Media Access, Service Delivery and the Poor: Results from Benin

Philip KeeferThe World Bank Development Research GroupJune 2011

Why are the poor. . . poor?

One axis of debate about persistent poverty: it is the consequence of a political breakdown (in the extreme, an oligarchic elite extracts rents at the expense of the

majority) or behavioral distortions (in the extreme, high levels of risk aversion and lack of information

prevent the poor from undertaking actions in their own interests). While political breakdown affects all public policies, public policies to correct behavioral

distortions almost surely easier to implement than those that transfer rents. Providing information to the poor can potentially address either or both issues. Looking at media access can similarly inform either.

The question: does media access help the poor – and if so, how?

Information plays a critical role in service delivery: Accountability Take up

And media potentially plays a large role in providing information About government activities About the value of services

Prior research has shown that media matters – but we’re not sure it helps the poor.

Stuti’s and my research looks at the effects of community radio access across a poor population in northern Benin. Significant service delivery effects (literacy, bed net acquisition) Little evidence of an accountability channel, and greater evidence of a behavioral channel.

This shouldn’t be surprising: Complementary political features needed for accountability are missing. In particular, organizations like parties that permit citizens to act collectively.

Previous research argues for accountability effects

Unemployment assistance, US Great Depression (Strömberg). Counties with greater radio density received more transfers (controlling for income,

literacy, schooling, employment, and using geologic characteristics to instrument for radio density).

Interpretation: radio facilitated political accountability (effects strongest in competitive counties).

Can’t interpret effect of radio on the poor. Radio helps targeting (transfers go to poor with radio) or Radio undermines targeting (transfers to those with radios, independent of their

income). Disaster relief greater in Indian states with greater newspaper penetration

(controlling for state fixed effects, etc.) (Besley /Burgess). Again, can’t say for sure that this makes the poor better off. Indeed, no reason to expect it to. But again, interpretation is an accountability one.

Also arguments for behavioral effects from media access Large behavioral effects (e.g., rates of divorce) from variation in exposure to mass

media (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009; La Ferrara et al, 2008) Behavioral constraints to acquisition and use of bed-nets (Mahajan et al, 2009;

Dupas, 2009; Hoffman, 2009) Use of mass media to persuade households about the value of using bed-nets

(Roll Back Malaria Campaign), but untested.

Our data

Difficult to research whether and how media affects service delivery information on content of media programs (bed nets? education?) data on policy implementation/household behavior and exogenous variation in radio access.

We surveyed all the radio stations in Benin and verified extensive health and education programming by community radio broadcasters.

Household data on bed net ownership/literacy/spending on education for 4,200 households in 210 villages in 32 of the 77 communes in Benin.

Significant, exogenous within-commune differences to community radio access. Stations cater to the commune in which they are based. But variation driven by out-of-commune broadcasters. Small variations in distance/topology: large differences in access to neighboring

commune-based radio across villages within the same commune. Variations are uncorrelated with village-specific characteristics. Alternative to previous ID strategies: large geologic differences.

Observable characteristics of villages unrelated to access

Number of Community

Radios

Share of Community Radios

Village population (1,000s) -.014(0.78)

.002(0.77)

Distance to nearest urban center -0.00609(0.14)

-0.000312(0.65)

Distance to nearest bus/train stop -0.00410(0.30)

-0.000156(0.75)

Number functional private schools -0.227(0.28)

-0.0133(0.72)

Fraction of surveyed households: with income < 30,000 CFA Francs

-0.383(0.23)

-0.0825(0.20)

with a mobile phone 0.346(0.47)

0.109(0.33)

Most common language in village and commune is the same

0.301(0.24)

0.0249(0.48)

Prob. that main language in any two households is the same

-0.558(0.27)

0.0608(0.35)

Mean number of houses in village with brick walls

0.298(0.46)

0.159(0.11)

Literacy and media access

Our first project explores effects of media access on education performance. Susceptible to both household decisions and to government action (e.g., in

contrast to road quality). Primary education is well-funded in Benin (a donor priority) – should be politically

salient. Very, very few kids go to private school (no “exit”).

Measuring education performance: do students learn? Literacy test for 2,100 2nd graders across 210 villages. Avg age: 8.75 yrs. 19% could read simple sentences/paras in French 32% of villages: no child could read at this level. 12%: more than half of children could.

