Petras - Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Transition

Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Transition to SocialismAuthor(s): James F. Petras and Frank T. FitzgeraldSource: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 1, Transition to Socialism (Winter, 1988), pp.93-111Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633619 .

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Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Transition to Socialism

by James F. Petras and Frank T. Fitzgerald*

Every regime intent on effecting a transition to socialism inevitably confronts the necessity to utilize both authoritarian and democratic measures. On the one hand, recent historical experiences provide ample evidence that neither local bourgeois and imperial interests nor their military and police protectors can be expected to peacefully allow themselves to be divested of privileges. Regimes that shy from utilizing authoritarian measures against such opponents can expect to find their transitions aborted, often in the most bloody fashion. On the other hand, any transition to socialism worthy of the name must entail an extension of popular democratic control over state and society and of the democratic freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition. A regime that fails to extend democracy may enhance its chances for survival, but does so, typically, at the cost of compromising the democratic essence of its socialist project.

These issues of authoritarianism and democracy in the transition to socialism are mystified by two opposing, yet equally demagogic, perspectives. One sacrifices the need for democratic practice in the name of security. Typically, the regime unduly expands its definition of political enemies, and unduly extends the measures designed to deal with the exceptional circumstances of direct and serious threat to its survival. In short, the emergency and the measures put in place to deal with it become the norm. Democracy is judged an expendable luxury, impugned as a lower form of political practice, or redefined to include authoritarian centralized rule. The other perspective rejects the use of

*James F. Petras teaches at the State University of New York at Binghamton and has authored many articles and books, including the recent Latin America: Bankers, Generals, and the Struggle for Social Justice. Frank T. Fitzgerald teaches at the College of Saint Rose and has authored several articles and the forthcoming book, Politics and Social Structure in Revolutionary China.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 56, Vol. 15 Na. 1, Winter 1988 93-111 ? 1988 Latin American Perspectives

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94 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

necessary authoritarian measures in the name of democracy. Typically, the regime unduly narrows the way in which it defines its enemies, and fails to deal decisively with the very real threats to its survival. Failing to specify appropriate political, military, and social policies for sustaining itself in the face of opposition, the regime often naively expects its enemies to abide by the democratic rules of the game. As necessary authoritarian measures are shunned, democracy is often ahistorically judged appropriate for all times and places.

Clearly, these issues of authoritarianism and democracy cannot be- and in the past, largely have not been-discussed independently of political and social context. Eighteenth century revolutionary democrats, as well as nineteenth and twentieth century anticolonialists, liberal democrats, and socialists, have at one time or another supported varying degrees of democracy and authoritarianism according to the context. It is sheer demagoguery devoid of historical substance, then, to wave the flag of democracy, as some writers do, in every place and point in history, particularly in periods of large-scale, long-term change from one social system to another, when invasion by an imperial military power is imminent. On the other hand, it is a perversion of democracy to extend and institutionalize authoritarian practices beyond the context that evoked them, and to claim that the new autocratic polity constitutes a higher form of governance.

In discussing these issues of authoritarianism and democracy, it is necessary to distinguish two distinct but interrelated phases in the transition to socialism: (1) establishing thefoundation of the new social system, and (2) building the participatory institutions for the normal, long-term operation of the system. Each of these phases defines the extent to which authoritarian or democratic practices are necessary or inappropriate. In moving from one phase to the other, a process of conversion must take place. If the tasks of each phase are accomplished and the process of conversion is successful, a securely founded, democratic socialist society can be created. But, as everyone knows, the success of the process is not guaranteed. The transition to socialism can go awry in many ways and at many points.

In this essay, we will analyze both of these phases of the transition to socialism and their interconnections. Our analysis will be based on, but by no means limited in relevance to, key recent Latin American experiences in Chile, Jamaica, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The first section will focus on the need for authoritarian practices in establishing the foundation of the new society. The second section will focus on the need



Petras, Fitzgerald / AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY 95

for democratic practices in building participatory institutions. The third section will attempt to draw out the implications of our argument for recent debates on authoritarianism and democracy.

ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATION FOR SOCIALISM: THE

AUTHORITARIAN IMPERATIVE

Establishing the foundation for socialism requires organizing and mobilizing the beneficiaries of the new society and displacing its adversaries. The latter, made up most immediately by local bourgeois and imperial interests and their military and police protectors, have never given up their privileges without resistance. Building the foundation of the new society, then, necessarily entails profound social and political polarization, intense conflict, and frequent resort to force. Neither the forces threatened with large-scale, long-term displacement nor the regime and its supporters share a common set of values or interests that allows their differences to be resolved in an electoral, parliamentary framework.

Concretely, the necessity for authoritarian practices in the foundation-establishing phase can perhaps best be observed in their absence. In Chile between 1970 and 1973, Salvador Allende and his Unidad Popular (UP) government pursued a policy of realizing socialist reforms through the electoral, parliamentary system; and, in Jamaica between 1972 and 1980, Michael Manley and his People's National Party (PNP) attempted to construct "democratic socialism" through existing state institutions.1 Both governments made consequential efforts to redis- tribute wealth, income, and political power. Both nationalized or placed significant limits on the perogatives of domestic and international capital. Both extended new benefits and legal protections to workers and peasants, while creating or emboldening popular mass organizations, which began to play an active role in workplace and community decision making. Internationally, both turned to the nonaligned movement and took leadership in the struggle for a new international economic order. Both, unfortunately, failed to take authoritarian measures sufficient to defend themselves, and both failed to establish the foundation of a new socialist society.

In the absence of decisive authoritarian measures, opposition forces violated the norms and procedures of the legal system, engaging in




extralegal violence and illegal economic transactions (Smirnow, 1979: 100-156; Manley, 1982: 169-174; Kaufman, 1985: 187-191). Capitalists, bankers, and merchants held back on investments, illegally sent money abroad, hoarded goods, and speculated on the black market to undermine the economy. This was followed by propaganda directed at the populace blaming the economic problems on the regime's incom- petence. Worse still, with their imperial backers, they funded, organized, and encouraged a host of antiregime activities, including violent paramilitary attacks on loyal civilians. The terrorists were aided and abetted by opposition politicians, who not only opposed the regime in parliament but who openly encouraged antiregime activity in the streets, in the military, and among civil servants. In addition, in both countries military and police remained subject to imperial influence and funding, and most senior civil servants retained ties with their patrons among the foreign and domestic rich and were well-placed and ideologically oriented to block effective implementation of many of the regime's programs. In the end, with political violence beyond control and the economies of both countries in shambles, their transitions were blocked. In Chile, Allende and tens of thousands of his supporters were subjected to a bloodbath at the hands of the military, a coup initially supported by the Christian Democrats and other supposedly democratic parties (Sobel, 1974: 145). In Jamaica, Manley and his associates were overwhelmed by the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) in the 1980 election.

But were there alternatives? Did either regime have the political wherewithal to take the authoritarian measures necessary to block the opposition? The answer is yes.

In Chile, Allende was elected in September 1970 with a plurality of 36.3 percent. In the April 1971 municipal elections, which were conducted as a plebiscite on the new government, the UP received 50.9 percent, an effective majority of the vote. With the golpista sector of the military still weakened and smarting from the aborted coup of October 1970, and with substantial support among large numbers of enlisted men and even senior officers, the time was ripe for major initiatives. The Socialist Party within the UP saw this, and, in keeping with the UP program and the provisions of the law, called for a plebiscite to disband the bicameral Congress and replace it with a unicameral Popular Assembly. If successful, this would have ended blockage of the new government in the old Congress and would have enabled the new government to restaff the judiciary. Allende pushed this notion in the opposition-dominated Congress, where it predictably lost, but he did




not initiate a plebiscite. Forces within the UP, most particularly the Communist Party, which was committed to an alliance with the "middle class" as represented by the opposition Christian Democrats, opposed a plebiscite and Allende conformed. A critical opportunity was lost.

