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Matthew Singer PS 0600 Political Theory, Friday 11 a.m. Recitation

Mill Paper 

In John Stuart Mill’s work in On Liberty, as well as in other writings, it becomes readily apparent

that his support for actions are rooted in the concepts of utilitarianism, which can be, for the sake of the

following arguments, loosely defined as the endorsement of choices and actions that maximize happiness

while reducing suffering for the greatest number of parties involved. In that sense, it would stand to reason

that if an individual or institution went about a certain course of action, it would be permissible if that course

of action resulted in widespread benefit and minimal dissatisfaction or harm, which is also the justification

often used with the government’s use of eminent domain. Eminent domain is the government’s ability to take

 possession of private property for the sake of the public good, provided that just compensation is provided to

the private owner.

While this logic would seem to be congruent with Mill’s utilitarian model of spreading out benefits

to the many — in this instance, the general public rather than just the private property owner  — and reducing

suffering — as must be justified for the government to take possession of the property, which means that it

must be helpful to the public, therefore solving a problem — it actually runs in a contradictory grey area, due

to Mill’s support for a government that stays out of the private economic market. So, though eminent domain

seems to play to the heart of utilitarian concepts, it actually goes against Mill’s beliefs that the government

should not be involved in private, property-related or economic matters.

Therefore, it is hard to define eminent domain as a principle that is in line with Mill’s writings in On

 Liberty, because, as will be discussed, eminent domain both serves many people while only proving

 problematic for a few, and involves the government overstepping what Mill saw as its appropriate

 boundaries. This characteristic duality sees competing aspects that would both seem to win his writing’s

favor and disapproval.

By definition, the government’s use of public domain can only be warranted if they provide

 justification that amounts to some form of service to the public good.1 Historically and by reference of 

 precedent, this typically has been done so in terms of public works projects, such as railroads, bridges or 

1 http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cssn/expansion/infosheets/eminentdomain.pdf 

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other such forms of mass utilized, publically funded projects. In the instance of a railroad, the government

reserves the right to take possession of private property, though while compensating the original owner, if it

means completing a railroad that could, for example, ship valuable supplies cross-country, or help people

commute to work on a smaller scale.

The state is only permitted to take the private property in order to complete some sort of public

 project, which by definition is for the good of the public, or the population as a whole. Otherwise, the private

 property cannot be seized.2

So, the government could not seize the private property to build a house for one

other person, because that does not benefit the public. In this sense, through eminent domain’s requisite

recipient base being that of a high number of people, every instance of eminent domain is therefore an act

that serves many, many people while only becoming an inconvenience or harm for one, while also trying to

mitigate that inconvenience or harm through just compensation.

Yet, despite being mandated that the use of eminent domain be used for the benefit of large scale

recipients, it must be divorced from Mill’s concepts of utilitarianism as outlined in On Liberty, as he very

strictly advocates for government non-intervention in the private economy. However, by reserving the right

to rescind private property rights and take control of private property, eminent domain simultaneously seems

utilitarian because of its intent while being un-utilitarian through application.

Mill warms that the government’s role in the economy can’t reach proportions that become

“despotic” and writes that its role in free enterprise should be limited. It is hard to classify his exact opinions

on eminent domain, as only common law based on now outdated property laws were present and utilized in

his time. Eminent domain, when examined and contextualized by Mill’s writing in On Liberty, therefore,

can’t be speculated to be either “good” or “bad” in a relative sense. 

Furthermore, when viewed through a modern lens with direct application to what he seems to

 purport as utilitarian, while also measuring it against his opinions of government involvement in economic

matters — even on a microeconomic scale so small as a case-by-case, private citizen-by-private citizen basis

 — eminent domain seems to both fulfill his requirements for the justification of actions and be guilty of the

criteria that he uses to deem government action impermissible.

2 http://constitution.findlaw.com/amendment5/annotation14.html#t182