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PETER DELLA SANTI NA

MADHYAMAKA SCHOOLS IN INDIA

A Study of the Madhyamaka Philosophy and of the Division of the System into the Priisangika and

Svatantrika Schools

PETER DELLA SANTlNA

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED DELHI

First Edition: Delhi, 7986 Reprint: Delhi, 1995

MOTIL.AL BANARSIDASS PUBUSHERS PRIVATE UMITED All Rights Reserved

ISBN: 81-20!Hl153-9

Also Ar:lllilllhk Ill: MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007 120 Royapcttah High Road, Mylaporc, Madras 600 004

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PRINTED IN lNDIA BY JAINI!J"Jl)RA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI]A1NEND.I

TO the late Prof. LAL MANI Josm

who laboured tirelessly to shed a brighter light on the vast and profound Buddhist Tradition

and to re~eal it in its rightful role as one r of the great pillars oflndian Culture

CONTENTS

Page FoREwqRo ix INTRODUCTION xiii

I. The Origins of the Madhyamaka Philosophy 1 11. The Principal Exponents of the Madhya-

maka System in India 17 III. The Madhyama ka Philosophy 31 IV. Indian Logic and the Madhyamaka System 48 V. The Origin of the Division 59

VI. The Development of the Controversy 67 Vti. The Development of the Controversy in Tibet 78

VIII. 'The Significance ofThese Interpretations Assessed 94 IX. The Vigrahavyavartani and the Exposition of

the Status of the Valid Instruments of Cognition 103 X. The Refutation of Origination 120

XI. The Refbtation of the First Alternative 130 XII. T he Controversy between Bhavaviveka and

Candrakirti 1-J.O XIII . Bhavaviveka's Independent Syllogism Cr.iticised 155 XIV. The Refittation of the Second Alternative 171 XV. The Refutation of the Third Alternative 184

XVI. The Refutation of the Last Alternative 189 XVU. A Final Look at the Differences benveen the Pra-

sangika and Svatantrika Schools 202 Conclusion

APPENDtx A. An Abridged Biography of the Teacher bSod-nams Sen-ge

APPENDIX B. English, Sanskrit, T ibetan Glossmy

B IBLTOORAPHY

INDEX

219

223 228

232 235

FOREWORD

This book 1s a welcome addition to the growing litera ture in English on the history and philosophy of the mo~t famous school of BudJhisl thinkers known as the ?vladhyamaka. For a thou-sand years ( 100 to 1000 A.D. ) this school held aloft the banner of Buddhist soteriology and gnosiology in India and produced a series of technical treatises (.Mstras) in Sanskrit. Most of these treatises were destroyed by anti-Buddhist fanaticism and vandal-ism carried on first by the Brahmanical Hiadus and then by invading Muslims. Only a small number of Buddhist texts in

th~ir original form has survived not in India but in the neigh-bouring Buddhist lands.

Recently Professor David Seyfort Ruegg has published a short but excellent account of the literature of this school (The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philoiophy in India, Wics-baden: Otto Harrassowitz, 19Bl ). This book for lhe first time presents a systematic history of the Madhyamaka literature in India. Although a history of the Madhyamaka School of Bud-dhist Philosophy is still a desideratum, a number of able scholars have over the years contributed significantly to -our knowledge of several aspects of the Madhyamaka thought. Since the original works of the philosophers of this school are preserved in their Tibetan translations, most of the modern scholars interes-ted in the study of the M adhyamaka doctrines and dialectics are making u se of Tibetan sources. Two recent doctoral disser-tations in this area based on Tibetan materials are still unpub-lished: Language and Existence in Madhyamika Buddhist Philosophy, Oxford University D. Phil. Thesis (1978); pp. 390 by Dr. Paul M artin Williams, and A Q!Jestio11 of Nihilism: Bhavauiueka' s Res-ponse tc the Fundamental Problems of Miidhyamika Philosophy, Har-vard University Ph.D. Thesis {1980) , pp . 482 by Dr. Malcolm David Eckel. An important and valuable work, also a doctoral thesis, based on both the Sanskrit and Tibetan sources has been recently published. This is called Reason and EmjJtiness : A Study of Logic and Mysticism by Dr. Shotaro lida (Tokyo : The

X Foreword

Hokuseido Press, l 980) . Japanese Buddhht scholars have been publishing their valuable researches in the area of the Madhya-maka though t a."ld literature rnostly in Japanese language, and a large number of students of the subject arc not able to read their publications.

Dr. Peter Della San tina's };.fadhyamaka Schools in India: A .Study of the Madh;amaka Philosophy and of the Division of the System into the Prasaiiglka and Sviitantrika Schools is based on the Tibetan sources. He has made use also ofNii~{lrjuna's Mulamadhyamaka-kiirikii with Candrakirti's Prasannapadiiniimamadhyamakazrtti. In his treatment of the philosop..kka l problems which became the centre of controversies l;>ctween the Prasangikas and the Sva-tantrikas, he .. Iargely f6llows the outlines found in the dBu ma spyi ston of bSod''nams Sen ge.

The work is well planned and well executed. In earlier chap-ters the author sets forth early history and basic doctrines of the Madhyamaka School. Here he also discusses elements of Indian forrnallogicwhich appear in thesourcesemployed in sub-sequent chapters. I n a series of four chapters we arc then pre-sented with a detailed picture of the rise and growth of contro-

. versy between the two groups of the Madhyamika thinkers. In a nother series of subsequent four chapters, we have a brilliant discussion of the trenchant critique of the theory of origination of entities offered by the great masters like Nagarjuna, Buddha-pii.lita, Bhavaviveka, and Candrakirti. In course of this discus-sion the reader will find the differences between different sets of arguments against the same theory advanced by the philoso-phers of the two schools. This section also brings to light Bhava-viveka's criticism of the views of the Prasangikas and Candra-kirti's polemics against Bhiivaviveka. The last chapter attempts a kind of summing of the entire work.

The book of Dr. San tina is substantially based on his doctoral dissertation approved by the University of Delhi. It is the 1esult of several years of h is devoted study and patient inte llectual labour. I n spite of his serious physical disabi lities, he swdied Buddhist t hought, mastered Tibetan language to a rema1kable degree, and has set an inspiring example of a heroic struggle for conquest of ignorance and possession of the proverbial 'wisdom eye.' I have no doubt that l,is book will earn for him a place of honour in the assembly of8uddhist scholars in general, and Tibe

Foreword xi

tologists in particular. Students of India's philosophical history will find this a source of much needed knowledge about the subtle and profound teachings bearing on the crucial concep-tions of JUnya and Silllyatua. Here they will find, in readable language and lucid style, an account of the ideas of those ancient Buddhist sages and philosophers who sought to clear the forest of speculative opinions by rationally examining the structure of language and logical reasoning. As a philosophy of philoso-phies, the Madhyamaka System has stood the test of time and advancement of modern thought, and is likely to become a. tong lasting source of intellectual challenge to all thinking minds. I h ope this book will contribute to a better understanding of the M adhyamaka thought and promote further studies into the niceties of and differences between absolute negation (prasajya-pralift .~z.a) and relative negation (paryudasaprat~~tdha ) of any theoretical proposition.

15 January 1983 Haverford College

.,

L. M. JosHr Margaret Gest Visiting Prqfessor in the

Cross-Cultural Study of Religion

INTRODUCTION

The ~1adhyamaka system of philosophy, as it evolved in India and Tibet, has not untn relatively recent times received much attention from modern Indian and Occidental scholars. The study of the Madhyamaka, indeed, lagged far behind the study of the Vedfmta or even ofTheravada Buddhism. This is, perhaps, not surprising, inasmuch as the }v1adhyamaka virtually dis-appeared from the land of its origin centwies ago. Though it continued to flouri sh in Tibet arid Mongol ia, these lands were all but inaccessible to most modem scholars. Hence, it was not untiL relatively late in the history of modern Buddhist scholar-ship, that the existence of a vast quantity of Mahayana Buddhist literature in Sanskrit, Tibetan and .Mongolian was even dis-covered.

The ;nodem study of the Madhyamaka philosophy can there~ fore lJe said to have actually commenced only a scant sixty or seventy years ago. Two great Occidental Indologists, one French and one Russian, must be credited with initiating the serious study of the .Madhyamaka among modern scholars.1 Both these pre-eminent figures, La Vallee Poussin and Thcodor Stcher-batsky, turned their attention to the works of Nagarjuna and Candra.kirti. Stcherbatsky's The Conception of Buddhist NirvtirJa1 remains even today a valuable aid to students of the Madhya~ maka philosophy.

Thereafter, the modern study of t.he Madhyamaka again fell into a petiod of relative neglect, and it was not until the last two decades that the Madhyarnaka again began to receive the atten-tion of Indian and Occidental scholars. Among these recent contributions to the study of the Madhyamaka philosophy, Pro-fessor T. R. V. Murti's The Central Philosophy oJBuddhism3 stands out as a remarkably comprehensive exposition of the Madhya-maka philosophy on the basis of authoritative t .xts. Recent years have also seen the publication of two English translations of the Mulamadhyamalaklirikii of Nagarjuna, the fundamental treatise of the Madhyamaka system, one by Doctor Frederick

ltiv Introduction

Streng4 and tbe other by Dr. Kenneth K . I nada.l> Dr. K . V . Ramanan' and Dr. R. H. Robinson7 have also contributed valuable studies of the M adhyamaka based primarily upon Chinese soarces.

I\"onctheless, the state of our knowledge of the Madhyamaka philosophy is stiU far from satisfactory. Although as we noted,

. the Mulamadhyamakakarikii has recently been n.Vice translated into Engli~h, \4,'C still. .. havc no comp lete translation into English of Candrakjrti 's comrilentary on thi's work, the Prasannapadri. This is a seriot1s defic icnlf:.y.J~c.cause- tll~-kM-ika is extremely cryptic and tends to he unintelligible without the'.aid of an authoritative commentary. Ag-ain, the .~ii.Jryatasaptati and r uktiJaJ!ika of Nagar juna, which are important treatises of the 1.\!ladhyamaka system, have thus fa r not been transla ted into any modern E uropean language. As fo r the works of the other principal exponents of the Madhyamaka like Duddhapali ta, Bhii.vaviveka, Candrakirti, Santideva, Santarak~ita and KamalaSila, only three-the Sik$ii samuccaya8 and Bodhicaryavatara9 of Santideva and the Tattva Saritgralla10 of Santarak~ita have been translated into English whllc another, the Aiadhya.makiioatiira of Candrakirti has been partly translated into Frcnch.11 The Karatalaratna of Bhava viveka has a lso been translated into French.U -T hus, it is evident that our knowledge of the M atlhyamaka p hilosophy is still frag mentary, i11asmuch as a comprehensive picture of the Madhya maka is not readily available to schola,s and students.

