojuangco family in Rizal, the Calderon family in Nueva Vizcaya,

and Peps Bengzon has been calling my attention to the existence now of a Bengzon line of

political officeholders in Pangasinan. This is not to say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that the Philippine

society has been immobile. We see lots of evidence that, in fact, people disadvantaged by the

accident of birth have indeed risen through their own efforts to become successful competitors

of entrenched political dynasties in their provinces and cities. I can sympathize with

Commissioner Nolledos concern about dynasties because he comes from a province which

tends to be governed by political dynasties. Is that not right, Mr. Presiding Officer?

Indeed, the question of an anti-dynasty law or provision challenges the right of a citizen to vote

and be voted in the spirit of democracy, it essentially curtails the right of the people to a free

choice on who their political leader should be (Monsod, 1986). At a certain extent, the framers

of the constitution have posited a valid question. Does not an anti-dynasty law discriminate

politicians who are born of politician family or parents?

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago attempted to answer this question in the abstract portion of

the Anti-Dynasty Act which she has filed during the first regular session of the upper legislative

chamber in 2011.

The Constitution, Article 2, Section 26

The State shall guarantee equal access to public service and prohibit political dynasty

as may be defined by law.

To give force and effect to this provision, the playing field of the political arena should be

leveled and opened to persons who are equally qualified to aspire on even terms with those

from ruling politically dominant families.

Philippine society, many sociologists note, revolves around the system of extended families.

However, this extended family system, an beneficial concept when applied to the social aspects

of human behavior, finds its pemicious effects in the political arena where public office becomes

the exclusive domain of influential families and clans that are well entrenched in Philippine

politics. The monopoly of political power and public resources by such families affects the

citizenry at the local and national levels.

The socio-economic and political inequities prevalent in Philippine society limit public office to

members of ruling families. In many instances, voters, for convenience and out of cultural

mindset look up to these ruling families as dispensers of favors, and thus elect relatives of these

politically dominant families.

The same bill defines political dynasty as a situation when an incumbent official's spouse or his

or her second-degree relatives hold or seek office together, or when a spouse or relative

succeeds him or her. It also happens when spouses or relatives run for or hold public office

together even if they are not related to an incumbent official14. According to Defensor-Santiago

(2012), the parameter of the anti-political dynasty bill shall be to prohibit relatives from

occupying office in the same agency. Defensor-Santiago believes this to be a fair compromise

for the counter-arguments of those that see no reason to rule out dynastic individuals from

exercising the rights vested unto them by a democratic state.

This writer believes the compromise to still be defective and detrimental to the polity and,

although may decrease the existence of political dynasties, does not really eliminate its