After this, the initiative steadily shifted into the hands of the opposition, which coalesced (the Christian Democrats and the National Party) and increasingly engaged in a campaign of political and economic sabotage that reached its peak in the "employers' strike" of October 1972. The wide participation of industrialists, shopkeepers, truck operators, and professionals in this debilitating strike, which went on for 20 days and cost U.S. $300 million in lost production, clearly signalled the fallacy of an alliance with the "middle class." On the other hand, the response to the strike of workers and peasants, who galvanized their workplace and community organizations to keep the economy producing, showed the depth of their commitment to the government, their class consciousness, and their capacity for struggle (Henfrey and Sorj, 1977; Winn, 1986). Instead of building support on the basis of the newly formed worker and municipal councils, however, Allende granted the opposition concessions and quieted its nerves by inviting the military into his cabinet. A similar scenario was played out the next summer, and none other than Augusto Pinochet was appointed commander of the army.

Allende's belief that the military would respect democracy was perhaps his greatest weakness (Debray, 1971). From the beginning, the new government tread softly with the military, and even hoped to coopt it with expanded political and economic responsibilities. Moreover, the government failed to cleanse the officer corps of antidemocratic elements and failed to allow supporters to organize politically among the ranks. When leftists outside the UP coalition attempted to organize among the majority of democratically inclined enlisted men, they were summarily ousted. Nor did the government respond to the mass demands of July 1973 to organize a popular militia. Instead, in the fateful year of the coup, the government allowed the right wing- controlled military to search for and confiscate arms from those workplace and community organizations that had proven to be the government's only reliable base. The erroneous notion that the military shared a common belief in the supremacy of civilian control and that it respected the conception of democracy as a good in itself proved fatal.

In Jamaica in 1972, Michael Manley and the PNP won 56 percent of the vote on a platform that promised honest government, improved




economic management, and moderate social reforms. In this election, the PNP found its strongest base of support among a broad array of social classes ranging from the working class to the middle class, to the wealthy. Yet the popular hopes generated by the electoral success and the early institution of quite moderate reforms set off a process of social polarization. In these years, the Jamaican economy was wracked by the international economic crisis and the machinations of the transnational aluminum companies, but the new government's reforms cushioned the living standards of workers, peasants, and the poor. In the 1976 election, the PNP won with a similar majority, but with a very different following. Middle- and upper-class support had eroded, while support from workers, peasants, and the urban poor had surged to make the PNP victorious in an election that clearly posed the alternatives of capitalism or socialism.

As in Chile in 1971, with this electoral victory, a critical juncture had been reached. Perhaps the most salient issue in Jamaica at the time was whether to seek economic help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or whether to break with the IMF and follow the Emergency Production Plan (EPP), which was drawn up right after the election (Kaufman, 1985: 130-139). Seeking IMF funding, of course, involved accepting a severe austerity program leading to severe cuts in the standard of living of the PNP's strongest supporters, and the inevitable erosion of political support. Although the EPP posed problems of its own, it would have radically shifted the balance of forces by mobilizing and devolving much more power to the PNP's mass base and by deeply cutting into the remaining perogatives of capital and the middle class. The PNP leadership went back and forth on this issue, first rejecting IMF austerity and then accepting it. The result was not an improved but a worsened economy, in addition to austerity (Kaufman, 1985: 191-192). Furthermore, choosing the IMF path failed to mollify capital and the middle class, while austerity and the PNP's zig-zagging disillusioned the masses. By the time the PNP attempted to correct its course in 1980 by breaking with the IMF, it was too late. Not only had many former supporters lost confidence in the PNP, but the opposition had been emboldened by the PNP's indecision and the consequences of its choice.

In 1980, the opposition JLP demagogically exploited the PNP's submission to the international bankers with slogans like "IMF = It's Manley's Fault," and was swept to victory with nearly 59 percent of the vote (Kaufman, 1985: 192). The JLP and other opposition elements, including perhaps the CIA,2 prepared the way for victory with




destabilizing street violence, incendiary rhetoric, false news reports, and a coup attempt. The security forces, which the PNP had failed to transform, openly allied with the JLP and harassed the PNP campaign effort. Rather than calming the opposition, the PNP's failure to clamp down only emboldened it to heighten the conflict.

In both Jamaica and Chile, socialists failed to recognize the gravity of the challenge to their democratic mandate. They failed to assert their authority by strengthening democrats and purging rightists in the military and civil service to ensure order, by assuming executive power and temporarily recessing or reforming parliament in order to pass essential legislation, and by institutionalizing and providing resources to workplace and community organizations to implement programs. Both regimes banked on an alliance with the "middle class," and restrained themselves in the hope of cementing such an alliance. They continued the politics of democratic pluralism, even after the bourgeoisie and its allies had declared violent class war. By not restricting the political participation of those who would, and eventually did, destroy it, and by not expanding the participation of those who were its primary defenders, the Chilean and Jamaican socialists undermined the transition to socialism.