This is pcrhap3 why, even today, the Madhyamaka philo sopby is often misunderstood by those who are only superficially acquainted with it. The most conspicuous example of this kind of misunderstanding is the in terpretation of the Madhyamaka, which is popular in some' circle~, as nihilism. This imetprctation, however, does not w ithstand comparison wiili the actual doctrine of the Madhyamaka as it is presented in the original texts of the system. In this connection, it must be notecl that the publica tion of Professor Murti's work has gone a long way toward cor~ recting this facile misltndcrstanding.

Given the still rather inadequate state of our knowledge of the Madhyamaka philosophy, it seems that modern scholars and students who turn their attention to the study of this system would do well to sec themselves as explorers seeking to uncover new areas of knowledge, rather than as arbiters attempting to settle

Introduction XV

conclusively the philosophical problems which they study. This is, in fact, the attitude which we have adopted in carrying out this presen t research.

If, as we have tried to indicate, the state of our knowledge of the Madhyamaka p hilosophy as such is far from complete, it must be said, in all cando1,1r, that our knowledge of the division of the system into the Pd\sangika and Svatantrika schools is all but non-ex.istcnt. There has thus far been not even a single volume p ublished devoted to this problem. We have in fact seen only two articles written by two .Japanese scholars and published in The .Nava-Nalanda i\1ahiivihara Research Publication., Volume Jl3 and in Two Truths n Buddhism and VediJ11tal:rial regarding the philosophy of the Prasangika school and Professor David Eckles's doctoral thesis completed at H arvard University is a study of the philosophy ofBhavaviveka, the fc)un-der of the Sva tantrika school. T hese recent studies will undoub-tedly contribute much to our knowledge of the division of the M adhyamaka system into the two schools, when and if, they be-come available to the general public. We have unfortunately not had the opportun"ity to consult these manuscripts.

I t may be asked why the question ofthc division of the Madh-yamaka system into the two schools has received so li ttle attention from modern scholars. We may suggest that the answer to this question is twofold. In the frrst place, the philosophical problem involved in the division is an extremely difficult one, as is uni-versally acknowleQ.ged by both classical and modern scholars. I n the second place, the original texts of the Svatantrika school, with only two exceptions, the lviadhyamakahrdayakarikii, and Tarka-ju/1[1118 of Bhavaviveka, have been lost in the Sanskrit and are preserved only in Tibetan translations. An additional difficulty is presen ted by the fact that the Svatantrikamadhyamaka philosophy is, in fact, today virtually extinct even among T ibetans.

Although the Svatantrika philosophy was taken up and pre-served by a number of notable early Tibetan ~1adhyamaka scholars, it steadily lost ground over the centuries in T ibet and

xvi l11lroduc lion.

was eventually replaced by the Ptasarigika philosophy which became the orthodox philosophy of the four major sects of the Tibetan Buddhist scholastic tradition.

This situation has in large part determined our own approach to the sludy of the division of the Madhyamaka system into the two schools. Indeed, it was our original intention t.o undertake a comparative study of some of the principal texts, authored by the i(lremost Indian exponents of the two schools, like the Prajiid pradijm of Bhrtv;tvivek.'l..and Prasannapada of Candraki:rti. It, how-ever, became immediately apparent that if we were to attempt a direct study of texts like ~ Prapiilpraiiijlfl and Prasannapada, it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the roperly speaking, gene1al expositions of the Madhyamaka philosophy, hence, the passages contained in them which have a direct bearing on the problem we had undertaken to study are necessarily few and fl1r between. The attempt to extlact the relevant portion.s from lengthy treatises like the two cited above would therefore obvi~ ously be most time consuming and laborious. 1\foreover, texts like the Prajniij1radipa, a \though preserved only in Tibetan trans lation, have not been actively studied hy Tibetans for many years. Thus, the search for someone able to competently eluci date their meaning to us seemed little short of hopeless.

Given these considerations, we concluded that we would do better by making use of a recognised and authoritative indigen ous Tibetan exposition of the origin, natme and development of the division between the two schools. This, it seemed clear, would enable us to approach the philosophical problem which

we had undertaken to study more efficiently and with more satis-factory results.

The usc of an inrligenous Tibetan exposition for the purpose of studying the division of the Madhyamaka system into the Pra-sarigika and Svatantrika schools is easily justifiable, since the controversy between the two schools which had begun in India, was actively pursued in Tibet over the course of several centuries. The Tibetan Madhyamakas were therefore without doubt fully conversant with th~ principal issues involved in the dispute. We selected, for the purpose of our study, the exposition of the clivi~ sion of the Madhyamaka system into the two schools given by the master bSodnams Sen-ge in the work entitled, The Gmeral

Introduction xvii

Meaning of Madhyamaka (dBu-ma Spyi-ston).17 bSod-nams Sen-ge, who lived in the fifteenth century, was not too far removed from the era during which the dispute between the Prasangikas and Svatantrikas was pursued with intensity on Tibetan soil. bSod-nams Sen-ge is, moreover, widely recognised by Tibetans as a peerless expositor of Buddhist doctrine and his explanation of the origin, nature and development of the division between the n-vo schools is accepted by a not inconsiderable portion of the T ibetan scholastic tradition.

vVe have not, however, confined ourselves to merely presenting bSod-nams Sen-ge's exposition of the problem at hand. We have sought to supplement his e-q>osition through a careful consider-ation of some of the original Indian texts of the Madhyamaka system which have direct relevance to the issues involved in the dispute between the two schools. Inasmuch as an acquaintance with the nature of the Madhyamaka philosophy as such is essen-tial for a correct comprehension of the limited philosophical problem of the division between the two schools, we have consi-dered some of the important works of the founder of the system, Nagarjuna. These include the Mulamadhyamakakiirika,18 the Sunyatiisaptati,u the VigrahfUJyiivarlani," and the Ratttdvali.n In addition, we have made use of Candrakirti's commentary to the Miilamadh_vamakakarikd, ~e Prasannapadd,22 which takes up in the first chapter the questions raised by Bhavaviveka's criticism of the approach of the Prasangika.

We have developed our interpretation of the division of the Madhyamaka system into the Prasangika and Svatantrika schools alorig the lines suggested by bSod-nams Sen-ge. bSod-nams Sen-gc maintains that the principal issue which divided the two schools is an epistemological or pedagogical one. According to him, the Prasangikas and Svatantrikas differed over the question of the character d the arguments which were to be employed by the Madhyamaka, in order to bring about an understanding of the doctrine of the Madhyamaka, on the part of opposing philo-sophers. bSod-nams Sen-ge holds that there are no very great ontological or philosophical differences between the two Madhya-maka schools. What distinguishes them is the character of the arguments which they employed in order to convince their oppo-nents of the truth of the philosophy which they mutually shared.

It must here be mentioned that there does exist another inter

XVlll Introduction

pretation of the natUJ'e of the division between the two schools; the foremost exponent of which is the Venerable Tson-Kha-pa, the father of the dGe-lugs-pa order of Tibetan Buddhists. Accor-ding to him, the issue which divided the two schools is not that of the character of the arguments to be employed against oppo-nents of the Madhyamaka, but rather a philosophical difference involving the acceptance of a particular kind of real existence of entities on the part of the Sviitantrikas. According to his inter-pretation, the Sv;i.tantrikas accepted the existence of entities by virtue of their characteristic marks.23 This existence of entities by vi~tue of their charact~ri;:tic"fnarks, Tsm1-KI!a::pa holds, is not at all accepted by Prasangikas, ~)lris-cons-tTi-utek the principal difference between the two schools. It is clear that this interpre--tation given by Tson-Kha-pa emphasises ontological or philo~ sophical difference between the two schools. It is equally clear that Tson-Kha-pa's interpretation is at variance with that offered by bSod-nams Scn-gc. .

For our part, we have not attempted to deal with the inter-pretation of the division betv;cen the two schools given by Tson-Kha-pa. To do so, would have required the vast expansion of this present study; an expansion which was precluded by tempo-ral limitations. :Moreover, Tson-Kha-pa's interpretation of the division between the two schools has already, to a very limited extent, been brought to the attention of modern scholars and students while bSod-nams Sen-gc has not. It, therefore, seemed better to devote ourselves to bringing out an interpretation of the division which has at least an equal claim to legitimacy and which has thus far escaped the notice of modern Indian and Occidental scholars. 2"'

Our study of the Madhyamaka philosophy and of the division of the system into the. two schools is roughly divided into three parts, the first, introductory, the second, general and the third, specific. In chapters one through tour, we have examined the origins and fundamental conceptions of the Madhyamaka philo-sophy. The principles oflndian formal logic, which are to figLtre prominently in our subsequent discussion of the arguments em-ployed by the Pnhangika and Svatantrika schools, are introdu-ced.

Chapters five through nine deal with the origin and develop-ment of the controversy between the two Madhyamaka schools

Introduction xix

in !ndia and in Tibet. We have tried to focus upon and disc~.lSS some of the principal issues around which the controversy bet~ ween the two schools centred. Our discussion of the philosophi cal problem at hand in this and in the last part of the text by and large follows the outlines suggested by bSod-nams Sen-ge in the dBu-ma spyi-ston. . . .

Chapters ten thro~gh sixteen are devoted to the examination of the arguments advanced by the Madhyamakas against the concept of origination or causality. The arguments advanced by Nagfujuna, Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka and Candrakird against the concept of origination are presented and discussed in detail. Tl:lrough the consideration of the arguments advanced by the principal Indian exponents of the two Madhyamaka schools against the concept of origination, the characteristic diffe-rence in the arguments employed by the Prasailgikas and Sva tantrikas becomes apparent. The polemics advanced by Bhava-viveka and Candrakirti agai~st the arguments employed by the Prasangikas and Svatantrikas respectively are examined.

