Running Head: REPUTATIONAL CONCERNS AND PREVENTION FOCUS

A regulatory focus perspective on reputational concerns:

The impact of prevention-focused self-regulation

Stefan Pfattheicher

Ulm University, Germany

Address correspondence to:

Stefan Pfattheicher

Universität Ulm

Abteilung Sozialpsychologie

89069 Ulm, Germany

stefan.pfattheicher@uni-ulm.de

+49-(0)731/50 31161

Pfattheicher, S. (in press). A regulatory focus perspective on reputational concerns: The impact of prevention-focused

self-regulation. Motivation and Emotion.

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Abstract

The hyper-sociality found in the human species is unequivocally manifested in their special

sensitivity about reputation. In the present contribution, individuals’ reputational concerns are

examined from the perspective of one prominent motivational approach: regulatory focus theory.

Specifically, individual differences in prevention and promotion focus are related to reputational

concerns. Building on the assumption that prevention-focused individuals are sensitive to and

concerned with oughts and social expectations, it is expected that prevention-focused individuals

are particularly concerned regarding their reputation. In line with this assumption, Study 1

documents a positive relation between individual differences in prevention focus and reputational

concerns (beyond the Big Five and perceived stress). In Study 2, individuals are exposed to a

subtle reputation cue (i.e., stylized watching eyes). It is documented that prevention-focused

individuals specifically react to this cue in that they donate more money when such a cue is

present. This finding is replicated in an additional sample and shown to be independent of the Big

Five. In sum, the present work contributes to a better understanding of basic motivational

orientations regarding reputational concerns.

Word count: 177

Keywords: prevention focus; regulatory focus; reputation; social presence; watching eyes

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Introduction

There is long-standing and striking evidence that humans modify their behavior in the

presence of others (Darley & Batson, 1973; Markus, 1978; Schnuerch, & Gibbons, in press;

Zajonc, 1965). For instance, individuals do better on simple tasks when others are present (i.e.,

social facilitation; Markus, 1978; Zajonc, 1965), they adjust their judgments depending on

judgments made by others (Sherif, 1936), even when these are obviously wrong (Asch, 1956), and

they behave more prosocially towards unknown others when their behavior is observed (Burnham

& Hare, 2007; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Rege & Telle, 2004). One explanation

why individuals modify their behavior in the presence of others is reputation (e.g., Feinberg,

Cheng, & Willer, 2012). Reputation refers to the judgments of relevant others about one’s

personal qualities and one’s behavior (Emler, 1990). The notion of reputation holds that

individuals are concerned about how they are perceived by others because a good reputation

serves them well in future interactions (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Roberts, 1998; van Vugt,

Roberts, & Hardy, 2007). In this sense, individuals with a reputation for prosocial behavior are

more likely to be selected as future interaction partners and also acquire higher benefits in these

new interactions (Milinski et al., 2002; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002). Accordingly, individuals

modify their behavior in a reputation-beneficial way when reputation is at stake (e.g., van

Bommel, van Prooijen, Elffers, & van Lange, 2012).

Indeed, individuals’ striving for a good reputation is considered to be an essential factor in

the evolution of lasting human relations and cooperation in social groups (Alexander, 1987;

Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Roberts, 1998; Van Vugt et al., 2007). Examining which individuals

are particularly concerned regarding their reputation seems to be of great relevance because it

provides a better understanding of a factor that plays a crucial role in the functioning of social

groups.

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In the present contribution, individuals’ reputational concerns are examined from the

perspective of one prominent motivational approach: regulatory focus theory (RFT; Higgins,

1997, 2012a). Specifically, the assumption is put to the test that prevention-focused individuals

report being concerned with their reputation and modify their behavior accordingly when their

reputation is at stake.

