Peter Donovan - The Intolerance of Religious Pluralism [a]

8/16/2019 Peter Donovan - The Intolerance of Religious Pluralism [a]

1/14

The Intolerance of Religious PluralismAuthor(s): Peter DonovanSource: Religious Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 217-229Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20019607 .

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2/14

Rel. Stud.

29,

pp. 217-229.

Copyright

?

1993

Cambridge University

Press

PETER DONOVAN

THE

INTOLERANCE

OF

RELIGIOUS

PLURALISM

The

pluralistic approach

to

religions

has

come

in

for

some

serious criticism

in

recent

writings.

I shall

consider

two

examples

in

particular.

The

first is the

book

Christian

Uniqueness

Reconsidered:

The

Myth

of

a

Pluralistic

Theology

of

Religions,

edited

by

Gavin D'Costa.1 This is a collection of

essays

offered in

response

to

The

Myth

of

Christian

Uniqueness,

edited

by

John

Hick and

Paul

Knitter.2

The second

example

is

an

essay

by

Paul

Morris,

'Judaism

and

Pluralism: the

Price

of

"Religious

Freedom"',

in

Religious

Pluralism and

Unbelief,

edited

by

Ian

Hamnett.3

Gavin D'Costa and the other defenders of Christian

uniqueness,

in

framing

what

they

call

'a

proper

Christian reflection

on

religious

diversity',

do

not

simply

offer

customary

theological

reaffirmations.

They

set

out,

as

well,

to

attack

pluralism

itself,

using

in

some cases

the

most

up-to-date

of

weapons,

a

postmodernist critique

of the whole

Enlightenment

tradition of

intellectual

liberalism. Paul

Morris,

in

framing

his

objections

to

religious

pluralism,

similarly

criticizes

liberalism,

particularly

as a

political

ideology

and

pro?

gramme.

He,

too,

is

impressed

by postmodernist

writings

with their

suspicion

of Western

rationality

and

its claims

to

universality.

I

shall

attempt

to

clarify

some

main

elements in

these

critiques,

and

consider what

implications they

may

have for

the

academic

study

of

religions

as

a

liberal,

pluralist

enterprise.

OBJECTIONS

TO PLURALISM

Since the

early

1970s,

writers

on

religious

diversity

and

plurality (John

Hick

in

particular)

have

commonly

classified

into

exclusivist,

inclusivist,

and

pluralist

the

possible

attitudes

people might

hold towards

religions

other

than

their

own.

The

implication

has

been,

for

most,

that these

attitudes

range

from

the

less

generous

or

tolerant

(i.e.

exclusivist)

to

the

more

so

{i.e.pluralist).

('Plural?

ism' here

means

regarding

the

world's faiths

as

being

more or

less

equally

valid,

or

at

least

equally

capable

of

making

their

contribution

to

an

on-going

search for common religious insight and understanding.)

What is

being alleged,

by

the

new

wave

of

writing

critical of such

a

position,

is that

genuine

tolerance of

differences

and

respect

for

otherness

is

1

Christian

Uniqueness

Reconsidered

(Maryknoll,

New York:

Orbis,

1990).

2

The

Myth of

Christian

Uniqueness

(London:

SCM

Press,

1988).

3

Religious

Pluralism

and

Unbelief (London:

Routledge,

1990),

pp.

179-201.


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3/14

2l8

PETER

DONOVAN

by

no

means

an

assured

outcome

of

a

pluralist

attitude. On the

contrary,

pluralism

is

coercive. It does

not

allow others

simply

to

be themselves.

To

play

the

pluralist

game

properly, parties

are

expected

to countenance

quite

radical

reinterpretations

and

amendments

being

made

to

their

own

positions

as

well

as

those

of others. Pluralism

presupposes

liberalism,

which

involves

compromise,

accommodation,

and

the

dismantling

of

distinctive

traditional

convictions.

The

common

features and

agreed

truths it

purports

to

arrive

at,

through

embracing

a

wide

range

of

viewpoints,

are

in

fact

simply

reinforce?

ments

for

the

political

and economic interests of

a

dominant

ideology.

Religious

pluralism,

as

found

in

writers

like

John

Hick,

Wilfred Cantwell

Smith and Ninian

Smart,

is

charged

with

being similarly

a

product

of the

'Enlightenment mentality',

a

lingering

form

of

European

cultural

imperial?

ism which

today's

more

politically perceptive

intellectuals have

seen

through

and

are

learning

to

live

without.

Let

us

look

first

at

this

critique

as

it

is formulated

in

Christian

Uniqueness

Reconsidered.

In

introducing

the

book,

Gavin

D'Costa remarks how

pluralistic

theology

'often

seems

to

hinder rather than

aid

a

proper

recognition

of

religious

plurality'.4

Christoph

Schw?bel

notes

how

the

pluralist

approach,

contrary

to

its avowed

intentions,

seems

to

rest

on

the

picture

of

an

ultimate

noumenal focus

or a common

anthropological

basis of all

religions

'

which

allows their distinctive

particularity

only

a

penultimate

and

preliminary

status'.5

J.

A.

DiNoia

points

out

that the

pluralist proposals

under discussion

[i.e.

those

in

Hick

and

Knitter's

Myth

of

Christian

Uniqueness]

do

not

so

much

account

for the

diversely

featured

religious

world

they

observe

as

suggest

some

important

changes

in it.

