United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued May 14, 2015Decided August 11, 2015 No. 14-5157 PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, APPELLANT v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANDTHOMAS J . VILSACK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY ASSECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, APPELLEES Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:13-cv-00976) MatthewD.Strugar argued the cause for the appellant.JeffreyS.KerrandDelciannaWinderswerewithhimon brief. WilliamE.Havemann,Attorney,UnitedStates DepartmentofJ ustice,arguedthecausefortheappellees.RonaldC.Machen, United States Attorney at the time brief was filed, and Michael J. Singer, Attorney, were with him on brief. 2 Before:GARLAND,ChiefJudge,andHENDERSONand MILLETT, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. Dubitante opinion filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT. KARENLECRAFTHENDERSON, CircuitJudge: In 2004, theUnitedStatesDepartmentofAgriculture(USDAor Agency)announcedthat,forthefirsttime,itintendedto applytheprotectionsoftheAnimalWelfareAct(AWAor Act), 7 U.S.C. 2131 et seq., to birds.Although the Agency hastakenstepstocraftavian-specificanimalwelfare regulations, it has yet to complete its task after more than ten yearsand,duringtheinterveningtime,ithasallegedlynot applied the Acts general animal welfare regulations to birds.Frustrated with the delay, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals(PETA)suedtheUSDA,arguingthatitsinaction amountedtoagencyactionunlawfullywithheld,in violationofsection706(1)oftheAdministrativeProcedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(1).The district court granted the USDAsmotiontodismiss,concludingthattheUSDAs enforcement decisions are committed by law to its discretion.See id. 701(a)(2).For the reasons set forth below, we affirm on different grounds.I.BACKGROUND In1966,theCongressenactedtheAWAto,interalia, insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment and to assure the humane treatment of animalsduringtransportationincommerce.7U.S.C. 2131(1)(2).To effect these goals, the Congress instructed theUSDAtopromulgatestandardstogovernthehumane handling,care,treatment,andtransportationofanimalsby 3 dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors.Id. 2143(a)(1).Forsomeanimals,theUSDAisrequiredbystatuteto promulgatespecies-specificregulations,seeid. 2143(a)(2)(B)(dogsandprimates),anditretainsthe discretion to promulgate species-specific regulations for other covered animals, see id. 2151.It has done so for, inter alia, hamsters, guinea pigs, rabbits and marine mammals.See9 C.F.R. 3.253.28;3.503.53;3.1003.104.Allother animalsbenefitfromtheprotectionoftheAWAsgeneral animalwelfareregulations,whichestablishminimum requirementsforhandling,housing,feeding,watering, sanitation, ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and temperatures,adequateveterinarycare,andseparationby species.7 U.S.C. 2143(a)(2)(A); see9 C.F.R. 3.1253.128. CompliancewiththeActandwiththeUSDAs implementing regulations is accomplished through the Acts licensure,inspectionandinvestigationrequirements.Its predicatelicensurerequirementprovidesthatanimal dealer[s] and exhibitor[s] must obtain[] a license from theUSDAbeforetheybuy,sell,offertobuyorsell, transport or offer for transportation any animal.7 U.S.C. 2134.Upon receiving an application for licensure from a dealer or exhibitor, the USDA issues a license in such form and manner as [it] may prescribe.Id. 2133.The Act also allowstheUSDAtounearthviolationsoftheActby mak[ing]suchinvestigationsorinspectionsas[it]deems necessary.Id. 2146(a)(emphasisadded).Ithas promulgatedregulationsprovidingthat,beforeobtaininga license,[e]achapplicantmustdemonstratethathisorher premises and any animals, facilities, vehicles, equipment, or otherpremisesusedorintendedforuseinthebusiness comply with the regulations and standards set by the USDA andmustmakehisorheranimals,premises,facilities, 4 vehicles, equipment, other premises, and records available for inspection . . . to ascertain the applicants compliance with the standards and regulations.9 C.F.R. 2.3(a). Although seemingly broad, the Acts scope turns on the USDAs definition of animal.7 U.S.C. 2132(g).When first enacted, the AWA protected only dogs, cats, monkeys (nonhumanprimatemammals),guineapigs,hamsters,and rabbits.See Pub. L. No. 89-544, 2(h), 80 Stat. 350, 351 (1966).For years, the USDA excluded birds from the Acts protection.SeeUSDA,MiscellaneousAmendmentsto Chapter, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,917, 24,919 (Dec. 24, 1971). Theirstatuschangedin2002,whentheCongress amended the AWAs definition of animal to exclude birds . . .bredforuseinresearch.7U.S.C.2132(g).InterpretingtheCongresssexclusionofresearchaviansto mean the inclusion of all other birds, the USDA updated its regulations on J une 4, 2004, to make explicit that birds would thenceforthbenefitfromtheActsprotections.Animal Welfare; Definition of Animal, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,513, 31,513 (J une 4, 2004); seealso9 C.F.R. 1.1.On the same day it announced that it would apply the Act to birds not bred for use in research, however, the USDA announced that it d[id] not believe that the general standards under the AWA, which were promulgated with an eye toward mammalian care, were appropriate for birds.SeeAnimal Welfare; Regulations and StandardsforBirds,Rats,andMice,69Fed.Reg.31,537, 31,539 (J une 4, 2004).The USDA issued an Advance Notice ofProposedRulemaking(ANPR)foravian-specificanimal welfare regulations.Id. Intheensuingnotice-and-commentperiod,theUSDA received over 7,000 comments from a wide range of sources.Basedonthecomments,theUSDAconsultedwith 5 veterinarians,economists,industrymembers,related governmentagenciesandotherstodevelopasetofavian-specificregulations.ItalsoassignedtheAnimalandPlant HealthInspectionService(APHIS)theUSDAsub-agency that administers the AWAto assist with the process.The APHIS then hired an avian health-and-welfare expert to help it accomplish its task. Despitetheseefforts,theUSDAhasrepeatedlyset, missed, and then rescheduled deadlines for the publication of proposed bird-specific regulations.PETAv.USDA(PETA I), 7 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013).During this time, the USDAhasallegedlynotappliedtheAWAslicensureand inspectionprovisionsorthegeneralanimalwelfare regulationstobirds,althoughithasinformallyvisited facilities accused of avian mistreatment.There is apparently someconfusionattheAgencyaboutwhethertheAWA applies to birds at all.Despite its regulatory pronouncement that birds are AWA-regulated animals, seeAnimal Welfare; Definition of Animal, 69 Fed. Reg. at 31,513, the USDA has respondedtosomebird-relatedcomplaintsbyinsistingthat birds are not regulated under the AWA and do not fall within the jurisdiction of the USDA.Indeed, the USDA responded toaFreedomofInformationActrequestbystatingthat [a]gencyemployeesconductedathoroughsearchoftheir filesandadvisedourofficethatbirdsarenotbeing regulated.PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 6. Frustrated by these representations and by reports of bird-related abuse and neglect, PETA sued the USDA on J une 27, 2013, invoking section 706(1) of the APA and requesting the district court to compel the USDA to take two actions it has allegedlyunlawfullywithheld,5U.S.C. 706(1).PETA askedthecourttocompel[]theUSDAto. . .publishfor public comment in the Federal Register, by a Court-ordered 6 deadline,proposedrule(s)specifictobirdsandthen promulgate, by a Court-ordered deadline, standards specific to birds.Compl. 