Overall, the present contribution has two central aims. First, it aims to contribute to a better

understanding of individuals’ striving for a good reputation in that individuals’ reputational

concerns are related to basic motivational orientations. As such, basic motivational orientations

are examined with regard to an important factor in the evolution of lasting human relations and

cooperation in social groups. Second, although a large amount of research documents that basic

self-regulatory orientations shape individuals’ cognitions, emotions, and behavioral tendencies

(for an overview of the field of self-regulation research, see Vohs & Baumeister, 2006), the impact

of basic self-regulatory orientations with regard to reputational concerns is almost completely

neglected. Thus, it is aimed to contribute to the literature on self-regulation by connecting basic

self-regulatory orientations (i.e., prevention and promotion focus) to reputational concerns. In

sum, important gaps in the research on reputation and self-regulation are addressed in that

individuals’ reputational concerns are examined from the perspective of RFT. It is important to

highlight that the present contribution is not about reputation in general, that is, striving for a

positive or negative reputation. Rather, the focus of the present contribution is reputational

concerns.

In the following, a brief discussion is given of the core assumptions proposed in regulatory

focus theory. Based on this, it is outlined why prevention-focused individuals are expected to be

particularly concerned regarding their reputation. Finally, two studies are reported testing this

main assumption.

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Regulatory Focus Theory

Humans (consciously and/or unconsciously) modify and adjust their own habits or actual

states to bring these into alignment with a positive standard (Vohs & Baumeister, 2004; Vohs &

Schmeichel, 2003). In this sense, self-regulation refers to the general hedonic principle that

individuals are motivated to approach pleasure and to avoid pain and that individuals regulate their

current state according to this principle. RFT (Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2012a; Scholer & Higgins,

2008, 2011) proposes that it is necessary to differentiate between specific standards (i.e., what is

perceived as pleasure or positive standard) as well as between specific preferred strategies in terms

of how positively evaluated standards are approached and how negatively evaluated standards are

avoided. Here, RFT proposes two distinct regulatory systems: a prevention-focused orientation

and a promotion-focused orientation (Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2012a; Scholer & Higgins, 2008,

2011).

The input factors (i.e., valued standards or reference points) of the prevention-focused

orientation are safety and security needs. Individuals possessing a prevention focus are oriented

toward significant others, that is, they are concerned with oughts, responsibilities, and social

expectations. Moreover, prevention-focused individuals are motivated to avoid losses and to

approach non-losses. In doing so, prevention-focused individuals typically prefer avoidance

strategies and are sensitive with the presence or absence of negative outcomes and information

(Higgins, 2012b; Scholer & Higgins, 2008, 2011; Pfattheicher & Sassenrath, 2014). Neural

correlates support this assumption indicating a greater activity in the amygdala, anterior cingulate,

and extrastriate cortex for prevention-focused individuals when negative (vs. positive) information

is presented (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2005). If a goal is reached, prevention-focused

individuals experience quiescence/calmness-related emotions whereas if a goal is missed

prevention-focused individuals experience agitation/anxiety-related emotions (Molden, Lee, &

Higgins, 2008; Higgins, 1997).

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The input factors of promotion-focused orientation are growth, advancement, and

accomplishment. Individuals possessing a promotion focus are oriented toward ideals, wishes, and

aspirations. Promotion-focused individuals are, moreover, motivated to avoid non-gains and to

approach gains. In doing so, promotion-focused individuals typically prefer approach strategies

and are sensitive with the presence or absence of positive outcomes and information (Higgins,

2012b; Keller & Pfattheicher, 2013; Scholer & Higgins, 2008, 2011). Neural correlates also

support this assumption indicating greater activity in the amygdala, anterior cingulate, and

extrastriate cortex for promotion-focused individuals when positive (vs. negative) information is

presented (Cunningham et al., 2005). If a goal is reached, promotion-focused individuals

experience cheerfulness/happiness-related emotions whereas if a goal is missed promotion-

focused individuals experience dejection/sadness-related emotions (Molden et al., 2008; Higgins,

1997).

On Regulatory Focus and Reputational Concerns

In situations where individuals’ personal qualities and behavior is judged by others,

reputation is at stake (Emler, 1990). In this sense, reputational concerns refer to concerns

regarding what others think about one’s personal qualities, that is, a state that reflects that one’s

attention is directed to how one appears in the eyes of others (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;

Mifune et al., 2010). It is assumed that prevention-focused individuals would be particularly

sensitive regarding their reputation. The following reasoning suggests this positive link.

Basically, the relevant standards of prevention-focused individuals represent oughts,

duties, and responsibilities that reflect the social expectations of others (Higgins, 1997, 2012a).