They

can

be read

as

in

effect

inviting

the

Christian

community

and,

by

implication,

other

religious

communities

as

well,

to

entertain and

adopt

certain

revisions of their

doctrines...6

Lesslie

Newbigin

sees

pluralism

as

akin

to

the

competitive

economic

liberalism

on

which the

developed

world

at

the

moment

is hell-bent...

'

a

form of

paganism

which surrenders

ultimate

authority

to

"the

market'".7

J?rgen

Moltmann

also likens

pluralism

in

religion

to

the consumerism

of

Western

society,

and

accuses

it

of

a

'repressive

tolerance',

which allows

everything

a

subjective possibility

but

is

sceptical

about

any

objective

reality

being

adequately

mediated

by religious

symbols.8

It

is

in

the

chapters

by John

Milbank

and Kenneth

Surin,

however,

that

the

most

pointed

criticisms,

in

the

postmodernist

idiom,

are

offered. Milbank

alleges

that

pluralist

theologies

are

in

fact

pervaded

by

a

rhetoric of

liberalism

'which assumes the propriety of theWest-inspired nation-state and theWest

inspired

capitalist

economy.

'9

And

Surin,

after

comparing

the

global

preten?

sions

of

Enlightenment

liberalism

to

the

marketing

of the

Macdonald's

hamburger,

concludes:

4

Christian

Uniqueness

Reconsidered,

p.

xi.

5

Ibid.

p. 33.

6

Ibid.

p.

121.

7

Ibid.

p. 147.

8

Ibid.

p.

152.

9

Ibid.

p.

175.




4/14

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

210,

Traditional

liberal

intellectuals

pride

themselves

on

acknowledging heterogeneity

and

plurality,

but this

acknowledgement

is

always

fatally

compromised

by

a

de?

ployment

of

homogeneous logic

- a

logic

which irons out the

heterogeneous precisely

by

subsuming

it

under the

categories

of

comprehensive

and

totalizing global

and

world

theologies...

'I

am

convinced',

he

continues,

'that the time of this

modernist

general

intellectual

is

over,

even

in

the

philosophy

and

theology

of

religions.'10

The

heat

at

times evident

in

these attacks

on

pluralism

is

partly

explained,

no

doubt,

by

the fact that the

writers

being

criticized

(i.e.

the

contributors

to

The

Myth

of

Christian

Uniqueness,

and those

elsewhere

in

the

even

more

provocatively

titled

Myth

of

God

Incarnate)

contemplate

some

very

radical

revisions of the central Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trin?

ity. They

do this

partly

on

the

grounds

that

exclusivism

based

on

such

doctrines has been the

source

of

much

injustice

and

oppression.

A

radical

rethinking

of

those

beliefs,

they

believe,

would

remove

a

serious

impediment

to

inter-religious harmony

and

reconciliation.

It is

not

surprising

that de?

fenders of traditional

Christianity,

however

ready

they

may

be

to

look

with

greater

sympathy

than

in

the

past

on

the other faiths of

the

world,

will

vigorously

reject

such

theologies

if

they

seem

to

involve massive

departures

from central Christian

tenets.

It is

also,

of

course,

a

shrewd tactical

move

for

confessional Christian

theologians

to

complain

that

pluralism

puts

the

distinctives of

other faiths

equally

at

risk.

A

conservative

stance

which also

champions

the

right

of

'

the

other'

to

be left alone

can

thus

be

seen

to

take

over

the moral

high

ground,

in

the

area

of

inter-faith

dialogue

and

co-operation.

And

if

the

rhetoric of

postmodernism

lends

itself,

temporarily

anyway,

to

the

chastening

of

liberals,

then

so

much the

better

it

would

seem.

(Though

a

cynic might

well be

intrigued

to

see

the

descendants

of

Calvin and

of the

Inquisition joining

forces

with

the

disciples

of

Nietzsche

to

give

lessons

on

tolerance

to

the

children of

the

Enlightenment )

Leaving

that

irony

aside for

a

moment,

we

must

consider the

possibility

that

these critics of

pluralism,

whatever

their

theological

agenda

may be,

are

raising

issues

with

serious

implications

for the

theory

and

practice

of

aca?

demic

religious

studies

itself.

Does

this

discipline's

high-minded

commitment

to

freedom of

thought

contain,

in

its

implicit

assumptions,

a

capacity

for

coerciveness which

destroys

its would-be

neutrality,

and

makes

it

through

and-through

ideological, intrinsically

intolerant

and

culturally

hegemonic?

THE

POSTMODERNIST

CRITIQUE

The

postmodernist

critique

can

be

simply expressed.

The

value

placed by

philosophers

in

the

Enlightenment

tradition

on

freedom

of

thought,

toler?

ance

of

dissent,

and the

search for

truth

through

agreed

empirical

methods,

10

Ibid.

p.

210.




5/14

220

PETER DONOVAN

was

because

such

an

approach

provided

an

escape-route

from

the domi?

nation

of

entrenched

ideology

and authoritarian

tradition.

But the

resulting

Liberalism,

it

is

alleged,

with

the institutions and

disciplines

committed

to

it

(intellectual,

political,

and

economic),

has

developed

an

equally

totalitarian

character and become

just

such

a

system

of

power-structures.