7.Second, PETA requested the court to order the USDA to immediately extend enforcement of the AWA to birds covered by the AWA, by enforcing the general AWA standards that presently exist.1The USDA responded with a motion to dismiss (or in the alternative, for summary judgment),arguing,first,thatPETAlackedstandingand, second, that PETA failed to state a claim because the AWA leaves enforcement decisions to the USDAs non-justiciable discretion. ThedistrictcourtrejectedtheUSDAsstanding argument.Recognizing that an organizational plaintiff such as PETA [can] sue in its own right, PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 7, the district court found that PETA suffered two cognizable injuries.First,unlesstheUSDAappliedtheAWAs protectionstobirds,PETAcouldnotredressbird mistreatment by filing complaints with the USDA and, as a result, PETA had to expend resources to seek relief through other, less efficient and effective means.Second, the USDAs failure to protect birds meant, ipso facto, that the USDA was not creating bird-related inspection reports that PETA could use to raise public awareness.Finding that [t]hese are real, concrete obstacles to PETAs work, id., the district court also concludedthatPETAhaddemonstratedtherequisite causation and redressability, id. at 9. 1ThedistrictcourtdeniedPETAsrequestedmandatory injunctivereliefrequiringtheUSDAtopromulgatebird-specific AWA regulations.See PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1315.PETA has abandoned that argument on appeal. 7 ThedistrictcourtnonethelessdismissedPETAssuit, concludingthatPETAfailedtostateaclaimbecause individual decisions by USDA not to enforce the AWA with respect to particular avian incidents . . . are unreviewable [as] committed to agency discretion by law. Id. at 13 (quoting 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2)).It rejected PETAs arguments that the AWA sufficiently constrained the USDAs discretion to make itsenforcementdecisionsjusticiableandthattheUSDAs allegedpolicyofnon-enforcement,underD.C.Circuitlaw, could be challenged in court.Regarding the former, the court reasoned that the AWA gave the USDA broad discretion to conductinvestigationsorinspectionsas[it]deems necessary.Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).On the latter, the courtfaultedPETAsfailuretoidentifyanyconcrete statementfromUSDAannouncingageneralpolicynotto regulatebirdsundertheAWAandcreditedtheUSDAs expressed. . . officialpositiononthematterinits regulations bringing birds under the scope of the AWA.Id. at12(quotationmarksomitted).2PETAmovedfor reconsideration or, in the alternative, to amend its complaint, both of which motions the district court denied.PETA then filed a timely notice of appeal. II.ANALYSIS Wereviewthedistrictcourtsdismissaldenovo, treat[ing] the complaints factual allegations as true and . . . grant[ing][PETA]thebenefitofallinferencesthatcanbe 2The district court did, however, comment that the USDA would . . . be well advised to educate its officials on the agencys policyregardingbirdsnamely,thatbirdsareregulatedbythe AWA and do fall under the agencys enforcement jurisdictionand to ensure that they break their bad habit of misinforming the public on this matter.PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 12 (emphases in original). 8 derivedfromthefactsalleged.RallsCorp.v.Comm.on ForeignInv.inU.S., 758 F.3d 296, 31415 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (some alteration in original).We need not, however, accept thetruthofalegalconclusioncouchedasafactual allegation.Trudeauv.FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006).Toavoiddismissal,PETAmustpleadsufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on itsface. Ashcroftv.Iqbal,556U.S.662,678(2009) (quotingBellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550U.S.544,570 (2007)). PETA has not alleged that the USDAs delay in enforcing the AWA with regard to birds is arbitrary and capricious, in violation of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).See Compl. 67.And on appeal, PETA has abandoned its effort to require the USDA topromulgatebird-specificregulations,seeAppellants Br. 25;OralArg.Recording14:2215:50,anddoesnot pursuetheallegationmadeinitscomplaintthattheUSDA unreasonablydelayedenforcementofitsgeneralanimal welfareregulationswithregardtobirds,inviolationof section 706(1) of the APA, seeReply Br. 3233.The only question before us, then, is whether PETAs complaint states a claim that the USDAs alleged policy of not enforcing the general regulations with respect to birdswithout regard to thereasonablenessvelnonofthedelayinenforcementconstitutes agency action unlawfully withheld, in violation of section 706(1) of the APA.Before reaching that question, however, we must first address PETAs standing to press its claim.SeeCTSCorp.v.EPA,759F.3d52,57(D.C.Cir. 2014) (as a matter of constitutional duty, court must assure itself of its jurisdiction to act in every case). 9 A.STANDING Asanorganization,PETAcanassertstandingonits own behalf, on behalf of its members or both.Equal Rights Ctr.v.PostProps.,Inc.,633F.3d1136,1138(D.C.Cir. 2011).Here,PETAassertsorganizationalstandingonly, which requires it, like an individual plaintiff, to show actual orthreatenedinjuryinfactthatisfairlytraceabletothe alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision. Id.(quoting Spannv.ColonialVill.,Inc., 899F.2d24,27(D.C.Cir.1990));seealsoHavensRealty Corp.v.Coleman,455U.S.363,37879(1982)(in organizational-standingcase,courtsconductthesame inquiryasinthecaseofanindividual:Hastheplaintiff allegedsuchapersonalstakeintheoutcomeofthe controversyastowarranthisinvocationoffederal-court jurisdiction?(quotationmarksomitted)).Thekeyissueis whetherPETAhassufferedaconcreteanddemonstrable injury to [its] activities, mindful that, under our precedent, a meresetbackto[PETAs]abstractsocialinterestsisnot sufficient.EqualRightsCtr., 633 F.3d at 1138 (quotation marks omitted); see also Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (The organization must allege that discreteprogrammaticconcernsarebeingdirectlyand adversely affected by the defendants actions.).3 3On appeal, the USDA does not argue that PETA failed to demonstratethecausationandredressabilityprongsofstanding.Because we have an independent obligation to satisfy ourselves that PETAhasArticleIIIstanding,wemustconsidercausationand redressabilitysuasponteand,havingdoneso,agreewiththe district court that the injuries complained ofUSDAs refusal to takeenforcementactioninresponsetoPETAscomplaintsand USDAs failure to compile the information PETA wants to use in itseducationalmaterialsarecausedbytheagencyandthe 10 The United States Supreme Court has made plain that a concreteanddemonstrableinjuryto[an]organizations activitieswiththeconsequentdrainontheorganizations resourcesconstitutes far more than simply a setback to the organizations abstract social interests and thus suffices for standing.Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379.We, in turn, have elaborated as to when an organizations purported injury isnotsufficientlyconcreteanddemonstrabletoinvokeour jurisdiction.Forexample,anorganizationsdiversionof resourcestolitigationortoinvestigationinanticipationof litigation is considered a self-inflicted budgetary choice that cannot qualify as an injury in fact for purposes of standing.Am. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entmt, Inc.,659F.3d13,25(D.C.Cir.2011);seealsoNatl TaxpayersUnion,Inc.v.UnitedStates, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C.Cir.1995)(Anorganizationcannot,ofcourse, manufacture the injury necessary to maintain a suit from its expenditure of resources on that very suit.).Nor is standing foundwhentheonlyinjuryarisesfromtheeffectofthe regulationsontheorganizationslobbyingactivities,Ams. forSafeAccessv.DEA,706F.3d438,457(D.C.Cir.) (quotationmarksomitted),cert.denied,134S. Ct.267 (2013), and cert. denied sub nom. Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,134S. Ct.673(2013),orwhenthe service impairedispureissue-advocacy,Ctr.forLaw&Educ.v. DeptofEduc., 396 F.3d 1152, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2005).4To remedies soughtan order compelling USDA to enforce the AWA with respect to birds . . .would redress those injuries.PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 9.4ButseeAm.Soc.forPreventionofCruelty toAnimals, 659 F.3d at 27 ([M]any of our cases finding Havens standing involved activities that could just as easily be characterized as advocacyand, indeed, sometimes are.). 11 determine whether an organizations injury is concrete and demonstrableormerelyasetbacktoitsabstractsocial interests, Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379, we ask, first, whether the agencysaction or omission to act injured the [organizations]interestand,second,whetherthe organizationuseditsresourcestocounteractthatharm.Equal Rights Ctr., 633 F.3d at 1140. PETAsmissionistopreventcrueltyandinhumane treatment of animals.Compl. 5.It accomplishes this goal throughpubliceducation,crueltyinvestigations,research, animalrescue,legislation,specialevents,celebrity involvement,andprotestcampaigns.Id.Oneofthe primary ways in which PETA accomplishes its mission is educatingthepublicbyprovidinginformationaboutthe conditions of animals held by particular exhibitors.J effrey S.KerrDecl. 16(KerrDecl.).Asthedistrictcourt explained,theUSDAsrefusaltoapplytheAWAtobirds perceptiblyimpairedPETAsmissionintworespects:it precludedPETAfrompreventingcrueltytoandinhumane treatmentoftheseanimalsthroughitsnormalprocessof submitting USDA complaints and it deprived PETA of key information that it relies on to educate the public.PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 8 (alterations omitted). WeagreethatPETAhas,atthedismissalstage,5 adequatelyshownthattheUSDAsinactioninjuredits interests and, consequently, PETA has expended resources to counteract those injuries.Indeed, PETAs alleged injuries are 5SeeAbigailAllianceforBetterAccesstoDevelopmental Drugsv.Eschenbach,469F.3d129,132(D.C.Cir.2006)(At each stage of trial, the party invoking the courts jurisdiction must establish the predicates for standing with the manner and degree of evidence required at that stage of trial. (quotation marks omitted)). 12 materiallyindistinguishablefromthoseallegedbythe organizations in Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphiav.Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1986).In thatcase,fourorganizationsthatendeavor[ed],through informational,counseling,referral,andotherservices,to improve the lives of elderly citizens sued the Secretary of the UnitedStatesDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices (HHS) because it had, interalia, promulgated HHS-specific regulationsthatwereallegedlyinconsistentwith government-wideregulationsthatafford[ed]interested individuals and organizations a generous flow of information regardingservicesavailabletotheelderly.Id.at93537.According to the organizations, the HHS-specific regulations . . .significantlyrestrict[ed]thatflow.Id.at937.We reversedthedistrictcourtsdismissalforlackofstanding, concluding that the plaintiffs had pleaded the same type of injuryastheplaintiffsinHavensRealty:thechallenged regulations den[ied] the [plaintiffs] access to information and avenuesofredresstheywishtouseintheirroutine information-dispensing,counseling,andreferralactivities.Id. at 93738.We held that, [u]nlike the mere interest in a problem or [an] ideological injury, the plaintiffs had alleged inhibitionoftheirdailyoperations,aninjurybothconcrete and specific to the work in which they are engaged.Id.at 938 (quotation marks and citations omitted). So too here.Because PETAs alleged injuriesdenial of accesstobird-relatedAWAinformationincluding,in particular, investigatory information, and a means by which to seek redress for bird abuseare concrete and specific to the work in which they are engaged, id., we find that PETA has alleged a cognizable injury sufficient to support standing.In other words, the USDAs allegedly unlawful failure to apply theAWAsgeneralanimalwelfareregulationstobirdshas perceptibly impaired [PETAs] ability to both bring AWA 13 violationstotheattentionoftheagencychargedwith preventing avian cruelty and continue to educate the public.SeeAm.Soc.forPreventionofCrueltytoAnimals, 659 F.3d at25.BecausePETAhasexpendedresourcestocounter theseinjuries,ithasestablishedArticleIIIorganizational standing. TheUSDAmakestworesponses,neitherofwhichwe find persuasive.First, it argues that it is not at loggerheads withPETAsmissionofpreventingcrueltytoanimals.Appellees Br. 1718.It so contends because the USDA does not in fact mistreat animals nor do its actions directly result in themistreatmentofanimals.TheUSDA,however, misconstrues PETAs alleged harms; they do not result from the mistreatment of birds by third parties but rather from a lack of redress for its complaints and a lack of information for itsmembership,bothofwhich,PETAasserts,theUSDA would provide if it complied with its legal obligations.See PETAI,7F.Supp.3dat9.Moreover,althoughwehave emphasizedtheneedforadirectconflictbetweenthe defendants conduct and the organizations mission, Abigail Alliance,469F.3dat133,theUSDAsallegedlyunlawful conductdoeshamperanddirectlyconflictswithPETAs stated mission of preventing cruelty and inhumane treatment ofanimalsthrough,interalia,publiceducationand cruelty investigations.Compl. 5.Finally, it bears noting that our at loggerheads requirement exists because, [i]f the challenged conduct affects an organizations activities, but is neutralwithrespecttoitssubstantivemission,thenitis entirelyspeculativewhetherthechallengedpracticewill actuallyimpairtheorganizationsactivities.Am.Soc.for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 659 F.3d at 25, 27 (quoting Natl Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).Here, however, it is conceded that, if theUSDAappliestheAWAsgeneralwelfarestandardsto 14 birds, it will employ the same inspection reports and redress mechanisms for birds that it currently uses for other species.Accordingly,theUSDAschallengednon-actionplainly impairsPETAsactivitiesinanon-speculativemannerby requir[ing]PETAtodivertandredirectitslimited resourcestocounteractandoffsetDefendantsunlawful conductandomissions.Compl. 