The final chapter of our study falls somewhat outside the. tri-partite division suggested above. This i~ because in it we have1 attempted to recapitulate the essential points made throughout the course of the text and to pre~ent some additional information regarding a number of the secondary differences between the two Madhyamaka schools. bSod-nams Sen-ges exposition of the method of argument advocated by the Prasangikas is also sum~ marised in the final chapter.

It must be stressed that we do not in the least pretend to have offered a comprehensive study of the Madhyamaka philosophy and of the division between the Prasailgikas and Svatantrikas. Our approach has been selective and we have not attempted to examine directly the vohtminous texts of the Svatantrikas pre-served in Tibetan translations. Neither can our study claim to be altogether impartial, since we have been guided throug~hout by the interpretation given by bSod~nams Sen-ge who was him-self a Prasangika. Again, no attempt has been made to settle finally the question of the relative merits of the doctrines of the Pnisangika and Svatantrika schools. Given the present state of our knowledge of the Madhyamaka and of the philosophies. of the two schools, any such attempt would certainly be premature.

Nonetheless, we do venture to hope that this present study does

lntroductWn

contribute in some degree, however small, to our knowledge of the Madhyamaka philosophy and of the division of the system into the Prasangika and Svatantrika schools which has so far remained an enigma to modem scholars and students. A viable interpretation, based upon an authoritative original text, of the principal difference which divided the two Madhyamaka schoo~ has been presented, perhaps for the first time. In the process some light has been thrown upon the development of Madhya-maka philosophy and logic in India, particularly over the period extending from the. second to the sixth centuries c.E. It may also be added that despite the reservations expreSsed above re-garding the impartiality of our study, we believe that the picture of the Svatantrika doctrine which emerges from these pages is not a distorted one.

Mention mwt also be made of another problem which inevit-ably faces any writer who seeks to express the concepst of ancient Indian philosophy in a modern European language. It is the problem of terminology. The selection of terms capable of ex-pressing adequately the concepts of Buddhist philosophy has in the past, and continues even today, to ocCasion considerable controversy among modern scholars of the subject. Indeed, an other fifty or one hundred years may easily be required before an acceptable and standardised modern lexicon is evolved capable of satisfactorily translating the concepts of Buddhist philosophy into English and other European languages.

Since this present study is occupied with the discussion of the Madhyamaka philosophy, and to a lesser extent with that of Indian formal logic both of which contain numerous technical concepts, we have had to employ a very large number of technical terms throughout the course of the text. In the choice of English tenns for translating the concepts of the Madhyamaka philos-ophy and logic, we have been guided by two principal consi-derations: linguistic and functional. Thus it has been our attempt to conform insofar as possible, in our English rendering_ of Sanskrit or Tibetan technical terms lo the original linguistic signification of the terms. We have, however, resorted to func-tional translations in cases where the literal rendering of the ori-ginal tenns seemed unduly awkward in English a."l.d where the fWlctional equivalence of the original terms with the English terms was sufficiently clear. This was particularly found to be

Introduction xxi

desirable in the case of the translation of a number of technical terms used to express logical concepts.

In all this, however, one point must be stressed. The use of a technical vocabulary of any sort presupposes a cettain familiarity on the part of the reader with the universe ~f discourse in which the terms are being used. Keeping this in mind, we have tried to indicate the philosophical context in which the terms we have employed operate. Thus, it is hoped that our use of a technical vocabulary which was, given the nature of our subject, inevitable, will not present an insuperable obstacle to the comprehension of the ideas we have tried to convey. Moreover, for the benefit of those conversant with Sanskrit and Tibetan, we have supplied the equivalents in those languages of the technical terms used throughout the text.

Finally, it must be admitted that we have had no training in formal Occidental logic. We have, therefore, not attempted to correlate our description of the logical problems taken up in this study with any system of formal Occidental logic. Whether or not the picture of Indian and Madhyamaka logic which emerges from our treatment is wholly or partly comparable with any existing system of formal Occidental logic is a question which others may feel free to attempt to answer.

We are deeply indebted to a great many individuals for the completion of this present study. First, and foremost, we should like to give our very special thanks to H. H. Sakya Trizin without whose help this study would never have been even begun. Very special thanks are due to the Venerable Khenpo Appey Rin-poche, Principal of the Sakya Institut~ of Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy, Dehra D un, India and to the Venerable Lobsang Dakpa and Venerable Migmar Tsering also of the Sakya Insti-tute for the extensive instruction and assistance which they provided us in the study of our principal original text, the dBu-ma-spyi-ston ofbSod-nams Sen-ge. We must thank our eminent and able advisors from the Department of Buddhist Studies of the University of Delhi, Dr. K. K .. Mittal and Geshe G. Gyatso for their invaluable advice and encouragement.

We should also like to thank ShriHarshKumarofSt. Stephens' College and the Department of Sanskrit of the University of Delhi for his gracious help in the study of the Sanskrit texts of the Vigrahar~iivartani and the Prasamw.padii . . Thanks are also due

xxii Intr()duction

to T . C. Dhongthog:Rinpo.che, former librarian of T ibet House, New Delhi, for his indispensable aid in the preparation of a~

. English ~ansJation of the biography of bSod-nams Sen-ge. we also .owe our thanks to Mr. Sonam, Lecturer in T ibetan, School of Foreign Languages, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, for his help in the preparation of the English, Sanskrit and Tibetan . glossary found at the end of this text. I am deeply indebted to Professor L. M. Joshi, for his constant encouragement and valuable suggestions and for his contribut ion of the Foreword to this volume. Thanks are also due to Venerable Lozang Jamspa.l, Venerable Ngawang Sam ten Chophel and Mr. Indu Dharan for their generous help. Last, but certainly not ]east, I should like to express m'y deepest appreciation to my wife Krishna for the immeasurable effort, dedication and patience which she devoted to the preparation of this manuscript.

REFERE NCES

I. Poussin La Vallee, 'R'fozions', 'Buddhi,a', Haruo.rd J Qtlrnal of Asian .Studies, 1937. Poussin. La Vallee, 'Mtuihyamoka' in H astings Encyclopa~dia of Religion arvl Ethi~ in 1915; Stcberbauky Th. N~a, Du dui Richtungen in rkr Philosaphu dts Buadhimzus, R=ik Orjentaijstyczny X. 1934, pp. 3-37.

2. Stcherbatsky. Th. The CoTJCtptitm of Buddhist Nirtarza . 1927. 3. Murti, T. R. V., Tk Central Philosqp!rJ ofBuddhiJm, London, 1955. 4. Streng, Frederick], EmptiMSs- A Sludy in R1ligwus Meaning. New York,

1907. 5. I nada, Kenneth K., Niigtirjtma: A lranslatW11 !if his MGlamiidhyamika-

klirilcll with an l ntrxluctory Essay. Tokyo, 1970. 6. Ramanart, K. V., .NagarjWUI's Philosophy. Varanasi, 1970. 7. Robi.o.sQn, Richard H., Early Miidhyamika in India and ChiruJ. London,

1967. B. Bendall, Cecil and Rouse, W. H . D. (Tr.), Si~li-samucca;a. Motilal

Banarsidau, Delhi, J9il. 9. Matics, Marion L. (Tr.), Badhi&4rydDat4ra, New York, 1970.

I 0. Jha, Ganganath (Tr.) Tattvasamgralus. 2 Vols. Gaekwad Oriental Ser ies, N os. LXXX and LXXXII, 1937, 1939.

II. Poussin, La Vallee, Le M useon, 1907, 1910, 191 1. 12. Tran1latcd by Poussin, La Valle~ us Maluiyanatiilaratna Sdstra (Lf.

Joyau dans la Mai~) in MCB ii (1932-1933). 13. Kaj iyama, Y. Bhdvaviveka and the Prdsangika Schoal. Mookerjee, Saikari

(ed.). The Nava-Niilanda-Mahavih.ara Research Publication. Vol. I , Patna, 1957, pp. 289-331.

/ntrodu&tion xxiii

14. Jida, Shotara, Tlu NaJuu of Sanrorti and tlu RelatioNhip of Param4rtha to it in Solflail.trika-Madlryamika. Sprung M. {Ed.), Two truths in Buddhisrn and V,Jd,ta. Dordrecht-Holland. 1973, pp. 64-77.

15. Guenther, H. V., Buddhist PllilDsophy in TJwry Q7Jd Prac~e. London. 1976,

16. Murti, T. R. V., Tlu Cmlral Philosophy of Buddhism. p. 98. 17. tiB~MM-sJIYi-.rkln, published by Sakya College, Mussoorie, 1975. 18. English t:rarulations ofKa.rik~ from the MOlamadhyami.A:akdrika, found

in the text, are b ased upon a comparative study of Dr. K. Inada's translation and the original Sansluit text. Vaidya, P. L. (cd.) Mtldhyamakasdstra of Nagar juna. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts-No. 10. PubliJhed by The Mitbila Institute. Darbhariga. 1960. pp. 1-259.

19. A thus far, unpublished EngliSh translation of the SUIIyat4saplati along-with its autocommcntary was made by the Venerable L. jamspal and the author from the Tibetan translation preserved in the bsTan-'gyur (mDo. XVII. 4-) in Delhi. 1973-74.

20. English translations from the Vigrahavyioartard and its autocommen tary are baaed upon a comparative study of Satkari Mookereje's English rendet" ing of the work, published in The Nava-Nalanda Mahavihara Research Pub-lication. Vol I. Patna, 1957 (Tiu Absolulist's Stand/X}inl in Logic. pp. 1-175) and the original Sanskrit text edited by Vaidya, P. L. Op. cit. pp. 277-295.

21. Translated and edited by Hopkins,Jeffrey and Lati, Rimpoche with Klein, Anne entitled T1u Precit>us Garland and the Songs of tire Four Mintffubw}.t (The wisdom of Tibet Series-2 ). George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1975.