It is ironic that some left-liberal commentators argue that Allende and Manley went too far and too fast, and that they should have sacrificed major sectors of their programs in order to continue in office. This ignores the fact that the compromises they did make only emboldened the opposition, and the fact that the initial reforms engendered tremendous energy and support from increasingly class- conscious and organized workers, peasants, and poor.3 The opposition could not be stopped with compromises, and supporters could not be denied basic changes necessary to improve their everyday life. Once the popular social movements experienced their newly won political power, they had to be either institutionalized or repressed by force.

The real problem was that changes in civil society were not accompanied by structural changes in the state. The question of the rate or scope of socioeconomic change was less important than the need for a coordinated shift in the organization of state power. In fact, greater changes in state power would have allowed for a more measured tempo in social transformation.

This proposition can best be illustrated .by examining the contemporary Nicaraguan experience.4 There, after eight years of revolutionary power, a mixed economy5 and a plural democracy still operate.




Nicaragua differs from Chile and Jamaica in that the Sandinistas have transformed the state and empowered mass organizations. As a result, they have effectively limited economic sabotage by private capitalists and destabilizing efforts by opposition forces. As in Chile and Jamaica, the Nicaraguan socialists have attempted to maintain an alliance with the "middle class," but only on terms consistent with the new social foundation, only so long as middle-class behavior conforms to what the Sandinistas call "the logic of the majority" (Brundenius, 1985: 21). Private capitalists who do not produce run the risk of expropriation, and, although a wide range of political opposition is accommodated within the political framework laid down by the revolutionary regime, the Sandinistas have not failed to use authoritarian measures, from censorship to arrest, against serious attacks against the regime (Gilbert, 1985: 169-177). As a result, much of the opposition not willing to function within the legal framework has been displaced to places like Miami or to contra bases in neighboring countries. The revolutionary regime is thus still under threat, but the decisiveness of the Sandinistas in dealing with the illegal acts of the opposition inside the country has so far enabled them to transform civil society in a relatively gradual and orderly fashion.

Although the foundation of the new society is not fully secured in Nicaragua, it has been for many years now in Cuba. That process too required authoritarian measures, emanating from a transformed state and allied mass organizations (Morley, 1980: 387-424; Fitzgerald, 1985: 94-96). Even more so than in Nicaragua, the Cuban oppositionists who relied on violent and illegal activities departed, not infrequently subordinating themselves to U.S. intelligence agencies. The economy was rapidly nationalized and the benefits distributed to the masses. As we shall see in the next section, the Cuban revolutionaries overstepped some critical boundaries in the process of establishing the new basis of rulership, but they did secure the foundation of the new society, an accomplishment that would not have been possible without resort to exceptional measures.

CONVERSION TO PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTIONS: THE DEMOCRATIC IMPERATIVE

Although some restrictions are imperative in the early phase of the transition to socialism, in the process of establishing the foundation for




the transition to socialism, it is essential that political boundaries be delineated and respected. Clear boundaries must be established between those political and social forces that defend the old regime and those that back the new, between those that cooperate with foreign inter- vention and those that defend the nation against such aggression. These boundaries serve the functions of restricting the participation of those who would destroy the new regime and of encouraging the participation of those who accept the new regime, but who may differ on policies, institutional practices, and procedures. These boundaries are crucial for the conversion to participatory institutions that are fully democratic. Without clear boundaries, the tendency is to lump together democratic critics and enemies of democracy and to fail to recognize that, in establishing the foundation, but especially after it has been securely established, the interests and opinions of democratic socialists will differ in a variety of matters.

For the same reason, temporal boundaries must also be established and respected. These make clear that the necessary politically restrictive measures are time-limited in nature. For the democratic regime under military or political attack, authoritarian practices are the order of the day and must remain in force so long as survival is in question. But the fact that these are exceptional measures-to be jettisoned as soon as the new foundation is secured and the emergency ended-must be openly stated. Authoritarian practices must be defined as reflecting a specific, exceptional situation. Authoritarian necessities must not be turned into virtues and built into the basic conception of socialism. These conditions are necessary to prepare the groundwork for conversion to full democratic participation and rulership immediately upon the ending of the emergency.