As Morris

in

his

essay says,

commenting

on

Michel

Foucault's

analysis

of

the

coercive

powers

of

liberalism

:

A state

whose

success

is

measured in

terms

of

the introduction

of modern

mercantile

economies

requires

the

management

of

individuals,

goods,

family

wealth,

etc. to

facilitate

this

economy.

No

aspect

of

life,

customs,

traditions, ways

of

thinking

and

doing,

is

exempt

from this end

and

its attendant

disciplines.11

Underlying

this abuse

of

power

by

the

state

is

'

the liberal

discourse of

reason

and

progress

'.

Using

examples

from

Jewish

experience,

Morris

demon?

strates

ways

in

which

'

the

supposed

universal

notion of

liberal

rationality

can

and does have

grave

consequences

for

religious

traditions

in

the

context

of

the

modern

state'.12

At

this

point

a

preliminary

attempt

could be made

to answer

the

critique

of liberalism outlined

so

far. We

might

begin

by

drawing

a

distinction

between

respect

for

liberty

of

opinion

as

an

epistemological principle,

and

liberalism as a total belief-system and political policy. The former we may

call

epistemic

liberalism

;

the

latter,

ideological.

Not

all

liberal thinkers

by

any

means,

we

might

argue,

have

been

ideologically

committed

to

a

'

modernist

'

project

whereby

the

beliefs and

practices

of others

are

to

be

progressively

brought

into line with

a

secular, scientific,

and

humanistic

world-view,

to

form

a

uniform

global

culture.

The

intentions

of

most

liberals involved

in the

study

of

religion

have

been

far

more

modest

:

the conscientious

application

of

the

best

scholarship

they

knew

to

the

questions

before

them.

Only

when

urged

on

by

secular

voices,

perhaps,

or

provoked

by

the

reactionary

response

of the guardians of orthodoxy, have they found themselves taking on the role

of

crusaders

for

a new

world

order.

The

modernist

ideology,

it

could be

argued,

has

in

many

ways

been

thrust

upon

liberal

scholarship,

rather than

being

inevitably

bound

up

with

it.

Such

a

fundamental

confusion

about

liberalism

may

well

infect the

dis?

cussion

of

religious

pluralism,

when

critics

fail

to

distinguish

pluralistic

tolerance

as

an

epistemic

requirement,

from

ideological

pluralism

as

a

faith

commitment,

super-theology,

or

universal

way

of salvation.

It

is

clearly

one

thing

to

say

pluralism

is

a

way

to

finding

truth,

and

quite

another

to

say

Pluralism is the Truth. If the main

objection

to the

religious

pluralists

is that

they

have been

too

ready

to

suggest

what

must

be

the

truth

of the

matter,

and have

attempted

to

manufacture

agreement

on

that truth

by carrying

out

radical

surgery

on

the

traditions,

then

the

criticisms

may

be sound

ones.

Despite

describing

their efforts

as

'hypotheses'

only,

pluralist

theologians

11

In

Hamnett, ed.,

Religious

Pluralism

and

Unbelief,

p.

192.

12

Ibid.

p.

193.




6/14

RELIGIOUS

PLURALISM

221

such

as

the

contributors

to

volumes like

The

Myth

of

Christian

Uniqueness

may

well,

at

times,

have laid themselves

open

to

the

charge

of

seeking

to

promote

some

new,

all-embracing, global

ideology,

a universal faith or World

Theology.

If this

is

so,

then

it is of

course

vitally

important

for

the

practice

of

religious

studies

that

a

clear

distinction be

preserved.

The

pluralist approach

to

religions

adopted

on

epistemic

and

methodological grounds

is

quite

a

dif?

ferent

matter

from

pluralistic hypotheses,

soteriologies

or

theologies

offered

for

ideological

or

confessional

reasons.

Both

fall

within

the

subject-matter

with

which

religious

studies

concerns

itself.

But

the

profound

difference

between the

two

must

be

clearly

recognized

(however

difficult

it

may

be

to

do

so

owing

to

the

frequent

overlap

on

the

part

of

scholars, institutions,

publishers,

and wider

audiences with

an

interest

in

both

activities).

LIBERALISM,

TOLERANCE,

AND FALLIBILITY

How far does the distinction between

epistemic

and

ideological

pluralism

go,

towards

answering

the

postmodernist

critique

outlined above?

I

believe

it

is

crucial,

but

it

may

well

seem

to

be

only

the

beginning

of

a

much

larger

debate.

For

might

it

not

be claimed that it

is

in

fact

at

the

epistemic

level

that

liberalism

is

most

at

fault,

when it

comes

to

complicity

in

the

prevailing

Western

ideology

and

structures

of

power?

Is it

not

on

this

count,

the

identification

of

knowledge

and truth with

power

and

domination,

that

writers such

as

Foucault and

Lyotard

make

their

most

penetrating analyses?

One

way

to

approach

this

question

might

be

to

consider

the

classic defence

of

epistemic

liberalism found

in

J.

S.

Mill's

essay

On

Liberty,

in

the

chapter

on

the

liberty

of

thought

and

discussion.