22. References to this text are based upon a compatative study of Pro-ft:Jsor Stcherbatsky's translation. Th Co~~&eption of Bwfdhi.st Nirfk'l(la and the original Sanskrit text edited by Vaidya P. L., Op.cit. pp. 1259.

23. ~ .... , 24. The worb which nave thUJ far been published on the question seem

to suggest an acquaintance familiarity with Tson-Kha-pa.

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF THE MADHYAMAKA PHILOSOPHY

While the Madhyamaka as a systematic philosophy arose only in the second century C. E. with the figure of the great scholar and saint acarya Nagarjuna, the essentials of the Madhyamaka were anticipated by the earlier Buddhist tradition, as it developed out of the teachings of the Buddha Sakyamuni. We may say right at the outset that we do not subscri~e to the interpretation, offered by some, according to which the Mahayana in general, including the Madhyamaka system, is regarded as an incongru ous development within Buddhist philosophy. On the contrary, we maintain that the Madhyamaka represents a legitimate inter-pretation of th.e original teaching of the Buddha. This conten-tion is supported by substantial canonical evidence of quite an early date. Our interpretation is also ft!lly supported by certain modern scholars, such as Professor T. R. V. Murti who goes so far as to endorse the Madhyamaka's claim to represent the quint-e88ence of the teaching of the Buddha.1 Due credit must be given to Professor Murti for providing a lucid description of the Mad-hyamaka system which does justice to the importance of this central philosophy of Buddhism.

The essentials of the Madbyamaka system were anticipated by the Buddha, as is evident even from the Pali sources. The tetra-lerruna (Catu~o!i), which is so characteristic of the Madhya-maka, is met with at numerous places within the Pali canon, as is the concept of the void or emptiness (siinyata) . It should also be recalled that the Law of interdependent origination (prati-tyasamutpada) is universally acknowledged by all the Buddhist schools, including the Madhyamaka, to be the essence of the teaching of the Buddha. Moreover, the characteristic interpre-tation of the law of interdependent origination in the Madhya-maka philosophy is possible in complete agreement with the utterances of the Buddha, even as they are recorded in the Pali dialogues. This will be shown through relevant citations.

In addition, the direct precursors of the Madhyamaka philo-sophy were the Prajnaparamita Siitras. The close affinity bet-

2 1Hadhyamaka Schools in India

ween the :Madhyamaka, as a systematic philosophy, and the philo-sophy of the Prajnaparamita literature has perhaps not escaped. anyone who has turned his attention to these matters. W e shall attempt to illustrate this affinity with the help of a number of specific citations later in this chapter. The fact that the Madhya- - maka system is obviously indebted to the Prajfiaparamiti Sutra11 _ for much of its philosophical content, also attests, in part, to the antiquity of its origins. Indeed, it is now accepted that at least one of the Prajiiaparamita Sutras is of a quite early date.

The dialectical analysis employed by the Madhyamaka is evident in the presentation of the fourteen inexpressibles (avya-krta) found in the Pali canon.These fourteen alternatives, \~hich the Buddha refused to assent to, arc met with at a number of places within the Pali dialogues. 2 The fourteen propositions which the Buddha Sakyamuni refused to assent to arc as follows: 1 . that the world is eternal, 2. that the world is not eternal, 3. that the world is both eternal and not eternal, 4. that the \~a'rld is neither eternal nor not eternal, 5. that the world h finite, 6. that the world is not finite, 7. that the world is both fini te and not finite, 8. that the world is nei1hcr finite nor not. finite, 9. that the Tathagata

exists after death, I 0. that the Tathagata does not exist after death, 11. that the Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death, 12. that the Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist

. ~fter death, 13. that the self is identical with the body, 14. that the self is different from the body. The Buddha refused to agree to any of the above propositions when they were put to him by the wanderer Vacchagotta.

The structure of the presentation of the fourteen inexpressibles is dialectic. The primary alternatives are the eternalist and the nihilist. The former affirms the existence of a transcendental ground of phenomena, while the latter denies the existence of . any such ground. It is quite likely that the Buddha could have had before him the eternal matter (prakrti) of the Sankhya and the materialist's denial of the nonemperical, as examples of the two primary alternatives. .

The first two sets of four alternatives seek to determine whether the world is limited in time and in space. The etcrnalist affirms that the world is eternal and unlimited, while the nihilist main-tains that jt has temporal and spatial limits.

The propositions regarding the existence or non-existence of

The Origi1zs of the Madhyamaka Philosophy 3

the Tathagata after death refer to the reality or unreality of an unconditioned mode of being. The phrase 'after death' (para-mara"Q.at) signifies an existence apart from all phenomena. The former altemative affirms the reality of unconditkned exis-tence, while the latter denies the possibility of such eltistence .

. The two primary alternatives, the ctcrnalist and the nihilist, are also reflected in the last two propositions mentioned in the fourteen. In this case, the eternalist affirms the e>cistence of a transcendental principle, i.e., the self or soul, independent of the psycho-physical states, while the nihilist or materialist maintains that there exists nothing apart from the psycho-physical states. The latter view was in fact advocated, in the Buddha's own day, by the materialist Ajita Kesa Kambalin.

The fourteen propositions enumerated in the avyakrta consti-tute mere conceptual constructions which are superimposed upon the nature of reality. They are intellectual falsifications which only obscure and bifurcate the real (tattvam). They purport to provide accurate descriptions of reality when, in fact, they simply distort it. The fourteen proposhions are, therefore, fit to be rejected as the useless fabrications of speculative philosophers.

The Buddha discarded all theories in the Brahmnjala-Sutta of the Digha Nikiiya, as dogmatism ( dinhivada), and refused to be drawn into the net (jala). 3 The wanderer Vacchagotta asked the Lord : why he did not answer the fourteen questions presented in the avyakrta definitely while other philosophers did so and whether he had any theory of his own. The Lord answered in the Majjhima Nikaya l, discourse no. 72, "The Tathagata, 0 Vaccha, is free from all theories ... Therefore the Tathagata has atlained deliverance and is free from attachment, inasmuch as all imaginings, all agitation, all false notions, concerning an Ego or anything pertaining to an Ego, have perished, have faded away, have ceased, have been given up and relinquished." The Lord said, ''To hold that the wodd is eternal or to hold that it is not, or to agree to any other of the propositions you adduce, Vaccha, is the jungle of theorising, the wilderness of theorising, the tangle of theorising, the bondage and the shakles of theorising, attended by ill, distress, perturbation, and fever; it conduces not to detachment, passionlcssness, tranquility, peace, to knowledge and wisdom of Nirviil)a. "5

Malunkyaputta reflected, " ... that the Tathagata exists after

Mad/ryam4ka Schools in India

death, that the Tathagata does not exist after death, that the Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death, that the Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death-these' the Blessed one does not explain to me." ' Again Vacchagotta asked the Lord, "Gotama, where is the monk reborn whose mind .. :. is thus freed? (The Lord rcplicd)- Vaccha, it is not true ~9'. say that he is reborn.-Then, Gotama, he is not reborn. Vaccha; it is not true to say that he is not reborn. -Then, Gotama, he is . both reborn and not reborn. - Vaccha, it is not true to say that he is both reborn and not reborn. - Then, Gotama, he is neither reborn, nor not reborn. -Vaccha, it is not true to say that he is neither reborn nor not reborn."'

The Buddha was aware that the fourteen propositions, presen-ted in the avyakrta, reflect the primary alternatives of eternalism and nihilism. He explains the reason for his silence to Ananda, after Vacchagotta had departed. "If, Ananda, when asked by the Wanderer: 'Is there a self?' I had replied to him; 'There is a self', then Ananda, that would be siding with the recluses and Brahmins who are eternalists. But if, Ananda, when asked 'Is there not a self?' I had replied that it does not exist, that, Ananda, would be siding with those recluses and Brahmins who are annihilationists."' . The structure as well as the content of the fourteen inexpressi-bles of the Pali canon is exactly paralleled in the M illamadhyamaka-kiirika and other works of Nagarjuna. Thus, he writes, "If the world has limits, how could there be another world? Again, if the world has no limits, how could theie be another world? The continuity of the function of the aggregates (skandhas) is like the continuity of a flame, and so it is not possible to speak of limi ts and non-limits."9 Again, in theRatnavali Nagarjuna writes, "Sights, sounds and so forth were said by the conqueror neither to be true nor false .. . . Thus ultimately this world is beyond truth and falsehood. Therefore, he does not assert that it really exists or does not. Th~se in all ways do not exist, how could the omni-scient-one say they have hmits or no limits, or have both or nei-ther. " lo Again, in the M ulamadhyamakakarika it is stated, "Since all entities are of the nature of emptine~s ( sunyata), where, by whom and in what manner could such false views on eternity etc. arise."11

Regarding the status of the Tathagata after death, Nagarjuna

The Origins of the Madhyamaka Philosophy 5 writes, "It cannot be said that the Blessed one exists after Nirva1;1a or not or both or neither.''ll Indeed, Sariputta had questioned Yamaka whether the tt'Ue self of the Tathagata is his material fonn and had received a negative reply. Yamaka replied in a similar manne.r to the questions whether the Tathagata is in the material form, or it in him, or different from it and so on with respect to the four other aggregates which make up the empirical individuat Yamaka admitted that the Tathagata is not in the five aggregates collectively, nor is he without the five aggregates. Sariputta then confronted his interlocutor with the conclusion that even in life Yamaka cannot comprehend an essence, the Tathagata. Even in life Yamaka cannot demonstrate that the Tathagata really exists.n Nagarjuna writes, "It cannot be said the Blessed one exists in life, or not, or both, or neither."1'

Regarding the questions concerning the identity or difference of the self and the 'psycho-physical states, Nagarjuna writes that the self is neither identical with nor different from the body, nor both nor neither.1'

The Buddha, indeed, taught that there are two primary views, .. eternalism (bhavadinhi) and nihilism (vibhavadi~~hi). No one adhering to either of these views can hope to be free of the world. Those who realise the origin, nature and contradiction of these two views can be free from the grip of existence ( sari\sat a). The lord said, the world .is used to rely upon duality, it is and it is not, but for one who sees, in accord with truth and wisdom, how phenomena arise and perish, for him there is no is or is not. That everything exists, is Katyayana, one alternative. That it does not is another alternative. Not accepting either of the alter-natives, the Tathagata proclaims the truth from the middle position. til