It is precisely with this process of conversion that twentieth century socialist revolutionaries have had the most difficulty. One of the differences between the American Revolution and contemporary socialist revolutions is not over the initial period of authoritarianism,6 which all of them share, but over the establishment of boundaries and the process of conversion. The American revolutionary leadership, for example, more or less delineated the political elements (empire loyalists) to be excluded from effective participation (to be sure, many non- loyalists, including women, blacks, Indians, immigrants, etc., were also excluded) and recognized the temporal limits of its repressive measures. Upon the new foundation (an independent republican nation-state based on private property), political participation to debate and discuss




policies was granted. In contrast, contemporary socialist regimes typically operate with elastic boundaries.

Cuba, at least up to 1970, offers a good example. Even after the decisive defeat of internal counterrevolutionary forces and the defeat of the counterrevolutionary returnees at the Bay of Pigs, and even after the guarantee of no further invasions wrenched from U.S. imperialism in resolving the missile crisis, the revolutionary leadership kept Cuba on an emergency footing and maintained a high level of centralized and authoritarian control (Fitzgerald, 1985: 112-124). As the 1960s prog- ressed, restrictions were maintained. Channels, such as political and scholarly journals through which socialists could debate issues such as forms of representation, strategies of economic development, market, and plan, were unduly controlled. Politicomilitary defense organizations, such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the Revolutionary Armed Forces, which were allied to the government and directed from the top, took over increasing responsibility for mobilizing the population and economic resources, while potentially participatory organizations, such as the trade unions, withered away (Bengelsdorf, 1985: 164-213; Fuller, 1985: 435-438; Perez-Stable, 1985: 149-156). The Party was unified and interlocked with the state. Centrally directed politicomilitary organizations, instead of representative or democratic participatory organizations, inhabited political and economic spheres. The relationship between leaders and followers was defined in authoritarian-mobilizational terms, rather than in terms of democratic debate.

The revolutionary leadership failed to establish temporal boundaries, and projected authoritarian practices, initially invoked to establish and secure the foundation of the new society, as the norm rather than the exception. They expanded political boundaries and introduced the politics of amalgamation: dissent and debate were conflated with the (previous) military activities of the (already defeated) counterrevolution. Those who did not agree with how or why they were being mobilized were often treated as enemies, whose continued existence justified continued authoritarianism. Ideologically, the revolutionary leadership violated the language of politics and invoked the imagery of permanent war. Further, it legitimated elastic boundaries with reified conceptions of the revolutionary classes and their social interests. Different and competing revolutionary classes, strata, a?Cd groups, and their specific immediate interests were obscured by conceptions of The Working Class and The Peasantry and their Historic Interests. Reified and




teleological notions served to justify monolithism-the opposite of democratic pluralism;n

Many have used and abused the term pluralism in discussing the issues of democracy and socialism. Pluralism refers to the existence of a variety of competing interests, ideas, and policies among a variety of political forces seeking to influence decision-making structures. Liberals and conservatives, however, associate pluralism with a specific set of socioeconomic interests in a given social order and with a particular distribution of political power. They define the minimal conditions for "pluralist politics" by the presence of capitalist property-owning groups that defend property interests, profits, and so forth, by private control of the media, and by political structures subject to the influence of unequally distributed economic resources.

Unfortunately, many socialists agree with this view and commit two opposing types of errors. On the one hand, some socialists accept the liberal-conservative conception of political pluralism, and permit property-owning groups and their allies to dominate strategic positions within the economy, state, and society, positions they can exploit to destroy democracy. In both Chile and Jamaica, socialists attempted to elicit the cooperation of private capitalists in their economic development plans. The capitalists responded by massively transferring capital out of the country, running down plant and equipment, and working in tandem with international capital and the U.S. imperial state to destabilize and erode the popular base of the democratic-socialist regime. Subsequent to the downfall of the regime, the liberal and conservative "defenders" of pluralist democracy supported a military dictatorship in Chile and an authoritarian parliamentary regime in Jamaica. On the other hand, some socialists reject the idea of pluralism altogether. By failing to distinguish between the ideologically loaded liberal-conservative conception of pluralism and a notion that recog- nizes a plurality of interests within a collectivist society, these socialists contribute to the installation of a monolithic political regime.