Mill

writes

:

The

peculiar

evil of

silencing

the

expression

of

an

opinion

is,

that it is

robbing

the

human race ;posterity as well as the existing generation ; those who dissent from the

opinion,

still

more

than those who hold it. If the

opinion

is

right, they

are

deprived

of

the

opportunity

of

exchanging

error

for truth

;

if

wrong,

they

lose,

what

is almost

as

great

a

benefit,

the

clearer

perception

and livelier

impression

of

truth,

produced

by

its collision with

error.13

Tolerance

of free

thought,

Mill

argues,

is the

best

guarantee

there is that

truth will

emerge

from

debate,

and that

knowledge

will be

maintained

on

the

basis

not

of

authority

and

prejudice,

but

of

rational

assurance

arising

from

the

continuing

need

to

withstand refutation.

Mill

himself makes

no

attempt

to

disguise

the

paradox implicit

in

such

a

position.

When truth does

emerge

out

of

diversity

of

opinion,

error

is

thereby

excluded. And the

greater

the

degree

of

agreement

as

to

truth,

the less the

scope

for tolerance of

disagreement

-

or so

it

would

seem.

Mill

puts

it

thus:

13

John

Stuart

Mill,

'On

Liberty' (1859),

in

Utilitarianism,

Liberty,

and

Representative

Government,

Every?

man

Library

edn

(London: J.

M.

Dent

&

Sons,

1910),

p. 79.




7/14

222

PETER

DONOVAN

As mankind

improve,

the

number of doctrines

which

are no

longer disputed

or

doubted will

be

constantly

on

the

increase... The

cessation,

on one

question

after

another, of serious controversy, is one of the necessary incidents of the consolidation

of

opinion...14

Mill

admits

that,

on

his

own

argument,

this

would

be

'

no

trifling

draw?

back',

involving

as

it would 'the

loss of

so

important

an

aid

to

the

intelligent

and

living

apprehension

of

a

truth,

as

is

afforded

by

the

necessity

of

explain?

ing

it

to,

or

defending

it

against,

opponents_'15

Perhaps

we

can

find

confirmed

in

this

admission

by

an

arch-liberal,

the

spectre

of

totalitarianism

to

which

the

critics

of

pluralism

are

drawing

attention with such alarm.

Liberalism's tolerance is

provisional

only

and

aims,

in the

end,

at a

closure;

the

arrival

at one

universal

truth and the

negation

of

all

other

possibilities.

Not

only

ideological

liberalism

then,

but

epistemic

liberalism

too,

if

taken

as

the

'royal

road

to

truth',

ends

up

involving

itself

in

an

ultimate

imperialism.

But is this

an

inevitable

outcome

of the

liberal

path?

Mill

has

already

set

in

place

a

fundamental

safeguard.

It

is the

principle

of

fallibility,

and the

necessity

of continued

openness

to

criticism,

even

when beliefs

and

opinions

have reached

the

point

of

being

uncontested.

If

they

are

justifiably

held

as

truths,

it will

be

only

because

they

have

succeeded

so

far in

resisting

refu?

tation,

and for the time

being

continue

to

do

so.

('The

beliefs which

we

have

most

warrant

for have

no

safeguard

to rest

on,

but

a

standing

invitation

to

the whole world

to

prove

them

unfounded.')16

Acceptance

of

fallibility,

openness

to

refutation,

and invitation

to

radical

critical

scrutiny

is,

in

Mill's

view

anyway,

of the

essence

of liberalism.

Consistently

applied,

it

provides

the needed

protection

against

liberalism's

developing

into

a

totalitarian

ideology.

Properly

understood,

that

is

to

say,

liberalism welcomes

a

plurality

of

opinions,

not

so as

to

absorb them

all

into

a

rational

uniformity,

but

so

as

to

guarantee

that

any

belief

or

opinion

presently

held

as

the truth remains

constantly

open

to

challenge

and

cor?

rection.

Now far from

this

being utterly

at

odds

with

the

postmodernist

viewpoint,

it is

in

fact

entirely

consistent

with

it.

The

deconstructionist,

ironist,

rhe?

torical

stance

inevitably

presupposes

a

fallibilist

epistemology

such

as

Mill's,

and could

hardly

function without

it.

For

what

power

is there

in

a

critique,

however

radical,

unless there

are

those

who feel bound

to

take notice of

criticism?

Indeed,

Mill himself

explicitly

welcomes

the radical

voice.

So long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that

unpopular

truth should

have one-sided

assertors

too;

such

being

usually

the

most

energetic,

and the

most

likely

to

compel

reluctant

attention

to

the

fragment

of

wisdom

which

they

proclaim

as

if

it

were

the

whole.17

He

goes

on

to

commend such

a

one-sided

radical, Rousseau,

whose

para

14

Ibid.

p.

103.

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid.

p.

83.

17

Ibid.

p.

106.




8/14

RELIGIOUS

PLURALISM

223

doxes

exploded

'

like bombshells

'

amongst

those

of the

eighteenth

century

who 'were lost

in

admiration

of what

is

called

civilisation,

and

of

the marvels

of modern

science, literature,

and

philosophy...'.18

Thus the

extreme

opposition

apparently

mounted

by

radical thinkers with

regard

to

liberalism,

rationality

and

the

Enlightenment

heritage,

their

some?

times

outrageous

overstatements,

devastating

insinuations and

ruthless de

constructions,

may

be

recognized

by

the

perceptive

liberal

as

entirely

necess?

ary

to

their

rhetorical

intent.