Nagarjuna has expounded essentially the same .idea. "The Lord" he states, "has taught the abandonment of the concep tions of existence and non-existence."17 "One who conceives of the mirage~like world that it does or does not exist is conse-quently ignorant. When there is ignorance, one is not Iibera-. ted."18 "Ask the worldly ones, the Sankhyas, VaiSe~ikas and the Nirgranthas, the proponents of a person and aggregates, if they .. propound what p~sses beyond existence and non-existence. Hence know that the nectar of the Buddha's teaching is called the profound, an uncommon doctrine passing far beyond exis-

6 Madll.yamaka Schools in India

tence and non-existe.~ce. " iD Nagarjuna makes specific reference to the instructions given by the Buddha to Katyayana in the following stanza. "According to the instructions of Katyayana,' the two views of the world in terms of existence and pan-existence were criticised by the Buddha for similarly admitting . the bifurcation of entities intc> existence and non-existence. " 20 .-'

We have suggested that the Mad hyamaka philosophy is fouti~ ded upon an interpretation of the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of interdependent origination. While th~ Abhidharmika schools, the Vaibba$;kas and the Sautrantikas understood the doctrine of interdependent origination propounded by the Buddha Sakya-muni to mean the temporal succession of momentary and dis-crete existences whtch were in themselves real, the Madhyamaka interpreted the doctrine of interdependent origination to signify the universal relativity and unreality of all phenomena. Acyord-ing to the Mad hyamaka, the doctrine of interdependent origina-tion is meant to indicate the dependence of all entities upon other entities. This is equivalent to their lack of self-existence (svabhava) and emptiness (siinyata).

The interpretation advocated by the Madhyamaka is in com-plete agreement with some of the utterances of the Butldha re-corded in the Pali canon. The following passage from the Maj-jhima .Nikiiya may be offered as evidence of this fact. The Buddha declared that form, feeling and the like are illusory, mere bubbles. "Dependent on the oH and the wick" (Buddha declared) "does light in the lamp burn; it is neither in the .one nor in the other, nor anything in itself; phenomena are, likewise, nothing in them-selves. All things arc unreal, they are deceptions, Nibbana is the only truth.'' 31

In the Siinyatiisaptati Nagarjuna writes, " Since the own-being of all entities is nol in (the individual) causes and conditions, nor in the aggregation ofeauses and conditions, nor in any entity whatsoever, i.e., not in all (of these), therefore, alJ enti ties are emp ty in their own being."21 In the Ratnavali it is also stated, "when this exists that arises, like short when there is long. Wh~n this is produced, so is that, like light from a fl.ame. When there is long there must be short; they exist not through their own nature, just as without a flame light too does not arise."*3 Again

. Nagarjuna points out that the Buddha declared that elements are deceptive and unreal. Therefore, he says, "The Buddha

The Origins of the Madhyamaka Philosophy 7 simply expounded the significance of emptiness (siinyata).2' He has also said in the Sunyatdsaptati that whatever originates dependently as well as that upon which it depends for its ot igi nation do not exist.'5 Nagarjuna precisely indicates the stand point of the Madhyamaka in the following stanza found in the Millamadhyamakakiirika. "We declare that whatever is inter dependently originated is emptiness ( sunyata). It is a conceptual designation of the relativity of existence and is indeed the middle path. "28 No element can exist" he writes, "which does not participate in interdependence. Therefore no element which is not of the nature of emptiness can exist. "17

Moreover, even on the evidence of the Pali canon, the Buddha appears to have regarded the doctrine of emptiness (siinyata) as the real essence of his teaching. The Buddha spoke of the monks of the future period in the following way in the Samyutta Nikiiya. "The monks will no longer wish to hear and learn the suttfmtas proclaimed by the Tathagata, deep, deep in meaning, reaching beyond the world, dealing with the void (suiinata patisamyutta), but will only lend their car to the profane suttan-

ta~ proclaimed by disciples, made by poets, poetical, adorned with beautiful words and syllables."t$ This passage found in the Pali canon clearly supports the Madhyamaka contention that the doctrine of emptiness reptesents the real heart of the teaching of Sakyamuni.

Although the Buddha undoubtedly formulated a doctrine of elements (dharma), it is evident that the Buddha meant it to have only provisional utility. In the Alaguddupama Sutta, the Buddha compares the doctrine of elements to a raft. Once the goal has been attc:i:ined and the ocean of existence has been crossed, the doctrine ought to be discarded since its utility has then been exhausted.t9

Indeed, Professor Murti has rightly indicated that while the .doctrine of clements can be without difficulty subordinated to the doctrine of emptiness, the reverse is not possible.ao The statements of the Buddha which speak of emptiness and of the unreality of all phenomena cannot be understood in any other way than as the ultimate teaching. These consideratic,ms suggest the division of the truth into the phenomenal (samvrti) or conventional (sar:hvyavahara) and the ultimate (paramartha) which is employed by the Madhyamaka. A similar distinction

8 Madhyamaka Schools in India

is suggested with respect to the canonical scriptures which may be divided into those of expedient import (neyartha) and those of direct import (nitiirha). Mention must here be made of another important element present in the teaching of the Buddha from its very inception. This is the concept of ignorance (avidya) which is regarded as. the cause of illusion and bondage. A concept closely associated with that of ignorance is that of imagination or conceptualisa-tion {vikalpa) which according to the Buddhist view is responsi-ble for the character of one's perception of reality. ,As it has been suggested, the~e concepts were central to Buddhist philosophy from the outset, though it must be admitted that the full extent of their signlfkance did not become apparent until the advent of the Madhyamaka.

Even the Abhidharmika philosophy which attempted the fint systematic synthesis of the Buddha's teaching in conformity with a realistic and pluralistic ontologyattributed the notions of sub-stance, permanence, the whole and the universal to subjective conceptualisation (vikalpa). According to the Abhidharmika philosophy, these conceptualisations are uncritically imposed by ordinary people upon what are in reality momentary and particular elements. Imagination conditioned by ignorance fashions the notions of the self and the permanent, which in turn result in attachment, aversion and delusion.

The Sautl.~antika school of the Abhidharmika philosophy was a very vigorous form of the critical attitude of early Buddhism

The' Origins. of the Madhyamaka Philosophy 9 tion of imagination and false notions was liberation. This doc-trine is further elaborated in the Prajnaparamita literature and is one of the fundamental conceptions of the Madhyamaka philo- sophy.

The semicritical philosophy of the Abhidharmika schools, the Vaibha~ikas and the Sautrantikas was only a preliminary step. The inadequacy of the doctrine of elements became increa-singly apparent to critically minded philosophers like the Bud-dhists. It is, thus, not surprising that the earlier phase of Buddhist systematic philosophy should have in time led to the wholly critical philosophy of the Madhyamaka.

The following passage is contained in the Ktii;apapariuarta portion cf the Ratnakiifa Siitra, one of the earliest texts of the Mahayana. "Oh Kasyapa, substance (atma) is one alternative. Insubstantiality (nairatmya) is another alternative. That which is the middle path avoiding these two alternatives is formless, unpercdvable, non-abiding, unapprehendable, indescribable and uncontainable. It is, Oh Kasyapa, called the middle path. '.'33 Nagarjuna expresses the same ide. in the Ratniiuali. He states that there is a position (pak~a ), hence there is a counterposition

(pratipak~a) . Neither of them is real." This conception of the inconceivable and indescribable nature of reality which transcends the categories of thought is further amplified in the Prajiiapammita literature.

The oldest of the Prajiiapiiramitd Siitras was probably the A!tastiha.frika Prajriiiparamitii. It is likely that the Satastihasrik4 Prajiiiip11mmitti., the Paiicauiliuatisdhasrikii Prajn(ipti.ramita, the Saptaiatikii Prajiiaparamilii and the Prajiiiipiiramitiihrda:ra Sritras, were expansions and abridgements of tl1c former. This is con-trary to the opinion often held according to which the Siihasrikd Prajtiiipiiramitii Sr1tra is thought to have been abridged into the A!tasiilwsrikii and so on . Professor Murti however cites the evidence afforded by H aribhadt"a's 'conunemary to' the Abltisam-ayiilatikara in support of the above interpretation.

The A!tasiihasrika Pra)Mpiiramilii wns translated into Chinese in I 72 C.E. by Lokarak~a. This fact kads Professor .Murti to suppose that the A~!asahasrikii probably dates from the first cen-tury B.c. if not earlicr.86

The predominant theme of the Pr:ljJ)~p~lrmnita literature is that there is no changcordccay, noorigination, extinction, coming

10 Madhyamalca Schools in India

or going, no identity, no differentiation, no self, not-self, exis-tence, non-exi~tence and so on. All the above are merely imagi-ned by the ignorant. The reality of the aggregates, elements and the like is rejected. The qoctrine of interdependent origination is interpreted to mean the essential relativity of all phenomena which exist dependently. The insubstantiality of the per~on (pudgalanairi'ltmya) which was central to the Abhidhann'ika systems is extended to include all entities ( dharmanairatmya). All phenomena, therefore, according to the Prajiiaparamita

~

literature, are devoid of self-existence (nil;lsvabhava) and empty (Su'!.)'a). The division into. the two truths, conventional and ultimate is also suggested in the Prajfiaparam~ta literature as is the doctrine of the non-differentiation of the phenomenal and the ultimate.

We shall now proceed to consider a number of pas~ages from the PrajMt"paramita literature and to compare them with some of the statements of Nagarjuna. Inasmuch as the Prajiiapiira-mita literature is admittedly voluminous, we have for our pur-poses chosen to consider only the verse summary of the AJtasaha-srikli Prajnaptiramita and the Prajiiaparamitahrdaya Satra which in themselves provide a reasonably comprehensive representa-tion of the philosophical content of the Prajnaparamita litera-ture as a whole.