A more adequate conception of pluralism is evidenced in the efforts of Nicaragua's Sandinistas to fashion a political framework for socialist transition. The Sandinistas have transformed the state apparatus, initiated a dynamic public and cooperative sector, and encouraged the rapid growth of autonomous and semiautonomous mass organizations. They have designed and implemented an electoral system that accom- modates a broad range of competing political parties, some to their right and some to their left (Latin American Studies Association, 1985).




Moreover, the top Sandinista leadership did not arrogate to itself the task of codifying the foundation of the new society in a new constitution. Constituent as well as legislative powers were granted to the National Assembly, where the Sandinista majority debates and negotiates with representatives of all other political parties (Instituto Historico Centro- america, 1985).

The Sandinistas have defined the political boundaries and have allowed and encouraged wide-ranging democratic participation within these boundaries. They have also clearly delineated and openly stated the temporal boundaries of authoritarian practices. In a characteristic statement about La Prensa, the opposition newspaper that was ultimately shut down, censor Nelba Blandon, for example, has said that "when the danger to Nicaragua from armed attacks by ex-Somoza guardsmen disappears, La Prensa would again be allowed to commit the sin of publishing lies" (Nichols, 1985: 193). Depending on how the U.S.-contra war against Nicaragua proceeds, the Sandinistas may have to widen or be able to narrow the range for authoritarian measures. But what is notable at present is that, even in this period of military defense, democratic civilian organizations are debating issues and programs and are infusing the processes of establishing the foundation of the new society and building participatory institutions with a democratic pluralist ethos.

In the 1960s, this was not done in Cuba. By 1970, however, it became clear to the Cuban leadership that the system had to be reformed, that a conversion to more participatory institutions had to be achieved. This realization was induced by growing popular discontent, which mani- fested itself in heightened absenteeism and lessened productive effort, and by a variety of deepening economic problems (Fitzgerald, 1985: 120-124). Yet the direction and extent of change was largely determined by the revolutionary leadership, which had already accommodated itself to centralized practices. The conversion to participatory institutions has been substantial, but it is important to underline the extent to which restrictive practices continue. The conversion to democratic practices remains incomplete.

Perhaps the best example of this is the structure and functioning of the Organos de Poder Popular (OPP) (Bengelsdorf, 1985: 225-327; Fitzgerald, 1985: 302-310), which are elected assemblies that have been in existence at the national, provincial, andmunicipal levels since 1976- 1977. The OPP provide the population with a formal structure through which criticism can be voiced and solutions proposed to economic and




social problems. This is especially the case at the municipal level, where OPP delegates are responsible for the administration of local social service and economic units. Also at this level, OPP delegates are subject to direct popular nomination, election, and recall, all of which doubtless help to keep them responsive to local popular concerns.

Yet, at the higher levels of the OPP structure, where the responsibilities become greater in importance and scope, the extent of democracy diminishes. The provincial and national OPP assemblies, for example, are elected not directly by the population but by the municipal delegates. Moreover, officially constituted "nominating committees," not the population itself, nominate the candidates for the higher positions. These nominating committees are made up of representatives of state- and Party-allied mass organizations, under the chairpersonship of a representative of the Party. These committees must nominate 25 percent more candidates than the available vacancies, and the municipal delegates may reject the lists of nominees in whole or in part (Gonz'alez Mendoza, 1986). Nevertheless, this structure gives the Party a great deal of control over who is elected to higher OPP positions (Fitzgerald, 1985: 303-307).

Although Party members do not necessarily predominate at the municipal level, they do at the provincial and especially at the national level. This predominance of Party members at the higher levels of OPP is clearly a major mechanism for Party control of OPP decisions. Party members in OPP positions remain under Party discipline and are duty- bound to attempt to persuade non-Party delegates to follow the Party line. If this does not work, matters are to be taken through the Party structure all the way up to the National Assembly, if necessary, where compliance with the Party line is assured (Castro, 1974). Thus the big decisions and the power to control lesser decisions taken at lower levels remain in the hands of the Party, that is, of the top revolutionary leadership.