Moreover, prevention focus is linked to a special concern with interdependence and social

connectedness (Aaker & Lee, 2001; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Lockwood, Marshall, & Sadler,

2005), indicating a tendency to act in accordance with the subjectively imposed expectations of

significant others rather than in accordance with personal ideals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In

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this sense, Keller and Pfattheicher (2011) show that prevention-focused individuals contribute

more to a public good under conditions of social presence. Thus, prevention-focused individuals

seem particularly sensitive and concerned about how they appear in the eyes of others.

It is further reasonable to assume that the ought-guide implemented in prevention focus is

strongly socially referred. Oughts such as duties, obligations, and responsibilities often reflect

social norms which mirror expectations held by significant others (Higgins, 1997). This is also in

line with the approach of Markus and Kitayama (1991) which holds that those individuals

emphasizing the ought-guide (i.e., interdependent people) align their thoughts, feelings, and

behaviors with those of other individuals. In contrast, ideals such as hopes, wishes, or aspirations

(implemented in promotion focus) typically mirror the personal expectations held by the

individual him/herself. Markus and Kitayama (1991) argue that those individuals who emphasize

the ideal-guide (i.e., independent people) develop their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors

independently. That is to say, the self-guide of prevention-focused individuals is strongly socially

referred whereas the self-guide of promotion-focused individuals is less strongly socially referred.

Given the (socially referred) ought self of prevention-focused individuals, these individuals should

also be concerned about what other individuals think of and expect from them. Given the less

socially referred ideal self of promotion-focused individuals, these individuals should be less

concerned about what other individuals think of and expect from them. Accordingly, a positive

relation of prevention focus and reputational concerns should emerge while such a relation is

unlikely to emerge for promotion focus.

Taken together, there are good reasons to expect that prevention-focused individuals

possess strong reputational concerns. In contrast, the role of promotion focus is not evident. That

is, the majority of the factors that characterize promotion-focused self-regulation (eagerness, ideal-

self, need for personal development and growth) do not appear to be conceptually closely related

to reputational concerns. This argument does not preclude the notion that promotion-focused

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individuals strive for a good reputation; yet, promotion-focused individuals have a special concern

for independence (Aaker & Lee, 2001; Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 2012a; Lee et al., 2000; Lockwood

et al., 2005), which emphasizes the importance of the uniqueness of the self to these individuals

(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Additionally, as outlined above, the ideal-self of promotion-focused

individuals is unlikely to be strongly socially referred. Accordingly, one could expect that

promotion-focused individuals are not particularly concerned about their reputation (cf. General

Discussion).

In sum, the studies reported below test the following key assumptions: individuals are

more likely to be concerned about their reputation the more they are chronically prevention-

focused in their orientation (Study 1); and prevention-focused individuals modify their behavior in

a reputation-beneficial way when their reputation is at stake (Study 2). Several alternative

explanations are ruled out in the studies. One alternative explanation is that anxiety might be

related to prevention focus as well as to reputational concerns. That is, anxious individuals are

more likely to be prevention-focused and concerned about their reputation. So the possibility

exists that the relation between prevention focus and reputational concerns might be explained by

anxiety. In addition, it is possible that challenging, difficult and stressful life events might also

function as a third variable leading to a prevention focus and making individuals more concerned

and stressed about negative situations such as having a bad reputation. To test these alternative

explanations, subjective stress and anxiety (i.e., neuroticism) were also assessed in the reported

studies.

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Study 1

Method

Participants. Study 1 includes three Samples.1 All participants were recruited via Amazon

Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Sample 1 includes 300 participants

(Mage = 31.8; 45.7% women), Sample 2 includes 102 participants (Mage = 35.6; 39.2% women),

and Sample 3 includes 106 participants (Mage = 32.8; 42.0% women).2

Regulatory focus. Chronic self-regulatory orientations were assessed using the regulatory

focus scale (RFS) developed by Lockwood, Jordan, and Kunda (2002). A sample item of the

prevention focus subscale reads: “I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to become the

self I ought to be to fulfill my duties, responsibilities, and obligations.” A sample item of the

promotion focus subscale reads: “I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and

aspirations.” Unless indicated otherwise, the scale endpoints of the items in the present work are

labeled “1” (not at all true) and “7” (completely true). The alpha reliabilities, means, and standard

deviations of all scales are displayed in Table 1.