In the verse summary of the AJtasahasriktl Prajiiaparamita~Siltra it is stated, "The Bodhisattva finds that all these dharmas are entirely empty ...... When the Bodhisattva does 'not course in form, in feeling, or perception, in will, or consciousness, but wanders without home, remaining unaware of coursing firm in wisdom, his thoughts on non-origination- then the best of all the calming trances cleaves to him. ae In the above passage the rejection of the reality of the aggregates alluded to earlier is abundantly dear. The importance of one of the principal themes of the Madhyamaka philosophy, i.e. the negation of origination is also indicated. In the Prajnaparamitiihrdaya-Siltra it is also stated that in emptiness neither the aggregates (skandhas), sense-spheres ( ayatanas) nor elements ( dhatus) exist.

Nagarjuna indeed rejects the reality of the aggregates in the fourth chapter of the M ii.lamadhyamakakiirikli as well a:. in the

Si1nyatasaptati. His criticism in both works is directed against the notion of the reality of form (rupa) and is intended to be

The Origins of the Madf9'amaka Philosophy 11 applied to the remaining four aggregates. Nagfujuna argues that form cannot exist disassociated from its material cause, i.e. the four great elements (catvarimahabhiitani).37 Form is there fore devoid of self-existence and is thus empty.

Also in the Sunyotasaptati Nagarjuna writes, "If fotm were originated from the great elements, form would originate from an imperfect (cause). " 38 Again the four elements also do not exist, because though it may be thought that their existence is proven through their characteristic marks, their characteristic marks do not exist before the elements themselves. Therefore, inasmuch as the characteristic marks are unproven, the charac-terised elements are also unproven.39 Here too the application. of the logic ofthe equivalence of interdependence and emptiness is evident.

Again Nag{ujuna says that form does not exist, because it is altogether not apprehended.40 Though it may be thought that the existence of form is proved by the perception of it, that per-ception does not exist in reality because it originates from causes and conditions. Again, whatsoever origina:tes from causes and conditions, i.e. originates dependently, is devoid of self-existence and hence it is ultimately not existent. 41

Nagarjuna argues further that inasmuch as the intellect whioh is thought to perceive form as well as form itself are impermanent, i.e. momentary, the latter cannotbeapprehendedbythe former.u

Just as form and the other aggregates which originate depen-dently do not exist in reality, so also all elf!Jllents or entities are empty. The verse summary of the A,tJasiihasrika states, "All ele-ments (dharmas) are not really there, their essential original nature is empty."43 The text further states that the Bodhisattva comprehends all elements as empty, signless, tmimpeded and without any duality. The fundamental contention of the Madhyamaka is indeed that all entities are essentially empty.

Again the independent reality of the foul' cardinal tenets of the Abhidharmika philosophy, i.e. impermanence, suffering, not!.elf and impurity is rejected in the Prajnaparamita literature. Thus, it is stated in the verse swnmary that impermanence and permanence, suffering and happiness, the self and notself, the pure and the impure, are of just one suchness (tathata) in empti~ ness.411

Nagarjuna referring to the same :rour doctrines makes the

12 Madhyamaka Schools in India

following statement in the Miilamadhyamakakarika. " If atman, purity, permanence and bliss are not to be admitted, then like-wise anatman, impurity, impermanence and ~uffering are not to be admittcd. " 46 Here also inasmuch as purity, impurity, and so on ar~ only relative concepts which originate dependent upon one another,47 they are declared not to exist ultimately.

Furthermore the view that notions like existence and non-existence as well as all entities are mere concepts originated from the conceptualising activity of the mind is explicitly ~expressed in the Praj.fUtparamita literature. The verse summary contains the following statement. The fooli.sh imagine existence and non-existence. Non-existence as well as existenc~ they fashion. As facts, both existence and non-existence are not real.48 Apain it is stated that the fool who has admitted into himself the notion ofl and mine is forced by that quite unreal notion of I to undergo birth and death again and again.49 I t is further said in the same text, "As many beings as there are in the low, middle and high (regions of the) world, they have all, so has the Sugata said, been brought about by ignorance."'0

Nagii.rjuna also argues that inasmuch as existence and non~ existence are notions which are only obtained relative to each other neither are rcal.61 He a lso writes in the Ratniivali, "By him who speaks only to help beings, it was said that they all have originated from the conception of I and are enveloped \.vith the conception of mine. " 52 Again he has said, "The wheel of exis-tence (bhavacakra) originates from the pTOpensity for false con-ceptualisation. "53

The ultimate truth as it is described in the Prajiiaparamita literature transcends thought and is inexpressible. Thus, it js stated in the verse summary, that wisdom is free from construe tion and non-discdminating.6' Again, it is said in the s.ame text, "All words for things in usc in this world must be left behind . AU things originated and made m ust be transcended. The death-less, the supreme, incomparab le gnosis is then won. , ;55

Nagarjuna writes in the M ulamadhyamakakiirik.a, " Uncondi-tioned, quiescent, non-conceptualised, non-discriminated and non-differentiated, these are the characteristics of reality."66

The division into the two truths, conventional and ultimate which i~ so characteristic of the Madhyamaka system is also suggested in the Prajflii.paramita literature. As it is stated in the

The Origins of the MaJhyamaka Philosophy 13 verse summary of the A!lasiihasrika, "AI; mere talk, the Bodhi-sattva cognizes all these elements which the Buddha has demons-trated, practised and revealed/'67 In the Mulamadhyamakakiirika Nagarjuna states, "The teaching of the Dharma by the various Buddhas is based on the two truths. Mainly the conven-tional and the ultimate. Those who do not know the distinction between the two truths, do not comprehend the profound nature of the Buddha's teaching."68 The various statements of the Bud-dha are expressions of conventional reality (vyavahiirasatya). They have no ultimate reality. Thus, Nagarjuna indicates that from the ultimate standpoint not any dharma with respect to anyone at any place was ever taught by the Buddha.st

Nonetheless, according to the doctrine of the Prajiiaparamita literature and the Madhyamaka phenomena and ultimate rea-lity are essentially non~differentiated and identical. As it is stated in the verse summary, "The space-element in the eastern direc-tion, and in the southern, and so in the western and northern direction is boundless; above and below, in the ten directions, as far as it J~oes there is no multiplicity, and no difference is attained. Past Suchness, future Suchness, present Suchness, the Suchness of the Arhats, the Suchness of all dharmas, the Suchness of the Jinas--all that is the Dharma-Suclmcss, and no difference is attained."&o Thus, the Enlightenment of the Sugatas, is free from differentiated dharmas. In the Prajiiaparamitahrdaya-Sutra it is also stated, form is not different from emptiness. Emptiness is not different from form.

Nagarjuna writes in the Mulamadhyamakakiirika, "Samsara is nothing essentially different from NirvaJ;la. Nirvii.Qa is nothing essentially different from Sarilsara. " 81 He also states, "The nature of the Tathagata is also the nature of this worldly existence. The Tathagata is without any self-existence (svabhava) and this worldly existence is likewise so."8 :1

Thus, it may be said that the essential teaching of the Prajiia paramita literature is that all entities which originate dependent-ly are ultimately unoriginated, unextinguished and empty. This idea is precisely expressed in the following passage contained in the verse summary of the Aflasahasrikii, "'I11c Bodhisattva who understands interdependent origination (pratityasamut pada) as non-origination and this wisdom as non-extinction, as the rays of the sun free from the covering of the clouds, so he has

14 Madlryamaka Schools in India

dispelled the covering of ignorance. "U ~agarjuna likewise stAnother canonical work of a rel jttively early date which could well have influenced Nagarjuna is the Ratnalcu;a Sutra. About forty Sutras including the Kasyapaparivarta, Pitaputrasamiigama, Upiiliparip,ccM and so on a re included in the Ratnakiif,a class in the Tibetan and Chinese collections.

Thus, it is evident from our considel'ation of the philosophical content of the Prajfi~paramita literature that the doctrine of Siinyata which was systematically expounded by the Madhya-maka was central to it. Yet this 'Linyata should also not be thou-ght to be anything in itself. It should not be seized upon as a position or view. The Samiidhiraja Sutra indicates that while emptiness is the middle path avoiding the two altern a tive.> of existence and non-existence, the wise should also not abide in the middle.6 7 T he standpoi~t of the M adhyamaka is properly speak-ing not a position at all, but a philosophically critical attitude. Naga.rjuna has also d eclared, "The wise ones have said that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Yet it is said that those who adhere to the idea of emptiness are incorrigible."88 It is also significant that among the twenty types of emptiness listed by Haribhadra in his commentary to the Abhisamayalan-kara, the fourth is the emptiness of cmptiness.69 It is, therefore, clear that the emptiness of the Prajiiaparamita literature and of the Madhyamaka system cannot be interpreted as a philosophi-cal position among other philosophical positions. I t is qualitative-

The Origins of the Madhyamaka Philosophy 15

ly different from the doctrines advanced by dogmatic philosophers. In thi~ opening chapter we have attempted to indicate the

philosophical origins of the Madhyamaka system and to illustrate the continuity of the philosophical development within the Bud-dhist tradition from the time of Sakyamuni up to that of Nagar-jt;na. From the evidence we have aduccd, it ought to be abun-dantly clear that the Madhyamaka philosophy represents a logical and perhaps inevitable development out of the earlier Bud-dhist teachings. Thus, the emergence of the Madhyamaka as a systematic philosophy within the Buddhist tradition is by no means inexplicable or incongruous. Indeed, there is ample evi-dence as we have shown to support the Madhyamaka's claim to represent the profound and essential import of Buddhlst philo-sophy as a whole.

RI!.PI!RENCl!S

I. Murti, T, R. V., The CetJtral Philosophy of .Buddhism, p. 55. 2. Referenc::es for avyakrtas from the Pali sources: Mqjjhimo. Nikilya 1

pp. 426-32 (Sutta 63); pp. 483 ff (Sulta 72); Samyui.ta Nik4y4 III, pp. 257 ff (Vacchagotta SamyuUam); Samyukta Nikiiya IV, pp. 374-403 (avyakata Samyuttam}; Makinidana Brahmajiila Sutta (DigM. Nilca,va); Mahdlisutta (DigM.-JVikiiya) Po/IM.pada Sutla ( DigM.-Nikiiya}; Milinda Patlho, pp. 144 ff.