The conversion to participatory institutions is also inhibited in ways the leadership never intended. Currently, the Cuban politicoadmini- strative apparatus is occupied by a considerable number of individuals who rose to and were socialized to their positions of responsibility before the authoritarian-mobilization system was reformed. By habit, and for other reasons that we cannot go into here (Fitzgerald, 1985: 354-370, 390-412), such individuals are, according to the former head of the Central Planning Agency, "impregnated with the old centralizing and in many cases bureaucratic habits" (Perez, 1979: 14). Such




individuals have difficulty adapting to the participation envisaged by the revolutionary leadership. The conversion to democratic participatory institutions in Cuba is thus inhibited by the authoritarian ethos implanted in the 1960s.

While noting the continuing restrictions that operate in Cuba-a legacy of the real and continuing military threats and actual attacks launched from Washington, D.C.-the important point is the historical direction that the revolution is taking: its movement away from a decision-making system informed by an authoritarian ethos toward structures that have been opened up to truly mass participation. Moreover, the social foundation of the regime has effectively operated to allocate the benefits of economic growth in a very egalitarian fashion (Brundenius, 1981: 102-151). The social foundation has democratized the benefits of the revolution. Yet full democratic political participation remains to be realized.

Although, for purposes of analytic clarity, we have distinguished the foundation-establishing and the institution-building phases of the socialist transition, these phases, in fact, interpenetrate one another. If clear political and temporal boundaries are not instituted in the foundation-establishing phase, then authoritarian practices threaten to carry over into the institution-building phase, become identified with the basic notion of socialism, and block the development of a democratic socialist pluralism. On the other hand, if the authoritarian imperative of the foundation-establishing phase is not recognized or acted upon, then the very chance to build democratic participatory institutions upon a socialist foundation will be jeopardized. In this regard, the Nicaraguan practice of combining national defense and pluralism, building participatory institutions, and operating with a realistic understanding of state power, presents a major breakthrough in conceptualizing the transition to socialism.

CONCLUSIONS

The basic theoretical error of the Allende and Manley regimes that translated into practical disaster was the idea that "democracy is a good in itself." This rather vacuous phrase translates into the notion that the procedures and institutions of a parliamentary electoral system operate independently of class relations, class conflict, and imperial penetration. By assuming that shared values of political democracy override partisan




class interests, these regimes provided space for the right wing to recruit coup-makers within the military, while preventing democratic military forces from acting ... politically; they negotiated compromises with the bourgeoisie, which utilized concessions to make new demands and transformed tactical negotiations into transitional demands oriented toward a strategic rupture with the existing democratic socialist regime. The Right had no illusions about democracy being a "good in itself." It was good insofar as it safeguarded their basic interests, but it was to be discarded or disrupted when it eroded their prerogatives. The tragic mistake of the Manley and Allende regimes, which sought to radically reform society without transforming the state, is being repeated today by a group of democratic theorists who abjure social reform in the name of a "realistic democracy." "Realists," such as O'Donnell (1986) and his coauthors, tacitly recognize the impotence of political regimes con- strained by the military and the international bankers, yet loudly proclaim the preeminent "democratic" virtue of these compromised and weakened regimes.

The transition to socialism raises several basic issues concerning the relationship between political power and class relations, more particularly between state, regime, and class conflict. Many contemporary democratic practitioners in Latin America have reverted back to a 1940s political version of democracy, emphasizing legalistic and formalistic criteria rather than examining the historical process and class and institutional relations that constrain the operation of elections, presi- dents, and parliaments. These democrats operate within the boundaries established by the military, the international banks, and the local bureaucratic and propertied elites; and they formulate policies that "manage" conflicts, social pacts to contain class conflict, and political formulas that subordinate social movements to elite negotiations and bargaining (Petras, 1986).

