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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 September 30, 1975

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the TestateEstate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance ofIloilo), petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, presiding Judge of the Court of First Instanceof Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-27936 and L-27937 September 30, 1975

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307).TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,administrator-appellant,vs.LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN,BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANOLUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES,ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFAPREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last asAdministratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OFTECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.

R E S O L U T I O N

BARREDO, J.:

Motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration filed bypetitioner-appellant Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and motion for modificationfiled by Joe Hodges and "the other heirs of Charles Newton Hodges" in regard to thedecision of this Court of March 29, 1974.

Upon consideration of said motions, the Court has not found any new matter thereinsufficiently persuasive to induce a modification of its judgment, for which reason, the Court,with its members reaffirming their previous opinions and votes, resolved unanimously toDENY as it hereby DENIES the motions for reconsideration and modification above referredto.

Anent the motion of respondent-appellee Avelina Magno for the assessment of the damagesshe claims she and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges have suffered by reason of thepreliminary injunction in this case which was lifted per resolution of the Court of September8, 1972, the Court resolved to authorize the trial court to make the assessment prayed for,subject to appeal, to this Court, if necessary.

Considering the substantial value of the subject estates and the length of time they havealready been pending judicial settlement and for the reason that the payment of thecorresponding taxes thereon are being unduly delayed, and also because the properties ofsaid estates have to be disposed of in favor of Filipinos before May 27, 1976, the Courtenjoins the parties to exert all efforts to have the inventories of said estates finalized withoutfurther delay, and if possible to extrajudicially settle their remaining differences to avoidfurther complications, expenses and unnecessary loss of time. The respondent court isdirected to expedite proceedings by giving due priority thereto, requiring the parties to submitthe inventories within thirty days from notice hereof, and to resolve the remaining issues asdelineated in the Court's decision and to close the proceedings upon payment of thecorresponding taxes within three months from notice hereof. Respondent judge is furtherdirected to report to this Court from time to time the action taken by him hereon.

Castro, Actg., C.J., Fernando, Muoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

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Makalintal, C.J., Esguerra and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

I join in the resolution denying the motions for reconsideration for the reasons andconsiderations already indicated in my separate concurring and dissenting opinion of March29, 1974.

I specially welcome the resolution's directive to respondent court to expedite and terminatethese long-drawn out proceedings (for over 18 years now since Linnie Jane Hodges' deathon May 23, 1957) and to "resolve the remaining issues as delineated in the Court's decision"and to cause the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes long overdue to theGovernment "within three months from notice hereof." (See pp. 19-20, writer's separateopinion).

I take it that the resolution's directive to respondent court to expedite and terminate theprotracted proceedings within three months supersedes pro tanto the disposition in theoriginal decision of March 29, 1974 for the segregation of the minimum one-fourth of thecommunity properties adjudged to be the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for delivery to andexclusive administration by respondent as her estate's administrator, with the other one-

fourth to remain under the joint administration of said respondent and petitioner and CharlesNewton Hodges' one-half share to be administered by petitioner exclusively as his estate'sadministrator, since such physical segregation and separate administration could notpossibly be accomplished before the more pressing and indispensable matters of submittalof the two estates' inventories and determination by respondent court of the remaining issuesare attended to by respondent court within the limited three-month period given in the Court'sresolution. (See pages 7-8, writer's separate opinion).

The remaining issues to be resolved by respondent court revolve on the two questionsofrenvoiand renunciation. In his separate opinion (at page 7 et seq.), as concurred in by theChief Justice and Justice Makasiar and Antonio, the writer urged that these two questionsshould be resolved "preferentially and expeditiously" by respondent court, since aside from

the time problem, these proceedings have "apparently degenerated into a running battlebetween the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice of all the heirs." (atpage 20).

Since respondent court is now again presided by still another judge in a long line of judgeswho have come and gone without even terminating the proceedings, and since as is clearfrom the decision itself, no consensus on the best means of expediting the closing of theestates was reached by a majority of the Court (see pages 8 and 10, separate opinion), Itrust that those who did not concur with the "suggested guidelines" in the writer's separateopinion (at pages 8-20) either because they were not ready to express their definite opinionthereon or because they felt that respondent court should be given a free hand, willunderstand that the writer now commends anew to the new judge presiding respondent courtthe careful reading of the said suggested guidelines in the hope that they may lighten his

work and help find the appropriate measures and solutions to "expedite the closing of theprotracted estate proceedings below to the mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without needof a dissatisfied party elevating his resolution of this only remaining issue once more to thisCourt and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings." (page 10, separate opinion), and thusenable him to comply timely with the Court's directive to close out the estates within threemonths from notice.

Makasiar and Antonio, JJ, concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

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I join in the resolution denying the motions for reconsideration for the reasons andconsiderations already indicated in my separate concurring and dissenting opinion of March29, 1974.

I specially welcome the resolution's directive to respondent court to expedite and terminatethese long-drawn out proceedings (for over 18 years now since Linnie Jane Hodges' death

on May 23, 1957) and to "resolve the remaining issues as delineated in the Court's decision"and to cause the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes long overdue to theGovernment "within three months from notice hereof." (See pp. 19-20, writer's separateopinion).

I take it that the resolution's directive to respondent court to expedite and terminate theprotracted proceedings within three months supersedes pro tanto the disposition in theoriginal decision of March 29, 1974 for the segregation of the minimum one-fourth of thecommunity properties adjudged to be the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for delivery to andexclusive administration by respondent as her estate's administrator, with the other one-fourth to remain under the joint administration of said respondent and petitioner and CharlesNewton Hodges' one-half share to be administered by petitioner exclusively as his estate's

administrator, since such physical segregation and separate administration could notpossibly be accomplished before the more pressing and indispensable matters of submittalof the two estates' inventories and determination by respondent court of the remaining issuesare attended to by respondent court within the limited three-month period given in the Court'sresolution. (See pages 7-8, writer's separate opinion).

The remaining issues to be resolved by respondent court revolve on the two questionsofrenvoiand renunciation. In his separate opinion (at page 7 et seq.), as concurred in by theChief Justice and Justice Makasiar and Antonio, the writer urged that these two questionsshould be resolved "preferentially and expeditiously" by respondent court, since aside fromthe time problem, these proceedings have "apparently degenerated into a running battlebetween the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice of all the heirs." (atpage 20).

Since respondent court is now again presided by still another judge in a long line of judgeswho have come and gone without even terminating the proceedings, and since as is clearfrom the decision itself, no consensus on the best means of expediting the closing of theestates was reached by a majority of the Court (see pages 8 and 10, separate opinion), Itrust that those who did not concur with the "suggested guidelines" in the writer's separateopinion (at pages 8-20) either because they were not ready to express their definite opinionthereon or because they felt that respondent court should be given a free hand, willunderstand that the writer now commends anew to the new judge presiding respondent courtthe careful reading of the said suggested guidelines in the hope that they may lighten hiswork and help find the appropriate measures and solutions to "expedite the closing of theprotracted estate proceedings below to the mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need

of a dissatisfied party elevating his resolution of this only remaining issue once more to thisCourt and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings." (page 10, separate opinion), and thusenable him to comply timely with the Court's directive to close out the estates within threemonths from notice.

Makasiar and Antonio, JJ, concur.