3. Murti, T. R. V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 40. 4. Ibid, p. 45. 5. Ibid, p. 47. 6. Robinson, R. H., Early Mddhyamika in India and China, p. 54, cites

Majjhima Nikaya, 63. 7. Robinson, R. H. ibid, cites Majjhima Nika;~a, 72. 8. Samyutta NiJcaya, pp. 400-401. 9. Ml1lamadhyamakaA:ariJca, XXVII. 21, 22. 10. Ratr1dvali, II. 104-6. 11. .M.Uamadhyamakakariica, XXVII. 29. 12. Ibid. XXV. 17. 13. Murti, T. R. V., The Central Philoso~Ay of BuddJJism, pp. 5354. H. Atiilamadh;amakakarika, XXV. 18. 15. Ibid. XX:Vll. 15, 16, 17 and 18. 16. Majjhima Nikiiya I, p. 65; Udana, p. 33; ltivuUaka, pp. 4344; Sath.Jfllttl

Nikaya!l, p. 16 and 61 ff. I 7. .M ulamadh)amakakarik4, XXV. I 0. 18. Ratnavali, I. 56. 19. Ibid., I. 61-6~. 20. Mtilamadhyamakakarikil, XV. 7. 2!. Murti, T. R. V., The Central Philosoplly qf Budd/Wm, p. 5(). 22. .~ iit~)atd.faptati, Stanza 3 23. Rattltivali I. 48, 49.

16 Madh.yamaka Schools zn India

24. MU/amadhyama/;akiirik4, XIII. 1, 2. 25. Sunyatasaptati, 14 commentary. 26. Op. cit. XXIV. lB. 27. Miilamad~yamakaktlrikll, XXIV. 19. 28. Murti, T. R. V., The Central Philosophy of Buddllinn, p. 31. 29. Ibid, p. 52. 30. Ibid. p. 53. 31. Ibid, pp. 81-82. 32. ibid. p . .:2. 33. Quoted in the Pra.sanrt(lpa!lii commentary to Mulamad~ramakakiirika

XVIII. 6. 34. Ratn?Ioali, II. 104. 35. Murti, T. R. V., The Cmtral Philos()phy ~Buddhism, pp. 83-84. 36. adapted from Conze, Edward: The Perfection ~ Wisdom in Eighl. T!wu

sand Lirus and Its Verse Summary, Chapter I, 8-10, p. 10. 37. Mulmnadhyamakakarika, IV. 1-3. se. .5 un_yatasaptali, 45 39. Ibid. 27 and commentary, Mulamadh,yama/;akdrikii, V. 40. .'iiinynta.raptati, 47. 41. .~zlnyatiuaptati, 4i commentary. ., 42. Szi'!l!ata.rnptali, 49 and commentary. 43. adapted from Conze, Edward, Verse Summary r. 28, p. 12. 44. Ibid. XXVI. 3, p. 57. 45. Ibid. II. 2, p. 13. 46. J.fiilamad"'yamakaA:tirikd XXIII. 22. 47. Ibid. XXIII. 10, II. 48. Con:>.c, Edward. Verse Summary I. 13, p. 10. 49. Ibid. XXII, 6. p. 51. 50. adapted from Verse Summar_v XXVIII. 5, p. 61. 51. .~ unyatiisaptati 19 and commentary;also Mulamad~yamakaA:iirikli, XV. 5,6. 52. Ratniivalf, I. 27. 53. Pralif~asamutplida~rdayaktiriktil.lrtti, Stanza, 5. 54. Com:e, E

CHAPTE~ IT

THE PRINCJP~\L EXP0~3NTS OF THE :VL\DHYA\1.-\.KA SYSTEM I~ INDIA

A$ we noted at the out::ct ofrhe f()fegoingchapter, the ~1adhyamaka as a sy.>tematic philosophy was initiallr fo1mulat:~d by the great Buddhist scholar and saint acarya Nftgft:juna. A great many episodes ofperhap:; a legendary charaGtet have hccn natu-rally as~ociated with the life of this outsLanding religious figure. The popular and traditional accoun!s of the life of acC:uya Nagar-ju na invariably include at least some of these legend,;. :'{onethcless, it is beyond doubt that Nii6a1juna was an historic~tl personality.

A numhet of facts about the acarya's life can. be established with relative certainty. Modern schnlars have i()r the most part tended to believe that Nagiiljuna lived some time durin.~ the later part of the second century. This, however, d()~S not accord. with recent archeological finds which indicate th;:tt )4[1garjuna more probably lived during th~ last quarter of the fi1st and first quarter of the second centuries c.E.t

Nagitjuna was born in the south, in what is.now Andhra and was the son of a Brahmin. He travelled to Nalanda where he received ordination from Rahulahhadra2 and where he appa-rently remained for some time. The later portion of his historical life seem~ to have been largdy spent at Sripa1vata3 in Andhra at the monastery built for him by his fticnd and patmn King Gotamiputra of the Satavahana line of Andhra. Indeed, it wa~ for the King Gotamiputra that Nagi.'ujuna wrote the Suhrllekk1 and Ratnavali.

Among the most important and popular legends associated with the lifi~ cf the great acarya arc those conccming his birth and conversion and his procurement of the Prajii.aparamita Sutras. It is said that at the time ofNagarjuna's birth a prophet foretold that if the child lived he would achieve unsurpassed greatness, but that unfortunately he would not live for more than seven days. By making appropriate offerings to Brahmins and Monks, hi~ parents succeeded in extending his life to a period of seven years: However, it was foretold that beyond that period

18 Madhyamaka Schools in India

nothing could be done to prolo11g his life. Thus, his parents who were unwilling to behold his eminent death sent him away from their abode along with attendants and provisions for a long journey.

I t is said that eventually he came to Nalanda where he became acquainted with the great Brahmin Saraha.' Nagarjuna related the prophecy concerning his impending death to Saraha5 who advised him that his life might be saved if he renounced the world. It is said that Nagatjuna then agreed to do so and was initiated by Saraha into the mandala of Aparamitayus. Throug~ reciting. the dharani of the latter, ~agarjuna was saved from the early death which had been prophesied for him.

Nagarjuna's evident association with the' Praji'iaparamita literature is explained through the following legend commonly associated with his life. It is said that one day while he was en~ gaged in teaching the doctrine to an assembly of listeners, he noti-ced that two of the youths who had been listening to his discourse disappeared beneath the ground when he had finished. The two youths were Nagas who invited the acarya to their kingdom where he is said to have been presented with several volumes of the Praji'laparamita literature. 7 . Acarya Nagarjuna produced works of unequalled excellence in all a reas ofDuddhist philosophy and religion. Even excluding those works traC.itionaHy ascribed to Nagarjuna the authenticity of which cannot be definitely established, Nagarjuna's literary and philosophical contribution to the Buddhist and Indian intel-lectual tradition was immense.

Among the -works definitely authored by Nagarjuna perhaps the most important are the Malamadhyamakakiirikii,8 the Sunyata-soptati, and autocommentary, The YuktiF

The Principal Indian Exponntu 19

objections advanced by realists. From it a clear picture of the standpoint of the Madhyamaka in the area of epistemology and logic emerges. Inasmuch as the Vigrahavy~vartani is particular-ly relevant to our study, an entire chapter has been devoted to it later in the text.

In addition to these works, Nagarjuna almost certainly wrote the Vaida~asiltra and PrakaraQa, the VJavahiirasiddhi, the Suhrllekha, the Ratnlivali, the Catu/;lstava (Nirupama, Lokatita, Cittavajra and Paramartha Stava), the Pratityasamutpadahrdayaklirika and Sii.tra-samuccaya. Among these works, the Vaida~asiUra and Prakara'Qa, the Ratnlivali and Suhrllekha, the Catu{lstava and the Sii.trasamuc-caya perhaps deserve additional mention. The Vaida~asiUra and PrakaraQa is devoted to the refutation of the charges levelled by the realist logicians against the Madhyamaka. The Ratntivali, Suhrllekha and Sutrasamuccaya are interesting in that in them Niigarjuna devotes his attention to the exposition of the practical application of Buddhist philosophy in religious discipline. The Catu!;tstava is composed of devotional stanzas of the highest quality which indicate that Niigarjuna in addition to being a philosopher par excellence was also possessed of a highly developed religi-ous temperament.

In addition to these works, the Prajiiiida7Ja, the MahiiyiiM~ vimsaka, the Upayahrdaya, the Mahaprajiiapiiramitiisastra12 and the Dasabhilmivibhiijasiistra13 are said to have been written by Nagar-juna. The authenticity of all these works is hard to establish beyond doubt, however all of them could well have been com-posed by Nagii1juna. The MahaprajiUipiiramitii!astra is not in-cluded in the Tibetan collection, however the Dasabh ii.mivibhii-

~lisiistra is included. Nagarjuna is also traditionally believed to have authored a great many works in the areas of medicine, alchemy and Tantra.

Nagarjuna's immediate disciple and successor was Aryadeva. He merits a place among the great classical exponents of the Madhyamaka system which is second in importance only to that accorded to Nagiirjuna. Indeed, he must be said to share with the latter the honour of having founded the Madhyamaka system.

As in the case of the life of his master Nagarjuna, the life of Aryadeva as it is traditionally retold is embellished with a great many attractive legends. Nonetheless, in the case of A.ryadeva

20 .Madh,:vamaka Sc!tools in India

also there is no reasonable doubt that he was an historical persona-lity. Nor is there any reason to doubt that he studied at the feet of Nagarjuna. Thus, it may be said with relative certainty that Aryadeva was a younger contempora1y of Nagf~rjuna.

We are told by both Candrakittil" and Taran~tha that Arya-dcva was the son of King Paiicasrng~u; of the island of Sirhhala .

. Aryadeva, though he ascended to the throne of the land, was strongly inclined toward religion and so was moved to renounce the world. He received his m.onastic vows acc01ding to Tara-natha from the abbot Hcmadeva.18 He completed the -i;tudy of the entire Tripi taka in his native land and then travelled to India on pilgrimage to visit the holy places of the vatious regions.