Reputational concerns. Individual differences in reputational concerns were assessed using

(a) the concern for reputation scale by de Cremer and Tyler (2005) and (b) the approval by others

scale by Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, and Bouvrette (2003). A sample item of the reputation scale

reads: “I am rarely concerned about my reputation” (reversed).3 A sample item of the approval by

others scale reads: “I don’t care what other people think of me” (reversed).

1 Sample sizes in the present contribution were determined to achieve at least 80% power to detect a medium effect at

an alpha-level of .05 (two-tailed) if an effect is present (cf. Cohen, 1988) and were also influenced by the research

project budget. Those participants who did not respond to every scale were excluded from reporting on sample sizes

and analyses. All scales applied in the studies are reported. 2 Sex did not significantly moderate the main results in the present contribution (all ps > .29).

3 The items “I wish to have a good reputation” and “I try to work hard on my reputation” were removed from the

reputational concerns index given that these items do not measure reputational concerns but general striving for a

good reputation. Removing the items did not affect the results in any way. Of note, both items were positively

correlated with prevention (rs > .17, ps < .01) and promotion focus (rs > .13, ps < .08) in all three samples, suggesting

that promotion-focused individuals are also motivated to approach a positive reputation. See General Discussion

regarding this point.

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Neuroticism. In Sample 2, neuroticism was assessed using the Big Five Inventory (John,

Donahue, Kentle, & 1991; John, Naumann, Soto, & 2006). A sample item of the neuroticism scale

reads: “I am someone who worries a lot”. The other Big Five dimensions were also assessed (see

Supplementary Materials for the results involving extraversion, openness, conscientiousness, and

agreeableness).

Stress. In Sample 3, the perceived stress scale (PSS) of Cohen and colleagues (1983) was

applied. A sample item reads “In the last month, how often have you felt that you were unable to

control the important things in your life?” The scale endpoints were labeled “0” (never) and “4”

(very often).

Results

Zero-order correlations among the applied scales are displayed in Table 1. As expected,

individual differences in prevention focus were significantly positively related to both reputational

concerns measures in all three samples. In contrast, individual differences in promotion focus were

not significantly related to the reputational concerns scale; a significant negative association was

found in relation to the approval by others scale in Sample 1 but not in Sample 2 and 3.

Addressing the alternative explanation that neuroticism might explain the relation between

reputational concerns and prevention focus, partial correlations revealed that the relation between

prevention focus and reputational concerns remained substantial and significant, even when

neuroticism was controlled for (see Table 2).

Addressing the second alternative explanation that stress might function as a third variable,

partial correlations revealed that the relation between prevention focus and reputational concerns

remained substantial and significant, even when perceived stress was controlled for (see Table 2).

The first study provides evidence for the main assumption that individuals are more likely

to be concerned about their reputation the more they are chronically prevention-focused in their

orientation. This finding was independent of neuroticism and perceived stress. In contrast,

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promotion focus was not significantly related to the reputational concerns scale whereas an

inconsistent picture was presented in relation to the approval by others scale.

Study 2

In Study 2, the findings of the first study are extended and a behavioral measure is used to

test the relation of reputational concerns and prevention focus. It is assumed that if prevention-

focused individuals are particularly concerned about their reputation they should modify their

behavior in a reputation-beneficial way when their reputation is at stake. It is well-documented

that prosocial behavior (e.g., donations to charity organizations or altruistic giving) enhances

individuals’ reputations (Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009; Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2010;

Mifune, Hashimoto, & Yamagishi, 2010; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002 2002a;

Milinski, Semmann, Krambeck, & Marotzke, 2006; Oda et al., 2011). Therefore, in Sample 1,

participants could donate to an organization providing support for HIV-positive individuals. In

Sample 2, participants could transfer money in an economic game (the dictator game) to an

anonymous interaction partner. It should be observed that prevention-focused individuals increase

their prosocial behavior when reputational concerns are activated. To manipulate reputational

concerns a standard reputation cue is used, that is, a pair of stylized watching eyes (Haley &

Fessler, 2005; Nettle, Harper, Kidson, Stone, Penton-Voak, & Bateson, 2013; Pfattheicher &

Keller, in press; Sparks & Barclay, 2013). In Sample 2, neuroticism was also measured to address

the alternative explanation that anxiety might explain the relation between prevention focus and

reputational concerns.

