Persons Cases 5

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

FELICIANO, J. :

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Courtof Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wifeJanet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that

respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that themarriage be declared null and void.

1

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the ProvincialProsecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in theinstant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-foundedbelief that the absent spouse was already dead,"

2and second, Nolasco's attempt to

have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" tocircumvent the law on marriage.

3

During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had firstmet Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of hisship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived withrespondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's

hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contractexpired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose,Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of SanJose.

Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtainedanother employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in SanJose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondentreceived a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth tohis son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to returnhome. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his shipdocked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent tohis missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the addressof the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also

claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of JanetMonica.

On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later marriedJanet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. Heinsisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after theywere married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica'sdisappearance to the Philippine government authorities.

Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She

testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return toEngland even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982.When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique,respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of lifein San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade JanetMonica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, butwhen she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for herexpenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further claimed thatshe had no information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.

The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 thedispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of thePhilippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended byExecutive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declaresas presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, withoutprejudice to her reappearance.

4

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred indeclaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco hadfailed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent hadsufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had alreadydied.

The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition forReview where the following allegations are made:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's findingthat there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco thatJanet Monica Parker was already dead; and

2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court'sdeclaration that the petition was a proper case of the declaration ofpresumptive death under Article 41, Family Code.

5

The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolascohas a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead."

6

The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the FamilyCode which provides that:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the

subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unlessbefore the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse


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had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse presenthad a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under thecircumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the CivilCode, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under thepreceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summaryproceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration ofpresumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect

of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).

When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which itsuperseded,

7the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time

required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however,there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spousepresent to remarry.

8Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard

than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there beno news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered tobe deadand believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed deadunderArticle 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

9The Family Code, upon the other hand,

prescribes as "well founded belief"that the absentee is already deadbefore a petitionfor declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for thedeclaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutiveyears, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurredwhere there is danger of death under the circumstances laid downin Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that theabsentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for thedeclaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

10

Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11

Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failedto prove that he had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missingwife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.

United States v. Biasbas,12

is instructive as to degree of diligence required insearching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas wascharged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that hisfirst wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised duediligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:

While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerningthe whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made

such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife,who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securinginformation concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had asuspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the onlybasis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . .

13

In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted byrespondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is toosketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was alreadydead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's

departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of manymillions of inhabitants, to look for her there.

Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, didyou exert efforts to inquire the whereabouts ofyour wife?

A Yes, Sir.

Court:

How did you do that?

A I secured another contract with the ship and we

had a trip to London and I went to London to lookfor her I could not find her(sic).15

(Emphasissupplied)

Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool andthis casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court ofAppeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:

. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know thegeographical difference between London and Liverpool, for ahumble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one place in England, the port where his ship docked and where hefound Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave hometo visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque, wouldannounce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." Thisapparent error in naming of places of destination does not appearto be fatal.

16

is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, onone hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by theSolicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do notconsider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope ofsomehow bumping into one particular person there which is in effect what Nolascosays he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.

The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give anyinformation as to her personal background even after she had married respondent

17

too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said ofthe loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent

claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters,under unspecified circumstances.


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Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he hadinquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did notidentify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since theprosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kindof evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is notsynonymous with credibility.

18As noted before, there are serious doubts to

respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimonymerely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate withtheir common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.

Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime inJanuary 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique.However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when heallegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reachedSan Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker withoutinquiring about her parents and their place of residence.

19Also, respondent failed to

explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities inLondon and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of JanetMonica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult toregard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.

In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda,20

the Court stressed that:

. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity

the public is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and theparties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of anycontract they make. . . . .

21(Emphasis supplied)

By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient ofagreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, tocircumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent eventried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.

In In Re Szatraw,22

the Court warned against such collusion between the partieswhen they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legalmeans.

While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, formaternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed

to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration ofpresumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinarycontract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.

. . . Marriage is a special contractofpermanent union between aman and a woman entered into in accordance with law for theestablishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of thefamily and an inviolable social institution whose nature,consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subjectto stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the propertyrelations during the marriage within the limits provided by thisCode. (Emphasis supplied)

InArroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,23

the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in thepreservation of which the State bas the strongest interest; thepublic policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. InArticle II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth thefollowing basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family lifeand shall protect and strengthen the family as abasic autonomous social institution. . . .

The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of thePhilippines in Article 149:

The family, being the foundation of the nation, isa basic social institution which public policycherishes and protects. Consequently, familyrelations are governed by law and no custom,practice or agreement destructive of the familyshall be recognized or given effect.