Taranatha says that he met Nagarjuna shortly before the la.ttcr left for Sl'iparvata from the land of King U (iayana.17 Then at Sriparvata he studied under Nagfu:juna. Bu-s ton says that he became proficient in all the branches of science and in all the heterodox and orthodox philosoph~cal systems.IS

According to Taranatha's account, 19 after the death of Nagar-juna, Aryadeva assumed the responsibility. for preserving and furthering the doctrine. He worked for the benefit of living be-ings through study and meditation in the atea around Sriparvata. He constructed twcntyfour monasteries and made all of them centres cf the Mahayfma.

Again, according to Taranatha, there was at th.:lt time a Brah-min called Dm-dhar~akala,zo who lived in the city of Khorta in Nalanr in the east. Thi~ Brahmin was at that time going about engaging Buddhists in philmophical debates and contests of miraculous powers and defeating them. when he reached Nalanda, the monks the-re were unable to face him and so they sent .fi)f help to Aryadeva. 21

Aryadeva, it is said, tholxght the time was right to meet the Brahmin in a contest of knowledge and power, and so he set out for ~alanda. On the way, according to Taranatha's account, he came upon a woman who required his eye in mdcr to accomplish her religiotts prr,ctice. It is said that Aryadcva then gave her one of his cyes.~2

Wh~n he reached Nalanda, Aryadeva thl'Ough his skill in de~ bate and mitaculous powers, defeated the Brahmin Durdhar~akala in a public contest. Eventually, the Brahmin was converted aPrl. became a master of Buddhist teaching.

The Pri11cipar lndia11 exponents 21

Bu-ston's account of these incidents of Aryadeva's life differs sligh tly from that given by Taranatha. The name of the Brah-min for instance who .i\ryadeva is said to have defeated is given as M atrceta. 28 Also, according to Bu-ston, the monks of Nalanda sent a message to Nagarjuna who wa!) then residing at Sripa r-vata, but it was Aryadeva who wen t in his place.24

According to l'aranatha,u Aryadeva then remained at Nalanda for a considerable period of time after which he again returned to the south. Taramitha says tha t in R anganatha near K afii he entrusted R ahulabhadra with the responsibility for the tea

22 Madlayarrwlca Schools in India '

attention to the criticism of heterodox philosophical systems, espedally those of the Siuikhya and Vaise~ika. Although l'fagar-juna wa:; also certainly familiar with these systems, h~ cz-'i'ticises their doctrines less frequently in his works than he docs those of the Abhidharmika philosophy. It seems that Nagarjuna was first concerned to establish the Madhyamaka as' the ultimate essence of Buddhist philosophy. Aryadeva demonstrated that the philosophical method of the Mad.hyamaka could be systemati--, cally and successfully applied to the doctrines of the heterodox schools. Thus, it is certainly true to say that the Madhyamaka philosophy owes much of its stability to the contribution of Arya-

deva.~ With the advent of the ma~ters Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka

the Madhyamaka system entered a new phase. It was then that the Madhyamaka system was divided into the Prasangika and Svatantrika schools. The division in fact occurred as the result of the different interpretations offered by these two acaryas of the philosophy of l\iiga1juna and Aryadcva.

Buddhapalitais considered the founder of the Prasangika-madh-yam~ka school because he held that the essence of the Madhya-maka philosophy could only be revealed through arguments ad absurdum (prasa.rlgavakya). He probably lived during the first half of the third century c. E. According to Taranatha's29 account, Buddhapalita was born in a place known as Hamsakric;la, in Tambala in the south. He renounced the world and became vastly learned in the scriptures.

Buddhapalita studied under the master Samgharak~ita, a disciple of A.rya Nagamitra, and learned from him the original works of Nagarjuna. It is said that he attained the highest know-ledge through intense meditation and that he had a direct vision of Arya Maiijusri.

He is said to have taug-ht the doctrine at the Dantapuri monas-tery in the south. There he expounded the works of Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Aryasura an.d others. I t is said that at last Buddha~ palita practised the gutikasiddhi and attained success.

The only work of Buddhapalita which has been recorded is the MalamadhyflTTUlkaurtti, the commentary which he wrote on the Mulamadhyamalca Karikti of Nagarjuna. This work although lost in the original, is preserved in Tibetan translation.30 . .

The master B.h.avaviveka to whom the credit of founding the

The Principal Indian Exponents 23

Svatantrikamadhyamaka school belongs may well have been a younger contempl>rary of Buddhapalita.31 Be that as it may, Bhav~viveka according to Tat'anatha31 studied the works of Buddhapalita only afte1 the latter ha~ passed away. The master Bhavaviveka advanced his own interpretation of the thought of NagaJ:jlma and refuted the opinion expressed by Buddhapalita. He maintained that independent syllogisms could be legitimately used by the Madhyamaka to convince opponents of the truth of the philosophy of emptiness.

According to Taranatha, Bhunced the world and became a scholar of the Tripitaka. Later, he tra veiled to Madhyadesa and studied under the master Samgha rak~ita. From the latter he learned many Mahayana siitras as well as the works of the master Nagatjuna.

I t is said that when he returned to the south he had a vision of Vajrapii.t:ti and that he attained el(traordinary meditative pow~rs. He became the head of about fifty monastedes in the south and delivered numerous discourses on the doctrine. Finally, he too practiced gu!ikasiddhi and attained success.3s

Taranatha adds that while BucldhapiiJi ta did not have many followers, Bhavaviveka had thousands of disciples and monks who followed him. As a result Tiiranatha says his views were spread more extensively than those of Buddhapilita.

Bhavaviveka composed a number of works of which pe1haps the most important is his commentary to Nagarjuna's Mula-madhyamakakiirika entitled the Prajiiiipradipa.3 In addition, he is said to have composed the Madhyamakilvatiirapradipa , 36 the Madhyamokapratityasamulpiido, the K aratalaratna, the Madhyamaka hrdoyaktJ.rikii and its commentary the Tarkajviilii.'J8 Bhavaviveka was undoubtedly well versed in the contemporary philosophical systems of his day, since the Tarkajviilii contains detailed exposi-tions of the doctrines of the Siuikhya, Vaise~ika and Vedanta.S1

Another outstanding exponent of the Madhyamaka system was the master Candrakirti. He was, indeed, the foremost expo-nent of the Prasangikamadhyamaka school and his rigorous formulation of the orthodox Prasailgika standpoint is ~ccepted even today by the living Buddhist traditions of Tibet and Mongo-lia. Candrakirti severely criticised Bhavaviveka and the method of argument which he advocated for the Madhyamaka. He

Madhyamaka Sclwols in India

work which runs, "When existence and non-existence cease to be present before the intellect", he rose into the sky~ Though his body became invisible, his voice continued to be heard until his recitation was compleled.

According to the Tibetan accounts, Santideva then went to the south to Sridak~iQa and remained in the city of Kalinga in Trilinga. Envoys were sent there to persuade hi.m to return to Nalanda, however the master refused. Nonetheless, he told them where copies of the Sutrasamuccaya and Sik~asamucc~a could be found. The Bodhicaryavatiira was preserved in a version of one thousand stanzas as it was retained in the memory of the scholars of Nalanda. It is said that he then renounced ~he marks of a monk and lived as naked ascetic .. Among the marvellous feats attributed to him the story of his defeat of the heretics led by Sarikaradeva somewhere in the south of India is widely recoun-ted.4 It is said that an enormou!> maQI;iala of the god Mahesvara was constructed in the sky by the heretics. Through his mira-culous powers Santideva called up a great blast of wind which scattered the heretics and their maQQala.

Santideva is also said to have converted five hundred ascetics who were followers of the Pa~aQI;iika teaching through sustaining them with food and drink when they had been deprived of their livelihood. It is also said that he converted a thousand beggars by similarly supplying them with sustenance when a famine befell the region in which they were living.

As it has been said, Santideva's most important works are the Bodhicaryavatiira and the Sik~iisamuccaya. The former is a work of the highest merit which takes up, among other topics, the creation of the enlightenment thought (bodhicitta). The ninth chapter of the Bodhicary?il.latara is particularly interesting for its exposition of the standpoint of the Madhyamaka philosophy. Like Candrakirti, Santideva rigorously criticises the doctrine of the Vijilanavada.

The Sik!asamuccaya is a compendium of excerpts from Maha-yana Sutras which illustrate the practical religious discipline of the Madhyamaka. Santidcva supplies twenty seven stanzas which serve as the headings under which the excerpts are collec-ted.60 The Sutrasomuccaja is an abridged exposition of the con-tents of the Sik!iisamvccaya.

Among the other classical Indian exponents of the Madhya~

The Principal Indian Exponents 27

maka system, the masters Srigupta, jfianagarbha, Santarak~ita and Kamalasila deserve mention. All of them were followers of the Svatantrikamadhyamaka, or Y cgacarasvatantrikamadhya-

m~a schools. Bu-ston remarks that while Buddhapalita and Candrakirti are the two principal representatives of the Prasangi-kamadhyamakas, or the Lokaprasiddhivargacarimadhyamakas, the teacher 3havaviveka is a follower of the Sautn'intikamadhya . makasvatantrika school. According to Bu-ston Srigupta, Jnana-garbha, Santarak~ita and KamalaSila are adhetcnts of the Yoga-caramadhyamakasvatantrika system.51 These various schools w:ithin the Madhyamaka svstem gave their own interpretations of the thought ofNagarjuna and Aryadeva.

The Master Srigupta was an adherent of the Svatantrika philosophy. It is said that he was worshipped by King Vimala-

. candra. Sligupta was a disciple of Sampradiita62 and seems to have resided in Bharhgala.6* Srigupta composed the Tattvaloka,H a work on Madhyamaka philosophy aud logic.

The masterjiianagarbha was born in Odivisa,65 It is said that he resided in the east during the time of King Gopala. He studied under Srigupta in Bhatilgala and attained fame as a great Svi~ tantrika scholar. It is said thatJiianagarbha defeated opponents in debate and could redte numerous siitras from his memory. He propitiated for a long time Arya Avalokitdvara and at last had a vision of the deity moving the cintamal}icakra. Jnana-garbha composed the MadlrJamakasatyadvfiyakarika and wrote his own commentary on the work. M

The Madhyamaka master Santarak~ita is the foremost repre-sentative of the Yogacaramadhyamaka or the Yogacaramadhya-makasvatantrika school. It was he and hls immediate disciple Kamalasl