Method

Participants. In Sample 1, 100 students of the University of Ulm (Mage = 23.7; 43.0%

women) completed measures assessing chronic levels of regulatory focus. Upon arrival in the lab,

participants received a payment of €3 (six 50 cent coins) as compensation for participation in the

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study. In Sample 2, 123 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. This study was

conducted online.

Regulatory focus. In both samples, chronic self-regulatory orientations were, as in Study 1,

assessed by the RFS developed by Lockwood et al. (2002). ). The promotion (αs >.83) and

prevention focus (αs > .81) subscales of this instrument were positively correlated in Sample 1 (r = .32,

p < .01) and not significantly correlated in Sample 2 (r = -.05, p = .60).

Neuroticism. In Sample 2, neuroticism (α = .90) was assessed as in Study 1, using the Big

Five Inventory (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2006). The other Big

Five dimensions were also assessed. Neuroticism was significantly positively correlated with

prevention focus (r = .52, p < .001) and negatively with promotion focus (r = -.26, p < .01).

Prosocial donations. In Sample 1, participants learned that they had the opportunity to

donate some of the money they received as compensation for their participation (six 50 cent coins)

by way of putting coins in an envelope that was to be placed in a “mailbox” that was positioned in

the room at the conclusion of the study. It was emphasized that donations were made

anonymously and participants were instructed to put whatever amount they wished inside the

envelope (and to keep the remaining coins for themselves).

In Sample 2, participants played an economic game (the dictator game; Bolton, Katok, &

Zwick, 1998) which enables a behavioral assessment of prosocial behavior. Participants learned

that they had been randomly paired with another participant and that they could transfer any of

the 100 US cents they were given to the other participant who had received no financial

endowment. Participants were paid depending on their transfer decision in the dictator game (i.e.,

they earned what they did not give away).

Reputation cue. In Sample 1, for half of the participants the text where participants learned

that they had the opportunity to donate some of the money was headed by a pair of stylized eyes

(see Keller & Pfattheicher, 2011; validated in Pfattheicher & Keller, in press; for meta-analyses on

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subtle reputations cues see Nettle et al., 2013; Sparks & Barclay, 2013). The size of the eyes was

3.8 x 0.9 cm. The eyes were printed on the top of the sheet of paper.

In Sample 2 (the online study), the page were participants made their decision how much

to transfer to the other participant was headed by the same watching eyes and same size as those

used in Sample 1. This size was ensured if internet users were using standard browser settings. No

eyes were presented to the control group (in both samples).4

Results

Prosocial behavior was regressed on prevention focus, the experimental condition (i.e.,

reputation cue present vs. not present), and the interaction between prevention focus and the

experimental condition (see Table 3, Model 1). While no significant main effects emerged, a

significant interaction was found in both samples. Decomposing the interactions (Aiken & West,

1991; Hayes, 2013) revealed that the reputation cue significantly increased donations for those

with a relatively strong chronic prevention focus (1 SD above the mean) in both samples (see

Figure 1 and 2). The pattern is reversed for those with a relatively weak chronic prevention focus

(1 SD below the mean) in Sample 1. Specifically, for these individuals the reputation cue

significantly decreased donations. However, this finding was not replicated in Sample 2 where no

significant effect emerged for those with a relatively weak chronic prevention focus.

These findings remained robust (significance levels and directions) when promotion focus

was controlled for. Promotion focus scores (and the interaction term involving promotion focus

scores) did not play a meaningful role in Study 2 (all ps > .77).

Controlling for neuroticism in Sample 2, the reputation cue still significantly increased

donations for those with a relatively strong chronic prevention focus (see Table 3, Model 2). This

significant effect also holds when the other Big Five dimensions were controlled for. The

4 In Study 2, Sample 1, social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was also assessed. Social desirability did not

significantly influence the results (neither as a control variable nor as a moderator in two- or three-way interactions; ps

> .24).

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interaction including neuroticism and the reputation cue was not significant (p = .25; see Table 3,

Model 3). The interactions including the other Big Five dimensions were also not significant (all

ps > .62).