24

In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required bylaw that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a courtorder declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990,

affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively deadis hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.Costs against respondent.


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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-8492. February 29, 1956.]

In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of: LOURDES G. LUKBAN,Petit ioner-Appellant , vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Opposi tor -Appellee.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .:

This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration thatPetitioner is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be

dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is notauthorized by law. After Petitioner had presented her evidence, the courtsustained the opposition and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.

Lourdes G. Lukban, Petitioner herein, contracted marriage with FranciscoChuidian on December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. OnDecember 27, of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarreland since then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her.She also inquired about him from his parents and friends but no one was able toindicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last knownaddress being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is already deadbecause he had been absent for more than twenty years, and because she

intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order thatshe may be relieved of any liability under the law.

We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in thecase of Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup., 243, wherein it was held that apetition for judicial declaration that Petitioners husband is presumed to be deadcannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declarationcannot be made in a special proceeding similar to the present, much less can thecourt determine the status of Petitioner as a widow since this matter must ofnecessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the court candeclare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed tobe dead. (Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st sup. 243).

The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot bemade in a proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case above-cited.

Thus, we there said that A judicial pronounc ement to that effect, even if final andexecutory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It isfor that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement ordeclaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which acompetent court has to pass . It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration thata person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in sevenyears, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannotreach the stage of finality or become final.

Appellantclaims that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in the presentproceedings because in the case of Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880, it wasdeclared that a special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establishthe status or right of a party, or a particular fact; but, as already said, thatremedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of thehusband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of death. Ifit can be satisfactorily proven that the husband is dead, the court would notcertainly deny a declaration to that effect as has been intimated in the case ofNicolas Szartraw, supra.

Appellantalso claims that the present petition can be entertained because article349 of the Revised Penal Code, in defining bigamy, provides that a personcommits that crime if he contracts a second marriage before the absent spousehas been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in theproper proceedings and, it is claimed, the present petition comes within thepurview of this legal provision. The argument is untenable for the words properproceedings used in said article can only refer to those authorized by law suchas those which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of adeceased person (Articles 390 and 391, new Civil Code). That such is the correctinterpretation of the provision in question finds support in the case of Jones vs.Hortiguela, 64 Phil., 179, wherein this Court made the following comment:

For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the formerspouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made inaccordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose toenable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of theestate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law

only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutiveyears at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not knowhis or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generallyreputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of thecelebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).

The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.


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Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,vs.

MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.

VITUG, J .:

On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels ofland with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife,herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.

Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been marriedto James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Boundsdisappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta weremarried eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorlysecured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.

On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a survivingsister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City,Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the DeceasedTeodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be interalia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between thelatter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous andthereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., beappointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that theinheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would havebeen settled.

Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage

with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, hiswhereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contractedher second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse ofTeodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.

On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointlySinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator andadministratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.

On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor ofpetitioner Antonia; it adjudged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitionerand against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas yCalisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate of TeodoricoCalisterio y Cacabelos.1

Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court ofAppeals, formulating that

1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code inthe instant case despite the fact that the controversy arose when theNew Civil Code was the law in force.

2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failureof the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of her first

spouse.

3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugalproperty of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased TeodoricoCalisterio.

4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legalheir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.

5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration shouldbe granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant.2

On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M.

Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from isREVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring asfollows:

(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;

(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, SanFrancisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugalpartnership property with the concomitant obligation of thepartnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate asof the time of the taking;

(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is

entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico'ssister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to theother half;

(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence ofMarietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico'sestate, and if so found competent and willing, that she beappointed as such; otherwise, to determine who among thedeceased's next of kin is competent and willing to become theadministrator of the estate.

3

On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motionfor reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present appeal.Petitioner asseverates:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_136467_2000.html#fnt1


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It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appealsreversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court is not in accordwith the law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.4

It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage betweenthe deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would bedeterminative of her right as a surviving spouse.

The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta wassolemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not

the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of theFamily Code

5 itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it

thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordancewith the Civil Code or other laws.

Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 ofthe New Civil Code which provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during thelifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other thansuch first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at thetime of the second marriage without the spouse present having news ofthe absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absentfor less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believedto be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting suchsubsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according toarticles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any ofthe three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during thelifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage isfirst annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from theabove rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptionalcases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absenteespouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. 6Badfaith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing ofwrong it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty throughsome motive of interest or ill will.7The Court does not find these circumstancesto be here extant.

A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary8 as

long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that themarriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, tobe deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It followsthat the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing thesecond marriage.