When it is claimed

by

postmodernists

that

Western ideals of

rationality

and liberalism

are

self-interested,

imperialistic,

hegemonic,

destructive of

otherness,

and

so

on,

and when

in

making

that

claim the normal

philosophical, literary

or

academic conventions

are

flouted

and

assailed,

it is

not

necessarily

an

invitation

to

abandon liberalism's critical

ideals

;

nor

is

it

a

proof

(as

the

conservative

theologians

seem

to

hope)

that

such

ideals

have

at

last

gone

out

of fashion.

For

suppose

there

are

lessons

to

learn

from

the social distortions

and

injustices

unearthed

by

Foucault,

and

the

new

insights

into

oppression

and

otherness

brought

to

light

by

the

deconstructions

of

Derrida. Those lessons

will

be

appropriated

not

through

abandoning

notions

of

rationality

and

a

common

quest

for

truth,

but

through

a

greatly

enhanced

appreciation

of

the

difficulty involved in properly applying such notions, given the inevitability

of their

being

compromised,

in

subtle and

unsuspected

ways,

by

their

in?

volvement with economic and

political

interests and

power-struggles.

The

intent is

not

to

overthrow

rational,

critical

methods,

in

other

words,

but

to

free them

up

and make them

perform

far

better.

This is

not,

of

course,

something

that

postmodernist

ironists and

radical

deconstructionists

can ever

admit.

To do

so

would

destroy

the

power

of their

rhetoric,

the effectiveness

of

their

paradoxes.

They

are

seeking

to

bring

about

an

enlargement

of

perception

through

using

reason

against

itself,

through

testing to destruction the critical process. This endeavour has a long and

honoured

history,

but

to

maintain

continued effectiveness it

has

to

emerge

again

and

again

in

ever-more-extreme

forms.

As

in

the

old

game

of

out-staring

one's

partner,

in

confrontation with

conventional

epistemic

liberals,

postmodernist

radicals

cannot

afford

to

blink

first.

Their

very

effectiveness lies

in

their

refusal

to

allow

the

liberals

to

get

off

lightly,

announcing

too

glibly

that

they

have

seen

the

point

or

got

the

message.

For

the

chances

are

that

however

much

liberals

may

think

they

can

grasp,

theoretically,

what the

critics

are

trying

to

convey,

they

will

barely

have begun to appreciate what itmeans at the political and pragmatic levels.

Indeed,

as

feminist

criticism

brings

out

so

clearly,

they

must not

assume

they

necessarily

ever

will have

that

capacity,

however hard

they

may

try.

Morris's

paper

shows

an

understanding

of

this whole

strategy.

He

sets out

to

demonstrate,

in

the

case

of

Judaism,

the

serious

deficiencies

of liberalism

18

Ibid.




9/14

224

PETER

DONOVAN

as

a

political ideology,

and

the

implications

this has for

a

religious

pluralism

analogous

to

it.

Drawing

support

from

postmodernism's scrutiny

of the

universal claims of

Enlightenment,

he

calls

for

a

'

genuine

pluralism

'

which

would

recognize

that 'liberal

rationality

has

no

prior

claim

to

truth,

nor

justification

for

being

the

yardstick by

which all

other

traditions

are

to

be

evaluated,

judged,

and

transformed'.19

But far from

this

being

a

rejection

of liberal

rationality

and its

critical

methods

at

the

epistemic

level,

it

is

in

fact

an

appeal

to

them,

and

an

intensification

of them.

Without

these,

as

Morris is well

aware,

relativism

and

scepticism

would

prevail

and

critiques

of

liberalism's

shortcomings

would

carry

no

more

weight

than

the

arbitrary expression

of

any

other

point

of

view.

Thus Morris concludes:

Jews

have

no

desire

to return to

their

ghettos,

and

the

Enlightenment

cannot

be

undone.

Nor

should

we

reject

Kant's

understanding

of man's

responsibility

to

use

his critical

rationality,

entailing

a

relentless

examination of

our

most

cherished and

central beliefs... .20

So

for

Morris,

at

least,

the

postmodernist critique

leads

not

to

any

refu?

tation

of

religious pluralism

as a

rational,

critical

enterprise,

but

to

a

refine?

ment

and

enlargement

of

its

scope,

particularly through

the

d?mystification

of its entanglement with the dominant political ideology of the West.

THEOLOGICAL

CONSERVATISM

AND

PRAGMATIC TOLERANCE

For

the

defenders

of Christian

uniqueness,

however,

the

matter

is

very

different.

They

take the

postmodernist

achievement

to

be

one

which

con?

veniently

frees

theological

conservatism

from the

uncomfortable

pressures

of

secular,

rationalist

criticism.

The

file

can now

be

closed

on

their

unfinished

business with the

Enlightenment.

With the liberal

opposition

finally

put

in

its

place they now,

as

representatives

of

traditional

orthodoxies,

can

gladly

embrace

the

task

of

getting

on

with other

religions, finding

any

number

of

pragmatic,

strategic,

or

missiological

reasons

for

at

last

showing

such

tol?

erance.

I have

already

mentioned

the

irony

to

be found

in

the

appropriation

of

a

postmodernist

critique

by theological

conservatives.

For what

postmodern?

ists

most

reject

in

the

Enlightenment

mentality

is

not

simply

its

tendency

to

be

embodied

in

ideology

and

absolutism,

but the realism

and

objectivism

which

its

progressivist

epistemology

presupposes.