6.Forexample,PETA has alleged that:[It]hassubmittednumerousformalAWA complaintstotheUSDAregardingbirds.Kerr Decl. 7. When it submits complaints to the USDA regarding AWA-coveredanimalmistreatment,theUSDA generallydispatchesaninspectortothefacilityat issuetodetermineifanyAWAviolationsare occurring, and the resulting USDA inspection reports are made available in an online database.Id. 6.The USDA, however, has consistently refused [to] takeactiononthesecomplaints,assertingthatit lacks jurisdiction and that it does not regulate birds.Id. 7. Consequently,PETAhasexpendedfinancial resourcestoinvestigateandrespondtocomplaints about birds subjected to inhumane treatment, and/or toobtainappropriateandnecessaryreliefforthese animals,Compl. 6,byalternativemeans, includingresearchingthelabyrinthoflocaland statecruelty-to-animalsandwildlifestatutes, regulations, and policies, as well as federal animal-related laws other than the AWA, Kerr Decl. 9.15 PETA is also forced to expend time and resources preparing and submitting complaints to the pertinent local,state,and/orfederalagencies. . .,which wouldbeunnecessaryiftheUSDAwasproperly regulatingbirdsusedforexhibitionunderthe AWA.Id. 10; see also id. 11 (describing twelve complaints PETA has been required to research and prepare as a result of the USDAs failure to regulate birds under the AWA). PETA would not have needed to expend (or expend tothesameextent)theseresourcesabsent[the USDAs] failures to comply with its mandates under theAWA.Compl. 6;seealsoKerrDecl. 13 (But for the USDAs failure to regulate birds under theAWA[,]PETAwouldnotneedtoundertake these extensive efforts and expend the resources to do so.). Ifitprevailsinthisaction,PETAwillnolonger havetoexpendasmanyresourcespursuingother avenues . . . .Kerr Decl. 14. Additionally: One of the primary ways in which PETA works to preventcrueltytoandinhumanetreatmentof animalsusedforentertainmentisbyeducatingthe public,especiallythroughinformationalservices.Id. 16; see also id. (describing variety of means by which PETA disseminates information). TheUSDAsAWAinspectionreportsarethe primary source of information relied upon by PETA in preparing these educational materials.Id. 17.16 [T]heUSDAsfailuretoregulatebirdsunderthe AWA . . . deprives PETA of information on which it routinelyreliesinitseffortstoeducatethepublic . . . .Id. 15. Thisembargooninformationregardingthe conditionsofbirdsusedforexhibitiondirectly conflicts with PETAs mission to prevent cruelty to and inhumane treatment of animals and frustrates its public education efforts.Id. 18.As a result of the USDAs failure to regulate birds undertheAWA,PETAisrequiredtoexpend resources to obtain information about the conditions ofbirds. . . ,includingthroughinvestigations, research,andstateandlocalpublicrecords requests.Id. 19.But for the USDAs failure to regulate birds under theAWA,PETAwouldnotneedtoundertake. . . extensive efforts . . . .Id. 20. Andfinally,PETAestimatesthat,asadirectresultofthe USDAs failure to regulate birds . . . , it has been forced to expend more than $10,000 on staff attorney time not related tothislitigationandrelatedexpensesanditexpectsto continue expending more than $3,000 per year on the same unless and until the court grants thereliefrequested in this case.Id. TheUSDAssecondargumentthatPETAsalleged injuries are self-inflicted and thus non-cognizablefares no better.Granted, we have held that a particular harm is self-inflictedifitresultsnotfromanyactionstakenby[the agency], but rather from the [organizations] own budgetary 17 choices.Fair Empt Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg.Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).That an organizationvoluntarily,orwillfully. . .divertsits resources,however,doesnotautomaticallymeanthatit cannot suffer an injury sufficient to confer standing.Equal Rights Ctr., 633 F.3d at 1140 (alteration and citation omitted).Wethenaskwhethertheorganizationundertookthe expenditures in response to, and to counteract, the effects of thedefendantsallegedunlawfulactsratherthanin anticipationoflitigation.Id.Asalreadynoted,PETA redirecteditsresourcesinresponsetoUSDAsallegedly unlawful failure to provide the means by which PETA would otherwiseadvanceitsmissionfilingcomplaintswiththe USDAandusingtheUSDAsinformationforitsadvocacy purposes.Contrary to the USDAs assertion, PETA did not bootstrap its way into court by alleging that agency inaction renders its advocacy efforts more expensive.Appellees Br. 21. Insum,precedentmakesplainthat,ifanorganization expendsresourcesinresponseto,andtocounteract,the effectsofthedefendantsalleged[unlawfulconduct]rather than in anticipation of litigation, Equal Rights Ctr., 633 F.3d at 1140, it has suffered a concrete and demonstrable injury that suffices for purposes of standing, HavensRealtyCorp., 455 U.S. at 379.PETA has expendedand must continue to expendresourcesduetotheUSDAsallegedlyunlawful failure to apply the AWAs protections to birds and its alleged injuriesfitcomfortablywithinourorganizational-standing jurisprudence. B.FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Having won the standing battle, PETA nonetheless loses thewar.Asnoted,thesolenon-jurisdictionalquestionis 18 whethertheUSDAhasapolicyofnon-enforcementthat constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld, in violation of section706(1)oftheAPAregardlesswhetherthenon-enforcementhasgoneonforareasonableorunreasonable lengthoftime.Thedistrictcourtfound,seePETAI,7F. Supp. 3d at 13, and, on PETAs motion for reconsideration, iterated, see PETA v. USDA (PETA II), 60 F. Supp. 3d 14, 18 (D.D.C.2014),thattheUSDAsenforcementdecisionsare unreviewablebecausetheyarecommittedtoagency discretion by law. PETAI, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 13(quoting 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2));seealsoPETAII, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1619 (same).PETA maintains that the district court erred in two ways.PETAfirstarguesthattheCongresstookawaythe USDAsenforcementdiscretionbecause[t]heclear implication of the AWA is that all entities wishing to sell or exhibit animals must first obtain a license from the USDAand the agency may not, consistent with the regime, announce totheworldthatnosuchlicensewillberequiredtoany facilitythatsellsorexhibitsanentireclassofanimals.Appellants Br. 31 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).PETA further contends that the USDAs failure to apply the general AWA standards is a judicially reviewable wholesale abdication of enforcement as to an entire biological class over the course of a dozen years.Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted). [A] party must first clear the hurdle of [section] 701(a), which prohibits judicial review of agency action to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.Hecklerv.Chaney,470U.S.821,828(1985) (quotation marks omitted).Section 701(a)(2) of the APA is not, however, a jurisdictional bar.SeeOryszakv.Sullivan, 576F.3d522,52425&n.2(D.C.Cir.2009).Forthat reason,weneednotdecidewhethertheUSDAhasinfact adoptedageneralpolicyofnon-enforcementthatcouldbe 19 subjecttoreviewundertheAPA.6Instead,weaffirmthe districtcourtonthealternativegroundthatPETAfailedto plausiblyallegethattheUSDAsdecade-longinaction constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld.See Munsell v. USDA, 509 F.3d 572, 59293 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding requirement was non-jurisdictional but affirming dismissal on alternative ground supported by record). In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), the Supreme Court set out the limits the APA places upon judicial review of agency inaction.542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004).Relevanthere,theCourtheldthataclaimunder[section] 706(1)canproceedonlywhereaplaintiffassertsthatan agencyfailedtotakeadiscreteagencyactionthatitis required to take, id. at 64 (emphases in original), and cannot be used to enter general orders compelling compliance with broadstatutorymandates,id.at66.Itexplainedthatthe discreteagencyactionlimitationprecludes. . .broad programmaticattack[s]andtherequiredagencyaction limitation rules out judicial direction of even discrete agency actionthatisnotdemandedbylaw.Id.(emphasisin original).If, for example, an agency is compelled by law to act within a certain time period, but the manner of its action is left to the agencys discretion, a court can compel the agency to act, but has no power to specify what the action must be.Id. at 65. The USDA argues that PETA cannot satisfy the SUWA test.Weagree.PETAinsiststhattheUSDAmust promulgate[] standards that apply to allanimals covered by the AWA, 7 U.S.C. 2143(a)(1), and apply those standards 6Similarly,weneednotdecidewhetherthedistrictcourt imposed a heightened pleading standard on PETAs allegation of agency policy.Appellants Br. 45. 20 throughthelicensuresystem,id. 2133.ReplyBr.33 (emphasis in original).But even if the USDA has adopted an interimpolicyofnon-enforcementpendingtheadoptionof bird-specificregulations,asPETAalleges,nothinginthe AWA requires the USDA to apply the general animal welfare standardstobirds(whichstandardsitviews,atbest,as ineffective and, at worst, as hazardous to avians, seeAnimal Welfare;RegulationsandStandardsforBirds,Rats,and Mice, 69 Fed. Reg. at 31,538397) before it has promulgated moreappropriatebird-specificregulations.Cf.Cutlerv. Hayes,818F.2d879,89293(D.C.Cir.1987)(upholding FDA policy of postponing enforcement of the [Food, Drug, andCosmetic]Actsefficacyrequirement. . .untilthe completionof[theagencys]OTCdrugreviewprogram because Congress has not given FDA an inflexible mandate to bring enforcement actions against all violators of the Act (footnote omitted)).Therefore, even assuming that the USDA is compelled by law to act, SUWA, 542 U.S. at 65, we have no power to say that it must do so before finalizing its bird-specific regulations, at least in light of PETAs abandonment ofitsargumentthattheUSDAunreasonablydelayed enforcement,seeReplyBr.3233.Moreover,theAWAs mandatory licensure requirement is directed to dealer[s] and exhibitor[s]ofanimals,nottotheUSDA.See7U.S.C. 2134.While section 2133 of the AWA provides that the USDA shall issue licenses to dealer[s] and exhibitor[s] upon applicationthereforinsuchformandmanneras[it]may prescribe,id. 2133,thiscongressionaldirectivedoesnot mean that the USDA must demand licensure in all instances.Thus, we cannot say that the USDA has failed to take action it 7Seealso,e.g.,J ohannaBriscoeDecl. 17(APHISalso recognizes that breeding requirements for certain species preclude dailycleaningandhumaninterference(i.e.nestingbirdsmay purposely crush their eggs if a stranger enters the vicinity.)).21 was requiredtotake.SUWA, 542 U.S.at 64 (emphasis in original). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courts judgment of dismissal. So ordered. MILLETT, CircuitJudge, dubitante: Iftheslatewere clean,Iwouldfeelobligatedtodissentfromthemajoritysstandingdecision.ButIamafraidthat theslatehasbeen writtenupon, andthiscourtsorganizationalstanding precedent will not let me extricate this case from its grasp.Orat least not without making fine distinctions that would just skate around the heart of the problem.The majority opinionholds that standing exists because the governments inactioninjured PETAs interest in having the Animal Welfare Act enforcedagainstcertain thirdparties, andbecausePETA chose todevoteitsownresourcestomakeupforthe governmentsenforcementomission. Maj. Op.11 (emphases added).That ruling is in grave tension with Article III precedent andprinciples,suchastheprinciplethatanindividuals interest in having the law properly enforced against others is not, without more, a cognizable Article III injury. See, e.g.,Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619(1973); Sargeant v.Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1997). It is also hardtoreconcilewiththe generalrulethataplaintiffs voluntaryexpenditure ofresourcestocounteract governmental action that only indirectly affects the plaintiffdoes not support standing. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA,133 S. Ct. 1138, 11481151 (2013).At bottom, PETA thinks the government should do more toenforcethelawagainstbirdexhibitors,andsohas voluntarily taken steps to protect birds itself. That may be laudable,butitisnotanArticleIIIredressableinjury.Ifcircuitprecedenthasbroughtus tothepointwhere organizations get standing on terms that the Supreme Court hassaidindividualscannot, thenitmaybetime,inan appropriatecase,torevisitthepropermetesandboundsof organizational standing.2I should note, at the outset, that my views do not in any way question the sincerity of PETAs concern for neglected and abused birds or its desire to better their conditions.Nor canIcriticizethemajorityforitsdecision.Themajority opinion hews faithfullyto precedential lines, as we must at this procedural juncture. See GeneralComm.ofAdjustment, GO-386 v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 295 F.3d 1337,1340(D.C.Cir.2002)(circuitprecedentbindsus, unlessanduntiloverturnedbythecourtenbancorby [h]igher [a]uthority) (internal quotation marks omitted).Organizationalstandingstartedfromthecommon-sense determinationthatorganizations,likeindividuals,cansufferdirectandconcreteinjuriesforArticleIIIpurposes.See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1974). At least intheformseenhere, thedoctrine traces itsoriginstothe SupremeCourtsdecisioninHavensRealtyCorp.v. Coleman,455 U.S.363(1982).Inthat case, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), a group dedicated to achieving equal housing opportunity, and individual plaintiffs brought a FairHousingActchallengetothe raciallydiscriminatoryhousingpracticesofanapartmentcomplex owner.See id. at 367369.The Fair Housing Act conferred onallpersonsalegalrighttotruthfulinformationabout housing, id. at 373, by making it unlawful to represent to anypersonbecauseofrace,color,religion,sex,handicap,familialstatus,ornationaloriginthatanydwellingisnot available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available, 42 U.S.C. 3604(d).Afterfirstholdingthatanindividualplaintiffhad standing, Havens, 455 U.S. at 374, the Supreme Court went on to rule that HOME had standing as well, id. at 379. That is unsurprisingbecausetheFairHousingActspecifically defines the persons entitled to truthful housing information 3to include associations as well as one or more individuals.42U.S.C. 3602(d).HOMEhadalsoidentifiedhowthe discriminatorymisinformationitwasgivenabouthousing opportunitiesdirectlyfrustratedandunraveleditseffortsto matchindividualswith availablehousing.Inparticular,HOMEallegedthatthechallenged racialsteering practices frustrated * * * its efforts to assist equal access to housing through counseling and other referral services, and forced ittodevotesignificantresourcestoidentifyandcounteract the unlawful conduct targeted at it. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379.TheSupremeCourtconcludedthat, because theallegedpracticeshad perceptiblyimpaired[thegroups] abilityto providecounselingandreferralservices, theorganizationhad plainly suffered an injury in fact. Id. That concrete and demonstrableinjurytotheorganizationsactivities andconsequent drain on the organizations resources, the Court stressed, represented far more than simply a setback to the organizations abstract social interests, which could not have conferredstanding.Id.Havens recognition of HOMEs organizational standing makessense.Federal law vested HOME with a specific legal right to truthful, non-discriminatory housing information, and HavensRealtysraciallydisparatemisinformationtargeted HOME alongwiththeindividualsitwasaiding.The apartment owners violations unraveled again and again the workandresourcesthatHOMEhadputintoproviding housing and equal housing opportunities for its clients.Put simply, what HOME used its own resources, information, and client base to build up, Havens Realtys racist lies tore down.That is the type of direct, concrete, and immediate injury that Article III recognizes. See Fair Elections Ohio v. Husted, 770F.3d456,460n.1(6thCir.2014)(Havensinvolveda statutoryentitlementtotruthfulinformation, and[t]he misinformation provided bytheHavensdefendants, i.e.[,] a 4lietoldtoblackrenters,includingamemberofthe organization,thatnorentalunitswereavailable,directly interferedwiththeorganizationsabilitytoprovidetruthful counseling and referral services.); seealsoAmericanCanoe Assn,Inc.v.CityofLouisaWater&SewerCommn,389 F.3d 536, 550 (6thCir. 2003) (Kennedy, J ., concurring in part anddissentinginpart) (HOMEsinjurywasspecific, cognizable,andparticularbecausethegroupencountered significantdifficultyhelpingindividualplaintiffscounteract discrimination directed at them in a localized area); 13A C.Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure 3531.2,at100(3ded.2008) (HOME wasengagedin specific efforts to aid particular people who in fact had been injured by housing discrimination).TheproblemisnotHavens ortheconceptof organizational standing.The problem is what our precedent hasdonewithHavens. Asthiscaseillustrates,our organizational standing precedents now hold that the required Article III injury need not bewhat the defendant has done to the plaintiff; it can also be what the defendant has not done to a third party.And the manifestation of that injury is not that the defendant has torn down, undone, devalued, or otherwise countermanded the organizations own activities or deprived itofastatutorilyconferredright.Itisinsteadafailureto facilitate or subsidize through governmental enforcement the organizations vindication of its own parallel interests. See Maj. Op.1113,17; ActionAllianceofSeniorCitizensof Greater Philadelphia v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(seniorcitizensgroupsprogrammaticconcerns hamperedbyagencyregulationsthat(i)limitedthe informationtheagencyhadpreviouslyprovided inother contexts, and (ii) made raising certain challenges within the agency more difficult); id. at 937938 (by pleading denial of accesstoinformationandavenuesofredresstheywishto 5useintheirroutineinformation-dispensing,counselingand referral activities, organizations have alleged inhibition of their daily operations sufficient for standing purposes).1That takes standing principles toand I think overthe brink.Tobeclear,PETAdoesnotclaimhere thatthe Department of Agriculture directly contributesto the unlawful mistreatment of birds that PETA aims to halt, or has denied PETA information to which any law or regulation entitles it.NordoesPETAclaimthatthegovernmenthasdismantled,affirmativelyundermined,orengagedinacampaignof misinformation that has damaged PETAs independent efforts toprotectbirds.Instead,asthemajorityopinionexplains, PETAs asserted Article III injuries are: PETA has filed complaints on which the Department has not acted; PETA then chose to expend resources pursuing alternative means of protecting birds; if it prevails, PETAwillnothavetoexpendasmany resourcespursuingothertypesofbirdprotection.Maj. Op. 1415 (quoting Kerr Decl. 9, 14).1See alsoASPCAv.FeldEntertainment,Inc.,659F.3d13,27 (D.C.Cir.2011)(reservingthequestionwhetheranorganizationhas standing based on expend[ing] additional resources on public educationtorebutthemisimpression,allegedlycausedby[the defendants] practices); comparealso CenterforLaw&Educ.v. DepartmentofEduc.,396F.3d1152,1162(D.C.Cir.2005) (rejectingorganizationalstandingwheretheonlyservice impairedispureissue-advocacy),with FeldEntertainment,659 F.3d at 2628 (impairment of a groups ability to provide advocacy services mayqualify as injury where a defendants conduct is at loggerheads with the groups mission) (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1429(D.C. Cir.1996)).6 PETAisnotreceiving inspectionreportsforbirds thattheDepartmenthasvoluntarilyproduced after enforcement efforts involving other animals, and the absenceofsuchreportsmeansthatPETAexpends resourcescompilingitsowninformationto educatethepublic;ifsuccessful,PETAwouldrelyonthe governmentsreportingandundertakeless extensiveeffortsofitsown. Maj. Op.1516(quoting Kerr Decl. 20).Neitherofthoseshouldcountasjudiciallyredressableunder Article III.Inaction on PETA ComplaintsThe Departments failuretoactonPETAscomplaintsshould bea complete non-starter for Article III purposes. The cases are legion holding that PETA has nolegally protected or judiciallycognizableinterestintheenforcementoftheAnimalWelfareActagainstthirdparties foritsownsake.See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (It is settled doctrine that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion cannot be challenged by one who is himself neither prosecuted nor threatenedwith prosecution.);Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619([I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.).22SeealsoLujanv.DefendersofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574578 (1992) (no standing based on generalized objection to insufficient enforcement of the law); HighPlainsWireless,L.P.v.FCC, 276 F.3d599,606(D.C.Cir.2002)(nostandingtoobjecttothe agencys refusal to sanction a third party); Sargeant, 130 F.3d at 1069 ([T]heinterestsMohwishproffersintheprosecutionof 7Nor does PETAs sincere and deep interest (Maj. Op. 11) in promoting the humane treatment of birds get it across the Article III threshold. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (Article III does not permit any group with a bona fide special interest in the laws enforcement to bring suit.); Gettmanv.DEA, 290 F.3d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Petitioners seem to believe that their commitment to their cause and the alleged importance of their cause is enough to confer Article III standing.It is not.).3Sincethosegeneralinterestsinthelawandits enforcementwillnotsuffice,PETAneededtoidentifya specific and concretelegally protected interest of its ownthat has been injured by thegovernments non-enforcementpractices. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. But neither PETA nor the majorityopinionhasdoneso.UnlikeHOMEsspecific informationalrightundertheFairHousingAct,absolutely nothingintheAnimalWelfareActinvestsPETAwithany righttohaveitscomplaintsacteduponoritsresource-allocations eased.That the Department of Agriculture accepts such private complaints without any apparent statutory requirement to do government officials and in seeing that the laws are enforcedare not legally cognizable within the framework of Article III.).3See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for SeparationofChurch&State,Inc.,454U.S.464,486 (1982)([S]tandingisnotmeasuredbytheintensityofthelitigantsinterest or the fervor of his advocacy.); FeldEntertainment, 659 F.3d at 24 ([A]n organizations abstract interest in a problem is insufficient to establish standing, no matter how longstanding the interestandnomatterhowqualifiedtheorganizationisin evaluating the problem.) (quotingSierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739).8so isnotenough.Thedeprivationofaproceduralright withoutsomeconcreteinterestthatisaffectedbythe deprivationaproceduralrightinvacuoisinsufficientto createArticleIIIstanding. Summersv.EarthIsland Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009).Thus, absent the ability todemonstrateadiscreteinjuryflowingfromthealleged violation, PETAcannotestablishstandingmerelyby asserting that the [agency] failed to process its complaint in accordance with law. Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1997).If PETA is not injured in any legally relevant sense by the governments failure to act on its complaints, how can its decisiontoincuradditionalexpensesinthewakeofthat failure be anything other than a self-chosen consequence of anygovernmentalnon-enforcementdecision? Icannot imaginethatSimonwouldhavecomeoutdifferentlyifthe Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization had just added an allegation that it had chosen to expend its own resources to shine a light on hospitals mistreatment of the indigent that theInternalRevenueServicestax decisionsallegedly tolerated.Nor, I presume, could Linda R.S. have gotten into court if she had just added to her complaint an allegationthat, absentprosecution,shewouldhavetoexpendherown resources hiring a private investigator or asking the employerofherchildsfather togarnishhiswages.ArticleIIIs requirement of aconcrete injury to a legally protected interest demands more than just creative pleading.Underscoring the point, the Supreme Court recently held that, where concerns about governmental action that was not targetedattheplaintiffsdidnotconstituteanArticleIII injury,the costsvoluntarilyincurredinresponseto those concerns could not fill in the gap either. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1152. Surely that case would not have been decided 9differently if Amnesty International had simply alleged that it hadto divert its resources to educatethe public about how to protect themselves against government surveillance.Finally,PETAscontentionthatitsresourceswillbe better allocated if its complaints are acted upon runs into a fierce separation-of-powersheadwind.Theclaimofinjury here is simply that, given the Executive Branchs chosen level of enforcement under the Animal Welfare Act,PETA mustexpendmore resourcesthanitwouldotherwisehavetoin pursuit of its parallel goals.SeeMaj. Op. 15 (if the suit is successful,PETAwillnolongerhavetoexpendasmanyresources pursuing other avenues) (emphasis added) (quoting Kerr Decl. 14).While this case alleges non-enforcement, if standing exists here, then there is no meaningful reason why suit could not be brought every time an organization believes thatthegovernmentisnotenforcingthelawasmuch,as often,orasvigorouslyasitwouldlike.Andmaybea differentgroupcouldsueifitbelievesthelawisbeing enforcedtoomuchandsochoosestouseitsresourcesto advise the public about the harms of over-enforcement.ArticleIIIsstandingrequirement is meanttohelp[] preservetheConstitutionsseparationofpowersand demarcatestheproperandproperlylimitedroleofthe courts in a democratic society. Coalition for Mercury-Free Drugsv.Sebelius,671F.3d1275,12781279(D.C.Cir. 2012) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498).Yet hinging judicial superintendenceofExecutiveenforcementdecisionsonnothing more than a groups unadorned interest in the laws purposes, combinedwithjustadashofvolitionalcounter-expenditures,wouldmakethecourtsvirtuallycontinuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.Lujan,504U.S.at577(quotingAllenv.Wright,468U.S. 737, 760(1984)).10Failure to Produce Enforcement ReportsPETAsclaimofinformationalinjuryshouldnotopen theArticleIIIdooreither,foronesimplereason:Evenas alleged by PETA, there is no suggestion that anything in the Animal Welfare Act or any regulation gives PETA any legalright to such information or reports.PETA thus may claim thatitsresource-allocationdecisionsareinjuredbythe absence of such reports from the agency; but that injury is not evencolorablytiedtoalegallyprotectedinterest in obtaining that information, as Lujan requires, 504 U.S. at 560. To be sure, the majority opinions contrary determination justwalksthepaththatcircuitprecedent hastrodden.In ActionAlliance,thiscourtheldthatagrouppromotingthe interestsoftheelderly hadorganizationalstandingbecause the Secretary of Health and Human Services failed to apply to herDepartmentthesameagediscriminationregulations applied to other federal agencies.This court reasoned that, if the Department had followedthe same information-disclosure regulationsasotheragencies,thenit wouldhaveproduced more information, which the plaintiff group could then use to refer its members to services or to provide age-discrimination counseling.Action Alliance, 789 F.2dat 935, 937.Action Alliance was perhaps justifiable on its facts.Asin Havens itself, the information sought was arguably required to be disclosed at least by regulation, and was being put to a specific use by the plaintiffs seeking to protect the legal rights of the elderly individuals they served.See Cass R. Sunstein,Informational Regulation and Informational Standing:Akinsand Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 664 (1999).Butin subsequentcases,wehavereliedonAction Alliance for the proposition that organizational standing may exist more broadly whenever information is essential to the 11injured organizationsactivities,andwherethelackofthe informationwillrenderthoseactivitiesinfeasible.Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy(EspyII),29F.3d720,724(D.C.Cir.1994)(extending a similar rule to the Animal Welfare Act); Animal LegalDefenseFund,Inc.v.Espy (EspyI),23F.3d496, 501502 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same).4This case, however, goes even further. At least in earlier cases, there was something somewhere in the law that at least required the agency to generate the reports in the first instance(even assuming that would be enough to create a private right to such information). In our Animal Welfare Act cases, for example,theSecretarywasrequiredtoincludethe informationatissueinanannualreportsubmittedto Congress. SeeEspyI, 23 F.3d at 501.5In this case, PETA points to nothing that requires the Department to generate the enforcement reports that it finds so helpful, let alone a legal 4We have also concluded, in the cases brought under the Animal WelfareAct, thattheorganizationalleginginformationalinjury failed to establish that the zone-of-interests test had been met.SeeEspyII,29F.3dat724;EspyI,23F.3dat502504.Butthe government has not raised that challenge to PETAs suit here. That would not in any event affect the jurisdictional analysis, because the Supreme Court has since made clear that the zone-of-interests analysisisnotastandinginquiryrequiredbyArticleIII. SeeLexmarkIntl,Inc.v.StaticControlComponents,Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 & n.4(2014).5That requirement has since been eliminated.See Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-66, 3003,109 Stat. 707; see also 7 U.S.C. 2155 codifications note.12basisforassertinganenforceableprivaterighttosuch information. NordoesPETAclaimtobeusingthe information to educate other individuals who are protected by the statute about their legal rights.Thatpressestheconceptofinformationalstandingfarbeyond anything the Supreme Court itself has recognized. InFECv.Akins, 524U.S.11(1998), theSupremeCourt recognized a claim of informational injury when:(i) on the plaintiffs view of the law, thegovernment ora third partywasrequired bystatute tomakepublic theinformationat issue, id. at21,and(ii)theplaintiffsinterestinthe informationwas directlyrelatedtotheexerciseofthe personsownindividualrighttovote,themostbasicof political rights, id. at 2425.We have thus recognized that [o]nly if the statute grants a plaintiff a concrete interest in the information sought will he be able to assert an injury in fact.Naderv.FEC, 725 F.3d 226, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2013).Absent such a statutory basis, we have held that the claim of informational standingfails.6At least we had until today.Furthermore, unlikeAkins where the claim was premised on a desiretohave informationabouta groupsroleinan electioninwhichtheplaintiffintendedtovote, PETAhas identified no concrete pieceofinformation intheagencys possession thatit isseeking,letalonethatithasanylegal rightto. Theagencywouldnotevenacquirethedesired information unless it were first to enforce the law as PETA 6See Feld Entertainment, 659 F.3d at 2324; see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 306 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (standing available at least where statute requires information to be publicly disclosed and plaintiff plausibly claims that the information would help it).13desires.But if PETA lacks Article III standing to require the agencytoenforcethelawagainstthirdparties,itsurely cannot get standing through the back-door route of claiming injury by theabsence of post-enforcement reports.To be sure, the Supreme Courts decision in Akins did not specificallydisplaceourprecedentfindingorganizational standing when the failure to provide information impinge[d] on the plaintiffs daily operations or [made] normal operations infeasible.Akinsv.FEC,101F.3d731,735(D.C.Cir. 1996),vacatedby524U.S.at29;CompetitiveEnterprise Institute, 901 F.2d at 122(similar). But as this case makes all tooclear,thebroadreachofourcaselawisgetting increasinglyhardtosquare withSupremeCourtprecedent handed down since Action Alliance.First, the notion that an organizations desire to supply * * * information to its members and the injury it suffers when the information is not forthcoming are without moresufficienttoestablishstandingrunsheadlongintothe obstacle of Sierra Club v. Morton.Foundation of EconomicTrends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 8485 (D.C. Cir. 1991).Sierra Club held that a groups mere interest in a problem could not suffice for standing purposes, 405 U.S. at 739, and [i]t is notapparentwhyanorganizationsdesireforinformation aboutthesame*** problemshouldrestonadifferent footing, Foundation of Economic Trends, 943 F.2dat 85; see Akins, 101 F.3d at 746 (Sentelle, J ., dissenting) (arguing that Action Alliance was inconsistent with Sierra Club).To the extent, then, that PETA has organized one of its many operations around disseminatinginformation to which it does not have a legal entitlement, I can see no sound basis for elevatingthegovernmentsfailuretofacilitatethose operations to the level of an Article III injury. Doing so just 14confuses an inconvenience withaninjuryinfacttoa legally protected interest, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.Second, PETA does not seek information that is in anywayconnectedtotheexerciseofarightconferredbythe Animal Welfare Act, akinto the linkage between information andvoting inAkin. PETAs purposeinseekingthis information appears to besimply to have the information for its own educational and promotional materials, so that it can conserveor redirect its own resources. But [t]o hold that a plaintiff can establish injury in fact merely by alleging that he has been deprived of the knowledge as to whether a violation ofthelawhasoccurredwhateverthepersonaluseit intends to make of that knowledgewould be tantamount to recognizingajusticiableinterestintheenforcementofthe law.Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418.Finally, itishardtoseehowthedoctrinewehave embracedcan practicallybecabined.[I]nformational injury,initsbroadestsense,existsdayinanddayout, wheneverfederalagenciesarenotcreatinginformationa member of the public would like to have. Foundationof EconomicTrends,943F.2dat85.IfPETAspositionis correct,anyorganizationcould,aspartofitsmissionto advanceenforcementofagivenlaw,begindisseminating information an agency chooses to publish, and thereby gainalegallyprotectedinterestinpreservingthatflowof information throughsomeformofinformationaladverse possession. Could an organizationdisseminate reports based on a U.S.AttorneysOfficespublicpressreleasesand consequently claim a justiciable interest in the enforcement of thefederalcriminalcode becauseitwouldgeneratemore press releases? Surely not.And why should the group status matteratall? SeeCommonCause, 108F.3dat417 ([S]tandingrequirementsapplywithnolessforcetosuits 15brought by organizational plaintiffs.). The same principles thatpreventanyindividualcapedcrusaderfromusingthe courtstovindicatehisorherviewsastotheproper enforcement of the laws should preclude the same gambit by a group of likeminded individuals.As for Batman or Wonder Woman, so too for the J ustice League.* * *At bottom, standing in this case is grounded on a claimed (i) protection from making voluntary resource choices when responding tothegovernmentsfailuretoenforcethelaw againstthirdparties,and(ii)informationgeneratedasa byproduct of the governments enforcement activities withoutany alleged statutory obligation to make it at all, let alone to makeit public.Ifind it mightydifficulttoseeany real daylightbetweenthat claimofstandingandthegrantofa justiciable interest in the enforcement of the law that we have long said Article III does not permit.