General Discussion

Humans are social animals – they rely heavily on the judgments made by other individuals

(Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1936) and are particularly sensitive to the presence of others (e.g., Gilovich,

Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000). It is important for humans to be concerned about how they appear in

the eyes of others because a good reputation will serve them well in their interpersonal relations

(Milinski et al., 2002; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002). Individuals with a good reputation are

more likely to be trusted and they are more likely to be the target of prosocial behavior (King-

Casas et al., 2004; Van Vugt et al., 2007). In the present work, the relations of basic motivational

orientations with regard to reputational concerns were examined. Specifically, it is documented

that individuals are more likely to be concerned about their reputation the more they are

chronically prevention-focused in their orientation. Congruently, prevention-focused individuals

modify their behavior in a reputation-beneficial way when their reputation is at stake. Promotion

focus was not significantly related to the reputational concerns measures (excluding Study 1,

Sample 1). Accordingly, in Study 2, no modification of behavior as a function of promotion focus

was observed when reputation was at stake.

At this point, the methodological strengths and shortcomings of the present contribution

are acknowledged. First, in Study 1 positive associations between individual differences in

prevention focus and reputational concerns are shown. One could argue that these findings simply

reflect biased responding on self-report scales. One strength of the present work is that this

possibility was reduced in the second study in that it is shown that prevention-focused individuals

also react, and not only self-indicate, in line with the assumption that they are particularly

concerned with their reputation. Second, although neuroticism and perceived stress were both

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correlated with prevention focus and reputational concerns, the relation of reputational concerns

and prevention focus also emerged when neuroticism and perceived stress were controlled for.

Thus, the present work also addresses two meaningful alternative explanations. Third, it is

documented that prevention-focused individuals increased real donations (rather than in a

hypothetical scenario) when a reputation cue was given. As such, the claim that research in

psychology should include real behavior in its analyses is addressed (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder,

2007). Fourth, one can highlight the fact that statistical power detecting the effects of the present

studies was sufficiently high (above 90% in both studies which exceeds the requested 80%,

Cohen, 1988) thus fulfilling recent claims about appropriately powered studies (e.g., Simonsohn,

2013).

Beyond the documentation of the central findings, the present work is remarkable in

several respects. First, documenting a positive relation between prevention focus and reputational

concerns suggests that individual differences in prevention focus play a significant role in regards

to the factors that are important for the evolution of cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2002;

Pfattheicher & Schindler, in press; Pfattheicher, & Keller, 2014). This complements the picture

drawn by previous research showing that individual differences in prevention focus predict

another important factor in the evolution of cooperation, that is, costly punishment of

uncooperative interaction partners (Pfattheicher & Keller, 2013).

Second, the present research contributes to the literature on self-regulation documenting

that prevention-focused individuals are particularly concerned about their reputation. Indeed,

empirical evidence is provided that prevention-focused individuals are sensitive to oughts and

social expectations – an assumption that is implemented in regulatory focus theory but that is

rarely empirically tested. As such, the present research also contributes to the literature on

regulatory focus.

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Third, the findings suggest that prevention-focused individuals show an adaptive strategic

shift. Specifically, when how they are perceived by others is relevant prevention-focused

individuals modify their behavior in a reputation-beneficial way and increase their donations.

Reviewing the literature on regulatory focus theory (e.g., Molden et al., 2008) one can easily get

the impression that promotion focus is functionally superior to prevention focus. Therefore, by

highlighting the adaptive aspects of prevention-focused self-regulation, the present work

contributes to the understanding that there are obvious positive aspects of prevention focus

(further positive aspects are mentioned in Scholer and Higgins, 2011).

Fourth, although prevention focus and neuroticism share various features (i.e., both reflect

a vigilant avoidant self-regulatory orientation), the findings suggest that prevention focus and

neuroticism are distinct orientations. From a theoretical perspective, the present findings suggest

that the ought self, which is explicitly conceptualized in prevention focus but not in other

avoidance orientations such as neuroticism, is relevant to the specific relation of prevention focus

and reputational concerns. Thus, the present work adds to the literature by conceptually and

empirically distinguishing two vigilant avoidant self-regulatory orientations.