The deep structural affinity between these democratic theorists and practitioners and the Reagan administration is located in their unac- knowledged acceptance of bourgeois hegemony as the precondition for contemporary "resurgent democracies." The fundamental absence of any analysis of the class relations that underpin these electoral regimes undermines the theoretical and practical utility of these arid conceptions of democratic transition. In contrast, the Reagan administration understands perfectly well that class and property relations are central in defining its view toward political regimes. ITence the administration is able to support "death-squad democracies" in Guatemala, El Salvador,




and Honduras, as well as state terrorist regimes in countries like Chile, and civilian regimes based on the traditional military and international banks in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. By factoring out imperial and class ties, these democrats contribute to the ideological obfuscation engendered by the Reagan administration, which has become quite adept at using formalistic electoral formulas to defend propertied, military, and imperialist interests.

The significant issues are those concerned with the profound connection that exists between class relations and political power, the deep structural linkages that define the scope and depth of political and social transformation (Wood, 1986). Regimes that wish to succeed in transforming social relations must transform the state or end up reproducing the existing pattern of social relations. The notion of "state autonomy," which has been extended to include what its proponents call "state-centered" approaches, divorces the state from the matrix of class relations and contributes to "classless" conceptions of politics, as can be seen in the recent work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Such theorists fail to recognize that state "autonomy" has not prevented bourgeois class power from destroying "autonomous" states and instituting very nonautonomous bourgeois dictatorships.

The difference between the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions and the demise of the Allende and Manley regimes is rooted in the theoretical issue of the relationship between class and state. The Nicaraguans have reorganized the state and created the social and military organization to sustain a pluralist regime. The United States and the local bourgeoisie reject the state and class basis upon which the pluralistic party-electoral system functions. They want to have their own army-the contras-and their political organizations in control of the civil bureaucracy in order to create their version of a pluralistic bourgeois democracy. Debates over socialism and democracy in the period of transition have as their primary focus precisely this problem: the necessity to transform the existing state apparatus in order to achieve durable and consequential socioeconomic reforms and to institutionalize a popular democratic political system.

NOTES

1. The literature on Chile under Allende is vast, that on Jamaica under Manley less so. Our analyses of these cases are largely consistent with Smirnow (1979) and Sweezy and




Magdoff (1974) on Chile, and with Kaufman (1985) on Jamaica. Although some have questioned the socialist potential in Jamaica, Kaufman (1985: 233) has correctly concluded that "dramatic and profound changes were possible in Jamaica. Neither the existing situation of dependency nor the desire to preserve and extend democratic institutions prevented such a transformation. These changes could be inaugurated within the perspective of a democratic road to socialism.... The possibility was ushered in by the politicization of the 1974-1976 period and the massive vote for the PNP on the basis of its pledge to build a democratic socialist Jamaica. There was an embryonic movement of change. There was tremendous power, creativity, good will, initiative, and courage waiting to be unleashed and directed."

2. We say "perhaps"because, as Manley(1982: x) has pointed out, "no 'smokinggun' has been found." On the other hand, Manley (1982: 223-237) has compiled a "Destabili- zation Diary" that displays the typical CIA modus operandi. Of course, in Chile, the gun was found blazing (Petras and Morley, 1975).

3. The capacity of the masses in both Chile and Jamaica has been often overlooked, and adequate histories of these mass mobilizations have yet to be written. Beginnings have been made by Espinosa and Zimbalist (1981), Henfry and Sorj (1977), Raptis (1974), and Winn (1986) on Chile, and by Feuer (1984) and Kaufman (1985) on Jamaica.

4. The best compilations of materials and analyses on the trajectory of Sandinista Nicaragua are by Harris and Vilas (1985) and by Walker (1985).

5. While liberals may be soothed by the continuance of the mixed economy in Nicaragua, socialists should be aware that this constitutes not a strength but a weakness for the Sandinistas. The persistence of the mixed economy is explained by the low level of socialization of the Nicaraguan economy, and is clearly a weakness imposed on the Sandinistas by a horrendous legacy of exploitation (Wheelock, 1983: 83-103). As Lapper (1986) makes clear, the mixed economy is nothing more than a "headache" for the Sandinistas.

6. This fact is typically overlooked by knee-jerk democrats and civil libertarians who cannot conceive of legitimate conditions for limiting democracy. For a useful discussion of legitimate authoritarianism in liberal democratic regimes, written from a liberal viewpoint, see Rossiter (1948).

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