Yet such

a

view

of truth

is

one

to which theological conservatism,

even

more

than

liberalism,

is

pro?

foundly

committed.

It is

perhaps

understandable

that

today's

conservatives,

in

writing

their

'post-liberal'

theologies,

will

find

some

affinity

with

the

deconstructionist

method

which

accounts

for

meaning,

knowledge,

and

rationality

not

by

19

In

Religious

Pluralism

and

Unbelief,

p.

194.

20

Ibid.

p.

195.




10/14

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

225

reference

to

correspondence

with external

reality,

but

rather within the

semiotic domain

of'narratives',

'texts' and

'traditions'. For

the

confessional

Christian

theologian,

these

terms

can seem

rich with revelationist

possibilities

and ecclesiastical associations.

But

one

of the lessons which

the

fact

of

religious

diversity

makes

unavoid?

able is that

others

can

appeal

with

equal

justification

(or

lack

of

it)

to

the

meaning

and truth

conveyed

by

their revealed

texts,

ancestral

narratives,

and

tradition-constituted rationalities. And while

for

the

essentially

pragmatic

and

relativistic

postmodernists,

plurality

of

texts,

narratives and

traditions is

not

a

problem,

it

clearly

is for

conservative

theologians.

They,

even

more

than

liberals and

modernists,

are

in

need of

a

realist,

absolutist,

view of

truth,

if

they

are

to

hold

their tradition

and

revelation

to

be the final

word,

rendering

all

others false

or

incomplete.

Thus conservative

theologians

in

fact have

very

little

in

common

with

the

postmodernists.

And their difference with the liberal

pluralists

does

not

lie

at

all,

I

suggest,

in

the

conservatives'

having

any

greater

concern

about the

oppressiveness

of totalistic

and

absolutist claims

to

truth. It is rather

that

they

are

much less

prepared

than

liberals

are

to

accept

the

means

by

which

the

potential

coerciveness

of truth-claims

may

be

ameliorated

;

that

is,

rig?

orous

application

of critical

methods,

and

a

scrupulous acceptance

of

one's

own

fallibility.

Be

that

as

it

may,

the

contributors

to

D'Costa's book

defending

Christian

uniqueness

do have

one

clear

message

to

give

to

the

advocates of

religious

pluralism.

It is

this

:

a

commitment

to

religious pluralism

derived from

liberal

epistemic

and critical

principles

is

by

no

means

the

most

promising

basis

on

which

to

promote

religious

toleration

in

practice.

For it is

obvious that

few

participants

in

the

inter-religious

domain

are

likely

to

share

the

liberal's

view

of

the

priority

of

epistemic

over

other considerations.

In

an

everyday sense,

tolerance

means

'

putting up

with

'

something

which

one

would

prefer

to

be

otherwise,

not

primarily

on

intellectual

or

philosophi?

cal

grounds,

but

because there

are

prudential

reasons

for

doing

so.

On

religious

questions,

unshakeable

conservatives

may

well be

far

better

placed

than

fallibilist

liberals

to

engage

effectively

in

practical

co-operation

with

those

holding

different

beliefs. Mutual

concerns

can

be

dealt with

more

congenially

when

there

is

no

question

of the

parties

involved

being

expected

to

reconsider

their

deepest

traditional

convictions

or

commitments.

As

con?

servative

folk-wisdom has

always

said,

'

strong

fences make

good

neighbours

'.

There is also

the

further basis for toleration

on

the part of religious

conservatives which

I

have

called

'strategic

and

missiological'.

According

to

this

argument,

Christians have

good

reasons

for

being

respectful

and

attent?

ive

towards

non-Christian

faiths,

for

through

such

an

approach,

it is

claimed,

they

will

best

be able

to

'receive

God's

judgement'

on

their

own

short?

comings,

and

to

'

find

Christ

coming

to

them

'

from

within

other

cultures and




11/14

226

PETER

DONOVAN

traditions.21

This

argument

for tolerance

underlies

the

Vatican

II

statements

concerning

the

Catholic Church's

relationship

with

other

faiths,

and

is

an

application

of the inclusivist

approach

promoted particularly by

the theo?

logian

Karl Rahner. Such

theological

inclusivism is

commonly

criticized

by

liberal

pluralists

as

patronizing

and

offensive because

it

involves

defining

the

'other'

in terms

of one's

own

interests.

But

in

the

political

domain

and the

world

of

everyday

life,

a

symbiotic

form

of

toleration,

on

the basis of

mutually

inclusive

ideologies,

might

well

be

welcomed

as a

considerable advance

on

most

other

alternatives.

Advocates

of tolerance

in

the

face of

religious

diversity,

then,

can

clearly

appeal

to

a

number

of

arguments,

by

no means

all

of which have

anything

to

do with the

epistemic, truth-seeking

process

of

thinking epitomized by

Mill

and

so

cherished

by

liberal

intellectuals. It is

a

mistake

to

assume

that

a

philosophical preference

for

diversity

of belief and

freedom

of

thought

automatically

leads

in

practice

to

religious

toleration,

or

has

any

privileged

status

over

other

possible

justifications

for it.

RELIGIOUS

STUDIES AND

THE

'WHO'S

RIGHT?'

QUESTION

In

conclusion,

I

wish

to

consider

how academic

religious

studies

might

make

use

of

some

of

the distinctions I

have

mapped

above,

in

dealing

with

issues

of

religious pluralism

and tolerance.