One can also discuss the role of promotion focus in the context of reputation. Basically,

reputations can be positive or negative. On this basis it is likely that prevention-focused

individuals strive to avoid a negative reputation while promotion-focused individuals strive to

approach a positive reputation. From this perspective it is reasonable that the general item “I wish

to have a good reputation” is positively correlated with both prevention and promotion focus in all

three samples of Study 1 (see footnote 3). Yet building on the considerations that the ought-guide

implemented in prevention focus is more socially referred than the ideal-guide in promotion focus,

prevention-focused individuals should be more concerned about their reputation, as shown in the

present studies.

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One can also relate the concepts of the present contribution to similar concepts and

research. For instance, self-awareness might play a role when a subtle reputation cue is presented.

In this regard, public self-awareness, which reflects the state that individuals direct their attention

to how they appear in the eyes of others (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012),

might be at work. In fact, a recent study (Pfattheicher & Keller, in press) shows that public self-

awareness provides an exploratory account of the watching eyes phenomenon (i.e., increased

prosocial behavior and decreased antisocial behavior when a subtle reputation cue is present in the

environment). The essence of public self-awareness is that individuals direct their attention to how

they appear in the eyes of others which is also the case when individuals are concerned about their

reputation. Indeed, the term reputational concern is used interchangeably with public self-

awareness (Mifune et al., 2010; van Bommel et al., 2012, 2014). Thus, the finding that public self-

awareness provides an exploratory account of the watching eyes phenomenon suggests that subtle

watching eyes can be used as a cue to render reputational concerns salient.

It is further relevant to consider whether the prosocial behavior of individuals when being

watched reflects a tendency to seek (social) rewards (which fits a promotion focus) or avoid

(social) punishment (which fits a prevention focus). There is evidence that public self-awareness

plays a crucial role in behavior when individuals are watched (Pfattheicher & Keller, in press).

Importantly, the avoidance system is predominant regarding public self-awareness (Carver &

Blaney, 1977; George & Stopa, 2008). These findings suggest that when being watched,

individuals are motivated to avoid (social) punishment. This notion is in line with the present

research’s findings given that it is particularly those individuals using vigilant avoidance strategies

in goal striving (i.e., prevention-focused individuals) who increased their prosocial behavior.

The present research has also implications for the field of subtle cues of being watched.

Whereas several studies document significant main effects of cues of being watched on prosocial

or antisocial behavior (see the meta-analyses of Nettle et al., 2013; Sparks & Barclay, 2013), some

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studies have failed to find main effects of eye cue manipulations (cf. Brudermann, Bartel, Fenzl, &

Seebauer, in press; Cai, Huang, Wu, & Kou, in press; Carbon & Hesslinger, 2011; Fehr &

Schneider, 2009; Jolij & de Haan, 2014; Lamba & Mace, 2010; Raihani & Bshary, 2012; Tane &

Takezawa, 2011). In view of this inconsistency, it is proposed to include theoretically relevant

constructs that might moderate the influence of being watched on social behavior (e.g., van

Rompay, Vonk, & Fransen, 2009). The present work suggests that – due to a special concern

about reputation – prevention-focused individuals are most sensitive with regard to subtle cues of

being watched.

To conclude, the present work suggests that social behavior based on reputational concerns

is heavily dependent on basic motivational orientations. As such, the present work contributes to a

better understanding of a critical factor that plays an important role for lasting interpersonal

relations and the evolution of cooperation.

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Table 1. Zero-order correlations, means, standard deviations, and alpha reliabilities (Study 1)

Prevention Promotion Reputation

scale

Approval by

others scale Neuroticism Stress

Prevention

Sample 1

1

-.11 .33*** .37***

Sample 2 -.03 .44*** .49*** .61***

Sample 3 -.14 .43*** .39***

.60***

Promotion

Sample 1

1

-.07 -.29***

Sample 2

.09 -.05 -.33**

Sample 3

.08 -.14

-.28**

Reputation scale

Sample 1

1

.71***

Sample 2

.81*** .34**

Sample 3

.73***

.29**

Approval by

others scale

Sample 1

1

Sample 2

.45***

Sample 3

.44***

Mean

Sample 1 4.27 5.43 4.51 3.58

Sample 2 4.07 5.20 4.36 3.54 3.57

Sample 3 4.20 5.37 4.25 3.47 2.68

SD

Sample 1 1.24 1.02 1.33 1.46

Sample 2 1.30 1.13 1.26 1.45 1.40

Sample 3 1.36 1.20 1.30 1.37 0.91

α

Sample 1 0.87 0.91 0.81 0.85

Sample 2 0.89 0.92 0.83 0.88 0.92

Sample 3 0.90 0.95 0.84 0.83

0.79

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

29

Table 2. Zero-order and partial correlations including reputational concerns, prevention

focus, neuroticism, and perceived stress (Study 1, Sample 2 and 3)