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamousmarriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must

concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absentfor four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under thecircumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time ofdisappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absentspouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declarationof presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present caninstitute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The lastcondition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicialintervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 419, in relation to

Article 40,10of the Family Code.

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's firsthusband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for morethan eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with thedeceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contractedduring the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstandingthe absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having beenadduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains tothem in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the propertyshould rightly be divided in two equal portions one portion going to thesurviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. Thesuccessional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate11of thedeceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces(the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothersand sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews andnieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence ofuncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeedin their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews andnieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents whopredecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erredin granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment,successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antoniawho herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased

brother.1wphi1WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of thedispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled,along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is herebyDECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely topetitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
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7/14


SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION), and ALAN B.

ALEGRO, Respondents.D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J .:

On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptivedeath of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.

In an Order1dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May

30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be publishedonce a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, anewspaper of general circulation in the Province of Samar, andthat a copy be posted in the courts bulletin board for at least three weeks before

the next scheduled hearing. The court also directed that copies of the order beserved on the Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan,through counsel, and that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alancomplied with all the foregoing jurisdictional requirements.

2

On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss3 the petition, which was,however, denied by the court for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules ofCourt.

4

At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.5 He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Leaarrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of theirhouse. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would bebetter for her to go back to her parents.6 Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that,when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but whenhe arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found .7Alan thoughtthat Lea merely went to her parents house in Bliss, Sto. Nio, Catbalogan,Samar.

8However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.

Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to thehouse of Leas parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was notthere. He also went to the house of Leas friend, Janeth Bautista, at BarangayCanlapwas, but he was informed by Janettes brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza,that Janeth had left for Manila.

9 When Alan went back to the house of his

parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their housebut that she left without notice.10Alan sought the help ofBarangayCaptain Juan

Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from hisfriends of Leas whereabouts but to no avail.

11

Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but hismother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Leamay come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed.

12 However, Lea did not show up.

Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotaswhere Janeth, Leas friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janethtold him that she had not seen her.13 He failed to find out Leas whereabouts

despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxidriver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. Hereturned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.

14

On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local policestation.15The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001.16Alanalso reported Leas disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)on July 9, 2001.

17

BarangayCaptain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declaredthat on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed byhis house and he told Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea haddisappeared. He had not seen Lea in the barangay ever since.

18 Leas father,

who was his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not

know where Lea was.19

After Alan rested his case, neither the Off ice of the Provincial Prosecutor nor theSolicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.

On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The falloof the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioners absent spouseROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for thepurpose of the petitioners subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the FamilyCode of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of thesaid absent spouse.

SO ORDERED.20

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which renderedjudgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the RTC.

21The CA cited

the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.22

The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorariof the CAs decision alleging thatrespondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief thatLea was already dead.23 It averred that the respondent failed to exercisereasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admittedthat Leas father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been to their housebut left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported hiswifes disappearance to the local police and also to the NBI only after thepetitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as

gleaned from the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locateLea. Finally, the petitioner averred:
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8/14

In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the FamilyCode for the declaration of presumptive death of ones spouse, the degree of duediligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locatingthe whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There havebeen times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by partieswishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are aliveand well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages x x xdeclared nulland voidunder Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 ofthe Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature of its

proceedings.

It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic socialinstitution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is aninviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect fromdissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondents failure to prove that hehad a well-founded belief that his wife is alreadydead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for hismissing wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have beendenied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals.

24

The petition is meritorious.

Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of aprevious marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of thesubsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutiveyears and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spousewas already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under thecircumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, anabsence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the precedingparagraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as providedin this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, withoutprejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.25

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absentand that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already deadbefore the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law doesnot define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "esmenester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales ."26

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. Itmay be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend,even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determinationprobably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character,habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usuallycontrol the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as ittends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their

intentions,

27

competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest togoodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absentspouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whetheror not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absentspouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great manycircumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absentspouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.

28

Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the

present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,

29

the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find itimpossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is alsothe maxim that "men readily believe what they wish to be true."

In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than BarangayCaptain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista orNelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiriesabout Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondentadmitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on February14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she leftwithout notice.

The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he

chided her for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and toldher that it would be better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the lifeof a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned.Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugalabode because of her resentment to the chastisement she received from himbarely a month after their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondentfailed to make inquiries from his parents-in- law regarding Leas whereaboutsbefore filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of therespondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in- law about Leaswhereabouts considering that Leas father was the owner of Radio DYMS.

The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities andthe NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the

OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that hehad a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouseRosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisionof the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SETASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch27, is ORDERED to DISMISSthe respondents petition.