In

a

recent

copy

of the

Spectator,

columnist

A. N. Wilson

tells how

a

number

of

recent

Jewish/Christian

debates have led

him

to

ask

again

'Who's

right?'.

Christians

[he writes]

claim

that

Jesus

was

the

Jewish

Messiah and the Founder

of

the

Catholic

Church.

Jews

believe

that

Jesus

was a

Galilean

holy

man

who

repre?

sented

much

that

was

sublime

in

his ancestral

prophetic

tradition,

and who died

tragically

in

about

the

year

30

of

the

Common

Era.22

Having

studied

the

matter

for

years,

Wilson

says,

he

now

admits

that

he is

reluctantly

drawn

to

the

view that

the

Christian belief

is

unsupported

by

evidence.

'

Far from

proclaiming

a

Decade of

Evangelism

to

convert

the

Jews

and

infidels',

he

concludes,

'

I

wish the

Christians

would

admit

that

they

had

got

this

matter

wrong,

and

that,

had he

ever

lived

to

hear of such

a

thing,

Jesus

would

have been

horrified

by

"Christianity"'.

Suppose

a

practitioner

of

religious

studies

were

called

upon

to comment

on

the

question

posed

by

Wilson,

'Who's

right?'.

What

appropriate

re?

sponses are available? How would one decide, reasonably, morally, which to

choose?

(i)

A

strong argument,

on

postmodernist

grounds,

could be

offered

for

rejecting

the

question

'Who's

right?'

altogether.

At

the

epistemic

level

it is

21

See

especially

Gavin

D'Costa's

own

chapter

'

Christ,

the

Trinity

and

Religious

Plurality'

in

Christian

Uniqueness

Reconsidered,

pp.

16?29.

22

The

Spectator,

4

January

1992, p.

6.




12/14

RELIGIOUS

PLURALISM

227

unintelligible,

presupposing

as

it

does

some

superior

reference-point

from

which

to

arbitrate

between

different

belief-systems.

There

are no

such ab?

solute

reference-points,

no

metanarratives

in

terms

of

which

to answer

the

matter

once

and

for all.

At the

political

level,

moreover,

to

press

the

question

'Who's

right,

as

between

Jews

and Christians?' is

to

risk

exploiting

an

already

glaring

im?

balance

between

powerful majority

and

fragile minority

interests.

A

schol?

arly

crusade

to

settle the

matter

'in

the interests

of

truth',

could

not

take

place

in

a

political

vacuum.

These

are

the

1990s.

Antisemitism and its

allies

lurk

always

in

waiting.

Christian

triumphalism

is

more

selfconfident than

ever

with

the

collapse

of its

communist

enemies.

Popular

millenialist fantasies

are

widespread.

Fermenting

a

showdown

over

Jesus,

a

global

confrontation

between

Jewish

and

Christian

protagonists

(and,

of

course

Islamic

and

secular

ones)

would

be

inviting diplomatic

chaos

and international

disaster,

while

offering

the world's

news,

propaganda

and

public

relations

companies

a

media

coup

matching

the Gulf War.

One

might

indeed have

strong

suspicions

about the

motivation

of

a

journalist

or

publisher,

in

posing

the

question

so

provocatively

at

this time.

Can

anyone

put

pen

to

paper,

on

such

a

subject,

without

betraying

vested

interests of

some

sort? Likewise,

a

branch of the Western liberal education

industry

calling

itself

religious

studies,

which

claimed

to

facilitate academic

debate

on

such

questions

in

the interests

of

'pure

scholarship',

would be

ludicrously

naive,

if

not

criminally

incompetent,

if

it failed

to

recognize

the

political

implications

of

promoting

such

an

illusory

ideal,

in

today's

world.

(ii)

Choosing

like

postmodernism

to

repudiate

the

'Who's

right?'

ques?

tion itself would be

congenial

also

to

conservative thinkers

amongst

Jews

and

Christians. Each

being

convinced

that the

true

answer was

known

only by

divine revelation

received

in

obedient

faith,

they

could well

agree

that

for

pragmatic and strategic reasons such an issue was best left alone, or taken

only

so

far

at

the

scholarly

level

as was

needed

to

define

the

areas

of their

fundamental

differences.

An

'agreement

to

disagree'

on

this crucial

matter

can

be

seen

to

have

much

pragmatic

wisdom

on

its

side. Freed from

the

pressures

of

a

major

rift,

the

parties

can

still maintain

a

respectable degree

of

judicious

cooperation

for

shared

moral

and humanitarian

goals

and

common

action

against

mutual

adversaries.

Embarrassment about the

past,

whether

as

oppressor

or as

oppressed,

can

meanwhile be

dissolved,

little

by

little,

through

gracious

understatement, mutual restraint, and tacit forgetfulness. Respect for other?

ness

is

preserved throughout,

and

neither

party

is

coerced into

selling

out

on

their

heritage.

Loyal Jewish

and Christian

traditionalists,

engaged

in

this

profound

and

delicate

business, may

well be

inclined

to

doubt

whether

an

eclectic and

superficial

subject

like

religious

studies

(as

they

regard it)

can

have

anything




13/14

228

PETER DONOVAN

useful

to

contribute.

Certainly,

pressing

for

answers

to

the

question

'Who's

right?'

will

not

be

thought

at

all

helpful.