Radio and literacy

To test whether community radio access affects quality of education, estimate:

Because within-commune variation in village access to radios is exogenous, B1 is fully identified after controlling for commune fixed effects.

Controls: besides observables: education of village chief; availability of other public goods (paved roads, literacy centers, health centers,

potable water); village access to other types of radios (commercial, religious, public).

Controls generally not significant. With controls: 1 SD increase in community radios (1.5) increases share of

literate children by 8 percentage points (.40 SD).

jkkjkjkojk BXradioscommunityofnumberliteracyChild 1

Next question: Mechanisms?

Are villages with greater access exposed to more programs? YES Does greater exposure affect accountability (collective action, government inputs)?

NO Radio access has no effect on student-teacher ratio; textbooks/pupil; teacher absenteeism;

# classrooms; level of PTA activity. Measurement issues, so not as high-powered as we would like. Still – high consistency

across quite varied indicators. Or behavior (household investment in education)? YES

Test 1: HHs in villages with more access buy books/ pay fees for more kids Test 2: HH that listen to more community radio (IV = access) buy books/ pay fees for more

kids

Bed nets and media access

Our second project explores effects of media access on HH acquisition of bed nets (free government, or paid bed nets).

If accountability effects dominate, expect more media access to be associated with greater access to free government nets, no effect on paid bed nets.

If behavioral effects dominate, expect the reverse. Behavioral obstacles to free nets much less than for paid nets. Indeed, radio access could lead to reluctance to seek out bed nets if raises concerns

about crowding/bed net quality.

Community radio and bed net ownership(p-values, clustered SEs)

Total bed nets

Free Gov. bed nets

Paid bed nets

Total pre-

treated bed nets

Free Gov’t pre-

treated

Paid pre-

treated

Community radio received by village (# stations)

0.021(0.58)

-0.053(0.02)

0.074(0.02)

0.035(0.33)

-0.045(0.12)

0.08(0.00)

Observations

3,867 3,867 3,867 3,867 3,867 3,867

R-squared 0.28 0.18 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.13

Again, mechanisms?

Are HHs with better radio access more likely to know about free bed net distribution? NO Most respondents know about the program. Tells us that knowledge of program is not sufficient for access NB: >25% of HHs report no free bed nets, despite universal transfer rules. Targeting to

children/elderly doesn’t explain this. Are supply decisions influenced by radio? NO

Visits by health workers significantly assoc. with free bed nets But radio access not associated with health worker visits.

Are HHs with better radio access more likely to know behaviorally-relevant info? YES Among HHs where women were respondents or with more children, respondents in

villages with greater radio access were more likely to know that ORS is the correct treatment for diarrhea.

More radio access, greater knowledge of child mortality in Benin.

Robustness/Alternative explanations

No accountability effects b/c of rigorous targeting? Unlikely. HHs with young children, elderly, no more likely to report gov’t nets. Kids’ test is powerful: 2,190 HHs with children under 5.HH results robust to DV = share of HH bed nets rather than number. Dropping all controls except commune FEs Controlling for health worker visits Using only 1,187 HHs with no gov’t bed nets. Jointly estimating the decision to acquire government or non-gov’t bed nets using Seemingly

Unrelated Regressions. Using only HHs in villages with paved roads Excluding 25 percent of sample closest to bus stop Excluding 25 percent of sample furthest from bus stop Jointly estimating effects of community radios inside and outside of commune. Outside have a

significant, positive effect on own-acquired bed nets.Village-level observations Results significant using wide array of village controls (proximity to urban area; transportation;

presence of literacy/health centers, private schools; education level of village chief; paved road; village population).

Conclusion

First evidence that (a particular kind of) media access has a substantial effect on public goods or goods with substantial spillovers (literacy, acquisition of bed nets).

Direct evidence on separate mechanisms. Unique identification strategy:

not reliant on significant cross-jurisdiction geographic/topographic differences (quality of soil – Strömberg; mountains – Olken, Yanagizawa),

more plausible “excludability” Policy:

Media effects on accountability can’t be taken for granted – depend on broader conditions in political markets.

Media financed by government and donor purchases of time may be particularly unlikely to offer “accountability” programming.

However, media can have a substantial effect on HH behavior, with measurable consequences for development outcomes.