Sample 2

Reputation scale Approval by others scale

Prevention .44*** .49***

Prevention (controlling for Neuroticism) .32** .30**

Sample 3

Reputation scale Approval by others scale

Prevention .43*** .39***

Prevention (controlling for Stress) .34*** .18*

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

30

Table 3. Regression coefficients of the main analyses (Study 2)

Sample 1 Sample 2

Criterion: Model 1

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Prosocial Behavior B SE B

B SE B

B SE B

B SE B

Constant 1.42*** 0.11

23.19*** 2.10

23.19*** 2.11

23.40*** 2.13

Prevention 0.11 0.11

-1.22 1.76

-2.44 2.04

Condition -0.07 0.11

2.73 2.12

2.95 2.11

2.91 2.13

Prevention × Condition 0.41*** 0.11

3.55* 1.76

3.66* 1.76

Neuroticism

2.37 2.00

-1.53 1.76

Neuroticism × Condition

2.04 1.76

- 1SD Prevention -0.95** 0.31

-1.41 2.99

-1.33 2.99

+ 1SD Prevention 0.67* 0.31

7.21* 3.01

7.56* 3.03

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; - 1SD Prevention refers to 1 standard deviation below mean;

+ 1SD Prevention refers to 1 standard deviation above mean; Control condition = -1,

reputation condition = 1; Prevention and Neuroticism are mean centered

31

Figure captions

Figure 1. Prosocial donations (predicted values) as a function of prevention focus and the

reputation cue (Study 2, Sample 1).

32

Figure 2. Money transfer dictator game (predicted values) as a function of prevention focus and

the reputation cue (Study 2, Sample 2).

33

Table - Supplementary Material - Zero-order correlations, means, standard deviations, and alpha reliabilities including the Big Five (Study 1)

Prevention

Prevention

(controlled for

Promotion)

Promotion

Promotion

(controlled for

Prevention)

Reputation

scale

Approval by

others scale N E O A C Stress

Prevention

Sample 1

1

-.11

.33*** .37***

Sample 2

-.03

.44*** .49*** .61*** -.35*** -.01 -.15 -.37***

Sample 3

-.14

.43*** .39***

.60***

Prevention

(controlled for

Pormotion)

Sample 1

1

.33*** .35***

Sample 2

.45*** .49*** .63*** -.36*** .01 -.15 -.38***

Sample 3

.45*** .38***

.59***

Promotion

Sample 1

1

-.07 -.29***

Sample 2

.09 -.05 -.33** .29** .34*** .18 .35***

Sample 3

.08 -.14

-.28**

Promotion

(controlled for

Prevention)

Sample 1

1

-.03 -.27***

Sample 2

.12 -.03 -.38*** .30** .34*** .18 .36***

Sample 3

.16 -.10

-.25**

Reputation scale

Sample 1

1

.71***

Sample 2

.81*** .34** -.27** .10 -.01 -.22*

Sample 3

.73***

.29**

Approval by others

scale

Sample 1

1

Sample 2

.45*** -.42*** -.01 -.09 -.32**

Sample 3

.44***

Mean

Sample 1 4.27 5.43 4.51 3.58

Sample 2 4.07

5.20

4.36 3.54 3.57 3.71 4.79 5.04 4.98

Sample 3 4.20 5.37 4.25 3.47 2.68

SD

Sample 1 1.24

1.02

1.33 1.46

Sample 2 1.30

1.13

1.26 1.45 1.40 1.40 1.09 0.92 1.18

Sample 3 1.36

1.20

1.30 1.37

0.91

α

Sample 1 0.87 0.91 0.81 0.85

Sample 2 0.89

0.92

0.83 0.88 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.80 0.90

Sample 3 0.90 0.95 0.84 0.83 0.79

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001