(iii)

For those schooled

in

liberal traditions of

scholarship,

it

remains

difficult

to

give

up

the

conviction

that their

primary

task,

indeed their moral

duty,

is

to

try

to

'

get

the

facts

straight

',

by

the best

humanly

available

means,

even

in

matters

of

religious

history

and

interpretation.

If

this involves

un?

settling

the

faithful,

exacerbating long-time injustices,

or

fuelling

the fires of

prejudice

and

hatred,

these

are

regrettable

but inevitable

costs

to

be borne.

The alternative

is

to

allow

people

to

go

on

living

in

a

world

of

errors

and

delusions.

Even when due allowance

is

made

for

the

ideological

distortions

and

colonizing

ambitions

with

which critical

rationality

has

again

and

again

been

contaminated,

there

remains

a

task

for

it

to

do,

so

long

as

there

are

any

matters

of fact

at

all,

any

lasting

constraints

on

claim

and

counterclaim,

interpretation

and

re-interpretation.

Adherence

to

some

basic

principles

of

honesty

and

truthfulness,

it

is

felt,

must

be fundamental

to

any

form of

communication.

That

being

so,

the liberal will

argue,

the

question

about the rival

Jewish

and

Christian

views of

Jesus,

and the

many

possible

positions

and shades

of

meaning

within the articulation

of

those

views,

is

an

entirely legitimate

one

for

scholarly

debate,

and it

ought

to

be

pursued

by

all

available

empirical

and

critical methods

(such

methods

themselves,

of

course,

being

open

to

on?

going

rational

criticism).

If the result of such

scholarship,

as

A. N.

Wilson

claims,

does

in

fact

support

one

view rather than the

other,

there is

a

scholarly

and

(the

liberal

will

argue)

a

religious duty

to

make that conclusion known.

Only

then

will

there

be

the

opportunity

for that reform of incorrect

opinion,

and

consequent

growth

in

understanding,

on

which

all

human

knowing

rests.

If,

in

the

process,

massive

and almost

inconceivable

adjustments

to

tra?

ditional

creeds

and institutions

seem

called

for,

it

will

not

be

for the first

time,

the liberal

will

point

out.

And

as

in the

past,

the

experience

of

adjustment

may

prove

to

be for

the

overall

enhancement,

rather than

the

destruction,

of the

faith of those involved.

'Great is

truth',

after

all,

and

surely

'it

shall

prevail'.

Liberal

thinkers

will

take

it for

granted

that academic

religious

studies

should

stand

with them

in

this

enterprise,

providing

them

with

a

forum and

many

of the

resources

with

which

it

can

best

be furthered.

(iv)

Meanwhile

there

remain the

Pluralists,

in

the

ideological

or

theo?

logical sense, who will approach the question 'Who's right?' committed

to

finding

a

place

for both views.

Rejecting

a

pragmatist

relativism

('all

views

are

right

if

they

work

for those

who hold

them')

the

pluralist

will seek

an

interpretation

which

allows

Jewish

and

Christian

responses

to

be,

in Hick's

term,

equally

'

salvific

'

by

virtue of

some

higher

principle

under

which each

can

be

subsumed.

If the

suggested

reinterpretation

seems,

to

the

faithful,

to




14/14

RELIGIOUS

PLURALISM

229

be

a

denial of traditional

distinctives,

that is

because

they

are

in

thrall

to

the

antagonisms

and

exclusivisms

of the

past.

The world's future

safety

and

security

demands that believers

be

re-educated

to

leave

such

ways

behind

them.

Pluralists,

like

liberals, may

see

religious

studies

as

their natural

ally,

assuming

that the

exposure

of

many

faiths

to

one

another will

inevitably

lead

to

mutual

adjustment

and

gradual

harmonization.

CONCLUSION

Postmodernist, Conservative, Liberal,

Pluralist

-

there ismuch

to

be said for

each

of

those

positions,

in

relation

to

questions

of

religious diversity,

toler?

ance,

and

respect

for difference. But

so

far

as

academic

religious

studies is

concerned,

I

suggest,

no

one

of

these

options

should be favoured

above the

others.

At

most,

religious

studies should commit itself

to

a

pluralism

based

strictly

on

epistemic

principles

;

that

is,

the

recognition

of

human

fallibility

and

the

responsibility

to

take

account

of

all

sides

of

an

issue.

By doing

this

it

can

continue

to

foster

that

precious

human

capacity

for

informed,

respon?

sible

judgement.

And

at

the

same

time it

can

help keep

the

way

open

for the

enlargement of spirit which comes through the interaction of competing

ideas,

not

merely

between diverse

religious

traditions

and

institutions,

but

above

all

within the minds of individual

men

and

women

themselves.

As

Emperor

Ashoka

proclaimed

:

'

Concord

is

meritorious,

to

wit,

hearkening,

and

hearkening

willingly,

to

the Law of

Piety

as

accepted

by

other

people.

'23

John

Stuart

Mill

could

not

have

put

it better.

Department of

Religious

Studies,

Massey University,

Palmerston

Morth,

Mew

Zealand

23

Ashoka,

Rock Edict

XII,

trans,

by

Vincent A.

Smith,

in

Classical

India,

edited

by

William H.

McNeill

and

Jean

W. Sedlar

(New

York:

OUP,

1969),

p.

106.

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