SO ORDERED.
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Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,vs.FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or

FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, andTEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J. :

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnizedduring the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15,2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on thepleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1of the Court of

Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment2of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery ofproperty, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land totheir compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots areparticularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of theCourt of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specificallyreserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. ofAlabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an areaof Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as anon-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. ofMuntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 byLot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S,points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Roadwidening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY

(130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion ofLot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang,Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River;and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containingan area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan.Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, conla parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un puntomarcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde elpunto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas,continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROSCUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon.Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, conla parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un puntoMarcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el

punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas,continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROSCUADRADOS.

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During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. Theagreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De DiosCarlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name ofTeofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by theRegistry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds ofMakati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad andtheir son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 wereregistered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two(2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued bythe Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City,docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and causedthe approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the partiesacknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the firstparcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing theremaining land of the first parcel between them.
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Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,42,331 square meters of the second

parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-squaremeter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed onAugust 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted thesupplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under thecontracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135,against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a)declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo andrespondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license.He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptivefather of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondentFelicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation ofthe certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the propertiescovered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as

proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplarydamages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the materialaverments of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of detailsregarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo.Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased TeofiloCarlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also askedthat their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, begranted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summaryjudgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace whosolemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth ofrespondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidadwere designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the groundof irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodgedhis own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the LocalCivil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondentTeofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony ofrespondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony,

respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court itsreport and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion forSummary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion forSummary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is herebyrendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and TeofiloCarlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the MarriageCertificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisitemarriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum ofP18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date offiling of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, lessthe portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No.139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of

Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiffherein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff anddefendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of MakatiCity to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issueanother title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff anddefendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendantSandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register ofDeeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant

Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register ofDeeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on hisclaim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees,and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, interalia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary

judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II asnot an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
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WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SETASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to thecourt of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court aquo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards.The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial

court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "torecover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summaryjudgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that nogenuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of thecase cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree ofannulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practicallyamount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards havetraditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter ofdissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, thatappellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as

husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is thevery means by which the latter i s sought to be deprived of her participation in theestate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into thecircumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by whichthe court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that thematerial facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should alwaysbe proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails totender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of theadverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct

judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage orfor legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shallalways be proved." (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summaryjudgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the findingof the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may bereadily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites ofmarriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to

Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect theserial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing themarriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, althoughirregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth ofevidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of theexistence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement inthe affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace whoofficiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issuedat Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage

contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but thenumber of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in themarriage contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filledup the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may haveoverlooked the same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of theconsidered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement aswell as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in atrial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence ofmarriage - is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither shouldappellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proofthat the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of themarriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt shouldbe resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes thelegitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejectionof the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father onthe basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements.

Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding thelegitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is theillegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose thepossibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the sameor, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee'sbare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from anindigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient tosupport what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from hisputative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements,appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation ofTeofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that,during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant theuse of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial courtcould have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order tobe able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellantTeofilo Carlos II.

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On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of theponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under theDecision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsiderationunder the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugnedmarriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed agrave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despitethe fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplatedand intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance nottheretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner

probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this HonorableCourt;
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2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieuthereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for furtherproceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appealscommitted a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, insteadof Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieuthereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for furtherproceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appealscommitted grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, madefindings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwisecommitted misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.

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(Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void abinitio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefitof a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not aspouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved.Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So isconfession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19

10

of the Revised Rules of Court,which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender anissue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party'spleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on suchpleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, thematerial facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governingsummary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of theRule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewiseconsidered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summaryjudgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the findingof the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x

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But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA wascorrect in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on

judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declarationof absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as " Rule on Declaration of AbsoluteNullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages ," the question on theapplication of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity orannulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid downby the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003

12is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of thecase. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as tomatters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage mustbe proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of

judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13

In thatcase, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application ofsummary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage ordeclaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicableto all kinds of actions.

14(Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful rightand duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by thedeclaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The Stateshould have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the

judgment was rendered.15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecutingattorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutorsees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is nosuppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be

presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor tointervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression orfabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General willensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings fordeclaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression ofevidence.

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II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solelyby the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced beforethe effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during theeffectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment ofVoidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not befiled by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of thespouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriagemay be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition

for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule isenlightening, viz.:
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Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidablemarriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitioncannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file thepetition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the deathof their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage ofthe spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of theestate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, theconcern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution .

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(Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of ahealthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and howto build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their maritallife. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play.Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but

Persons Cases 5

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